Chapter 6 - The administrative system—an overview
The administrative system is primarily concerned with decisions and
processes associated with the command and control, operations and
administration of the Australian Defence Force. The right to report a wrongdoing or
to make a complaint is an integral part of the administrative system.
This chapter looks at the various avenues for reporting wrongdoing or
making a complaint about unacceptable or inappropriate behaviour. It examines
the opinions and experiences of those who have raised concerns about various
aspects of the reporting processes available to ADF members.
Avenues for complaint
The ADF has a range of measures in place for reporting wrongdoing or
inappropriate conduct so that the circumstances of a report can be
investigated, the facts of the complaint determined and corrective action taken
where appropriate. The diagram on the following pages sets out the various
processes that may be taken to lodge a complaint. They range from the most
informal of approaches to the more formal written complaint that initiates
Self initiated resolution or
alternative dispute resolution
The Defence Force encourages members to seek to resolve a problem at the
lowest level of command. Initially, complainants are advised to rely on their
initiative to rectify a situation by working with the other parties to the
dispute or grievance to reach a resolution. If such an approach is not
appropriate or does not produce a satisfactory result, the complainant is
encouraged to obtain the support of a third person to work informally toward a
resolution with the parties involved in the conflict.
For situations not amenable to this informal approach, the ADF promotes
the use of alternative dispute resolutions involving mediation or conciliation
as the most suitable next course. Supervisors or personnel in the chain of
command are available to help resolve a problem. According to the Defence
Equity Organisation, mediation can only be facilitated by an accredited mediator
who has received formal training, and both parties must be willing to
participate in the process.
Figure 5.1—Options for resolution of unacceptable behaviour
the situation for themselves
Complainant to be provided with advice on how to
approach the respondent. Using the “I”
statement the complainant privately addresses their feelings with the
the situation for themselves with a third party there for support
Complainant may not
feel comfortable in approaching the respondent without support of a third
party. The third party does not speak
on behalf of, or become involved in the discussion between complainant and
respondent but is present for moral support.
The respondent may also have a third party present.
Submit a Complaint to a
commander or manager
A complaint of unacceptable behaviour
is the disclosure of any unacceptable behaviour to a commander or manager
through any means: verbal, written or observed.
(Any ADF member,
Defence APS employee, Defence contracted staff or member of a foreign defence
force can make a complaint)
Commander or manager to
conduct a quick assessment to determine what has happened and then determine
whether the matter can be resolved through informal means or if a formal
inquiry is required.
Refer DI(G) PERS 35-3 -
Management and Reporting of
Informal Resolution - After
receiving a complaint, the commander or manager is to assess whether or not
informal resolution is suitable (best for low-level issues where
disciplinary or administrative action is not required). If appropriate, the commander or manager can recommend that the
complainant try self-resolution.
Alternatively, the commander or manager can informally counsel the
people involved or conduct staff training.
Another option is for the commander or manager to arrange Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR), bearing in mind that participation is
voluntary. Refer DI(G) PERS 34-4 – Use and Management of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Defence. Contact DADRCM by phoning 02 6265 2050.
Formal Resolution – Conduct an inquiry. Following
an inquiry, the commander or manager is to decide on the appropriate manner
of resolution, which may be formal or informal. Refer to the Administrative
Inquiries Manual, ADFP 06.1.4 or the Defence
Workplace Relations Manual, DRB 19 for guidance.
Dissatisfaction with Complaint outcome
Submit a Redress of Grievance (ADF member) or
a Review of Actions (Defence APS employee).
Redress of Grievance – ADF member lodges a written complaint through the
chain of command.
Refer DI(G) PERS 34-1 -
Redress of Grievance – Tri-Service
Review of Actions - Defence APS employee lodges Review of Actions grievance to the
Refer Defence Workplace Relations Manual,
DRB 19, Part 19, Chapter 1.
A complaint is
reported to the Defence Whistleblower
If a complainant is worried
about victimisation, the Defence Whistleblower Scheme offers an alternative
and independent process for reporting and investigating concerns. Contact can be made by phoning 1800 673
a Complaint to an External body
Commonwealth / Defence Force `Ombudsman
A complaint is lodged
with the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman will
encourage the use of internal options first.
