Chapter 13
Coordinating Australia's contribution
13.1
Cooperation between agencies involved in a peacekeeping operation is critical
to the success of a mission. Defence made clear that it understood the
necessity for whole-of-government cooperation, explaining:
In recent years, a more whole-of-government approach to peace
operations has developed. Such an approach necessitates a thorough
understanding of the interrelated roles of all actors involved and methods to
plan and implement a multifaceted campaign. The whole-of-government approach...whereby
all relevant elements are coordinated at the strategic and operational level,
maximises the efficacy of the resources made available.[1]
13.2
In this chapter, the committee considers the existing mechanisms for the
coordination of Australian peacekeeping operations. It also examines the
structures that provide whole-of-government policy direction. The first section
is concerned with planning and coordination at the strategic level. The second
section focuses on operational considerations and preparedness, identifying how
Australian peacekeepers can work together effectively as a coordinated and
well-integrated whole.
Coordination—strategic level
13.3
The arrangements for coordinating and implementing Australia's
contribution to peacekeeping operations are developed case by case and based on
'flexibility, responsiveness and reliability'. Ms Gillian Bird, DFAT, observed
that 'We have well-established and well-tried structures to make decisions and
to coordinate planning and implementation'.[2]
13.4
The following mechanisms are used to formulate whole-of-government
policy and to coordinate Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations:
- the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and the
Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCONS) provide policy direction and
development;
- the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG) at the deputy
secretary level provides strategic oversight and direction across agencies; and
- standing interdepartmental committees (IDCs) address specific
peacekeeping operation issues.[3]
13.5
As noted in Chapter 3, the NSC sets policy and is chaired by the Prime
Minister. It sits at the highest level of government, convenes regularly, and meets
on a daily basis, if required. The SPCG includes DFAT, PM&C and Defence as
the core agencies.[4]
Although chaired by PM&C, any member of the committee may call a meeting if
issues arise. The SPCG committee meets routinely on a monthly basis, and more
frequently as required.[5]
13.6
The IDCs provide a whole-of-government framework for policy formulation
and coordination of an individual peacekeeping operation. Whole-of-government
working groups focussed on particular areas, such as a legal working group and
security working group, come under the IDC. For example, with RAMSI, DFAT
convenes an IDC that meets weekly.[6]
However, Australia's contribution in Timor-Leste is coordinated through the SPCG,
which includes the AFP, A-G's and AusAID as well as the core agencies for
discussions on East Timor.[7]
Major General Mike Smith commented that he was 'surprised that there was not
an IDC or a real whole-of-government approach to the recent East Timor mission'
as there was for RAMSI.[8]
13.7
In addition to specific whole-of-government fora, agencies have
established other mechanisms for coordinating peacekeeping operations. For
example, AusAID and ADF 'meet at head of agency/CDF level periodically for
strategic and senior level discussions'. During a humanitarian crisis, the ADF
places liaison officers with AusAID.[9]
13.8
Lt Gen Gillespie considered that the new Joint Operations Command
Headquarters at Bungendore, near Queanbeyan, NSW, would improve
whole-of-government planning and coordination:
Because of the way that our headquarters are constructed at the
present time, the different capabilities that the headquarters can bring are in
the different places. Whilst we can engage with other departments, we can't
engage with them with all the toolsets there at one time. We will be able to do
that in Bungendore. So situational awareness, intelligence, access to legal staff,
the ability to take something from the joint operations level back to the
strategic commitments/whole-of-government level will be vastly increased.
Turnaround times will decrease. The duplication of effort and staffs will
decrease dramatically.[10]
13.9
In addition to the standing forums and facilities for coordinating peace
operations, the committee received some examples of operation-specific
coordination.
RAMSI
13.10
Individual operations have mechanisms for coordination on the ground.
