Chapter 11 - Australia's public diplomacy: Training and practitioners
11.1
Most countries now consider public diplomacy a serious business with
some looking to specialists in private enterprise to help them with their
public diplomacy programs.[1]
Participants in a recent international conference in Geneva examining the
challenges for foreign ministries believed strongly that traditional training
methods were 'no longer enough' for diplomats. They recognised that one of the
growth areas in training included public diplomacy.[2]
In looking specifically at the diplomat assigned abroad, they recognised that
one of the key tasks was 'to create understanding for the home country' which
required the capacity to reach out to people in the host country, 'connecting
with the active publics'. They concluded that a diplomat abroad is no longer
the principal negotiator, nor the key interpreter of home policy:
His main business is not so much with the foreign ministry in
the receiving country as with the entire political class; he needs a dense and
stable network of contacts. Personal communication skills and language ability
are vital.[3]
11.2
In this chapter, the committee looks at the role and function of the Images
of Australia Branch (IAB) as the unit within DFAT that manages and coordinates the
department's public diplomacy programs. It examines how effectively public
diplomacy is integrated into the mainstream of DFAT's work and the role of the
IAB as the main coordinator for the department's public diplomacy. The committee
looks at where this unit is located in the department, the staff dedicated to
public diplomacy, and IAB's role in training and preparing staff for public
diplomacy activities. The committee also considers the skills required in an
effective public diplomacy practitioner and whether DFAT should have a unit of
public diplomacy specialists.
Coordinating public diplomacy activities within DFAT
11.3
DFAT has primary responsibility for implementing Australia's public
diplomacy programs. In September 2003, DFAT announced a series of initiatives
to integrate public diplomacy work more closely into the mainstream of the
department's activities.[4]
In its evidence to the committee, the department said that in 2005–06 it had a team
of public diplomacy specialists and a staff of 229 dedicated to public
diplomacy work.[5]
They are distributed throughout the department as set out in the following
table provided by DFAT.
Table 11.1: Public Diplomacy staff in 2005–06[6]
Division
|
Total
|
Americas Division
|
1.2
|
Australian Passport Office
|
6.5
|
Corporate Management Division
|
5.0
|
Consular Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs
Division
|
23.7
|
Economic Analytical Unit
|
7.0
|
Europe Division
|
2.3
|
Executive Planning and Evaluation Branch
|
1.5
|
Global Issues Branch
|
2.0
|
International Organisations and Legal Division
|
3.9
|
International Security Division
|
5.8
|
North Asia Division
|
6.0
|
Office of Trade Negotiations
|
2.7
|
Pacific Division
|
3.4
|
South-East Asia Division
|
2.9
|
South and West Asia Middle East Africa Division
|
2.2
|
Trade Development Division
|
5.6
|
Free Trade Agreement Taskforces and Unit
|
1.0
|
Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Taskforce
|
0.5
|
State offices
|
13.0
|
Posts – Europe
|
5.2
|
Posts - Middle East & Africa
|
4.4
|
Posts - New Zealand & South Pacific
|
4.0
|
Posts - North Asia
|
3.4
|
Posts - South & South East Asia
|
8.6
|
Posts - The Americas
|
5.2
|
Posts – Locally Engaged Staff (LES)
|
102.0
|
Total
|
229.0
|
11.4
For the purposes of this report, the committee concentrates mainly on
the IAB which manages the department's internationally focused public diplomacy
programs and coordinates overall public diplomacy activities. The IAB is
located within the Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs
Division of DFAT.
11.5
According to Dr Strahan there are 'about 16 or 17 people' in IAB. The
economic analytical unit, the trade outreach area and the secretariats
servicing the bilateral councils also employ a number of officers involved in
public diplomacy activities. He indicated that there may also be 'a couple of staff'
working on the public diplomacy side of important issues such as counter-terrorism
and counter-radicalisation. He explained that the remainder of public diplomacy
staff tend to be located at overseas posts.[7]
Public diplomacy a part of
mainstream work
11.6
Dr Strahan informed the committee that in recent years DFAT had decided
to 'much more closely integrate public diplomacy work with the work' of other
sections in the department. In his view, the distribution of staff engaged in
public diplomacy within the department demonstrates the extent to which
mainstream public diplomacy activity is integrated into the department in
general. He stated:
At some point public diplomacy can be seen as being a little bit
to the side of mainstream work in a foreign ministry. That is not the case in
our service. All of our officers are expected to take public diplomacy
seriously and to see how it fits into their normal foreign policy and trade
work.[8]
11.7
He gave the example of 11 newly recruited media specialists:
We do not want these specialists to feel like they are part of a
separate stream, that they are a subspecies which is different from the rest of
the department. They must feel very much that they are officers who can be
deployed to other positions later in their careers which might be more
traditional policy or diplomatic positions where they will continue to draw on
their specialist skills. Sometimes they might have a more specialist position,
but they are very much part of the general cohort of skilled people in the
department.[9]
11.8
A number of witnesses before the committee commented on DFAT's approach
to making public diplomacy an activity central to the department's work.
