Chapter 5 - China, the U.S. and the shifting balance of influence in East Asia
Security is like oxygen: you tend not to notice it until you
lose it. A continued U.S.
presence in East Asia provides the oxygen that is so
crucial for the region's stability and economic prosperity...the United
States must maintain its troops, develop
regional institutions, bolster its allies, and remain deeply engaged in Asia.[239]
5.1
The previous chapter concentrated on bilateral
relations between China
and the United States.
This chapter takes a broader approach. It focuses on the complex web of
relations in East Asia and how smaller countries in the region,
particularly Australia,
are accommodating changing circumstances as China
and the U.S.
work out their relationship.
5.2
For many decades the United
States has taken an active interest in
maintaining a secure environment in East Asia.[240] While acknowledging China's
growing presence in the region, the U.S.
recognises that it needs to ensure that it remains fully engaged with the
nations of South-east Asia.[241] Deputy Secretary of State, Mr
Robert Zoellick,
suggested that the U.S.
should:
...work together with ASEAN, Japan,
Australia and
others for regional security and prosperity through the ASEAN Regional Forum
and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.[242]
5.3
Despite Mr
Zoellick's comment, some
analysts argue that America is not paying adequate attention to multilateral fora in Asia.[243]
5.4
Against the backdrop of China's growing influence, the
following section looks at the current level of U.S. engagement in East Asia
and the expectations within the region of the U.S.' role.
United States of America's
engagement with ASEAN countries
5.5
The United States
participates in a number of consultative meetings with ASEAN, including the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) and the Post Ministerial Conferences that immediately
follow the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. According to ASEAN, the meetings:
Offer an opportunity for the U.S. Secretary of State to review
contemporary political, security, economic and development cooperation issues
affecting the dialogue relations with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.[244]
5.6
The U.S.
has publicly indicated that it is committed to ASEAN and the region.[245] In June 2004, the Hon.
James Kelly,
Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of State, explained that the
continuing development of regional organisations is essential to East
Asia:
We have been an active supporter of ASEAN, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the region's only
multilateral security dialogue, and APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
fora, and have sought to strengthen and build capacity within these
organizations.[246]
5.7
According to the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr
Goh Chok Tong,
however, the U.S.
lost some goodwill in the region following the Asian financial crisis:
Fairly or unfairly, the US
was perceived to be not forthcoming enough in helping the Southeast Asian
countries. The IMF was seen by some as a tool of the US
to achieve the latter's objectives.[247]
5.8
Numerous analysts have observed that a major obstacle
to strengthening the relationship between the U.S.
and ASEAN countries stems from their different priorities in the region.[248] In September 2005, the Malaysian
Prime Minister, the Hon. Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi,
summed up a common perception of the U.S.'
engagement with East Asia, and more particularly with ASEAN.
He observed that the ASEAN–U.S. dialogue suffers in part from different
expectations. In his view, ASEAN expects the U.S.
to be an important strategic, economic and development partner as much as a
diplomatic one while the U.S.
gives a higher priority to ASEAN as 'a strategic partner for political and
regional security purposes'.[249] He
continued:
...the Dialogue between ASEAN and the United
States has yet to reach its full potential.
May I say that, to improve the Dialogue, the United
States has to listen more to ASEAN's
concerns and aspirations. The United States
must also make efforts to appreciate the 'ASEAN way' of conducting business,
which may at times appear slow and sluggish to the United
States.[250]
5.9
He noted further that the U.S.
had not acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which he emphasised was
a 'very important and key document in the life of ASEAN'.[251] Indeed, ASEAN believes that its
dialogue with the U.S.
has 'focused more and more on political and security discussions over the
years, particularly with the end of the Cold War'.[252]
5.10
In keeping with this view, the Hon Edward Masters,
Co-Chairman of the U.S.–Indonesia Society, told a U.S. House of Representatives
committee that the countries of Southeast Asia:
...very much want to see the United States remain a part of the
picture and a more active part than it is now. They find the United
States focused, too narrowly, in their view,
on counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism is important to them also...But they are
also concerned about the need for better governance, for removing poverty, for
consolidating their democracies...they want to resume rapid economic growth so
they can absorb new entrants into the workforce and work off the very large
unemployed group.[253]
5.11
A former Deputy Undersecretary
of Defense, Mr Dov Zakheim, stated in 2000 that the 'American attitude to ASEAN has
generally been one of benign neglect'.[254]
More recently, U.S. Secretary of State, Dr
Condoleezza Rice,
was criticised for not attending the last ARF meeting in July 2005, sending her deputy instead.[255]
A number of commentators urge the U.S. government to take a more active approach to the ARF and to
consider new mechanisms to step up dialogue with ASEAN as a group.[256] This viewpoint, that the U.S.
