Chapter 2 - Mr Chen
Yonglin's request for political asylum
2.1
This chapter examines the request by Mr
Chen Yonglin
on 26 May 2005 for
political asylum and the initial responses and activities of the Department of
Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) on that day. The sequence of events are
presented chronologically with events from 27 May 2005 onwards dealt with in chapter four. The
committee heard two different accounts of events on 26 May 2005 which cannot be reconciled. Rather
than determine which version is correct, the committee seeks to answer the broader
questions of whether the response of the government to Mr
Chen's requests for asylum and protection was
fair and appropriate.
Background
2.2
Mr Chen
Yonglin arrived in Australia
in August 2001 and assumed the role of Consul for political affairs at the
Chinese Consulate in Sydney.
He was 'in charge of implementing the PRC Central Government policy in relation
to the Five Poisonous Groups (Falun Gong, pro-democracy movement activists,
pro-Taiwan independence force, pro-Tibet separation force and Eastern
Turkistan force)'. [1] In particular, he noted he was required
to persecute Falun Gong practitioners overseas. Mr
Chen stated it distressed him to work for an
authority which he deemed unjustifiably placed Falun Gong practitioners in
labour camps, jails, forced re-education courses and put uncooperative
practitioners to death.[2] He said he
grew to hate his work because he supports democracy and the information he
collected on these groups could be used against the individuals and their
families.[3]
Initial contact with DIMIA
2.3
On 26 May 2005,
Mr Chen Yonglin
approached the Australian Government to seek political asylum. According to Mr
Chen:
I approached DIMIA on the morning of 26 May to ask for an
appointment with the state director of DIMIA. I stood in the public space
outside the entrance to the department's inquiry office and I used my mobile
phone to call the department. I said I wished to speak to Mr
Nick Nicholls.
A male official indicated that Mr Nicholls
was no longer the director and that the new director was Mr
O'Callaghan. The male official transferred
the call to the state director's office, but the phone line to the state
director's office was busy. A few minutes later I called the director's office
directly. I introduced myself and identified myself. I said that I was the
consul for political affairs in the Chinese consulate in Sydney
and requested an urgent meeting. The female official asked whether I had made a
prior appointment and I said 'no'. The female official then asked for the phone
number of the Chinese consulate. I said, 'I would prefer not to give you the
phone number but if you insist I can give it to you', and later I gave the
phone number to the female official. I said: 'Please don't call them. It is an
unusual meeting request. I have a very important matter to talk to the state
director about and I can prove myself with my ID issued by DFAT and my
passport'. The official later indicated that the state director was in a
meeting and asked if it was an urgent matter. I said 'Yes'. She later talked to
the director and asked me to leave my mobile phone number and said that she
would call me back.
I waited and about 10 minutes later I called again. The first
official responded that the director already knew of my request but that he was
in a meeting. She asked if it was necessary to interrupt the meeting. I said
'yes'. She went to talk to the state director and I approached the reception
desk and showed my ID to the security guard and the security guard called the
state director's office to prove that I held the ID card issued by DFAT.
At that time I called the state director's office again. The
phone was answered by another female secretary and she said that the first
official was connecting to the Chinese consulate to check my ID. I said that
would not be necessary, that I had shown my ID to the security guard, and said
that I would be in danger – my life would be in danger – if they contacted the
Chinese consulate and I feared that. The second female official said that the
first one was connecting. I was very shocked to learn that. She said that the
first one was transferring the call to my mobile, so that I was frightened and
hurried to say, 'No, I have to go; I can't stay here any more'. I left two
letters. One was addressed to the state director and I changed the name to Mr
O'Callaghan. The other letter was addressed
to Mr Illingworth.
