Chapter four - India's tests—Operation Shakti
‘BuddHa today Smiled’[1]
4.1
On Monday, 11 May 1998, India conducted three
underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran Range in the desert of Rajasthan near
the Indo-Pakistan border.[2]
In defiance of world opinion, India followed these tests on 13 May with two
additional explosions.
4.2
The tests, the first carried out by India since
1974, marked the culmination of years of work undertaken by the Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research & Development Organisation
(DRDO). According to DAE and DRDO the three tests conducted on 11 May were with
a fission device with a yield of about 12 KT, a thermonuclear device with a
yield of about 43 KT and a sub-kilo tonne device. All were detonated
simultaneously and the thermonuclear device was designed to meet stringent
criteria such as containment of the blast to minimise any chance of causing
damage to buildings and structures in neighbouring villages. The 12 KT weapon
was designed for tactical purposes such as aircraft bombs, missiles and
artillery shells while the thermonuclear weapons were normally intended for
strategic purposes.[3]
4.3
The tests carried out on 13 May involved two
sub-kiloton devices and were also detonated simultaneously. The yields of the
sub-kiloton devices were in the range of 0.2 to 0.6 KT and produced data to be
used for the computer simulation of nuclear design.[4] DAE and DRDO maintained that
the tests were fully contained with no release of radioactivity into the
atmosphere.[5]
The two explosions on 13 May barely registered on global seismic equipment but
this may have been because the bombs were set off in a deep sand dune.[6]
4.4
A scientist involved in India’s nuclear weapons
program stated: ‘We have complete mastery over a range of nuclear weapon
technologies and they are intended for different delivery systems. Also, we can
do computer simulation of subcritical experiments in the future.’[7] Dr Anil Kakodkar, Director,
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, explained in an interview that their project was
part of an ongoing activity:
We had planned the tests with an objective. Our objective was to
prove a standard fission device and a thermonuclear device. The objective was
also to generate data on the basis of which further work can be carried out.
That is how the devices consisted of one standard fission device, one
thermonuclear device and three sub-kiloton devices of different
configurations...now, the total yield of these devices had to be limited in such
a way that the seismic damage to the buildings in the nearby village, 5 to
5.5km away, is kept to a minimum. We did not want any damage to occur. So that
put a limitation on the maximum yield.[8]
4.5
Several seismic experts have questioned India’s
estimation of the magnitude of the yield from the detonations. They believe the
yields were smaller than those announced officially. In particular, some
seismologists doubt Indian claims about their exploding a thermonuclear device;
they suggest that it was simply a boosted atom bomb. Despite the scepticism,
and in the absence of conclusive evidence, a number of analysts have accepted
at face value Indian claims that the yields were kept deliberately low to
minimise damage to the surrounding district.[9]
P.K. Iyengar, a former Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, stated
simply:
Whatever the details, it is clear that India has graduated from
the fission club to the fusion club, it has demonstrated that it can make a
fusion weapon or hydrogen bomb.[10]
India's Reasons
National Security
Direct military threat from China and Pakistan
4.6
It would appear as though India’s public
pronouncements on China made before the tests prepared the ground for the
justifications that would follow the explosions. India had clearly indicated
that it felt increasingly threatened by the provocative and belligerent
activities of China and Pakistan. Official comments and observations presented
India as a nation under siege and fighting for its survival and honour.
4.7
The depiction of China and Pakistan by India as
aggressors persisted without interruption or deviation after the tests. India
unequivocally put forward security as the overriding motivation for conducting
the nuclear tests. It argued that India could no longer be seen as complacent
in the face of Pakistan’s rapidly developing missile program or China’s growing
military influence in the region.[11]
Indian strategic analysts such as Jasjit Singh and Brahma Chellaney clearly
identified China as fundamental in their assessment of India’s security
interests. At one stage before the tests, Mr Challaney warned that India’s
restraint in not demonstrating its nuclear capability:
is being challenged by China’s growing military and economic
power and its continuing covert nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan.
...
The Sino-Pakistan umbilical cord will snap only if New Delhi can
stand up to Beijing and the Chinese strategy of building up a countervailing
power to tie India down south of the Himalayas. But at present, India does not
have even the conventional military resources to deter direct or indirect Chinese
threats to its security.[12]
4.8
Strengthening this theme of self-defence, the
Ministry of External Affairs issued a press release immediately following the
tests which stated:
The Government is deeply concerned as were previous Governments,
about the nuclear environment in India’s neighbourhood. These tests provide
reassurance to the people of India that their national security interests are
paramount and will be promoted and protected. Succeeding generations of Indians
would also rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with nuclear
option have been passed on to them in this the 50th year of our independence.
4.9
The Prime Minister also sent a letter to
President Clinton, dated 12 May, in which he wrote of the deteriorating
security situation, especially the nuclear situation, faced by India. In part
he said:
We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state
which committed armed aggression against India in 1962...to add to the distrust
that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert
nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour we have suffered
three aggressions in the last 50 years. And for the last ten years have been
the victim of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it in several
parts of our country, specially Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.[13]
4.10
A number of witnesses before the Committee
agreed with Chellaney’s assessment and with the Indian Government’s main
justification for conducting the tests. Dr Mohan Malik submitted that China was
‘the most important actor inducing India to exercise its nuclear option, and
that ‘India’s nuclear and missile capabilities owe much to the dynamics of
Sino-Indian rivalry’. He maintained:
The singlemost objective of China’s Asia policy has been to prevent
the rise of a peer competitor, a real Asian rival to challenge China’s status
to Asia-Pacific’s Middle Kingdom...
