Footnotes

Footnotes

Executive Summary - Recommendations

[1]        AusAID, 2011–2012 Annual Review of Aid Effectiveness, p. 37 and Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 4.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

[1]        Journals of the Senate, No. 99, 28 June 2012, p. 2698. The Senate continued through to 29 June 2012.

[2]        'Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions', Bonn, 2001, http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm  (accessed 1 August 2012).

[3]        See the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade', 5 December 2011.

[4]        See information in TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012.

[5]        AusAID, answer to written question on notice no 33.

  - Background to development assistance to Afghanistan

[1]        See for example, Ashley Jackson, Oxfam International, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, November 2009, pp. 7–10.

[2]        See Afghanistan/Pakistan, UNGOMAP—Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/background.html (accessed 6 September 2012).

[3]        United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/43/129–S/19482, 9 February 1988, Letter dated 9 February 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

[4]        See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, A/45/644, Report of the Economic and Social Council, 'Situation of human rights in Afghanistan', 31 October 1990, paragraph 16.

[5]        See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, A/45/644, Report of the Economic and Social Council, 'Situation of human rights in Afghanistan', 31 October 1990, paragraphs 17 and 21; The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, Main Report, May 2012, p. 3, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/04/000333038_20120704045213/Rendered/PDF/708510v20WP0Bo0ansition0Beyond02014.pdf (accessed 4 December 2012); Ashley Jackson, Oxfam International,  The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, November 2009, pp. 9–10.

[6]        UN website, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml#1990s (accessed 15 October 2012).

[7]        The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, Main Report, May 2012, p. 3.

[8]        UN website, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml#1990s (accessed 15 October 2012). See for example, The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, Main Report, May 2012, p. 3.

[9]        United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/52/682–S/1997/894, 1 November 1997, paragraph 37.

[10]      See for example, Jean-Rodrigue Paré, Afghanistan: UN Intervention, Library of Parliament, Parliament of Canada, 15 November 2007, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0726-e.htm (accessed 3 September 2012); Tim Youngs, Afghanistan: the culmination of the Bonn process,  House of Commons Library, Research Paper 05/72, 26 October 2005; and United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/48/208, 21 December 1993.

[11]      United Nations, Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/1995/64, 'Final Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan', 20 January 1995, paragraph 17.  The Taliban regard their emergence as 'a spontaneous reaction of some groups of clerics, disgusted by the chaos and orgy of abuse which engulfed southern Afghanistan in 1994', cited in Antonio Giustozzi with Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978–2011, Afghanistan  Research and Evaluation Unit, January 2012, p. 22.

[12]      United Nations, General Assembly, A/50/908, 'The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International Peace and Security', Report of the Secretary-General, 3 April 1996, paragraph 8. See also Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, vol. 13, No. 3(C), July 2001, p. 11.

[13]      United Nations, General Assembly, A/50/908, 'The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International Peace and Security', Report of the Secretary-General, 3 April 1996, paragraphs 10–11.

[14]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/52/682-S/1997/894, 'The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security', 14 November 1997, paragraph 12.

[15]      United Nations, General Assembly, A/53/L.66, 9 December 1998.

[16]      United Nations, General Assembly, A/53/L.66, 9 December 1998.

[17]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/55/633–S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000, paragraph 25.

[18]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/55/633–S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000, paragraph 56.

[19]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/55/633–S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000, paragraph 80.

[20]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/55/633–S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000, paragraph 92.

[21]      See for example, United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1333 (2000) and United Nations, General Assembly, A/53/L.66, 9 December 1998.

[22]      United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1267 (1999), adopted on 15 October 1999.

[23]      United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1267 (1999), adopted on 15 October 1999.

[24]      United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1333 (2000), 19 December 2000, paragraphs 1–3.

[25]      107th Congress, Joint Resolution, J.S. Res. 23, 18 September 2001 and Richard F. Grimmett Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS 'Report for Congress, Authorization For Use Of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History', update January 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf   (accessed 27 July 2012).

[26]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2001–02, pp. 3–4. It did so for the first time in the Treaty's fifty-year history on 14 September 2001, by invoking the Anzus alliance, under Article IV.

[27]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2001–02, p. 4; Ashley Jackson, Oxfam International, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, November 2009, p. 12.

[28]      Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan, Strategic Perspectives no. 8, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2011, p. 7; Tim Youngs, 'Afghanistan: the culmination of the Bonn process', House of Commons Library, Research Paper 05/72, 26 October 2005, p. 11; Ashley Jackson, Oxfam International, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, November 2009, p. 12; and United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, paragraph 55.

[29]      Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan, Strategic Perspectives no. 8, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2011, p. 7. United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, paragraph 58.

[30]      See for example, Jean-Rodrigue Paré, 'Afghanistan: UN intervention', Infoseries, 15 November 2007, Canadian Library of Parliament.

[31]      His Excellency Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, was prepared to transfer power to an interim authority under the chairmanship of Mr Hamid Karzai. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (the Afghan Bonn Agreement), http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm

[32]      The Afghan Bonn Agreement, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.

[33]      The Afghan Bonn Agreement, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.

[34]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, paragraph 117.

[35]      See for example, Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan, Strategic Perspectives no. 8, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2011, p. 5. United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A56/1000–S/2002/737, 11 July 2002.

[36]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, paragraphs 7–8 and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391(2008–2013), A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, p. 1. The Strategy recorded that 76 per cent of eligible voters participated in the presidential election.

[37]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/1000–S/2002/737, 11 July 2002, paragraph 2.

[38]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/1000–S/2002/737, 11 July 2002, paragraph 3.

[39]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/1000–S/2002/737, 11 July 2002, paragraph 3.

[40]      Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan, Strategic Perspectives no. 8, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2011, p. 19.

[41]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, paragraph 55.

[42]      United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1386 (2001), adopted 20 December 2001.

[43]      United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1386 (2001), adopted 20 December 2001.

[44]      See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, A/57/L.56, 3 December 2002.

[45]      United Nations, Report of the Security Council, 1 August 2002–31 July 2003, A/58/2, p. 5.

[46]      NATO, Press Briefing by NATO Spokesman, Yves Brodeur, 16 April 2003, http://nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030416a.htm (accessed 6 September 2012).

[47]      NATO, Press Release, 'NATO to assume command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul on Monday, 11 August 2003', 8 August 2003, http://nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-091e.htm (accessed 6 September 2012).

[48]      NATO, Address by Mr Hamid Karzai, President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, 11 August 2003, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_20580.htm (accessed 6 September 2012).

[49]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/60/712–S/2006/145, Report of the Secretary-General, paragraphs 46–47.

[50]      See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/60/32A–B, 7 December 2005, which noted increased terrorist attacks caused by al-Qaeda operatives, the Taliban and other extremist groups. See also United Nations, Security Council, S/PRST/2003/7, 18 June 2003.

[51]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, paragraph 61.

[52]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, paragraph 76.

[53]      United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1378 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4415th meeting, 14 November 2001.

[54]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, paragraph 59.

[55]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, paragraph 59.

[56]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/55/633–S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000; A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001; and A/56/875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002.

[57]      See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/55/633–S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000; paragraphs 67, 78–79; United Nations, General Assembly, A/56/687, 7 December 2001, paragraphs 37 and 70; and United Nations, General Assembly, A/57/410, 17 September 2002, paragraphs 49 and 88.

[58]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/55/633–S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000, paragraph 66.

[59]      Submission 15, p. 4.

[60]      Mr Mark Tattersall, AusAID, Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 22.

[61]      The World Bank Group, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators', http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp (accessed 21 March 2013).

[62]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, paragraphs 103 and 116.

[63]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, paragraph 98.

[64]      United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1401 (2002), adopted on 28 March 2002.

[65]      See for example, United Nations, Report of the Security Council, 1 August 2002–31 July 2003, A/58/2, p. 5.

[66]      AusAID, Annual Report 2002–2003, p. 50.

[67]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/1000–S/2002/737, 11 July 2002, paragraph 58.

Chapter 3 - Development assistance to Afghanistan 2001–2010

[1]        United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56875–S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, paragraphs 76 and 78.

[2]        United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/681–S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, paragraph 85.

[3]        The Afghan Bonn Agreement, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm (accessed 2 January 2013).

[4]        Co-chairs' Summary of Conclusions, The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 21–22 January 2002.

[5]        Co-chairs' Summary of Conclusions, The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 21–22 January 2002, paragraphs 4 and 13.

[6]        The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the ACCRA Agenda for Action, 2005 and 2008 respectively.

[7]        For example, by the end of 2010, the objective for education was to have net enrolment in primary school of at least 60% of girls and 75% of boys; a new curriculum in operation in all secondary schools; the number of female teachers increased by 50%; and 70% of Afghanistan's teachers pass a competency test. The Afghanistan Compact, London, 31 January–1 February 2006.

[8]        Overall, the objective of South-South cooperation is for developing countries of the South to foster national and collective self-reliance by promoting cooperation in all areas. See United Nations General Assembly, A/64/504, 'Promotion of South-South cooperation for development: a thirty-year perspective', 27 October 2009, Report of the Secretary-General, http://southsouthconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/A-64-504-E.pdf (accessed 4 January 2013).

[9]        The London Conference on Afghanistan, The Afghanistan Compact, London 31 January–1 February 2006, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf (accessed 11 September 2012).

[10]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391 (2008–2013), A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, p. v.

[11]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391 (2008–2013), A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, p. v.

[12]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391 (2008–2013), A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, pp. 5–6.

[13]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391 (2008–2013), A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, pp. 6 and 155.

[14]      Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, issued under the authority of the Three Co-chairs, the President of the French Republic, the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Paris, 12 June 2008.

[15]      Communiqué issued at the London Conference, 28 January 2010, paragraphs 3 and 4, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf (accessed 11 December 2012).

[16]      Communiqué issued at the London Conference, 28 January 2010, paragraph 31.

[17]      Communiqué issued at the London Conference, 28 January 2010, paragraph 24.

[18]      Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010, paragraphs 1–2.

[19]      Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010, paragraph 5.