Then I left the immigration building. At that time, because I was frightened
that the immigration office was too close to the Chinese consulate – it is
about 10 minutes drive by car – I hurried to take a taxi and go to Chatswood
railway station and go away to my hiding place.[4]
2.4
The submission from Mr
Chen and his lawyer describes his concerns
regarding contact with the Chinese embassy:
A DIMIA official informed the Chinese consulate that Mr
Chen was present in the Department on 26 May
despite Mr Chen's
protestations that such action may endanger his life. This action, we submit,
may reasonably be construed as an attempt to refoule Mr
Chen. We submit that the Department, by
failing to keep Mr Chen's visit confidential, made it impossible for Mr Chen to
re-avail himself of the protection of the PRC [People's Republic of China] government
and in fact enhanced his chances of being persecuted. In this regard we submit
that the mere act of seeking political asylum could be seen by the PRC as an
act of treason or an act endangering state security.[5]
2.5
DFAT told the committee the consulate advised them that
Mr Chen
also left a letter in his apartment which stated he was not happy in his job
and was not going back to China.[6] The committee failed to question Mr
Chen about the alleged letter as it had no
knowledge of it at the time they spoke to Mr
Chen.
DIMIA's version
2.6
According to Mr Jim O'Callaghan, the current State
Director, New South Wales, Mr Chen's calls on 26 May 2005 did not come to him
personally but were handled by executive assistants as he was in a meeting in
another part of the building at the time of the calls. Mr
Chen was told that Mr
O'Callaghan was unavailable. Mr
O'Callaghan stated 'at one point the
executive assistants sought to confirm he (Mr
Chen) was who he said he was. He provided
some telephone numbers for us to confirm that with the Chinese consulate'.[7] Mr
O'Callaghan said that Mr
Chen did not offer to wait when told he was
unavailable but called back three or four times. When he could not meet the
State Director or get past the security guards he left two identical letters
addressed to two people with the security guards at the front desk.
2.7
Mr O'Callaghan
indicated one of the executive assistants called the Chinese consulate mid
morning. He said he did not ask for the call to be made but that it had
occurred by the time he returned to his office. Mr
O'Callgahan stated:
I recall coming back into the office and saying, 'There is
someone from the Chinese consulate seeking to talk to me. Where is the number?'
and so on, I had returned, I had undertaken to follow up, and at that stage I
was advised that one of the executive assistants had made contact with the
Chinese consulate. That was done on the basis that Mr
Chen was advised by the executive assistant
that we wanted to confirm his identity as part of the process of determining
whether he should be having an appointment with the state director. Mr
Chen was asked to provide some telephone
numbers. He provided two telephone numbers at the Chinese consulate. At no time
did Mr Chen
indicate any difficulty about following up his identity with the Chinese
consulate.[8]
2.8
Mr O'Callaghan
emphasised that until he read Mr Chen's
letter there had been 'no information about what Mr
Chen's interest in calling the immigration
office was'.[9] He further stated, 'I
asked what were the circumstances of the contact with the Chinese consulate and
I was advised – and I did double check this on more than one occasion – that Mr
Chen provided two numbers and consented to his identity being checked at the
Chinese consulate'.[10] Mr
O'Callaghan told the committee that after he
read Mr Chen's
letter he asked the two executive assistants to prepare an account of what
occurred that morning before he returned to the office.[11] This account was provided to the
committee and is consistent with Mr O'Callaghan's
evidence. It is attached at Appendix 4.
Identity check
2.9
During a phone call with Mr
Chen, the executive assistant heard laughing
in the background and became concerned that the call may not be genuine. She then
asked for his number at the consulate to confirm his identity and Mr
Chen said that he had no problem with them
being contacted.[12]
2.10
Mr O'Callaghan
further explained to the committee:
In this case Mr Chen
provided numbers to the executive assistant and indicated no difficulty about
that contact being made and that is why the contact was made. I think what that
indicates is a responsiveness on behalf of this junior officer to Mr
Chen's request to escalate his situation to
see a senior officer. She was doing her job to test the appropriateness of him
being able to see a senior officer.[13]
2.11
It would seem that Mr
Chen and DIMIA had a different understanding
of the reason for providing the number of the Chinese consulate. Mr
Chen told the committee 'I just wanted to
ensure that giving the consulate phone number should be enough'.[14] Mr
O'Callaghan, however, took the view that Mr
Chen was clearly being asked to provide
assistance to confirm his identity and gave no indication that he had any
difficulty with his identity being checked at the consulate.[15]
2.12
Mr Hughes, First Assistant Secretary, Refugee,
Humanitarian and International Division in DIMIA, reiterated that Mr Chen did
not indicate a problem with his identity being confirmed with the consulate and
indicated to the committee that Mr Chen was not known to be an applicant for
political asylum or a protection visa at the time DIMIA spoke to the consulate
and no information was provided to them.[16]
2.13
DIMIA stated its position regarding contact with the consulate
in a media release dated 8 June 2005.
