Chapter 4 - The connection is made

4.1       This chapter looks firstly at DIMIA's databases and their search capacity in 2001. It then moves to 2003 and discusses the actions taken by DIMIA in response to a missing persons inquiry from the Queensland Police. It describes how the connection between the identities of Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon was made. It also examines actions taken by DIMIA and DFAT in 2003 and 2004 regarding further requests for information on Ms Solon.

Accessing Vivian's records

4.2       In chapter two, the committee considered the nature of the checks made to establish Ms Solon's identity in light of her claims that she had been married to an Australian, was divorced, and was an Australian citizen. This chapter focuses more directly on DIMIA's systems and the checks DIMIA made to establish Ms Solon's movements in and out of Australia.

4.3       Mr Freedman informed the committee that the records they received from DIMIA indicate that between 13 July 2001 and 19 October 2004, Vivian's records were accessed at least 161 times using different surnames and combinations of it.[91] Mr Newhouse added that the documents only show searches for the incorrect spelling 'Alverez' and not 'Alvarez' so many more searches may have been made.[92]

System searches in 2001

4.4       Ms Daniels told the committee that the 'access logs will show that in July 2001, a number of staff members searched for records relating to Alvarez, which was the name that was known at the time but there was nothing found on the systems under that name'.[93]

4.5       The committee questioned why a wild card search was not done on Vivian before her deportation. Ms Daniels commented that it appears from the Palmer report that there were doubts that this facility was available in 2001.[94] She further stated:

I am saying that in the sequence of events, were the wild-card search to have been available—and I am not in a position to say whether it was or not—then the report says that there would have been some 70 records on the list. It would have been on the list under Solon Young, whereas the person looking at the list may have had—but this is speculation—Alvarez in their mind, so the link may not have been made in any event.[95]

4.6       Mr Matt Kennedy, Deputy Chief Information Officer, DIMIA, clarified that the only system that has a wild card search capacity is TRIM (Tower Records Information Management), the registry system.[96] He said the other key systems are the Integrated Client Services Environment (ICSE) system which deals with clients in Australia and the Travel and Immigration Processing (TRIP) system which are the movements, border and entry systems. He further explained that:

In respect of TRIP, the principal name is Vivian Solon Young, with a birth name of Vivian Alvarez Solon. With the name Vivian Solon Young, Young is recorded in the system as the principal name and the principal surname, and Vivian and Solon are shown as given names. In the case of the birth name, which is the secondary name on the record, Vivian Alvarez are shown as given names and Solon is the family name. When the search routines go away and search, they bring back likely matches. Those matches are then scored according to how close they are to the data that was put in. If a search were done on Solon, for example, it might find Vivian Solon Young but it would not come back as a highly scored search. So it may be well down...In the case of both ICSE and TRIPs, the searches bring back up to 200 matches. In fact behind the scenes, the searches find at least 10,000 matches. Those matches are then scored, and the 200 most closely representing the data that was put in are brought back.[97]

4.7       Mr Kennedy added that 'as Mr Palmer noted, the record of Vivian Alvarez, which would have come up as a secondary name, came up at about the 70^th name in the search returns. In respect of the name Cook, there is no record relevant to Alvarez Solon Young at all'.[98]

4.8       DIMIA informed the committee that in relation to the search logs:

It must be remembered that these logs showed the results that were hit, not necessarily what the compliance officer typed into the computer. In relation to the interview that the then Ms Alvarez participated in, when she made the call that she was an Australian citizen, if the compliance officer had typed in the name Alvarez nothing would have come up because there was no record. But we cannot show that because of the way that our systems work. With these logs it is result based. So we can say that the files of Vivian Solon were searched upon, the results were hit and those officers searched those files, but we cannot say what compliance officers actually typed in the computer at the time.[99]

Palmer conclusions

4.9       In the Palmer report, two areas of concern were highlighted in the findings regarding Ms Solon. First, the report refers to the limited search capacity and functionality of the DIMIA databases and operating systems and the poor understanding by staff of the systems. Mr Palmer reports that 'as the inquiry understands the situation...the capacity existed in 2001 for DIMIA officers to have identified Vivian Alvarez as an Australian citizen'.[100] The committee is concerned with Mr Palmer's findings which point to serious shortcomings in DIMIA's database and operating systems.

