5.1
This chapter considers Australia's readiness for a biosecurity threat incursion. It provides an overview of measures to limit, control and eradicate these threats, and recover from any incursion. It focusses on foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and lumpy skin disease (LSD), and the current varroa mite incursion in New South Wales (NSW).
Overview of preparedness
5.2
In relation to FMD and LSD, the committee welcomed the findings of the government's Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce:
It found that EAD [emergency animal disease] response arrangements are comprehensive and well-understood by system participants. These response arrangements are regularly used, with success, in responding to biosecurity incidents. Overall, the system is strong, in particular in prevention and mitigation, and the system is sound.
5.3
The committee heard that while Australia is reasonably well-prepared for an FMD incursion, more can still be done. Jason Strong, Managing Director of Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) advised:
What has been forgotten, or ignored, in some of these discussions is the level of preparedness that we actually have as a country and that we have had for a very long time. There are very clear processes that would follow and that cover all options, all areas and all potential risks. It's also highlighted that, while those things have worked incredibly well for us—we don't have these diseases here now, so the system's working … I think everybody agrees that they could be better.
5.4
The Red Meat Advisory Council (RMAC) agreed, writing:
As an industry, we are satisfied with both industry and governments responses to the heightened [FMD and LSD] disease threat to date, noting that we do not and cannot operate in a zero-risk environment. Arrangements are in place to rapidly detect and respond to exotic disease incursions. However, there is always more that can be done.
5.5
Alastair James from RMAC told the committee that Indonesia's FMD incursion was beneficial in one sense for Australia:
We've had the benefit of a crisis response without the crisis being here in Australia. Having it present in our near neighbour Indonesia has kicked everyone into gear, without having to deal with the disease in Australia. The benefits of that have been that the responses to all of the risks that need to happen are all happening now, instead of after we get the disease … So, as long as we keep our foot on the pedal, we should be okay.
5.6
However not all submitters shared this confidence. Angus Hobson suggested that Australia had overestimated its abilities to detect and respond to an incursion, and underestimated the costs and impacts:
Despite the often-glowing (and often politically motivated) endorsements of our emergency management systems and 'world class biosecurity' protocols, the reality is that Australia does not have a good track record for delivering efficacy or efficiency in either area … As sound as mock-up events and co-ordination strategies may be in theory, the reality is that the 'perfect storm' created from a combination [of events with] an incursion of FMD ... will deliver anticipated and unanticipated consequences that simply exceed our response capability.
5.7
Australian Pork Limited drew on its recent disease incursion experiences and cautioned that Australia's biosecurity system is under pressure:
While this system has historically protected Australia's natural assets and key industries it is facing increasing pressure due to a combination of challenges … The pressure on our biosecurity system, and the need for urgent reform, has reached a critical tipping point. The growing calls from across industry, government and, increasingly the community, to safeguard Australia's biosecurity system must be addressed using a coordinated, collaborative, innovative and sustainably funded approach.
5.8
The Australian Honey Bee Industry Council (AHBIC) warned that despite preparedness measures being in place in anticipation of a varroa mite incursion, the industry remained underprepared and blindsided by the most recent incursion:
As an industry, we have done a lot of training and a lot of simulations; we've been through a lot of preparations, designing response plans and getting agreement from industry. But, now that it has happened, we're not as prepared as we thought we were, and I think that's a really key lesson for other industries to take away from this: we thought we were prepared, but we weren't.
Incursion response arrangements
5.9
Australia's nationally agreed responses to pest and disease incursions are detailed in the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN) and Australian Emergency Plant Pest Response Plan (PLANTPLAN), as outlined in Chapter One.
AUSVETPLAN
5.10
The committee received a range of evidence about the development of the AUSVETPLAN and its effectiveness in addressing an emergency animal disease (EAD) response, including in relation to:
the complexity of responses outlined in the AUSVETPLAN, and the need for the plan to prioritise key actions and risks;
the lack of information about how EAD outbreaks and responses will impact industries across the supply chain (e.g. plant industries, transport and retail), and the need to involve a wider range of stakeholders;
the urgent need for a review of the AUSVETPLAN's valuation and compensation procedures;
the importance of the development of preparedness and response frameworks and conduct of activities under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) and AUSVETPLAN to ensure consistent outcomes which do not duplicate efforts and waste resources;
the clarification of response actions for feral animals, particularly given the impacts on freedom from disease and trade;
the need for technical information to be more easily understood (e.g. vehicle decontamination information);
the lack of resourcing within Animal Health Australia (AHA), governments, and industry bodies which make it challenging to review and update the AUSVETPLAN as required; and
the importance of testing the plans to ensure they and the various roles and responsibilities are clear and up to date.
5.11
The Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce also drew attention to the requirement for response plans to be kept up to date, for arrangements to be operationalised, and that provision is made for national sharing and coordination of resources.
5.12
Mathew Munro from the Australian Livestock and Rural Transporters Association (ALTRA) warned that the success of the AUSVETPLAN in the event of an incursion:
… will depend largely on the operational preparedness of state and territory authorities … Our discussions with senior policy representatives across the jurisdictions indicates varying levels of preparedness, resourcing and industry engagement … the federal government certainly can play a role in coordinating and resourcing.
5.13
Overall, the committee heard that the AUSVETPLAN is valued by industry and producers, particularly for its role in promoting collaboration across a wide range of stakeholders and 'guidance based on sound analysis, linking policy, strategies, implementation, coordination and emergency management'.
PLANTPLAN
5.14
In accordance with PLANTPLAN, a Response Plan is agreed to by affected parties of the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD). The Plan specifies emergency containment actions, payment of reimbursement costs and cost sharing arrangements. The NSW varroa mite incursion demonstrated the strengths and vulnerabilities of this system; in particular, a need for improved harmonisation and collaboration of incursion responses across jurisdictions.
