Chapter 4
Infrastructure Investment, Environmental Works and Measures, and Constraints
Management and Removal
Introduction
4.1
This chapter examines the use of infrastructure investment and environmental
works and measures as part of the government's strategy to return water to the
Basin system.
4.2
In particular, it focuses on recent evidence received about the
contribution of up to 650 GL/y of the 2750 GL/y reduction in take to be achieved
through environmental works and measures. In doing so, the chapter presents
evidence about the uncertainty created by this strategy at the present time,
but also the general preference for environmental works and measures of some
Basin stakeholders over further government buybacks of water entitlements.
4.3
In addition, the chapter examines the government's announcement to
return 450 GL/y to the Basin through new on‑farm efficiency works, in
addition to the 2750 GL/y reduction in take. The chapter does this by
providing a brief outline of the recent amendments to the Water Act 2007
(Water Act) which gave effect to the return of additional water. The chapter then
notes the potential consequences of this policy and how it will be managed into
the future under the constraints management strategy.
4.4
Figure 4.1, reproduced from the Department of Sustainability,
Environment, Water, Population and Communities' (SEWPaC) Environmental Water
Recovery Strategy for the Murray-Darling Basin: Draft for Consultation,
shows how these two features (the 650 GL/y and the 450 GL/y) of the Basin Plan
form part of the government's overall plan to return water to the Basin.
Figure
4.1—Environmental Water Recovery and SDL Adjustment Mechanism[1]
Environmental Works and Measures
4.5
SEWPaC describes environmental works and measures as:
...examples of 'supply measures' that can help deliver water
more efficiently and effectively to meet environmental objectives. Some of
these projects have the potential to provide SDL offsets by achieving
equivalent environmental outcomes using less water.[2]
4.6
Previous environmental works and measures programs have been funded by
Basin governments, including the works delivering and managing environmental
water to five Living Murray 'icon sites' under the Living Murray program.
4.7
Currently, there is a $10 million Commonwealth funded program to:
...assist Basin states and communities to investigate new
environmental works and measures projects. The types of projects being
investigated include the removal of impediments to environmental flows,
building regulators to deliver environmental water more efficiently to
wetlands, and purchasing flood easements.[3]
4.8
A key implication of the adjustment mechanism in the final Basin Plan is
for environmental works and measures to provide for up to 650 GL/y of the final
2750 GL/y reduction in take.[4]
Any potential shortfall in reaching the 650 GL/y with works and measures will
be met by water purchases from 2016.[5]
4.9
The MDBA further explained what the 2016 deadline means in practice in
the following exchange:
Senator NASH: Do the savings have to have been
completed by 2016, or what is the arrangement?
Dr Dickson: No. Those projects have to be completed
and deliver the savings up until 2024.
Senator NASH: As long as they are identified by 2016?
Is that what we are talking about?
Dr Dickson: They are identified, there is investment
against them and they have agreed that they are going to deliver those savings.
They need to be well and truly in prospect, but they do not need to have been
built and delivered at that time.[6]
4.10
Environmental works and measures were criticised by some stakeholders
because, under the adjustment mechanism, environmental works and measures may
return water to irrigators rather than the environment. Mr La Nauze of the
Australian Conservation Foundation stated that this was not an appropriate way
of spending public money under the Basin Plan:
Firstly, the proposed SDL adjustment mechanism needs
reworking. The parliament should be aware that, as it is currently drafted,
this mechanism will result in the Commonwealth spending hundreds of millions if
not billions of dollars returning water to irrigators instead of to the
environment. It turns the water reform process on its head. New investments in
certain categories of water-saving measures—the [MDBA] calls them 'supply
measures'—will be used to increase the amount of water available for
consumptive use rather than for the environment. This includes the
reconfiguration of water storages such as the Menindee Lakes and investment in
environmental works and measures. So even where the environmental outcome is
manifestly inadequate, as it would be under the current 2,750-gigalitre plan,
public money would be spent increasing water for irrigation instead of making
more water available for the environment.[7]
4.11
Another witness, Mr Ted Hatty, Chairman, Southern Riverina Irrigators,
argued that environmental works and measures would lose effect if there was a
return to drought:
...with reference to the river's health in the last few years, ...we
have to recognise that the river was in the midst of the worst drought in 100
years. That is something that seems to be lost on a lot of folks in the city.