Mr Jacob Townsend, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, was of the view that
the 'mainstreaming of public diplomacy activities throughout DFAT placing
emphasis on it in staff training and general staff awareness was a good idea'.[10]
He agreed that it was important for DFAT staff to appreciate that public
diplomacy was an important part of their work. Mr Freeman also defended
strongly DFAT's policy of streaming and mainstreaming and getting public
diplomacy 'to be very much an integral part of the way the department works'.[11]
11.9
Although some witnesses approved of DFAT's approach to making public
diplomacy a mainstream function of the department, they nonetheless were
critical of, or could see scope for improving, DFAT's public diplomacy efforts.
For example,
Mr Townsend expressed concern about the professional value placed on public
diplomacy in DFAT. He quoted from DFAT's submission that 'In 2006, IAB launched
a new PD training course for staff proceeding on overseas postings. This course
will become mandatory in 2007 for all staff appointed to positions with a
significant PD content'. He interpreted this statement to mean that:
...there is a differentiation between staff who have a PD role and
staff who have less of a PD role. That suggests also that therefore you are
not mainstreaming in a comprehensive way; you are suggesting to people vaguely
that public diplomacy is a responsibility but you are not reinforcing it.[12]
Committee view
11.10
The committee notes Dr Strahan's comments about the high value that DFAT
places on integrating public diplomacy into the mainstream of its work. The committee
agrees with this policy. The committee believes, however, that DFAT must ensure
that its stated policy of public diplomacy as an integral part of mainstream
diplomacy is supported by action that clearly demonstrates that public
diplomacy is a highly valued activity in the department.
The role of IAB in training staff
and coordinating public diplomacy activities
11.11
To ensure that the department's public diplomacy activities continue to
reflect Australia's foreign and trade objectives, the IAB conducts regular
reviews. It holds annual consultations with staff from the department's geographic
and subject expert areas and six-monthly budget reviews. Furthermore, in June
2005 it produced its Public Diplomacy Handbook and in July 2006 its Public
Advocacy Techniques.
11.12
DFAT also explained to the committee that new graduates, who provide the
main source of recruitment and go on to do mainstream policy and corporate work,
receive a briefing session about the department's general public diplomacy
programs. Dr Strahan explained:
We then have a program where we take them around to a number of
different stakeholders who contribute to the overall public diplomacy effort.
For instance, they will meet with Australia Network and the Australia Council.
That is our front-line moment where we first communicate with our new staff and
make sure that they understand the importance of public diplomacy. We then have
a series of rolling training programs, which run throughout the year, including
a relatively new pre-posting training course specialising in public diplomacy.
We have a series of what we call advocacy workshops which run every year and
have been doing so for some time. Those advocacy workshops will pick up on key
issues of the moment, so we will judge, in consultation with other parts of the
department, what issues would warrant a dedicated public diplomacy advocacy
training session. We have just had a series of those in the last couple of
weeks and we will have more across the year.[13]
11.13
The IAB also maintains close contact with overseas posts and works with them
to ensure that their work is consistent with the government's public diplomacy
goals.
Overseas posts
11.14
The department currently runs funded public diplomacy programs in 85
locations overseas. In 2005–06, Australian overseas posts held more than 3000
public diplomacy activities for a total annual budget of $1.6 million. The
activities ranged from public advocacy campaigns, including a joint
Indonesia–Australia public information campaign on illegal fishing, to major
cultural events to the mainstay of public diplomacy such as speeches, media
releases, seminars, conferences, cultural promotions, exhibitions and displays.[14]
Staff working on public diplomacy at
overseas posts
11.15
Clearly, Australia's overseas posts form an integral part of DFAT's
public diplomacy network. Dr Strahan explained that there is a range of people
at post doing public diplomacy work. He stated:
We have five full-time positions overseas which are PD dedicated
and then there will always be an A-based officer in each mission who spends a
varying proportion of their time on public diplomacy. In some cases that might
be 10 or 20 per cent. This is where the fractions come in. That is why we have
half people or people that work part-time. [15]
Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade—Posts, Consulates and offices.