Refer DI(G) PERS 34-3 - Inquiries
by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Defence Force Ombudsman Affecting the
Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force. Contact can be made by phoning 1300 362
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
A complaint is lodged
Person lodges a written
complaint to HREOC. This is an
alternative to submitting a complaint through the chain of command. HREOC may encourage the use of internal
options first. Refer DI(G) PERS 34-2 -
Complaints of Discrimination and
Harassment Through the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. Contact can be made by phoning the central
office on 1300 656 419 or the local state number.
A complaint is lodged with the Minister.
A complaint can be
forwarded to the Minister or the local Member of Parliament.
State/Territory Police or Courts
A complaint of sexual
assault or any other harassment or discrimination complaint is reported to
police or pursued through legal means.
Matter is addressed
either directly to the police or through a legal adviser to be pursued
through the civil court.
Sexual Assault: Do not “counsel” for sexual assault.
Refer immediately to Commanding Officer or senior Manager to initiate
steps to notify police if the complainant requests. Refer to medical officer
and to professional counsellor.
Complainant’s wishes should be taken into account and confidentiality
Refer DI(G) PERS 35-4 -
Management and Reporting of Sexual
Other Unacceptable Behaviour: In the case of some criminal matters, a complaint
may be made to police. Civil
litigation may also be an option in some cases.
Department of Defence,
Defence Equity Organisation, Options for resolution, http://www.defence.gov.au/equity/
Additional strategies to help members resolve complaints include new
policies on the use of alternative dispute resolution practices and a
directorate established in June 2001 to develop and assist in the adoption of
these practices. According to Defence, these initiatives set high standards and
allow the ADF to take a lead in complaint resolution, resolving issues before
they need to be referred to other Commonwealth bodies.
The Directorate of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management
is responsible for facilitating the provision of dispute resolution services
across the ADF. It is developing a
comprehensive training program designed to inform the Defence community about
the benefits of using alternative conflict management processes and provides
training in the necessary skills to employees, managers and practitioners in
alternative dispute resolution.
Requests for access to the dispute resolution services are made through the
Complaint Resolution Agency (CRA), the Defence Equity Organisation, Commands,
commanders and line managers at all levels and personnel managers.
The committee notes the work being done to encourage the use of
alternative dispute resolutions. It did not explore in any depth this avenue of
settling disputes during the course of the inquiry. The committee notes,
however, that a number of the matters raised in submissions started as
relatively minor disputes that escalated into major concerns as the
administrative system seemed to compound difficulties rather than ameliorate
them. The CRA noted that the most common matter raised in redress of grievance
is 'general harassment as well as personality conflicts'. Dispute resolution measures are an
ideal mechanism for defusing these types of conflicts at an early stage and the
ADF is right to include them in their range of options for managing
The committee urges the ADF to place a high priority on promoting and
encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution measures as a means of
settling conflicts and resolving grievances at the unit level. It should ensure
that there are sufficient well-qualified staff readily available to assist ADF
members resolve conflicts.
Making a formal complaint
Where alternative dispute resolution is not feasible or has not achieved
a satisfactory outcome, the Defence Force has a more formal approach whereby
the complainant lodges a complaint officially. He or she may submit the
complaint, which does not have to be in writing, to command, to manage and
inquire into. The complainant may lodge a redress of grievance to his or her
commanding officer where the member considers that he or she has a grievance
concerning any matter relating to his or her service. This type of complaint
must be lodged in writing. According to the Defence Equity Organisation, this
option is suitable where the complainant has exhausted internal options or
where the complaint has been investigated by the chain of command and the
complainant is dissatisfied with the result.
The redress of grievance process when used as a means of seeking a review of a
decision which adversely affects a member is discussed in full in chapter 10.
Although the ADF prefers that problems or difficulties be settled at the
lowest level of command, the reporting system allows for complainants to raise
their concerns outside the chain of command, for example through the Defence
Force Ombudsman. The newly appointed Inspector-General of the Australian
Defence Force may also receive complaints. The work of these two bodies is
dealt with in chapter 11 as part of the committee's consideration of the appeal
and review processes.
The importance of reporting wrongdoing
A sound and workable administrative system relies on mechanisms that
encourage the exposure of impropriety, maladministration, inappropriate
conduct, abuse, negligence or unsafe or dangerous work practices within an
organisation. Effective reporting processes ensure that an organisation is made
aware of shortcomings in the workplace and is well placed to rectify any
impropriety and prevent accidents or mishaps. The following section looks at
the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional arrangements in the ADF that
are intended to facilitate the disclosure of wrongdoing or inappropriate or
unacceptable conduct in the forces.