The fact is that we also had programs such as The Living Murray which were
agreed to prior to the drought but were never actually given an opportunity to
run. So there is a whole host of works and measures that are currently on the
table and that were already agreed to prior to all of this Basin Plan. Prior to
the drought they were ready to go, but it stopped raining. River health is
always going to be an issue if it stops raining.[8]
4.12
The NSW Irrigators’ Council argued that the process for proceeding with
environmental works and measures projects actually provides a disincentive for
the completion of such projects. As Mr Andrew Gregson explained:
When it comes down to it, the basis of the 650 [GL/y for
environmental works and measures] is this: if it is not obtained through
environmental works and measures then it will be obtained through buyback.
Minister Burke argues that the resolve to get it done lies in the hands of the
states. What we would ask is that that 650 be subject to apportionment in the
same way that every other purchase is subject to apportionment. Unfortunately,
Minister Burke and the [MDBA] have not seen fit to implement that in the plan.
What happens as we understand it is that the proposals come
from the states to the ministerial council. The ministerial council, which is
all of the states' ministers, must agree on each and every project. In the
event that there is not unanimous agreement then that project will not proceed
and potentially the 650 will not be met. Because of that unanimity requirement
there is an effective veto handed to every state. Not only does that mean that
there is no incentive for them to bring projects to the table but also there is
no incentive for them to accept projects from other states. It is our opinion,
therefore, that achieving the full 650 is, at best, difficult. As a result,
that is why, again, we are calling for a cap on buybacks. At the very least,
that 650 should be apportioned to give every state an incentive to be involved.
If I could be parochial for just one moment...if that 650 were apportioned
there would be an incentive for South Australia to look at environmental works
and measures in respect of the Lower Lakes and Coorong, and we think that that
is absolutely vital as part of this process.[9]
4.13
A SEWPaC official was asked about whether the potential 650 GL/y return
of take from environmental works and measures would be apportioned between the
Basin states:
...starting from the 2,750, there is apportionment of
the downstream component to provide, in a sense, a starting point, and that is
done now under the planning processes. The apportionment of, to coin a phrase,
the benefit of whatever the 650 has got will depend—there are some locational
dimensions to this—on what the projects are and where they are. We do not know
precisely what the projects are and where they are. There is a process going on
right now with some prefeasibility studies and so forth being done, but the
decisions on what those projects will actually be will occur in 2016. The
locational apportionment of the benefit of those projects will depend upon the
decisions which are taken at that point in time.[10]
4.14
Further to this point the MDBA added:
Dr Dickson: The default arrangements for the
apportionment is if states do not get to agreement, they are done on the
baseline diversion limits—the apportionment of the 2009 baseline. There is a
default if states do not get to agreement, but there is enough time in there
for states to come to an agreement.
Senator NASH: Does that
calculation take into account any savings through the works and measures from a
particular state?
Dr Dickson: As Mr Parker said, you cannot be
absolutely definitive on that, because those works and measures could come from
different tributaries or different parts, and one state may put the lion's
share of an investment in and there may be some need for them to get agreement
with another state on how they are going to share those benefits. It is up to
the state governments to work out how best they want to have this managed.[11]
4.15
The MDBA and SEWPaC were also asked about what options were available if
the environmental works and measures programs had not met its target by 2024:
Mr Parker: By 2024 we expect to have bridged the gap
one way or another.
Senator NASH: But what is the other way? That is what
I want an answer to.
Mr Parker: As I said earlier in response to your
question, if the project is not completed substantially in accordance with
specifications and so there is a shortfall in the recovery, then there would be
a gap which needs to be recovered by other means.
Senator NASH: That is exactly what I am after. What
are the other means?
Mr Parker: As I said, purchase or
investment. It will depend on where they are, what the type of project is and
so forth.
Senator NASH: So there is potentially further buyback
if they do not meet the targets.
...