It emphasised that Mr Chen
had not indicated any problem with his identity being confirmed with the
consulate, DIMIA did not provide any information to the consulate and at the
time of the call, DIMIA had no knowledge of the matter Mr Chen
wanted to discuss.[17]
2.14
Mr Manne,
Coordinator, Refugee and Immigration Legal Centre, told the committee that
there were many other ways the official could have tested Mr
Chen's identity if there were any doubts. He
stated:
It seems incredible to us that it would be seen as necessary to
contact Chinese officials to clarify the identity of a Chinese diplomat. It is
clear that there are many ways available to the Australian government to check
identity. Instead, what happened was that one of the cardinal sins in
considering a request for asylum was committed. That was to contact the very
authorities from whom he said he would face fundamental human rights abuse.[18]
Discrepancies between Mr
Chen and DIMIA's accounts of 26 May
2.15
DIMIA's account of this period contradicts evidence
provided by Mr Chen
on the following points:
-
Mr Chen claimed that he asked the executive
assistant not to call the Chinese consulate. DIMIA officials stated to the
committee and released a media release saying that Mr Chen did not indicate any
difficulty with the Chinese consulate being contacted;
- Mr O'Callaghan's evidence and the media release indicate
Mr Chen provided more than one telephone number for the Chinese consulate.
According to Mr Chen, he provided only one;
- Mr O'Callaghan indicated that the phone call with
the Chinese consulate was only to check identity. Mr Chen's evidence seems to
indicate that they were trying to transfer the Chinese consulate to his mobile;
- importantly, DIMIA's version does not mention
that Mr Chen expressed concerns for his safety. Mr Chen told the committee that
he tried to persuade the executive assistant not to call as he feared for his
life if the Chinese consulate was contacted;
- DIMIA asserted that the call to the consulate
was made without further information being provided. Mr Chen's submission notes
that a DIMIA official informed the Chinese consulate that Mr Chen was present
in the department on 26 May 2005; and
- there may also be an additional discrepancy as
the DIMIA media release seems to suggest that Mr Chen offered the phone number
of the Chinese consulate without being asked whereas Mr
O'Callaghan told the committee that Mr Chen was asked to provide the
number for the Chinese consulate.
2.16
The committee reminded Mr
O'Callaghan that Mr
Chen was on the public record saying he asked
the consulate not to be called, that he had an unusual request and it was a
serious matter. Mr O'Callaghan
replied 'that is inconsistent with the advice my officers have given me'.[19] He further stated 'all I can say is
what I have been factually advised, and that is that Mr Chen provided phone
numbers for the consulate to be contacted and gave no indication that he had
any difficulty with his identity being checked at the consulate'.[20]
2.17
When asked about DIMIA's account, Mr
Chen reiterated and confirmed his account
for the committee.
2.18
The committee is unable to determine which version of
events regarding the contact with the Chinese embassy is correct. It is clear,
however, that DIMIA did contact the Chinese consulate about Mr
Chen. The committee now considers whether
this action was necessary and appropriate.
Procedures for confirming identity
2.19
Mr Mark
Green, Coordinator of the Refugee Advice and
Casework Service (RACS) and Mr Chen's
lawyer, questioned the appropriateness of the call to the Chinese consulate:
Contrary to the department's version of events as set out in the
press release dated 8 June 2005,
Mr Chen
did indicate that he had a problem with his identity being confirmed via telephone
call to the consulate...With respect, telephoning Mr
Chen's Consulate was neither intelligent nor
politically astute.[21]
2.20
The committee sought further explanation from DIMIA regarding
why the phone call to the Chinese consulate was made. Mr
Chen was offering his ID card and, according
to Mr Chen,
also his passport. Mr O'Callaghan
stated several times that the call was made to confirm Mr
Chen's identity and he indicated he had
answered this question previously and had nothing to add.[22]
2.21
The committee understands there were other options
available to the executive assistant to confirm Mr Chen's identity such as his
identity card (and possibly his passport), checking the department's database
(as Mr Chen had a valid subclass 995 visa) or approaching DFAT.[23] The committee believes that later
events would show DIMIA's contact with the Chinese consulate was unwise.