...
Since the 1962 India-China War, China has built up Pakistan as a
military counterweight to India so as to tie India down south of the Himalayas.
India, on its part, has always perceived Sino-Pakistani military nexus as
‘hostile’, and ‘threatening’ in both intent and character.[14]
4.11
He argued that China had ‘taken advantage of
Burma’s isolation since 1990 to satisfy its own great power ambitions,
especially its desire to counter India in the Indian Ocean, and to ensure the
control of vital sea lanes by drawing Burma tightly into its sphere of
influence’.[15]
He further cited the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet, the extension of
runways in that country and China’s military modernisation program as
developments that worried India’s military community.[16] Dr Malik had no doubt that:
No other Asian country has ever backed and armed another Asian
country as China has backed and armed Pakistan over the last 30 years in such a
consistent manner over such a long period of time. So there is obviously a key
strategic objective that Pakistan and now Burma fulfil in China’s strategy for
the 21st century. They tie India down to the south of the Himalayas
and thereby prevent its rise as a major challenger to China’s primacy of the
Asia–Pacific.[17]
4.12
According to Dr Malik, India’s concerns were
further heightened at signs ‘that far from balancing China, the US had been
drawing it into a close embrace, seemingly oblivious of its implications for
regional security.’[18]
He acknowledged India’s claims that by detonating the nuclear weapons it has
‘corrected the asymmetry in power relationship with China and restored
strategic balance of power in the Asia-Pacific which had tilted in China’s
favour following the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union from the Asian
region’.[19]
In summary Dr Malik asserted:
...India sees China as the mother of all its security concerns
from the Bay of Bengal to the Persian Gulf.[20]
4.13
Dr Debish Bhattacharya supported Dr Malik’s
thesis and told the Committee that India had become more concerned in the 1990s
about there being some kind of encirclement of India. He explained to the
Committee:
On the east, there is Burma and Bangladesh, and the United
States wants influence in Bangladesh. On the north nothing has been done about
the Chinese exporting missile technology to Pakistan and, there is Pakistan. [21]
4.14
It should be noted that from his analysis of
English and Hindi language newspapers, Dr Peter Friedlander found that India’s
English speaking elite and the foreign press, perceived China as the prime
reason for India’s nuclear tests. But a study of the Hindi press revealed a
preoccupation with Pakistan and a coverage of the nuclear tests that emphasised
the Pakistani threat and rubbed in insults from Islamabad.[22] He did point out that the only
times when the mention of China did arouse interest was when the press
‘reminded people of the Indo-Chinese war in 1962 and when there was a great
deal of talk about the need to maintain awareness on all fronts for defence
purposes’.[23]
Failure of the international
community to move toward nuclear disarmament
4.15
India strengthened its ground for claiming it
acted in self-defence by focusing on the failure of the international community
to deal with the deteriorating security situation in South Asia. India argued
there was no element of adventurism on its part but rather Indians were left
with no other option especially given China and Pakistan’s collaboration in
missiles development and nuclear technology and the inaction shown by the world
community.
4.16
Mr K. Subrahmanyam, former director of the
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in India, had no doubt that ‘India
was compelled to join the nuclear club because the international community
legitimised nuclear weapons when they indefinitely extended the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty (NPT)’.[24]
4.17
Similarly, on 27 May 1998, the Prime Minister
Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee tied India’s security worries with the international
community’s inability to guarantee a secure environment. He told the Indian
Parliament:
The decades of the 80s and 90s had meanwhile witnessed the
gradual deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and
missile proliferation. In our neighbourhood, nuclear weapons had increased and
more sophisticated delivery systems inducted. In addition, India has also been
the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy and clandestine
war.
At a global level, we see no evidence on the part of the nuclear
weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a
nuclear-weapon-free-world. Instead, we have seen that the NPT has been extended
indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons
in the hands of the five countries.
Under such circumstances, the Government was faced with a
difficult decision. The touchstone that has guided us in making the correct
choice clear was national security. These tests are a continuation of the
policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and
independence of thought and action. [25]
4.18
Not only did India portray itself as a defender
of its people and its territory but as a staunch advocate of nuclear
disarmament as the following official press release showed:
It is necessary to highlight today that India was in the
vanguard of nations which ushered in the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 due to
environmental concerns. Indian representatives have worked in various
international forums, including the Conference on Disarmament, for universal,
non-discriminatory and verifiable arrangements for the elimination of weapons
of mass destruction. The Government would like to reiterate its support to
efforts to realise the goal of a truly comprehensive international arrangement
which would prohibit underground nuclear testing of all weapons as well as
related experiments described as sub-critical or ‘hydro-nuclear’.