could and should be doing more to strengthen its relationship with East
Asia, extends beyond security matters. Some analysts are calling
on the country to expand or accelerate existing measures in diplomacy,
security, trade and cultural exchanges—to 'rediscover its soft power in the
region'.[257]
5.12
At a time when the commitment of the U.S.
to promoting the interests of the region—as distinct from its own narrower
strategic pursuits—is under question, China's
influence is on the ascendency. Indeed, a number of analysts have compared China's
growing sophistication and skill in its foreign diplomacy in the region with
the lack of interest by the U.S.
One stated that China's
charm campaign contrasts sharply with U.S.
'hectoring nanny-ism'; another maintained that while the Chinese diplomatic
offensive was 'a thing of beauty', the U.S had been 'oblivious'.[258] The International Institute for
Strategic Studies suggested that:
... there is a growing appreciation in the region that US
influence is declining as China's
grows. Furthermore, while China
is an increasingly attractive partner, the Bush administration's war on
terrorism has complicated Washington's
relations with Southeast Asia.[259]
5.13
Similarly, another analyst noted that China's
increasing leadership in the region is acceptable to its neighbours, given China's
better understanding of the region's shared priorities. The same observation,
however, did not apply to the U.S.:
Japan
and Singapore
apart, Asian nations clearly are not keen to include the U.S. Asian leaders
grumble that Washington
does not seem to understand that economic development—not the fight against
international terrorism—is at [the] top of the agenda for Southeast Asian
governments.[260]
5.14
A 2005 survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project
found that positive opinions of the U.S. in Indonesia had plummeted to as low
as 15 per cent in 2003, but had rebounded to 38 per cent by 2005. The survey
found that the U.S.
tsunami aid and relief effort was widely hailed in Indonesia
and gave Indonesians a more favourable view of the U.S.
Even so, the U.S.'
favourability rating is very low when compared to the 73 per cent support
rating attributed by Indonesians to China.[261]
5.15
To underline his point that U.S.
engagement with ASEAN lacks vigour, the Singaporean Prime Minister, Mr
Goh Chok Tong,
made the following comparisons:
Formal ASEAN India dialogue relations were established in 1995.
In the ten years since, 14 ASEAN India mechanisms were established. Formal
ASEAN China dialogue relations were established in 1996. In the nine years
since, 27 ASEAN China mechanisms at different levels have been established.
ASEAN Japan dialogue relations were formalised in 1977. In the 28 years since,
33 ASEAN Japan mechanisms were established. The US ASEAN dialogue relationship
was formalised at the same time as Japan's,
almost three decades also, but there are currently only 7 ASEAN US bodies and
they meet only infrequently.[262]
5.16
Mr Goh
sees the U.S.–China relationship as the key relationship in East
Asia: 'If U.S.-China relations are strained, all East
Asia is unsettled'.[263]
He has expressed the view that 'an East Asian architecture that does not have
the US as one
of its pillars would be an unstable structure'.[264]
5.17
The International Institute for Strategic Studies emphasised
the view that 'in order to maintain its regional influence Washington
needs to employ a more coordinated strategy for Southeast Asia'.[265] Mr Eric Heginbotham has argued that
rather than focus on military issues alone, the United States needs 'to be
connected to political and economic realties...to pay more attention to the wider
Asian context—one that is generating underappreciated opportunities to
influence political outcomes, as well as creating non-traditional security
challenges'.[266]
5.18
Witnesses to the inquiry also raised concerns about the
role of the United States
in the region. Professor Paul
Dibb, Director of the Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre at the Australian national University (ANU), told the committee
that the United States
has 'taken its eye off the East Asia security ball'.