Safety concerns
2.22
The circumstances surrounding Mr
Chen's visit to DIMIA were highly unusual
and raised the question of whether DIMIA should have been more sensitive to his
circumstances. Mr Green
asserted that:
Mr Chen, who was then an accredited diplomatic representative of
the People's Republic of China made a very serious attempt to communicate his
fear of persecution and the reasons for that fear to the Australian government.
In taking that step Mr Chen
and indeed his family clearly indicated that they no longer wished to avail
themselves of the protection of the People's Republic of China.[24]
2.23
Mr Green
told the committee that 'Mr Chen
made several protestations on that day to department of immigration officials
that, were they to take certain courses of action, his life would be in danger.
These are not mere words; these are things which, when said, need to be taken
very seriously'.[25] He further stated:
The department and the government of Australia
throughout this case should have been aware, we would submit, that the mere act
of seeking political asylum in Australia
could always be seen by the government of the People's Republic of China
as an act of treason and an act that endangered
state security.[26]
2.24
The letter from Mr
Chen dated 25 May seeking political asylum
clearly stated that he believed his life was at risk.[27] Mr
Chen informed the committee that if he
returned to China
'I definitely would have been persecuted. My life and my career would all be
finished. Even my family would also be facing certain persecution. Freedom
would be limited'.[28]
2.25
Mr Chen
was certain in retelling his account:
I said I would give the phone number, but please do not call the
Chinese consulate. I just wanted to ensure that giving the consulate phone number
should be enough. I persuaded her not to call the consulate, because, once she
called, the consulate would definitely know that I was there to make some
unusual, special meeting and that would definitely alert them.[29]
2.26
Evidence provided to the committee is consistent with Mr
Chen's claims regarding likely persecution.
The Federation for a Democratic China stated that as a senior diplomat, Chen
Yonglin would certainly face persecution if
he were sent back to China
and further that the government's handling of his case has placed Mr
Chen's life in danger.[30]
2.27
The Falun Dafa Association of NSW were of the view that
the contact with the Chinese officials would have been an obvious cause for consternation
which could have resulted in serious harm for Mr
Chen. The association further notes there
was no provision of immediate physical protection for Mr
Chen once his application for asylum and/or
protection was made. [31]
2.28
DIMIA's account of the telephone call to the Chinese
consulate does not mention that Mr Chen
expressed fears for his safety.
2.29
The Committee has been presented with two conflicting
accounts regarding whether Mr Chen
made concerns for his safety known to DIMIA before it made contact with the
Chinese consulate. Clearly, if Mr Chen
expressed fear for his safety, this should have been of paramount importance to
DIMIA.
2.30
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees notes
that Australia
is a State-Party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol, under which concomitant international obligations arise.
They stated 'the primary consideration should be the physical safety and
protection of asylum seekers and refugees as well as that of their family
members or persons with whom they are associated'.[32]
2.31
The contact with the Chinese consulate by a junior
departmental official or others, albeit with innocent intentions, also raised
concerns about the maintenance of confidentiality and protocols.
Recommendation 1
2.32 The committee recommends the department formulate a
protocol requiring that people claiming to be diplomats, employees or officials
of foreign governments or people who possess knowledge or understanding of the
foreign government in question, be dealt with by senior officers.
Maintenance of confidentiality for applicants of territorial asylum and/or
protection visas
2.33
The Federation for a Democratic China stated that the
contact made with the Chinese consulate by a DIMIA official was done without
regard for the regulations and guidelines concerning the maintenance of
confidentiality for consular officials or staff.[33] The Falun Dafa Association of NSW also
noted their concerns that the contact with the Chinese consulate seemed to be a
breach of confidentiality.[34]
2.34
Questions regarding the maintenance of confidentiality
have been raised in relation to human rights law, the Migration Act 1958 and the Privacy
Act 1988. The relevant areas are outlined below.