India remains committed to a speedy process of nuclear
disarmament leading to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons.[26]
4.19
India’s preoccupation with China as a major
threat to its security seemed inconsistent with a growing trend toward friendly
relations between the two countries. In 1994, India and China had signed the
Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement which addressed their dispute over their
Himalayan borders.[27]
The visit by President Jiang Zemin of China to India in 1996 marked the high
point of improved relations between the two countries. In November 1996, China
and India agreed in principle on mutual troop withdrawals from disputed areas
along a 2,500 mile frontier and pledged that neither would use its military
capability against the other. [28]
4.20
A number of commentators and analysts, aware of
the trend toward improved relations between these two neighbours, regarded
India’s stated fear of China’s military intentions as exaggerated. They felt
that any suggestion that China posed a major threat to India’s national
security interests ‘flies in the face of ten years of Chinese military reforms,
the improvement in Sino-Indian relations since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing
in 1988’.[29]
4.21
Similarly, they discounted the argument that the
Chinese-Pakistani nexus posed a real threat to India’s security interests. They
maintained that nothing had happened recently in India’s security environment
that warranted even a mild qualification of this proposition. A prominent
Indian journalist Praful Bidwai argued:
It is irrelevant to cite, as some of India’s hawks do,
Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. Apart from being old hat, such cooperation
is of limited, non-strategic nature. No state has recently threatened India
with nuclear weapons or acted more belligerently than before.[30]
4.22
Before the Committee, several witnesses also
drew on this record of growing detente between India and China, to question the
genuineness of India’s jusification. DFAT and the Department of Defence noted
India’s stated concern about China being its main security threat but held that
‘such perceptions appear to give little weight to the improvement in
Sino-Indian relations over the last decade’.[31]
4.23
Following this same line of argument, Mr Hamish
McDonald maintained that prior to the election of the BJP government there had
been ‘a longstanding process of confidence building with the Chinese and
substantive negotiations on the border question’.[32]
4.24
In support of this view, Dr Samina Yasmeen
argued that the reference to the presence of a Sino-Pakistan axis fails to take
account of the reality of a changed Chinese position vis-à-vis South Asia. She
asserted that the Chinese Government has consistently pursued a policy of
improving relations with India. According to Dr Yasmeen, India responded
positively to China’s approach and ‘Sino-Indian rapprochement had become a
reality of the South Asian scene’.[33]
She pointed to India’s need for prestige and recognition in the post-Cold War
era, arguing that domestic factors provide a more realistic understanding for
New Delhi’s decision to test nuclear weapons. Indeed, she suggested that India
may have been reinforcing its claim to a better status in the post-Cold War
era.[34]
Strength respects strength[35]
4.25
The extent to which the Indian Government
deliberately played on the China and Pakistani threat in order to gain domestic
and international approval for their actions is difficult to determine.
Nevertheless, India’s apprehensions about its security situation must be
acknowledged as a significant but not the only factor which determined its
foreign and defence policies.
4.26
Undoubtedly India perceived China as a rival and
potential security threat. India’s reasons, however, for exploding the nuclear
bombs go beyond the necessity to deter overt conventional and nuclear attack
from neighbours or to preserve its territory from incursion or secessionist
movements, for example in Kashmir. India’s argument about national security is
not confined to the defence and preservation of its territory and its people.
India’s security interests encompass a much broader context that takes in the
protection and enhancement of national integrity and independence.[36] India felt that it needed to
be able to resist intimidation from potentially hegemonic powers. It was
concerned about the ability of powerful nations with interests in the region,
such as the United States and China, to intrude into its affairs and those of
South Asia. Witnesses said that India saw nuclear weapons as a political tool
to be used in pursuing foreign policy as well as in military operations.
4.27
Some witnesses developed this line of argument
further. They appreciated that India sought to preserve its territory and to
protect its integrity as a sovereign nation, but that India’s nuclear tests,
were also a means to enhance its prestige. The nuclear weapons were not only a
deterrence against military attack and political coercion but were a way of
becoming a major regional and global power to be respected and to be taken
seriously.
4.28
The desire by Indians to be recognised as a
great nation permeates Indian society. A poll by the Times of India
conducted in six cities within 24 hours of the first set of tests revealed that
91 per cent of those interviewed approved of the explosions.[37] Indeed, expressions of joyous
pride followed the announcement of India’s nuclear explosions—people greeted
the news with public displays of enthusiastic support; they danced in the
streets and distributed sweets.[38]
They were confident that it would earn their country the international
recognition and status due to a powerful nation. The Indian tests were seen as
an assertion of national greatness in defiance of the hostility of the major
powers.
