CHAPTER 7
HOSTAGES
Introduction
The Case of Kellie Wilkinson Summary
of Events
Claims concerning consular assistance
Discussion
The Case of David Wilson
Summary of Events
Role of Australian Government in the Hostage
Crisis
The Australian Government's role in relation
to the Cambodian Government
Australian Government's recognition of Cambodian
sovereignty
Co-operation with British and French Governments
The Australian Government's mode of operation
The Cambodian Government
Access to Cambodian Government
The ransom demand
The withdrawal of General Chea Dara
The option of negotiation
The military assault
The Role of the then Minister for Foreign
Affairs
Removal of military aid
The Issue of Amnesty
Departmental Services to the Wilson Family
Access to Information
The payment of a ransom
Personal possessions
The announcement of the death of the three
hostages
DFAT and the Media
Consular Travel Advice
Comments
The Consular Response Group
7.1 In this Chapter the Committee considers consular responses
to Australians taken hostage overseas, including Kellie Wilkinson's and
David Wilson's capture and murder by the Khmer Rouge in 1994.
7.2 Late in the afternoon of 11 April 1994, Kellie Wilkinson and two
British friends were abducted from a taxi while travelling from Phnom
Penh to Sihanoukville. They were led into the jungle in Khmer Rouge-held
territory. The taxi driver reported that a ransom of US$10,000 was being
demanded for their release.
7.3 The Australian Defence Attache in the area was informed and made
preliminary contact with officials. The investigation of the kidnapping
was led by the Police Chief in Sihanoukville, Tak Vanntha. Australian
and British Embassy officials travelled to Sihanoukville on 13 April.
A consular and Australian Federal Police (AFP) team (hostage experts)
was subsequently sent to Sihanoukville from Australia. New Scotland Yard
police also went to Sihanoukville. Kellie's father, Mr Wilkinson and her
brother travelled to Sihanoukville from Australia on 14 April.
7.4 On 16 April the Consular Desk Officer visited Kellie's mother, Mrs
Wilkinson, in Caloundra, Queensland. Consular offices had almost daily
contact with Mrs Wilkinson over the months that followed and Senator Evans
also made contact on several occasions.
7.5 The Embassy was advised that the Sihanoukville Provincial Governor
had informed the Australian Defence Attache that US$15,000 per person
was being demanded for the hostages' release. There followed many unconfirmed
reports of sightings and reports of ransom demands.
7.6 The matter was raised by Senator Bolkus with a number of Ministers
and senior officials during a visit to Cambodia in mid April. King Sihanouk
wrote to the Khmer Rouge on 24 April appealing for the hostages immediate
release.
7.7 On 6 May, the Embassy advised that there were unconfirmed reports
that a Cambodian police operative had been in touch with the leader of
the Khmer Rouge unit, General Sam Bo, and that a ransom of US$50,000 per
person was being sought. Bo indicated that he was unwilling to provide
proof that he actually held the group or that they were safe and well.
The Cambodian police operatives were directed by the Cambodian Police
Chief and DFAT stated that 'At no time did the [Australian] advisers deal
direct with the operatives or allow themselves to be drawn in to the strategy
formulation process'.[1]
7.8 On 14 May, a ransom note was found demanding US$150,000 for the release
of the group. The Police Chief, Tak Vanntha, considered the note authentic
but the AFP and British police were sceptical. A medical kit and a letter
from Mr Wilkinson were sent in response. A report from Tak Vanntha indicated
that Sam Bo and others had begun to claim that they had killed the hostages
in an attempt to stem the flow of people looking for them.
7.9 On 16 May, Cambodian officials advised that they believed that the
reports of the deaths of the hostages were imprecise but that they would
need to consider the use of armed police to enter Khmer Rouge camps if
reports of graves were confirmed.
7.10 The Australian and British Government positions were reaffirmed
to the effect that they did not pay ransoms and Cambodian officials were
encouraged to explore options and channels of negotiation. Throughout
late May and June attempts were made to influence the Khmer Rouge. A letter
was sent to King Sihanouk from the Governor-General and Senator Evans
wrote to Prince Ranariddh thanking them for their co-operation and urging
that efforts be maintained. King Sihanouk responded and reported his discussion
about the hostages with the Khmer Rouge nominal leader, Khieu Samphan.[2]
7.11 On 19 June, there was an attempt to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge
via radio contact but this did not run according to plan. The AFP reported
that there had been a possibility that the Khmer Rouge had planned to
kidnap Mr Wilkinson and his interpreter during the negotiations.
7.12 On 30 June, Tak Vanntha reported that an operative had made contact
with a Khmer Rouge member, Phat, who claimed to have been one of a group
who had murdered the hostages.
7.13 On 1 July, the Australian High Commission in London advised that
the UK Government had approved the proposal of providing a 'goodwill gesture'
(bags of rice etc). On 6 July, Prince Ranariddh, Cambodia's First Prime
Minister, told the media that he proposed that a ransom be paid to secure
the release of the hostages and that he noted the British and Australian
Governments' positions on the payment of ransoms.
7.14 On 9 July, the 'goodwill gesture' and posters seeking assistance
of local people were distributed in the Khmer Rouge controlled village
of Ta Ney. The next day, 10 July, the Embassy received via one of Tak
Vanntha's operatives items including bones, hair and clothing claimed
to have been collected from the grave site by Phat in Kampot, who was
seeking a reward. These were forwarded to the UK for testing.
7.15 On 13 July, the AFP team conveyed a new local police report that
indicated that one hostage only was dead. Approval was given for AFP officers
to visit the site where Phat claimed the remains lay, subject to a guarantee
that the area was safe and secure. Arrangements were made for the simultaneous
briefing of the families in Australia and in the UK of the forensic results.
7.16 On 14 July, all the families were told that there was strong evidence
that the hostages were dead. Mr Wilkinson was accompanied home to Australia
by a consular officer.
7.17 On 21 July, DFAT received advice that additional evidence had been
recovered by the operatives, in effect double-crossing Phat at great risk
to themselves. The families were told that the deaths had been confirmed
on 23 July.
7.18 The AFP/DFAT team withdrew from Sihanoukville on 6 August and on
19 August 1994, the balance of the remains were recovered by stealth.
The identity of the remains was finally confirmed by British experts on
31 August. Several months later, Act of Grace payments of US$7,000, approved
by both the British and Australian governments, were made to the police
operatives who recovered the remains, to allow them to relocate.
7.19 On 17 April 1995, one of the suspects, Chuon Samnang alias Mean,
was arrested but then released. Press reports indicated that he had the
support of high military officers. He was re-arrested on 22 June and press
reports indicate that this was after protests by a number of high ranking
officials including Tak Vanntha.[3]
In the trial that followed, Samnang was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
At the trial Samnang gave details of the murder of the hostages indicating
that they had been killed on 12 April, the day after they had been kidnapped.
This is consistent with other evidence. The other five suspects received
prison sentences, in absentia. General Sam Bo, the commander of the guerilla
group received a 20 year sentence in absentia.
7.20 In July 1995, press reports suggested that Tak Vanntha knew on 27
May 1994 that the hostages had been killed. It is alleged that he kept
this matter secret in order to obtain supplies and money for expenses.[4]
The Minister asked the Australian mission in Phnom Penh to investigate
the allegation.
7.21 It has also been suggested that a Cambodian military intelligence
officer was involved in the kidnapping as there appeared to be military
pressure to release Chuon Samsang before the trial. In May 1996, press
reports stated that Samsang was now saying that he was coerced into a
confession and that the real killers were still at large. At the same
time the Vice Commissioner of Police at Sihanoukville implicated a military
intelligence officer, Colonel Lay Loeun, in the kidnapping. Press reports
suggest Loeun signed a letter on 20 April 1996 guaranteeing that Samnang
could work for him in the Cambodian military as a free man. Local police
rejected the letter.
7.22 No submission has been received from the Wilkinson family but DFAT
stated in its submission that the Wilkinson family was satisfied with
Government action.[5]
7.23 DFAT's submission details its response to the kidnapping. This included
the placement of a consular and AFP team in Sihanoukville for three months
and the support given to the Wilkinson family, including Mr Wilkinson,
while he was in Cambodia.
7.24 DFAT noted that they believed Tak Vanntha to be professional and
honest and DFAT provided him with equipment and small amounts of money
for the payment of police agents. Cambodian police agents put their lives
at risk to secure the remains and two agents were paid US$7,000 each to
cover the cost of re-location. DFAT also noted the difficulties encountered
during the investigation including the flow of contradictory and confusing
reports. DFAT reported that information that the hostages were still alive
was sometimes generated by the Khmer Rouge in order to confuse investigators
and to extort money. It was also possible that some of the reports that
the three were still alive were 'derived from a culturally based desire
to be the bearer of good tidings'.[6]
7.25 The pursuit of justice for the murderers of Kellie Wilkinson became
a constant theme of Australia's bilateral dealings with Cambodia. The
issue was complicated by suspects hiding out in 'no-go' areas of the country.
7.26 DFAT raised two issues from its consideration of this case:
- ... [what] limit, if any, be set to the financial and personnel resources
which can be dedicated to resolving cases where neither proof of life
nor death can be obtained for a long time; and
- ... the difficulties of deciding how much 'information' to pass on
[to the next of kin] in protracted and highly fraught cases.
- [7] (This subject is dealt with
elsewhere in the report, in particular in paragraphs 7.135-43)
7.27 The Committee believes it is impracticable to try to set a limit
on the resources used in any particular case. Every case is different
and much will depend on the circumstances of the case. The extent of media
interest in a case and whether the case has been politicised will also
have a bearing on the amount of time which a Government will devote resources
to it. With cases also involving nationals of other countries, such as
in the Kellie Wilkinson and David Wilson cases, there is an added factor
to take into account. However, as a matter of principle, while there is
the possibility of saving the life of an Australian, efforts should continue
to be made to achieve that outcome.
7.28 A chronology of events, in Annex 9 of the DFAT submission, is at
Appendix 4. A summary of the main events included in the chronology is
set out below.
7.29 On 26 July 1994, Mr David Wilson was travelling on a train from
Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville in Cambodia when it was attacked by the Khmer
Rouge. Mr Wilson and two other foreigners (Englishman Mark Slater and
Frenchman Jean-Michel Braquet), and some 200 Cambodians were abducted.
The attack was led by Colonel Chhouk Rin, who subsequently handed the
foreigners and some of the other hostages to General Noun Paet, whose
base was on Phnom Vor in an isolated and jungle-covered area of Kampot
Province.
7.30 On 28 July 1994, the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh established
that an Australian was among those abducted and a consular officer travelled
to Kampot with representatives of the British and French Embassies. The
Australian Federal Police officer in Sihanoukville made enquires with
the local police commander to confirm the abduction of an Australian citizen.
The same day, Victorian police attempted to contact the Wilson family,
successfully contacting David Wilson's mother, Mrs Wendy Young, on 29
July. Mrs Young was also visited by a consular officer and briefed on
events.
7.31 On 29 July, the Australian, French and British Ambassadors in Phnom
Penh reached agreement on a common approach to the Cambodian Government.
Diplomatic Notes were forwarded to the Cambodian Government and the Ambassadors
met the Cambodian Foreign Minister. It was confirmed that no military
action would be taken without first advising the three embassies.
7.32 A letter from the hostages and General Paet's ransom demand of US$50
000, in gold for each hostage were given to First Prime Minister, Prince
Ranariddh, during his visit to Kampot on 31 July. Three days later, the
Ambassadors met the heads of non-government organisations (NGOs) operating
in Kampot to explore the possibility of enlisting their assistance in
a resolution of the hostage crisis. A further demand was received on 8
August from General Paet for US$900,000 compensation for damages caused
by Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), 20 watches and medicine.
7.33 On 16 August, the Khmer Rouge radio made cessation of military aid
a condition for the release of hostages. This was followed three days
later by further demands from General Paet that the three Ambassadors
meet Khmer Rouge representative, Khieu Samphan, and that Cambodian Government
troops be withdrawn to Kampot town.
7.34 On 23 August the trilateral police and consular team withdrew from
Kampot on instructions of the Cambodian Government but returned on 5 September.
7.35 On 15 October Colonel Chhouk Rin defected to the Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces. Three days later, the Kampot team reported that the debriefing
report of a former hostage of Khmer Rouge included an account of the death
of the foreign hostages. On 26 October, the Kampot team was told by General
Meak May of the death of the hostages in September.
7.36 On 1 November, the Australian Charge d'Affaires was informed that
the grave of the hostages had been identified. Three bodies were exhumed
the next day and transported to Phnom Penh. The identity of David Wilson's
body was confirmed the day after. The next day, Senator Evans issued a
press statement which extended condolences to the families.
7.37 On 9 November, the funeral of Mr David Wilson was held in Melbourne,
attended by Senator Evans and departmental officers.
7.38 The character of the Australian Government's interactions with the
Cambodian Government were set to a large extent by the Australian Government's
recognition of the sovereignty of Cambodia and by the co-operation established
with the French and British Governments in the David Wilson hostage crisis.
The relationship and interactions between the Australian and Cambodian
Governments are discussed below.