Human Rights Law
2.35
Without passing comment on this specific case, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
noted the right to privacy of the individual outlined in human rights law:
International human rights law guarantees everyone the right to
privacy and protects individuals from arbitrary or unlawful interference. It
also requires that effective measures be taken to ensure that information
concerning a person's private life does not reach the hands of third parties
that might use such information for purposes incompatible with human rights
law. The rights to privacy and confidentiality enshrined in these instruments
clearly applies to asylum seekers and refugees. Respect for that right assists
in creating the climate of trust and confidence that needs to exist between an
asylum-seeker and the country of asylum.[35]
2.36
UNHCR further advised
that 'Australia
has assumed responsibility to extend protection to asylum seekers and refugees
through accession to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of refugees (the Refugee Convention)'.
2.37
Mr Manne,
Coordinator, Refugee and Immigration Legal Centre, outlined his concerns
regarding the maintenance of confidentiality for the committee:
Put simply, at the heart of a person being able to pursue what
is a fundamental human right, as guaranteed under article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights – that is, that everyone has the right to seek and
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution – is protection from those
they are seeking asylum from. In this area one of the cardinal sins, if I could
say this, in relation to dealing with someone who is seeking asylum is to go to
their authorities in any way or manner whatsoever. That that not occur is one
of the fundamental safeguards afforded to anyone who wants to put a case for
their need to be protected.[36]
2.38
UNHCR has also advised
the following principles should inform the application of the Migration Act 1958, its regulations and
guidelines concerning the maintenance of confidentiality, for any consular
officials or staff who apply to DIMIA, DFAT, or their respective Ministers for
territorial asylum and/or protection visas:
Confidentiality in the
context of Refugee Status of Determination
The consent of the asylum seeker should be sought before
individual case information about his or her claim for refugee status is shared
with other parties. In addition, individual case information about asylum
seekers should be kept strictly confidential because of the potential risk to
the asylum seeker and others. Confidentiality in asylum procedures is
particularly important because of the vulnerable situation in which refugees
and asylum-seekers find themselves. As discussed during the Global
Consultations in International Protection, 'the asylum procedure should at all
stages respect the confidentiality of all aspects of an asylum claim, including
the fact that the asylum-seeker has made such a request' and highlighted that 'no
information on the asylum application should be shared with the country of
origin'. State practice also shows that the principle of confidentiality is
paramount in asylum procedures.
The decision-making authority in the country of asylum should
not share any individual case information about an asylum seeker with the
authorities of the country of origin...A decision-making authority should not
confirm to the authorities or other entities in the country of origin whether
or not a particular individual is or has been in contact with the
decision-making authority, regardless of whether the person concerned is an
asylum-seeker, a refugee, a resettled refugee, or whether she or he has been
denied refugee status or excluded.
The decision-making authority in the country of asylum should
not communicate with entities within the country of origin, whether they are
governmental or non-governmental, in order to verify or authenticate
declarations or documents provided by an asylum seeker.[37]
The Migration Act 1958
2.39
DIMIA, DFAT and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were also
criticised in the press with suggestions that the Migration Act 1958 may have been breached by providing compromising
information to the Chinese government about Mr
Chen Yonglin's
bid for political asylum.[38]
2.40
Part 4A of the Migration Act (obligations Relating to
Identifying Information) contains the following provisions regarding the
prohibitions on the authorisation to disclose and the disclosure of identifying
information to foreign countries which are central to determining whether a
breach occurred.
2.41
Section 336 E, Disclosing identifying information,
states that:
- A person commits an offence if:
- the person's conduct causes disclosure of
identifying information; and
- the disclosure is not a permitted disclosure...
2.42
Section 336 F (3), Authorising disclosure of
identifying information to foreign countries etc, states:
- A disclosure is taken not to be authorised
under this section if:
- the
person to whom the identifying information relates is:
- an applicant for a protection visa; or
- an offshore entry person who makes a claim
for protection under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol;
and
- the disclosure is to a foreign country in
respect of which the application or claim is made, or a body of such a country.