4.29
Indeed, nationalism and India’s self image were
fundamental to India’s policy-makers in deciding to become a nuclear weapons
power. The nuclear tests touched a strong current of national pride in the
Indian people and met a deep underlying need to be acknowledged not only as a
self-reliant and autonomous nation but as a major international force with
authority and power.[39]
Defence Minister George Fernandes stated bluntly ‘India has to restore its
pride and its place in the world’.[40]
4.30
The nuclear tests also provided an opportunity
for Indian scientists to demonstrate and receive accolades for their skill and
ability. Indeed, the scientific community and their desire to ‘show off their
excellence’ may well have fed into the overall domestic approval for India to
demonstrate their nuclear prowess.[41]
On a practical and technical level the tests gave them the opportunity to build
on these tests and to move further ahead with developments in nuclear
technology. Dr Malik observed:
While Pakistan was in possession of tested Chinese nukes and
missiles, Indian scientists were not absolutely certain of whether they had
usable and reliable nuclear weapons which form the basis of stable nuclear
deterrence. Moveover, the five NWSs had gone in for smaller, and hence more
usable nukes or designer nukes because advances in nuclear and missile
technology afforded the opportunity to use nuclear weapons in regional conflict
without causing collateral damage. Making small nuclear bombs (miniaturisation
or mini-nukes) necessitates testing. [42]
4.31
As noted above, DFAT and the Department of
Defence maintained that their assessment of India’s motivations for conducting
the tests do not necessarily concur with reasons given by India and that India
overstated its fear of China. Both departments argued that the fundamental
reason for India’s tests is tied up with its place in the international
community. Mr Griffin from DFAT told the Committee:
The conducting of the tests in the first instance was to prove
in an anachronistic way that they could shoot their way into the top boardrooms
which they felt disgruntled about being excluded from for so long. Having
demonstrated that they could do what...the big boys do, that demonstration effect
is, in terms of prestige, all they need. [43]
4.32
India’s drive for international status was
frustrated by its inability to gain recognition as a global power. Dr Malik
told the Committee that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided a
nuclear security umbrella for India, but in the post-Cold War world India, as a
growing power, found itself increasingly ‘friendless and lonely’.[44] Its exclusion as a permanent
member of the Security Council, of ASEAN and of APEC deepened its sense of
isolation. According to a number of submitters and strategic analysts India
felt left out of international affairs; it believed that it was not taken
seriously and that its voice was not being heard.[45]
4.33
Dr Jim Masselos submitted that Indians have ‘a
sense of a new kind of world imperialism which excludes them and which tries to
dominate them, and there is that sense of apartheid by...first world nations’.[46] Along similar lines, Dr
McPherson argued: ‘Indians often feel that the West dismisses the reality of
their achievement in remaining a democracy and accord more respect to the
repressive and far from democratic nuclear power, China’.[47] This feeling of neglect, even
alienation, sharpened India’s ambition to be recognised as a major power.
4.34
Professor Stephen Cohen described how deeply
Indians felt about being overlooked:
This sense of isolation cuts across the entire political
spectrum, and is compounded and heightened by an awareness of economic failure
(compared with the fast-growing economies to the east), and a belief that India
was not accorded the respect due to it because of its civilizational and
cultural qualities, its population, and its potential, let alone its dominant
position in South Asia.[48]
4.35
It is important to keep in mind the association
made between the possession of nuclear weapons and great nation status.
Witnesses in evidence said that India saw the tests as a means to earn
international respect and recognition. This connection between nuclear
capability and national might is clear in a number of public statements made by
Indian officials which promote an image of India as a strong, self-reliant
nation.
4.36
After the tests the Indian Prime Minister Atal
Behari Vajpayee announced that ‘India is now a nuclear weapon state...the
decision to carry out these tests was guided by the paramount importance we
attach to national security...the tests...have given India shakti, they have given
strength, they have given India self-confidence.[49] In a similar vein, Dr R.
Chidambaram, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, explained after the
tests that ‘India must be strong. The greatest advantage of recognised strength
is that you don’t have to use it.’[50]
Clearly Indians associated national strength with the possession of nuclear
weapons. The link between nuclear weapons and national status is a fundamental
and unquestioned assumption at the heart of India’s drive for international
standing.
4.37
Further evidence of the strong association
between India’s self image as a global force and the possession of nuclear
capability can be seen in the reaction of the people of India to the news of
the nuclear tests. The Hindustan Times wrote:
The ‘smiling Buddha’ of 1974 has now blossomed into a new
assertion of the country’s right to arm itself in a manner which it believes is
best suited to its security interests. [51]
4.38
Witnesses before the Committee also drew
attention to this tight connection between the possession of nuclear weapons
and national prestige. According to Professor Ian Copland, India believed
‘understandably, that possession of nuclear weapons is one of the distinguishing
marks of great power status’. He went on to say ‘It reckons that going public
on its nuclear capability will give it leverage with America, Britain, Russia,
France and (perhaps especially China) that it has not had in the past.’[52] Mr Harun Rashid, former
Bangladesh Ambassador to Australia, argued that India’s main purpose in
conducting the tests was to signal to China and Pakistan that it was a
‘regional player with nuclear capability’ and to the world that it ‘should not
be ignored as a global power.’[53]
4.39
Mr McDonald agreed that great power status is
equated with nuclear weapons possession and noted that the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council are the five recognised nuclear-armed
powers.[54]
He strongly supported the view that national status and prestige were major
factors driving India’s decision to detonate the weapons. He believed that
India, equating great nation status with nuclear weapon ownership and desiring
standing as a world power, had kept the China threat alive to justify keeping
its nuclear option open.[55]
4.40
Also using the Security Council as a yard stick
of international influence, the People for Nuclear Disarmament pointed out that
since its inception the composition of the UN Security Council had been
dominated by the permanent members who were also declared nuclear weapon
states. It went on to conclude ‘it is little wonder that countries such as
India should see that their international status would be enhanced by
possession of the bomb’.[56]
Mr Richard Leaver pointed out that the BJP government believed that the nuclear
tests would pave the way to a seat on the UN Security Council.[57]
Domestic politics
4.41
Indian nationalism and India’s annoyance at the
lack of international recognition were significant factors guiding government
policy. Some commentators and submitters argue further that domestic party
politics finally pushed India into going overtly nuclear: that the newly
elected BJP was, for political gain, prepared to take that final step in openly
demonstrating India’s nuclear capability.