5.15
Representatives from the bee and agricultural sector raised concerns with the state governments' decision (in Victoria, South Australia and Queensland) to close their borders and restrict the movement of bee hives. In terms of operational activities, the committee heard that there was a 'good level of cooperation' between personnel from interstate to assist with the NSW response. However, the AHBIC observed that Victoria and Queensland had 'both stood up their own incident management teams' resulting in a commitment of their own resources, 'which [was] outside of the agreed response plan and not funded or cost shared across industries'. According to the AHBIC, this led to the '[depletion] of the resources across the board'.
5.16
The almond industry was a primary critic of the different control measures implemented across jurisdictions. Each year the almond industry requires over 300 000 hives during the August pollination season. The scale of this event means almost all commercial pollination hives across Queensland, NSW, Victoria and South Australia are required each year. In recognition of the almond industry's need for hives, the NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI) implemented an exemption for the movement of hives from low-risk areas. However, this measure was not pursued by other jurisdictions, which closed their borders to hives located in NSW, with disastrous impacts for the almond industry.
5.17
The Almond Board of Australia was critical of the lack of harmonisation between jurisdictions, which resulted in extensive production losses for the industry (estimated to be $300 million) and undermined the industry's confidence in the national emergency plan, to which the almond sector contributed $8.7 million. The Almond Board of Australia was of the view that jurisdictions had failed to implement the agreed national emergency plan:
They didn't follow the national response. The national response came up with a plan which balanced the absolute need to contain the mite with the absolute economic impact that was going to occur if that wasn't followed … The economic impact will be way beyond [the almond] industry.
5.18
The lack of jurisdictional harmonisation was also raised by the bee industry. The AHBIC observed different rules and requirements being applied by different states. These actions had a burdensome impact on the honey bee industry by making it difficult to follow compliance measures and understand what was occurring across jurisdictions. The AHBIC also commented that the closure of borders between jurisdictions was never part of the national response plan. The NSW Apiarists' Association (NSWAA) highlighted the widespread disruption caused by the border closures, with pollination services stuck in Victoria reducing the availability of hive numbers for avocado and macadamia pollination in Queensland.
5.19
Overall, the AHBIC observed 'protectionism coming into play' in response to the incursion, but also acknowledged the difficulties faced by states because of the varied views on how best to respond. The AHBIC noted that industry itself was divided on how best to respond should eradication efforts be unsuccessful. However, it detailed a longstanding agreement to a 'five-zone policy':
As an organisation, as the peak representative body, we agreed many years ago to what we call the five-zone policy: to support eradication as much as possible but also to support business continuity and allow movement. Critical to business continuity in the bee industry is migration and movement of hives. When you restrict movement of hives, particularly across borders … you are impacting the trade of our industry. However, we don't want to encourage that movement if it's going to impact the feasibility and put at risk the eradication program, because that is our No. 1, eradication.
5.20
Various witnesses and submitters called for better national coordination, particularly with the implementation of the emergency response plan. The Almond Board of Australia suggested that harmonisation could be supported by a bee hive traceability system to track hives and verify whether transported hives are from a declared biosecurity zone (see National traceability systems below for further information).
5.21
The Inspector-General of Biosecurity (IGB), Dr Lloyd Klumpp, advised the committee that while NSW was leading the response to varroa mite, it remains a national response supported by all jurisdictions. Dr Klumpp acknowledged that 'there are challenges to that model', but that the system was 'really sound and effective'.
Simulation exercises and testing
5.22
Australia's plans and preparedness for disease and pest incursions have been tested in a wide range of scenarios, desk and field exercises, and simulations.
Simulation exercises—FMD and LSD
5.23
Recent animal health exercises include Exercise Odysseus in 2014–15 involving a national livestock standstill in response to an FMD outbreak, Exercise Border Bridge in 2018 covering a cross-jurisdictional LSD incident, and Exercise Tuckerbox testing NSW's ability to meet National Livestock Traceability Performance Standards relevant to FMD, in April 2022.
5.24
Exercise Paratus, a two-year exercise, has been established to better understand whole-of-government response arrangements for FMD and LSD with a focus on legislation, coordination and exploring the role of the Commonwealth. It will culminate in a major functional exercise in 2023 which will include 'the laboratories testing samples and in-laboratory testing'.
5.25
The committee heard that, while exercises and incursions provide some important learnings and result in recommendations to improve Australia's biosecurity preparedness, there is 'no accountability for ensuring actions are completed to build the resilience of the broader biosecurity sector'. Witnesses described the implementation of resulting recommendations as 'ad-hoc' and pointed to the need for additional implementation resourcing, over and above that required for normal business, and improved governance to address short comings.
5.26
The Australian Chicken Meat Federation observed that the same recommendations keep being made—highlighting that recommendations are not being progressed. Australian Pork Limited also noted that resulting recommendations are often not released quickly and are seldom implemented:
What is clear is that while independent reviews and exercises can generate significant recommendations that can inform the enhancement of our biosecurity system, and EAD preparedness and response arrangements, they are only of value if they are subsequently implemented.
5.27
It further advised that:
While our biosecurity system has historically protected us, the clear message from these reviews and exercises, and our lived experience, is that the Australian biosecurity system is at risk of no longer being fit for purpose to protect our industries.
5.28
The Australian Livestock Export Corporation Limited (LiveCorp) told the committee that its simulation exercises had provided important learnings, particularly in relation to gaps and areas for further development, and the importance of role and responsibility clarity. LiveCorp also discussed the importance of taking simulations further and pressure testing response measures to ensure that Australia continues to have a robust system that is still fit for purpose and properly resourced, a view supported by the MLA.