11.16
He informed the committee that the department has two A-based officers,
who work full time on public diplomacy, in Jakarta, one in Beijing, one in
Tokyo, and one in Washington and that these positions had been in place for
'many years'.[16]
11.17
Mr Kirk Coningham, former DFAT officer, accepted DFAT's argument that the
maintenance of Australia’s diplomacy demands an expensive and elaborate network
of overseas missions. He also agreed with the view that 'to do diplomacy well
it must be done on the ground'. He went on to state that:
But when you look at the public diplomacy resources on the
ground, you come up with a pretty sorry picture. In its evidence to this committee
DFAT admitted that in the vast majority of posts it is 10 to 20 per cent of the
responsibility of a normally junior DFAT officer. That is a day or so a
fortnight. The reality at post is that the function is performed by locally
engaged staff.[17]
11.18
The committee notes that table 11.1 provided by DFAT to the committee records
an equivalent of only 30.8 A-based staff working on public diplomacy at Australia's
overseas posts and 102 locally engaged staff (LES).
Training for, and coordinating,
public diplomacy activities at overseas posts
11.19
DFAT maintained that it has incorporated public diplomacy activities
into the work of all its posts. Dr Strahan referred to the new pre-posting
training courses that focus on public diplomacy. He noted further that:
A number of other agencies pointed out that they do not attend
our pre-posting PD training courses. That has been a slip on our part. We will
now invite all officers from all agencies who are going on posting to attend
these courses so that they can understand the public diplomacy dimension of their
work.[18]
11.20
Also, under an initiative announced in 2003, IAB conducts a more regular
and systematic program of regional public diplomacy workshops for posts. DFAT
advised the committee that these workshops are intended to 'provide an
opportunity for face-to-face discussion, mentoring and revision to Post PD
programs'.[19]
The department recently held regional public diplomacy workshops in Shanghai, Hanoi
and Brisbane to help posts integrate their public diplomacy activities more
closely with key foreign and trade policy objectives.[20]
Dr Strahan explained:
We get our posts from one particular region and we pull them
together for two days and systematically go through all of our different public
diplomacy and cultural diplomacy programs. That is the venue for our posts to
communicate with us and let us know what is confronting them at the coalface of
public diplomacy overseas and it is a chance for us to communicate with them
new things that we are introducing back home.[21]
11.21
As noted previously, IAB publishes a public diplomacy handbook which is
used as a guide for Heads of Mission to ensure that public diplomacy activities
are closely linked with the government's key policy objectives. The handbook is
intended to offer practical advice for posts 'to advance Australia's foreign
and trade interests, highlight areas where Australia excels and dispel
potentially damaging misconceptions'.[22]
To this end, it emphasises that before holding any event, posts should 'clearly
identify the message, target audience and most effective means of delivery'.
Moreover, these events should be part of a post's annual public diplomacy
strategy.
11.22
Indeed, posts are required to prepare public diplomacy strategies and
programs. According to DFAT, the strategies include 'a description of the
post's operating context, identification of resources including opportunities
for partnerships in public diplomacy projects, the post's key objectives, means
to secure these objectives, major platforms available for activity and
performance indicators'. Dr Strahan used the European posts as an example of
the steps taken to ensure that posts are in touch with one another and aware of
the broader public diplomacy objectives:
What we first do is set an overarching PD strategy which covers,
in this case, the entire European region where we clearly have a number of core
objectives. Under that umbrella, each post has to transform that general PD
strategy into a country-specific strategy. Sometimes particular parts of the
overall strategy might be more relevant to one country or another. They then
have to have very tight, good and concrete objectives which are strategic in
nature, which they then have to report against.[23]
Locally engaged staff
11.23
Dr Strahan also noted that locally engaged staff employed at overseas
posts have a significant role in Australia's public diplomacy programs. Mr Coningham,
however, questioned their capacity to perform public diplomacy on behalf of Australia.