4.10      Evidence provided to the committee illustrated the difficulties with the search capacity of the system but perhaps more importantly, highlighted the number of times Ms Solon's records were accessed before and particularly after her removal.

Committee view

4.11      A factor contributing to the lack of connection between the names 'Alvarez' and 'Solon' were the system deficiencies. The committee supports Mr Palmer's findings that DIMIA's systems are flawed and not effectively networked. Mr Palmer concluded that the capacity existed in 2001 for DIMIA officers to have identified Ms Solon as an Australian citizen. The committee supports Mr Palmer's recommendations that DIMIA's information systems be subjected to an urgent, independent review and analysis to address lack of connectivity and limited search capacity issues.[101]

The moment of discovery in 2003

4.12      On 14 July 2003, the Queensland Missing Persons Bureau sought information from DIMIA on Vivian Solon aka Cook aka Young who had been missing since 16 February 2001 when she failed to collect her son from childcare. It was at that point DIMIA established that the missing person and the person removed in July 2001 were one and the same. This information was passed to Queensland police on 21 August 2001, but according to records, was not brought to the attention of senior DIMIA officers.[102]

4.13      DIMIA told the committee that in July 2003:

...there was a request from Queensland Missing Persons Bureau seeking information about a person whose surnames were Solon, Young and Cook, They gave a date of birth, which was a consistent date of birth. The inquiry came into the central office of DIMIA on the basis that the police in Queensland were trying to locate details of this missing person, because of foster care arrangements being set in place for her child, who had been left in a child care centre...It was at that point, in July-August 2003, that system searches in the DIMIA central office were able to quickly establish that the person who was the subject of the missing person inquiry and the person who had been removed in July 2001 was one and the same. That information was conveyed to Queensland missing persons on, I think, 21 August 2003.[103]

4.14      Ms Daniels, DIMIA, clarified that 'the penny certainly dropped in July 2003, and I think we have made that clear. From the records we have, it appears that at the time the fact that the persons were one and the same was not brought to the attention of senior management'.[104]

4.15      A DIMIA email reporting on system searches notes that 'the person who made the connection initially appears to have been an APS 2. The established connection was conveyed to Queensland Police by an APS 6'.[105] Ms Daniels told the committee that in 2003 there were a number of people involved in establishing that Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon were the same person and one of the officers was at the APS 2 level, with the other officers at the APS 5 or 6 level.[106]

4.16      As DIMIA senior officers have not yet consulted these individuals, DIMIA representatives have been unable to clarify or confirm the sequence of events surrounding the realisation that Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon were the same person. Mr Rizvi told the committee:

...On the basis of the documentation that we have, we can identity those individuals who accessed the records. We can identify those and we can see when they accessed the records...What we are unable to do at this stage is to advise you what interactions took place between those individuals when they became aware of this information and to what level they escalated the knowledge that they had acquired from accessing this material.[107]

Committee view

4.17      The committee simply cannot comprehend how DIMIA did not act on the knowledge that it had removed an Australian citizen in 2001. The records show that at least two DIMIA officers knew that Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon were one and the same person and that Ms Alvarez had been removed from Australia in 2001. Senior officers and ultimately the Minister should have been notified of this discovery immediately and remedial action taken with the greatest of urgency.

4.18      Because the committee does not have before it all the information concerning the discovery that Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon were the same person, it can only conclude at the moment that a grave error of judgement occurred resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice. This failing in communication needs to be thoroughly examined. The department's culture, resources, training of staff, its systems of checks and balances, its reporting regime all need to come under the microscope. It is unacceptable for an organisation to excuse its failings because senior officers were not properly informed. Systems must be in place to minimise the risk that senior staff are not aware of what is happening in their areas of responsibility. The committee awaits the Ombudsman report before making any further observations.

