Chapter 14 - Funding Australia's public diplomacy
14.1
Australia's capacity to deliver effective, well-coordinated public and
cultural diplomacy programs, both in-country and overseas, depends crucially on
adequate levels of public funding. This chapter examines the level of funding
for Australia's public diplomacy programs and considers whether it is adequate and
well targeted. It is also interested in recent trends in expenditure and how the
funding for Australia's public diplomacy compares with other countries.
Resources for Public diplomacy
14.2
It is clear that significant effort is required to project and establish
a positive image of Australia in a fiercely contested international space. It
is an expensive undertaking for a medium-sized country to secure and maintain international
recognition as an 'identity' in its own right. Considerable resources are
needed for research and analysis before messages are crafted and promoted in a
way that will convey a positive image of Australia and leave a lasting favourable
impression.
Funding for Australia's public diplomacy
14.3
DFAT informed the committee that it has a two-tiered approach to funding
its public diplomacy activities. It allocates funds to enable general public
diplomacy work to be undertaken throughout the department as well as funds
allocated explicitly for front-line public diplomacy programs.[1]
In 2005–06, the actual expenditure on public diplomacy identified by DFAT was
$93.5 million which comprised:
- $32.4 million on grants and contributions;
- $8 million on Australia's participation at the 2005 World Expo in
Aichi; and
- $53 million on general departmental public diplomacy outputs.[2]
14.4
The $53 million for general departmental public diplomacy is 'a real
allocation'. It captures 'all of the work that is done on public diplomacy by
the department in totality'.[3]
The figure was calculated from the department's activity based costing model.
DFAT explained:
The model was developed through a survey completed by a large
sample of officers in Canberra and at post, who together represented the
operations of the department as a whole. The survey collected data on time
spent on various activities, including public diplomacy. This information was
used to determine an allocation of the department's resources across its
Outcomes.[4]
14.5
It should be noted that the allocation from this activity-based model
encompasses the full range of costs incurred by the department which contributes
directly to public diplomacy and includes salary, travel, communications and
property costs. It also includes 'a calculated share of overhead functions such
as human resources management, financial management and other corporate
services'. The following table indicates that over the last five years the
general departmental public diplomacy expenditure has moved between
approximately $63 and $51 million and now stands at $54.8 million.
Table 14.1: Expenditure for the last 5 years (excluding
administered items and revenue from other sources)[5]
2002–03 |
2003–04 |
2004–05 |
2005–06 |
2006–07 |
$62.618 |
$56.499 |
$50.842 |
$52.999 |
$54.791 |
14.6
Dr Strahan, Assistant Secretary of the Images of Australia Branch (IAB),
noted that the percentage of 'spending devoted to public diplomacy over the
last six or seven years...has remained broadly stable. It has fluctuated between about
9.4 per cent of the total DFAT budget in 1999–2000 to about 8.7 per cent of the
budget in the last financial year, with little bumps up and down'.[6]
He pointed out, however, that:
...the budget...which in current dollar terms is $15 million higher
than it was in 1999, is only part of the much more general federal public
diplomacy spend and once you include the expenditure of related agencies, such
as the Australia Council and Tourism Australia, you get a much larger number,
of course, which gives a good picture of the total public diplomacy effort...On
the general question of the figure of $53 million, that relates to, as I said,
a certain percentage of the total budget which is allocated to each outcome
under the budget.[7]
DFAT's public diplomacy programs–IAB
14.7
The IAB has the primary responsibility for implementing the department's
public diplomacy programs and accordingly administers the largest public
diplomacy budget that was $23.5 million in 2005–06.[8]
14.8
The table below shows a breakdown of IAB's expenditures on public diplomacy
activities from 2002–2003 to 2005–2006.[9]
Table
14.2: Breakdown of IAB's expenditure on public diplomacy programs and
activities it manages from 2002–03 to 2005–06
Expenditure by IAB
|
2002–2003
|
2003–2004
|
2004–2005
|
2005–2006
|
Public Diplomacy (Posts)
|
$1,936,434
|
$1,473,647
|
$1,607,605
|
$1,585,557
|
Australian International Cultural Council
|
$1,080,276
|
$1,027,473
|
$1,076,790
|
$1,067,540
|
