Dissenting Report of the Australian Labor Party
Introduction
1.1
Labor Senators have grave concerns about elements of this Bill and
cannot support it in its current form.
1.2
In particular, Labor is concerned about:
-
Schedule 1, which seeks to provide legal authority for the Government’s
policy of turning back asylum seeker boats on the high seas;
-
The provisions in Schedule 2 which seek to reintroduce the failed
Temporary Protection Visa;
-
The Government’s failure to honour its commitment to the Palmer United Party
to create the Safe Haven Enterprise Visa, which was to provide a pathway to
permanent residency;
-
Schedule 4, which will deprive asylum seekers of the opportunity to have
their applications for protection reviewed fairly;
-
Schedule 5, which attempts to displace Australia’s international
obligations under the Refugee Convention and replace them with a codified
version of the Government’s preferred interpretation of those obligations; and
-
The provisions in Schedule 7 which will abolish the requirement to decide
protection visa applications within 90 days and to report on compliance with
that requirement.
Amendments to Maritime
Powers
1.3
The Government has argued that Schedule 1 of the Bill provides legal
authority for its turn backs policy.
1.4
The Australian Labor Party maintains its longstanding concern about the
secretive 'on water' operations carried out by the Government in relation to
turning back asylum seeker vessels. The Government refuses to tell the
Australian people precisely what is involved in turn backs. We have even
witnessed the absurd situation on occasions where the Immigration Minister
refuses to admit that a boat has been intercepted despite widespread reporting
that this is the case.
1.5
Moreover, we maintain our concerns about the safety at sea of Australian
Customs and Navy personnel involved in conducting these operations. In
2011 Admiral Ray Griggs stated before Senate Estimates that 'there are
obviously risks involved in this process'. We are yet to hear an explanation
from the Australian Government about what, if anything, has changed to now make
these operations safe. The Australian Government should not lightly place
our service personnel in harm’s way.
1.6
The Australian Labor Party is also concerned that the Government’s turn
backs policy is harming Australia’s vital relationship with Indonesia. We
have seen turn backs result in incursions into Indonesian territorial waters on
more than 6 occasions. The new Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko
Widodo, has issued a stern warning to the Australian Prime Minister about his
failure to respect Indonesian sovereignty.
1.7
That said, Schedule 1 is less about legislating for turn backs than it
is about seeking to undermine a specific case before the High Court, namely CPCF
v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (CPCF case)). Schedule 1
seeks to address each of the points which have been raised in the CPCF Case.
1.8
Labor Senators believe that a pre-emptive strike on an existing High
Court case is an inappropriate basis for legislative action. Indeed it is
important that the High Court be allowed to do its job and apply the rule of
law.
1.9
The High Court should be allowed to determine the legality of the
Government’s turn backs policy as implemented on the basis of existing law. If
the turn backs policy is shown to be totally lawful that is important for
public confidence in the Government and its actions. Equally if aspects of the
turn backs policy are found to be unlawful it is important that this be a
transparent part of the public record.
1.10
In the latter event the Government might then come to the Parliament and
seek legislative remedial action in respect of those areas which might be found
to be unlawful. The Parliament can then consider its position in light of this
legal verdict.
1.11
However, the current scatter gun approach in Schedule 1, put before the
Parliament on the assumption of a negative court ruling, but without the Parliament
having the benefit of considering such a ruling, is deeply inappropriate.
1.12
Accordingly the Labor Senators oppose Schedule 1.
Temporary Protection Visa
1.13
Labor Senators oppose the provisions in Schedule 2 of the Bill which
seek to reinstate the failed TPV. The Australian Labor Party has a well-established
policy against TPVs.
1.14
Temporary Protection Visas suspend asylum seekers in a prolonged state
of uncertainty that leads to fear, anxiety, financial hardship and an inability
to move forward in building a new life in safety for themselves and their
families in Australia and prevent them contributing to the community.