Dr Dickson: Yes, but that is why there is the point at
2016 and why we need a long period in developing the projects in that period so
that we can be very confident in the savings identified and very confident
there is investment and those projects will be built. That is why it needs that
proper assessment, so it can minimise risk by forces that no-one could be aware
of that might make a project no longer able to be conducted. Those are the
sorts of things that you have to manage for, but most of the effort is in
making sure that we have good projects at that time and that they are well and
truly agreed on and bedded down to minimise that risk.[12]
4.16
The National Irrigators’ Council stated that the process risked being
overly complicated which in turn could impact on reaching the desired outcomes
of the environmental works and measures strategy:
What we are concerned about with the 650 is not that it is
not there; it is not that we do not believe that we can get the same outcomes that
you would have got if you had bought that water or got it back through on-farm
investments or whatever; it is that governments—certainly not this one—in the
past had a marvellous way of overcomplicating what should not be that
complicated. At the moment, we do seem to be heading down that path. As Andrew [Gregson,
CEO, NSWIC] said, there are some issues within the process itself of various
states perhaps being able to veto it, but even getting those projects to the
ministers and then getting them through the MDBA's modelling—there are plenty
of hand grenades that can be built into that that do not need to be there, and
that is what we are a little bit worried about. If it becomes too complicated,
everyone chucks their hands in the air at a government level and says, 'Just
buy back.'[13]
4.17
Finally, the Wentworth Group noted that there was no particular scientific
preference for any of the three forms of water recovery, however, it also expressed
the need for policies to identify the cost effectiveness of such water recovery
programs, including environmental works and measures:
From a scientific perspective no [it doesn't make any
difference how the water is recovered]. In 2007, we put a statement out which
looked at the environmental needs, the economic opportunities for achieving
those and the social impacts and how to address those issues. ... In simple
terms, there are a range of alternatives for delivering water. Buyback is one
alternative, on-farm infrastructure improvements is another and public
infrastructure works is a third—there are a range of them. Our view was that
once you have established the needs of the river system, based on the science,
you then use whatever tools are available and you work with local communities
to identify the most cost-effective way, both in economic and socioeconomic
terms, to deliver those environmental outcomes.[14]
Committee view
4.18
The committee supports the use of environmental works and measures to
contribute towards the reduction in take. The committee considers such measures
to be an essential part of an appropriate water recovery strategy.
4.19
However, from the evidence received, the committee is concerned that the
current provisions relating to environmental works and measures for the reductions
of 650 GL/y of water results in some uncertainty for Basin stakeholders. In
particular, the committee is concerned that the extent to which buybacks may be
required to meet a shortfall from environmental works and measures (should one
occur) will not be known until 2016 and potentially much later. The committee
is also concerned that should a shortfall occur, the decisions about the
apportionment of such a shortfall among the Basin states have been delayed and
that this creates further uncertainty.
4.20
Finally, while supporting the program for environmental works and
measures, the committee is mindful that the return of water to the Basin should
be both cost‑effective and mindful of the socio-economic impacts on Basin
communities.
Recommendation 8
4.21
The committee recommends the MDBA conduct further research into how
effective the works and measures programs are for delivering environmental
outcomes and the cost effectiveness of such projects in comparison to other
forms of water recovery. This research should also include the socio-economic
impacts to irrigation communities of increased levels of 'buyback'.
Recommendation 9
4.22
The committee recommends that the MDBA and SEWPaC provide ongoing
public updates to Basin stakeholders on progress in securing water savings from
environmental works and measures.
An additional 450 GL
4.23
On 26 October 2012, the government announced that it would:
...provide $1.77 billion over ten years from 2014 to relax key operating
constraints and allow an additional 450GL of environmental water to be obtained
through projects to ensure there is no social and economic downside for
communities.[15]
4.24
The 450 GL/y is in addition to the 2750 GL/y reduction in take that is
targeted in the Basin Plan. The announcement came in response to the MDBA's
release of the 3200 GL/y relaxed constraints modelling scenario (see chapter two).[16]
The relationship of the 450 GL/y to the other aspects of environmental water
recovery is illustrated in Figure 4.1 above.