2.43
Section 336 F also states:
However, if:
- the person to whom the identifying
information relates has requested or agreed to return to the foreign country in
respect of which the application or claim is made; or
- the person is an applicant for a protection
visa, and the application has been refused and finally determined...
2.44
Regarding the sections of the Migration Act above, Mr
Manne told the committee there is specific
legislation which on its face precludes disclosure to a foreign country,
including the home country of the applicant if they are an applicant for
protection. 'It is only in circumstances where that matter has been finally
determined – if you like, the claim for protection has been finally determined
– that the nondisclosure requirement ceases to exist or does not apply.' He
further stated '...the disclosure of identifying information in relation to the
applicant Mr Chen, by any agency – whether by DFAT or whether by any particular
public official, including in the department of immigration – could well have
potentially constituted an offence under the acts, as referred to'.[39]
2.45
The definition of personal identifiers in the Migration Act 1958, Section 5A, does not
specifically include names but it does include 'any other identifier prescribed
in the regulations'.[40] In all of the
circumstances of the facts before the committee, it is unable to conclude that
there had been any breach of the Migration Act as at 26 May 2005 by either the
DIMIA executive assistants in Sydney or any DIMIA or DFAT officers in Sydney or
Canberra.
2.46
Even so, some members of the committee are concerned
that a strict interpretation of this provision in the Act fails to take account
of the circumstances of Mr Chen's
case. A common sense approach dictates that disclosing the name of an
individual seeking to remain anonymous because they fear that their life and
that of their family may be in jeopardy is a serious breach of that individuals
rights. Such rights should be protected under the law.
2.47
The committee recommends that the government review the
provisions of the Migration Act to ensure that the rights of people in a
situation similar to Mr Chen
are afforded adequate protection. The law should, in such situations, prohibit
the disclosure of names or any other information that would identify them.
Privacy Act 1988.
2.48
International obligations regarding an individual's
right to privacy are implemented in domestic laws through the Privacy Act 1988. The protection of
personal information is set out in the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) which
commonwealth departments must adhere to. Regarding the Privacy Act 1988, Ms Sheedy, Assistant Secretary, Information
Law Branch, Attorney-General's Department, informed the committee that:
...the Privacy Act sets up a regime for protection of personal
information. In relation to the public sector, there are a set of principles
called the Information Privacy Principles, which agencies, such as DIMIA are
bound by. Those IPPs set out a regime for the collection, storage, use and
disclosure of personal information. The overarching principle is: only collect
for a lawful purpose and only collect what is necessary for that purpose. In
relation to disclosure: only disclosure for the purpose for which the
information was collected. Then there are a series of exceptions to that
disclosure rule, including where the individual has consented, where the
information is necessarily disclosed to protect life and safety or for law
enforcement purposes.[41]
2.49
Information Privacy Principles (IPP) 10 and 11 may be
relevant in relation to the maintenance of confidentiality for any consular
officials or staff who are applicants for territorial asylum and/or protection
visas by DIMIA, DFAT and their respective ministers.[42]
2.50
IPP 10 describes limits on the use of personal
information. IPP 11 states that personal information cannot be disclosed to
another agency except in certain circumstances, for example under law.
2.51
Ms Sheedy further explained to the committee that the
provision in the Migration Act 1958 (336E)
is an offence provision but 'The IPP's under the Privacy Act give rise to a
complaint mechanisms – you complain to the Privacy Commissioner about a breach
of privacy'.[43]
2.52
Mr Green told the committee that 'the more important
issue is whether there has been a breach of the refugees convention, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – instruments which clearly state that
asylum seekers, people who are afraid of being persecuted, should not be
refouled and should not be identified to the government of the country which
they fear persecution from. That
principle, ethically and morally and
as a matter of fundamental human rights, is the principle at stake.'[44]
2.53
In Mr Chen's
case, if there had been a breach of the refugees convention by DIMIA, such a
breach was clearly unintended. However, DIMIA's action in contacting the
consulate was still unwise. This was a highly unusual set of circumstances, as
DIMIA acknowledges, and the committee believes that DIMIA must take measures to
ensure that in future, greater care will be taken in dealing with people
claiming to be consular staff seeking, in unusual circumstances, to meet senior
DIMIA officials.