[20]      Mr Scott Dawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 1.

[21]      AUSAID, Annual Report 1999–2000, p. 62.

[22]      AusAID, Annual Report 2001–2002, p. 90.

[23]      AusAID, Annual Report 2001–2002, p. 90.

[24]      AusAID, Annual Report 2002–2003, p. 64.

[25]      ACIAR Annual Report 2002–2003, p. 53 and 2003–2004, p. 67. Overall, between July 2001 and June 2003, Australia disbursed more than $60 million in assistance to Afghanistan. According to AusAID, this level of support then represented Australia’s third largest contribution to a humanitarian effort exceeded only by East Timor and Iraq. AusAID Annual Report 2002–2003, p. 64.

[26]      AusAID, Annual Report 2004–2005, p. 87 and AusAID, Annual Report 2005–06, pp. 93–94.

[27]      AusAID, Annual Report 2004–2005, p. 87 and also Statement by the Hon Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign affairs, 'Australia's International Development Cooperation 2004–05', 11 May 2004, pp. 42–43.

[28]      AusAID, Annual Report 2002–2003, p. 64.

[29]      AusAID, Annual Report 2001–2002, p. 90.

[30]      Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2005–06, p. 53.

[31]      AusAID, Annual Report 2005–06, pp. 93–94. At the London Conference on Afghanistan in 2006, the Australian Government pledged 'an indicative $150 million over the next five years to support Afghan peace and nation building'. Statement by the Hon Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Australia's Overseas Aid Program 2006–07', 9 May 2006, p. 50.

[32]      Australia's ODA to Afghanistan then climbed to $102.5m and $191.1m respectively for 2010–11 and 2011–12.

[33]      Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2005–06, pp. 11, 51 and 53.

[34]      AusAID, Annual Report 2006–07, p. 90.

[35]      AusAID, Annual Report 2007–08, p. 111.

[36]      AusAID, Annual Report 2007–08, p. 111.

[37]      AusAID, Annual Report 2007–08, pp. 110–111.

[38]      United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, ALICEGHAN, 2nd Quarter Project Progress Report, 2009.

[39]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2005–06, p. 53; Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2006–07, p. 5 and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2005–06, p. 58.

[40]      Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2005–06, p. 58.

[41]      Department of Defence, Afghanistan Fact Sheet, http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/info/factsheet.htm (accessed 7 January 2013); Statement by Senator the Hon Bob Carr, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2012–2013: Helping the World's Poor: Implementing Effective Aid', 8 May 2012, Budget 2012–13, pp. 65, 102, http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/ministerial_statement/ausaid/html1/ausaid.htm  (accessed 11 September 2012).

[42]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/60/224–S/2005/525, 12 August 2005, paragraph 69. See also Department of Defence, Afghanistan Fact Sheet, http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/info/factsheet.htm (accessed 7 January 2013).

[43]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2006–07, pp. 17 and 22; See also Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2007–08, p. 45. See also Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 21 October 2009, p. 33.

[44]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 21 October 2009, p. 34.

[45]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2007–08, p. 6.

[46]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 21 October 2009, p. 34.

[47]      AusAID, Annual Report 2007–08, p. 111.

[48]      Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2006–07, p. 56.

[49]      Senator the Hon. Christopher Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs, Media Release, E3/07, 31 January 2007.

[50]      Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2006–07, p. 73.

[51]      Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2006–07, pp. 56–57.

[52]      Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2008–09, p. 74 and Senator the Hon Christopher Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs, Media Release, E3/07, 31 January 2007.

[53]      Senator the Hon Christopher Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs, Media Release, E3/07, 31 January 2007 and Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2007–08, p. 58.

[54]      The Hon Bob Debus, Minister for Home Affairs, Media Release, 'AFP Numbers Boosted in Afghanistan', Budget 2008–09', 13 May 2008.

[55]      Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2008–09, p. 74; the Hon Bob Debus, Minister for Home Affairs, Media Release, 'AFP Numbers Boosted in Afghanistan', Budget 2008–09, 13 May 2008.

[56]      Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2008–09, p. 74.

[57]      Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2008–09, p. 74.

[58]      Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2009–10, p. 96.

[59]      OECD, 'Is it ODA?', Factsheet—November 2008, www.oecd.org/dac/stats (accessed  3 January 2013).

[60]      The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Media release, 'Australia pledges $250 million in further assistance for Afghanistan', 12 June 2008, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2008/fa-s093_08.html (accessed 4 January 2013);  AusAID, Annual Report 2008–2009, p. 112.

[61]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 1 June 2009, p. 153.

[62]      The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Statement to the International Conference on Afghanistan', The Hague, 31 March 2009, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2009/090331_ica.html (accessed 4 January 2013).

[63]      The Hon Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, Interview, Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 29 April 2009.

[64]      AusAID, Annual Report 2008–2009, p. 113 and AusAID, Annual Report 2009 –2010, p. 112.

[65]      The Hon Brendan O'Connor MP, Minister for Home Affairs, 'AFP deployment to Afghanistan', Parliament House, Canberra, 28 April 2010.

[66]      The Hon Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, Interview, Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 29 April 2009.

[67]      AusAID, Annual Report 2009–2010, p. 4.

[68]      AusAID, Annual Report 2009 –2010, p. 112. The Report stated that other Australian assistance through AusAID’s regional and global programs and other government departments brought Australia's total ODA to an estimated $130.1 million—the revised ODA total as shown in Table 3.1 now shows that total for 2009/10 at $82.13 million.

[69]      AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, p. 10.

[70]      AusAID, Submission 16, p. 14.

[71]      See revised AusAID table 3.1.

[72]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, pp. 121–122.

[73]      AusAID Afghanistan, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid (accessed 10 September 2012) and AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 121. See also Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2010–11, p. 4.

[74]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2010–11, pp. 64–65 and DFAT Submission 22, pp. 3–4; ACFID, In it for the Long Haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 1 and AusAID, Submission 16, p. 14. In early 2003, members of the international coalition in Afghanistan began to deploy provincial reconstruction teams outside of Kabul. United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/60/224–S/2005/525, 12 August 2005, paragraph 69.

[75]      See for example, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 1.

[76]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2010–11, p. 4.

[77]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2010, p. 14.

[78]      AusAID, Submission 16, p. 14.

[79]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2010, p. 14.

[80]      AFP, Media Release, 'AFP clarifies its commitment to Afghanistan', 1 January 2011. One of the NTM–A's main tasks was to support the ANSF, including coordinating international efforts to train, equip and sustain the ANA, ANP and the Afghan Air Force, http://www.aco.nato.int/page272701224.aspx (accessed 4 January 2013).

[81]      AFP, Media Release, 'AFP clarifies its commitment to Afghanistan', 1 January 2011.

[82]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2010, pp. 20–21.

[83]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2010–11, p. 62.

[84]      AusAID, 2011–2012 Annual Review of Aid Effectiveness, p. 37.

[85]      Mr Scott Dawson, AusAID, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 4.

Chapter 4 - Challenges

[1]        Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, Baawar Consulting Group, p. 1.

[2]        See for example, Alex Thier, Assistant to the Administrator and Director of the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development, The Brookings Institution, 'The State of Afghanistan', Washington, D.C., Tuesday, July 3, 2012; Asian Development Bank Afghanistan, Fact Sheet as of 31 December 2011.

[3]        Asian Development Bank, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, p. 4. See also, CIA: The World Factbook—Afghanistan; UNICEF, Afghanistan, 'In remote Afghan mountains' http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_55638.html (accessed 2 August 2012).

[4]        United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/67/354–S/20/12/703, 13 September 2012, paragraph 50.

[5]        See also, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration: Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, Baawar Consulting Group, p. 1.

[6]        AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 121.

[7]        Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 78 and Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 51.

[8]        International Human Development Indicators—United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, 'Afghanistan Country profile', http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=68 (accessed 3 May 2013) and The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 12. It noted the dramatic improvements in life expectancy recorded by the Afghan Public Health Institute. See USAID et al, Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010, Key Findings, p. 11.

[9]        http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html#93 (accessed 3 May 2013) http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=68 (accessed 3 May 2013). See also AusAID, Afghanistan Annual Program Performance Report 2011, July 2012, p. 6.

[10]      AusAID, Annual Report 2009 –2010, p. 114 and Asian Development Bank, 'Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan, Fact sheet', as at 31 December 2011. USAID, 'Afghanistan Fact Sheet'. The UNICEF Fact sheet records under-5 mortality rate at 199 per 1,000 live births.

[11]      See for example, USAID et al, Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010, Key Findings, p. 11. For 2010, UNICEF still recorded the under-five mortality rate at 149 per 1,000, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html

[12]      Asian Development Bank, 'Asian Development Bank Afghanistan, Fact sheet', as at 31 December 2011; The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 1: Overview, May 2012, p. iv; and Submission 6, p. [17].

[13]      USAID, 'Afghanistan Fact Sheet', The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 1: Overview, May 2012, p. iv.

[14]      See for example, Professor Stephen Howes and Mr Jonathon Pryke, Submission 14, p. 5 and IMF, Program note, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, last updated: July 12, 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/notes/afghanistan.htm (accessed 26 October 2012).

[15]      Submission 14, p. 5.

[16]      See for example, The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, Main Report, May 2012, p. 9.

[17]      Submission 14, p. 4.

[18]      Asian Development Bank, 'Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan, Fact sheet', as at 31 December 2011 and The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 1: Overview, May 2012, p. iv.

[19]      Asian Development Bank, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–13, paragraph 169.

[20]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Organization, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2011–12, Issue No. 33, July 2012, pp. 255 and 256.

[21]      http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/AFG.gif (accessed 1 March 2013).

[22]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Organization, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2011–12, Issue No. 33, July 2012, p. 255 and Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, p. 7.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 51.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 38.

[25]      See for example, AusAID, Submission 16, p. 8; Caritas Australia, Submission 10, p. 4 and ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, paragraph 144.

[26]      Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, p. 7.

[27]      See for example, Mr Scott Dawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 2.

[28]      See also TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 101.

[29]      See also TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 78.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 2.

[31]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 12–13.