International Media and Cultural Visits
|
$484,082
|
$468,235
|
$447,393
|
$537,206
|
Media Strategies and Publications
|
$315,952
|
$272,335
|
$367,966
|
$306,819
|
Public Diplomacy Contingency Fund
|
$0
|
$56,234
|
$21,101
|
$25,000
|
Cultural Relations Discretionary Grants–Administered
|
$302,000
|
$339,892
|
$386,657
|
$378,337
|
Australian Institute of International
Affairs—Administered
|
$60,000
|
$65,000
|
$65,000
|
$71,000
|
ABC AsiaPacific (now Australia
Network)—Administered
|
$17,370,000
|
$17,770,000
|
$18,180,000
|
$18,600,000
|
Musica Viva
|
|
|
$130,000
|
$130,000
|
Indigenous programs
|
|
|
$135,471
|
$120,830
|
Asia Link
|
$445,465
|
$353,478
|
$130,000
|
$130,000
|
Administration and Tender Costs
|
$87,231
|
$83,144
|
$146,001
|
$383,545
|
Internet
|
$251,049
|
$221,820
|
$285,978
|
$223,985
|
Public Communications
|
$178,771
|
$120,927
|
$91,163
|
$0
|
Asia Pacific
Sports Program (AusAID)
|
-$4,503
|
-$13,949
|
$0
|
$0
|
Expos
|
-$27,573
|
$0
|
$0
|
$0
|
Total
|
$22,506,184
|
$22,238,236
|
$23,068,125
|
$23,559,819
|
* In 2005–06, the Public Communications Section was
merged into other parts of IAB.
** The Asia Pacific Sports program is funded by AusAID
and cost neutral to IAB.
*** Expo expenditure was not managed by IAB between
20003–04 and 2005–06.
14.9
Table 14.2 shows that the major items of expenditure were on the
Australia Network ($18.6 million), public diplomacy activities for posts ($1.59
million) and the Australian International Cultural Council ($1.07 million).
These three items accounted for over 90 per cent of the Branch's total
expenditure on public diplomacy programs for the financial year. Administered
funding on Australia Network alone accounted for 79 per cent of total
expenditures.
14.10
DFAT's submission mentioned that IAB is currently conducting a review of
the public diplomacy funding for all posts 'to ensure that the current spread
of allocations serves Australia's key foreign and trade policy objectives as
effectively as possible'.[10]
General views on funding available for Australia's public diplomacy
14.11
A number of witnesses were of the view that Australia's public diplomacy
is not a high priority for the government. Mr Kirk Coningham argued that:
The reality is that Australian public diplomacy has been
relegated to a level of importance equivalent to that of Embassy gardens. It’s
now almost exclusively managed around the world by locally engaged staff. DFAT
will argue that dedicating 30 percent of the duties of the 3rd Secretary
Political as a ‘supervisor’ is sufficient for the task. It is not. Under DFAT
this incredibly important function will remain the domain of the garden shed
while the increasingly redundant work of the traditional diplomat will maintain
its place in the ivory tower.[11]
14.12
Mr Trevor Wilson suggested that the resources devoted to public
diplomacy in Australia are 'pretty miniscule': that Australia is running its
public diplomacy program 'on a shoestring'.[12]
He explained:
I am actually quoting somebody in the department who is running
it when I say that. If it is the high priority that the government says it is,
it probably should be getting quite a lot more money. Most of the submissions
that you have received from the individual councils say that. But on the other
hand, I think it is very difficult to justify giving public diplomacy a lot
more money without some more rigorous evaluation.[13]
14.13
He noted that a number of activities or programs listed by DFAT as
public diplomacy would not fall within the definition of public diplomacy. He
noted:
...a lot of their publications, which are actually targeted at the
Australian public and not overseas. Of course, they are useful overseas as
well, but they are primarily for the Australian public. The trade advocacy
program I would not particularly call public diplomacy.
The Economic Analytical Unit’s work I also would not call public
diplomacy. Their trade advocacy is mainly aimed at convincing people about good
trade practice. You can put that into good governance if you like but I think
it is a bit dubious. The Economic Analytical Unit is primarily aimed at
informing Australian people about the economic situation in other countries. It
is not aimed at the overseas public at all.[14]
14.14
Mr Freeman agreed that the funding available for public diplomacy was
'pretty modest by national standards'. He took the example of the IAB with
their staff of around 12 or 14:
Their operational budget, once you take out the Australia Network
and some of the discretionary cultural funding and so on, comes down to
probably about $4½ million.[15]
14.15
Aside from these general observations about the funding of public
diplomacy by some witnesses, two areas attracted particular comment for their
funding—the bilateral foundations, councils and institutes (FCIs) and cultural
diplomacy.