Simulation exercises—varroa mite
5.29
In relation to varroa mite, an Australian-wide emergency preparedness and response exercise took place in 2018, followed by a smaller simulation with the National Biosecurity Response Team at Jervis Bay in 2019. The 2018 simulation exercise, titled Exercise Bee Prepared, was facilitated by Plant Health Australia (PHA) through a series of workshops across Australia that tested how rapidly stakeholders respond to a serious bee pest incursion. The 2019 simulation sought to enhance Australia's biosecurity emergency response capability and test the ability to enact the Commonwealth's Biosecurity Act 2015.
5.30
As previously noted, the AHBIC advised the committee that despite the preparations and simulations made prior to the current incursion, stakeholders remained underprepared and blindsided by the most recent incursion. This concern was shared by the Queensland Beekeepers' Association (QBA) which noted that the current response plan had been designed to focus on the early detection of an incursion at a high-risk port. However, the NSW incursion demonstrated both a 'low-risk sea port detecting a bee pest, as well as potentially a non-traditional point of entry'. Further, the NSW incursion highlighted the increased 'complexity should a bee pest be wider spread when detected'. QBA was of view that both low-risk and non-traditional points of entry should be included in early warning systems.
5.31
Bee industry representatives recommended that governments and industry review responses to the NSW incursion to improve response measures. The AHBIC recommended that these stakeholders should support 'better preparation and documentation for incident management teams to allow for swift and unimpeded responses to occur'. It identified a range of shortcomings based on industry's experience with the NSW incursion, related to resourcing and administrative processes, along with early response measures not being applicable to the Newcastle incursion.
5.32
PHA confirmed with the committee the intention to conduct a series of reviews and debriefs into the NSW varroa mite response, which is a normal course of action when the EPPRD is enacted. This review process informs stakeholders of strengths and weaknesses of the response plan, which is shared with the animal biosecurity sector. PHA added that the NSW government would also conduct its own review, in addition to the national reviews and debriefs.
5.33
While measures are in place to review and learn from a response to an incursion or simulation, Nathan Hancock from Citrus Australia spoke of a lack of accountability for whether such reforms are implemented, and concluded that the primary hinderance to their implementation is resourcing.
Committee view
5.34
The committee acknowledges the value of the work done by AHA, PHA, governments, industry, and other stakeholders in the preparation of plans for a response to a pest or disease incursion, through the AUSVETPLAN and PLANTPLAN processes. These plans appear to place Australia on a firm footing to mount a robust incursion response. However, the committee also notes the need for stakeholders across the supply chain to be involved in the development of the plans; the need for key actions and risks to be prioritised; the need for plans to be current and communicated and roles and responsibilities understood; and, for responses to be governed by the plans.
5.35
The committee welcomes evidence that the plans continue to be tested, hearing that these reviews should result in a stronger biosecurity response. However, the committee is concerned that recommendations arising from these activities are not systematically implemented, or are not implemented quickly enough. The committee also notes the importance of conducting simulations and tests under pressure to ensure that Australia's biosecurity system is prepared.
5.36
The NSW varroa mite incursion is the first of its kind in Australia and the largest response to date under the PLANTPLAN and EPPRD. As demonstrated by stakeholders' evidence, it has revealed the strengths and weaknesses of incursion response plans within NSW and across Australia. A varroa mite outbreak, originating at a location outside of a bee surveillance area, is a major concern. In addition, the committee is of the view that the actions of state jurisdictions to close borders prevented the movement of low-risk bee hives, and undermined the good will between governments and industry, and the functionality of the biosecurity system more broadly. Despite these concerns, the committee is confident that PHA, along with all signatories of the EPPRD, will conduct a thorough review and debrief into the NSW varroa mite incursion.
5.37
The question that remains is whether such reviews and debriefs result in meaningful change, as experienced by the citrus industry regarding the citrus canker outbreak. The committee is concerned that lack of accountability and resources are reportedly preventing findings from a simulation or incursion being integrated into an emergency plant pest response plan and the biosecurity system more broadly. If the primary hinderance is resources, the committee is hopeful that additional funding to the biosecurity system will ensure the system is adequately resourced to prevent, and when necessary, respond to an incursion.
5.38
The committee recommends that Animal Health Australia and Plant Health Australia broaden their consultations to include all stakeholders from across the supply chain, including transport and livestock transport industries and the retail sector.
5.39
The committee recommends that the Australian Government work with agencies and industry bodies to ensure appropriate governance and reporting structures are in place to ensure that recommendations arising from simulations and exercises are implemented in a timely way.
Cost-sharing and compensation arrangements
5.40
Government-industry cost sharing arrangements for an EAD are determined by the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) or EPPRD. However, eligibility and the amount of compensation a producer receives is determined by states and territories, while business continuity and recovery costs are addressed through separate funding mechanisms.
Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement
5.41
As discussed in Chapter One, part of the purpose the EADRA is to ensure that funds to combat an EAD are made available and the costs shared among the beneficiaries of the response. Notably, the agreement does not cover the total costs of responses, feral animals are not covered, not all responses are cost shared under these arrangements and not all industry sectors are party to these arrangements—leaving gaps in response funding. There is also no specific funding mechanism for pro-active biosecurity mechanisms such as preparedness and surveillance.
5.42
Under the EADRA, FMD is subject to an 80–20 cost split between government and industry, while LSD is a 50–50 cost split. The AHA is considering submissions for LSD to be rescheduled as a category two disease, which would result in an 80–20 cost split—a move supported by the cattle industry.
5.43
In September 2022, the Government introduced the Animal Health Australia and Plant Health Australia Funding Legislation Amendment Bill 2022 to the House of Representatives. Now enacted, the bill amended the Australian Animal Health Council (Live-stock Industries) Funding Act 1996 to facilitate the funding of emergency responses under emergency biosecurity response deeds other than the EADRA to, for example, allow for payment under the Aquatic Deed.