According to Professor Dibb, the U.S.' preoccupation with the war on terrorism
and Iraq has left the U.S. distracted, while 'China has been allowed to develop
soft sources of power and influence, not least a sphere of influence in
South-East Asia'.[267]
The United
States and the EAS
5.19
Concern over the United
States' lack of engagement in the region was
heightened with the proposal for an East Asia Summit that did not include the United
States. Some American political observers have
expressed concern that the East Asia Summit (EAS) may become exclusive and
inward-looking.[268] Mr
Drew Thompson
of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies suggested that the U.S.'
exclusion from the summit may reflect a broader trend of China
attempting to marginalise America
in the region:
China
has continually expressed its intention not to seek hegemony or disrupt
international balances, but simply to maintain its 'peaceful rise'. However,
not all are assuaged by its reassurances. While China
may not significantly degrade Japan's
economic influence or the U.S.
strategic position in the near-term, China's
opaque transactions and unstated intentions are a cause for concern that China
is treating the United States
and Japan as
regional competitors. For example, China's
promotion of an East Asian Summit scheduled for November of this year has so
far excluded the U.S.,
which remains the dominant economic and strategic force in the region. This
behaviour fuels the feeling in Washington
that Beijing is attempting to
marginalize the U.S.
and ultimately push it out of Asia. Reinforcing this
notion, Taiwan
(which was not invited to attend the 1955 Bandung
conference either) risks being another regional powerhouse excluded from the
meeting over ideology.[269]
5.20
In November 2004, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Mr
Richard Armitage,
indicated that the United States
was 'less happy' about the EAS because it is not a member. He noted 'we are a
Pacific power, we want to be involved in the Pacific and the life of the
Pacific, and we intend to be involved'.[270] The following May, he stated that the U.S.
would 'oppose overt efforts to block it from participating in the summit', but
it would not insist on sending a representative to any meetings because 'it can
ask Japan, Australia
and other nations to speak for the American side'.[271]
5.21
A number of China
experts have asserted that, with the U.S.
absent, it was important for Australia
to participate in the East Asia Summit. For instance, Dr
Peter Van Ness
of the ANU's Contemporary China Centre told the committee:
What the United States
fears is not just being left out but that some sort of strategic arrangement
will develop out of that which will not be in their interests and which will
not let them in effect play the role that they have been playing so far in East
Asia. Australia
has important influence here. Colleagues in Japan,
for example, talk about Prime Minister Howard
as having ‘the Crawford connection’ and being able to talk to
the American administration in ways that many other countries cannot. [272]
5.22
He accepted that America
may not be part of the EAS, but that Australia
'can try to build in a cooperative way a new set of arrangements, including
security arrangements, for East Asia'.[273]
5.23
Even though, at the moment, it is excluded from the
EAS, the U.S.,
as discussed earlier, is a member of numerous major regional fora. In noting
the establishment of regional organisations, 'several of which exclude the United
States', Mr
Kelly told a U.S. House of Representatives' Committee
that:
...we need to strengthen the organizations in which we are a
member, such as the ARF, ASEAN and APEC.[274]
5.24
This observation is pertinent in light of some of the
criticism levelled at the U.S.
for failing to give adequate attention to the region. As a respected and strong
ally of the U.S.,
Australia is
well placed to support and encourage the U.S.
to maintain an active presence in the region.
Committee
view
5.25
The committee believes that Australia
must do its utmost to encourage the United
States to remain constructively engaged in
the region. While the committee has stressed the important role that the United
States has in APEC, it believes that Australia should also encourage the United
States to demonstrate its support for the broader objectives of ASEAN—including
the ARF—and to build a more visible and credible presence in the region.
Recommendation 2
5.26
The Australian government, through its good relations
with the United States, encourage the United States to use its influence more
effectively in the region, and in so doing, to improve its relationship with
ASEAN and its member countries.
Triangular relations involving China
and the U.S.
5.27
As noted in chapter 2, countries in the East Asian
region are endeavouring to maximise the benefits deriving from their
relationship with China, but are at the same time taking measures to guard
against a potentially more assertive or demanding China. One of their major
apprehensions is that relations between China
and the United States
may sour.
5.28
They are keen to see China
and the United States
enjoy positive relations: they do not want to be placed in a position where
they may have to take sides. As Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr
George Yeo, noted: 'the greater the number of major powers in our house, the
more comfortable our lives would be, the greater will be the opportunities
available to each and every one of us'.[275]
5.29
Noting the predicament of being caught in the middle of
a possible superpower rivalry, Dr Van
Ness submitted that:
The vast majority of countries in the region find themselves in
a similar situation: they have good relations with both, and don't want to have
to choose either the US
or China.[276]
5.30
Dr Richard
Ellings, President of the National Bureau of
Asian Research, told a U.S. House of Representatives' Committee
on International Relations that China's
rise is 'exerting a gravitational pull felt throughout Asia'.