Funding for the bilateral foundations, councils and institutes
14.16
There are nine bilateral foundations, councils and institutes. Although they
have their own mission statements, in general their overarching objective is to
develop and strengthen people-to-people links and to foster greater mutual understanding.
The objectives of the Council on Australia Latin American Relations place an
emphasis on economic ties (see appendix 4 for information on the FCIs).
14.17
DFAT explained that the funding arrangements for FCIs are determined by
the instrument under which they were established—an Executive Order in Council
or an Administrative Circular. It provided the following details:
FCIs established under Executive Orders in Council are funded
from the administered Outcome 3 measure ‘International Relations Grants
Programme (IRGP)’. Applications for IRGP funding are assessed on an annual
basis by DFAT’s Senior Executive, usually in June, following which a
recommendation is made to the Minister for the forthcoming financial year
only.
FCIs established under Administrative Circular are funded via
the department’s own internal budgetary process. The initial funding for these
FCIs was determined by the Minister upon establishment and set the basis for
their permanent (or base) budget. In addition to their permanent budget, these
FCIs are able to access the biannual Budget Allocation Review (BAR) mechanism
in a similar manner to other work areas within the department. It should also
be noted, that while these FCIs are currently funded via the departmental
appropriation, there is also scope for them to make a supplementary application
for funding though the IRGP, as described above.[16]
14.18
The following table lists government funded expenditures by the nine FCIs
from 2002–2003 to 2005–2006.[17]
The Australia–Japan Foundation spent $2.5 million in government funds for the
financial year; the next highest was the Australia–China Council with $745,731.
Table 14.3: Expenditure by the nine foundations, councils
and institutes
FCI Expenditure
|
2002–2003
|
2003–2004
|
2004–2005
|
2005–2006
|
Australia China Council
|
$732,851
|
$752,596
|
$752,132
|
$745,731
|
Australia India Council
|
$738,172
|
$749,900
|
$749,390
|
$739,419
|
Australia Indonesia
Institute
|
$848,583
|
$785,104
|
$784,390
|
$729,275
|
Australia Malaysia
Institute*
|
|
|
|
$288,216
|
Australia Thailand
Institute**
|
|
|
|
$297,668
|
Australia Korea Foundation
|
$719,731
|
$743,229
|
$746,190
|
$737,854
|
Australia Japan Foundation***
|
$3,413,093
|
$3,322,763
|
$3,159,338
|
$2,500,000
|
Council for Australian–Arab Relations
|
$149,583
|
$399,899
|
$492,030
|
$470,528
|
Council on Australia Latin America Relations
|
|
|
|
$414,493
|
Total
|
$5,869,162
|
$6,000,895
|
$5,931,338
|
$6,177,453
|
* The AMI was established in April 2005. Its
first budget was for 2005–06.
** The ATI was established in June 2005. Its
first budget was for 2005–06.
*** The AJF was an independent statutory
authority until 2006. AJF expenditure includes staffing and administrative
costs
14.19
Only three FCIs were directly represented at the committee's public
hearings. They indicated that they could certainly do more work with increased
funding.
Ms Dinah Dysart, Deputy Chair of the Australia–China Council, informed the committee
that the Council's 'modest budget and the necessity to do more with fewer people'
was their greatest challenge. She explained:
When I was appointed to the council in 1998 there were 12
members on the council. Now there are nine members, including an ex-officio
member, and that is likely to reduce further to eight later this year. This
reduction has occurred over time to reduce costs and maximise program funding.
This has meant that the councils have had to work smarter, as there has been no
reduction in the programs that we deliver. At the same time, China’s profile in
Australia continues to grow, as we all know, and with it interest in and
expectations of what the council is able to fund have also grown.[18]
14.20
The Chair of the Council on Australia Latin American Relations (COALAR),
Mr Bernard Wheelahan, told the committee he had recently written to the
Secretary of DFAT asking for funding parity with other councils. He told the committee:
'...what I am expecting is to get $750 000...Representing 500 million people in 22
countries, I reckon that is value for money'.[19]
A member of the Australia–India Council, Professor Bruce Bennett, told the committee:
It is my view that a budget of $1.5 million would be more
appropriate to the sorts of activities that the Australia-India Council
projects into the future, particularly in education, the arts and public
policy, including media links. We are continually saying, ‘No, we can’t fund
this.’ We get excellent applications, many of which we have to turn back.[20]
14.21
Professor Bennett told the committee that the Council was awaiting
DFAT's inquiry into FCI funding before deciding whether to approach the department.