For example, RAMSI has a special coordinator, a DFAT officer, who has overall
responsibility for the mission. In addition, the senior group involves an AusAID
development coordinator, a senior AFP officer and a senior ADF officer. The
group meets frequently to ensure 'total transparency of knowledge between them...so
that the mission is in fact ready for contingencies that may be foreseen'.[11]
RAMSI's Special Coordinator is also supported by a Deputy Special Coordinator
from New Zealand, and an Assistant Special Coordinator from Fiji.[12]
13.11
In addition to thrice-weekly coordination meetings in Honiara, there is
a weekly IDC meeting by telephone hook-up between the Office of the Special
Coordinator and agencies in Canberra. The Special Coordinator's office also
provides a weekly situation report. DFAT coordinates a six-monthly report to
the NSC, with input from all agencies.[13]
Mr Alan March, AusAID, explained the information flow from Solomon Islands
back to contributing agencies:
There is a whole-of-government structure in Honiara that
captures this information, makes decisions and prioritises. Thereafter, there
is a twin stream in which information then comes back to Canberra. It is
through that whole-of-government reporting back to the whole-of-government
structure here in Canberra and then separately through the line agencies...[14]
13.12
In an audit of the coordination of Australian government assistance to Solomon
Islands, the ANAO concluded that the coordination arrangements between
Australian government agencies were sound.[15]
The ANAO found that program objectives had been established for RAMSI, an
evolutionary approach to strategic planning employed, a strategic approach to
risk management adopted and arrangements put in place for regular
whole-of-government reporting to the Australian Government.[16]
13.13
As noted earlier, this IDC approach is not used for Timor-Leste which is
coordinated through the SPCG.
Peace Operations Working Group and
other contacts
13.14
DFAT also informed the committee about the Peace Operations Working
Group which looks at peacekeeping operations more thematically. It is an
informal working group chaired by DFAT, with members from Defence, AFP, AusAID
and A-G's. The group was formed in 1995 and meets as required, generally 'a
few times a year'. Mr Michael Potts, DFAT, described three main aims of the
Peace Operations Working Group:
Firstly, its objective is information sharing...Secondly, it is a
very useful clearing house...to look at how peacekeeping is likely to figure on
the [General Assembly] agenda for this year. Thirdly, it provides the opportunity
for new initiatives, to look at, for example, what we might want to do with the
Peacebuilding Commission and so on.[17]
13.15
Agencies also maintain informal dialogue with each other. For example,
the AEC liaises with other agencies regarding countries in which it has
long-term interest; and it is frequently consulted on election-related matters
and governance issues. Outside Australia, AEC staff maintain contact with Australian
embassies and high commissions. The AEC observed that it has 'invariably received
strong support from them'.[18]
Adequacy of existing arrangements
13.16
The Government of Canada advised the committee that it has adopted a
whole-of-government approach to peace operations and has established a specific
bureau for this purpose.[19]
In Australia, government departments and agencies did not see the need for a
specialised coordination group; they were satisfied with existing arrangements.[20]
AusAID noted, however, that these arrangements have a 'high transaction cost'
as agencies have to invest senior and experienced people in the process. It
added that some agencies have had to strengthen their 'senior level staffing
profile to be able to engage in this'. Nevertheless, AusAID considered that 'It
is certainly an acceptable cost, and it is certainly a cost that is far
outweighed by the dividends of having a more joined up approach'.[21]
13.17
In reference to RAMSI, DFAT noted the 'intensity and complexity' of
managing whole-of-government planning and implementation, observing the
importance of devoting sufficient resources to the coordination task.[22]
It was satisfied that the development of the IDG and engagement between the
agencies provides the capabilities that Australia needs for the kinds of
operations it is involved in.[23]
AusAID considered that such costs would mitigate over time as agencies 'get
intuitively more involved with aligning our systems and the areas of overlap
become much more clearly understood at all levels in agencies'.[24]
Committee view
13.18
The committee notes the formal mechanisms that exist to coordinate the
Australian Government's contribution to peacekeeping operations at a strategic
level. Evidence suggested that government agencies are satisfied with current
arrangements.