[32]      See for example, Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, p. 7 and the Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2012, A Survey of the Afghan People, 2012, p. 107.

[33]      Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011.

[34]      Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/cpi_2012_report/5 (accessed 14 February 2013).

[35]      United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims, January 2010, p. 35.

[36]      Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan Looking Ahead: Challenges for Governance and Community Welfare, Research Briefs for the 2011 Bonn Conference, p. 4. See also The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2012, A Survey of the Afghan People, 2012, p. 8. Another report, an Oxfam study, revealed that just less than one half of all individuals surveyed (48%) identified corruption and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government as a major cause of conflict in Afghanistan. Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, Oxfam, 2009, p. 4. The research for this publication was jointly designed and/or carried out by a number of aid organisations including Afghan Civil Society Forum, Afghan Peace and Democracy ACT, Association for the Defence of Women's Rights et al.

[37]      Phil Sparrow, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 16.

[38]      Phil Sparrow, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 16.

[39]      Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, 'Laying the Foundations for an Inclusive Peace Process', December 2011, p. 9. Thirteen civil society organisations/networks and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission oversee and sponsor the public discussions recorded in this dialogue.

[40]      The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2012: A survey of the Afghan People, 2012, p. 8.

[41]      Statement, His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 'Tokyo Development Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan', Tokyo, Japan, 8 July 2012.

[42]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 88. Professor Howes suggested that corruption seemed to be rampant on the investment side of things often through contractors and subcontractors where side payments are made. Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 15.

[43]      Submission 4, paragraph 4.2.

[44]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 23.

[45]      See for example, Lydia Khalil, Submission 20, p. [2].

[46]      Referred to in Phil Sparrow, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 16.

[47]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, pp. xii and  41.

[48]      Submission 16, p. 9.

[49]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 6.

[50]      Submission 4, p. [2].

[51]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 83. According to Professor Maley, donors bypass the Afghan state altogether and seek to deal with local communities as a way of short-circuiting the complexities that arise if one has to get approval from central ministries in Kabul before one can implement a local project. Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 6.

[52]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 6.

[53]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 58.

[54]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 58.

[55]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 26.

[56]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 26.

[57]      See for example, United Nations and General Assembly, Security Council, A/61/799–S/2007/152, Report of the Secretary-General, 15 March 2007, paragraph 3.

[58]      See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/61/799–S/2007/152, Report of the Secretary-General, 15 March 2007, paragraphs 2–10.

[59]      Air Chief Marshal Angus G Houston, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 21 October 2009, p. 47.

[60]      United Nations, Security Council, S/2008/434, Special Report of the Secretary-General, 3 July 2008, paragraphs 5–6.  The Security Council continued to urge Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to ISAF. United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/1833 (2008), 22 September 2008. See also, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/65/873–S/2011/381, Report of the Secretary-General, 23 June 2011 and United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/2011 (2011), 12 October 2011.

[61]      The 2012 TLO report concluded that 'The continued influence of patronage networks is an obstacle that inhibits progress in the governance sector, with many tribes and minority communities facing discrimination and exclusion'. TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. xiii.

[62]      TLO, The Dutch  Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010, August 2010, p. 49.

[63]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 6.

[64]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. xiii.

[65]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 84.

[66]      Submission 20, p. [2].

[67]      AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, p. 17.

[68]      Submission 22, p. 1. See also Lydia Khalil who cited reports indicating that insecurity, poor governance capacity and corruption constrain development efforts across Afghanistan. Submission 20, p. [2].

[69]      See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/63/751–A/2009/135, 10 March 2009, paragraphs 45–47.

[70]      See for example, Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, Oxfam, 2009, p. 5. The research for this publication was jointly designed and/or carried out by a number of aid organisations including Afghan Civil Society Forum, Afghan Peace and Democracy, Association for the Defence of Women's Rights et al.

[71]      Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, Oxfam, 2009, p. 28.

[72]      Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, Oxfam, 2009, p. 28.

[73]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/751–A/2009/135, 10 March 2009, paragraph 6.

[74]      The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, 2005 and 2008 respectively.

[75]      See observations made on the Paris 2008 Compact, the 2010 London and Kabul conferences, paragraphs 3.11–3.17.

[76]      See for example, Dr Nematullah Bizhan, Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 23.

[77]      Ministry of Finance, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012, p. 16.

[78]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 23.

[79]      Submission 5, p. 1.

[80]      Submission 18, p. [2].

[81]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 56.

[82]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 56.

[83]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 56.

[84]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 56.

[85]      UNFPA Afghanistan, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 5.

[86]      See for example, Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, Oxfam, 2009, p. 29.

[87]      Ms Lydia Khalil, Submission 20, p. [2].

[88]      See for example, Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, Oxfam, 2009, p. 28.

[89]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 23.

[90]      Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, Oxfam, 2009, p. 14.

[91]      Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, 'Laying the Foundations for an Inclusive Peace Process', December 2011, p. 8.

[92]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 40.

[93]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, pp. 40–42.

[94]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 41.

[95]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 77.

[96]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 7.

[97]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 7.

[98]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 30.

[99]      Submission 13, p. 7.

[100]    Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 23.

[101]    The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 1: Overview, May 2012, p. 1.

[102]    Submission 20, p. [1].

[103]    Submission 20, p. [2]. For quote see International Crisis Group, Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan,  Asia Report no. 210, 4 August 2011, p. i, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/210-%20Aid%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf.

[104]    Submission 14, pp. 17–18.

[105]    United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Afghanistan USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs, p. 8.

 Part II - The effectiveness of Australia's development assistance to Afghanistan

[1]        See AusAID Table 13.1. The OECD provides the figure of $191.1 million http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/AUS.gif (accessed 12 February 2013).

[2]        AusAID Annual Report 2011–12, p. 111. The corrected figure of $191.1 million is contained in AusAID answer to question on notice no. 33. OECD statistics record that Australia was placed tenth in the top donors of gross ODA (2001–2011 average), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/AFG.gif (accessed 1 March 2013).

[3]        Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010, paragraph 7.

[4]        Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010, paragraph 8.

[5]        AusAID Afghanistan, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid and http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Pages/artf-head-agreement.aspx and letter agreement of 2003 between the World Bank and AusAID, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Documents/artf-head-agreement.pdf   (accessed 10 September 2012).

[6]        The World Bank, 'National Solidarity Project: Promoting Community-Based Development in Afghanistan', http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22888068~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html (accessed 10 September 2012).

[7]        Mr Dawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[8]        World Bank, Afghanistan Country Program Evaluation 2002–2011, Independent Evaluation Group, The World Bank Group, 2013, p. 21.

[9]        The World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/ARTF_information.pdf (accessed 10 September 2012).

[10]      The recent Independent Evaluation Group's Afghanistan Country Program Evaluation 2002–2011, p. 21, recorded that as of December 2011, the 32 donors had pledged $4.8 billion. See also Ms Browning who informed the committee that 'Since its establishment in 2002 the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has successfully mobilised over $4 billion worth of assistance from around 30 donors, including Australia, which has contributed $210 million since 2003'. Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10. See also The World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, pp. 5 and 7, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/ARTF_information.pdf (accessed 10 September 2012). According to US Government Accountability Office, as of April 2011, 32 donors had contributed about $4.3 billion to ARTF. ARTF provides these funds through the Afghan government national budget to finance the government's recurrent operating costs and national development programs, United States Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government, Report to Congressional Addressees, July 2011, p. 5.

[11]      The World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, p. 1, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/ARTF_information.pdf (accessed 10 September 2012).

[12]      The World Bank, 'National Solidarity Project: Promoting Community-Based Development in Afghanistan', http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22888068~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html (accessed 10 September 2012). The World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/ARTF_information.pdf (accessed 10 September 2012).

[13]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 15.

[14]      Mr Dawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[15]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[16]      AusAID, Annual Report 2004–2005, p. 87 and AusAID, Annual Report 2005–06, pp. 93–94 and Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[17]      AusAID Afghanistan, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid (accessed 10 September 2012).

[18]      AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, pp. 7 and 9; Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10; and DFAT, Submission 22, p. 2.

[19]      See Table 15.1 in chapter 15 of this report.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[22]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.  See also comments by Ms Browning who said the fund was 'one of the best ways we can provide effective assistance in a fragile and conflict affected state'. Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[23]      Mr Dawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10 and Mr Lehmann, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 11.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 11.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 11.

[26]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 193.

[27]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 192.

[28]      AusAID Afghanistan, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid (accessed 10 September 2012) and Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[29]      Phil Sparrow, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 18.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[31]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 192.

[32]      Mr Scott Dawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[33]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[34]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[35]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 198.

[36]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 216.

[37]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 192.

[38]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[39]      Submission 14, p. 12.

[40]      Submission 13, p. 6.

[41]      Submission 14, p. 12.

[42]      Mr Dawson and Ms Browning, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[43]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 65.

[44]      AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, p. 17.

[45]      AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, p. 17.

[46]      AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, p. 17.

[47]      Submission 14, p. 12. See also, Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 15.

[48]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 15. Professor Howes and Mr Pryke noted further: 'Large pools of money (where disbursements and contracts can reach millions of dollars) have more limited feedback mechanisms and accountability and are more susceptible to patronage and corruption'. Professor Howes noted that 'because of the World Bank involvement and the way it has been organised, there is pretty good monitoring. You cannot guarantee that the teacher turns up to school, but at least you can guarantee that they have a salary'. Professor Howe and Mr Pryke, answer to written question on notice no. 5.

[49]      Submission 14, p. 12.

[50]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 15.

[51]      Submission 13, p. 7.

[52]      Professor Howes, Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 17.

[53]      The World Bank, 'National Solidarity Project: Promoting Community-Based Development in Afghanistan',  http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22888068~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html (accessed 10 September 2012).

[54]      The World Bank, 'National Solidarity Program III', http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22984153~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html  (accessed 1 March 2013).

[55]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 2 June 2009, p. 110.

[56]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 2 June 2009, p. 110.

[57]      The World Bank, 'Promoting Community-Based Development',  http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21296643~menuPK:3266877~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html   (accessed 1 March 2013).