He stated further that '[N]ot knowing the future of Chinese power or America's
commitment in the region, many Asian nations are hedging by increasingly
seeking accommodation with both power centers'.[277] Indonesia
is a good example, having signed a 'strategic partnership' with China
in April 2005 while pursuing the re-establishment of military to military
contacts with the U.S.[278]
5.31
However, Dr Ron Huisken, a Senior Fellow at the ANU's
Defence and Strategic Studies Centre, has observed that 'choosing between the
US and China is the common nightmare in East Asia, something to be avoided if
at all possible'.[279] Similarly, Professor
David M. Lampton,
director of China
studies at Johns Hopkins
University's School
of Advanced International Studies, has
argued:
China's
rise, therefore, is forcing many of our traditional allies in the region and
farther afield increasingly to balance their interests with Beijing
against their interests with Washington.
Most Asian countries do not wish to be forced to choose between the two. As China
becomes a bigger security and economic player, and if it continues with its
trade and smile diplomacy, alliances that initially were directed against the
PRC, and more recently designed to maintain balance and reassurance in the
region, will become progressively less effective unless they adapt.[280]
5.32
Australia
confronts the same challenge. Mr Peter Jennings, Director of ASPI, defined
Australia's relations with the U.S. and China in terms of 'hedging' and
'bandwagoning':
...there is still a
degree of uncertainty in the region about the ultimate shape of China’s disposition to use power. And, really, we
will not know the answer to that question until we get there. But all of these multilateral,
trilateral and bilateral moves to one degree or another reflect the region
becoming more alive to the need to work out how we can either hedge, by
cooperating with the Americans, or bandwagon, by cooperating with the Chinese.[281]
5.33
The following section considers Australia's
position in the context of the China–U.S relationship in the region.
Maintaining healthy relations with
two superpowers
5.34
China's
rise has rendered Sino–U.S. relations one of the most important considerations
in Australia's
foreign policy. Along with many countries in the East Asian region, Australia
shares the desire to see China
and the U.S.
manage their relationship in a way that will encourage a stable and
economically prosperous region. As noted earlier, however, as China's
influence grows, uncertainties about the shift of power in the region are
emerging. There are concerns that China
may ultimately seek to dominate the region and that the United
States and China
may compete for power there, rather than cooperate to bring stability and
economic prosperity.
5.35
Australia's efforts to balance its relationship between
prospective 'peer' superpowers has to date consisted of maintaining the best
possible relations with both nations and hoping that zero-sum choices between
them will not need to be made. The future health of the relationship between China
and the U.S.
will have significant implications for Australia,
particularly given our close strategic ties with the U.S.
and the trade benefits derived from China's
economic growth.
5.36
Despite the clear economic compatibility and recent
warm political relations between Australia
and China,
potential difficulties remain. Most significantly for Australia,
China's emerging
influence across East Asia is inextricably linked with
the influence of the U.S.
in that region. As a close strategic ally of the U.S.,
Australia's
positive political relationship with China
will be significantly dependant on how these two large nations come to terms
with the shifting balance of power in the region. Whether or not Australia
can continue to develop a close political relationship with China
while maintaining close ties with our foremost ally, the U.S.,
potentially presents Australia
with a most challenging foreign policy issue.
5.37
As a relatively small nation, however, much of this
task will be outside Australia's
immediate control; it will depend on how China
and the U.S.
manage their own relationship and their diplomacy with other major Asian
nations. For example, the Lowy Institute's Mr
Allan Gyngell
has noted that successfully meeting the new challenges posed by an emerging China
will be somewhat out of Australia's
hands and dependent largely on the U.S.
and China's own
conduct:
For the past 50 years Asia's most
important power, Japan,
has been a staunch partner of the U.S. Australia has not had to make choices
between its principal ally and its most promising market. But it may now face
the uncomfortable challenge of having to maintain constructive relations with
both Washington and Beijing.