5.44
AHA highlighted several future challenges for the EADRA, including ensuring valuation processes across jurisdictions are appropriate and take account of changes to the agricultural environment (such as trade, market requirements and consumer demands) and the structure and funding of governments. Other challenges include managing the One Health approach and inter-relationships with human health bodies (for example in relation to the Japanese encephalitis virus), the management of vector-borne disease incursions, and the need to encourage new and emerging industry groups to become signatories.
5.45
WoolProducers Australia highlighted the importance of EADRA signatories upholding the primacy of the EADRA as the framework under which all EAD preparedness response activities should be undertaken, to prevent inconsistent outcomes and duplication of effort.
5.46
Australian Pork Limited advised that the agreement could be used to improve Australia's biosecurity response, and advocated for the continuation of a 'collaborative and innovative partnership approach' which is appropriately resourced. Specifically, it argued for strengthened engagement between supply chain businesses and government, a response informed by industry, better alignment and coordination between response plans, and prioritisation and resourcing of coordinated communications.
EAD Emergency response levy
5.47
The committee heard that there are existing levy mechanisms in place to allow for the funding of other biosecurity activities and that these could be used to negotiate wider agreements between industry and government without the need for new or amended legislation. Most industries have established an emergency response levy, usually introduced at a nil rate and activated when required in order to repay the industry's response contribution.
5.48
Any change would require all jurisdictions and industry organisations, as well as the AHA, to agree to the initiative and the amendment of relevant regulations to vary current levies—negotiations which could take some time.
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
5.49
As detailed in Chapter One, the EPPRD establishes the financial arrangements and cost sharing agreements between signatories of the deed. The committee heard concerns about the scope of industry participation under the EPPRD. Specifically, bee industry representatives were concerned at the exclusion of pollination services under the EPPRD levy. The AHBIC submitted that the 'steady decline in the national honey crop and industry's inability to impose a levy on pollination services has seen the overall funding from industry (to the EPPRD) decrease over time'. The AHBIC advised the committee that it has advocated for the inclusion of pollination services, with no success, as it is deemed a service rather than a product.
5.50
PHA provided additional information about including pollination services under the EPPRD levy. It outlined the complexities of including services under the current levy guidelines:
Under the levy guidelines a levy proposal must nominate a levy collection point in the supply chain. It also must define a leviable commodity, determine a unit or levy, determine the rate of the levy and determine the levy return frequency. In the case of pollination services, they're considered a service. They're not listed under these principles, unfortunately, which precludes them from establishing that levy.
5.51
When asked whether amending the guidelines would be a legislative process, PHA responded that no changes to law would be required to make such an amendment. It added that the racehorse industry had established a precedent for the inclusion of services under a levy system.
5.52
The Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (AgriFutures Australia) added that, in response the AHBIC's 2021 proposal for pollination services to be included under the levy system, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) responded that a 'pollination levy does not fit within the current legal framework on imposing a levy on primary production'. However, it was AgriFutures Australia's understanding that DAFF was 'working to streamline and modernise the agricultural levies and charges (levies) legislation'.
5.53
This matter was previously considered by this committee in 2014. At the time, the committee recommended that the AHBIC, the Australian Government and the now disbanded Pollination Australia 'enter into discussions about the best way forward to enable the pollination industry to make a contribution … to research and development, and to biosecurity'. In 2015, the Australian Government agreed to this recommendation in principle, advising the committee that it had 'been identified as an option to be pursued in the medium term' and that a 'new legislative framework and extensive consultations with pollination dependent industries' would be required.
5.54
Although most industries reliant upon bee pollination are signatories of the EPPRD, the committee was also advised that one industry was not a signatory and therefore was not obliged to contribute funds to the varroa mite emergency response plan. The committee was informed that this industry was working with PHA to rectify this matter.
5.55
In September 2022 the Government introduced the Animal Health Australia and Plant Health Australia Funding Legislation Amendment Bill 2022 to the House of Representatives. In relation to plant pests and diseases, the bill (which passed both Houses on 1 December 2022) amended the Plant Health Australia (Plant Industries) Funding Act 2002 to empower the Secretary of DAFF (or their delegate) to determine that a body is a 'relevant Plant Industry Member' and to permit the use of emergency plant pest response (EPPR) levies to promote or maintain the health of an EPPR plant, providing greater flexibility for industries.
Compensation—varroa mite
5.56
According to PHA, an underlying principle of the EPPRD is that 'no one should be better or worse off due to an [Emergency Plant Pest] incursion'. This principle means an owner of a crop or property that is impacted because of an Emergency Response Plan is entitled to be reimbursed under the EPPRD.
5.57
On 9 July 2022, the Australian Government and NSW Government announced an $18 million compensation package for affected registered beekeepers. The compensation package was announced as part of an agreement made under the National Management Group for Emergency Plant Pests. The package compensates impacted bee keepers for costs associated with the loss of equipment, hives and bees destroyed as part of NSW's eradication process. Costs associated with honey loss were also included in the package.
5.58
On 13 September 2022, the NSW Government announced the availability of payments under the compensation package for those within the eradication areas of the biosecurity zone. In collaboration with PHA and the AHBIC, and with the agreement of all governments and apiary industry bodies, an evidence framework was established to guide reimbursements. Recreational beekeepers were entitled to a $550 payment for each hive destroyed, or $200 for those wanting to keep their hive ware. Access to compensation was extended to beekeepers within surveillance zones on 18 October 2022, recognising that those businesses had been adversely affected by the eradication response.