7.39 The guiding principle in the Australian Government's interaction
with the Cambodian Government is stated unequivocally in the following
statement made by Senator Evans to Mr Tim Wilson:
On foreign soil, I am afraid we do not have the right or power to demand
anything, least of all to give orders affecting the deployment of the
military forces of another country. What we can do is endeavour to persuade
the foreign government to take certain steps in the interests of one of
our citizens or in Australia's general national interests.[8]
7.40 From an operational point of view, DFAT confirmed that the role
of the Cambodian Government in the hostage crisis was important because
of their experience of the Khmer Rouge:
The Cambodian government, whatever its faults and failings, is, and was
then, sovereign. It is the only government that can claim any authority
over the countryside and its national institutions - including the bureaucracy,
the military and the police. Cambodia has had to live and deal with the
Khmer Rouge for more than two decades. Neither Australia nor France nor
the United Kingdom knows the Khmer Rouge in this way. Equally, they have
no authority whatsoever over Cambodia or its parts. It was never possible
for the three Western countries, let alone Australia by itself, to seek
to take over this case.[9]
7.41 The decision to work closely with the British and French Governments
meant that the Cambodian Government was presented with the agreed positions
of all three Governments. This was particularly so in relation to the
decision by all three Governments not to offer a ransom and their united
opposition to military action:
... the decision to use the approach which involved the three governments
was one which was approved and endorsed in the three capitals and, to
some extent, the circumstances of the case dictated the way we operated.
Certainly, the way in which Ambassador Kevin has described it was one
which was fully supported and, indeed, decided upon in the three capitals.
Given that the Cambodian government itself was responsible for the conduct
of the release of the hostages and the negotiations, working as three
governments was a decision taken in the three capitals and we all concurred
and agreed with that approach.[10]
7.42 Mr Tony Kevin, Australia's Ambassador to Cambodia, stated that the
combined approach allowed the three Governments' representatives to reach
combined decisions and benefit from each country's shared interest in
the case:
We decided from the outset of the case that the three governments - the
Australian, the British and the French - had identical interests. We each
had one hostage that we were trying to recover alive. There was no reason,
therefore, not to work together as a tripartite group in our representations
in Phnom Penh, in our reporting and policy advice to our home governments,
and in our activity at Kampot.[11]
7.43 In particular the three Governments agreed at an early stage that
there should be no ransom and that no military action should be taken
which would endanger the hostages:
The Australian, British and French Embassies reached agreement on a common
approach to the Cambodian government and sent diplomatic notes urging
a prompt response to the abduction. This set the pattern of future close
and cooperative relations between the Embassies and of repeated high level
approaches to the Cambodian government to press for information, including
details of what plans the Cambodian government had to obtain the safe
release of the hostages, and to register our concerns that no military
action be taken to endanger the hostages' safety.[12]
7.44 The consular officials established themselves in Kampot and set
up 'a trilateral Australian, French and UK team' which enabled them to
make the most of the resources of all three Governments, including 'members
of the Australian Federal Police and New Scotland Yard':[13]
The British had two Scotland Yard detectives on station in Kampot as
part of the team throughout the case. Those Scotland Yard detectives were
rotated but they had experience in hostage case management which, of course,
the British have a great deal of experience of. The French had experts
in Cambodia who were people generally of military background or intelligence
background.[14]
7.45 The Kampot team also had access to locally available expertise:
... we sought advice from three other experts: a French expert who had
lived through the UNTAC period and worked in Cambodia, Christoph Peschoux;
an Australian expert who had been the special adviser to General Sanderson,
Peter Bartu; and a Cambodian American who had worked in detail on the
Himes case, Sos Kem.[15]
7.46 As the crisis proceeded other expertise was drawn upon including
the United States Ambassador, Charles Twining, who had experience through
involvement in the Melissa Himes case and four international NGOs who
were active in the Kampot area.[16]
7.47 Mr Robert Hamilton[cedilla]Assistant Secretary, Consular Branch,
told the Committee that DFAT devoted considerable time and effort to this
case:
Within the department, the case was managed by a joint group from the
Consular Branch ... Senior officers, up to and including the secretary,
were also involved as necessary. In Phnom Penh our Embassy had no higher
priority than to work to save David Wilson. The Ambassador, his deputy,
and others in the mission worked, in effect, full time on the case. In
Kampot, near to the scene where the hostages were held, we had virtually
throughout the ordeal both a consular officer and an officer from the
Australian Federal Police, both sent from Canberra and both rotated monthly.
Because the British and French governments were equally involved ... Foreign
Affairs and Trade staff in Australian missions in Paris, London and also
in Washington worked extensively on the case and other missions were involved
whenever we thought it necessary. Our estimate is that the equivalent
of some eight to 10 Australian officials were engaged full time.[17]
7.48 The hard work and integrity of the officers involved in the case
was not questioned by the Australian journalists' who made a submission
to the Committee. Mr Cater, one of the journalists in Cambodia at the
time, stated:
... we believe all the Australians involved in the case - diplomats,
Federal Police officers and others - were fully committed to the case
and gave their utmost in extremely trying circumstances. If there are
any criticisms implicit in our submission, they should be interpreted
as being of the policies, not of the people on the ground who were obliged
to implement those policies. The embassy staff in Phnom Penh and in Kampot,
in our experience, worked tirelessly and devotedly in very difficult conditions.[18]
7.49 In agreement with the observations made by the journalists, the
Committee finds that that the officers concerned acted with integrity
and commitment in very trying circumstances.
7.50 In their submissions to the Committee, the Wilson family criticised
the Australian Government for 'leaving the responsibility for the hostages'
lives to the Cambodian Government' and for taking 'a monitoring role'
in the Cambodian Government's negotiations with the Khmer Rouge.[19]
7.51 In response, Mr Kevin, explained that as the Cambodian Government
was taking the lead in the negotiations, the tripartite team in Kampot
was told not to negotiate directly with Paet or have direct contact with
the hostages:
The Kampot team was enjoined by the three governments not to get involved
in the negotiations and not, for example, to get on the end of a telephone
and talk to the hostages. The reason for that was that it was consistent
with the policy that had been recommended to governments and decided by
governments from the outset, which was that the Cambodian government,
which had the sovereignty, had to carry the primary negotiating responsibility.
We could not assume that responsibility for them.[20]
7.52 As Mr Kevin described the Embassy's role in the crisis:
We functioned throughout the crisis at two levels of negotiation and
contact. At the Phnom Penh level we were plugging into the higher policy
management of the case by the Cambodian government through our contacts
with the chief negotiator, Chea Dara, through our contacts with the Foreign
Minister, and occasionally through contacts at prime ministerial level.
Also, through both me and Colonel Smith, our defence attache, we had contacts
with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces at the highest level to try to keep
them on course in terms of putting the security of the hostages at the
top of their list of priorities.[21]
7.53 Mr Kevin said that the Kampot team was required to provide a 'strictly
defined' service that is, 'to provide a consular liaison service for the
families in terms of finding out exactly what was going on and reporting
back to the capitals. They prepared their reports on an agreed basis so
each Government got the same report. They reported very frequently.'[22]
7.54 Mr Tim Wilson criticised Australian officials for being more than
20 kilometres away from Phnom Vor, relying on briefings by Cambodian army
generals, and not making direct contact with the hostages and Paet.[23]
However, as mentioned above, the Kampot team were required to leave contact
with General Paet and the hostages to the Cambodians. The Committee considers
it sensible for only one authority to have engaged in contact with the
Khmer Rouge and undertake negotiations. Otherwise, two sets of officials
might be operating at cross purposes.
7.55 Mr Peter Wilson complained of decisions being referred back to Canberra
causing a timelag between decisions being made in Phnom Penh and Canberra.
Mr Kevin agreed that decision making was necessarily a 'to and fro' process:
What happened mostly was ... we would periodically be given instructions
by cable from Canberra to go in and discuss with our British and French
colleagues a series of proposed representations to be made to the Cambodians.
We would then, if the three ambassadors agreed, go in and make those representations.
So it was a to and fro process, if you like, of consultation and instructions
which we would follow.[24]
7.56 According to Mr Kevin there was also scope for decisions to be made
spontaneously on the basis of the co-operation among the three Governments,
the professionalism of the officers concerned and the availability of
locally-available expertise:
We sometimes acted spontaneously. We used our professional judgment as
three ambassadors. When we heard a report or a rumour that needed to be
quickly followed up, we would immediately follow it up and get on the
phone to the foreign ministry and say, 'What do you know about this?'
We would not seek instructions on something like that. We would seek instructions
on questions like: do we need to elevate this question to the level of
Prime Minister? Is this sufficiently important that we have to ask for
a call on the Prime Minister? We would seek instructions if there was
any proposed course of action that was a little bit outside the bounds
of what had previously been the agreed policy.[25]
7.57 In addition, in Mr Kevin's view, when a response was sought from
Canberra, it was 'Always very prompt, always very understanding. We had
very good co-operation with our head office which Ms Shwabsky was running
in Canberra at the time, under the overall direction of Mr Oliver, at
all times. There was complete co-operation and trust between the post
and the department.'[26]
7.58 Nonetheless, it is acknowledged by all parties that practical difficulties
did hamper communication. The Wilsons commented:
They had enormous difficulties in communications. There were no reliable
direct telephone links and certainly no secure links between Kampot and
Phnom Penh. They did manage to establish a secure telephone link back
to Canberra. They had to dictate their reports down that telephone line.
They were then typed up and sent back to Phnom Penh and the other capitals.
There was usually a couple of days delay in getting the reports from Kampot.[27]
7.59 DFAT agreed that communications between Phnom Penh were very difficult
at the time. The landline between Phnom Penh and Kampot was mostly inoperative.
Most communications between the two places went via Canberra.
7.60 The Committee believes that DFAT should have done more to improve
the system of communications during the crisis. That the Kampot team's
communications from Kampot and Phnom Penh mostly went via Canberra made
for a cumbersome process and ensured a slower response time during the
crisis. The Committee believes that DFAT should have looked at faster,
less cumbersome and more effective communication systems for use at that
time.
7.61 From 24 August to 5 September the Cambodian Government declared
an exclusion zone in the Kampot area. DFAT stated that the journalists
and the consular officials were banned from the area. DFAT suggests that
this was in part due to the large media presence in Kampot, a rationale
which the journalists dispute as they say the exclusion zone did not apply
to them.[28] For DFAT, it was
an example of the precarious nature of the negotiations with the Cambodian
Government:
The fact is we were very, very close to the borderline at all times,
as is seen, for example, by Prince Ranariddh's unfortunate decision to
declare an exclusion zone in Kampot ...This was a very crucial period
in the crisis when we would have certainly been better off if our consular
office in Kampot had stayed open. So it was not easy to manage relations
with the Cambodian government and we had to modulate the degree of pressure
that it was useful to apply'.[29]
7.62 This statement conveys a sense of the delicacy with which relations
between the Cambodian Government and the three other Governments had to
be handled. Before examining the specifics of this relationship, the next
section attempts to convey a sense of the environment in which negotiations
took place.
7.63 The criticisms of the Cambodian Government's actions and the alleged
lack of influence of the Australian Government on the decisions taken
need to be understood in relation to the character of the Cambodian Government
in that period. First, the Government was barely one year old and, while
experienced in terms of dealing with the Khmer Rouge, it was a major effort
for the 'fledgling' Government to try to resolve a major international
hostage crisis.[30] This tension
in turn affected the relationship between the Australian and Cambodian
Governments. In this regard, DFAT noted that:
Foreign pressure to resolve the crisis clearly frayed the nerves of all
Cambodians involved, up to and including the Prime Ministers, and it is
the Government's judgement that any more heavy-handed pressure (such as
bringing to a halt our aid program) would have destroyed the degree of
cooperation and effort which was extended in response to our pressure
without improving the prospects of a successful outcome.[31]
7.64 This is the context for the approach which was adopted, which Senator
Evans described as 'quiet behind-the-scenes negotiation'.[32]
7.65 An additional difficulty facing the Australian Government was the
fact that the coalition structure of the Cambodian Government effectively
meant negotiations had to take place with one party. This effectively
left the military out of the negotiations. This situation was outlined
by Mr Kevin:
... the divisions between the two parties which form a coalition in government
were evident at the time and have become even more evident now. It is
certainly no secret, and I am not revealing any confidences to say in
this committee, that relations between first Prime Minister Ranariddh
and second Prime Minister Hun Sen are brittle and mistrustful. We were
in a situation at the time of the hostages crisis, however, where the
coalition government, which had only been elected in the previous year
and was still very new, was trying very hard to function as a coalition
government in which Prime Minister Ranariddh was the senior prime minister,
the first prime minister. So, he was our proper point of contact at prime
ministerial level, not Hun Sen. Hun Sen himself was very respectful of
that political fact, and he tended to stand back from the crisis during
most of its history. We found ourselves always dealing with ministers
who said, 'We will have to take that up with Prime Minister Ranariddh.'
The Cambodian side themselves at no point encouraged us to go to Hun Sen.