4.42
Clearly, the desire of many Indians to see
their country given international recognition as a global power was an
important force in influencing decision-makers within the BJP. To explain
India’s decision to demonstrate its nuclear weapons capability, some observers
within India cited the rise of Hindu nationalism which, to them, had altered
the language of Indian politics and was beginning to transform the character of
Indian society. They saw the BJP as the catalyst that propelled the decision to
conduct the nuclear tests. Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, who assert
that the timing of the tests was determined solely by the fact that the BJP-led
coalition took power six weeks before the event, wrote:
India’s nuclearization reflects the belief of the BJP-RSS as
well as growing sections of the Indian elite that nuclear weapons constitute a
shortcut to establishing the country’s stature as a major actor—in Prime
Minister’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s words, the nuclear tests ‘show our strength
and silence our enemies’.
The near-hysterical adulation this act initially drew cannot be
properly understood without recognizing that the groundwork was laid through
the growing acceptance of the way in which the BJP has transformed the
discourse of Indian nationalism. Despite resistance from the left and the
center, it is the right’s version of the ‘cultural’ essence of India, of
national security, of national ‘greatness’ that are setting the direction of
Indian politics, both external and internal.[58]
4.43
The BJP clearly sought to tap this deep current
of national pride. It saw the political advantages to be gained from building
on and further invigorating strong nationalistic sentiments. The party promoted
the call of Hindutva which is a plea for national greatness. According to the
BJP, Hindutva ‘...is a call to all Indians to their highest capabilities’.[59]
4.44
To stir nationalistic fervour, the BJP drew on
the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons would bring national
strength and greatness. In outlining its policy on major issues, Drs Krishna
Bhatta and Mahesh Mehta maintained that they believed in making India strong
and able to maintain peace in the region. They noted that with China and
Pakistan possessing nuclear capabilities, then India must also have nuclear weapons.[60]
4.45
A number of witnesses before the Committee
supported the view that the accession of the BJP to government was a
significant factor precipitating the nuclear tests. They believed that the BJP
saw the demonstration of India’s nuclear capability as politically
advantageous, and as a means of generating and galvanising public support.
4.46
DFAT and Defence clearly identified domestic
political considerations as an important force behind India’s decision to go
nuclear. They stated:
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government was
seeking to consolidate its hold on power. It had been in office for less than
two months and comprised a coalition of eighteen constituent elements with
internal divisions and every prospect of infighting. The BJP apparently
concluded that it could gain electoral support and a consolidation of the
coalition, as a result of its decision to test. As popular support for the
tests subsequently demonstrated, it may have been correct in this, at least in
the short term.[61]
4.47
Professor Copland maintained that the BJP-led
coalition, holding a majority in parliament of just ten seats, was conscious of
its vulnerability. It ‘saw the tests as an easy way of winning mass
support...more especially it wanted to shore up its core constituency who were
getting restless following the BJP’s dropping of other core planks’.[62]
4.48
Supporting this argument, Dr Yasmeen maintained
that the BJP coalition was not expected to stay in power for longer than a few
weeks. She suggested that the Indian Prime Minister ‘may have exercised the
option to test nuclear weapons in order to establish his government’s
credibility as a “good and strong” representative of Indian people’.[63]
4.49
Not all agree that the BJP acted for purely
domestic political gain. Dr Kenneth McPherson rejected the notion put forward
by a number of commentators that the Indian bomb was ‘a child of the recently
elected right wing BJP government and was paraded as evidence of India’s
resurgent Hindu nationalism’.[64]
He suggested, rather, that the nuclear bomb had wide bipartisan support.[65] Although he acknowledged that
the BJP were prepared to take the ultimate step to resume nuclear testing he
noted that the nuclear program was an evolutionary process.[66] He referred to a study that
had shown that there existed in India overwhelming support for the possession
of nuclear capability two years before the election of the BJP.[67]
4.50
The BJP itself denies that its actions were
politically motivated. Its general secretary, Mr Venkaiah Naidu, refuted
suggestions that the timing of the tests was influenced by party political
considerations by pointing out that the BJP had always advocated making a bomb
and that this was stated in the party’s manifesto and incorporated in the
National Agenda of Governance of the government. He asserted that ‘We would not
have undertaken the nuclear tests for partisan political purposes. It was part
of our known programme and there is no question of using this for electoral
gain.’[68]
4.51
Indeed, India had been teetering on the
threshold of going nuclear for many years. The former Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman Dr Raja Ramanna’s recent comments indicate that the preparations for
the tests would have started many months previous to the tests.[69] A.P.J.Abdul Kalam,
Director-General of the Defence Research and Development Organisation,
explained that the process of nuclear weaponisation involves many stages. He
stated that India’s five tests marked the culmination of many steps; that
before the tests there were simulation, design, verification and many laboratory
experiments.[70]
4.52
Undoubtedly there were strong domestic political
motives for India to declare its nuclear weapons status—the BJP clearly thought
that it would be a politically wise move. But other factors such as national
security and the desire for recognition as a world force came into play and
indeed fed into one another. Opinions differ as to which factor should be given
greater weight. Nevertheless, in seeking solutions to the issue of the nuclear
tests, all three factors should be taken into consideration, especially India’s
security concerns and its need to be seen as an important and valued member of
the international community.