5.59
The committee received evidence about the adequacy and scope of the compensation offered to affected industries. The AHBIC clarified that pollination dependent industries were not covered by the EPPRD because their financial losses were due to border closures. The committee heard that the compensation framework excluded the loss of pollination contracts, a matter objected to by the NSW Apiarists' Association (NSWAA). Although the financial impact caused by the incursion remained widespread, the AHBIC contended that there were limits on the scope of the compensation package because 'there is no way we could provide that cost-benefit analysis to warrant eradication' if all impacted industries were included.
5.60
The committee was also advised that the compensation package excluded those in breach of NSW's biosecurity order. However, Amateur Beekeepers Australia (ABA) raised doubts about whether this requirement acted as an effective deterrent and it questioned whether the DPI had investigated allegations of such breaches. DPI objected to this critique, advising the committee that it had issued 31 infringement notices to those in breach of the varroa mite emergency order, with further investigations underway.
All hazards disaster recovery arrangements
5.61
PHA proposed a new model to support relief and recovery efforts of farmers impacted by a pest or disease incursion. The suggested model was based on all hazards disaster recovery arrangements, which are applied during high-risk weather seasons. According to the PHA, this arrangement 'could be enacted to support farmers beyond the current national arrangements in addition to the broader impact on the economy, environment, and psychosocial effects'. With reference to the lessons learnt from previous incursions, PHA explained how an all hazards disaster emergency arrangement could be applied to the biosecurity sector:
Lessons identified across other responses have demonstrated the requirement for recovery services to be engaged early to assist with immediate impacts that are unrelated to pest eradication. Consideration of business continuity at the farm level, and continuity practices for key industry parties is essential for plant industries to continue to produce. This principle is accepted within other hazards as best practice but has not been adopted in the biosecurity sector.
Committee view
5.62
The EADRA and EPPRD appear to have served Australia adequately, establishing a mechanism to share costs and provide compensation to producers in relation to incursions of exotic pests and diseases. However, it is clear to the committee that these arrangements must continue to evolve.
5.63
The committee is aware of the growing challenges facing our producers—including extreme weather events, drought, and rising input costs—as well as increasing biosecurity risks. It is vitally important that cost sharing and compensation arrangements adequately provide for producers to ensure appropriate responses to incursions, resilience, and recovery to safeguard Australia's food production capacity. It is also important that the biosecurity system is sustainably funded, as discussed further in Chapter Six.
5.64
As the committee has noted elsewhere in this report, it is imperative that a wider range of stakeholders be engaged in biosecurity planning and arrangements across the supply chain. As demonstrated by the varroa mite incursion, pollination services have been directly impacted, yet are not included under the EPPRD levy system. The committee remains supportive of DAFF working with the honey bee industry to consider the inclusion of pollination services into levies guidelines and legislation, and is disappointed that there has been little progress in this respect since the committee last considered the matter. Similarly, essential enabling stakeholders in sectors like meat processing, transport, and retail must also be included in response arrangements.
5.65
The committee notes PHA's suggestion regarding value for the biosecurity sector in all hazards disaster recovery arrangements being applied to relief and recovery mechanisms, to support farmers impacted by a plant pest or disease incursion. The committee sees merit in further examination of this suggestion and encourages PHA to consult widely with stakeholders to further develop this proposal.
5.66
The committee recommends that the Australian Government increase funding to Animal Health Australia and Plant Health Australia to enable them to appropriately maintain, review and develop funding and compensation arrangements.
5.67
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry consults with the honey bee industry to consider the inclusion of pollination services under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed Levy guidelines and legislation.
National traceability systems
National livestock traceability system
5.68
The committee heard that a national livestock traceability system is critical to tracing animals through the supply chain, including those susceptible to exotic diseases as such as FMD and LSD. It enables the tracking of any incursion and vaccination status, and supports market access requirements, as well as offering other producer, industry, trade and consumer benefits.
5.69
David Hill, a Queensland cattle producer and Chair of the CCA's LSD and FMD Working Group told the committee that 'animals in this country are transported far and wide, and being able to trace them is the critical thing for us to be able to eradicate the disease'. The National Farmers' Federation (NFF) also observed:
Robust traceability systems are also important in protecting producers and consumers against food fraud. And the ability to manage biosecurity incursions and food safety incidents is contingent upon the ability to track produce through the supply chain. Accurate tracing can reduce costly consequences by targeting pests and disease responses and limiting product recalls. Consumers are demanding more information about food safety, quality, provenance and sustainability of production.
5.70
The National Livestock Identification System (NLIS) is funded by industry and operated by Integrity Systems Company (ISC), a subsidiary of MLA. It includes mandatory livestock identification and livestock movements (including vendor declarations) in a centralised database. Enforcement is the responsibility of states and territories under local legislation.
5.71
The SAFEMEAT Partnership provides oversight of the national livestock traceability system and has conducted several reviews of the system. ISC advised that testing of the traceability systems 'indicated that the [sheep] mob-based system has a long way to go with regard to meeting the standard, but the cattle system seems to be reasonably solid'. Other recommendations arising from reviews include that:
a national statutory body or regulatory authority be created to manage the national livestock traceability system, inclusive of standard setting, coordinating compliance and enforcement, and education and extension;
investment is made to ensure all livestock species can be managed through the system; and
the national mandated digital identification of all livestock species be in place before 2025.
5.72
In July 2022 Australian Agriculture Ministers reached in-principle agreement to develop a national approach to electronic tagging of individual sheep and goats by the beginning of 2025, with arrangements to be progressed by the Sheep and Goats Traceability Taskforce.
5.73
Implementation of a national livestock traceability system will be supported by '$46.7 million over three years from 2022–23 to improve on-farm biosecurity and support the transition to a national livestock traceability system'. Of this, around $26 million is flagged for investment in the database and $20 million for sheep and goat traceability.