Accessing records

4.19      The committee asked whether anyone who dealt with Ms Solon's removal in July 2001, subsequently accessed her records again in 2003 or 2004.[108]

4.20      In reply, Ms Daniels stressed that 'in July 2001, the people who were involved in Ms Alvarez's removal from Australia were focusing on the name Alvarez. There was another matter going on at the same time relating to an inquiry about the missing person Solon Young. They were two separate streams of inquiry'.[109]

4.21      In 2003, Ms Daniels said that a request from the Queensland Missing Persons Bureau led to the links being established between the names Alverez and Solon Young. She added 'I do not have the details but it would have been quite possible at that time for people who had been involved in the case in 2001 to have accessed the system, as a consequence of the matter being brought to the attention again through the request from the Queensland Missing Persons Bureau'.[110]

4.22      Mr Gallagher, DIMIA, clarified for the committee that 'there were a number of officers in the DIMIA central office who, from the files, appear to have known [that Alvarez, Solon Young and Cook were the same person], but they were not involved with the removal. They were Canberra based staff'.[111]

DFAT involvement

4.23      Mr Smith, DFAT, told the committee that on 9 September 2003, the Consular Operations areas of DFAT received a request from the missing persons unit of the Queensland police force for information on the identity of the person who met Ms Solon when she arrived in Manila in 2001. Mr Smith thought there had been some confusion about whether that person was a representative of the Australian Embassy. He said the embassy in Manila was able to confirm that the individual was not a representative from the embassy or from the immigration section of the embassy and that they were an employee of OWWA. This information was then provided to the Queensland police.[112] Mr Smith said that he understood that as a result of the provision of this information, the Queensland Police approached OWWA in the Philippines directly.[113]

4.24      In response to questions about the context of the request, Mr Smith added that the request was not formal but 'came through a telephone conversation'... and it did say that 'she was an Australian who had been removed or may have been unlawfully removed in 2001'.[114] Ms Daniels, DIMIA, confirmed that in the communication with DFAT, the Queensland Missing Persons Bureau indicated that DIMIA had removed Ms Alvarez in July 2001 and that she was a citizen.[115]

4.25      Mr Smith emphasised that it was a very specific request regarding the identity of the person who met Ms Solon when she arrived in the Philippines. He added:

Certainly there was nothing in the request that they put to us which suggested that they were looking for our assistance to locate her, and there was nothing in the advice they gave us to suggest that there was a welfare concern about her. It is easy to say that that is self-evident now, with all that we know about what happened to her, but it was not clear at the time to the officers.[116]

4.26      In response to a question about what role DFAT would normally play upon finding out such information, Mr Smith responded:

In this case, the Queensland police asked a very specific question. They asked for our help to identify an individual who was part of their missing person investigation. We were able to do that. If you look at the record of the correspondence, it was clear in the advice that went back to the embassy in Manila thanking them for the information that they were able to provide us with that, if there was any further action required, the Queensland police would get back to us. That was the very clear sense that the case officer handling the case was left with.[117]

We were not asked to look for Ms Solon

4.27      In providing context for their actions, Mr Smith further stated:

What we are not, is a missing persons bureau. We are not configured to be a missing persons bureau. Our officers are not trained for that. We do not have the links with Interpol or with local police authorities. So when a whereabouts inquiry appears to us to be more serious because we cannot through our normal consular avenues of inquiry find the person or where, from their case circumstances that we are provided with up front, it becomes clear that this is a more serious matter; what we will do is advise the individuals who have reported the case to us to report it to the police—to the missing persons bureau.

What was different about this particular instance was that the request or information came to us not from a member of Ms Solon's family or a friend but from a state police missing persons bureau. So it was clear from the context of the request that they had an investigation underway into her location. We will not try to take over that role from a properly authorised law enforcement body, whose job it is to find missing persons. We will often help—we will often work very closely with the missing persons units to locate people overseas—but we will not take on that role where it is clear that they have an investigation underway.[118]

4.28      The only record of the request from the Queensland police is a handwritten note on file by the officer involved. There is no formal letter or detailed file note. It is not clear from this handwritten note, which contains only some dates, names and contact numbers, the nature of the specific request.[119] The information given to the committee by Mr Smith, who stressed that DFAT received a narrow specific request, appears to be based on the recollections of the officer two years after taking that request. The officer recalled that:

...the Queensland Police had contacted him to follow up on leads regarding a missing persons case. Other than her possible names, no other detail was provided. He said the Queensland Police had framed their reason for contacting him in terms of a request for information on who from the Embassy might have met her on arrival in Manila in July 2001. After consulting our Embassy in Manila, he subsequently advised the Queensland Police that the person who met her was not from the Embassy but from a Philippine welfare agency.[120]

4.29      Records show that DFAT in Manila located Ms Grace Olajay, who was believed to be the person who met Ms Solon at the airport, and asked her about Ms Solon's arrival in Manila. They found that Ms Olajay was an administrative officer with OWWA but that she could not remember the incident in question. This information was conveyed to the Queensland Police and no further action was taken.

4.30      Mr Smith told the committee that in looking at what happened, they have identified a disconnect between DFAT and the activities of the Queensland police. To address this, DFAT is in the process of strengthening their cooperation arrangements with the AFP for the handling of such inquiries. They are also ensuring properly coordinated follow up to information flows about cases and are instituting a standing quarterly review between DFAT consular and the National Missing Persons Unit.[121]

4.31      It is clear that in September 2003, DFAT determined the name of the OWWA official who met Ms Solon at the airport and passed this name to the Queensland police. It is also clear that DFAT knew of Ms Solon's wrongful removal in 2003 but was waiting to respond to requests for action.

4.32      It should be noted that emails sent in 2003 between Manila and Canberra clearly stated that 'apparently an Australian citizen was removed as opposed to deported from Australia by DIMIA representatives who did not realise at the time that she was actually an Australian citizen'.[122] Apparently, DFAT officers did not act on this knowledge.

Committee view

4.33      The committee understands that the request from the Queensland Police was couched in specific terms and that the DFAT officer handing the matter in Manila treated the matter as confined strictly to identifying the person who met Ms Solon at the airport in 2001. It is also clear, however, that DFAT officials both in Canberra and the Philippines were aware in 2003 that 'apparently an Australian citizen was removed'. Surely alarms bells must have started to ring. Although not the responsible department, the committee considers that in this instance DFAT showed a lack of initiative and good judgement in failing at the very least to make enquiries of DIMIA about this most extraordinary case of an Australian citizen being removed from Australia. There must also have been broader diplomatic implications that had the potential to affect both the Australian and Philippines governments. This seems to have been ignored.

The link between the results of search in 2003 and 2005

4.34      As noted above, DFAT in Manila had contacted Grace Olajay, the person believed to have met Ms Solon at the airport in Manila, and established that she was an administrative officer of OWWA but that she could not remember the incident at the Airport in 2003. The committee is concerned that in 2005, after a taskforce had been arranged to respond to the request for the embassy in Manila to find Ms Solon, documentation shows DIMIA trying to work out whether the person who met Ms Solon worked for the OWWA.

4.35      Mr Smith responded that he could only assume the 2003 record was not found before DIMIA went through the same process of talking to OWWA that DFAT had done two years earlier.[123]

Mr Young's efforts to locate his ex-wife

4.36      The chair drew DIMIA's attention to an email dated 24 September 2003 from the NSW call centre which received a call from Mr Young about his missing ex-wife. The email stated:

I got a call from a male person and this is his story. He married a Filipina who arrived in 1984. Wife acquired citizenship in 1986. Wife went missing March 2001. Brisbane police told him wife removed from Australia July 2001. His initial query is 'How can this be?' Brisbane police advised him to contact Immigration as it was Immigration who removed his wife. He'd gotten in contact with a Russell of compliance who advised him the matter is a citizenship issue. Robin was BC. I asked for his name and number. He wouldn't give it to me. He took my name instead and said he would ring again when Robin is available.[124]

4.37      Ms Daniels confirmed that Mr Young had contacted a DIMIA call centre to inquire about his ex-wife. She said this was noted in a letter from the Queensland police in September 2004 which mentions Mr Young's contact with DIMIA and that DIMIA had responded that 'because his wife was a citizen, she would not have been removed'.[125]

4.38      DIMIA later advised the committee that:

...as the caller declined to provide either his personal details or those of his wife...there was no avenue to initiate further contact with the caller. For this reason the staff member handling the call drafted and sent the email [see paragraph 4.36] so that contact centre staff answering calls on the Citizenship queue would have information about the call he had taken.