13.19
The committee accepts the argument that flexibility is needed when
coordinating arrangements for peacekeeping operations to enable appropriate
responses to the circumstances of each mission. It would be interested in the
findings of a comparative study into the effectiveness of the approach taken
for RAMSI with the establishment of an IDC and that for East Timor where
coordination is managed through the SPCG. The committee believes that there are
important lessons to be learnt from such review and analysis.
Recommendation 12
13.20
The committee recommends that DFAT undertake a comparative review and
analysis of the strategic level arrangements for the planning and coordination
of RAMSI and peacekeeping operations in Timor-Leste and to use the findings as
a guide for future missions.
13.21
In Chapter 14, the committee considers how these mechanisms relate to those
outside government, and in particular, the extent to which NGOs understand and
engage with the process.
Coordination—operational level
13.22
Having considered the whole-of-government arrangements for managing peacekeeping
operations, the committee now examines how effectively Australian government
agencies work at an operational level. Although the committee has already
discussed ADF–AFP interoperability, it considers them here within a
whole-of-government context.
13.23
With the increasing number of civilian personnel engaged in
peacekeeping, greater attention has been given to the importance of
whole-of-government cooperation.[25]
Dr Bob Breen, ANU, noted that Australia's involvement in peacekeeping
operations in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, was significant in this regard.
This was the first time that diplomats were involved at an operational,
tactical level. It was also the first time that civilian peace monitors were
engaged in an operation:
Mixing those groups in and getting them to work cohesively with
the military marks the first attempt by a number of agencies to take a more
than crisis time interest in longer term commitments to work together to get an
effect on the ground.[26]
13.24
The findings of an ANAO report on the coordination of Australian government
assistance to Solomon Islands illustrated the importance of government agencies
working together. The report identified some deficiencies in coordination on
the ground when the security situation deteriorated rapidly in April 2006. It
found that while some civilian members of RAMSI were well informed about
developments during the riots, others were not.[27]
DFAT advised the committee that a broad 'lessons learned' exercise had been
undertaken following the riots and, as a result, RAMSI had 'strengthened
security, including establishing clear lines of communication in Honiara'. Some
of the changes put in place included the launch of a security website to
provide information to personnel and the development of a new civilian security
plan, including regular threat and risk assessments.[28]
13.25
The experiences in Honiara in 2006 underscore the fact that peacekeeping
operations may occur in volatile environments, where temporary flare-ups of
violence and breakdowns in law and order test the effectiveness of the
interoperability of all relevant government agencies. With the involvement of
civilians from a range of agencies, it is essential that basic information
about personnel, such as knowing their location, is available through a central
register and reliable communication networks are in place and efficiently
managed.
13.26
DFAT also advised the committee that coordination had been further
improved in light of RAMSI's response to the tsunami that caused widespread
destruction in Solomon Islands in April 2007, with all RAMSI civilians required
'to enter their current and planned movements on to the RAMSI Civilian Security
website'.[29]
Coordination—preparedness
13.27
Administrative tools such as clear lines of communication are essential
to achieving coordination between all components of a peacekeeping operation.