5.74
The announcement of sheep and goat traceability has been welcomed by AHA and livestock industries. However, the committee also heard that a number of industry participants want stronger federal government leadership, with some producers nervous that they won't be able to meet the 2025 deadline and others concerned about cost impacts and what the changes mean for them. To address these concerns, Mike Darby from the CCA advocated for better communications with producers:
There's always pushback against regulatory compliance, but the thing is that the biosecurity situation is unfolding in front of us. The threat is accelerating, and it's incumbent upon us to keep up with the increased threat. So it's a matter of communicating the need for that and why we're doing it so that people can see the threat and see what the solution to the threat is. And traceability is key to managing biosecurity.
5.75
Mr Hutchinson clearly explained the value of a truly national system:
[national traceability] … is going to put us into a position where, if we can get back into markets a week earlier, it will have paid for itself. If we're exporting $300 million a week of red meat around the world even before Livex [live exports] as well, that allows us an opportunity. By using these systems, they will all pay for themselves and that investment would seem to be definitely worthwhile. That can't be lost on any industry participant, politician or regulator. That's the name of the game.
5.76
ISC noted the growing demand for the database to accommodate all FMD‑susceptible species. System enhancements were also recommended by stakeholders to improve the stability, scalability, security, and analytical capabilities of the database, as well as catering for other livestock species and the consequent increase in volume and transactions. ISC and others also recommended a more comprehensive and equitable co-funding arrangement to enable continuous improvements.
5.77
WoolProducers Australia advised the committee that producers were finding different rules across jurisdictions were 'making the current system unworkable' and that compliance processes needed to be improved. Other witnesses called for better governance, standards and business rules, the implementation of digital systems (such as National Vendor Declarations) to enable 'nationally consistent real-time individual traceability', and national enforcement with a structured system of penalties.
5.78
Bonnie Skinner, Chief Executive Officer of Sheep Producers Australia, supported SAFEMEAT's recommendations, saying:
… what's really important is to achieve this truly harmonised national system, because if we don't have harmonisation we're going to continue to see the issues that have plagued the system up until this point. They largely are due to the disparities that exist, particularly with regard to jurisdictional legislation, and inconsistent application of business roles across each state and territory.
5.79
Queensland cattle producer and Chair of AgForce Queensland's Cattle Board, William Wilson, also highlighted governance and inertia challenges, telling the committee at its Rockhampton public hearing that:
If the aeroplane industry worked at the speed our industry is moving towards an electronic transfer of data of information of animals, they would still be smoking at the back of planes; it is horrendous.
Bee hive traceability system
5.80
A potential tool to improve coordination and harmonisation of responses to a future varroa mite outbreak is a national bee hive traceability system. Witnesses and submitters suggested that a traceability system would streamline the identification of bee hives during a pest or disease incursion. The ability to identify the movements of hives would enable their quick identification in an impacted area and enable the ongoing movement of low‑risk hives during an incursion. It was also argued that identifying the movement of hives would help prevent the closure of borders between jurisdictions, minimise the adverse impacts of an incursion and support the implementation of biosecurity control measures.
5.81
The Almond Board of Australia suggested the use of a single QR code for a truckload of hives (normally 120 per truck) to record hive movements. It emphasised the importance of designing a traceability system that tracks the movement of hives across jurisdictions.
5.82
Whilst supportive of enhanced registration and traceability systems, the NSWAA pointed out the importance of privacy for beekeepers. It suggested the use of industry‑run applications to ensure the locations of hives are not public. It also advocated for a traceability system should the varroa mite become endemic within Australia.
5.83
Whilst not specifically declaring its support for a national traceability system, the ABA recommended that beekeeper registration systems be upgraded to ensure they are easier to use, encourage participation, remain updated and collect information such as hive locations. The ABA argued the NSW registration system was not fit-for-purpose and had 'resulted in valuable time and resources being consumed attempting to identify and contact beekeepers and determine where hives are located'. Further, it highlighted the importance of functionality and ease of use, to encourage registration and engagement with the system, rather than punishment.
5.84
DPI recognised a need to review and take on stakeholders' feedback about the state's registration system. It clarified that an active debate about registration revolved around whether registration fees should apply, with some jurisdictions offering registration for free, and whether free registration translates into increased registrations.
5.85
One pre-existing system referenced with the potential to support traceability was the B-QUAL system. Established by the AHBIC, B-QUAL is a quality assurance system for the Australian honeybee industry that integrates certification and trains industry participants in quality standards and biosecurity. The NSWAA commented that discussion had taken place about B-QUAL integrating a 'national freedom of movement' capability. However, progress had been slow.
Committee view
5.86
Given the rise in biosecurity threats, and the wide range of benefits offered by a national traceability system, the committee supports the extension of the NLIS to include individual sheep and goats. It notes that there will be challenges in implementation and additional costs, including for producers, and welcomes the government's announcement of additional funding, while also recognising the need for a review of current funding arrangements.
5.87
The committee considers the role of the NLIS to be sufficiently vital to protecting Australia's livestock that it supports the SAFEMEAT Partnership's recommendations to establish a separate statutory or regulatory authority responsible for managing Australian livestock traceability. Furthermore, the committee is of the view that there is a need for improvements to governance standards and system enhancements to enable a truly national and consistent system.
5.88
In principle, the committee is supportive of a bee hive traceability system designed to support the identification of hives' movements and locations. Whilst traceability may help prevent some adverse impacts of an incursion on industry (such as preventing border closures and the ongoing movement of bee hives during an incursion), there are substantive barriers to its implementation (such as data privacy, alignment and sharing arrangements). For this reason, the committee foresees significant benefit of DAFF leading a feasibility study into a traceability system for commercial bee hives, in partnership with state and territory governments and the honey bee industry.
5.89
The committee recommends that the Australian Government conduct a review of national livestock traceability funding and co-funding mechanisms, to ensure they are sustainable, comprehensive, and equitable.