Aside from professional qualifications, discussed later in this chapter, Mr Kirk
Coningham raised another concern about the heavy reliance placed on locally
engaged staff to prosecute a post's public diplomacy activities. He would effectively
discount locally engaged staff as a vital component of public diplomacy
conducted by overseas posts because:
...they cannot read the cables and they are not at the
policy-making table. In fact, it would be unkind to them as foreign nationals
to allow them to see the skeletons that Australia may have or the negative
issues with which we are trying to deal in that country. We are basically
stripped of a professional capacity to do that in all but our top three posts.[24]
11.24
He emphasised that, in his view, 'If you are not at the policy table—if
you are not reading the cables—you really do not know what is going on'. [25]
The International Public Affairs Network also commented on, what it regarded
as, restrictions that limit the ability of locally engaged staff to contribute significantly
to public diplomacy:
Non-nationals have little firsthand knowledge or experience of
the country they are promoting, and little capacity to turn the Australian
Government’s objectives into effective public diplomacy strategies. Few locally
engaged Australian expatriate staff, if any, can be expected to have the levels
of security clearance needed to function effectively as members of a diplomatic
mission’s senior management team.[26]
11.25
In response to these observations about locally engaged staff, Dr
Strahan informed the committee that the locally engaged staff are not isolated
or treated as separate from embassy staff: that they are 'very much part of an
integrated team'.[27]
He pointed out that locally engaged staff cannot attend some meetings because they
do not have the appropriate security clearance. He underlined his previous
point, however, about the department's endeavours to achieve 'the right balance
and integration' between specialists and locally engaged staff'. He then noted
that there is always an A-based officer responsible for public diplomacy who
would lead the public diplomacy team. He explained that it would be incumbent
upon such an officer to be a conduit between the locally engaged staff and
those attending restricted meetings. He stated further that the 'vast majority
of public diplomacy' work is unclassified.[28]
11.26
Dr Strahan then commented on the training of locally engaged staff. He
advised that, they attend DFAT's regional public diplomacy workshops on the same
footing as A-based officers. He also mentioned that DFAT has an LES leadership
program which is open to LES in general. Under this program, groups of LES
visit Australia at regular intervals and that frequently public diplomacy staff
attend. He referred again to their career status but also noted the advantage
of having local knowledge:
There will be media officers, cultural officers or public
relations officers. Some posts at various points have had events managers. It
is a good way of building together good local knowledge, because the local staff
should also understand the country that we are working in. They have the
relevant qualifications and then they work with A-based officers who come armed
with a firm understanding of what we do.[29]
Committee view
11.27
The committee notes the concerns that locally engaged staff, who have a
significant role in a post's public diplomacy, may not be privy to communications
or discussions relevant to their area of responsibility and whose knowledge of Australia
may limit their ability to carry out their duties effectively. The committee
understands that DFAT has in place training programs designed to mitigate some
of these problems. Even so, the committee believes that if public diplomacy is
to be accepted as a mainstream activity, the department should review the staffing
arrangements of their posts to ensure that public diplomacy is not relegated to
junior officers or locally engaged staff but is a high priority for all staff
who should have the appropriate training.
11.28
In turning to the role and functions of the IAB, the committee welcomes
DFAT's endeavours to make public diplomacy a mainstream activity in the
department. It notes the work that IAB undertakes to ensure that public
diplomacy is integrated into the work of other sections in the department; that
the rest of the department is aware of the importance of public diplomacy; that
their activities are consistent with Australia's public diplomacy goals and
where possible are complementary.
11.29
On a number of occasions in this report, the committee has highlighted
the importance of public diplomacy especially as an exercise of soft power. An
effective public diplomacy strategy is critical to the overall endeavours of
the department to tackle effectively some of Australia's greatest foreign
policy challenges, such as the threat of terrorism and developments in the
South West Pacific. The committee believes that, if the IAB is to perform its
important role in the formulation, coordination and implementation of Australia's
public diplomacy, it must assume a prominent position in the department and be
well supported with resources.
11.30
To ensure that the department is able to meet the growing challenges of
conducting an effective public diplomacy policy, the committee believes it
would be timely for DFAT to conduct or commission an independent survey of its
overseas posts to ascertain their needs when it comes to public diplomacy. The
survey would cover issues such as training and resources available for public diplomacy,
access to specialists in public relations and the media and the effectiveness
of IAB in meeting the needs of posts in carrying out their public diplomacy
activities. As an example, the United States General Accounting Office
administered a survey to the heads of public affairs sections at US embassies
worldwide in 2003. It identified a number of problems including insufficient
resources and time to conduct public diplomacy effectively as well as
inadequate training in public diplomacy skills.[30]
Recommendation 15
11.31
The committee recommends that DFAT conduct an independent survey of its
overseas posts to assess their capacity to conduct effective public diplomacy
programs. The survey would seek views on the effectiveness of the post's
efforts in promoting Australia's interests, and how they could be improved, the
adequacy of resources available to conduct public diplomacy activities, the
training and skills of staff with public diplomacy responsibilities, the
coordination between agencies in public diplomacy activities; and the level of
support provided by IAB and how it could be improved.