But a shared understanding of the government's objectives in the mission, of
the roles and functions of participating agencies and how their contribution forms
part of an integrated mission is also important. For example, Defence noted:
In recent years a more whole-of-government approach to peace
operations has developed. Such an approach necessitates a thorough
understanding of the interrelated roles of all actors involved and methods to
plan and implement a multifaceted campaign.[30]
13.28
Furthermore, Defence expected that peacekeeping operations would
continue 'to evolve as a strategic tool for the resolution of conflict' and
that such operations 'will contribute to, and are coordinated with, a
whole-of-government approach'.[31]
13.29
Agencies should have a common understanding of a range of important
matters such as the legal aspects of a peacekeeping operation and their
implications for Australians participating in the mission. For example, the
Australian Red Cross suggested that joint training must include a detailed
explanation of the legal framework within which the operations are undertaken. In
its view, training needs to include, as a minimum, the relevant UN or bilateral
agreements covering such operations and the underlying international legal
framework—in particular international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. Training should also include clear guidance as to the application
of Australian domestic law, including criminal law.[32]
13.30
Studies indicate that joint pre-deployment training provides the
platform for a successful deployment. The Folke Bernadotte Academy, a Swedish Government
initiative with a particular focus on peace operations, has noted that 'There
is a critical need for participants in peace operations to train together'
prior to the deployment, instead of meeting for the first time on location. It
has stated:
The earlier in one’s education and training that one is exposed
to the often different views of other disciplines, the more readily one can adapt
to the needs of cooperative work in the field.[33]
13.31
The committee now considers the measures taken by the Australian Government
and its agencies to achieve an effective whole-of-government operation through
pre-deployment training and preparation.
Staff secondments
13.32
As noted in Chapter 11, the AFP seconds officers to various Defence
establishments. Several departments also second staff to other departments to
improve the links between their organisations, increase their knowledge and
understanding of each other's work and to encourage more comprehensive and
cohesive input to peacekeeping operations. AusAID explained that it provides a
seconded liaison officer to the IDG to assist in the coordination of
duties/projects of mutual interest to both agencies. It said:
In line with these responsibilities, the AusAID liaison officer
provides assistance in the development and design phase of the IDG’s current
Capacity Development training program. The AusAID liaison officer continues to
provide ongoing advice to IDG and contributes to all relevant IDG
training/course components, particularly in areas of capacity building and
practice. This officer also delivers briefings to all IDG pre-deployment
training courses to provide a broad overview of AusAID, its mandate and the
development projects in which it is involved.[34]
13.33
The AFP appreciates the benefits that derive from the exchange of personnel
and reciprocates by placing officers within AusAID. Assistant Commissioner Walters
described the strong strategic partnership between AFP and AusAID:
The linkage from peace, stability and development to security
and the rule of law is well known. The AFP’s relationship with AusAID in
preparing and implementing police and law and justice programs in pre and
postconflict environments grows. We have staff members embedded in AusAID’s
Fragile States Unit and the Office of Development Effectiveness and we benefit
from having an AusAID liaison officer attached to the International Deployment
Group.[35]
13.34
A number of other agencies also second officers to AusAID, particularly to
the Fragile States Unit.[36]
AusAID's Fragile States Unit
13.35
AusAID's Fragile States Unit (FSU) was formed in 2005 to analyse
international and regional experiences in relation to vulnerable states,
particularly those in Australia's region.[37]
It was conceptualised at the outset as an inter-agency unit, recognising the
need for an integrated approach to fragile states.[38]
13.36
Both the AFP and Treasury have officers placed within the FSU. Defence
does not currently have personnel seconded to the FSU but stated that it would
consider assigning an officer for 2008.[39]
13.37
Mr March, AusAID, considered that one of the greatest strengths of the
FSU is the improvement in inter-agency understanding and the approach it
fosters:
I think strengths are...that we bring from Treasury, AFP and, in
the past, from Defence, their perspective into our thinking, planning and
conceptualisation of how we are preparing activities and thinking about
providing advice to other programmatic areas in AusAID.[40]
13.38
The advantages flow both ways. Ms Alison Chartres, Director of the FSU,
commented that officers seconded to unit:
...take the knowledge that they are gaining from the unit and
AusAID staff that they are working with in our building back into Treasury. So
they have regular meetings back with Treasury and AFP. They report back, they
share the experiences that they are accessing through our international work
and our regional reviews that we are undertaking.[41]
13.39
Overall, secondments bring agencies closer together, increase the level
of mutual understanding and help to build a body of expertise that cuts across
agencies. They pay dividends when such officers are deployed because much of
the ground work for cooperation and coordination between these agencies has
already been done.