5.90
The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a statutory or regulatory authority responsible for managing Australian livestock traceability.
5.91
The committee recommends the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, in partnership with state and territory governments and the honey bee industry, conduct a feasibility study for a commercial bee hive traceability system.
Improved diagnostic capability
5.92
Submitters to the inquiry called for a range of improvements to current diagnostic capability, including in relation to FMD and LSD, as part of preparedness arrangements. Enhancements would improve disease surveillance and the ability to diagnose disease quickly, including through:
capacity building, especially in regional and remote areas, for example through partnerships and private veterinary laboratory involvement;
training and development to address shortfalls and improve capabilities;
improvements to sample transportation and processing, particularly for regional areas where results can take 48 hours to be confirmed;
increased uptake of existing and emerging rapid diagnostic technologies;
standardised reporting; and
improved national integration, harmonisation, and coordination.
5.93
Evidence provided by Jim Fletcher indicated that there is no structured approach to the management and funding of a national diagnostic capability. His submission stated that funding remains primarily with the states and territories, with a high reliance on user pays and fees, making it vulnerable to market failure.
5.94
Australian Pork Limited called for a review of the diagnostic testing system to 'streamline processes and enable an innovative system that is efficient, effective and trusted by government, industry, and trade partners'.
5.95
The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) emphasised the importance of improved detection and diagnostic capabilities. It submitted that development of genomic technologies, such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing, is vital.
5.96
The Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) facility has emergency plans in place in the event of an FMD incursion and has doubled its stock of PCR tests, with further stocks ordered. A workforce management plan has also been developed, including sharing testing with states and territories.
5.97
Horticulture Innovation Australia (Hort Innovation) referenced a forthcoming project that will investigate international best-practice methods to detect and control varroa mite. This investigation will seek to employ more efficient detection methods and reduce industry's reliance on chemical pest control measures. The horticultural industry's overall research goal is to 'secure and deploy an arsenal of cutting-edge tools to help Australian horticulture'.
Committee view
5.98
The committee heard that there is scope to improve Australia's diagnostic and testing network to ensure there is the capacity and capability to meet the pressures that may arise under any disease incursion, particularly in regional and remote areas. The committee is encouraged by the work that is being done to harmonise and improve the coordination of the diagnostic and testing network and emphasises the importance of the continuation of this work. The committee suggests that further work be done to collaborate and utilise private resources, and to better consider the impacts of incursions and lockdowns on the network, for instance in relation to transportation of samples.
Vaccines and other agvet chemicals
5.99
Under the AUSVETPLAN the vaccination of FMD‑susceptible livestock may be considered under certain circumstances, although vaccination may not prevent animals becoming infected with FMD. CSIRO advised that they have been working with the department to model the effects of vaccination against FMD, advising that vaccination will only have a big impact if there is a large outbreak in a densely farmed area. If FMD were to reach Australia the vaccine would be ordered in any case, with any decision on whether to use it, to be made subsequently.
5.100
An FMD vaccination has been approved for use in Australia in the event of an outbreak. Australian has an FMD antigen bank in the United Kingdom, which is supplied by a commercial company, managed by AHA, and co‑funded by states and territories and the Commonwealth. The antigens would be used for the manufacture of vaccines to enable Australia to respond to the incursion.
5.101
Testing and exercises have confirmed that Australia's current vaccine bank would be suitable for addressing the FMD strain circulating in Indonesia, and that in the event of an incursion, vaccines would be available within seven days. AHA has also established a local stockpile of suitable vaccine equipment and established an online training package to ensure sufficient capacity for a vaccine program in the event of an outbreak.
5.102
However, Australian Dairy Farmers were concerned that overseas procurement can 'be more expensive, inefficient, and subject to supply chain bottlenecks than if the capability were developed and expanded domestically' and called for the transformation of the ACDP as a 'centre of excellence' for vaccines and diagnostics.
5.103
CSIRO advocated for access to the live FMD virus by the ACDP to improve Australia's capacity to prepare for and respond to an FMD outbreak, advising:
… access to the live virus would allow improved national and regional surveillance, along with the ability to develop new diagnostic tools and future next generation vaccines including an mRNA [messenger ribonucleic acid] vaccine for FMD.
5.104
Although the laboratory has been designed to allow research into dangerous infectious agents, it (and other laboratories) is not currently permitted to conduct this work, and all research is conducted with collaborators overseas.
5.105
CSIRO is currently in discussions with international companies and a local research institute about mRNA vaccine development, including for FMD.
5.106
Opinions on the need to import the FMD live virus were mixed. RMAC advised that for the FMD virus 'we don't necessarily believe it's necessary to bring into Australia simply because we have an agreement with the UK to import that vaccination on seven days' notice'. However the Australian Lot Feeders' Association, thought there was merit in importing the live virus in order to understand how the disease may spread and behave in Australia.
5.107
The committee heard that the government is not currently considering the import of the FMD live virus, and that any decision would need to be managed carefully with trading partners. DAFF warned that 'there will be some trading partners that would automatically jump to the assumption … "that they effectively have the virus"'. The department also advised that given the highly transmissive nature of the FMD virus and the fact that it has previously escaped from high containment laboratories and vaccine production units overseas, a risk assessment of ACDP facilities, systems and procedures would also be required prior to import.
5.108
Australia has imported the LSD live virus, with a rigorous process attached to its import and use to ensure that there is no compromise in biosecurity. There is currently no LSD vaccine approved for use in Australia, however it is anticipated that an application will be made for a permit in due course. The Cattle Council of Australia (CCA) called for an offshore vaccine bank for LSD to allow a speedy response in the event of an incursion.