The effectiveness of the current reporting system
Confidence in the reporting procedures and a willingness to use them are
central to the success of such mechanisms. Recent studies, however, suggest
that a number of members do not avail themselves of the opportunities to report
their concerns about improper conduct. There were a number of reasons for this:
ignorance of process, a lack of belief in fair outcomes and a fear of reprisal.
In 1999, the ANAO conducted an audit of the redress of grievance process in the
ADF. It found:
From ANAO's interviews with members, it was apparent that many
were unaware of the ROG system or had only a limited understanding of it. Many
of those who had made a complaint, or indeed read the relevant Defence
Instruction, had difficulty understanding how to use the system. Others doubted
that any ROG they submitted would be treated fairly. Some were concerned about
possible adverse treatment if they submitted an AROG against a decision of a
A survey conducted of experiences of unacceptable behaviour in the ADF
released in February 2001 found that a small but significant proportion (14.6%)
of junior sailors reported that they had been physically bullied, assaulted or
threatened with violence at least once in the previous 12 months. Statistics
also showed that 9.5% of SNCO's; 3.2% of junior officers and 2.4% of senior
officers reported the same experience. For the Army, 29.1% of SNCOs and 18.6%
of other ranks reported that they had been bullied, assaulted or threatened
with violence, with a substantially smaller proportion of officers reporting
the same experiences. The Air
Force data showed a smaller proportion of personnel experiencing physical
assault. It is particularly important to note that:
Less than a quarter of those that had experienced unwanted
harassment sought the assistance of an equity advisor, chaplain or
psychologist. Fewer still chose to make a formal complaint or to seek a redress
of grievance. Respondents that took these actions were generally not satisfied
with the results, with many indicating that they felt victimised as a result of
The Survey went on to report that:
The most common explanation [for not seeking assistance] was
that the respondent took care of the problem themselves...Other common reasons
were 'I did not think it was important' and 'I thought it would make my
situation unpleasant'. Around one fifth of respondents of both genders took no
action because they believed nothing would be done, a similar proportion were
worried that they would be labelled a troublemaker if they pursued the issue.
Encouragingly, only 3.4% of males and 7.2% of females took no
action because they thought that they would not be believed, and only 3.4% of
males and 5.0% of females reported that they did not know what to do.
3RAR—reporting of wrongdoing
Further evidence about the reluctance of members of the ADF to report
wrongdoing came to light during inquiries into allegations about the use of
illegal or informal discipline in 3RAR. In August 2000, the JSCFADT decided to
examine the events alleged to have occurred in the battalion. Two months later, in October 2000,
the ADF announced it was establishing an inquiry into military discipline to be
headed by retiring Federal Court judge, Justice James Burchett.
The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) also held a stand-down period on 5 February 2001, at which each unit was addressed via video by the CDF
and the relevant Service Chief.
This public demonstration was to announce to all Australians and ADF members
that the 'highest standards of military justice and behaviour' were expected.
It was also intended 'to assure all members of the ADF that the law is there
for their protection, and that they should respect its procedures and come
forward with any personal concerns'.
In April 2001, the JSCFADT tabled its report on 3RAR. It determined from
the evidence that extra-judicial procedures and illegal punishments were
employed within 3RAR. It also found that there was 'a system in place that
inhibited soldiers from speaking out in relation to the bashings'. Of interest
to this committee is the joint committee's finding that:
One of the most surprising aspects of the 3RAR allegations has
been the reluctance of soldiers to speak out about what was happening. There is
no direct evidence to suggest that the battalion headquarters staff were aware
of what was happening. There is evidence that the unit padre was informed of
some aspects of the events, but testimony by previous unit equity officers and
doctors indicates that the allegations now being made about 3RAR were not
raised with them. This 'wall of silence' was maintained despite all key unit
appointments having received briefings in ADF equity policy.
The Burchett report, released in August 2001, gave added weight to the
joint committee's findings. It found that four soldiers from 3RAR committed
assaults in the guise of disciplinary measures and moreover that they were able
to do so unchecked for a time. It
accepted that bastardisation practices had existed at some military
institutions, and 'discipline by the fist' had been practised by some (perhaps
only a few) in a number of units.