Action taken on the morning of 26 May after Mr Chen delivered his request
for political asylum
2.54
Once DIMIA became aware that Mr
Chen was seeking political asylum, the
government and Mr Chen
became engaged in a formal process arising from the government's obligations
under the Migration Act 1958.
2.55
Mr O'Callaghan
clarified for the committee that he became aware of Mr Chen's
approach somewhere between 10:30am
and 11:00am on 26 May. He said that
while in a meeting he received a message that someone was seeking to talk to
him but he did not know about what saying 'I had no information about that
because our officers had no information and Mr Chen provided no information'.[45] Mr
O'Callaghan said the message he received
indicated that the person wishing to speak with him claimed to be an official
of the Chinese consulate. He said his response to the executive assistant
providing the message to him in the meeting was that 'I would respond when I
got back to my office'.[46]
2.56
Mr O'Callaghan
explained why he did not respond immediately to a matter which seemed to be of
sufficient importance to his executive assistant that she chose to interrupt his
meeting:
It was suggested that someone claiming to be an official of the
Chinese consulate was seeking to speak to me. Many people seek to speak to the
state director of the immigration department. We have between 1,000 and 1,500
people come into that office alone each day. We have 80,000 calls come into the
contact centre in the office each month. We have many calls come through to the
executives' numbers on a daily basis, where people are seeking to speak to the
state director or the deputy state directors. As you know, Immigration is an
agency dealing with people. There are a lot of people in New
South Wales and beyond who seek to speak to me.[47]
2.57
Mr O'Callaghan went on to explain that on occasions his
executive assistant does interrupt meetings to bring him messages that people
want to speak to him and on that occasion he expected to be back in the office
in 30-40 minutes 'and there was no reason to think that it could not wait until
then'.[48]
2.58
Mr O'Callaghan
told the committee that the letters left at the security desk by Mr
Chen were taken by the security guards to
the mail opening area where they were opened and brought to his office.[49] He clarified that he returned to his
office about 11:20am and the letter
was delivered around 11:30am.[50]
2.59
These identical letters were Mr
Chen's request for political asylum. One was
addressed to the former state director and this had been crossed out and Mr O'Callaghan's
name written in handwriting and the other was addressed to Mr
Robert Illingworth,
Assistant Secretary of the Onshore Protection Branch in the Refugee,
Humanitarian and International Division, DIMIA.[51]
2.60
Mr O'Callaghan
told the committee that upon reading the letter his first reaction was surprise
and then he called the business manager of the onshore protection area, Ms
Louise Lindsay,
to his office and asked her to contact Mr
Chen. He then put a phone call through to Canberra
to speak to any of the senior executive officers in the Refugee, Humanitarian
and International Branch but all those officers were before a Senate estimates
hearing and were unavailable. He then spoke to a director in that division, Ms
Kathleen Dunham.[52]
Contact with senior executives in Canberra
and DFAT
2.61
Mr O'Callaghan
told the committee that he understood that Ms
Dunham sought to contact senior officers who
were in Parliament House for Senate estimates hearings. She also spoke with
some other senior officers in the Canberra
office and contact was made with DFAT.[53]
Mr Illingworth,
DIMIA, clarified that Mr Chen's
letter was faxed from the NSW office to Ms
Dunham and she made a number of calls within
the department and calls to contact him at Senate estimates hearings which she
eventually did. According to Mr Illingworth, 'The upshot was that we received
the letter around noon, DFAT was called, they were briefed on the content of
the letter and the issue of territorial asylum visas orally over the phone and
the letter was faxed to DFAT at 1.06pm'.[54]
Mr Hughes,
DIMIA, said that he was not aware of DIMIA contacting the office of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs.[55]
2.62
Mr Illingworth
told the committee that DIMIA's response was to see this as a request for
political asylum and to deliver it to the appropriate portfolio to be actioned.