11.32
The survey would also seek a response from the overseas posts on
observations made by the educational and cultural organisations, noted by the committee
in this report, levelled at the delivery of Australia's public diplomacy
programs. Such matters would include suggestions made to the committee that
public diplomacy opportunities are being lost in the absence of effective
mechanism for the coordination of activities. See paragraphs 7.24–7.34 (alumni
associations); 9.22–9.30 (cultural organisations); 9.41–9.44 (educational
institutions); 10.23–10.39 (Australia's diaspora).
Practitioners of public diplomacy—skills and training
11.33
There were a number of witnesses who argued that public diplomacy
requires practitioners who are specially trained for this work. Mr Geoff Miller
identified the 'need for specialised staff able to understand, manage and add
value to the expanding international agenda and to deal with the increased
number of actors, despite resource constraints'.[31]
The International Public Affairs Network also argued that there was the need
for specialists in public diplomacy:
Australia’s voice is merely one among many clamouring for
attention in an increasingly noisy international public communication
environment. Only specialists in the category of public relations and
organisational communication known as public diplomacy can best achieve Australia’s
objectives in this highly competitive field.[32]
11.34
It contended that 'the highest rates of success in public diplomacy are
achieved by people with the necessary specialist skills and experience from the
realm of the mass media and public relations, as well as specialist team
structures and resources managed by specialists with whole-of-government
guidance'.[33]
It stated:
In practice it requires the skills of communication analysis,
planning, management, procurement, writing, design, multimedia production,
marketing and dissemination. These skills do not belong to the profession of
diplomacy, but to the profession of public relations and communication.
Therefore, ‘public diplomacy’ in its full sense is public relations—or
more precisely, a category under public relations, government international
public affairs.[34]
11.35
Developing this argument, Media Gurus also focused on the need for specialists
in public diplomacy within the government:
...it needs to be recognised that while bureaucrats have many and
varied skills in the Australian Public Service, the particular skills of public
diplomacy do not automatically come with promotion to higher office.
Strategic thought related specifically to strategic
communication can only come by way of intense training, in an environment where
that training yields specific outcomes in partnership between organisation and
officer: i.e. training needs to be looked at as a process with clearly
negotiated outcomes: ‘if I train in this and do well and meet milestones, I can
[expect] to benefit in the following specific ways’. It should be viewed by the
same criteria as performance related pay.
Additionally, serious consideration needs to be given to having
more specialist communicators and PD practitioners attached to departments and
agencies that have international promotional responsibilities.[35]
11.36
Mr Kirk Coningham stated that the 'traditional diplomacy' exercised by
DFAT officers 'does not include public diplomacy'.[36]
He maintained that 'expertise encompassed in training, education and experience
is an absolute prerequisite for doing public diplomacy correctly, and fulsomely'.[37]
11.37
Mr Chris Freeman, a public affairs practitioner with extensive
experience in Australia's public diplomacy policy programs, was of the view
that DFAT no longer has the capacity to undertake 'sustained long-term multimedia
communication strategies'. He noted further that at a time when the importance
of public diplomacy is recognised, Australia no longer has 'the kinds of
resources' it used to have.[38]
He stated:
I do believe that we need to boost the number of specialist
communications staff dedicated to PD work. I do not think we can make a lot
more progress without that. You need to use these specialists to develop and
implement strategic, sustained, multimedia advocacy and information campaigns.