It was of the view that the events at 3RAR occurred during a period of two
years which, if it had not already come to an end, apparently did so when
police investigations began on 29 September 1998.
According to the report, the first complaint in relation to 3RAR was that
made by [Mrs K] in March 1998, alleging that her son had been assaulted and
harassed whilst in Malaysia. Investigations were unable
to find conclusive evidence of an assault.
That same year, the father of a 3RAR soldier had also complained that his son
was ill-treated by members of the unit. The report notes that this complaint,
which was not related to illicit disciplining, was not 'ultimately pursued'.
Of significance to the committee was Burchett's observation that:
...the fact that complaints may not always be made easily by the
use of the avenues currently available, was amply demonstrated by the situation
that developed in A Company 3RAR.
The committee does not have any recent statistics available to gauge the
current levels of bullying and harassment in the ADF, if any exists, nor to
indicate the willingness or otherwise of persons to report such incidents. It
does, however, have strong anecdotal evidence to suggest that there are pockets
in the ADF where bullying and harassment have been tolerated and furthermore
that there are still substantial obstacles preventing members from reporting
such inappropriate behaviour.
of Infantry, Singleton—reporting of
The committee now turns to the School of Infantry (SOI), Singleton, as an
example of where the failure of the reporting system allowed bullying and
discriminatory practices to continue unreported and apparently unknown to
senior officers at Singleton. The committee received extensive evidence on
Much of the evidence came from the parents of young soldiers who
experienced the worst aspects of this environment. In the most extreme cases
those soldiers took their lives. The committee acknowledges that once a member
enters the ADF, personal and family relationships are changed by this new
professional environment. It also acknowledges that Defence must walk a fine
line in the management of its engagement with family of personnel. The
committee is concerned, however, that in case after case, worried and sometimes
frightened parents felt that they had no other option but to contact the ADF
directly about their concerns of mistreatment. In some instances, even this
significant step was still not enough to move senior officers to act.
Between March and May 2000, a young soldier was subjected to
inappropriate treatment while undergoing Initial Employment Trainees training
at the School of Infantry (SOI), Singleton. Even though his parents alerted
authorities to the conduct, such practices continued. The parents then
contacted the minister's office in the hope that senior officers in Army
Headquarters would be made aware of the problems. The parents informed the
Even with the minister's department involved our son was still
billeted in the guardhouse and segregated from other EITs. It was for this
continued inappropriate treatment that our son elected to discharge from the
army in June 2000.
In the later half of 2000, the
allegations about bastardisation at 3 RAR spurred the parents of the young
soldier at Singleton to press their concerns further. Mr Robert Amos, the father, stated:
We then wrote to the minister officially requesting an investigation
into events at SOI. This ensured that an official investigation would be
conducted and the incident no longer swept under the table. At this point our
concerns were that soldiers receiving this type of inappropriate treatment may
not have had the close support our son did, this fear was later borne out.
Although an investigation into this incident at SOI took place in 2001,
the ill-treatment of young soldiers continued. A later inquiry in 2003 was to
find practices of abuse at SOI similar to those that had been observed in the
2001 investigation. It identified a culture at SOI where there was a widespread
use of negative reinforcement to motivate recruits under training.
Mr Amos was not alone in raising
concerns about the treatment of young soldiers around this time. Ms Avril Andrew explained that her son Scott had sustained an injury to
his back and knee in October 2002 when undergoing his basic training at
Kapooka. She told the committee:
At first he was directed to ignore the pain and 'suck it in' and
was not allowed to miss training even though he could barely walk, much less
march. Finally it became impossible to cope with and he was sent to the Digger
James Rehabilitation Unit (DJ's).
In recounting her son's experiences, she stated that for young soldiers the
Digger James Unit 'represented weakness of the worst possible kind—a message
which was indoctrinated from day one'. She explained:
When he was sent there his comment was that he had been sent to
join the 'window lickers'. From the start he was unhappy at the stigma attached
to being in the unit, as during their induction there were many references to
people who were sent to DJ's being 'weak' and useless. When recruits marched
past the DJ building they were given the 'eyes right' command and told to
observe the 'window lickers' and other such derogatory remarks.