He added that at a practical level they continued to be in contact with the NSW
office regarding the efforts to contact Mr
Chen. Mr
Illingworth said that there was
communication during the afternoon between officers of the division in Canberra
and DFAT but 'there was no response in terms of the outcome of the request put
in the letter'. [56]
2.63
DFAT officers told the committee that DFAT first became
aware of this matter:
...when it received from DIMIA a copy of Mr
Chen's letter addressed to DIMIA New South
Wales office seeking political asylum. We received this letter by fax from
DIMIA on the afternoon of Thursday 26 May. This letter was brought to the
attention of Mr Downer's
office later that evening...about 7pm.[57]
2.64
Mr O'Callaghan
said that Ms Louise
Linsday tried to contact Mr
Chen around 11:30am
on 26 May but his mobile phone was switched off. She was able to contact Mr Chen
mid afternoon on 26 May and they had a discussion regarding setting up a
meeting for 27 May.
2.65
Ms Lindsay
explained:
I attempted to contact him at about 11:30am or 25 past 11
as I had been requested to by the state director. His mobile was turned off. I
got the message about the phone being out of range or switched off. I rang back
later that afternoon, just after 3pm.
I spoke to him and invited him to come in to our office for a chat about his
visa options. We had been conversing with Canberra,
who in turn had been conversing with DFAT as they have explained. Following the
claim for territorial asylum, we wanted to inform Mr
Chen of the kinds of options that would be open
to him if he did indeed want to remain in Australia.[58]
2.66
Ms Lindsay
told the committee that they organised for Mr
Chen to come to the Parramatta
office on 27 May and she arranged for one of the other business managers to
attend as they had a lot more information and knowledge of the visa classes.[59]
Conclusion
2.67
This chapter has examined the events which took place
on 26 May 2005 from the
time Mr Chen
called to make an appointment to see the state director until the appointment
was made for a face to face meeting on 27
May 2005.
2.68
The committee examined in detail all accounts regarding
the telephone contact made by DIMIA with the Chinese consulate on 26 May to
verify Mr Chen's
identity. The committee is unable to reconcile the conflicting accounts regarding
the phone call to the Chinese consulate but it is the committee's view that the
situation could have been handled better.
2.69
From the evidence provided by Mr
Chen, he was clearly anxious to see the
state director, calling several times in a short timeframe. Although not
providing a reason for wanting to speak to Mr
O'Callaghan, he stated the matter was
urgent, important and unusual. Mr Chen's
request seemed sufficiently urgent to the executive assistant that she had Mr
O'Callaghan's meeting interrupted to pass on
Mr Chen's
message.
2.70
With the benefit of hindsight, it may appear that Mr
O'Callaghan's failure to respond to the urgent note was inappropriate – having
been informed that a Chinese diplomat was in the foyer seeking urgent
attention, Mr O'Callaghan should have assumed personal and immediate charge of
the situation.
2.71
Mr Chen
said he offered his ID card and passport as proof of his identity and showed
his ID card to the security guards at the front desk. At some point DIMIA took the step of asking for a number for the Chinese consulate to confirm
Mr Chen's
identity with his employer. It appears Mr
Chen and DIMIA had a different understanding
of how the number of the Chinese consulate would be used to confirm his
identity.
2.72
The contact with the Chinese consulate, was, in the
committee's view an error in judgement. Clearly, there were more appropriate avenues
available to check Mr Chen's
identity and these included his ID card, DIMIA's own database and contact with
DFAT.
2.73
The committee is concerned that DIMIA's call to the Chinese
consulate displayed a lack of awareness of the sensitivities required in
dealing with a foreign diplomat seeking an urgent, private meeting with a
senior DIMIA officer.
2.74
On the basis of evidence presented to it, the committee
is not in a position to determine whether obligations regarding confidentiality
were breached when DIMIA contacted the Chinese consulate to confirm Mr
Chen's identity. It believes, however, that
the incident is a timely reminder for DIMIA to ensure its officers are aware of
their confidentiality obligations.
Recommendation 2
2.75 The committee recommends that DIMIA take immediate
steps to ensure that all officers are made aware of their confidentiality
obligations under relevant legislation and conventions. Furthermore, that they
are made aware of the need to exercise care when dealing with a foreign
diplomat and that such important matters are dealt with expeditiously by a
senior officer.
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