4.25
To achieve this expanded target, the government committed to investing
'primarily in on-farm efficiency works that generate water savings for the
environment and other projects as agreed by states', to 'ensure there is no
social and economic downside for communities.'[17]
4.26
On 19 November 2012, the Senate Environment and Communications
Legislation committee presented its report into the Water Amendment (Water for
the Environment Special Account) Bill 2012 (the Special Account Bill). The
Special Account Bill received assent (with amendments) on 15 February 2013. Its
aim was to amend the Water Act to give effect to the Prime Minister's
announcement of 26 October 2012.[18]
4.27
There are several key aspects of the Special Account Bill that were
relevant to the committee's inquiry such as the additional return of an
additional 450GL, the removal of physical constraints, and enhanced
environmental benefits. Specifically, the Special Account Bill:
...provides funding for the acquisition of an additional
450GL of water and the removal of physical constraints. The Bill identifies key
enhanced environmental benefits which could be achieved. Further reducing
levels of salinity in the Coorong and Lower Lakes so that improved water
quality contributes to the health of insects, fish and plants that form
important parts of the food chain. Increasing the water levels in the Lower
Lakes to provide additional flows to the Coorong and to prevent acidification,
acid drainage and river bank collapse below Lock 1. Ensuring the [Mouth] of the
Murray is open without the need for dredging. Discharging 2 million tonnes of
salt per year from the Murray-Darling Basin as a long term average. Increasing
flows through the Murray Mouth barrages and supporting fish migrations. In
conjunction with removing or easing constraints providing opportunities for
environmental watering of floodplains of the Murray-Darling Basin to improve
the health of forests and fish and bird habitat, improve connections to the
river system, and replenish groundwater. Increase the flow of rivers and
streams and provide water to low and middle level floodplains that are adjacent
to rivers and streams.[19]
4.28
Importantly, the Special Account Bill also sets out that the government
anticipates it will:
...acquire the additional water primarily through investment
in on-farm irrigation efficiency projects and also through off-farm efficiency
projects, the purchase of water access entitlements (but not through open
tender rounds available to all entitlement holders in a water resource plan
area) and other agreed mechanism where the social and economic outcomes can
be maintained or improved. This would achieve enhanced environmental
outcomes by increasing the volume of water available for environmental use, without
adversely impacting on the productive capacity of the Basin.[20]
4.29
The Special Account Bill also dealt with the issue of constraints
removal and provides funding:
...to allow the constraints removal to facilitate delivery of
the additional environmental water recovery and achieve improved environmental
outcomes from those water holdings. This could be done through a range of
projects including acquisition of flood easements, provision of access works
(for example, bridges, culverts), changed watering regimes and increased outlet
capacity on major dams and storages.[21]
4.30
The committee did not consider the specific details of the Special
Account Bill as it was a matter before the Environment and Communications
Legislation Committee. However, the committee did discuss some related issues during
its public hearing on 23 November 2012. In addition, the committee considers
that some of the general issues raised in the Environment and Communications
committee report to be of direct relevance to this committee's inquiry. The key
views of stakeholders before this inquiry are discussed in turn.
4.31
The Murray Group of Concerned Communities, for example, considered that
the effects of the Bill were potentially premature given the uncertainty about
how other aspects of the Basin Plan may operate:
...We feel that the 450 bill is premature. We have not yet
achieved the basin plan. We have not yet seen how the adjustment mechanism will
work in practice. We have not yet seen how getting 2,750 in the first instance
will work in practice. We do not see the need to scramble for further water
recovery before you can be sure that you can achieve outcomes and delivery
this.[22]
4.32
The National Irrigators' Council (NIC) expressed dissatisfaction with
the plan to return additional water through the Special Account Bill. As NIC
CEO, Mr Tom Chesson, told the committee:
We get frustrated because both the Prime Minister and the
minister went down to Goolwa [in October 2012] and announced the 450-gigalitres
and the upward movement. They both made the point very strongly that the reason
that they wanted to invest in irrigation was because there were downsides for
our communities. They have not explained what those downsides are, but we have
got organisations that have done microlevel work on what it costs in terms of
what these reforms will cost communities, and it is not pretty. If there are
downsides, if the government believes that there are not more large-scale water
tender buybacks, then why are we even having this discussion?
Surely, it should just be put into the legislation. Two bills
have gone through—one has gone through the Senate and another one is currently
in the Senate. We could amend the Water Act tomorrow—or next week—to make sure
that there are no downsides for communities in this, and then I think you will
see communities and irrigators come on board. They will be much more
comfortable, because what we are being asked to do is to trust governments, not
just today—I have no issue with the sentiments and the intention of government
today—but this process is probably going to be five, six or seven elections
long. What is discussed behind closed doors or what is discussed in these
committees today is not necessarily going to be government in 2016, 2017, 2018.
They are not necessarily going to go back and read this committee's report and
understand exactly what the intention was.
I just implore this committee: don't damage our communities
further by simply taking water out of them and simply buying back. There is a
win‑win, and we should follow that path.[23]
Constraints Management Strategy
4.33
In addition to the some of the specific concerns relating to the Special
Account Bill, it was the associated issues of the return of the additional 450
GL/y and the need to relax constraints in the Basin system to manage the
additional flow that was most contested. The alternative views of irrigators'
representatives and environmental groups are reflective of this.