The staff member recalled that he had retained the email and recognised its significance on seeing and hearing media coverage relating to Ms Alvarez/Solon. He brought the email to the attention of his work supervisor on 17 May 2005. A copy of the email was passed to the DIMIA liaison staff tasked with assisting Mr Comrie's enquiry later the same day, and subsequently passed to the inquiry.[126]

4.39      It would appear that Mr Young's initial request for information to the DIMIA call centre was rebuffed due to privacy concerns. Ms Daniels commented:

It could well be that, if a contact centre receives a call from somebody who is referring to their former wife, it would be quite reasonable for the person receiving the call to say, 'There are some privacy limitations on what I can provide you'.[127]

4.40      The committee suggested to DIMIA that a skilled operator would have got to the heart of the inquiry and determined what further assistance or advice was necessary. Ms Daniels replied:

What you are saying sounds quite reasonable. It could be that if an experienced operator at the end of a line receiving that call took a different approach they might suggest to the person, for example, 'This is a serious matter that you are raising. Would you mind putting it in writing, and we will examine it in detail'.[128]

Committee view

4.41      To a point, the committee accepts that because of privacy reasons DIMIA was unable to pursue the matter further with Mr Young. It does not accept, however, that DIMIA's duty to investigate the matter ended there. The information that DIMIA had to hand quite clearly indicated that the Queensland Police were under the impression that the department had removed an Australian citizen in July 2001. This assertion should have been checked, but again DIMIA officers brushed this information aside. There were numerous avenues that DIMIA should have rightly followed in establishing whether it had in fact made a major mistake. Having been made aware of the possibility of this mistake, the department was duty bound to investigate its own actions. The excuse that senior officers were not informed carries no credibility.

Missing persons inquiry—2004

4.42      Ms Daniels, DIMIA, told the committee that:

In September 2004 there was another request from the Queensland Missing Person's Bureau to central office in Canberra. That was on the basis that—if I recall, and I can find my records—Mr Young had sought to make contact with somebody in DIMIA and had approached the Queensland Missing Persons Bureau on that basis. The Queensland Missing Persons Bureau was asking us for a contact, to provide to Mr Young, to deal with him on the matters that he was raising.[129]

4.43      The committee heard that at this point a second group of officers, possibly unrelated to the first, which dealt with the request in July 2003 became aware of the Ms Solon case. It is unclear what action was taken on this inquiry.

Committee view

4.44      The committee repeats its findings that the situation in DIMIA where references to an Australian citizen being removed from Australia were ignored or downplayed on more than one occasion is unacceptable and points to serious problems in work practices in that department.

4.45      The committee wished to clarify whether any of the officers searching the records in 2003 again searched in 2004. Mr Gallagher, DIMIA, confirmed that the log indicates a 21 August 2003 and 29 September 2004 crossover.[130] The department later confirmed 'it appears that one officer accessed systems records relating to Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon Young in August 2003 and September 2004'.[131]

4.46      In September 2004, possibly as a result of the above request, Ms Solon's file was sent from Brisbane to the Movements, Alerts and Border Systems area in DIMIA Canberra.[132] Ms Daniels clarified that the compliance file covered the period from when the then Ms Alvarez came to DIMIA's attention to her removal.[133]

4.47      The department later clarified that the file was forwarded to the Law Enforcement Liaison Unit within the then Movement Alerts and Border Systems Section (MABSS), which provided a contact point for law enforcement agencies seeking movement records information. DIMIA advised that 'an examination of the file did not indicate that there was any email or note addressed to DIMIA staff in Canberra that offers an explanation as to why the file was sent to MABSS'.[134]

Mr Young continues his efforts to locate his ex-wife

4.48      In the aftermath of the Cornelia Rau case coming to light, Mr Young followed up his enquiries in 2003 and 2004 by writing to the Minister in April 2005. He stated:

Four years ago my ex-wife who was a naturalised Australian was reported as a missing person to Queensland police. Her citizenship would be recorded under Vivian Solon YOUNG however she may also have been known as Vivian Alvarez SOLON (maiden name) following our divorce in 1992. She is the mother of two children presently living in Brisbane, our son who now resides with me and another child who is in foster care. Queensland police have advised that their file on the case is now closed as my ex-wife left Australia in July 2001 after having been detained as an illegal immigrant? It appears an officer in your department phoned police after her disappearance was aired on national TV a year ago. To date no contact has been received from her or by her family in her former country.