We, in fact, tried to involve Hun Sen - the three governments and the
three embassies - because we knew that Hun Sen had a very important role,
particularly in instructing the army, which was very much influenced by
the Hun Sen side of politics rather than the Ranariddh side. But we were
obviously not sufficiently successful in that.[33]
7.66 Senator Evans also acknowledged that this was an important part
of the difficulty of communicating effectively with the Cambodian Government,
'Part of the problem is the incomplete relationship if I could put it
gently that the Cambodian civilian government has with the military leadership
and the incomplete relationship that the military government has with
its own commanders on the ground'.[34]
7.67 The third problem which affected negotiations was corruption. Mr
Tim Wilson stated that 'the Australian Government were well aware of the
corrupt antics of the Cambodian Army generals and soldiers but still insisted
in leaving the fate of the hostages to such a poorly led army who took
matters into their own hands'.[35]
7.68 DFAT recognised that 'corruption did bedevil the management of the
crisis' and that following the death of the hostages the Australian Government
made no attempt to hide the fact 'that venal elements within the Cambodian
military and government tried to gain personally from the hostage crisis
... The limited capacities and inexperience of the Cambodian armed forces
were a severe constraint on the Cambodian Government's capacity to manage
effectively an extremely difficult hostage situation.'[36]
7.69 DFAT also stated that, 'The department has never sought to disguise
the shortcomings of the Cambodian government, shortcomings that arise
from the destruction and horrors of the last 30 years of Cambodian history'.[37]
They acknowledged, however, that the Cambodian Government did far more
for the hostages than they would have done for their own citizens.
7.70 The final problem was the questionable information and unreliable
sources that were the distinguishing features of the environment, as one
of the journalists commented 'There is no such thing as a reliable source
in Cambodia'.[38]
7.71 In these less than ideal circumstances the question arises as to
what access the Australian Government had to the Cambodian Government
and what pressure they were able to exert.
7.72 Mr Tim Wilson argued that the Australian Government had limited
access and influence and used the example of his request for a meeting
with the Cambodian Government:
We asked for a meeting with the Cambodian government the very first day
we arrived. We continually requested that be arranged by our embassy officials.
Two weeks had almost lapsed and still nothing had been arranged. We were
getting very disgruntled and we basically forced the issue upon the ambassador,
Tony Kevin, at the time and a meeting was arranged for the next day with
foreign affairs Prince Sirivudh.[39]
7.73 Mr David Purcell told the Committee that, ultimately, it was Nate
Thayer, with his contacts in the Cambodian Government, who finally broke
the deadlock and arranged their meeting with Prince Sirivudh.[40]
They were keen to see the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister himself
did not get back from Europe until 1 September, three days after they
arrived. We got them in to see him on 9 September, so they had to wait
eight days. We pressed for that meeting. The reason why it was delayed
was really a question of Cambodian protocol. The Foreign Minister was
trying to get them in to see the First Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh,
and he did not want to see them first. But in the end we said, 'Look,
the family are really anxious to see somebody senior in the Cambodian
government. Please see them.' Then on 9 September, Tim and David, together
with the father of Jean-Michel Braquet and the three ambassadors, saw
Sirivudh and had a good meeting with him.[41]
7.74 Whether it was Nate Thayer or the Embassy which finally organised
the meeting between Tim Wilson and David Purcell with Prince Sirivudh,
or a combination of the two, is not known. Inevitably, there are protocol
considerations whenever there are meetings arranged with senior government
leaders, particularly when requests are made by diplomatic missions.
7.75 The Australian journalists, who were in Cambodia at the time of
the crisis and who presented a joint submission to the Committee, also
commented that:
Mr Kevin ... had a lot of difficulty getting meetings with Ranariddh
or Hun Sen. Our understanding is that for at least six weeks he could
not get a meeting with Ranariddh or Hun Sen.[42]
7.76 In response to the allegations, Mr Kevin stated:
In terms of access to ministers, I think the record speaks for itself.
During the 100 days of the crisis, I met the Foreign Minister, Prince
Sirivudh, 15 times and Paul Grigson also met Sirivudh. I met Chea Dara,
the chief negotiator, or Ke Kim Yan, the Chief of General Staff of the
Cambodian armed forces, or their representatives, 23 times and Paul Grigson
met them six times while I was in Australia. I met Prime Minister Ranariddh
on my own once and I met Hun Sen on my own twice. Paul Grigson met Ranariddh
once. Other heads of mission discussed the case with Ranariddh at least
six times in various bilateral meetings they had with him and also met
Hun Sen once. In total, in Phnom Penh, I or Paul Grigson had 51 high-level
meetings on the case in 100 days. So, it is an average of just over one
every two days - plus, of course, in Kampot there were almost daily meetings
by the tripartite consular team with their contacts down there. So, the
record shows that our meetings with relevant Cambodian senior officials
on the case were extremely frequent. Obviously, we did not want to outwear
our welcome by going in every day. We only went in when we had something
specific to say or something specific to ask. But the fact that we had
over 50 meetings...[43]
7.77 The issues raised above all bear on the way in which the hostage
crisis unfolded. Specific matters are discussed below, namely
- the ransom demand;
- the withdrawal of General Chea Dara;
- the option of independent negotiation; and the military attack
7.78 The Wilsons maintained that the only real attempt made by the Cambodian
Government to release the hostages was by payment of a ransom around 19-20
August.
7.79 The three Governments were united in their decision not to pay a
ransom on the basis that to do so would increase terrorism and endanger
their citizens who were living and working in Cambodia. While accepting
the Australian Government's stance on not paying a ransom, Tim Wilson
does not see why support could not have been given to the Cambodian Government's
ransom plans. He noted that in the past Paet had only released hostages
on exchange and that paying a ransom was obviously the only way that the
hostages were going to be released. He also drew attention to the David
Nason case where Bill Hayden negotiated his release from the Khmer Rouge.
7.80 DFAT stated that the Australian Government was aware of the Cambodian
decision to pay a ransom and:
...while not opposing it, spelt out again its own policy on ransoms.
The possible compromise of the no-ransom principle caused deep unease
and anxiety on the part of Australian officials involved. However, in
the last analysis it was a decision for the Cambodian Government to make.
It was their country and, therefore, their responsibility.[44]
7.81 Mr Hamilton reiterated this position to the Committee:
We were aware from very early on that the Cambodian government intended
to secure their release, or hoped to secure their release, by the payment
of a ransom. The question then of whether their release could be secured
without the payment of a ransom in a sense did not really come up. We
were not trying to push the Cambodians to do that, nor was it really an
issue on which we had any relevant views. We were not trying to secure
that outcome.[45]
And:
It was felt by the three governments that that was a decision for the
Cambodian government to take in the circumstances of their own dealings
with the Khmer Rouge.[46]
7.82 DFAT submitted to the Committee that:
General Dara was appointed by the Cambodian Government as the chief negotiator
with the Khmer Rouge forces ... on 6 August 1994 ... he was not formally
dismissed or replaced until sometime between 17 and 28 October. General
Dara never relinquished a role in the negotiating process ... and he and
his deputies remained useful points of contact for the three Missions
... It is correct however that by the middle of September General Dara
was complaining that military activities were making his negotiation task
harder.[47]
7.83 However, there have been press reports and public allegations made
by Mr Sam Rainsy, former Cambodian Finance Minister, that General Chea
Dara was relieved of his position as chief negotiator prior to the commencement
of the shelling of General Paet's camp. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the
Committee tried to get in touch with General Dara to try to clarify what
actually happened at that time; whether he was relieved of his negotiating
mandate and why the shelling began before negotiations with General Paet
were concluded. However, the Committee was unable to arrange a meeting
with him.
7.84 The Wilsons believed that, at this point, the Australian Government
should have been a 'lot tougher' in its discussions with the Cambodian
Government:
We were not involved in the talks between the embassy officials and the
Cambodian government officials. But considering everything, we believe
that, if the Australian government had been a lot tougher and said, 'Don't
take that military action. Don't shell that mountain. Allow Chea Dara
to negotiate', we know from correspondence that there was a deal struck
with Paet. We believe that Paet actually felt that the deal was reneged
on and we do not know why.[48]
7.85 Further, the Wilsons assumed a direct connection between the withdrawal
of the ransom offer and the commencement of military action:
... around 20 August, the money suddenly disappeared. Chea Dara's negotiations
with Paet came to a cease because he received orders from the Cambodian
Government to be removed from his post, and then General Meak May confirmed
in his media reports that he had received orders to take the mountain
at any cost. So it was a time when the Cambodian government changed course
in their tactics. Our government continued to remain inactive and stand
back, leaving full responsibility to the Cambodian government when it
was so obvious that they had ulterior motives designed.[49]
7.86 The journalists also said that the character of the crisis changed
owing to the removal of General Chea Dara:
I think the answer to what actually happened lies with what broke down
the negotiations that Chea Dara was having. He was the guy with $150,000
in a briefcase. We know from the letters that he sent to Ranariddh that
there was a deal done with Paet. The information ministry was telling
us that a deal had been done. In fact, on the day that they were expected
to be released, we were told that the Frenchman actually had been released.[50]
7.87 The journalists, however, also admitted that they had to be 'wary
with whatever we were told, even from the minister of information' and
that around this time 'the minister for information was telling us that
one of the hostages had been released that afternoon. But, luckily, by
that stage, we had learnt not to trust the minister for information and
we did not run with the story.'[51]
7.88 On the journalists' evidence alone then it is difficult to assess
how close to 'a deal' had been reached with the Khmer Rouge and the effect
of the withdrawal of the ransom offer, if at this stage, it had been made.
It is irrefutable, however, that military action followed.
7.89 The Wilsons and the journalists believed that a successful outcome
would have been achieved had a negotiator been appointed as was the case
when the American aid worker, Melissa Himes, was taken hostage in May.
In that instance the American Government had secured a cease fire and
an NGO worker had been able to negotiate and secure her release.
7.90 The journalists suggest that this would have been the appropriate
cultural option:
You obviously do it through Khmer intermediaries, which is the way that
Food for the Hungry operated. You do it the same way that you achieve
anything else in Cambodia.[52]
7.91 The Wilson family also argued that the bombing which commenced prior
to the successful release of Melissa Himes, was successfully stopped by
the US Government:
The Cambodians actually tried the same thing on the Melissa Himes case.
They brought troops into that province and were going to surround the
area. They were going to do exactly the same thing, but the American embassy
said in no uncertain terms, 'If you do that, the relationship with Washington
is on the line', and they pulled back.[53]
7.92 DFAT responded to comparisons with the Melissa Himes case by stating
that 'too many of the circumstances were radically different for a comparison
between the two cases to be more than superficial'.[54]
For example, if a representative of a firm or NGO is kidnapped, the organisation
often negotiates privately, without Government assistance, for the release
and sometimes payment of a ransom. In the Melissa Himes case, Food for
the Hungry negotiated directly. DFAT also noted that Ms Himes was known
and liked by local villagers who helped persuade the Khmer Rouge to release
her:
The American embassy's role - and it was a very important role at one
point - was to get called off a planned helicopter attack on Paet's camp,
an attack which would have been obviously very much the wrong thing to
do and might very well have resulted in Melissa's death, either in the
helicopter attack itself or as a retaliation afterwards by her captors.
When I saw the American Ambassador, Charles Twining, on 29 July, he in
fact gave me a full account of that episode, and it certainly was well
known to us from the outset.[55]
... the circumstances of the case were quite different in that, immediately,
the Cambodian government took full public responsibility for the crisis
and said, 'This is our government train that has been ambushed and we
will be responsible for handling this hostage crisis', and the international
media immediately had full knowledge of the circumstances of the case.
So the kind of quiet, low key approach through an NGO intermediary that
had been adopted in the Melissa Himes case was not available to us in
the David Wilson case.[56]
7.93 In terms of whether the situation was made political by the Cambodian
Government, it is important to remember that between May when Ms Himes
was released and 7 July when David Wilson was taken hostage, the Cambodian
Government had declared the Khmer Rouge an outlawed group. This meant
that the Cambodian Government had already abandoned its policy of leaving
the door open to the Khmer Rouge to become part of a process of 'national
reconciliation'. DFAT stated that this was 'tantamount to a declaration
of war' on the Khmer Rouge and that they responded accordingly, adding
political demands to their initial and more normal demands for money.
The Cambodian Armed Forces had also conducted punitive mortar shelling
and helicopter bombing of Paet's camp and zone of influence shortly after
Melissa Himes had been released.[57]
7.94 DFAT concluded that initially the three western hostages were:
... simply targets of opportunity accidentally caught up in a Khmer Rouge
attack on a train carried out primarily to obtain goods and money. Once
captured, however, they quickly acquired political significance Melissa
Himes had not had. Political demands were entirely absent from the Melissa
Himes case, making it more amenable to resolution.[58]
7.95 In spite of the differences in the two cases the Australian Government
did investigate the possibility of finding an independent negotiator who
could secure the release of the hostages. Their investigations were unsuccessful
owing to the danger the task held for the negotiator. The person who was
responsible for obtaining the release of Melissa Himes agreed that there
should be no money ransom and that he was too affected by the last negotiation
to participate:
We tried, on 3 August the three ambassadors met four NGOs which were
active in the Kampot area. From memory, we had Alan Haslett from Feed
the Hungary, who had been the chief negotiator for Melissa Himes, we had
APHEDA, an Australian NGO, and Medecins sans Frontieres and one other.
We asked all of them if they had anything to suggest or anything they
could do. Unfortunately, none of them did. Alan Haslett said that he could
offer to be a mediator, but it would have to be on the understanding that
no money ransom could be offered by his organisation because that was
their policy and he said that was a great risk for the families to take.