[58]      Afghanistan Country Program Evaluation 2002–2011, Independent Evaluation Group, The World Bank Group, 2013, p. 60. Previous statistics showed the NSP has established 26,395 CDCs in 34 provinces of Afghanistan, covering a rural population of about 22 million. So far, approximately 24,862 communities received financing to implement their priority subprojects. The World Bank, 'National Solidarity Project: Promoting Community-Based Development in Afghanistan',  http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22888068~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html (accessed 10 September 2012).

[59]      Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov, Winning Hearts and Minds through Development?, Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/12/000158349_20120712093251/Rendered/PDF/WPS6129.pdf (accessed 10 September 2012).

[60]      Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, p. 8.

[61]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 58 and Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 17.

[62]      Answer to written question on notice no. 5 (emphasis in original).

[63]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 6.

[64]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 11.

[65]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 83.

[66]      UNDP Afghanistan website, http://www.undp.org.af/demo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=68 (accessed 4 February 2013).

[67]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 14.

[68]      Ms Michaela Browning, AusAID, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 14.

[69]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 38.

[70]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 39–40.

[71]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 14.

[72]      AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 17.

[73]      Submission 6, p. 31.

[74]      Submission 6, p. 31.

[75]      Submission 6, p. 31.

[76]      Submission 6, p. 31.

[77]      Submission 6, p. 14.

[78]      Submission 6, p. 31.

[79]      Submission 6, p. 14.

[80]      Submission 6, pp. 14–15.

[81]      ACFID, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 1. See also an earlier Oxfam study which found that internationally-administered Trust Funds offer an effective means of minimising waste, Matt Waldman, Falling short, Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p. 21.

[82]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 216.

[83]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 192.

[84]      Scanteam, Analysts and Advisors, ARTF at a Cross Roads: History and the Future, Final Report, Oslo, September 2012, p. 1.

[85]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 11.

[86]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 14.

[87]      Submission 14, p. 13.

[88]      Submission 14, pp. 8 and 12.

[89]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 35.

[90]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 21.

[91]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 11 and Submission 22, p. 2. See also Submission 14, p. 12.

[92]      Scanteam, Analysts and Advisors, ARTF at a Cross Roads: History and the Future, Final Report, Oslo, September 2012, p. 2.

[93]      Scanteam, Analysts and Advisors, ARTF at a Cross Roads: History and the Future, Final Report, Oslo, September 2012, p. 2.

[94]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 11.

Chapter 6 - International NGOs

[1]        AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010-2012, December 2010, p. 17.

[2]        AusAID answer to written question on notice no. 3. Professor Howes noted that in general NGOs make up about 10 per cent of the Australian aid program but he and his colleague, Mr Pryke, had seen figures suggesting that 23% of the Afghanistan aid program goes through NGOs (9% to the International Red Cross, 14% to Australian and national NGOs in 2009 according to ACFID), Submission 14, p. 13.

[3]        AusAID, Annual Report 2002–2003, p. 64. For detail on projects see paragraphs 3.22–3.25; AusAID, Annual Report 2004–2005, p. 87 and AusAID, Annual Report 2005–06, pp. 93–94.

[4]        Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 31.

[5]        CGIAR website, http://www.cgiar.org/who-we-are/ and http://www.cgiar.org/cgiar-consortium/research-centers/international-center-for-agricultural-research-in-the-dry-areas-icarda/

[6]        Adel-El-Beltagy, Director General, ICARDA, Transcript, The Robert S. McNamara Seminar: Agriculture, Growth and Human Security, the Role of Agriculture and Agricultural Research in Generating Growth and Post Disaster Reconstruction, 2 July 2003, p. 28.

[7]        Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 33.

[8]        Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 32.

[9]        AusAID, Annual Report 2011–2012, p, 115. The Australian Multilateral Assessment has developed a multilateral rating system designed to assess a number of multilateral organisations in relation to poverty orientation and effect; capacity to make a difference; value for money; and alignment with Australia’s development objectives.

[10]      Submission 6, p. 16.

[11]      AusAID, Australian Multilateral Assessment, March 2012, p. xiv, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/partner/Documents/ama-full-report.pdf (accessed 5 February 2013).

[12]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 50 and Submission 14, p. 13.

[13]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 53. See also paragraph 10.38.

[14]      Submission 15, p. 10.

[15]      Submission 6, pp. 4–5.

[16]      AusAID, Annual Report 2001–2002, p. 90; AusAID, Annual Report 2002–2003, p. 64; and Statement by the Hon. Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Australia's Overseas Aid Program 2002–03', 14 May 2002.

[17]      Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 13.

[18]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 49.

[19]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 49.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 49.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 49.

[22]      Submission 10, p. 1 and Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 50.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 40.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 35.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 35.

[26]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 206.

[27]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 165.

[28]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 50.

[29]      Submission 14, p. 13.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 13–14.

[31]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 13–14.

Chapter 7 - Uruzgan Province

[1]        See for example, Submission 20, p. [2] and AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 121.

[2]        AusAID, Annual Report 2008–2009, p. 113 and AusAID, Annual Report 2009–2010, p. 112.

[3]        Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 2.

[4]        Submission 20, p. [1].

[5]        AusAID Afghanistan, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid (accessed 10 September 2012) and AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 121. See also AusAID, answer to written question on notice no 8.

[6]        AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 121. See also AusAID, Afghanistan, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid (accessed 10 September 2012).

[7]        AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 8.

[8]        Defence answer to written question on notice no. 5(2).

[9]        Submission 22, pp. 3–4.

[10]      Submission 22, pp. 3–4.

[11]      A comprehensive list is provided in Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 17A.

[12]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2009–10, p. 56.

[13]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 21 October 2009, p. 33.

[14]      Statement by Senator the Hon Bob Carr, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2012–2013: Helping the World's Poor: Implementing Effective Aid', 8 May 2012, Budget 2012–13, http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/ministerial_statement/ausaid/html1/ausaid.htm (accessed 11 September 2012).

[15]      Mr Brendan Sargeant, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 49.

[16]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 14.

[17]      AusAID, Annual Report 2011-12, pp. 5 and 113.

[18]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 14.

[19]      AusAID, Annual Report 2011–2012, p. 113.

[20]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, April 2012, p. x, http://www.tloafghanistan.org/images/PDF_Provincial_District_and_Area_Assessments/2012%20APRIL%20TLO%20Uruzgan%20Report%20Mid%202010_%20End%202011.pdf

[21]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, pp. 3 and 122.

[22]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 122.

[23]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. xi.

[24]      AusAID, Annual Report 2011–2012, p. 113.

[25]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391 (2008–2013), A strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, p. 161.

[26]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2010–11, p. 64.

[27]      Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2010, p. 20.

[28]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 123.

[29]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 123.

[30]      One of the interns, Abdul Sami, was appointed Director of the Directorate of Electricity and Energy in Uruzgan. AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 123.

[31]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 29.

[32]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 123.

[33]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 122.

[34]      AFP, Media Release, 'AFP clarifies its commitment to Afghanistan', 1 January 2011.

[35]      Chief of the Defence Force, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2010, p. 23.

[36]      AFP, Media Release, 'AFP clarifies its commitment to Afghanistan', 1 January 2011.

[37]      Chief of the Defence Force, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2010, p. 22.

[38]      Submission 19, pp. 6–7.

[39]      AFP, Annual Report 2012–2011, p. 39.

[40]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. x.

[41]      Statement by Senator the Hon Bob Carr, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2012–2013: Helping the World's Poor: Implementing Effective Aid', 8 May 2012, Budget 2012–13, http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/ministerial_statement/ausaid/html1/ausaid.htm  (accessed 11 September 2012). See also Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2010–11, p. 4.

[42]      Department of Defence, Submission 17, p. [2].

[43]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2010, p. 20.

[44]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 21 October 2009, p. 34.

[45]      Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2010–11, p. 64.

[46]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 17.

[47]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 17.

[48]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 17.

[49]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 17.

[50]      Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, Laying the Foundations for an Inclusive Peace Process, December 2011, p.9. Although tangible improvements have been made in Uruzgan, Afghans from the province participating in the People's Dialogue in 2011 'despaired of the conditions in which they live'. They referred to the lack of markets for buying and selling products due to poor roads connecting the districts; unavailability of adequate health care, and the weak education system, including the poor capacity of teachers.

[51]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 30.

[52]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 284.

[53]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 20.

[54]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 20.

[55]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 20.

[56]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. xi.

[57]      Answer to question on notice no. 1 from 22 March 2013 hearing.

[58]      AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 1 following 22 March 2013 hearing. AusAID's answer provides statistics for all provinces in Afghanistan, see appendix 4.  

[59]      Submission 14, pp. 13–14.

[60]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 18.

[61]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 16.

[62]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 17–18.

[63]      See for example, Submission 20, p. 4.

[64]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 3.

[65]      There are no reliable statistics on the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. See Dr Bizhan, answer to written question on notice, no. 3. Afghanistan's constitution identifies the following ethnic groups in Afghanistan: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbak, Turkman, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and others.

[66]      TLO, Three Years later; A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009, 18 September 2009, pp. 3–4.

[67]      TLO, The Dutch  Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010, August 2010, p. 28.

[68]      Phil Sparrow, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, pp. 16–17.

[69]      Mr Jim McMurchy also noted that some projects have seen 'the military support (tacit or otherwise) of some fearsome warlords and their militia, as an extra layer of security or promise of safe passage on the roads', Submission 18, p. [2].

[70]      Submission 14, p. 17.

[71]      Submission 4, p. [4].

[72]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 90.

[73]      Submission 13, p. 5.

[74]      Submission 13, pp. 5–6. The TLO Profile noted the appointment of 'strongman Matiullah Khan as Provincial Chief of Police and the security gains under his leadership', TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. xiv.

[75]      Department of Defence, Defence statement to ABC Four Corners program 'In Their Sights', 5 September 2011, dated 6 September 2011, http://news.defence.gov.au/2011/09/06/defence-statement-to-abc-four-corners-program-in-their-sights-5-september-2011/  (accessed 7 January 2013).