1.15
When the Parliament rejected Immigration Minister Scott Morrison’s
policy of bringing back Temporary Protection Visas in December of last year,
Scott Morrison, in an act of petulance, stopped processing people. Labor
believes the correct Government response should be to start processing people
without delay and managing its detention facilities in a safe, humane and
dignified manner.
1.16
Any claim that TPVs serve as a deterrent to people seeking to risk their
life and come to Australia by sea is patently wrong. Australia was taken off
the table with the Regional Resettlement Arrangement introduced by Labor in
July of last year. This issue has absolutely nothing to do with any person
that may seek to come here by boat. It relates to people already in detention that
arrived before 19 July last year. For that group of people, Labor believes we
need to have a sensible policy that sees them processed, and if they are found
to be genuine refugees then they should be allowed to settle in Australia.
During the use of TPVs by the Howard Government more than 90 per cent of
refugees initially granted TPVs under the Howard Government were eventually
granted permanent protection because their situation in their country of origin
had not changed. This underscores that the vast bulk of those seeking
protection will not have their situation change.
Safe Haven Enterprise Visa
1.17
The Australian Labor Party has offered in-principle support for the Safe
Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) and we are disappointed that the Government has
failed to deliver the SHEV through this Bill.
1.18
The commitment to deliver the SHEV was a key component of Mr Morrison’s
agreement with the Leader of the Palmer United Party, Mr Clive Palmer, to
support the reintroduction of TPVs.
1.19
The Minister for Immigration has repeatedly claimed that this Bill would
give life to a new visa to be known as a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. For
example:
(a)
In his letter to Mr Palmer of 24 September 2014, the Minister claimed –
A new Safe Haven Enterprise Visa will
be introduced which will be open to applications by those who have been
processed under the legacy caseload, and are found to be refugees. (Emphasis
added.)
(b)
In a statement to the House of Representatives on 25 September 2014 the
Minister contended –
Consistent with this Government's
principles of rewarding enterprise and its belief in a strong
regional Australia, the Safe Haven Enterprise Visa will
be created. (Emphasis added.)
(c)
In a media release of 25 September 2014 the Minister asserted –
A further temporary visa, a Safe
Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV)—where holders work in a designated self-nominated
regional area to encourage filling of job vacancies—will be introduced
as an alternative to a TPV. (Emphasis added.)
1.20
Unfortunately Mr Morrison has failed to deliver on this commitment. The
text of the Bill reveals that the Minister has misled Mr Palmer, the Parliament
and the Australian people.
1.21
The Bill does not in fact give legal effect to Safe Haven Enterprise Visas
(SHEVs) as a new visa class. The most that the Division of the Bill called
'Safe Haven Enterprise Visas' does is to introduce a new subsection 35A(3)
into the Migration Act 1958, which provides as follows:
(3A) There is a class of temporary visas to be known as
safe haven enterprise visas.[1]
1.22
It provides no further details, let alone the criteria for the visa or
the conditions that apply to it.
1.23
All it does is to name the class of visa that the Minister may bring
into effect in the future by promulgating an appropriate regulation.
'Naming' the Safe Haven Enterprise Visa in the Bill has no substantive legal
effect. The SHEV provisions which currently appear in the Bill are nothing
more than legislative window dressing.