Joint training
13.40
Some agencies use training to improve understanding between agencies,
increase people-to-people links across agencies and enhance the
whole-of-government approach to peacekeeping operations. In particular, AusAID
has taken on a role training personnel from other government agencies. The FSU
not only conducts applied research work and actively encourages other agencies
to place personnel in the unit, but it also contributes to inter-agency
coordination through training programs and pre-deployment briefings. Mr Alan March
explained:
This group here plus officers who work with us would on a
regular basis provide briefing to Australian Defence Force and the Australian
Federal Police. In general, it is command and staff college courses on issues
as diverse as state fragility, humanitarian response and humanitarian law,
peace conflict issues, gender issues, but up to and including briefing
rotations of AFP staff and ADF staff who are about to deploy to a theatre for a
particular activity.[42]
13.41
In 2003, AusAID established a Peace Conflict and Humanitarian Adviser
position to provide training for peacekeepers, civilian police and humanitarian
workers.[43]
The position develops capacity-building tools and training and oversees a
'modularised' training package on peace and conflict concepts and terminology.
According to AusAID, its intention is to expand the package to comprise
thematic issues such as gender and peacebuilding, and continue delivering it to
other government and non-government agencies.[44]
13.42
AusAID noted that it has a large role in the design of the two-day
humanitarian segment of the International Peace Operations Seminar (IPOS).[45]
IPOS gives AusAID an opportunity to present its view on coordination, namely,
that 'we can work with the ADF in this busy battle space with both of us doing
our core capabilities—but having a much better understanding of where we overlap—and
improving that work'.[46]
AusAID Operations Support Unit has briefed DFAT and other public service employees
in RAMSI on peace, conflict and development issues.[47]
13.43
The ADF offers a number of opportunities for personnel from other
government agencies to attend its pre-deployment courses. According to Defence,
the 39th Personnel Support Battalion has trained representatives
from agencies such as AFP, DFAT, Customs and Immigration. Participants from
other agencies have also attended and given presentations at IPOS. According to
the Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans' Association (APPVA), agencies
such as DFAT have also been involved in Defence's Mission Rehearsal Exercises
(see paragraph 9.24).
13.44
The AEC provides training for Australian government agencies regarding
electoral matters. It has collaborated with the ADF and contributed to IPOS
since 1994.[48]
The AEC noted:
In the last two years they (ADF) had major exercises going where
they were simulating peace operations with an electoral dimension and we went
along for a week each time to provide input into that exercise to try to make
it more realistic for the military officers who were doing that work.[49]
13.45
The AEC has not been involved in the AFP's IDG training courses. Mr Maley
explained that in Solomon Islands, the AEC would work through its contacts in
the Solomon Islands Electoral Commission, whose role it would be to coordinate
election security with police authorities. He also commented:
I suspect the IDG has been focused very much on the sort of
emergency end of the deployments in a case like Timor or the Solomons and that
normally electoral processes are not going to arise in that sort of environment
until things have calmed down very considerably.[50]
13.46
The committee notes that the IDG's role has extended well beyond initial
emergency response to longer-term institution and capacity building. The committee
suggests it would be worthwhile for the AEC and AFP to consider opportunities
for AEC contribution to the IDG pre-deployment training.