[76]      Department of Defence, Defence statement to ABC Four Corners program 'In Their Sights', 5 September 2011, dated 6 September, 2011, http://news.defence.gov.au/2011/09/06/defence-statement-to-abc-four-corners-program-in-their-sights-5-september-2011/  (accessed 7 January 2013).

[77]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 31.

[78]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 9.

[79]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 9.

[80]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 90.

[81]      See Dr Bizhan, answer to written question on notice, no. 3.

[82]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 24.

[83]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 24.

[84]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 24.

[85]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 23–24.

[86]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 3.

[87]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 25.

[88]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 2.

[89]      See TLO, Submission 7. The TLO informed the committee that the contract termination 'may have been somewhat unfortunate given that it cost around 130 Afghan employees (a majority based in Uruzgan province) their jobs and life subsistence'.

[90]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 6.

Chapter 8 - Civil/Military development assistance

[1]        AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, p. 3.

[2]        AusAID Afghanistan, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid (accessed 10 September 2012).

[3]        Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration: Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, Baawar Consulting Group, p. 8.

[4]        Submission 23, p. [1–2].

[5]        Submission 23, p. [1].

[6]        Submission 23, p. [1].

[7]        Submission 14, p. 15.

[8]        See for example, United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/56/100–S/2002/737, 11 July 2002, paragraph 61.United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/60/224–S/2005/525, 12 August 2005, paragraph 60 and 'SAS put on the squeeze', Army The Soldiers' Newspaper, 28 March 2002, http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1047/story02.htm (accessed 15 October 2012).

[9]        Submission 16, p. 13.

[10]      Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, 'The Australian Army has certainly evolved a very strong COIN doctrine', Exclusive Interview with General Peter Cosgrove, 1 September 2010 http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/78/The-Australian-Army-has-certainly-evolved-a-very-strong-COIN-doctrine (accessed 30 August 2012).

[11]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 21 October 2009, p. 34. See paragraphs 7.7–7.8 of this report.

[12]      Submission 17, p. [2].

[13]      Senator the Hon John Faulkner, Minister for Defence, Ministerial Statement on Afghanistan, 23 June 2010 and Senate Hansard, 23 June 2010, p. 4185.

[14]      Senator the Hon John Faulkner, Minister for Defence, Ministerial Statement on Afghanistan, Senate Debates, 23 June 2010, http://www.openaustralia.org/senate/?id=2010-06-23.158.2 (accessed 3 December 2012).

[15]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 48–49.

[16]      TLO, The Dutch  Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010, August 2010, p. 53.

[17]      TLO, Three Years Later: A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006–2009, 18 September 2009, p. 16.

[18]      TLO, The Dutch  Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010, August 2010, p. 50.

[19]      TLO, The Dutch  Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010, August 2010, p. 50.

[20]      TLO, The Dutch  Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010, August 2010, p. 50.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 9.

[22]      Submission 4, p. [4].

[23]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 91.

[24]      Submission 6, p. 12. The study was Ashley Jackson, Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan, Oxfam International et al, 2010, p. 1.

[25]      Submission 2, pp. 2–3.

[26]      See Submission 18, p. [2], Submission 23, p. [1] and paragraphs 7.27–7.34.

[27]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 91.

[28]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 91 (emphasis in original).

[29]      Submission 4, p. [4] and Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 9–10.

[30]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 91.

[31]      Submission 18, p. [2].

[32]      Submission 23, p. [1].

[33]      Submission 23, p. [1].

[34]      Submission 23, p. [2].

[35]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 46.

[36]      Submission 23, p. [2].

[37]      Submission 6, p. 12.

[38]      Quick Impact, Quick Collapse, the Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan. This paper is paraphrased from a speech given by Kai Eide to the UN Security Council on 3 January 2010.

[39]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, pp. 18 and 20.

[41]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 25.

[42]      Submission 23, p. [1].

[43]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 24.

[44]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 41.

[45]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 9.

[46]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 30–31.

[47]      Submission 6, p. 12. AID/WATCH also voiced concern about risks to the safety of communities as projects are drawn into existing conflicts and become targets. Submission 23, p. [1].

[48]      Submission 6, p. 12. The quote taken from Oxfam, Whose Aid is it Anyway? Politicizing aid in conflicts and crises, 124 Oxfam Briefing Paper—Summary, p. 2.

[49]      Submission 6, p. 12.

[50]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 13.

[51]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 13.

[52]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 13.

[53]      Submission 6, p. 12; Submission 23, p. 1.

[54]      Submission 4, p. [4].

[55]      Submission 8, p. 1.

[56]      Submission 2, p. 2.

[57]      AID/WATCH, Submission 23, p. [1].

[58]      Mr Bryant, Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 43.

[59]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 46.

[60]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[61]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 41.

[62]      See for example, Professor Howes and Mr Pryke, Submission 14, p. 13.

[63]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 24.

[64]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 24.

[65]      Submission 21, p. 5.

[66]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 55.

[67]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 52.

[68]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 52.

[69]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 54.

[70]      See Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations, August 2008.

[71]      See Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations, August 2008.

[72]      Submission 23, p. [2].

[73]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 52.

Chapter 9 - Case Studies

[1]        See Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, AliceGhan, Project ID 00051619.

[2]        Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 16 February 2012, p. 153 and AusAID, answer to written question on notice no 16.

[3]        The name AliceGhan derives from a combination of 'Alice Springs, a city in Australia which has a strong connection with Afghan migrants' and 'Afghanistan' symbolising the partnership and commitment of Australia and Afghanistan to realise the resettlement  project. See explanation given in UNDP, Urban Development Group Programme, AliceGhan Project Document, Annual Work Plan of 2009. See also United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, Annual Project Report [2007] [AliceGhan Project], September 2006–December 2008, p. 5.

[4]        See Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, AliceGhan, Project ID 00051619 and United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, AliceGhan, 2nd Quarter Project Progress Report, 2009.

[5]        DIAC, answer to question taken on notice no. 4.

[6]        United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, AliceGhan, 2nd Quarter Project Progress Report, 2009, p. 4.

[7]        United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, AliceGhan, 2nd Quarter Project Progress Report, 2009, p. 4.

[8]        United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, AliceGhan, 2nd Quarter Project Progress Report, 2009, p. 4.

[9]        Submission 9, p. 5.

[10]      Nassim Majidi, 'Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan', Middle East Institute, January 2011, p. 11.

[11]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 13 February 2012, pp. 103–104.

[12]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 29–30.

[13]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 41.

[14]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 4, p. 5.

[15]      Nassim Majidi, 'Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan', Middle East Institute, January 2011, p. 11.

[16]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 30.

[17]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2012, p. 86.

[18]      AusAID, answer to written question on notice no 16.

[19]      AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 15.

[20]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover,  A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 42.

[21]      AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 15.

[22]      AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 15 and additional answer to question taken, no. 8, following 22 March 2013 hearing.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 1.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 1.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 1–2.

[26]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 2.

[27]      See website, http://gevans.org/ (accessed 12 December 2012).

[28]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 2.

[29]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 3.

[30]      Supplementary submission 4A, p. [1].

[31]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 3.

[32]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 4.

[33]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 4.

[34]      Supplementary Submission 4A, paragraph 6.

[35]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 8.

[36]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 8.

[37]      Supplementary submission 4A, p. [1].

[38]      Supplementary submission 4A, p. [1].

[39]      Supplementary submission 4A, p. [1].

[40]      Supplementary submission 4A, p. [1].

[41]      Answer to written question on notice no. 2.

[42]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 14 February 2013, p. 95.

[43]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 14 February 2013, p. 95.

[44]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 14 February 2013, p. 95.

[45]      See AusAID's answer to written question on notice no. 31.

[46]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 12.

[47]      John Eyers, Aid to fragile and conflict-affected countries: a review of the literature and Australia's approach, ANU, Development Policy Centre, Discussion Paper 21, July 2012, p. 25.

[48]      See for example, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, 2012, pp. 10–11; IMF, 'Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Program note', last updated: July 12, 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/notes/afghanistan.htm (accessed 26 October 2012); TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, pp. 13–27.

[49]      AusAID, Submission 16, p. 7 and footnote 51 below.

[50]      See for example, Towards Self-Reliance, Strategic Vision for the Transformation Decade, 2.2 Draft, 12 June 2012, p. 3; UNFPA Afghanistan, Annual Report 2010–2011, Introduction; and TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 8.

[51]      See for example: Save the Children, Oxfam and World Vision Australia, Submission 6, pp. 17, 21–22, 26 and 31; Caritas, Submission 10, pp. 2–3; ActionAid, Submission 11, p. 3; CARE, Submission 15, p. 2; AusAID, Submission 16, p. 11; Mr Jim McMurchy, Submission 18,        pp. [1–2]; Lydia Khalil, Submission 20, p. [1]; DFAT, Submission 22, pp. 3–4.

[52]      Submission 10, p. 2.

[53]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Millennium Development Goals 2010 Report, October 2010, p. 7; and Matt Waldman, Falling Short, Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p. 2. See also AusAID, Annual Report 2009–2010, p. 114 and footnotes 49, 51 and 52 above.

Part III -  

[1]        See UNDP, 'Millennium Development Goals in Afghanistan, http://www.undp.org.af/demo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=68 (accessed 30 August 2012) and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387–1391 (2008–2013), p. 5.

[2]        Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387–1391 (2008–2013), p. i.

[3]        Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Millennium Development Goals 2010 Report, October 2010, p. 12. See also UNDP, Millennium Development Goals in Afghanistan—Afghanistan MDGs Overview, http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=68 (accessed 2 January 2013).

[4]        North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010.

[5]        The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade', 5 December 2011, paragraph 13.

[6]        North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, 21 May 2012.

[7]        Ms Jennifer Rawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 3.

[8]        Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012, http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/statement-house-representatives-%E2%80%9Cprogress-transition-preparation-future%E2%80%9D (accessed 1 November 2012).

[9]        Submission 17, p. [1].

[10]      Ms Jennifer Rawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 3.

[11]      Submission 20, p. 4; and Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012.

[12]      Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012.