You need then to integrate them into the policy-making elements of government
as well and not let them languish in isolation.[39]
11.38
Dr Strahan acknowledged that there has been a continuing debate about
'generalist' versus 'specialist'. He stated that DFAT monitors its mix of skills
and 'regularly refreshes its skills base' to ensure that it has the mixture of skills
necessary to deliver the required results. Indeed, he referred to the
recruitment of 11 media specialists over the previous year.[40]
He told the committee:
...we now have journalists working through the organisation who
will be doing different kinds of jobs. They came to the organisation with that
journalistic background. They might end up doing one of our jobs which is a
more mainstream exact media position, but a lot of them end up doing other
things. That is what we want. We want that two-way interchange between people
who have more specialist skills and people like me who joined the department
with a PhD in history—a very different kind of background—who can work together.[41]
11.39
Dr Strahan also explained that LES are appointed specifically for public
diplomacy functions and that at least half of their duties involve public
diplomacy activities.[42]
According to Dr Strahan, the preliminary findings of a recent stocktake
involving 56 of Australia's 86 posts provided 'a fairly good snapshot of the staff'
that DFAT have recruited as locally engaged public diplomacy people. It found a
significant number of staff with journalism, communications, public relations,
media studies or cultural studies qualifications; others held humanities
degrees, while some had languages and linguistics qualifications or other qualifications
which were relevant, such as marketing or commerce. He stated:
When we looked at where these people had previously worked, we
found that 22 of them had previously worked in public relations, communications
or event management; 20 had worked in the media; 13 had worked in marketing;
and so forth.[43]
11.40
In his view, the results of the survey were reassuring because it
demonstrated that DFAT had recruited the 'right kind of people'. He noted that
'Sometimes they might be Australian citizens who live abroad, but they have the
right qualifications, they have the right experience and then they work in
tandem with the A-based officers at the post'.[44]
In May 2007, he informed the committee that the survey of posts was almost
complete and confirmed initial findings cited above. Of the 127 locally engaged
staff currently working on some aspect of public diplomacy, '50 have
qualifications in journalism, communications, public relations, marketing or
other media qualifications; 26 have humanities degrees; 20 have degrees in law,
politics and international relations; and 13 have degrees in commerce'.[45]
Committee view
11.41
The committee recognises that DFAT faces a major challenge ensuring that
it has the skills set necessary to deliver effective public diplomacy,
including highly developed communication and public relations skills. Although
all DFAT officers should be skilled in the art of public diplomacy, the committee
accepts that not all can be trained specialists in the area of communications
and public relations.
Call for a specialist public
diplomacy unit
11.42
A number of witnesses not only highlighted the need to have skilled
public diplomacy practitioners but supported proposals for the establishment of
a public diplomacy unit staffed by specialists. They drew particular attention
to the loss of expertise and specialists in public diplomacy when the
International Public Affairs Branch within DFAT was abolished in 1996. The
International Public Affairs Network argued that this organisation, which had
responsibility for Australia's public affairs and information activities, had
given Australia an edge in public diplomacy for 57 years.[46]
It stated that Australia 'must rebuild and relaunch its international public
affairs capacity within a specialist organisation focused on
whole-of-government public diplomacy'.[47]
11.43
Mr Kirk Coningham referred to the loss of the entire international
public diplomacy specialists in 1996 which, in his words, 'stripped' DFAT of
public diplomacy expertise and Australia of public diplomacy ideas.[48]
He stated:
By removing the expertise from the Department of Foreign Affairs,
we removed the font of ideas around public diplomacy and what it can really
achieve. I think that was the terrible tragedy of the time. Where it has left us
now is in a situation where we have a press release or a travelling exhibit or
an Australia Day party—and, in great stock, that is our public diplomacy.[49]
11.44
Mr Trevor Wilson also referred to the 'old days' when, in his view, DFAT
had a number of specialist journalists and the Australian government had that
'institutional capacity'. He too suggested having an institutional unit of
specialised people who could provide the specialist knowledge, particularly to
overseas posts. He noted:
The corporate support that they [overseas posts] get is not
necessarily going to be all that helpful unless there is some kind of...store of
knowledge and expertise and information back in the department that can give
you this...It seems to me that we are now in a situation where we have to respond
much more on a short-term basis because some of the longer term messages do not
seem to be getting out there. I agree that an institutional unit would be some
kind of answer to that.[50]
11.45
In responding to the proposal for a specialised coordinating unit, Mr Freeman
noted that this organisational structure should be 'plugged in very closely
with the major policy-making areas of government as well'.[51]
Committee view
11.46
The committee notes the benefits for public diplomacy in having specialist
staff skilled in communications and public relations that are available to
offer advice, guidance, to train and educate other staff in public diplomacy
matters, or in some cases, to devise, manage or even deliver a public diplomacy
program. The committee, however, does not believe that a specialist unit is
required.
11.47
Although, the committee does not support the creation of a unit of
specialists in public diplomacy, communications and public relations, it does
see a very clear need for the department to ensure that it has the correct
balance of specialists and generalists engaged in Australia's public diplomacy.
It is important for public diplomacy to be seen as a mainstream activity and
not the reserve of specialists located in a separate unit.
11.48
Developments in technology also have implications for staffing and the
training requirements of DFAT officers with regard to public diplomacy. The
following chapter considers the challenges that modern technology presents for
Australia's public diplomacy.
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