1.24
Extensive provisions are included in the legislation to make clear that,
despite the SHEV being named in the Bill, no such substantive visa is actually
brought into effect and nobody can apply to obtain a SHEV until and unless the
Minister issues regulations to bring the SHEV to life.[2]
There is nothing to compel the Minister to ever promulgate such regulations;
accordingly the SHEV might never actually come into existence. This is because:
-
despite being 'named' in the Bill, the Minister is not required
to issue a regulation to prescribe criteria to give substantive effect to the
Safe Haven Enterprise Visa;[3]
and
-
unless and until regulations are issued to prescribe criteria for the
making of a valid application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa and for the
granting of the Safe Haven Enterprise Visa, non-citizens cannot make an
application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa.[4]
1.25
Further, the Government has failed to undertake the detailed policy
development necessary to make the SHEV a reality. As the evidence given by the
Department during the course of the public hearing made clear, the work that
must be done to develop these criteria and conditions has not advanced much beyond
the brief description of the SHEV contained in the Minister’s media release and
his remarks at the related press conference. The Department has 'attended a
meeting' of public servants and conducted 'first consultations' with States and
Territories, but these have been conducted only on the basis of the limited
information that the Minister has made public.[5]
There appears still to be high levels of doubt about many aspects of this visa,
including:
-
what pathway there will be to other visas (an issue that is
discussed in more detail below);
-
what 'regional Australia' means; and
-
what social services will disqualify a holder of a SHEV from
applying for other visas.[6]
1.26
In relation to the last point for example, the Department was unable to
tell the committee whether receipt of family benefits—including by women with
newborn children—would prevent them from applying for further visas to stay in
Australia. This was because the Minister was yet to give that detail of
information to the Department.[7]
1.27
Motivated by the paucity of publicly-available information about the
criteria and conditions that will relate to the SHEV, the committee asked the
Department to provide (on notice) 'more information about precisely what the
government is looking at putting into the regulations'.[8]
In response, the committee was provided with a fact sheet that provides no more
information than was already publicly available.[9]
1.28
This confirms Labor's suspicions that nobody really knows, at this
stage, what the SHEV will look like, if it comes into existence at all.
1.29
It is curious that the Government is progressing the policy development
to support the SHEV at such an unusually slow pace. It could be inferred that
the Government does not genuinely intend to create the SHEV, despite its
commitment to Mr Palmer, and that once it has secured the votes necessary to
reinstate the TPV it will quietly abandon its promise to create the SHEV.
1.30
The Parliament and the Australian people should not have to wait until
April 2015, which is the earliest date the Government says it will produce the
necessary regulations, to discover whether the Government will break its
promise to Mr Palmer.
1.31
Even if the Government does introduce the SHEV, two of the known aspects
of it are very concerning; namely that very few people will get them and that
it will be very difficult for those people to establish themselves in the
community.
1.32
Labor supports, in principle, the idea of SHEVs. Labor agrees with
Mr Palmer that, if properly established, SHEVs would be 'a win for
refugees', who would be able to 'protect themselves and work towards
establishing themselves in an Australian community', and 'a win for regional
Australia, which will benefit from the additional work resources in communities
where there is a labour shortage, thereby increasing the viability of these
areas'.[10]
1.33
Labor is very concerned, however, about the public statements that
Mr Morrison has made that suggest that:
-
only a very small number of people will be granted SHEVs; and
-
it will be nearly impossible for those who are granted SHEVs to gain
access to other visas and thereby remain in Australia.
1.34
In relation to the first point: when a journalist suggested to
Mr Morrison that it was possible that 'a very small number' of people
would be granted SHEVs and would satisfy the conditions that would enable them
to apply for other visas, Mr Morrison replied:
It's very possible.[11]
1.35
In relation to the second point, Mr Morrison said that
...these benchmarks [that will need to be met before people on
safe haven enterprise visas can apply for other visas] are very high. Our
experience on resettlement for people in this situation would mean that this is
a very high bar to clear. Good luck to them if they choose to do that and if
they achieve it...There is an opportunity here but I think it is a very limited
opportunity and we will see how it works out. But at the end of the day, no-one
is getting a permanent protection visa.[12]
1.36
If Mr Morrison only grants a SHEVs to 'a very small number' of
refugees, and if Mr Morrison sets 'a very high bar' for those refugees to
be able to stay in Australia, the safe haven enterprise visa will not create
the 'win, win situation' envisaged by Mr Palmer and supported by the
Australian Labor Party. The SHEV will not be the 'stepping stone for refugees
to make a positive contribution to Australian society' that Mr Palmer
agreed to.[13]
1.37
What is more likely is that—if it ever comes into existence—the SHEV
will be a TPV in all but name because it will not provide a realistic pathway
to permanency.
Limiting appeal rights in
the refugee assessment process
1.38
The Australian Labor Party opposes Schedule 4 of the Bill, which
seeks to deprive asylum seekers the opportunity to have their applications for
protection assessed fairly and replace it with a bureaucratic agency subject to
the direction of the Executive Government.