International Reactions to India’s Nuclear Tests
4.53
Generally countries throughout the world
condemned the tests. Some focused narrowly on India and others looked more
broadly at global disarmament; some imposed sanctions, others simply urged
restraint. The following selection of countries and their reactions to India’s
nuclear tests provides an indication of the range of responses at the bilateral
and multilateral level.
Pakistan
4.54
Pakistan’s reaction to India’s nuclear tests was
immediate, strong and unequivocal. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated that
the resumption of nuclear testing by India was not a surprise, that for the
past twenty-four years Pakistan had consistently drawn the attention of the
international community to India’s nuclear aspirations. He maintained that
India had ‘become a nuclear weapon state, openly for the first time. India has
owned up. India has bared its nuclear fangs and claws’. In turning to
Pakistan’s situation, he asserted that: ‘We have made it absolutely clear in
the past that any step of nuclear escalation by India will find a matching
response from Pakistan. We stand by that commitment’. Finally, with
unmistakable resolve, he went on to say:
I wish to assure the nation that Pakistan has the technical
capability to respond to any threats to its security. The ideological and
geographical frontiers of Pakistan, are by the grace of Almighty Allah secure
and impregnable. Pakistan will take all appropriate steps which are within its
sovereign right of self-defence. No outside pressure will deflect us from
pursuing the path of self-reliance. We alone will determine what is essential
for our security. [71]
4.55
The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made
it clear that Pakistan saw India’s actions as directed unequivocally at them.
He wrote to leaders of the G8 countries telling them that India’s nuclear
testing ‘of a whole range of weaponry, including systems which are Pakistan
specific, has multiplied the immediacy and the magnitude of threat to our
security’. He stated that the ‘BJP government has already made its aggressive
designs against Pakistan a fundamental article of its policy agenda...in the face
of these ominous developments which pose an immediate threat to our security,
we cannot be expected to remain complacent’.[72]
4.56
The overriding message that Pakistan sent to the
international community was of a dangerously changed security landscape in South
Asia and of its rock-solid commitment to ensure Pakistan’s safety.[73]
4.57
On 23 May, Nazaw Sharif explained further that
‘No amount of condemnation or sanctions have changed the immediacy or magnitude
of the threat to us. Practically sanctions mean little and change nothing. The
reality on the ground remains.’ The Prime Minister went on to say that the
whole nation had shown a sober and mature approach to developments in the
region. He reiterated:
We have not taken any action in haste. We have not behaved in a
tit-for-tat manner. We have not let any madness engulf us. Whatever decision we
will eventually take it will be in our supreme national interest. [74]
Clearly, the Pakistani government had put India and the rest
of the world on notice that they would not, under any circumstances, allow
their country to be put at risk.
Unites States of America
4.58
The US responded promptly to the Indian tests.
President Clinton expressed deep disappointment at the nuclear explosions,
threatened to punish India for its underground testing, and urged India’s
neighbours to refrain from taking the nuclear route. On 12 May, he made the
following statement:
This action by India not only threatens the stability of the
region, it directly challenges the firm international consensus to stop the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I call on India to announce that
it will conduct no further tests, and that it will sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty now and without conditions. I also urge India’s neighbours not to
follow suit—not to follow down the path of a dangerous arms race...our laws have
very stringent provisions, signed into law by me in 1994, in response to
nuclear tests by non-nuclear weapons states. And I intend to implement them
fully.[75]
4.59
President Clinton invoked the relevant
legislation almost immediately. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State dated
13 May he announced:
In accordance with section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control
Act, I hereby determine that India, a non-nuclear-weapon state, detonated a
nuclear explosion device on May 11, 1998. The relevant agencies and
instrumentalities of the United States Government are hereby directed to take
the necessary actions to impose the sanctions described in section 102(b)(2) of
that Act.[76]
4.60
The sanctions imposed and required by Section
102 of the Arms Export Control Act, otherwise known as the Glenn Amendment, are
as follows:
- termination of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, except for humanitarian assistance for food or other agricultural
commodities;
- termination of sales of defence articles, defence services and
construction services under the Arms Export Control Act, and termination of
licenses for the export of any item on the United States munitions list;
- termination of all foreign military financing under the Arms
Export Control Act;
- denial of any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial
assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
Government;
- opposition to the extension of any loan for financial or technical
assistance by any international financial institution;
- prohibition on United States banks making any loan or providing
any credit to the Government of India, except for the purpose of purchasing
food or agricultural commodities; and
- prohibition on the export of specific goods and technology
subject to export licensing by the Commerce Department.[77]
4.61
Finally, a similar determination under section
2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 directed that ‘the Board of
Directors of the Export-Import Bank may not give approval to guarantee, insure,
or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of