[13]      Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012. See also DFAT answer to written question on notice no. 1.

[14]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/66/855–S/2012/462, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 June 2012, paragraph 13.

[15]      North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Conference, 21 May 2012.

[16]      The Hon Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence, Transcript, Press Conference, 'Minister for Defence—Press Conference—Perth', 15 January 2013, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/01/15/minister-for-defence-press-conference-perth-4/ (accessed 16 January 2013).

[17]      Submission 17, p. [1] and The Hon Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence, Press Release, 'Minister for Defence—Uruzgan province begins transition', 17 July 2012, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/07/17/minister-for-defence-uruzgan-province-begins-transition/ (accessed 16 January 2013).

[18]      Submission 17, p. [1].

[19]      Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012.

[20]      Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence,Media Release, 'Minister for Defence Stephen Smith—Australia ready to lead ISAF Combined Team—Uruzgan (CTU)', 11 September 2012, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/11/minister-for-defence-stephen-smith-australia-ready-to-lead-isaf-combined-team-%e2%80%93-uruzgan-ctu/ (accessed 18 September 2012).

[21]      Submission 17, pp. [1–2]; Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 48–49; Submission 20, p. [3].

[22]      The Hon Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence, Transcript, Press Conference, 'Minister for Defence—Press Conference—Perth', 15 January 2013, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/01/15/minister-for-defence-press-conference-perth-4/ (accessed 16 January 2013).

[23]      UNHCR, '2012 UNHCR country operations profile—Afghanistan', http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6  (accessed 18 September 2012).

[24]      United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2012, p. 1.

[25]      United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2012, p. 2.

[26]      United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Annual Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2013, pp. 1 and 10.

[27]      United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2012, p. 7.

[28]      United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Annual Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2013, p. 13.

[29]      Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, 'Laying the Foundations for an Inclusive Peace Process', December 2011, p. 5. See also Professor Gordon, London School of Economics, Oral Evidence taken before the International Development Select Committee, 3 July 2012.

[30]      ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, paragraphs 36, 38 and 92.

[31]      Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan Looking Ahead: Challenges for Governance and Community Welfare, Research briefs for the 2011 Bonn Conference, p. 18.

[32]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/67/354–S/2012/703, 13 September 2012, paragraph 62.

[33]      UNHCR, '2012 UNHCR country operations profile—Afghanistan', http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6  (accessed 18 September 2012). See also ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, paragraph 10. The evaluation observed that armed conflict continued and concerns existed that 'security conditions could worsen with the slated departure of the international military force'.

[34]      UNHCR, '2013 UNHCR country operations profile—Afghanistan', http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6 (accessed 6 March 2013).

[35]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. x.

[36]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 115. It cited the destruction of the AWCC cell tower and the new Etisalat transmitter in Shah Mansur village and in July the RTA building, p. 46.

[37]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 115.

[38]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, pp. xiii and 116.

[39]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 116.

[40]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 125.

[41]      See for example, Professor Howes and Jonathon Pryke, Submission 14, p. 3 and answer to written question on notice, no. 2.

[42]      Submission 10, p. 4.

[43]      Submission 15, p. 2.

[44]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 1.

[45]      Submission 4, p. [5].

[46]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 12.

[47]      Submission 22, p. 1.

[48]      DFAT, answer to written question on notice no. 1.

[49]      Submission 22, p. 1.

[50]      Answer to written question on notice no. 11.

[51]      Answer to written question on notice no. 11.

[52]      Answer to written question on notice no. 11 and Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012, http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/statement-house-representatives-%E2%80%9Cprogress-transition-preparation-future%E2%80%9D (accessed 1 November 2012).

[53]      See also DIAC, Submission 9, p. 3.

[54]      See also DIAC, Submission 9, p. 3.

Chapter 11 - Safety of aid workers and Australian civilian personnel

[1]        See for example UNHCR, '2012 UNHCR country operations profile—Afghanistan', http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6  (accessed 18 September 2012).

[2]        Abby Stoddad, Adele Harmer and Morgan Hughes, Aid Worker Security Report 2012, Host states and their impact on security for humanitarian operations, Humanitarian Outcomes, December 2012, pp. 3–4.

[3]        TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 8.

[4]        TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 8.

[5]        See comments by Caritas and CARE Australia, Chapter 6, paragraphs 6.12–6.13.

[6]        Phil Sparrow, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 21.

[7]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 54.

[8]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 54.

[9]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 42.

[10]      See for example, Submission 2, p. 1 and Submission 16, p. 9.

[11]      Professor Maley noted the extreme difficulty when undertaking reconstruction in an environment where basic security is absent including increased risk to the beneficiaries of reconstruction projects, in ways that can be life-threatening. Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 91.

[12]      See for example, Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, p. 7. It stated that insecurity impedes appropriate utilization of aid and achievement of development results.

[13]      Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010, p. 7. According to Christian Aid ‘Ethnic and regional tensions are once more on the increase with ethnic bloc parties re-emerging and Afghans fearing ethnic warfare once international troops depart'. Christian Aid, written evidence to UK Select Committee, paragraph  3.5.

[14]      Submission 16, p. 8.

[15]      Submission 16, pp. 8–9.

[16]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 91.

[17]      Submission 17, p. [4].

[18]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2012, p. 79 and Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 268.

[19]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, pp. 268–269.

[20]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, pp. 11 and 143.

[21]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 143.

[22]      Submission 1, p. 2.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 34.

[24]      Submission 16, p. 9.

[25]      Assistant Commissioner Mandy Newton, AFP, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 41.

[26]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 38.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 40.

[28]      See Mr Dawson, Mr Lehmann, Ms Rawson and Mr Sargeant, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 6, 19 and 48.

[29]      Submission 17, p. [4] and Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 3 June 2010, p. 51.

[30]      Submission 17, p. [4].

[31]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 3.

[32]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2012, p. 80.

[33]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 7 and Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2012, p. 80. See also Submission 16, p. 9.

[34]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 3 June 2010, p. 48.

[35]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 7.

[36]      Submission 4, p. [5].

[37]      DFAT, answer to written question on notice no. 14.

[38]      The term 'at the greatest risk of harm' is used in the Joint media release by the Hon Chris Bowen MP—Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and the Hon Stephen Smith MP—Minister for Defence, 'Visa policy for at-risk Afghan employees', 13 December 2012, http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2012/cb192423.htm (accessed 17 December 2012).

Chapter 12 - Development assistance

[1]        The ADB noted that Afghanistan would face additional security and budgetary challenges with the planned withdrawal of foreign troops in 2014 and the gradual reduction in foreign support that its development partners have forecast. ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–13, paragraph 169.

[2]        The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade', Conference conclusions, 5 December 2011, paragraph 5.

[3]        The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade', Conference conclusions, 5 December 2011, paragraph 30.

[4]        The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade', Conference conclusions, 5 December 2011, paragraph 21.

[5]        Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan Looking Ahead, Challenges for Governance and Community Welfare, Research Briefs for the 2011 Bonn Conference, December 2011, p. 4.

[6]        The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade', Conference conclusions, 5 December 2011, paragraph 22.

[7]        North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 21 May 2012, paragraph 1.

[8]        Preamble, Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, The Tokyo Declaration, 'Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to Transformation', 8 July 2012, paragraph 1.

[9]        Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, 8 July 2012.

[10]      DFAT, Submission 22, p. 4 and Ms Jennifer Rawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 3.

[11]      IMF, Program note, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, last updated: July 12, 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/notes/afghanistan.htm (accessed 26 October 2012).

[12]      See for example, IMF, Program note, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, last updated: July 12, 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/notes/afghanistan.htm (accessed 26 October 2012).

[13]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, Main Report, May 2012, p. 1.

[14]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, vol. 2, Main Report, May 2012, p. 4.

[15]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/67/354–S/2012/703, 13 September 2012, paragraph 54. The Secretary-General spoke of closing nine provincial offices, a reduction of approximately 25 per cent of the authorized international and national staff (629 positions) and an adjustment to the Mission's logistical support, a revision downward of authorized number of military and police advisers. He noted further, 'National reach remains at the core of the Mission's mandated activities, but will now be carried out more flexibly, with regional offices functioning as hubs with logistical and substantive capacity to cover adjacent provinces, wherever possible',  paragraph 55.

[16]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 60. See also DFAT, answer to written question on notice no. 2.

[17]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 61.

[18]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 61.

[19]      ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, p. xiii.

[20]      ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, Preface.

[21]      ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, paragraph 167.

[22]      See for example, Save the Children, Oxfam and World Vision Australia, Submission 6,   pp. 31–32; Caritas, Submission 10, p. 4.

[23]      Mr Paul Lehmann, AusAID, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 5.

[24]      Submission 6, pp. 31–32.

[25]      Submission 10, p. 4. See also Mercy Corps, which foresees two significant likely economic consequences to the military drawdown: a significant reduction in Afghanistan’s GNI from the fall in the spending power of NATO-led forces and the fact that security is likely to become a more urgent issue. Mercy Corps, written evidence to UK Select Committee p. [1].

[26]      See for example, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan Looking Ahead: Challenges for Governance and Community Welfare, Research briefs for the 2011 Bonn Conference, 'Local Governance for Local Needs', p. 4.

[27]      See for example, Submission 16, p. 7.

[28]      Submission 22, p. 1.

[29]      Submission 22, p. 1.

[30]      Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012, http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/statement-house-representatives-%E2%80%9Cprogress-transition-preparation-future%E2%80%9D (accessed 1 November 2012).

[31]      Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, 'Vital aid assistance for Afghanistan', 20 May 2012, http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/vital-aid-assistance-afghanistan (accessed 10 September 2012).

[32]      Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012, see footnote 30 above.

[33]      Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012, see footnote 30 above. See also Memorandum of Understanding, 'Development Framework Agreement', between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Australia, 2012–2017, p. 4, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Documents/aus-afghanistan-development-framework-agreement-2012-17.pdf (accessed 18 January 2013).

[34]      Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Statement to the House of Representatives—'Progress in transition, preparation for the future', 31 October 2012, see footnote 30 above.