1.39
Schedule 4 seeks to remove access to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT)
for certain asylum seekers who the Government have given the Orwellian name 'Fast
Track Applicants'. In lieu of the RRT, asylum seekers who have their
application for protection denied will be directed to a new 'Immigration
Assessment Authority' (IAA).
1.40
The IAA will conduct only a limited merits review of the decision to
deny the application for protection 'on the papers', which fails to meet the
basic standards of justice. Unsuccessful asylum seekers will not have an
opportunity to appear before the IAA to argue their case; the review will be conducted
by a bureaucrat in a closed office. Asylum seekers will not even have the
opportunity to make written submissions. Asylum seekers will not have an
opportunity to be notified of adverse findings about them or respond to those
findings. They will be denied the right to legal representation. There are no
prescribed grounds for the review conducted by the IAA; it is entirely at the
discretion of the reviewer.
1.41
Furthermore, the IAA lacks the institutional independence from the
Executive Government which is a touchstone of fair and credible merits review. IAA
reviewers will not be employed by an independent statutory authority such as
the RRT or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Rather, IAA reviewers will be
regular public servants employed under the Public Service Act 1999. In
addition, in performing reviews they will be required to comply with Practice
Directions and Guidelines imposed by their superiors.
1.42
The proposed IAA is a pale imitation of the RRT which falls drastically
short of the basic principles of fairness. Asylum seekers will not be afforded
natural justice. The basic principles of fair and reasonable administrative
decision-making will be abandoned. The open and transparent review process
offered by the RRT will be replaced with a team of bureaucrats sitting in a
closed office in the dark corners of a Government building. The institutional
independence of the RRT will be substituted for a new bureaucratic agency
obliged to act at the behest of the Executive Government.
1.43
Even more concerning is the fact that the Bill seeks to give the
Government the unfettered and unreviewable power to use non-disallowable
legislative instruments to subject any person to this atrocious system
and, what is more, to exclude any person from it and leave them without
any form of merits review whatsoever. This flies in the face of the
time-honoured traditions of the rule of law.
1.44
The IAA is a truly Orwellian proposal. It amounts to a 'trust us, we’re
the Government' approach to justice. The rights and obligations of asylum
seekers should not be at the mercy of the Executive Government. Rather, asylum
seekers ought to be afforded a fair, independent, transparent and credible
forum for merits review. Accordingly, Labor Senators oppose Schedule 4 of
the Bill.
Displacing Australia’s
obligations under the Refugee Convention
1.45
The Australian Labor Party opposes the provisions in Schedule 5
which seeks to displace Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention
and replace them with a codified version of the Abbott Government’s subjective
interpretation of those obligations.
1.46
This is an alarming proposal. The Refugee Convention provides a
well-established framework for determining whether an asylum seeker is entitled
to protection, consistent with international law. It is unnecessary to displace
our international obligations with a codified version of the Government’s
subjective interpretation of what those obligations ought to be.
1.47
It is also strongly undesirable. The Abbott Government cannot be trusted
to draft a Code which would faithfully implement Australia’s obligations under
the Refugee Convention. The majority report outlines seven ways in which
submitters to this inquiry believe that the proposed definition violates the
Refugee Convention. Even if the Government acted in good faith, there is a
significant risk that the attempted codification would inadvertently omit
elements of the Refugee Convention or fail to accurately transfer them from the
Convention to the Code.
1.48
Even if the Abbott Government could be trusted to faithfully produce a
codification of the Refugee Convention, it is doubtful that the attempt to
displace our international obligations would be effective. Australia has an English
common law legal system. It is an inherent component of the common law system
that courts in one jurisdiction will apply precedents from courts in other
jurisdictions when interpreting legislation. This comity is a great strength of
the common law.
1.49
Accordingly, it is doubtful that Australian courts would cease to
consider international precedents when interpreting the codification proposed
by the Government in Schedule 5 of the Bill. The codification proposal is
accordingly both an undesirable and futile exercise.