We concluded, at the end of the meeting, that there was really nothing
that the NGOs could do in this particular situation, and we so informed
our three governments and the Cambodian government.[59]
7.96 DFAT also stated that Mr Haslett wrote and spoke to both Tim Wilson
and David Purcell advising that the Wilson family should rely on the Embassies
and that neither he nor his organisation were available as negotiators
and that he believed that no money ransom should be paid. He had offered
to set up a radio contact with General Paet, but when contacted by the
Embassy about this when it became public in August 1996, Mr Haslett stated
that he agreed that there was no need for his intervention because the
Cambodian Government had set up their own channel of communication through
couriers.[60]
7.97 DFAT said that the Cambodian Red Cross was approached and agreed
to help with medical assistance for the hostages. DFAT noted that the
Kampot representatives of the Cambodian Red Cross did make efforts on
behalf of the hostages and that they were 'terrified of the task'. The
Cambodian Government also sought the assistance of members of a religious
group but nothing came of this.[61]
7.98 DFAT concluded that it was not the case that there was a pool of
trained negotiators, familiar with the Khmer Rouge thinking and tactics
and the Khmer language, who could have been used during the hostage crisis.
However, they did make contact with other persons who may have been able
to assist.
7.99 DFAT stated that the Australian Government accepts that 'some degree
of military pressure, as long as it is combined with negotiations, is
a legitimate tactic in hostage situations'. However, there was concern
that military action by poorly co-ordinated units of the RCAF could endanger
the lives of the hostages and as a result:
On twenty-four recorded occasions during the crisis, the Australian Ambassador
and other officers in Phnom Penh, working on instructions from the Department,
and in co-operation with their French and British colleagues, discussed
or received assurances from the highest levels of the Cambodian Government
and armed forces that no military action would be taken that would endanger
the lives of the hostages or cut off the option of negotiation. We are
firmly of the view that our three governments' repeated representations
prevented a major military assault on Vine Mountain [Phnom Vor] and maintained
the commitment of the Cambodian authorities to negotiations long after
their patience with the Khmer Rouge would otherwise have run out.[62]
Further:
... for most of the crisis, and in fact long after the period when we
think it is most likely that the hostages were killed, we persuaded the
Cambodian armed forces not to launch a major attack on Phnom Vor. They
did not launch a major attack on Phnom Vor until well into October. Before
that, it was simply an encirclement and psychological warfare strategy
of occasional shelling to try and encourage negotiation in the early part
of the crisis and defection in the subsequent stages. So we did apply
effective pressure on the Cambodian government not to launch a major military
attack on Phnom Vor when, indeed, they would have wanted to do so.[63]
7.100 From the point of view of the hostages the 'occasional shelling'
was alarming and a letter from David Wilson dated 15 August stated 'we
plead the government stops bombing these innocent areas and pay the money
immediately'.
7.101 DFAT stated that when the graves of the victims had been discovered
it was evident that the shelling had not reached the Khmer Rouge camp
but had been close by:
... shelling, even if it lands some considerable distance from where
you are, is very loud and very terrifying; so I think that they were,
along with the local people and the Khmer Rouge soldiers, obviously psychologically
affected by the long shelling campaign. There is also a possibility that
the Khmer Rouge were perhaps encouraging them to support, as it were,
the Khmer Rouge's political demands by saying, 'Please stop the shelling.
Please tell the soldiers to go away from this area; these people just
want to be left alone.' Having said that, there is no evidence that our
three hostages were physically put at risk by that shelling.[64]
7.102 The Cambodian Government's 'dual objective' to destroy the Khmer
Rouge and to secure the release of the hostages, has been described by
Senator Evans as having the potential to be in 'direct tension'. Because
of this 'Australian representatives, acutely conscious of the problem
of military overreach, discussed or received assurances from the Cambodian
political and military authorities that no military action would be taken
which would cut off the option of negotiation'.[65]
Mr Kevin stated:
Certainly, there was a strong military objective on the part of the Cambodian
authorities to remove Paet's base at Phnom Vor; but we made it very clear
from the outset of the crisis that our primary objective was to keep the
three hostages safe. We believe that, for most of the crisis, both those
objectives were pursued in a broadly compatible way.[66]
7.103 On 19 October, the Cambodian Government took 'substantial military
action against Paet's stronghold'.[67]
The position of the Khmer Rouge was described by DFAT as:
The Phnom Vor area had been under the control of the Khmer Rouge ever
since the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979. The Vietnamese dominated
state of Cambodia had never been able to take it out and it continued
to be under Khmer Rouge control through the UNTAC period as well, right
up until the time of the hostages case. We are talking about an area of
very rough mountain country of about 20 kilometres by 30 kilometres in
area and about 20 or 30 kilometres north-west of Kampot town. It is in
a very strategic position overlooking both the main railway line from
Phnom Penh to Kampot to Sihanoukville, which is the main artery for heavy
goods travelling by rail between Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, and also
overlooking Route 3 which is the road link between Phnom Penh and Kampot.
From his position in those mountains the Khmer Rouge commander, Paet,
who had about 500 soldiers under his control at the opening of all this
was able to dominate a large part of Kampot province. Because of his power,
the local police and provincial authorities in Kampot had entered into
collusive arrangements with him on a sort of live and let live basis.
So we basically had a case of a province which was pretty much out of
the central government's control. We also know that, before the ambush,
the Cambodian armed forces were drawing up plans for an assault on Phnom
Vor, to take it out and to dislodge Paet from this position; and the two
things came together in a very tragic way. Certainly, there was a strong
military objective on the part of the Cambodian authorities to remove
Paet's base at Phnom Vor; but we made it very clear from the outset of
the crisis that our primary objective was to keep the three hostages safe.
We believe that, for most of the crisis, both those objectives were pursued
in a broadly compatible way. The military surrounded Phnom Vor with about
4,000 soldiers. The initial phase of their operation was, having encircled,
it to demoralise the Khmer Rouge group there by random intermittent shelling
and, by that process, to try and break Paet's power over the local villagers
and encourage a process of defection. Our concern was to make sure that
none of that shelling was directed anywhere near where the hostages might
be. In fact, the military had a clear understanding of the coordinates
of Paet's main camp where the hostages were. They knew where the hostages
were, from Chea Dara's contacts and intermediaries going in and out. They
told us, and we have no reason not to believe them, that they were very
careful to avoid shelling that central area.[68]
7.104 Tim Wilson alleged that the outcome was a 'strategic victory' for
the Cambodian Government in which the hostages lives were sacrificed.
Although DFAT stated that there was no additional danger to the hostages
lives during the fighting around Kampot, Tim Wilson maintained that there
was evidence of close shelling of the camp.
7.105 Tim Wilson contended that there was never any real pressure applied
to Cambodian Government to withdraw troops. Further, that shell craters
were found within 100 metres of where the hostages were held and that
the assaults did nothing but endanger the lives of the hostages.[69]
7.106 DFAT stated that:
In mid-August, the Cambodian military began activity involving periodic
shelling of the general area in which the hostages were held and anti-guerrilla
engagements. The strategy did not include a major attack on the mountain
but was designed to decrease the amount of territory held by Paet and
to increase pressure on him. The camp where the hostages had been held
was found after the tragic conclusion of the crisis to have been untouched
by these military skirmishes.[70]
7.107 A cessation of shelling was promised by Prince Sirivudh during
a meeting on 9 September with Tim Wilson, David Purcell, Jean-Claude Braquet,
the father of the French hostage, and the three Ambassadors. Tim Wilson
noted that during the meeting Prince Sirivudh said that negotiations were
continuing on a daily basis. Mr Jean-Claude Braquet stated that not even
one negotiation with Paet was attempted in September.[71]
7.108 Mr Tim Wilson said that the Cambodian Government's strategy was
clear - to take Phnom Vor at any cost - and their strategy changed around
20 August when General Dara was removed as negotiator and diplomats and
journalists were removed from Kampot. He said that 'Instead of the three
countries protesting they accepted this obvious ploy to blur the truth
of what was happening to the outside world' and that:
The Cambodian Government also continued to use the Khmer Rouge as a scape-goat
for all of Cambodia's problems and raised international interest and support
in the form of military aid to help defeat the Khmer Rouge.[72]
7.109 The Wilsons stated that the Westminster's Coroners' Inquest into
the death of Mark Slater concluded that the military attacks would have
contributed to the hostages deaths:
Commander Roy Rann had said in the hearing that the Cambodian government,
the authorities, showed very little compassion for the hostages' lives.[73]
7.110 It is not possible to conclude definitively whether the shelling
of Phnom Vor contributed to the deaths of the three hostages and, if so,
to what extent. Was it the shelling, the breakdown in ransom talks, or
other factors, or some combination of them, which caused the death of
the hostages?
7.111 There are unanswered questions as to whether Paet did reach agreement
with Chea Dara about payment of a ransom and, if so, why this was not
proceeded with. There are also questions about the role of Chea Dara from
the time of the commencement of the shelling of Phnom Vor. There have
been allegations made by Sam Rainsy about the capture of Paet as the highest
priority compared with the safe return of the hostages. Despite some expectations
that the Committee could resolve these vexed issues, it was clearly beyond
the powers of the Committee to do so. Some members of the Committee did
have a private briefing with Sam Rainsy but the Committee was unable to
speak to General Chea Dara despite efforts to interview him. If there
were hidden agendas among the Cambodian players as alleged, there is no
clear evidence of this and it is unlikely that any of them would be admitted.
7.112 The Wilson family expressed their concern that the then Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Senator Evans, should have made a personal visit to
Cambodia and that he continued to avoid making any public criticism of
the Cambodian Government's actions.[74]
The Wilson family were of the view that a visit by Senator Evans would
have brought about 'the necessary pressure' to resolve the situation as,
in their view again, 'the embassy officials were only acting under instructions':[75]
We only had one department to turn to, to represent our needs, and only
one minister was the head of that department. We thought Senator Evans
was the obvious choice because he helped install this government in the
1993 UNTAC elections. He had a thorough understanding of the ministers
there and we believe he was the one who could have applied the necessary
pressure...There is no other minister in the Australian government who
had been involved with the Cambodian government like Senator Evans, and
he was the Minister for Foreign Affairs. So, yes, he was the obvious one
to represent David's needs and our needs, which he did not. He remained
inactive throughout and still remains inactive in pursuing any sort of
explanation on what did happen .[76]
7.113 DFAT emphasised that no foreign minister from any of the three
Governments visited Cambodia while the crisis was on 'because we all wanted
to send a message to the Cambodian government that normal relations were
on hold while this crisis was going on'.[77]
7.114 In Senator Evans' view he decided not to undertake a personal visit
so that negotiations could remain 'low-key':
I did consider going personally to Cambodia to discuss the issue with
Prime Ministers Ranariddh and Hun Sen and my colleague Prince Sirivudh
and others on the ground but the judgement was really made that to do
so would inevitably just give the whole thing a major new injection of
international media and related profile and that given the nature of the
strategy was always one best pursued through keeping the temperature off
the situation and quiet back-stage negotiations.[78]
7.115 However, formal representations were made at the highest levels
of Government. Senator Evans communicated in writing with both the Cambodian
Foreign Minister and the two Prime Ministers in the course of the crisis.
He also saw the Cambodian Foreign Minister twice while abroad and raised
it specifically and as his first priority with the then Foreign Minister,
Prince Sirivudh. One of these meetings took place in Bali and one in New
York. The Australian Ambassador in France and the British ambassador in
France also met Prince Sirivudh on 30 August.
7.116 A similar stance was taken by the other two Governments. The then
British Prime Minister, John Major, wrote to the Cambodian Government.
Lord Carrington, a senior elder statesman, visited Cambodia and had talks
with both Ranariddh and Hun Sen during the crisis on behalf of all three
Governments. French Foreign Minister Juppe met Prince Sirivudh in France
on 25 August and also spoke to Hun Sen when he was in France for medical
treatment on 16 September.
7.117 Mr Nick Cater, one of the Australian journalists who made a submission
and appeared before the Committee, said that:
Nothing I have seen or heard of Senator Evans's behaviour during the
crisis, in any way, leaves me to suggest that he was anything less than
committed. I was actually present in Ulaan Bataar when he made the statement
that they feared the worst for the hostages. He had to make that statement
twice because the first time he broke down. He could not carry on. I have
no doubt he was fully committed ...[79]
7.118 Whether a visit to Cambodia by Senator Evans would have achieved
any change in the Cambodian Government's strategy is a moot point. However,
it might have lifted the stakes even further if the Khmer Rouge thought
that their captives were important enough to bring the Australian Foreign
Minister to Cambodia.
7.119 The Wilson family and the Australian journalists who gave evidence
to the Committee thought that the Australian Government should have taken
a tougher stance with the Cambodian Government against the shelling of
Phnom Vor. There was agreement at the start of the crisis that this would
not happen. To what extent the Australian Government could have unilaterally
done much more than it did is not clear. As the three Governments were
acting in unison, it would have been difficult for the Australian Government
to have adopted a different approach to the other two Governments. Ultimately,
the Cambodian Government, representing a sovereign country, which had
responsibility for handling the crisis, has to take responsibility for
its actions.
7.120 On the 16 August, the Khmer Rouge made the removal of military
aid the condition for the release of the hostages. The Australian Government's
aid to Cambodia consists of civilian/humanitarian assistance amounting
to $4 million over the current four year period and some limited non-lethal
defence assistance.