Prior to her going missing in Brisbane she has been hospitalised on occasions due to a mental illness. As this forms a very similar pattern to the 'Rau' case I seek advice as to who I should contact so full details can be disclosed for further investigation.

I have contacted the DIMIA call centres previously to report the matter however they advise that it cannot be further pursued due to privacy considerations. This I find hard to accept when there has been an overwhelming amount of confidential information disclosed in the Rau case.

This is a serious matter concerning an Australian citizen who appears to have been deported from Australia due to a mental illness. For the sake of 2 children who just want to know what happened to their mother your intervention would be appreciated.[135]

4.49      Finally, the information about Ms Solon's removal from Australia could not be ignored.

DFAT and more enquiries about Ms Solon

4.50      Documents provided to Mr Freedman from DIMIA indicate that in September 2004, DIMIA requested Vivian's passport records from DFAT but that this information was not provided as it was not in the correct format. Mr Freedman noted there did not appear to have been any follow up to this request by either DIMIA or DFAT.[136] DIMIA officials were unable to explain why that occurred.[137]

4.51      DFAT records show that DIMIA requested Ms Alvarez Solon/Young's passport dossier twice but the reason for the request was not explained on either occasion. The first occasion was around October 2004 and the Passports branch prepared the dossier for handing over and asked DIMIA to provide documentation stating the legal basis for its request under the Privacy Act. It was noted that DIMIA did not follow up. The second occasion was on 21 April 2005 when DIMIA again requested her passport dossier and photograph and provided appropriate privacy authorisation.[138]

4.52      From the time Ms Solon came to DIMIA's attention in 2001 to 2005, numerous opportunities arose that could have established the connection between Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon Young. Unfortunately, they came to nothing. Both DFAT and DIMIA have introduced measures intended to rectify some of the shortcomings exposed by the Solon case.

What has been done to stop this happening again

4.53      Ms Daniels, DIMIA, told the committee that:

There are a number of recommendations in the Palmer report that go to DIMIA systems, for example, and those matters are rapidly receiving attention.[139]

4.54      She further stated:

One of the prime initiatives that the minister has recently announced is the initiation of a National Identification and Verification Advice Unit that requires very strict adherence to certain protocols in the face of issues where there are identity concerns. It would be reasonable – in fact, it is a requirement – that if, for example, we do not find details of a person's entry into the country on our systems, as we did not in this case, there should then be a strict regime that an officer needs to follow, in consultation with the central office advice unit, to identify the person, prior to any action being taken against that person.[140]

4.55      Ms Daniels said 'certainly, under the systems that we have in place now, somebody who claims to be a citizen or a permanent resident would receive immediate investigation of their status—to the extent that those cases are required to be referred to detention review managers within a 24 hour period'.[141]

4.56      Ms Daniels explained that 'the establishment recently of detention review manager positions in all states is one major initiative to ensure that detention decisions, particularly those in respect of issues to do with identity, are very regularly reviewed and that, while identity is not clearly established, the process is done in consultation with the national identification verification advice unit in central office'.[142]

4.57      At a later hearing, Mr Rizvi, Acting Deputy Secretary, DIMIA, provided the committee with an update on steps being taken to address the issues arising from the Palmer report:

A range of initiatives have been introduced to address some of the systemic weaknesses identified by Mr Palmer. These include: creation of detention review manager positions in each state to review all cases of detention within 24 hours of the decision to retain and review of all ongoing detention cases; review by state and territory directors of all decisions to detain when a claim of citizenship is made—this review is separate to the review by detention review managers mentioned above; and establishment of a national identity and verification and advice unit and formal escalation of identity matters to the unit within tight time frames. The unit facilitates access to identification capabilities of other agencies, assessment of cases and advice of avenues of investigation to confirm a client's identity. All decisions to remove unlawful non citizens are now cleared by an SES officer.