Its success in doing this will depend critically on two things: U.S.
strategy towards its emerging Asian competitor and China's
own behaviour.[282]
5.38
According to Professor
Hugh White of
the ANU's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian government
believes that even-handedness is sustainable in managing our relations with China
and the U.S.,
because 'growing strategic competition between U.S.
and China is
not inevitable'.[283] The Department of
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (DFAT) suggested that China's
approach to the relationship favours cooperation over confrontation:
China's
leaders recognise that a stable regional security environment is essential for China's
economic development. They also recognise that a productive relationship with Washington
is in China's
interests.[284]
5.39
In a speech to the Lowy Institute in March 2005, the
Prime Minister expressed optimism about the future of the U.S.–China
relationship:
It would in my strong view be a mistake to embrace an overly
pessimistic view of this relationship, pointing to unavoidable conflict. Australia
does not believe that there is anything inevitable about escalating strategic
competition between China
and the United States.[285]
5.40
He added that, from Australia's
perspective:
Australia
is encouraged by the constructive and realistic management of this vital
relationship. We see ourselves as having a role in continually identifying, and
advocating to each, the shared strategic interests these great powers have in
regional peace and prosperity.[286]
5.41
For Australia,
with its long-term ANZUS alliance, the U.S.
is properly viewed not as an outside balancer to China,
but as an integral and long-standing component of its strategic policy. If Australia
is to pursue its ties with Washington
and Beijing concurrently, it is
obviously in Australia's
best interests for cordial and constructive relations between the U.S.
and China.
5.42
However, some elements within the current U.S.
administration and Congress do not wholeheartedly share this view, instead
perceiving China's
growing influence in 'zero-sum' terms (see earlier discussion at paragraphs 4.12–4.19).[287] If this view were to ultimately
prevail in Washington, Australia's
position would be considerably more challenging.
5.43
Professor White
has suggested that Australia
needs to negate the prospects of a 'choice' by convincing the U.S.
not to force it into making one:
Both Beijing and Washington
want to force us to a choice, and we can only avoid that with very forceful,
imaginative and effective diplomacy. Howard
needs to persuade Washington
that it is in America's
interests to have a U.S.
ally embedded in the new, China-dominated Asia.[288]
5.44
He has stated that Australia
is shifting its foreign policy emphasis towards China
out of pragmatism:
China
is seen as the key to Australia's
economic future, and Beijing has
made it clear that economic opportunities are conditional on strategic and
political alignment. China
is using its economic potential to build a sphere of influence, and we are
being drawn in by our purse strings.[289]
5.45
He also commented that:
For 100 years we have supported American primacy in Asia.
Now we seem happy to be drafted into a Chinese sphere of influence that
directly challenges that primacy.
That is not necessarily a mistake. Australia
has no choice but to adjust our policies to the raw facts of China's
growing power.[290]
5.46
Professor William
Tow, Director of the International Studies
Program at the University of Queensland,
has argued, however, that Australia
should not risk undermining its U.S.
alliance:
...no Australian government can risk adopting security policies
that are at odds with the world's remaining superpower and one that shares a
language, a set of liberal values and a historical identity very similar to Australia's
own.[291]
5.47
From the Chinese perspective, public statements on Australia's
strategic alliance with the U.S.
have been positive. In a February 2005 speech, the PRC's Ambassador to Australia,
Her Excellency Madam Fu Ying, stated that China
did not view Australia's
alliance with the U.S.
as targeted at China.
She added that it would not 'in any way harm Australia's
relations with China'.[292]
5.48
One aspect of discussions with the committee during
this inquiry was Australia's
need to be transparent with both China
and the U.S. about
our allegiances and relations with the other. For example, the Department of
Defence's submission stated that:
The U.S.-China relationship will be the key bilateral
relationship shaping the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region for
the foreseeable future. As China
continues to view its relationship with Australia,
particularly in defence issues, through the prism of our alliance with the U.S.,
we welcome the opportunity to discuss Australia's
involvement in U.S.
initiatives of particular interest to China.[293]
5.49
Although Australia's
influence over U.S.
or Chinese strategic foreign policy is limited, evidence received during this
inquiry assessed Australia's
options for maintaining healthy political relations with both countries. Professor
White has highlighted that on one hand, Australia
needs to adjust to the realities of China's
emergence, yet on the other, America's
continued effective engagement in the region is necessary to Australia's
own strategic interests.[294] How Australia
achieves this balance is a difficult proposition, especially with regard to Australia's
role as mediator.
Australia
as an intermediary?
5.50
Since the visits of the U.S.
and Chinese leaders to Australia
in 2003, the prospect of Australia
actively assisting the two nations to overcome their political tensions has
emerged. Having a close strategic alliance with the U.S. and warm political
relations with China, Australia may be perceived to hold a unique facilitative
position between the two and be able to act as a mediator between them by
virtue of an unthreatening middle power status.