[35]      In Dr Bizhan's assessment, Afghanistan's future appeared gloomy unless the international community provided a sizable package of international assistance to make up for its military withdrawal and the Afghan government managed the transition well. Submission 13, p. 3.

[36]      Submission 4, p. [5].

[37]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 14.

[38]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 40.

[39]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 7.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[41]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 24.

[42]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[43]      See the committee's discussion on the contribution of NGOs in chapter 6. 

[44]      Scanteam, Analysts and Advisors, ARTF at a Cross Roads: History and the Future, Final Report, Oslo, September 2012, p. 2.

[45]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 149.

[46]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 93.

[47]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 93.

[48]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 57.

[49]      Submission 13, p. 1.

[50]      Submission 13, p. 2.

Chapter 13 - Protecting the gains—education

[1]        Memorandum of Understanding, 'Development Framework Agreement', between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Australia, 2012–2017, p. 4, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Documents/aus-afghanistan-development-framework-agreement-2012-17.pdf (accessed 18 January 2013).

[2]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 11.

[3]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37.

[4]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37.

[5]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37.

[6]        Submission 5, p. 1.

[7]        Submission 5, p. 1.

[8]        Submission 13, p. 2.

[9]        Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Fifth Report: Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, November/December 2011, p. 90.

[10]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 39–40.

[11]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 60.

[12]      Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Fifth Report: Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, November/December 2011, pp. 90–92.

[13]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 9.

[14]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 9.

[15]      AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 14.

[16]      Submission 16, p. 41.

[17]      AusAID Submission 16, pp. 32–33.

[18]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 121.

[19]      AusAID Submission 16, pp. 32–33.

[20]      Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, Media Release, Australian-Malaysian Joint Statement, 3 March 2011, http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/australian-malaysian-joint-statement (accessed 3 January 2013).

[21]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 122.

[22]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 14.

[23]      Save the Children website, 'About Children of Uruzgan', http://www.savethechildren.org.au/emergency/cou/about-children-of-uruzgan/ (accessed 15 January 2013).

[24]      Save the Children website, 'About Children of Uruzgan', http://www.savethechildren.org.au/emergency/cou/about-children-of-uruzgan/ (accessed 15 January 2013).

[25]      Save the Children website, 'About Children of Uruzgan', http://www.savethechildren.org.au/emergency/cou/about-children-of-uruzgan/ (access  15 January 2013).

[26]      Save the Children website, 'About Children of Uruzgan', http://www.savethechildren.org.au/emergency/cou/about-children-of-uruzgan/ (access 15 January 2013).

[27]      Save the Children website, 'About Children of Uruzgan', http://www.savethechildren.org.au/emergency/cou/about-children-of-uruzgan/ (access 15 January 2013).

Chapter 14 - Rural development and food security

[1]        Submission 11, p. 11.

[2]        See for examples comments by Adel-El-Beltagy, Director General, ICARDA, in The Robert S. McNamara Seminar: Agriculture, Growth and Human Security, The Role of Agriculture and Agricultural Research in Generating Growth and Post Disaster Reconstruction, Transcript, 2 July 2003, p. 28.

[3]        Save the Children, Oxfam and World Vision Australia, Submission 6, p. 17 and ActionAid, Submission 11, p. 10.

[4]        Submission 6, pp. 17–18.

[5]        Submission 1, Attachment A, p. 1.

[6]        Submission 1, Attachment A, p. 1.

[7]        Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 33.

[8]        ADB, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Assistance Program Evaluation, Independent Evaluation CE–28, 2012–2013, paragraph 22.

[9]        Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 32–33.

[10]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 31.

[11]      Committee Hansard, 3 December  2012, p. 31.

[12]      Submission 1, p. 2 and ACIAR, Annual Report 2002–03, p. 53.

[13]      ACIAR, Annual Report 2003–04, pp. 67–68.

[14]      Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, April 2011, p. 155.

[15]      Caritas Australia, Submission 10, p. 2 and Save the Children, Oxfam and World Vision Australia, Submission 6, pp. 17–18.

[16]      Submission 11, p. 9.

[17]      Submission 10, p. 2.

[18]      Submission 6, p. 18.

[19]      Submission 6, pp. 17–18.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 23.

[21]      TLO, Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 28.

[22]      Submission 6, p. 18.

[23]      Submission 6, p. 18.

[24]      Submission 11, p. 9.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 58.

[26]      Answer to written question on notice no. 3.

[27]      Answer to written question on notice no. 2.

[28]      Submission 6, p. 18.

[29]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 58.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 59.

[31]      Submission 6, p. 20.

[32]      Submission 6, p. 20.

[33]      Submission 6, p. 20.

[34]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[35]      Submission 10, pp. 2 and 4 and Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 50.

[36]      Submission 11, p. 10.

[37]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 59.

[38]      Submission 11, p. 10.

[39]      Submission 11, p. 11.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 58–59.

[41]      Submission 5, p. 1.

[42]      Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391(2008–2013), A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, p. 5.

[43]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 26.

[44]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 26.

[45]      United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, Summary Findings. November 2012, p. 4.

[46]      United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, Summary Findings. November 2012, pp. 5 and 27.

[47]      Submission 3, p. 2.

[48]      Submission 11, p. 10.

[49]      Submission 14, p. 11. They indicated that in some districts in Uruzgan 50–80 per cent of the population was involved in opium poppy cultivation.

[50]      Submission 14, p. 11.

[51]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 33.

[52]      See for example, Moore Stephens, Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (AEITI), Afghanistan Second EITI Reconciliation Report, 1389, October 2012, p. 7; Mr Scott Dawson, AusAID, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 9 and U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Geological Survey, Preliminary Non-Fuel Mineral Resource Assessment of Afghanistan, USGS Open-file Report 2007–1214, 2007, p. xxxi.

[53]      See Stephen G. Peters, Trude V.V. King et al, Summaries of Important Areas for Mineral Investment and Production Opportunities of Nonfuel Minerals in Afghanistan, vol. 1, U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Geological Survey, Open-file Report 2011–1204, 2011, p. 1.

[54]      Moore Stephens, Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (AEITI), Afghanistan Second EITI Reconciliation Report, 1389, October 2012, p.7 and Stephen G. Peters, Trude V.V. King et al, Summaries of Important Areas for Mineral Investment and Production Opportunities of Nonfuel Minerals in Afghanistan, vol. 1, U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Geological Survey, Open-file Report 2011–1204, 2011, p. 32.

[55]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 26; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 'Afghanistan publishes mining revenues and contracts', 19 October 2012. The article refers to the expected increase in revenues.

[56]      The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014, vol. 2: Main Report, May 2012, p. 26 and Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 9–10. See also United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Featured News, 'Managing Afghanistan's mineral wealth', 2 August 2012,   http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=35578&language=en-US (accessed 6 February 2013).

[57]      Mr Scott Dawson, AusAID, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 9.

[58]      Submission 13, p. 2.

[59]      Submission 13, p. 7.

[60]      Memorandum of Understanding, 'Development Framework Agreement', between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Australia, 2012–2017, p. 4, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Documents/aus-afghanistan-development-framework-agreement-2012-17.pdf (accessed 18 January 2013).

[61]      See also United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Featured News, 'Managing Afghanistan's mineral wealth', 2 August 2012,   http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=35578&language=en-US (accessed 6 February 2013).

[62]      Scanteam, Analysts and Advisors, ARTF at a Cross Roads: History and the Future, Final Report, Oslo, September 2012, p. 2.

[63]      See also United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Featured News, 'UN chief says discovery of vast mineral deposits in Afghanistan should be managed properly', http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=35927&language=en-US (accessed 6 February 2013).

[64]      United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Featured News, 'UN chief says discovery of vast mineral deposits in Afghanistan should be managed properly', http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=35927&language=en-US (accessed 6 February 2013).

[65]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 43 and also Submission 23, p. [4].

[66]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 44–45.

[67]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 44–45.

[68]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 28.

[69]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 44.

[70]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 44.

[71]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 44.

[72]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 33.

[73]      Answer to written question on notice no. 32.

[74]      Answer to written question on notice no. 32.

[75]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, pp. 9–10.

[76]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[77]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 9.

[78]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 9.

[79]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 9. See also http://eiti.org/countries (accessed 25 February 2013).

[80]      See Moore Stephens, Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (AEITI), Afghanistan Second EITI Reconciliation Report, 1389, October 2012, p. 7; http://eiti.org/files/Afghanistan-2010-2011-EITI-Report.pdf (accessed 10 March 2013); Mr Scott Dawson, AusAID, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 4.

[81]      Answer to written question on notice no. 14 submitted after 22 March 2013 hearing.

[82]      EITI, 'Australia to pilot the EITI', 27 October 2011, http://eiti.org/news-events/australia-pilot-eiti (accessed 1 May 2013).

[83]      EITI, 'Australia to pilot the EITI', 27 October 2011, http://eiti.org/news-events/australia-pilot-eiti and EITI conference 2013 in Sydney, http://eiti.org/news-events/australia-host-eiti-conference-2013 (accessed 1 May 2013).

[84]      AusAID, Overview of Australian assistance for sustainable mining across the world, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/aidissues/Documents/mining-for-development-part2.pdf.

[85]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 9.

[86]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 9.

[87]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 10.

[88]      The World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, October 2012, pp. 1 and 13.

[89]      Answer to written question on notice no. 15 following hearing on 22 March 2013.

Chapter 15 - Aid delivery channels

[1]        Ms Jennifer Rawson, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 3.

[2]        AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 1.

[3]        Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report, 2012, Table 2, p. 29, http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/2013/Development%20Cooperation%20Report%20-%202012.pdf.

[4]        This table is taken from Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report, 2012, Table 2, p. 29, http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/2013/Development%20Cooperation%20Report%20-%202012.pdf.

[5]        See chapter 5 paragraphs 5.53–5.64. For example, Dr Bizhan noted that it would be important that Australian assistance use Afghan government systems and channels such as on-budget mechanisms by using the Trust Funds and the government budget. Submission 13, p. 2.

[6]        The fund and its advantages were discussed fully in chapter 5. 