7.121 One of the concerns of the Wilson family was that the Australian
Government could have used the threat of the withdrawal of military aid
to influence the outcome of the negotiations:
...why did our government never apply the required pressure on the Cambodian
government by threatening to remove military aid, pending the removal
of their troops from the mountain base? UN workers and aid workers have
continually voiced their concerns about giving such military aid to a
poorly led and corrupt army, as the army generals displayed throughout
the crisis by shelling at will, selling false stories to journalists,
et cetera. They have continually reported atrocities committed by the
Cambodian army, appealing to such countries as Australia to apply more
pressure in upholding UN human rights laws and allocating overseas aid
more to education, health and rural development than to the military.[80]
7.122 Subsequent to the crisis, the ex Finance Minister, Sam Rainsy alleged
in the press that the Cambodian Government had 'deliberately sacrificed
David Wilson' in a bid to raise further international aid. In response
Senator Evans stated that this was 'an attempt to sow dissension between
Cambodia and the three governments which support it with aid.'[81]
Sam Rainsy also suggested that the Cambodian Government's interests were
in defeating the Khmer Rouge rather than saving the lives of the hostages
suggesting they were deliberately sacrificed.
7.123 Mr Tim Wilson stated that Senator Evans's responses to Sam Rainsy's
allegations indicated that he was supportive of the efforts of the Cambodian
Government during the hostage crisis and that his commitments lay 'with
the re-building of war-torn Cambodia rather than the life of an Australian
citizen'.[82]
7.124 In a press statement in November 1994 the Australian Government
announced that it was committed to 'a bilateral civil aid program of $92
million over the four years to 1998, covering child health care, education,
human rights, rehabilitation of infrastructure, agriculture and further
de-mining assistance'.[83] The
Government also stated that its assistance complemented that of other
countries, including Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands,
Norway and the US. The aid was justified by the need to restructure the
society after its near decimation under the Khmer Rouge:
The international community has an immediate humanitarian imperative
to help Cambodia's reconstruction. After more than thirty-five years of
conflict the countryside has been ravaged, the population decimated and
demoralised, and nearly all infrastructure destroyed. Between one and
two million people were killed by the Khmer Rouge or died under their
rule, and others - including many of those needed for the country's development
- fled the country. With a current per capita income of about US$210 per
annum, Cambodia's nine million people are amongst the poorest and most
disadvantaged in the world.[84]
The press release confirmed that the package of assistance offered to
the Cambodian Government 'did not include the provision of lethal material'.
7.125 DFAT stated that the assertion that the Cambodian Government wanted
the hostages to be killed to help it raise international aid 'does not
stand up to examination'. DFAT notes that foreign governments did not
require further proof of the dangers of the Khmer Rouge and that the Cambodian
Government had no reason to doubt Australia's commitment to continued
support.[85]
7.126 Tim Wilson questioned why Australian taxpayers should provide military
assistance to a corrupt Government which lied about the military assault.
In his view, the Australian Government should have at least threatened
to remove military aid. He stated that the Australian Government also
refused to co-operate with international laws banning land mines and sold
rifles to Thailand which found their way into the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
Tim Wilson also suggested that Senator Evans should have spoken to the
Thai Government about the sale of weapons to the Khmer Rouge. This would
have eliminated the Khmer Rouge supply and undermined their stronghold
in Battambang.[86]
7.127 DFAT in its submission stated that the Australian Government did
delay taking a decision on a Cambodian request for additional military
assistance to avoid unnecessary provocation of the Khmer Rouge.[87]
DFAT went on to note that a decrease in general aid would only have harmed
the people of Cambodia.[88]
7.128 Tim Wilson noted that Colonel Rin, who admits to being responsible
for the kidnapping of the three hostages, is now a colonel in the Cambodian
army and that no bounty has been put on Paet's head.
7.129 Tim Wilson notes that Senator Evans has stated that the investigation
was flawed, that Colonel Rin was likely to have known of the death of
the hostages before he defected. However, 'he ignores his original promises
and responsibility in pursuing any further explanation of the events during
the hostage crisis'.[89] He submitted
that Cambodia has ignored its international obligations by granting an
amnesty to Colonel Rin despite the fact that he lead the ambush on 26
July. He believed that Colonel Rin should have been prosecuted.
7.130 DFAT addressed this issue in its submission to the Committee, saying
that: Rin's treatment after his defection had to be seen in the Cambodian
context that is, that the Cambodian Government was encouraging defections
in order to weaken the Khmer Rouge. They stated:
Rin defected to the Cambodian Government in mid-October, reportedly with
about one hundred fighters previously allied to Paet. He joined the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces where he was feted and made a ranking officer.
The Chief Negotiator, Chea Dara, told us before the defection that he
was negotiating with Rin to defect and to bring the hostages with him.
This did not happen, but following his defection, Rin allegedly attempted
to persuade his former commander, Paet, to surrender and release the hostages.
We were always sceptical of the prospects of success of these efforts
by Rin, but no possibility of this kind could have been rejected at that
stage. The three Western Governments had no real alternative to accepting
the defection at face value. Nevertheless, when neither the hostages nor
Paet were produced, the Australian Government saw the generous treatment
afforded to Rin as a bitter pill for the family and the hostages' governments
to swallow. The Government has accepted, however, that it has no evidence
either that Rin was personally implicated in the murders or knew of the
murders of the hostages at the time of his defection.[90]
7.131 It was unfortunate that Colonel Rin, a senior officer implicated
in the kidnapping but not necessarily in the death of the hostages, was
not brought to account for his part in the hostage crisis. There was little,
however, that the Australian Government could have done about it.
7.132 The Australian Government has always insisted that General Paet
be brought to trial should he be captured or if he were to defect. The
Cambodian Government has always supported this position. The Committee
recommends that, given Khmer Rouge General Paet's central role in the
whole David Wilson hostage crisis including the death of the hostages,
the Australian Government should take the strongest possible action at
an international level should he be captured or defect and not be brought
to trial for the death of the hostages.
7.133 Mr Tim Wilson alleged that both in Australia and during the three
week visit to Phnom Penh, the family had limited access to information.
He expressed the view that 'information was censored and drip fed to our
family' and that there was no alternative for them other than to seek
other sources of information. He complained that they did not receive
constructive advice about how to cope with their situation and no counselling
was offered. He went on to say that he was given good advice and information
by Alan Haslett and Nate Thayer, two individuals involved in the Melissa
Himes case, including an information sheet on 'How to survive as a hostage'.
He stated that 'we repeatedly approached consular [officer] Wayne Fulton
about our anxieties and [he] repeatedly responded by saying that they
would not offer such advice, and that we have to ask everything before
given any answers'. Tim Wilson stated that this allegation was denied
at a DFAT meeting on 29 June 1995.[91]
7.134 Peter Wilson stated that 'they purposely held information from
us in this period covering most of September and October'.[92]
7.135 Mr Robert Hamilton responded to the allegations of members of the
Wilson family by explaining their policy about passing on information
to families:
... most information that was relevant was passed on. We did not, and
we still do not in our consular dealings with families, pass on every
piece of rumour and gossip. We are not in that business, and there is
a huge amount of it. There was a lot of rumour and gossip, if I can use
those terms, in the media articles that were written, which is why I suspect
a family such as the Wilsons might think that they are getting more information
from the media because there is a lot more in there. We try to pass on
material that we believe to be right. We may not always get it right,
but, essentially, we do attempt to have facts before we pass them on ...
It is very difficult to pass on every word of every conversation to a
family, but enormous efforts were gone to to pass on the content of the
activity that was taking place. I believe that meetings that took place
in Phnom Penh would have been referred to as having taken place, but there
would not necessarily be a three page cable read over the telephone about
exactly what might have happened in that meeting, but the fact of the
meeting would have been passed on. We would have gone into more detail
in those areas at any time, but there are practical limits to what can
be passed on.[93]
7.136 Mr Hamilton added that the Department did organise 'a number of
very specific and very detailed briefings for the family' in Australia.
This included flying Mrs Young, David's mother, to meet Senator Evans.
Peter Wilson was also invited but chose not to attend that meeting.[94]
DFAT stated that the briefing process was complicated by the fact of 'David's
parents being divorced and having little communication'. They stated that
David's mother was provided with a mobile phone to facilitate communications
between her and the Department.[95]
7.137 Tim Wilson and David Purcell went to Phnom Penh for three weeks.
They were met on arrival and Paul Grigson, the Deputy Head of Mission,
was established as their main point of contact at the Embassy. Mr Kevin
stated that although there were no written records of meetings, 'As far
as I know, they saw Paul pretty well every day while they were in Cambodia.
Paul kept them informed in a similar sort of way, I would suggest, to
the way in which the parents were being kept informed in Australia.' He
also said that:
The task of keeping Tim and David informed while they were in Phnom Penh
was ancillary to the main task of negotiating for the release of the hostages.
Tim and David were not involved in those negotiations. They had basically
come to Phnom Penh because they wanted to be near Tim's brother and they
wanted to have a better sense of what was going on, and we tried to help
them in that.[96]
7.138 Tim Wilson also complained that the Australian Embassy withheld
video footage from him in Cambodia. He alleged that the French and English
families had access to video footage of the hostages a week before he
and David Purcell were allowed access to it.
7.139 The Ambassador responded to the allegation by saying that he had
asked the Cambodian Foreign Ministry to make a copy of the video for them
and the viewing with Tim was held on the day it arrived. He suggested
that this was four days after it had been shown to the French and English
families.[97]
7.140 In Chapter 5 the Committee expressed the view that in such cases
the Department should provide families with all relevant information.
Although the rescue of the hostages should be of paramount importance
family members have a vital interest in the proceedings and outcome. The
fulfilment of the family's need for information must become a high priority
of DFAT and any mission abroad [see further discussion at para 7.26].
The Department has expressed the concern that much information was unsubstantiated
and proved to be incorrect or misleading. The Committee believes it is
the Department's role to pass on their concerns about the quality of the
information at the time that the information is relayed to the family.
7.141 The Committee therefore recommends that the provision of information
to families, in such distressing circumstances, be a high priority for
DFAT and any mission abroad.
7.142 When the Khmer Rouge demanded a ransom in exchange for the release
of the hostages, the Wilsons sought advice from the Department as to how
they could pay such a ransom. They alleged that:
The department's representative consulate to our family, Wayne Fulton,
told both my sister, Maree, and me from Canberra via a telephone call:
"We cannot help you in paying the ransom. It is against our policy.
All I can say is that you will have to seek out your own contacts to pay
the ransom. I cannot tell you any more".[98]
7.143 The Wilsons stated that the Department was effectively putting
the family and the hostages in danger by leaving them without assistance
in this matter. Mr Hamilton explained the Government's policy in relation
to payment of ransoms and assistance to other people to pay ransoms by
saying that this:
... is a real dilemma for governments on how to deal with cases such
as this. I think most people agree that it would be inappropriate for
governments to pay ransoms. So it then becomes a question of to what extent
governments involve themselves in somebody else paying a ransom and to
what extent would we, for example, deliver a sum of money on behalf of
the Wilson family? All of these questions were in our minds during all
of this. They are very difficult questions to answer. I do not think that
it is really possible to have a hard and fast set of rules in some of
these areas. It is delicate government policy territory, really.[99]
Further:
... in this particular case we were actually advising the family against
going up and paying a ransom themselves ... because we were concerned
that they would mortgage their house, borrow or do whatever it was they
were doing to get the money and that they would have that money taken
from them the moment they set foot in Cambodia. There would have been
a large number of people at the airport offering to deliver that money
for them. That was our view. We were therefore discouraging them in a
gentle way from proceeding down this path at all. But, ultimately, it
is their choice as to what they do about those things.[100]
7.144 Mr Hamilton said that the statement made by Mr Fulton would have
been a summary of their policy position on ransoms and he pointed out
that the family were advised that if they really wished to go ahead they
could use another means.[101]
Mr Fulton stated that the family were also advised that to pay a ransom
would put them in a dangerous situation.[102]
7.145 Mr Wayne Fulton, told the Committee that his major contact with
the family had been with Peter Wilson and Wendy Young, and that Tim Wilson
had rung distressed one evening and he had advised him as to what the
government policy was. The main conversation on this matter was with Peter
Wilson and he had advised him that:
... if he did go down that path - that if he did arrange this money,
as he told me indeed he did have the potential to raise it - there was
no suggestion that he would get, I think my words may have been, 'value
for money'. There was no guarantee that they would be returned to the
family. He understood that. This was, overall, a 20 to 25 minute conversation.
I want to set the scene. I never had any good news for the Wilson family.
It was never aggressive; it was always emotional with them ... I had to
then be at arm's length and professional with them to try to get this
position across to them. Peter understood it; he did not like it, but
he told me he understood.
And:
They were most certainly warned that, if money did change hands, they
were going on very dangerous grounds and even that the price might go
up. They might have agreed on a figure and, when that money is paid over,
they get nothing in return for it and the price goes up.[103]
7.146 The Committee formed the view from Mr Fulton that the discussions
he held with the Wilsons were at a hypothetical level and that he did
not consider, 'that they would go to Cambodia and do it themselves - certainly
not from Peter. Again, I repeat, Peter was my main point of contact along
with Wendy. But there was no suggestion that they would go there and do
it.'[104]
7.147 The difficulty for DFAT in this situation was that the Government
policy was not to pay a ransom and DFAT officers foresaw grave dangers
for the Wilson family if they tried to pay a ransom themselves. By not
supporting the Wilson family in pursuing payment of a ransom, this inevitably
resulted in the ire of family members. However, it would have been irresponsible
of the Department if they had tried to help the family pay a ransom when
the chance of success was extremely slight and the risks were very high.