United States exports to India’.[78]
4.62
In summary, according to State Department
spokesman, Mr James Rubin, the sanctions were ‘going to involve very stiff
penalties on the Government of India, including development assistance,
military sales and exchanges, trade and dual-use technology, US loan
guarantees’. He explained further:
The requirement for the United States to oppose loans and
assistance in the international financial institutions could potentially cost
India billions of dollars in desperately needed financing for infrastructure
and other projects. The prohibition on loans by US banks to the government of
India and on Ex-Im and OPIC activities could cost hundreds of millions of
dollars, affect projects already approved and could cause major US companies
and financial institutions to rethink entirely their presence and operations in
India. [79]
4.63
The US administration also took steps to
dissuade Pakistan from retaliating in response to India’s tests. President
Clinton spoke directly to the Pakistan Prime Minister and decided to send a
mission to Pakistan, headed by Deputy Secretary Talbott and General Zinni, the
Commander in Chief of the regional command. Mr Rubin explained that the mission
would work closely with the Pakistani Government to try to ensure that ‘the
actions by the Indian government does not spawn a nuclear arms race in South
Asia and that all steps we can take are taken to encourage restraint and to try
to stabilize what could be an increasingly dangerous situation’.[80]
Japan
4.64
Japan, one of the largest bilateral donors of
economic assistance to India, denounced the tests and announced it would freeze
all grant assistance to India with the exception of those programmes of an
emergency or humanitarian nature, and grassroots grant assistance. The Japanese
Government indicated that it would inform the World Bank of its intention to
withdraw Japan’s offer to host the India Development Bank chairmanship.[81]
4.65
On learning of India’s second tests, Japan took
additional measures which included freezing yen-loan to India for new projects
and examining carefully the loans extended to India by international financial
institutions. Japan also temporarily recalled its ambassador to discuss the
matter.
4.66
Responding to Pakistan, Japan sent a special
envoy to Islamabad with a letter from Prime Minister Hashimoto urging
restraint. The Prime Minister also phoned Prime Minister Sharif to encourage
him to shun the nuclear weapon option. Japan urged Pakistan ‘to stop its
nuclear development and tests, and to become party to the CTBT and the NPT,
while calling on the international community to unite in addressing the
situation of nuclear proliferation’.[82]
China
4.67
China strongly condemned and expressed shock at
the nuclear tests. It argued that the Indian Government had undermined the
international effort to ban nuclear tests in defiance of universal condemnation
so as to obtain hegemony in South Asia and had triggered off a nuclear arms
race in the region. China refuted outright India’s assertion that China posed a
nuclear threat to India, arguing that: ‘this gratuitous accusation by India
against China is solely for the purpose of finding an excuse for the
development of its nuclear weapons’.[83]
United Kingdom
4.68
Mr Derek Fatchett, Minister of State at the
Foreign Office, summoned the Indian High Commissioner to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office to convey the Government’s shock and dismay at the Indian
tests. The British High Commissioner was recalled from Delhi for consultation
on how Britain and Europe could most effectively convey to India their fears
for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and for the stability of the
South Asia region. The Foreign Secretary, Mr Robin Cook, told parliament that
the tests undermined the efforts of the international community to prevent
nuclear proliferation and that Britain would seek to co-ordinate its response
with that of its major international partners at the next G-8 Summit Meeting to
be held the following day. He also informed parliament that Britain was urging
Pakistani leaders to show restraint ‘at what we acknowledge is a difficult time
for them’.[84]
Russia
4.69
The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that
Russia viewed the nuclear tests with alarm and concern and denounced the tests
as unacceptable. It added that as a close friend of India, Russia regretted
India’s actions but would not support sanctions against that country. The
Foreign Ministry called on India to reverse its nuclear policy and to adhere to
the Non Proliferation Treaty and the CTBT.[85]
Canada
4.70
Canada also promptly responded to the tests by
expressing its deep concern and disappointment with India’s actions. It took a
two-pronged approach in addressing the problem of both non-proliferation and of
disarmament. It acknowledged the risk of India escaping significant real
censure or even gaining nuclear-weapon state status. Mr Lloyd Axworthy,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated: ‘any widespread endorsement of de facto
or de jure recognition that the five nuclear-weapons States of the Non
Proliferation Treaty can become six, or seven or eight, will inevitably lead to
pressures for further expansion of this club’. He maintained that Canada’s
actions in response to India’s tests were intended to demonstrate its
unwillingness to accept such an outcome. Canada took the following steps:
- recalled its High Commissioner;
- cancelled CIDA consultations, trade policy talks and the Joint
Ministerial Committee;
- banned all military exports to India;
- opposed non-humanitarian loans to India by the World Bank;
- stopped non-humanitarian Canadian development assistance to
India; and
- decided to offer Pakistan those aid funds withheld from India,
should Pakistan agree to refrain from testing.[86]
4.71
In addressing disarmament, Mr Axworthy announced
that Canada would continue to pursue its disarmament agenda with vigour. He
conceded that little progress had been made in turning the bilateral START
process into reality, pointing out that the Russian Duma had refused to
consider early ratification of the START II agreement.