[7]        See Chapter 6 especially paragraph 6.13. See for example Caritas, Submission 10, p. 2.

[8]        Submission 10, p. 1.

[9]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 50.

[10]      See as an example, Caritas Australia, Submission 10, p. 1.

[11]      The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, Conference conclusions, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade', 5 December 2011, paragraph 9.

[12]      The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, Conference conclusions, 'Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade, 5 December 2011, paragraph 9.

[13]      United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, A/66/855–S/2012/462, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 June 2012, paragraph 69.

[14]      Submission 20, p. [2].

[15]      Answer to written question on notice no 8.

[16]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 2.

[17]      AusAID, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 7.

[18]      AusAID, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 7.

[19]      Save the Children website, 'About Children of Uruzgan', http://www.savethechildren.org.au/emergency/cou/about-children-of-uruzgan/ (access 15  January 2013).

[20]      Answer to written question on notice no. 8 provided the following details: Children of Uruzgan Program ($35.7 million, 2011-15); Uruzgan Rural Roads Program ($25 million, 2012-15), Small Project Facility ($13.9 million, 2010-13) managed by GIZ, and Support for Local Government Program ($10 million, 2011-13), implemented by GIZ. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) has supported Afghanistan’s reconstruction since 2002. In total, GIZ has around 320 seconded and more than 1,500 local staff working on around 60 projects in Afghanistan. See http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/358.html.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 30.

[22]      AusAID, Australian Multilateral Assessment, March 2012, http://ausaid.gov.au/partner/Documents/ama-full-report.pdf. The assessment generally covers multilateral organisations that receive AusAID funding, Terms of Reference, http://ausaid.gov.au/HotTopics/Documents/AustralianMultilateralAssessmentTOR.pdf.

[23]      See chapter 6, paragraphs 6.15–6.26. See also Submission 10, p. 1.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37.

[25]      Submission 10, p. 1.

[26]      Submission 10, p. 1.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 54.

[28]      See for example, Submission 5, pp. 1–2.

[29]      Submission 10, p. 1.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 54.

[31]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 54.

[32]      Submission 5, p. 1.

[33]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 46 and 22 March 2013, p. 11.

[34]      TLO, Uruzgan:18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, pp. 12–13.

[35]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 31.

[36]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 32–33.

[37]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[38]      Submission 10, p. 1.

[39]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 9.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 10.

[41]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 10.

[42]      Tawanmandi website, CSOs Mapping Exercise, An analytical overview of the advocacy efforts of CSOs across Afghanistan. pp. 5 and 12, http://www.tawanmandi.org.af/english/images/files/Tawanmandi-Mapping-Report.pdf (accessed 12 March 2013).

[43]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37.

[44]      Submission 5, p. 2.

[45]      Answer to written question on notice no. 6 following 22 March 2013 hearing.

[46]      Answer to written question on notice no. 5.

[47]      AusAID Afghanistan home page, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Pages/home.aspx#aid (accessed 2 March 2013). See also AusAID answer to written question on notice no. 2 following 22 March 2013 hearing.

[48]      Submission 6, pp. 14–15.

[49]      Submission 15, pp. 11–12.

[50]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 40.

[51]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 54.

[52]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 5.

[53]      IMF, Program note, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, last updated: 2 July 2012, http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/notes/afghanistan.htm (accessed 26 October 2012).

[54]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 13.

[55]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 13.

[56]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37.

[57]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 22.

[58]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, pp. 22–23.

[59]      Information conveyed during a private meeting with representatives from Afghanistan.

[60]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 31.

Chapter 16 - The role of Afghan women

[1]        The Constitution of Afghanistan, Year 1382, Chapter Two, Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, Article Twenty-two, http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html

[2]        Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Fifth Report: Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, November/December 2011, p. 90.

[3]        Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Fifth Report: Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, November/December 2011, pp. 91–92.

[4]        Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Fifth Report: Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, November/December 2011, pp. 91–92. See also survey results on attitudes to women working outside the home, The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2012, A Survey of the Afghan People, 2012, p. 163.

[5]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 55.

[6]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37, Submission 15, pp. 11–12.

[7]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[8]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[9]        Scanteam, Analysts and Advisors, ARTF at a Cross Roads: History and the Future, Final Report, Oslo, September 2012, p. 2.

[10]      AusAID, Annual Report 2010–2011, p. 29.

[11]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 57.

[12]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 35.

[13]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 39.

[14]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 35.

[15]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 39.

[16]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 57. Ms Angir is the Senior Program Co-ordinator, Addressing Violence Against Women, ActionAid.

[17]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 57.

[18]      Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Fifth Report: Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan, November/December 2011, p. 93.

[19]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 55.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 12.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 9.

[22]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 55.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 7.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 8.

[25]      See for example, Amnesty International, Oxfam and the Afghan Australian Development Organisation, Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, pp. 7–9.

[26]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, pp. 7–8.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 8.

[28]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 8.

[29]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 8.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 8.

[31]      Answer to written question on notice no. 1 following 22 March 2013 hearing.

[32]      Answer to written question on notice no. 6 following 22 March 2013 hearing.

Part IV -  

[1]        Based on revised ODA figures—AusAID, answer to written question on notice no. 33.

[2]        Scanteam, Analysts and Advisers, ARTF at a Cross-Roads: History and the Future, Oslo, September 2012, p. 2.

[3]        Scanteam, Analysts and Advisers, ARTF at a Cross-Roads: History and the Future, Oslo, September 2012, p. 4. The report also noted that the fund should rely more on 'ex poste verification rather than ex ante permissions'.

[4]        Submission 15, p. 12. Mr Leahy stated that a set of benchmarks and targets should be established for a phased approach to managing the transition process and that the Australian Government should be strongly supportive of the international community adopting a set of benchmarks for the transition to budget support. Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[5]        Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 11.

[6]        International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Survey 2012, p. 25, http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf.

[7]        International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Survey 2012, p. 28.

[8]        International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Survey 2012, p. 28.

[9]        The World Bank Group, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators', http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp (accessed 21 March 2013).

[10]      Ms Michaela Browning, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 8 (also see Submission 16, pp. 51–54).

[11]      Memorandum of Understanding, 'Development Framework Agreement', between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of Australia,        2012–2017, p. 5, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Documents/aus-afghanistan-development-framework-agreement-2012-17.pdf (accessed 18 January 2013).

[12]      AusAID, Australian Multilateral Assessment, March 2012, p. xii. The World Bank ranked highly in the Australian Multilateral Assessment.

[13]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 16.

[14]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 20.

[15]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 20.

[16]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 16.

[17]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 16.

[18]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 16. The U.S. Agency for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Department for International Development and the German Foreign Affairs Ministry also support the production of this survey.

[19]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 16. See also Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 14 February 2013, p. 96.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 16.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 16.

[22]      Answer to written question on notice no. 1.

[23]      Submission 4, p. [3].

[24]      Attachment to Submission 4, William Maley, 'Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment' in Amin Saikal (ed.), The Afghanistan Conflict and Australia's Role, Melbourne University Press, 2011, p. 87.

[25]      Submission 4, p. [2].

[26]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 8.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 8.

[28]      Submission 14, p. 2.

[29]      Submission 14, pp. 18–19 and John Eyers, Aid to fragile and conflicted-affected countries: a review of the literature and Australia's approach, ANU, Development Policy Centre, Discussion Paper 21, July 2012, pp. 25–26.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 20.

[31]      Submission 4, p. [4].

[32]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 1 and Submission 4, p. [3].

[33]      Answer to written question on notice, no. 1.

[34]      Submission 4, p. [3].

[35]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 36.

[36]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 37.

[37]      John Eyers, Aid to fragile and conflicted-affected countries: a review of the literature and Australia's approach, ANU, Development Policy Centre, Discussion Paper 21, July 2012, p. 25.

[38]      Submission 14, pp. 18–19.

[39]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 19.

[40]      Submission 14, p. 18.

[41]      Submission 14, p. 18. The other exceptions (and their 2012-13 allocated budgets) are Iraq ($36.6m), Palestinian Territories & Other Middle East ($56m) and Latin America ($27.2m).

[42]      Submission 14, p. 18.

[43]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 19.

[44]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 19.

[45]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 20.

[46]      AusAID, answers to written questions on notice nos 22–23.

[47]      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Estimates, 14 February 2013, p. 97.

[48]      AusAID, Afghanistan Annual Program Performance Report 2011, July 2012, p. 6.

[49]      AusAID, Afghanistan Annual Program Performance Report 2011, July 2012, p. 10.

[50]      See paragraphs 4.47–4.48, 4.54, 7.27–7.30 and 9.13.

[51]      Submission 6, p. 12.

[52]      Phil Sparrow, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, ACFID Research in Development Series Report no. 1, March 2011, p. 2.

[53]      Submission 23, p. [2].

[54]      Submission 17, p. [3].

[55]      Committee Hansard, 22 March 2013, p. 17.

[56]      The TLO made this observation in Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover, A TLO Provincial Profile, April 2012, p. 42.

[57]      See paragraph 3.20 noting a statement from Mr Dawson, Committee Hansard, 3 December 2012, p. 1; Defence answer to written question on notice no 5(2); AusAID, Australia's strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010–2012, December 2010, p. 3 and The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Statement to the International Conference on Afghanistan', The Hague, 31 March 2009, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2009/090331_ica.html;

[58]      Answer to written question on notice no. 17 submitted after 22 March 2013 public hearing.

[59]      Answer to written question on notice no. 3 submitted after 22 March 2013 public hearing.

[60]      John Eyers, Aid to fragile and conflicted-affected countries: a review of the literature and Australia's approach, ANU, Development Policy Centre, Discussion Paper 21, July 2012, p. 25.

[61]      John Eyers, Aid to fragile and conflicted-affected countries: a review of the literature and Australia's approach, ANU, Development Policy Centre, Discussion Paper 21, July 2012, p. 26.

[62]      AusAID, An Effective Aid Program for Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, updated June 2012, recommendation 34, p. 64.

[63]      Committee Hansard, 4 December 2012, p. 13.

Top