While the dangers of this process were pointed out, those dangers should
have been made more explicit so that there was no misunderstanding about
the advice of the Department.
7.148 Mr Wilson asked 'how was it that the embassy officials never bothered
to retrieve all of David's possessions and a traveller staying at the
same guesthouse later sold David's travel photographs to journalists,
which we still have never seen, as well as wear his clothes and boots,
use his sleeping bag, et cetera?' He alleged that the Department did not
'properly retrieve' all of David's possessions and that as a consequence
some of his possessions were sold.'[105]
7.149 Mr Hamilton stated that it is the consular role to retrieve the
personal belongings of an Australian who has met with difficulties overseas.
He stated David's possessions were collected on 29 July and an inventory
was made and cabled to Canberra. He told the Committee that it was difficult
to collect all of David's belongings because not all of his possessions
were identifiable. For example, it was later discovered that David's boots
were being worn by his German colleague. He added, 'That certain things
were subsequently sold I think is evidence of the less than honourable
intentions of those who were holding them at the time'.[106]
7.150 Mr Hamilton acknowledged that although it was the practice to hand
over the possessions to the family straight away, 'In this particular
case, I think they were pretty much disregarded for some time. I do not
think we have a date offhand when those possessions were handed over,
but they were not seen as being the critical element in all of this and
they were not given the highest priority'. He stated that his recollection
was that 'the personal effects were passed to the family at about the
time of the funeral, which took place around about 6 November'.[107]
7.151 The Committee considers that it is plausible in the circumstances
that certain items were not retrieved when the possessions were collected.
However, the Department should have been more sensitive to the plight
of the family and handed the possessions to them as soon as possible.
7.152 Mr Kevin said that the position at the beginning of September 1994
was that the hostages had been 'put incommunicado by Paet'. This meant
that there was no 'proof of life' after the end of August, although the
Embassy was being offered 'indications of life' in terms of rumours. This
meant that the Embassy was 'lulled into a false sense of security for
much of the month of September ... It was only really towards the end
of September when we began to feel that things might not be going as well
as we thought.'[108] He went
on to say that:
We did not actually get a strongly credible death report until 18 October,
when the Kampot team met an ex-hostage who they had come across quite
accidentally by their own investigations of something that one of their
contacts had said to them. This man, who was an army soldier who had been
imprisoned by the Khmer Rouge with the hostages and had subsequently been
released, told a very credible story about how they had been taken out
and, presumably, shot between 2 and 8 September. We did not get that story
until 18 October.[109]
7.153 Mr Kevin said that the Wilson family was briefed the next day but
between 18 October and 26 October when the media announcement of the death
of the hostages was made, the Embassy was attempting to confirm the evidence.
He went on to say that:
What happened on the 26th and the 27th was that a lot of things happened
very quickly. The final army offensive started on 24 October, and Paet's
main camp was taken on that day. By 26 October, Paet himself was pinned
down in one square kilometre of territory. He was completely outnumbered.
He only had a few soldiers left; everybody else had defected. It was already
pretty clear that the hostages were not with him, although we were not
100 per cent clear. There was another uncertainty which was it was just
possible that, early in September, when we had no further proof of life
and presence of the hostages, they might have been taken out of the area
and moved up into another Khmer Rouge area closer to the main Khmer Rouge
base at Pailin. It was clear that the army encirclement was porous and
that people could filter in and out through it surreptitiously. There
were a number of reports, which, subsequently, proved to be false, but
at the time were inherently not incredible, that the hostages might have
been taken out of the area in early September. So we did not know that
either.[110]
.154 Mr Peter Wilson stated that after David's death was confirmed they
had no contact with the Department and that they heard of David's death
on the television news when Senator Evans and the Prime Minister made
parallel statements on 26 October 1994. He said that the death seemed
confirmed when Senator Evans and Alexander Downer criticised the Khmer
Rouge the following day.
7.155 Mr Tim Wilson also stated that he first heard of David's death
from a television report by the Prime Minister and Senator Evans. He said
that the family understood the Prime Minister and Senator Evans were 'offering
their condolences to our family'.[111]
He stated that on hearing the report he rang the department and the official
he spoke to said someone would get back to him.[112]
7.156 The Committee asked DFAT whether the Wilson family was told about
the death of David before the news report of his death. Mr Hamilton replied
that 'they had been told of the reports of the death. Exactly what words
were used to them I am not sure, but our concerns at these reports were
made clear to them. So they were well aware of the reports.'[113]
7.157 The Committee then asked DFAT when was the announcement made that
the hostages had been killed. Mr Hamilton replied:
The announcement that I think the Wilson family has been concerned about
was made the next day. It was first made by Senator Evans. If I could
just read a bit of the transcript of that, it will show what he said.
He said this in Ulaan Bataar to an ABC correspondent - he happened to
be in Mongolia at the time. He said:
We have received some rather distressing reports which are, unhappily,
very credible, but not as yet finally confirmed, that David Wilson and
his two fellow hostages were in fact killed by the Khmer Rouge, General
Paet and his followers some time last month. We can only hope for the
sake of David and his family, who have been enormously brave during this
whole long ordeal, that these reports do prove as false and as misleading
as so many others have been. But I do have to acknowledge that the signs
at the moment are not good.
He said more than that, but I think that is the first comment that was
made. It was picked up by other media and daytime TV - and I have no idea
what story they ran - but I think that is where it emanated from. In fact
I am sure that is where it emanated from. In a number of the reports that
were subsequently made, we are aware that the qualifications were left
off. For example, in the Prime Minister's comments that have caused a
certain amount of anguish, again the transcript of that has him - and
I am only quoting one part - as saying, 'If this is true, it is a very
tragic outcome and I would like, on behalf of the government, to extend
my condolences to David Wilson's parents.' Some media reports simply dropped
the 'If this is true' bit of it. But he did say it. So the initial comment
made by Senator Evans was that in Ulaan Bataar and it was then picked
up by the media and made much of during the day.[114]
7.158 However, the deaths could not be confirmed until some days later.
Mr Kevin told the Committee:
There was this very unfortunate four or five days between those statements
by Senator Evans and Mr Keating on 27 October and the final confirmation
by Hun Sen on 2 November that the graves had been found. I mentioned in
my opening statement the bad news was not well handled and I was really
very much mindful of that period when I made that comment. Very unfortunately,
Prime Minister Ranariddh, against all reasonable indications, wanted to
go on saying, 'Until the bodies are found, I refuse to believe that they're
not still alive. I believe they've been taken out of the area and are
somewhere else in Cambodia.' It was therefore terribly important to try
and locate the graves quickly so that we could be absolutely certain that
was not the case. We were worried that the fact that the mountain was
very heavily mined might be used perhaps as a reason for not locating
the graves quickly, and prolonging the agony even more. So that was why
we put very great pressure on the Cambodian authorities in those days
to find the graves and have them exhumed. And that was when Senator Evans
wrote to Hun Sen. It was a very tragic period and obviously greatly increased
the stress on the families.[115]
7.159 The Committee agrees with the observation that the time delay in
confirming the deaths was unfortunate and believes the process of informing
the family could have been better handled by the Department.
7.160 In a press release dated 3 November 1994, Senator Evans referred
to the briefing given the Kampot team by General Meak May on 26 October
that the hostages were killed on or about 27 September. Senator Evans
said:
I was informed shortly after officials in Canberra received this report,
and on the strength of this combined evidence (taking into account a mass
of other surrounding information), and in the knowledge that the family
had been informed, I made my statement in Ulaan Bataar.[116]
7.161 Ms Shwabsky expressed the view that the problem of confirmation
of death was exacerbated by the problem of the reliability of information:
Cambodia is a society in which you never get one story, ever, no matter
how simple the instance seems. In both cases we were pursuing leads that
were quite contradictory and until the last possible moment, until the
bodies are recovered, if there were a chance, we continued to pursue those
leads. In that week you are talking about, between the reports, the team
in Kampot, particularly, was really pursuing confirmation all the time
and we were very reluctant to abandon any hope.[117]
7.162 Ms Shwabsky gave the example of the Kellie Wilkinson case where
reports that she was still alive were circulating months after she had
been killed. Ms Shwabsky repeated that 'in Cambodia, contradictions just
abound. It is very difficult to know at the time what is true and what
is not true. In both cases, we did not give up hope and we did not give
up following up leads until simply there was material evidence that the
bodies were found.'[118]
7.163 Mr Kevin stated that 'On 31 October the French Foreign Ministry
announced that if the remains are found tomorrow then Paet must be found
and brought to justice. Similarly, on 31 October the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office told the Slater family that there were rumours that
the graves may have been found and that these were being investigated.
Finally, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office made formal statements on
1 November, after the graves were found.[119]
7.164 The Wilson family criticised DFAT for its handling of the media
in Cambodia during the hostage crisis. They submitted:
Embassy officials, together with departmental officials from Foreign
Affairs and Senator Evans' office, also continually refused to comment
to the media about the hostage proceedings. Being denied of information
as we were, they had no alternative but to seek out other sources of information,
creating a possibly dangerous situation in Kampot of disrupting negotiations
which both the Australian and Cambodian Governments accused the journalists
of doing. Had the good will of the press been respected in the first place,
this could have been avoided.[120]
7.165 Five Australian journalists made a submission to the Committee
which also criticised DFAT's handling of the media throughout the hostage
period, particularly the Department's 'no comment' policy.[121]
They said that when they arrived in Phnom Penh a few days after the capture
of David Wilson to cover the hostage crisis, they met the Australian Ambassador,
Mr Tony Kevin and other Embassy officials to establish a relationship
with the Embassy. They went on to say that:
We made clear to Mr Kevin we wanted to develop a cooperative approach
during the crisis. We made clear that we did not want to publish any material
that could jeopardise any ransom negotiations or put the hostages' lives
at risk. We sought a relationship of trust where we could check our information
with the embassy and seek advice and guidance on the risks we might take
ourselves in pursuing information. Our appeal for a cooperative relationship
was made in the knowledge that none of our editors, whether a television,
radio or print, would publish anything that could conceivably contribute
to the death of an Australian. Our request was denied and we were told
that the only point of contact from then on was DFAT's media office in
Canberra. We found it useless making contact with Canberra, where, even
if the spokespeople knew anything, they refused to confirm or deny information.
At the same time they were quick to make snide criticisms of what we had
published or put to air. The blanket 'no comment' policy seemed to be
founded on an arrogant and erroneous belief that if we were told nothing
by the embassy we would not write stories. In fact it forced us to seek
other sources, largely but not exclusively Khmer officials ...[122]
7.166 The Committee raised this matter with DFAT at the hearing on 25
November 1996. Mr John Oliver, who was the DFAT Branch Head responsible
for Indo-China in 1994, told the Committee:
... the policy of no comment was one which was decided upon in Canberra,
and it was also a policy that was agreed to by the French and the British
governments. To that extent, the ambassador and his colleagues were under
instructions from Canberra that there would be no comment. The approach
which was made to Ambassador Kevin, I am sure, was made in good faith,
but his ability to cooperate with the media was circumscribed by policy
set down from Canberra. So to that extent he was not a free agent and
could not have cooperated unless he had specific instructions from us.[123]
7.167 Ambassador Tony Kevin told the Committee that he supported the
'no comment' policy adopted by the Department. He also thought the strong
media interest was a negative influence on the case. He said that:
Because there were a great many media in Kampot looking for stories,
it created a market for a great deal of unofficial private enterprise
into mediation between Paet's camp and Kampot. At one point, there were
six separate teams of intermediaries coming in and out of the camp. They
basically had a great deal of material to sell - letters, photographs,
tapes, videos. I am not suggesting that Australian journalists bought
this material, but I am suggesting that the large international media
presence in Kampot did create a market for it and did therefore complicate
the negotiations as a process. Secondly, the large media interest in the
case from the outset encouraged both Nuon Paet himself and the Khmer Rouge
headquarters in Pailin to consider what sort of a propaganda advantage
they might get out of this. They had just been outlawed by the Cambodian
government; there was obviously a large military push to take out Paet's
base at Phnom Vor; and they tried to use the media interest to oppose
those objectives. On 15 August, about three weeks into the case, the case
was politicised by the Khmer Rouge in demanding that the military aid
to the Cambodian government by Australia, France and the United States
cease; in demanding that government forces withdraw from the Phnom Vor
area and leave Paet in charge of the area, as he had been before; in demanding
that the ambassadors go and negotiate with Khieu Samphan, the nominal
leader of the Khmer Rouge. I do not think that politicisation of the case
would have taken place if the strong media interest in the case had not
provided an opportunity for it. Finally, the media presence in the end
even irritated Paet in a very damaging way, because after the final video
was produced on 29 and 30 August it became public on 2 September Paet
then banned all intermediaries visiting the camp from seeing the hostages.
He hid the hostages away. That made it much easier for Paet subsequently
we suspect, about a week later to have the hostages killed and to conceal
knowledge of that fact for about six more weeks.[124]
... the fourth area in which they negatively influenced it was in the
decision by Prince Ranariddh to close down the Kampot office for two weeks.