Adequacy of training
13.47
While commending the efforts of departments to improve their
understanding and cooperation, some submitters concluded that more could be
done. World Vision Australia endorsed the secondments so far undertaken between
government agencies, but saw scope for significantly increased exchanges of
information, training and staff between key departments.[51]
Further, Major General Ford asserted:
...there is considerable ignorance concerning the complexity of
peacekeeping operations in many components of the ADF. In particular, our
military leadership could work more closely with AFP leadership and DFAT at
developing expertise in combined approaches to international and regional
security initiatives.[52]
13.48
AusAID was of the view that 'Australia's whole-of-government approach is
seen as international best practice'. Even so, it believed that there was room
for improvement in planning and preparation for peacekeeping operations across
military and civilian elements, 'Where gains can be made is on systems
alignment and joint doctrine and policy approaches'.[53]
13.49
Assistant Commissioner Walters also thought that the experience of
agencies beyond the security sector could be further utilised:
I think that to date we have done a reasonable job from a
whole-of-government perspective on trying to anticipate the challenges and
other developments, particularly in the arc of instability and particularly in
our region. I think there are opportunities for us to garner the experience and
resources of other institutions to help inform that body of work. Whilst the
AFP and the ADF have been working closely together and will enhance that level
of work, we will also bring the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and
AusAID—who also have extensive experience in offshore missions and other
activities—into the picture to try and inform that bigger picture. I think it
has been working well to date, but there are opportunities that we can exploit
by having broader engagement.[54]
13.50
Major General Ford advocated a 'combined military, police and DFAT
approach to training leaders who are prepared to command Australian contingents
in peace operations'. He pointed to the need for a coherent whole-of-government
approach that 'both studies and teaches an integrated Australian approach to
peacekeeping and peace-building'.[55]
To this end, he argued for a dedicated national peacekeeping facility staffed
by civil, military and police experts.
13.51
Similarly, Austcare commented that 'Australia's impressive record of
contributing to peacekeeping operations notwithstanding...more needs to be done
to coordinate "whole-of-government" and "whole-of-nation"
effectiveness'. Austcare also argued that part of the solution lies in the
formation of an independent national institute.[56]
13.52
Associate Professor Elsina Wainwright considered that the 'linkages
between all the agencies are pretty good on a world scale', but saw merit in a
centralised institutional capacity focused on aspects of peace building that
are not directly security related, such as democracy, finance and economics. She
considered that one possible avenue would be to expand the SFU within AusAID.[57]
13.53
It may be that a central agency is required to promote a whole-of-government
strategy to peacekeeping involving not only training but a whole range of
activities including the development of doctrine and the evaluation of
programs. This proposal is considered in detail in Chapter 25.
Committee view
13.54
The committee recognises the important role that joint training or
combined courses have in preparing Australian peacekeepers for deployment. The committee
is encouraged by the efforts of key agencies to improve their understanding of
each other's roles and methods of operation. It believes, however, that activities
such as secondments and joint training do not yet form part of a
whole-of-government strategy. It appears that activities geared toward
improving coordination currently rely on the motivation of individual agencies.
The committee commends the AFP for its initiative in seconding officers to
other departments and its willingness to form what it terms 'interdepartmental
partnerships'. The committee recognises that AusAID is similarly keen to take
on an active role in interagency training and notes the role that the Fragile
States Unit may play in this regard.
13.55
The committee is also pleased that Defence is making places available
for AFP and other government agency personnel in its training courses and
encourages it to continue these efforts. However, it considers that Defence has
been somewhat more active in creating opportunities for other agencies within
its structures than it has been in placing its own personnel within other
agencies. The committee sees significant benefit in key departments having a
sound appreciation of each other's role, approach and procedures. It urges
them, particularly Defence and DFAT, to seek opportunities to place their staff
with other departments.
Conclusion
13.56
Overall, the committee is of the view that if Australia is to achieve an
effective whole-of-government training framework, it must begin by finding a
way to integrate the separate training programs and ad hoc courses into
a coherent whole. While allowing agencies to continue to train their personnel
for their specific functions, this whole-of-government approach would avoid
duplication, identify and rectify gaps in training and promote better
cooperation and coordination among all participants in the field. A central
agency is required to provide overarching strategic guidance and planning that
would give coherence to the agencies' individual and joint education and
training programs.
13.57
In the next chapter, the committee looks at the role of non-government
organisations (NGOs) and their pre-deployment training.
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