5.109
Industry supported the importation of the live LSD virus, with Australian Dairy Farmers envisioning this step as the start of a 'more expansive capacity and capability building program domestically'.
5.110
Other agricultural and veterinary (agvet) chemicals and disinfectants have already been approved by the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA) for use in the event of an outbreak of FMD and LSD.
5.111
As previously noted, the APVMA regulates the use of fipronil, which is used to eradicate feral and non-commercial bee hives within the varroa mite eradication zones of NSW. Strict requirements are applied to its use, which is anticipated to run over a 12-month period.
Committee view
5.112
The committee is satisfied that the current vaccine bank arrangements in place would meet Australia's needs for vaccines in the event of an FMD incursion, and it supports the establishment of a similar vaccine bank for LSD.
5.113
Based on the evidence received during the inquiry, the committee notes that there are opportunities for Australia to build its vaccine research, development, and manufacturing capabilities in the medium to long term. As such, the committee supports the ACDP's calls for access to the live FMD virus, with appropriate protections in place, to enable Australia to be better prepared to identify and respond to an incursion and enable the development of a more complex vaccine capability.
5.114
The committee recommends that the Australian Government and Animal Health Australia establish a lumpy skin disease vaccine bank for use by Australia in the event of an incursion.
5.115
The committee recommends that the Australian Government negotiate with the United Kingdom Government the ability for researchers from the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness to access and conduct research on Australia’s bank of foot-and-mouth virus vaccine in the United Kingdom.
Transport infrastructure
5.116
Several witnesses drew attention to the need for improvements to Australia's transport infrastructure and systems as an essential part of the biosecurity system. Australian Pork Limited supported technological enhancements and digitisation of biosecurity information to monitor animal transport.
5.117
ALTRA warmed that 'while preparations are indeed underway to varying degrees, jurisdictions are not ready for an FMD outbreak' in the following areas:
availability of information relating to livestock standstill rules, emergency livestock holding facilities, and usable decontamination advice;
national digital systems to support livestock transport, including a tested national movement permit system, nationally consistent vendor declarations, and a national electronic livestock identification system; and
transport infrastructure to support livestock movement including decontamination-grade commercial truck washes in agricultural zones, established under a coordinated national truck wash plan, and managed livestock effluent disposal sites on key freight routes.
5.118
ALTRA recommended that the National Heavy Vehicle Regulator be consulted in the development of a national movement permit system, given its existing registration role and experiences with national permit systems.
5.119
The government's Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce also recognised the importance of a national system, recommending that the government consider further work on 'a national approach to interstate border control and permitting to ensure efficient and effective interstate border security movements as part of the enforcement of a livestock standstill or movement controls'.
5.120
In relation to livestock effluent disposal sites as part of multipurpose facilities on key freight routes, ALTRA highlighted that this committee's recommendation made as part of its 2021 inquiry into Australia's trucking industry, has not been addressed, impacting on animal welfare, safety and biosecurity preparedness. Mr Munro from ALTRA highlighted that 'getting that buy-in to build with a network-wide approach has been very difficult, and we really need the federal government's assistance to try and solve that issue'.
5.121
Mr Munro suggested that the development of appropriate effluent disposal sites, truck washdown and other facilities could be progressed if the federal government required the development of such sites through funding conditions, eligibility rules for cost recovery from industry and/or the application of mandatory standards to the design of rest areas.
5.122
To better support the livestock transport industry ALTRA also called on the Federal Government to conduct modelling and industry consultation to determine the feasibility of a Road Transport Management Deposit Scheme to enable the industry to self-fund temporary financial relief to affected transport operators, and improve the resilience and recovery of the agricultural sector in the event of an incursion. Mr Munro advised:
It's not about looking for handouts. It's about putting industry in a position where it can manage its own risk over the longer term …
We're not asking governments to establish it at this point. We're asking governments to look at some modelling to see how it might work.
Committee view
5.123
The committee heard that consultation and collaboration with the livestock transport industry in relation to biosecurity matters has been patchy, with the peak body, ALTRA, only recently invited to participate in preparedness and response planning.
5.124
Given Australia's COVID-19 experiences with border control, entry requirements and the issue of permits, the committee supports a nationally coordinated approach to the imposition of biosecurity movement restrictions and the development of a national movement permit system to ensure that our transport and freight network operates optimally.
5.125
The committee reiterates its recommendation arising from its inquiry into Australia's trucking industry, in its report Without Trucks Australia Stops, and advocates for the development of a coordinated network of facilities. It is clear that guidelines relating to heavy vehicle rest area facilities, including effluent disposal, truck washes, loading infrastructure, and holding pens, have been inadequate in ensuring the development of multiuser facilities on key routes, which could benefit users across the agricultural sector. The committee notes that in addition to the $60 million already set aside to fund rest areas through the Heavy Vehicle Safety and Productivity Program, the government has committed to an additional $80 million for new and refreshed rest areas.
5.126
The committee also heard that the projected cost of an FMD outbreak does not take account of economic impacts on related industries such as the livestock transport sector. This sector is subject to a range of pressures including those relating to extreme weather events (such as flooding), human and animal diseases, rising fuel costs and other emergencies, and is not a signatory to existing cost sharing arrangements. The committee applauds ALTRA's initiative and desire to manage its own risks over the longer term through a Road Transport Management Deposit Scheme and supports further investigation into the merits of such a scheme.
5.127
The committee recommends that the Australian Government coordinate the implementation of a national approach to interstate border control and permitting, and use of a national movement permitting system.
5.128
The committee recommends that the Australian Government coordinate the development of a national network plan and sustainable funding for the establishment of livestock transport infrastructure at rest stops on key livestock freight routes around Australia.
5.129
The committee recommends that the Australian Government conduct industry consultation to determine the feasibility of a Road Transport Management Deposit Scheme.