Improvements have been made to mental health services at Baxter and there is the establishment of a detention health task force to assist in implementing the government's response to those parts of the Palmer report that go to the healthcare of detainees. Finally there is a restructure of the border control and compliance and unauthorised arrivals and detention divisions to better focus on detention and compliance matters.[143]

4.58      Mr Smith, DFAT, admitted that with the benefit of hindsight more could have been done by DFAT to follow up the inquiry by the Queensland police and they have identified areas for improvement. They have taken steps to ensure the cable system is used for communication with posts which has a wider distribution than email and ensures other officers who need to know about important matters learn about them. He also outlined changes to the cooperation arrangements with the AFP which are noted above.[144]

4.59      Ms Smith also emphasised that:

...in fairness to the officers at the time, the information that they had was limited. This was a request put to us in a very informal manner by the Queensland police. It was a telephone call. It was not followed up with a letter. There was not any further follow up when we got back to them with the information they requested [145]...I think we can say that it is regrettable that they did not focus a bit more sharply on that particular piece of information. I cannot explain why they did not...like the officer in Canberra, they may well have been working on the assumption that the investigation side was being properly followed up with the Queensland police.[146]

Conclusion

4.60      DIMIA admitted that in July 2003, the fact that Ms Alvarez and Ms Solon were the same person was discovered but it was not brought to the attention of senior management. The committee can only express its disbelief at this inaction. As the committee was unable to speak to those involved, it expresses the hope that Mr Comrie's investigation will be able to answer the question of why this vital information was not brought to the attention of senior management. The committee considers that along with systems, DIMIA's processes need to be reviewed so that such information is passed to relevant persons who can act on it.

4.61      DIMIA also responded to another request from Queensland missing persons bureau in 2004. It appears there may have been crossover from at least one person working on the request in 2003 and then again on the request in 2004. This indicates that there was at least one officer who should have been able to make a connection between the two requests. Once again as the committee could not speak to those involved, it was unable to discover whether this connection was made by the officer involved, or whether the system again hampered this connection being made. Regardless, once again, DIMIA's systems and processes did not facilitate this connection being made and stopped action being taken.

4.62      In 2003, DFAT was in possession of the information regarding Ms Solon that she had been removed and was a citizen but no action was taken as DFAT officers had not formally been requested to initiate any action to find her. This is, to some degree, understandable as they would have assumed an investigation was underway by the Queensland police and that they would be called on to provide assistance as required. However, the committee believes their duty of care to Australian citizens would not preclude DFAT asking for more information or offering to take further action. DFAT officials stressed to the committee that they are not a missing persons bureau. However, they seem to have obtained the information requested by the Queensland police within one day and in 2005, they were tasked to coordinate the search for Ms Solon.

4.63      In 2003, evidence indicates that Mr Young made an attempt to locate his ex-wife but that this was rebuffed by DIMIA on privacy grounds. DIMIA admitted that a more skilled operator may have asked Mr Young to put his concerns in writing.

4.64      Mr Young continued his efforts in 2004 via the Queensland police, resorting to writing an email to the Minister which finally yielded results. This timeframe and the response to Mr Young's inquiries were clearly inadequate. The excuse of privacy concerns was clearly not appropriate in this instance and the committee recommends DIMIA ensure that call centre staff receive appropriate training. Training was another area identified by Mr Palmer as deficient and the committee supports his recommendations on this issue.

4.65      Documentation indicates that DIMIA requested Ms Solon's passport dossier in 2004 but that they did not supply privacy documentation so it was not handed over. This request does not appear to have been followed up by either DIMIA or DFAT. They requested her passport dossier again in 2005, along with the correct documentation, and it was provided. Without speaking to the individuals involved the committee is unable to discuss this lack of follow up but expresses its concerns that it further indicates poor processes.

4.66      Chapter five will examine the search and discovery of Ms Solon.

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