Ms Andrew, whose
son has been discharged from the Army and has been under constant psychiatric
care, expressed her apprehension at the way in which the Services treat their
recruits. She concluded:
I accept that the army have a difficult job to do and that all
personnel must be able to obey orders immediately, without question or
hesitation, particularly in hostile circumstances. I do not agree that the way
to achieve that is to break their spirit and then attempt to rebuild them as
'army'. Surely there is a better way?
The committee agrees. Clearly, abuse and intimidation
are not the way to develop responsible and well-disciplined ADF members.
Indeed, it is the circumstances surrounding Private
suicide that highlighted the extent of harm that can result from the failure to
stamp out incidents of harassment and abuse. They also exposed a serious lapse on the
part of senior officers to learn explicitly from the investigation into the
treatment of Private Amos and to implement the necessary changes to alter their
own behaviour and procedures. This is a lesson for all ADF officers. Mr Amos explained:
Senior-staff at SOI assured us that they had fixed the problem
they even went as far as to invite me down to inspect the changes they had
made, an invitation I now wish I had accepted. This was backed up by the
investigation report covering letter that claimed that the report's
recommendations had been implemented. We accepted their word in the firm belief
that Orders and Instructions contained in reports are to be acted upon...however
it has since been admitted by the army that the recommendations had not been
With the findings of the joint committee, the Burchett Report and the
investigation into the treatment of Private Amos at SOI still fresh,
allegations were raised in early 2003 that young Recuperation & Discharge (R&D)
Platoon soldiers at Singleton were being subjected to:
...abuse, denigration, harassment, bullying (including threats of
physical violence)...by staff and other Initial Employment Trainees (IETs); plus
the absence of efficient and effective support services or mechanisms where
these soldiers could seek redress beyond their NCOs for a wide range of
problems they were encountering...
Yet despite warnings, no one in the ADF took action. Jeremy committed suicide by hanging
at the SOI, Singleton, on 2 February 2003. According to his parents, in
the week prior to his death they became increasingly aware of his traumatised,
distressed and anguished state. Jeremy told them that he 'was made to feel worthless,
useless, scum and shameful because he was injured and had been transferred to
R&D Platoon'. His sister recalled
the events leading to his suicide:
On the morning of 29 January my father rang Singleton and spoke
to a sergeant at the base. He rang because he was deeply concerned about Jeremy's
general state. That night before this phone call Jeremy
had been in tears on the phone to my parents and he was convinced that his
career with the Army was over. My father's call the next day was the Army's
chance to save Jeremy, but the importance of his
warning was not heeded. The Army took a flippant approach to this warning and
they failed in their duty of care. Furthermore, assurances given to my father
that this call be kept confidential were broken. Someone at the base told Jeremy
of that phone call, and he said to my parents that evening, 'I was told my
parents rang the Army,' and he was angry and inconsolable over this. After his
death, the investigating officer was not able or was unwilling to find out who
had breached my father's confidence, who told Jeremy
of that phone call and why that crucial warning that could have saved his life
was not properly heeded.
Even following this death, Army chose to ignore what were now clearly
endemic problems at SOI until Jeremy's parents, after repeated attempts, were successful
in pushing for a thorough inquiry into conditions at SOI. At the time of their
son's death, they were assured by the Commanding Officer of the Infantry School that their concerns about the
alleged abuse were groundless and that the base was run professionally. They
told the committee:
Had we taken this officer at his word we would simply have
walked away and nothing would have been done about the situation at Singleton
or indeed within the Army; and how many more young men would have suffered the
same fate, not including the two deaths (that we know about) subsequent to Jeremy.
The Executive Summary of the Investigating Officer's Report into the
Death of Private Williams found:
...a widespread use of negative reinforcement to motivate recruits
under training. This includes disparaging and negative comments about Weary
Dunlop and Digger James Pls (discharge and rehab/remedial training
respectively). While the intentions of staff are commendable, in many cases
they are using the wrong methods to achieve their aims...
The allegation of a culture of denigration is not proved,
however, it is believed that there is a culture of negativity towards Weary
Dunlop and Digger James Pls.