5.51
Indeed, this prospect of proactive diplomacy has been
widely discussed in the context of Australia's
handling of Sino–U.S. tension. For example, Professor
Tow has emphasised Australia's
strategic importance to China
in terms of Sino–U.S. relations:
Australia
is...becoming an important strategic conduit between China
and the US as
those two great powers attempt to manage regional flashpoints such as the
Korean peninsula and Taiwan.
China covets Australia's
natural resources, and appreciates what it views as Australia's
greater sensitivity to its irredentism and human rights positions. As Chinese
leaders rely on Australia
to help modify what they view as excessively hardline US positions, they in
turn lend Canberra leverage in its
relations with Beijing.[295]
5.52
As noted earlier, Mr
Armitage has suggested that Australia,
among other nations, could speak for the American side in the EAS. More
recently, in July 2005, the U.S. President encouraged Australia
to be persuasive with the Chinese on issues over which they differ with the U.S.:
... we can work
together to reinforce the need for China to accept certain values as universal—the
value of minority rights, the value of freedom for people to speak, the value
of freedom of religion, the same values we share.[296]
5.53
At the same press conference, however, the Prime
Minister stated:
From Australia's
point of view, well, we don't presume any kind of intermediary role. That would
be absurd. We have relationships with the United
States, which I've talked about and
categorised in an unambiguous way. Everybody understands the centrality of that
relationship to Australia.
The Chinese understand it. But we are unashamed in developing our relations
with China, and
I am well pleased with the way the economic relationship has developed. And
I'll continue to do everything I can in the interests of Australia
to ensure that it develops further.[297]
5.54
This occasion was not the first time that Australian
leaders have made plain that Australia was not going to speak for the U.S. in
the region, nor be the middleman for China and the U.S. Both the Australian
Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have downplayed the
suggestion that Australia
has an honest broker role in East Asia. Prime
Minister Howard has clearly stated that Australia's
primary role in the region is helping friends.[298] Minister Downer has also asserted
that Australia
does not see itself as some kind of broker but as a country that 'promotes its
own interests and has a strong alliance with the United
States but good relations through East
Asia'.[299]
5.55
Professor White has suggested that Australia's
reluctance to become a U.S.–China mediator stems from the U.S.' unwillingness
to separate China's different political and cultural values from its legitimate
exercise of power,[300] where Australia
is content 'to build upon the things we have in common and not become obsessed
with the things that make us different'.[301]
5.56
Professor White
has written:
[The Prime Minister] acknowledges that China
and Australia
have different values, but does not agree with [the President] that China's
values undermine its claims to regional power. He accepts those claims as
legitimate.
5.57
However:
... they [the U.S.]
do not accept China's
claims for a share of power in Asia, because they
believe only countries that share America's
values can legitimately exercise such power. Power and values are so deeply
intertwined in American thinking they cannot be separated.[302]
5.58
The committee recognises that Australia would be
placing itself in a number of potentially awkward diplomatic positions by
attempting to act as a go-between for the two countries over their differences.
At present, the Australian government can maintain a close relationship with
the U.S.
without having to confront China
on issues of conjecture.
5.59
Notwithstanding this, the Chinese leadership has also
indicated that Australia
can have a meaningful role to play in assisting this important relationship,
particularly with respect to assisting with a resolution of the Taiwan
issue. In his November 2003 speech to the Australian Parliament, President
Hu Jintao
stated:
The Chinese government and people look to Australia
for a constructive role in China's
peaceful reunification.[303]
Committee
view
5.60
The committee believes that Australia
must maintain its current position of presenting itself as an independent
country whose abiding interest is in ensuring that the region as a whole remains
politically stable and secure. It recognises that a cooperative Sino–U.S. relationship
is crucial to Australia's
own interests in the region, particularly with respect to the U.S.'
regional security presence and China's
economic opportunities. It believes that Australia,
as a friend to both countries, should encourage them, in pursuing their own
interests, to place the highest priority on contributing to the stability and
prosperity of the region as a whole. The committee again underlines the
important role that multilateral fora have in creating an environment conducive
to cooperative and friendly relations that take account of the interests of the
region as well as of individual countries.
5.61
The following chapter develops this discussion in the
context of China's
military modernisation.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page