That came after a Sunday Times interview with the hostages which
greatly irritated Prince Ranariddh. The whole emphasis of media reporting
by that time was not so much on the Khmer Rouge's atrocity in kidnapping
hostages and holding them for ransom, as on the government behaviour in
attacking the hostages. Somehow or other the roles had been reversed.[125]
7.168 The journalists who gave evidence to the Committee strongly disagreed
with Mr Kevin's comments about there being a market for hostage photographs,
etc. among the media. Apart from one instance which the journalists detailed
in their submission, the journalists stated that 'there were, to our knowledge,
no instances in which any media organisation paid for information, photographs,
videos and so forth'.[126] They
argued that the 'international press contingent in Phnom Penh is a close-knit
community, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for chequebook
journalism to occur without it becoming widely known'. They concluded
that 'In summary, we would be intrigued to know who the rogue, unscrupulous
journalists were that Mr Kevin alleges created a market for information.
It is hard to see how you can have a market without a buyer.'[127]
7.169 The journalists told the Committee that they thought that DFAT
had over emphasised the influence of the media. Mr Nick Cater told the
Committee:
In fact, we think that the department has grossly exaggerated the influence
of the media in its submissions to the committee. But if the department
now maintains that we helped politicise the issue and, by doing that,
we disrupted negotiations and we interfered with the negotiation process
by trying to make our own contacts with Khmer Rouge sources or whatever,
you have to say that at the time it should have taken a much more serious
view of how to control or pass information to the media which was there
in Phnom Penh. They had very much the attitude at the time it was repeatedly
said to us that they were too busy handling the main element, which was
to free the hostages, to talk to us or to brief us. I cannot see how that
fits now with their submission that we were somehow central to the fate
of the hostages.[128]
7.170 Mr Dale Small, Manager, United Nations & International Support,
AFP, told the Committee:
If we had adopted the police line in relation to the handling of journalists
in a hostage investigation or hostage situation, we normally involve them
at the very beginning and we keep them well informed of the situation.
Basically, we call on their professional standards to make sure that certain
information is not released if that is going to be detrimental to the
particular event.[129]
7.171 The Committee strongly believes that DFAT's total 'no comment'
policy, either on or off the record, was a mistake, even though it was
agreed among the three Governments. If the Department is unhelpful to
the media, and unprepared to give guidance to the media, as happened during
the Wilson hostage crisis, the Department is in no position to criticise
the media for what is broadcast or written. The Australian journalists,
at least, were prepared to work with the Embassy and DFAT, and sought
co-operation from the outset. Nevertheless, their overtures were rebuffed
by DFAT.
7.172 The journalists were also willing to share information which they
gained from their sources with the Embassy but, again, the Embassy was
not willing to countenance any co-operation with the media on the Wilson
case. As the journalists were able to tap into Cambodian Government sources
without having the protocol restrictions of diplomats, and also other
sources not necessarily available to Embassy staff, the Committee believes
it could have been worthwhile for the Embassy to receive information gained
by Australian journalists. At the same time, the journalists could have
been warned that, if published, certain information they had obtained
from their sources might have endangered the three hostages.
7.173 DFAT could have sent a public affairs officer to Phnom Penh to
deal with the media but because they adopted a 'no comment' policy, no
such arrangements were made. That would have been the logical approach
to take if DFAT had adopted a more sensible media relations strategy in
Cambodia. A public affairs officer would not only have been experienced
in media relations but would have also allowed other Embassy staff to
focus on the case.
7.174 Obviously, the Department must continue to have the right to adopt
a public 'no comment' policy in particular situations. This does not mean,
however, that the Department should ignore the media. It needs to develop
means of handling the media in a co-operative way which ultimately best
serves the interests of the hostages.
7.175 By providing guidance to the media, the Department also avoids
any chance of the media playing off the Department with a hostage's family,
which not only causes additional distress for the family and extra problems
for the Department.
7.176 The Department should also explain carefully to a hostage's family
the media strategy which it is adopting so that the family does not gain
the impression that the Department is not acting in the best interests
of the hostage and the family.
7.177 The Committee recommends that, in any future hostage crisis or
similar event, DFAT provide guidance to the media rather than ignore the
media. The Department should also explain its media strategy to a hostage's
family.
7.178 Mr Tim Wilson submitted that DFAT's Consular Travel Advice for
Cambodia mentioned only the dangers of travelling by road and not by train.
He criticised the travel advice for not mentioning kidnappings and that
it was 'very vague and incomplete advice about the dangers involved in
travelling in Cambodia'. He also criticised DFAT for a lack of advice
on travelling in the country and suggested that information be posted
in hostels frequented by travellers.[130]
7.179 Mr Nicholas Cater, who was speaking on behalf of himself and two
other journalists, Mr Lindsay Murdoch and Mr Terry Friel, who covered
the David Wilson case in Cambodia, told the Committee that:
In fact, the consular travel advice current at the time of David Wilson's
kidnapping was issued on 6 May 1994 and so was 21/2 months old. It had
not been revised, despite the confirmation of the death of Kellie Wilkinson.
It mentioned the danger of travelling in the northern provinces, but made
no reference to the areas south of Phnom Penh. There was no mention of
Kampot province, where David was kidnapped, or Kampong Som province, where
Kellie Wilkinson had been kidnapped and murdered. It made special mention
of the dangers of travelling by road, but it did not refer at all either
to travel by rail or boat. It was, in our view, an inadequate document
which was misleading by its omissions.[131]
7.180 DFAT submitted that the Consular Travel Advice, which was current
for Cambodia at the time of David Wilson's visit, urged caution and that
travellers should contact the Embassy for specific security information.
DFAT stated that had David Wilson approached the Embassy he would have
been told of the hazards of travelling by train and noted that David's
German travelling companion said that he decided not to take the trip
to Sihanoukville because of the dangers involved.[132]
7.181 DFAT officers amplified the Department's submission when they gave
evidence on the David Wilson case. Mr Robert Hamilton said that:
... travel advices are not, and never have been - and I do not think
they realistically could be - designed to cover every conceivable thing
that might happen to a person overseas in every country, but much more
detailed information is available from our embassies all over the world,
and there is in fact a reference in travel advices to contacting either
the department or posts for more detailed information. That is the way
that we attempt to get information to people: if they want to know precisely
whether or not they should travel to a particular town or village or on
a particular road,or even, as in this case, on a particular train,the
appropriate place to find that out would be from the Australian Embassy
in the relevant city, which in this case was Phnom Penh.[133]
7.182 The Australian Ambassador to Cambodia, Mr Tony Kevin, told the
Committee:
On the consular travel advice at the time, let me just read out some
phrases from the travel advice which was issued on [5] May 1994 and which
reflected the recent kidnapping of Kellie Wilkinson and her companions
from a car on Route 4 between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville late in the
afternoon. It noted:
Security in parts of the country remains uncertain. Banditry remains
widespread outside the main urban areas. Australians intending to travel
by road outside Phnom Penh should only undertake necessary travel and
are strongly advised to join a convoy wherever possible, travelling only
in clear daylight hours. Australian travellers to Cambodia should exercise
due care and maintain a very high level of security awareness at all times.
The department strongly urges Australian travellers to check with the
Australian Embassy about the current security situation prior to embarking
on travel within Cambodia.
In fact, at the time, the only ways in which we recommended that people
travel between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville were either by air - there
were reasonably frequent air services for about $70 return - or by joining
a convoy with at least two cars and with at least two armed policemen
and travelling only between 10 o'clock in the morning and four o'clock
in the afternoon. Travel by train is something we would have strongly
recommended against. In fact, it was most unusual for any foreigners to
travel on the trains: they were known to be unsafe and they were known
to be frequently held up for money and for the kidnap of Cambodian passengers.[134]
7.183 Mr David Purcell, a friend of the Wilson family, told the Committee:
As a traveller and backpacker, I do not think that you visit embassies
unless you have to. If you have any travel advice it is given from other
backpackers in hostels and so forth. We brought these questions up to
the ambassador, Tony Kevin, while we were in Phnom Penh for David. We
said, 'Maybe you should put some of these warnings on bulletin boards
in hostels.' That was something they had never heard before. That is the
sort of thing we were up against.[135]
7.184 In reply to a question about the feasibility of putting notices
in hostels, Mr Purcell replied:
Very easily done. Cities like Phnom Penh are like the city of Dandenong;
it takes only five minutes from the embassy to get around to a hostel
or backpackers place. To put up a warning, or something like that, would
be no cost.[136]
7.185 DFAT submitted that:
Our Embassy in Phnom Penh attempted last year to put a copy of the Cambodia
Travel Advice in each hotel in Phnom Penh (just one relatively small city)
but found the exercise both enormously time consuming and not effective.
After all, do travellers read hotel notice boards?[137]
7.186 The Committee understands that DFAT's Consular Travel Advice system
is meant to warn prospective travellers about dangers they might face
travelling in particular countries. Travellers should take account of
Travel Advices in the planning of overseas travel. As DFAT told the Committee,
more detailed information about the dangers in particular parts of a country
and detailed travel advice about the use of modes of transport within
the country are available from the respective Australian embassy or consulate.
7.187 The Committee believes that travellers have a responsibility to
do everything possible to protect themselves from danger while travelling
overseas. If they are within reach of or can get in touch with an Australian
post, responsibility rests with the travellers to ensure they obtain up-to-date
travel advice if there is any doubt about their safety while travelling
in particular areas. The fact that backpackers do not want to contact
an Australian post for travel advice is not a valid criticism of DFAT's
consular services.
7.188 As mentioned elsewhere in the report, the Committee does not believe
that an Australian post should be placing travel advice in hotels or hostels
other than in very special circumstances. In overseas countries, the onus
should be placed on the traveller to obtain travel advice rather than
on the post to ensure travellers have such advice.
7.189 During the hearings a number of criticisms of the motives of the
then Senator Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, were made by some members
of the Wilson family. These statements included allegations that the Minister
was more concerned about Cambodia than he was about the life of David
Wilson (for example see paragraph 7.123). Similar statements alleging
a cover up by DFAT senior officers and the former Minister and, indeed
this Committee, were most recently publicly made by Peter and Tim Wilson
in a television interview on 12 May 1997.
7.190 The Committee rejects these allegations and agrees they are without
substance. They clearly derive from the grief and frustration felt by
Peter and Tim Wilson rather than an objective assessment of the actions
of the then Minister and officers who acted with integrity and dedication
during what was an extremely difficult and ultimately tragic situation.
7.191 However, Senators Troeth, Macdonald and Eggleston note the Minister's
close involvement in the UN peace process in Cambodia leading up to the
crisis. Their view is that this involvement may have indirectly influenced
the Minister in his dealings with the Cambodian Government during the
crisis. As such, the Minister may have been less willing to apply pressure
on the Cambodian Government during the crisis because of the volatile
nature of the Cambodian political scene and the possible damage that pressure
might have caused to the peace process.
7.192 Senators Troeth, Macdonald and Eggleston believe that the concerns
of the Minister for the UN Peace process in Cambodia and the fact that
this was a new and inexperienced Government should have been overridden
by the Australian Government's overwhelming responsibility to look after
the interests of its citizens. As such, the safety of David Wilson should
have been the chief concern of the Minister, rather than any other political
or foreign policy concerns.
7.193 The Committee as a whole, however, agrees with the following comments
made by Mr Hamilton in evidence:
It is tempting to say, when the outcome was so far from what we had all
sought, that the Cambodian government and the three Western governments
got it badly wrong. These are easy words but they pay little regard to
the realities of such situations. No government could give in meekly to
the demands that were made by the Khmer Rouge. Alternative approaches
had to be pursued. The Khmer Rouge, for reasons that we still do not know,
decided that the hostages were expendable and killed them. It then successfully
kept that crime secret for several weeks. They were not manoeuvred or
tricked into this. They could have released the hostages at any time.
As with Kellie Wilkinson, they did not. There was no sense to it and,
in that regard, it was a typical Khmer Rouge act,senseless, violent and
inexplicable. The brutal deaths of David Wilson and his companions remain
the responsibility of the Khmer Rouge and its members, specifically Nuon
Paet.[138]
7.194 The Committee acknowledges that many of the issues raised by the
family of David Wilson remain unresolved, although the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade has attempted to answer and address a number
of them. The Committee has taken the approach that there are lessons to
be learnt from this tragedy and has drawn these out wherever possible.
However, neither the Department nor the Committee are in a position to
address all the concerns. As such, while every attempt has been made to
deal with the issues there will inevitably remain unanswered questions.
7.195 At the time of the Wilkinson and Wilson kidnappings there was no
group within DFAT designated the responsibility to manage a crisis involving
an Australia national overseas or to develop policy or contingency plans
for an emergency. The management of difficult and complex cases was undertaken
principally within the Consular and Passports Branch by the Consular Operations
Section and Consular Policy Section. Other areas of the Department may
also be called upon to assist such as the media liaison team. The Department's
consultant, Mr T McDonald, noted in his report that:
Responses to these challenges have traditionally been improvised, with
responsibility for management of the case migrating from junior to more
senior officer and from operational to policy or geographical areas. Expertise
is brought in as required and coordination of effort effected through
senior officers' networks.[139]
7.196 Mr McDonald recommended that a Special Projects Section be created
in the Consular Branch. The aims of creating such a unit are :
to give the Department the ongoing capacity to manage difficult and complex
cases effectively; to provide a capacity for research and policy development
in this area; to ensure that the function is based on planning commensurate
with its importance; and to build a core of expertise in the management
of difficult cases which can monitor potentially difficult and complex cases
identify the need for special action at an early stage ensure the maintenance
of full and detailed records of cases take over management of cases when
judged appropriate form the core of a larger task force as necessary.