It went on to find:
There is a strong negative feeling among both staff and IETs
against some IETs who are getting discharged and those IETs who are perceived
as using injury or failure as a way to avoid hard training. At the time PTE
Williams was at SOI, most of these IETs were located in R&D P1, along with
all other injured IETs. There is also a perception that many of those in the P1
are 'weak'. As a consequence, all members of the P1 were subjected to widespread
denigration and harassment from both staff and IETs still in training.
It also found the use of extremely offensive language common at SOI.
The full report, which remains a confidential document, gave a more
complete picture. It found:
A culture of denigration and harassment existed towards R&D
P1 at the time PTE Williams was present in the P1. As a result, members of the
P1 were not treated with dignity, respect and sympathy.
It identified the following factors that contributed to this culture:
- an almost universal negativity by both staff and
trainees towards those who are perceived by them to be using injury or failure
as a means of avoiding hard training. This perception was then regularly applied
to all members of the platoon;
- a strong negative opinion by both staff and
trainees directed at a minority in R&D P1 who had psychologically
discharged themselves from the Army pending their formal discharge;
the widespread denigration of R&D P1 by
the widespread denigration of R&D P1 by IETs
in training. It is believed that this practice is encouraged by their own views
as well by the views of staff; and
- a lack of knowledge of this culture by the
senior members of the chain of command.
The report noted that 'while denigration of R&D was not
universal among junior staff, there was no evidence of steps being taken to
stop this culture'. 
Although the report found no evidence to support the view that a culture
of brutality, bullying and stand-over tactics existed at SOI, it noted that the
incidents reported, 'seem to be isolated incidents from differing individuals
that highlight inappropriate behaviour by individuals rather than a culture.'
It went on to state that there is evidence that a small number of staff members
do use the threat of violence and some may have used physical violence on IETs.
Furthermore, it found that 'cases of violence between IETs have been widely
reported and are considered to exist'.
The report noted that, at the time of writing, 'a culture of denigration
and harassment of R&D P1 was not apparent'. It should be noted that the earlier
2001 report reached the same conclusions, yet two years later the abuse was
Indeed, the investigating officer's report referred to the 2001
investigation into the alleged mistreatment of another private at SOI in 2000.
Importantly, it observed that the earlier report had identified a culture at
SOI with distinct similarities to that described two years on in the later
report. The earlier report had accepted that as a result of changes in 2000/01,
there was a far more professional and positive attitude at SOI. The later
Either the changes and remedial action identified in 2001 were
not followed through by the chain of command in 2001, or they were lost in the
space of a single posting cycle.
With regard to the investigation into the death of Jeremy Williams, Major General Gordon, in his Appointing Officer's
decision document stated:
One of the most important matters that has come from the
Investigation is the need for an enduring solution to the existence or
re-emergence of a culture of denigration and harassment especially towards
injured soldiers and towards soldiers who are not able to continue training (at
the School of Infantry). This problem was severe at the time that Private
Williams took his life and has previously
been evident. The problem has existed in a milder form at the Army Recruit
On 14 April 2003, Gunner John Satatas
committed suicide at A Battery (A Bty) 4 Field Regiment Holsworthy. He had
recently completed his IET at the School of Artillery (SOA). He had also spent
six months in R&D Pl from February to August 2002. The Investigating
officer's report into his death refers to the findings of the report into Jeremy Williams' death and concluded from an
analysis of the evidence that 'the same culture of denigration and harassment existed
during the period of Gunner Satatas's attendance at SOI and specifically in
Based on the findings of the investigations into the treatment of Private
Amos, Private Williams and Gunner Satatas, it is beyond doubt that between
March 2000 and February 2003 there were serious problems at SOI which were not
addressed by senior officers.
The Burchett report noted the critical importance of a recruit's first
experiences of the military and of discipline and its role in 'forming the
character of those who make up the Defence Force and their ideas about their
duties to which they are bound'. In its view, 'The plain conclusion is that the
respect for discipline of a member of the ADF grows in some measure from the Recruit Training School.' The committee agrees with this
assessment which makes the incidents at SOI all the more disturbing.
It is clear that there is something wrong with a reporting system that
failed to expose this type of improper conduct. Young men chose to remain
silent about abusive behaviour; seriously concerned parents raised concerns which
were not acted upon; and, more importantly, members of the ADF in command
positions were either blind to, or ignored warning signs.
The following chapters seek to examine the reasons that allowed these
situations to develop and to continue unchecked.
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