1.50
The dangers inherent in attempting to replace the Refugee Convention
with the Abbott Government’s preferred interpretation of the Convention
obligations are demonstrated by the concerning 'modification' principle
proposed by the Government.
1.51
Proposed section 5J(3) of the Bill will provide that an asylum seeker is
not entitled to protection if they could 'modify' their behaviour so as to
avoid persecution. The Opposition is concerned that the 'modification'
principle could operate inhumanely.
1.52
For example:
-
Should a person who has fled his or her country of origin after being
charged with apostasy for converting to Christianity be expected to renounce
his or her new religion, conceal it or cease to practise his or her new faith?
-
Should an activist such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai,
who fights against the Taliban for the right of girls to obtain an education 'modify
her behaviour' and accept oppression on the basis of her gender?
-
Should a person of a particular race, ethnicity or nationality conceal
this characteristic and feign belonging to the dominant race, ethnicity or
nationality in the area which they reside, so as to avoid persecution?
-
Should LGBTI refugees adopt a heterosexual identity or conceal their
true sexual orientation or gender identity? Note that some commentators
continue to claim that homosexuality can be 'cured' and that it is not an
innate, immutably personal characteristic?
1.53
The reasonableness of expecting a person to 'modify' his or her
behaviour to avoid persecution in any particular circumstances is ambiguous.
The Bill fails to expressly rule out expecting a person to 'modify' their
behaviour to avoid persecution in the above circumstances. Labor Senators find
this to be absolutely unacceptable.
Power to cap visas
1.54
Schedule 7 of the Bill addresses the decision in Plaintiff
S297/2013 v MIBP [2014] HCA 24 to make clear that the Minister has the
power to place a cap on the number of protection visas granted in a programme
year.
1.55
The ability for the Minister to cap the number of visas issued within
any visa category is an important mechanism in managing Australia’s migration
system. This applies equally to the management of protection visas.
1.56
However, the Abbott Government’s attempt to prevent, by capping, almost
the entirety of the last group of 6000 asylum seekers, for whom the bar was
lifted under the former Labor Government, from being granted a protection visa
was not about managing the business of the system but rather about preventing
Permanent Protection Visas from ever being granted. This was an abuse of
process which was struck down by the High Court.
1.57
The Australian Labor Party will not allow the provisions of Schedule 7
to allow the Government to undermine the High Court and prevent the relevant
cohort of asylum seekers from pursuing their application for a Permanent
Protection Visa.
90 day rule
1.58
Schedule 7 seeks to abolish the requirement to decide protection visa
applications within 90 days and to report on the meeting of that requirement.
1.59
Reporting on the 90 day rule has been an important accountability
measure in ensuring that the Government operates in a timely way in assessing
protection applications.
1.60
At the end of Labor’s period in office about half of all protection
applications were decided within 90 days. However, the most recent report
(1 March 2014–30 June 2014) indicated only 14 per cent of cases were
now being determined within the 90 day period.
1.61
The Abbott Government is obsessed with secrecy. Labor Senators will not
countenance the Government’s efforts to further reduce transparency and
accountability. We oppose any attempt to water down the 90-day rule.
Conclusion
1.62
The Australian Labor Party has serious concerns about elements of the
proposed Bill. The Bill seeks to undermine a single High Court case, namely the
CPCF Case. It seeks to resurrect the failed TPV, but fails to deliver on
its promise to the Palmer United Party to establish the SHEV. The Bill is
designed to deprive asylum seekers of the opportunity to have their
applications for protection fairly reviewed, by replacing the RRT which a
bureaucratic agency which fails to meet the basic standards of justice. It
attempts to displace Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, and
replace it with a flawed codification of the Abbott Government’s preferred
interpretation of those obligations. The Bill also makes questionable changes
to the Minister’s power to cap visas, and seeks to further entrench a culture
of secrecy within Australia’s migration framework by abolishing the 90 day
rule. In these circumstances, Labor Senators cannot support the Bill in
its current form.
Senator Jacinta
Collins
Deputy Chair
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