4.34
The NIC expressed serious concern with how the Constraints Management
Strategy would be implemented. In outlining this concern, the NIC's Mr Tom
Chesson noted the significant impacts that removing constraints could have on
certain communities and rural properties:
...We are concerned that the constraints management strategy
which is now to take place over the next 12 months could become just a
tick-a-box exercise because there is so much pressure on the government to
allow the 450 gigs of upward movement—that is that [$]1.8 billion that was
announced the other day. The Murray-Darling Basin Authority has made it very
clear in the modelling that was used as the basis for that upward movement
that, if the constraints that are relaxed in that model are not actually
implemented, there is no real environmental benefit of just putting another 450
gigs and sloshing it down the river.
It says the only way you will hit those extra environmental
targets is if you relax those constraints. The Victorian government, for
example, has done a lot of work on hydrological modelling for flood risks. I
know the Insurance Council has done a lot of work as well.
On 9 October 2010 and again on 10 October 2010, the water
minister in Victoria told the Victorian parliament that with 40,000 megalitres,
the constraint that was relaxed at McCoy's Bridge, you would have 100 buildings
flooded, you would have 250 kilometres of roads go under, over 8,000 hectares
of dryland and about 1,000 hectares of irrigated country. That is just with
that one constraint relaxed. They would argue that it is not a minor flood; it
is a serious flood. You heard before from Ian Lobban and the Murray
group—Louise Burge and others—that if you then have a rainfall event, you can
have a serious issue on your hands.
I think it needs to be understood that constraints are not a
simple thing and that, if you flood someone's home, there is a very big
difference between a rainfall event doing it and your own government doing it.
You need to understand that the [Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder] is
hiding behind the state governments, who are the river operators. If the states
flood someone's home, from what I understand, legally...the states are liable.
We are concerned that if the constraints are not managed properly, it could all
go pear-shaped in a horrible way for a lot of people.[24]
4.35
Mrs Jan Beer also told the committee that the impact on the Goulburn
river region could be significant and potentially result in moderate flooding.
Mrs Beer also argued that non-natural flooding events provided for under the
additional release of water could have significant impacts on farmers.[25]
4.36
These concerns were combined with evidence that predicting flows and
flooding was extremely difficult in the area. According to Mrs Beer, this could
also have significant consequences:
I am therefore very concerned how unpredictable tributary
flows, combined with totally insufficient real time data and the time lag
factor for streamflows combined with large environmental releases from Eildon
Weir, will impact on floodplain landowners and the many towns along the river
system such as Yea, Seymour, Shepparton.[26]
4.37
Mr Andrew Gregson of the New South Wales Irrigators' Council also noted
the complexity of the Basin system and expressed reservations about how the
removal of constraints could be managed:
One thing I am absolutely certain of is that there is not
sufficient understanding of what those constraints are or what the implications
are of removing them. 'Constraints' makes it sound unrealistically simple. We
are talking about an extremely complex system without a comprehensive
understanding of how, where and why water moves through it. One of the
constraints they are looking at is the capacity to release more water faster
from the Menindee Lakes system. That sounds pretty simple until you realise
that that water then has got to go somewhere. One of the volumes that we have
seen quoted as to what they want to release would be such that the Lower
Darling River channel could not carry it. It would spill into the anabranch and
effectively be lost. So I think we have got to be extremely careful of
oversimplifying exactly what the system constraints are and what the impacts
will be of changing or moving one thing. This system is like a balloon: if you
poke it in one area, you are going to have an implication somewhere else.[27]
4.38
Mr Gregson also stated that it 'is fair to say that the time frame made
available to consider this constraints removal strategy is going to prove
vastly insufficient to understand what the implications will be.'[28]
4.39
The MDBA responded to concerns raised about the unintended consequences
of the relaxing of constraints to achieve at total of 3200 GL/y return of take
by stating that it will work through the issues in consultation with local
farmers and through the development of the constraints management strategy. As
Dr Rhondda Dickson, Chief Executive, MDBA told the committee:
In terms of what has been done already, there is a lot of
experience in the Murray-Darling Basin Authority on this issue through many
years working on the river operations with local landholders through the
system. So there is a lot of knowledge there about the implications of changes
to river flows. So we have background information there, but the key piece of
work that the authority is going to be doing over the next 12 months—we are
already getting ready to do that—is the sort of analysis that you are talking
about, where there would be a lot of detailed work done on the implications of
what the priorities for the constraints are first, and then the implications of
changing one, having a look at what those implications are for changes to the
flow regimes on private properties and what the risks might be, and looking at
where the most effective relaxation might occur. There has been quite a lot of
work done already this year with basin states identifying all the constraints.
