Aircraft Noise Ombudsman
4.1
The bill proposes to establish an independent Aircraft Noise Ombudsman
responsible to review the handing of complaints by Airservices, report to the
relevant agencies and ministers, and report on the effectiveness of community
consultation initiatives undertaken by Airservices.
Current arrangements
4.2
Airservices has responsibility for managing complaints and enquiries
about aircraft noise and operations through its NCIS. The NCIS is the
'Australian aviation industry's main interface on aircraft noise issues for the
community'.[1]
Amongst other things, its role is to explain aircraft movements and flight
plans and to consider possible changes to air traffic management as well as to
advise if they are not possible, or refer them for further investigation.
However, the NCIS is not empowered to change flight schedules.[2]
If members of the public are dissatisfied with the NCIS, they may lodge complaints
and enquiries with the ANO.[3]
4.3
The ANO was established in September 2010 as an independent
administrative office in response to recommendations in the Aviation White
Paper. In January 2015, the ANO, Airservices and Defence signed a Memorandum of
Understanding and amended the ANO Charter to extend the role of the ANO to
provide an independent complaint and review mechanism for Defence.[4]
4.4
The purpose of the ANO is set out in the Aircraft Noise Ombudsman
Charter:
- The
Aircraft Noise Ombudsman (ANO) is an independent administrative office that:
- reviews
the handling of complaints or enquiries made to Airservices Australia (Airservices)
or the Department of Defence (Defence) about Aircraft Noise;
- monitors
and reports on the effectiveness of community consultation processes relating
to Aircraft Noise undertaken by Airservices and Defence;
- monitors
and reports on the effectiveness of the presentation and distribution of
Aircraft Noise-related information; and
- provides
targeted reviews of specific aspects of Aircraft Noise management as requested
by Airservices and Defence.
- The
ANO may make recommendations to the Board or the Chief of Air Force for
improvements relating to these matters.[5]
4.5
ANO reviews have considered aircraft noise operations, procedures and
practices that assist Airservices with its work to 'continuously refine and
improve the way [it engages] with the community'.[6]
4.6
The ANO is independent of both 'Airservices and Defence executive
management structure, and reports directly to the Airservices Board and Chief
of Air Force as appropriate'.[7]
4.7
The current ANO, Ms Narelle Bell, outlined her role and the process for
the management of complaints to the committee. With regard to the existing
complaint management process, Ms Bell explained that if an individual complaint
is made, the ANO's Charter provides that the complainant is first directed to
Airservices.[8]
If an issue remains, the ANO then investigates and looks into the response
provided by Airservices. Thereafter:
If we think that there is more to it we will ask questions
and obtain additional information. We look to see whether thorough and logical
reasons have been provided for whatever decision or response has been made. If
we have a run of complaints in relation to an issue, we can deal with those
altogether, as we did with the Hobart investigation, so that our review can be
more broadly based. That's how we respond to individual complainants.[9]
Awareness and understanding of the ANO's role
4.8
It became clear to the committee during the inquiry that there are
misconceptions about the ANO, highlighted by the fact the bill largely seeks to
replicate the role.
4.9
The Hume Residents Airport Action Group questioned the ANO's role,
expressing the view that it is restricted to the 'review of the administration
process of noise complaints' and should be broadened.[10]
4.10
MARA noted that it had previously thought the ANO's role was to assist
the community with aircraft noise issues.[11]
It made the point that more needed to be done to inform the public about the
role of the ANO. Miss Karen Hastings explained:
I think it's quite important that the purpose of this office
be made clearer to the public due to the misconception that the office plays a
role in managing actual noise complaints when its true role is actually
handling the process of the complaints.[12]
4.11
The fact that the existing ANO was established to conduct independent
administrative reviews of Airservices and the manner in which it handles
aircraft noise-related activities, such as the handling of complaints as well
as community consultation processes, was not well understood amongst many
submitters to the inquiry. It would appear that some of them supported the
provisions for a new ANO without a thorough appreciation for the role of the
existing ANO.