7.197 The Committee was told by Mr Fisher, First Assistant Secretary,
Public Relations and Consular Division, at its first hearing in September
1996 that:
The incoming government made a commitment at the last election to give
a particular emphasis to the consular role ... The Department, too, has
sought to live up to this commitment. Last week, for example,and despite
the very constrained budgetary circumstances,the Secretary of the Department
announced the establishment, for the first time in the Department's history,
of a separate Consular Branch. In addition, the Department has set up
a Consular Response Group of three officers whose role is to handle emergency
and particularly difficult cases.[140]
7.198 The reason for establishment of the Consular Response Group (CRG)
in May 1996 was 'to enable more focused attention on major or complicated
consular cases'.[141] DFAT told
the Committee that these would not just be hostage cases, but consular
cases that 'entail particular difficulties for us as an organisation'.[142]
The CRG has a research and policy development function and has assessed
posts' contingency plans to assess whether they could be improved as well
as initiating a comparative study of the handling of hostage cases.[143]
The Group is also developing and/or maintaining links with other agencies.
The CRG will be Canberra-based and 'is the focus of ... knowledge and
understanding and specific information seeking and training. We will use
that then globally to structure our responses to these incidents'.[144]
7.199 The decision as to which consular cases will be handled by the
CRG is made by the Assistant Secretary of the Consular Branch, in consultation
with the Consular Operations Section and Consular Policy Section. Cases
referred the CRG normally would be those of particular complexity, possibly
with policy implications and possibly of expected long duration.[145]
7.200 The CRG consists of three officers at differing levels, combining
skills for varying backgrounds. The present head of the group is a lawyer.[146]
The CRG works closely with officers in the Consular Branch and from other
parts of the Department. It is funded from the resources of the Consular
Branch.
7.201 The CRG has been formally allocated one case since its inception,
that of Justin Fraser who was detained in Somalia in late May 1996. The
officer in charge of the CRG spent four weeks in Nairobi in connection
with the case. He has also been to Vila to hand a difficult case.
7.202 In relation to hostage planning, Mr Hamilton stated that the CRG
is:
... working on something that we might call generic contingency plans
for hostage cases which would give posts something that was a more formal
piece of paper that would give them something that they could then develop
in the context of their own particular problems, but they would have all
of the basics right before them. So instead of each post having to work
its way through in specific consultation with us, there would be something
to start with. Cambodia is not the only country in the world where we
are extremely concerned about the possibility of Australian hostages being
taken in the future.[147]
7.203 In the case of Mr David Wilson, concerns were raised about control
being maintained by Canberra rather than by the posts. The CRG will be
Canberra based with the head of the CRG travelling to the location as
required. In evidence, Mr Hamilton indicated that generally the overall
control will remain in Canberra although it was difficult to make a generalisation.
In situations such as a hostage crisis, 'the first lesson is to be very
flexible and to adjust your response to the situation that you are facing.[148]
Mr Hamilton went on to state:
Generally, we would run it from Canberra. Again, it depends on the situation.
More often than not, a hostage situation requires the government to do
something to get the hostage back. It may be that there is some purely
local issue, in which case probably the post would be best to handle it.
But, more often than not, what the hostage is taken for is something that
relates to central government policy rather than something that has taken
place at the post. That was certainly the case in Somalia.[149]
7.204 Mr Hamilton also indicated a practical problem in maintaining the
CRG at optimal operational levels:
May I say that, in the nature of an organisation like the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, just when we develop expertise, we post
it. This is equally true in the consular area and I am sure it will be
true in the consular response group. People do not go into a job for life
in DFAT. No matter how expert we get people in the CRG or any other area
of consular, they tend to move. So, we are constantly having to redevelop
skills.[150]
A further problem is that each case is unique - different circumstances,
different location, different power groups - requiring different responses
and possibly input from a variety of organisations:
If we look at the Kellie Wilkinson case, the David Wilson tragedy and
the problems twice that we have had this year in Sudan and once in Somalia,
just as examples, each one of those has dealt with entirely different
problems. It has required input from quite different people, and it is
very hard to see how any one person in Australia could actually have been
equipped to manage all of those cases. [151]
7.205 DFAT has responded to this problem by seeking assistance from other
organisations including the AFP and in the case of Justin Fraser, the
Australian Defence Forces. However, neither were able to provide assistance
with the case of Ms Maree Worthington in the Sudan. Mr Hamilton went on
to say:
So it is not just a question of saying these groups of one or two people
will be able to solve the problems. It is more a question of knowing where
to look when the appropriate circumstances arise and of having, I think,
the competency to bring the relevant skills together in an appropriate
group at the time. We do not have the capacity to say that 90 per cent
of our hostage cases will be domestics in Australia and that you deal
with them in a particular way. We have only the capacity to say that each
case is likely to be in somewhere more remote and more difficult and less
known about than the one before and that is certainly the general way
in which these things happen. But we are working to establish the skills
and the competences and the relationships that are necessary. We have
been talking to other governments about how they do it. We hope to do
this again in a meeting next year,that is currently being organised,as
one of the issues on the agenda. We have already spoken to our counterparts
at the British foreign office about how they deal with things. They have
given us some ideas that we are working our way through on how we could
perhaps improve our own dealings. It is a continuing process.[152]
7.206 The Committee believes that the only feasible and appropriate way
to handle a crisis such as the kidnapping of Ms Kellie Wilkinson or Mr
David Wilson is through a specialist unit. Further, while recognising
that each situation is unique, DFAT needs to ensure that there are appropriate
contingency plans for emergencies, that contacts with other government
agencies and specialist groups are in place before the next crisis and
that a full analysis of what occurred during the kidnapping crises of
1994. Having said that, the Committee does not believe that either situation
was hampered by the lack of such a unit. Officers in Canberra who handled
both crises worked tirelessly, seeking specialist advice as necessary
and exploring alternatives to resolve the situation. It is to their credit
that they did so while handling the many other cases that were before
the Consular Section.
7.207 The Committee commends the Department for the establishment of
the Consular Response Group. However, the Committee recommends that DFAT
ensure that the CRG is adequately resourced and that the optimal level
of expertise is maintained with in the unit at all times.
Footnotes:
[1] DFAT submission, Annex 10.
[2] DFAT submission, Annex 10.
[3] The Age, 25 July, 1995.
[4] The Age, 25 July, 1995.
[5] DFAT submission, p. 27.
[6] DFAT submission, p. 26.
[7] DFAT submission, p. 27.
[8] Letter from Senator Evans to
Tim Wilson, 26 August, 1994.
[9] Committee Hansard, pp
297-8.
[10] Committee Hansard,
p. 307.
[11] Committee Hansard,
p. 306.
[12] DFAT submission, Annex 8,
p. 1.
[13] Senator Evans, question
and answer session, 3 November, 1994.
[14] Committee Hansard,
p. 307.
[15] Committee Hansard,
p. 305.
[16] Committee Hansard.
p. 305.
[17] Committee Hansard,
p. 297.
[18] Committee Hansard,
p. 359.
[19] Committee Hansard,
p. 117.
[20] Committee Hansard, p.
307.
[21] Committee Hansard, p.
307.
[22] Committee Hansard,
p. 307.
[23] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 9.
[24] Committee Hansard, pp
348-9.
[25] Committee Hansard, p.
349.
[26] Committee Hansard,
p. 349.
[27] Committee Hansard,
p. 307.
[28] Committee Hansard
, p. 309.
[29] Committee Hansard,
p. 313.
[30] Senator Evans, question
and answer session 3 Nov 1994.
[31] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 3.
[32] Senator Evans, question
and answer session, 3 Nov 1994.
[33] Committee Hansard,
p. 332.
[34] Senator Evans, question
and answer session, 3 Nov 1994.
[35] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 45.
[36] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 4.
[37] Committee Hansard, p.
299.
[38] Committee Hansard, p.
372.
[39] Committee Hansard, p.
112.
[40] Committee Hansard,
p. 112.
[41] Committee Hansard,
pp 314-5.
[42] Committee Hansard, p.
370.
[43] Committee Hansard,
p. 306.
[44] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 4.
[45] Committee Hansard, p.
328.
[46] Committee Hansard,
p. 328.
[47] DFAT responses to questions
raised in the Wilson family submission, p. 1.
[48] Committee Hansard,
p. 376.
[49] Committee Hansard, p.
140.
[50] Committee Hansard,
pp 379-80.
[51] Committee Hansard, p.
372.
[52] Committee Hansard,
p. 375.
[53] Committee Hansard, p.
376.
[54] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 5.
[55] Committee Hansard, p.
345.
[56] Committee Hansard, p.
345.
[57] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 6.
[58] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 6.
[59] Committee Hansard, pp
345-6.
[60] Letter to David Purcell,
6 August, 1994.
[61] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 9.
[62] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 7.
[63] Committee Hansard, p.
309.
[64] Committee Hansard, p.
344.
[65] DFAT submission, Annex 8,
p. 4.
[66] Committee Hansard,
p. 343.
[67] DFAT submission, Annex 8,
p. 4.
[68] Committee Hansard,
pp 342-3.
[69] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 24.
[70] DFAT submission, p. 25.
[71] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 44.
[72] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 46.
[73] Committee Hansard,
p. 134.
[74] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 23.
[75] Committee Hansard, p.135.
[76] Committee Hansard, p.
129.
[77] Committee Hansard, p.
318.
[78] Senator Evans, question
and answer session 3 Nov 1994.
[79] Committee Hansard,
p. 380.
[80] Committee Hansard, p.
99.
[81] Senator Evans, press release,
6 July, 1995, p. 3.
[82] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 32.
[83] Senator Evans and Senator
Ray, joint press release, 29 November, 1994
[84] Senator Evans, Parliamentary
Statement (attached to press release), 29 November 1994, p. 10-11.
[85] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 12.
[86] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 27.
[87] DFAT submission, p. 25,
Annex 7, p. 3
[88] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 3.
[89] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 29.
[90] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 14.
[91] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 18.
[92] Mr Peter Wilson submission,
p. 8.
[93] Committee Hansard, p.
313.
[94] Committee Hansard,
p. 313.
[95] DFAT submission, Annex 7,
p. 13.
[96] Committee Hansard, p.
314.
[97] Committee Hansard,
p. 315.
[98] Committee Hansard,
p. 102.
[99] Committee Hansard, p.
346.
[100] Committee Hansard, p.
346.
[101] Committee Hansard,
p. 327.
[102] Committee Hansard,
p. 348.
[103] Committee Hansard,
p. 348.
[104] Committee Hansard,
p. 348.
[105] Committee Hansard,
p. 114.
[106] Committee Hansard,
p. 341.
[107] Committee Hansard,
pp 341-2.
[108] Committee Hansard,
p. 336.
[109] Committee Hansard,
pp 336-7.
[110] Committee Hansard,
p. 337.
[111] Committee Hansard,
p. 130.
[112] Committee Hansard,
p. 131.
[113] Committee Hansard,
p. 338.
[114] Committee Hansard,
p. 338.
[115] Committee Hansard,
p. 338.
[116] Senator Evans, press
release, Annex 8, p. 5.
[117] Committee Hansard,
p. 339.
[118] Committee Hansard,
p. 339.
[119] Committee Hansard,
p. 342.
[120] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
p. 7.
[121] Messrs Lindsay Murdoch,
Nick Cater, Evan Williams, Adrian Brown, Richard McGregor and Terry Friel
submission, Richard McGregor, subsequently endorsed the submission, except
for paragraph 18 where he offered a modified view.
[122] Messrs Lindsay Murdoch,
Nick Cater, Evan Williams, Adrian Brown, Richard McGregor and Terry Friel
submission, p. 2.
[123] Committee Hansard,
p. 312.
[124] Committee Hansard,
p. 311.
[125] Committee Hansard,
p. 312.
[126] Committee Hansard,
p. 360.
[127] Committee Hansard,
p. 360.
[128] Committee Hansard,
p. 363.
[129] Committee Hansard,
p. 440.
[130] Mr Tim Wilson submission,
pp 4-5.
[131] Committee Hansard,
pp 359-60.
[132] DFAT submission, Annex
7, p. 12.
[133] Committee Hansard,
p. 302.
[134] Committee Hansard,
p. 304.
[135] Committee Hansard,
p. 107.
[136] Committee Hansard,
p. 107.
[137] DFAT submission, p. 77.
[138] Committee Hansard,
p. 298.
[139] DFAT submission, p. 104.
[140] Committee Hansard,
p. 3.
[141] Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1995-96, p. 195.
[142] Committee Hansard,
p. 352.
[143] Annual Report 1995-96,
p. 195.
[144] Committee Hansard,
p. 352-4.
[145] Senate Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Examination of Budget Estimates
1996-97, Additional Information Received, Vol 3, p. 210.
[146] Committee Hansard,
p. 25.
[147] Committee Hansard,
pp 657-8.
[148] Committee Hansard,
pp 666-7.
[149] Committee Hansard,
pp 666-7.
[150] Committee Hansard,
p. 353.
[151] Committee Hansard,
p. 353.
[152] Committee Hansard,
p. 353.