Sweden
4.72
The Swedish Government expressed its deep dismay
at the Indian tests and urged the Indian Government to refrain from any further
testing. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called in the Indian Ambassador to
make clear Sweden’s views. As a country strongly committed to nuclear
disarmament, Sweden took the opportunity to express the view that the
international community had ‘reached a point where new political force is
needed in nuclear disarmament work.’ The Minister for Foreign Affairs drew
attention to the Canberra Commission’s proposals and noted they should be
considered in depth in international disarmament fora with a view to their
early implementation. [87]
Germany
4.73
Germany condemned the tests and was one of the
first countries to act against India by freezing fresh development aid to India
and cancelling government talks with India on development policy.[88]
Indonesia
4.74
Although Indonesia did not condone India’s
actions, it took a less condemnatory stand. It also turned the spotlight on the
nuclear weapon states and their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, stated:
Indonesia fully acknowledges the sovereign right of states to
determine their own security requirements and the means to ensure them, but as
a non-nuclear weapon state, we are of the view that such a security policy
should be implemented without recourse to nuclear arms.
It is undeniable, however, that the possession of these weapons
by the five nuclear powers has conferred untenable privileges, incompatible
with the sovereign equality of all states as enshrined in the UN Charter. As
long as these are maintained, there will always be an incentive for the
non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear-weapon capability. Hence, we call
on the nuclear weapon states to fully implement both the letter and the spirit
of agreements relating to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and on all
states to refrain from developing these weapons and thereby facilitate the
attainment of the ultimate goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons. [89]
Saudi Arabia
4.75
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also expressed
concern about India’s tests and called for the complete prohibition of the deployment
of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. It urged all members
of the international community to refrain from conducting tests, which
‘threaten all of mankind’.[90]
Sri Lanka
4.76
After a noticeable delay, Sri Lanka finally
responded officially to the tests. It noted with deep concern the missile and
nuclear testings that had taken place in the South Asian region over the past
few months. As with Indonesia it wanted to broaden the context of the debate to
include global disarmament. A statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs explained:
Sri Lanka believes that the entire international community
should continue with efforts to achieve global disarmament leading to the total
elimination of nuclear weapons without which peace and international security
will continue to be in constant jeopardy.[91]
4.77
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar stated that Sri
Lanka was not opposed to anybody becoming a nuclear power and did not think the
nuclear club should be closed to only five members but rather there was the
need for total global nuclear disarmament. In turning to sanctions, he said
‘the application of sanctions includes a very judgemental decision, a sort of
punishment. World affairs cannot be conducted on that basis because very few
countries can afford to take a high moral ground on anything at all’. He added
that the surrounding countries ‘hoped that the tensions can be contained in
whatever way possible as between two mature countries.’[92]
Multilateral
UN Secretary-General
4.78
On 11 May, a spokesman on behalf of the UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed deep regret that India had conducted
three underground nuclear tests and called on all states for maximum restraint
with a view to facilitating nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.[93]
UN Security Council
4.79
Soon after India’s second set of tests, the
President of the Security Council issued a statement which strongly deplored
India’s actions. In part his statement read:
The Council strongly urges India to refrain from any further
tests. It is of the view that such testing is contrary to the de facto
moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, and to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament.
The Council also expressed its concern at the effects of
this development on peace and stability in the region.[94]
Conference on Disarmament
4.80
The Conference on Disarmament resumed its 1998
session on 14 May amid a storm of global protest about the nuclear explosions.
Over thirty countries took the floor to express their regret over India’s
tests.
G-8
4.81
On 17 May, the leaders of the G-8 countries—the
US, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia—agreed to a
statement which condemned the nuclear tests. They expressed their grave concern
about the increased risk of nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and
elsewhere and urged India and other states in the region to refrain from
further tests and the deployment of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. The
G-8 leaders called upon India to rejoin the mainstream of international
opinion; to adhere unconditionally to the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty; and to enter into negotiations on a global treaty to stop the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.[95] The Group failed to take a
collective stand on the imposition of sanctions and it was left to individual
G8 members to decide what specific measures they would take.[96]
Summary
4.82
The reactions of individual countries and of
countries which came together in international fora covered much common ground.
Overwhelmingly, the international community expressed grave concern over the
tests and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Many countries called on India
to refrain from further tests, some went further urging it to adhere to the NPT
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Other countries looked to the broader
problem of nuclear proliferation and wanted greater commitment from the nuclear
weapons states and the international community as a whole toward the elimination
of all nuclear weapons. The approach toward the imposition of economic
sanctions varied from approval through to outright disapproval.
4.83
In turning to Pakistan, the international
community was aware of the pressure on that nation to match India’s show of
nuclear force. Some countries made direct representation to the Pakistani
Government to dissuade the country from retaliating. Countries such as Canada
offered the carrot of additional aid as an incentive for Pakistan to refrain
from conducting nuclear tests. Others reminded Pakistanis of the heavy stick of
economic sanctions that awaited them should they decide to explode their own
nuclear weapons.
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