4.12
The EM effectively outlines what is the existing role of the ANO. It
states that the purpose of the proposed new ANO under the bill is to:
...review the handling of complaints and enquiries; report to
relevant agencies or Ministers; monitor and report on the effectiveness of
community consultations and other matters relating to aircraft noise; and make
recommendations.[13]
4.13
For this reason, Airservices argued that the bill outlines a function
that 'already broadly exists'.[14]
Similarly, the AAA noted that the ANO already carries out many of the key
functions proposed in the bill.[15]
Governance considerations
4.14
The bill proposes to establish a regulatory requirement for an
independent, government-funded ANO reporting to the Minister for Transport.
4.15
DIRDC expressed the view that the proposed amendment was:
...unnecessary considering the current ANO, who handles civil
and military aircraft noise issues, is already independent and reports directly
to the Airservices' Board or Chief of Air Force as appropriate on aircraft
noise matters.[16]
4.16
DIRDC also asserted the view that the current governance arrangement is
'very effective' because the ANO reports directly to the Airservices Board,
rather than the management team.[17]
This engagement with the Airservices Board ensures that 'issues are put before
the highest level of governance arrangements in Airservices' as it is the Board
that makes decisions about how to respond to ANO recommendations. DIRDC
observed that, on the whole, the Airservices Board responds 'very positively to
those reports'.[18]
4.17
Furthermore, DIRDC made the point that available evidence indicates that
the ANO is acting independently, as exemplified by the production of
significant reports with regard to a number of airports containing
recommendations 'all of which the Airservices board has implemented'. Mr Jim
Wolfe of DIRDC noted the response of the Airservices Board to ANO
recommendations:
As I understand it, they have implemented every one of the
recommendations made by the ombudsman. So I think it's a bit unfair on the
ombudsman to suggest that somehow they're in some sort of constrained
environment or their independence is being challenged. Of course, if there were
evidence to the contrary of that, it would be a different consideration. But,
as it stands now, to be honest, I think we get pretty positive feedback from
both sides of the fence about the role of the Aircraft Noise Ombudsman.[19]
4.18
It was suggested to DIRDC that in fact, 'most ombudsman...do not report to
the board of the main organisation that they are responsible to investigate'.[20]
In response, DIRDC stated that it would depend on 'whether it's a Commonwealth
statutory ombudsman or whether it's an industry ombudsman' and that the:
...concern would be if we believed that the Airservices board
were not having regard to what the ombudsman's work and recommendations were.
At the moment, we don't have any evidence of that.[21]
4.19
DIRDC added that the prospect of the ANO reporting to the Minister for
Transport could reasonably raise concerns regarding the potential
politicisation of the role.[22]
4.20
However, a number of submitters raised concern with the current arrangements
and in particular, the extent to which the ANO is independent. AMAC suggested
that while the current role and responsibility of the ANO as well as the
establishment of the position itself provides a mechanism for process review,
it raised concern about the 'direct role' that Airservices and Defence have in
'both the selection of the ANO and in identifying the resources that will be
made available to the ANO'. The AMAC continued:
Since actions taken and decisions made by those two agencies
are at the centre of the ANO’s review function, it is only proper that
decisions regarding the appointment, resourcing and reporting by the ANO should
not be tied to those same agencies whose actions are most often the subject of
review.
Similarly it would not be appropriate for the office of the
ANO to be attached to the Department responsible for the aviation portfolio
since decisions made there may also become the subject of review. [23]
4.21
The AMAC further argued that the ANO's capacity to delegate functions
should not be restricted to government agency employees. It suggested that the
way in which the Commonwealth and some state ombudsman are appointed should
provide a basis for the administrative and reporting framework most appropriate
for the ANO.[24]
4.22
Airservices acknowledged that the governance arrangements in place with
regard to the ANO are not consistent with those of other Commonwealth or state
Ombudsmen and 'potentially raise questions about independence or at least could
create a perception that independence is questionable'. In recognising that
this can 'create mistrust and cynicism within the community which detracts from
the ANO's investigative work and analysis', Airservices indicated that it was
open to considering other governance models or arrangements that could 'enhance
the ANO's independence and effectiveness'.[25]
However, DIRDC asserted that an ombudsman funded by the airline industry, via
Airservices, 'is a fairly normal way of ombudspersons being funded'.[26]
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