We have done quite a few studies on that.
So base work is being done, but there will be a very active
and intense program in the first year of getting a strategy together. That is
the constraints management strategy which is in the plan and which we are
required to do in very close consultation with states. We will be talking also
with landholders on what we should be looking at then. But, once there is an
initial strategy identified after a year—the program of how you would proceed
once the ministerial council and the basin governments agree on a
strategy—there is a long program of working closely with landholders, in a way
that has been done in the previous exercises, with looking at changes to constraints.[29]
4.40
The committee notes that the consultation process has already commenced.
Furthermore, the committee notes that Mrs Jan Beer, a stakeholder that appeared
at a public hearing on 23 November 2012 who was concerned about the
consultation process has subsequently been contacted by the MDBA to discuss
issues and arrange further meetings.[30]
4.41
Mr Jonathan La Nauze from the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF)
expressed support for the constraints management strategy but sought some
changes to how it was treated under the Basin Plan:
I think the constraints management strategy is absolutely
essential. I am not as worried about the delay [of the constraint strategy
being released
12 months after parliament is expected to sign off on the plan]; what I am worried
about is the way that it is written into the plan—it does not actually drive
the systematic assessment of those constraints, an assessment of the
feasibility of overcoming them and then actually ensuring that they will be
overcome where that is physically possible. It leaves that option open but it
does not drive it. But I think some simple wording changes to the constraints
management strategy in the plan would enable that, as well as realigning the
adjustment mechanism to work in the way that I said. So it actually requires
the overcoming of constraints and achieving a better environmental outcome
before you start to return any water for consumptive use.[31]
4.42
Environment Victoria urged that the MDBA work through the possible water
infrastructure achievements that could assist in the removal of system
constraints which it noted was a major reason for establishing the 2750 GL/y
reduction in take. As Environment Victoria's Ms Juliet Le Feuvre told the
committee:
...The MDBA has stated that system constraints are very
important limiting factors in setting SDLs and that they hinder the
availability of environmental water, particularly to the upper levels of the [subplain].
Constraints have been cited as a key reason for selecting the 2,750 gigalitre
figure. If that is the case, and the MDBA has to be prepared to do something
about them, it should conduct a systematic assessment of the feasibility, costs
and benefits of redesigning river management operations and infrastructure to
deliver ecological outcomes, followed by a prioritisation of works and
measures. Once an impediment to the delivery of environmental water has been
removed, the MDBA should review the ability to achieve improved environmental
objectives and adjust the SDL accordingly.[32]
Committee view
4.43
The committee supports the improved environmental outcomes for the Basin
system that will be achieved by returning an additional 450 GL/y primarily
through on-farm infrastructure investment.
4.44
However, the committee recognises that the additional return of 450 GL/y
of water to the Basin system which also involves constraints removal is a
contentious issue and the feasibility is yet to be proven.
4.45
The committee is concerned about the significant impact the additional
return of water for environmental purposes and the removal of system
constraints may have on many landholders and rural communities in certain parts
of the Basin system. It is clear from the evidence received that the proposals
for constraints removal may cause significant flooding and damage to rural
properties and also have adverse impacts on a number of farmers and related
businesses. The committee is also concerned that there may be unintended socio-economic
consequences of the policy as it currently stands. The committee notes from
recent press reports that this is an ongoing concern for a number of rural and
regional communities (see Appendix 4).
4.46
Finally, the committee acknowledges the concerns raised about the lack
of consultation that has occurred in the lead up to the relevant changes being
introduced into the Basin Plan. At the same time, the committee notes the
future consultation that was outlined by SEWPaC and the MDBA on this issue. The
committee also commends the commitment and the consultation undertaken by
relevant government officials regarding a specific request from a stakeholder
and committee members arising from the committee's public hearing 23 November
2012.
Recommendation 10
4.47
The committee recommends that greater detail on the socio-economic costs
and benefits of any proposed constraints removal be presented to affected
communities and the public in general. Such information should be publicly
updated in a timely manner when changes occur or new information is obtained by
the MDBA and SEWPaC.
Recommendation 11
4.48
The committee recommends that further consultation regarding constraints
management and the additional 450 GL/y should remain a high priority for the
MDBA and SEWPaC. To ensure consultation is adequately undertaken, the committee
recommends that the MDBA and SEWPaC develop and publish a strategy that identifies
and provides solutions for previous shortcomings (see chapter seven) in the
government's consultation process for developing the Basin Plan.
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