Taking a broader perspective, he also commented on the funding for all councils:
I think also there is a sense amongst the bilateral councils,
who meet informally once a month and discuss issues—secretariats and
members—that together they add up to something very significant in public
diplomacy and that none of them would want to make the kind of bold claim that
I made a moment ago [the appropriateness of a budget of $1.5 million] and
thereby dislodge another council or councils.[21]
14.22
Ms Alison Carroll, Asialink, who is on the board of the Australia-Indonesia
Institute, agreed that the FCIs are 'poorly funded'.[22]
Ms McGregor, Asialink, referred to a recent a proposal before a FCI for
$30,000.
We are not only non-profit, we use other money to support any of
the work that we do. We ended up getting $10,000 from them for it. You just
cannot make programs work like that, and it wastes everybody’s time. A lot of
time goes into a submission and there has got to be a more efficient way of
delivering than this.[23]
14.23
In 2004, JSCFADT recommended that funding to the Australia–Indonesia
Institute should be substantially increased to enable it to maintain the breadth
of programs it supports, to provide for continuity of successful core programs
and to enable it to extend its reach significantly. It further recommended that
the Australia–Indonesia Institute receive additional funding to expand its
efforts in promoting culture and the arts and a portion of the increase in
funding be dedicated to the furthering of the sports relationship between
Australia and Indonesia.[24]
Table 14.3 indicates that government funding to this institute has fallen since
then.
14.24
Accountability is an important aspect of government funding. The committee
notes that DFAT's Annual Report contains a section on the FCIs but conveys very
little information especially on expenditure. Some FCIs produce an annual report
that is presented to Parliament and some do not. The annual reports of the
Australia–China Council, the Australia–Indonesia Institute and the Australia–Japan
Foundation are tabled. Some FCIs, such as the Australia–Korea Foundation, have
in the past had their annual report tabled in Parliament but now do not. The
most recent annual report for the Australia–India Council available on DFAT's
website is for financial year 2001–2002 and for the Australia–Korea Foundation
is financial year 2003–2004.[25]
Dr Alison Broinowski suggested that 'it was time to review the operations of
the bilateral councils and consider whether their operations should be unified
to make them 'more coherent, more recognisable, more brandable'.[26]
Committee view
14.25
The committee agrees with the view that the funding for the FCIs is
'modest'. It accepts advice from the representatives of the councils that
appeared before it that their activities are constrained by limited funding. The
committee also notes that the nine FCIs have come into existence over a period
of time and under different instruments. It suggests that it would be timely
for DFAT to review the bodies as distinct entities and then as a group with a
view to identifying any anomalies that may have arisen since the Australia–Japan
Foundation was established in 1978 and which create unnecessary duplication in
functions or in administration. The committee is in no doubt that increased
funding to the FCIs would boost Australia's public diplomacy efforts. It is the
committee's view, however, that it would be unwise to consider such increases
before such a review which would also provide the opportunity to identify areas
where greater efficiencies may be gained.
14.26
In summary, the committee regards FCIs as very effective vehicles in
contributing to the conduct of public diplomacy. Evidence suggested they could
do with further funding. The committee urges the government to undertake a
review with a view to increasing their budgets.
Recommendation 19
14.27 The committee recommends that DFAT undertake a
review of the nine FCIs with a view to assessing their effectiveness in
contributing to the conduct of Australia's public diplomacy. The
review should consider, among other matters, whether the FCIs should receive an
increase in funding.
14.28
The committee suggests that for increased accountability, the FCIs be
required to produce an annual report and for the Minister to table the report
in Parliament. This requirement would not alter the current arrangement of DFAT's
annual report containing a summary of the FCI reports.
Recommendation 20
14.29
The committee recommends that each FCI produce an annual report to be
tabled in Parliament.
Funding public diplomacy activities
14.30
This report has considered a number of public diplomacy programs that
are making a valuable contribution to Australia's public diplomacy. They
include visitors' programs, student exchanges, educational programs, sports
development, promotional campaigns run by Tourism Australia or Invest Australia,
and many different and varied cultural events and exhibitions.
14.31
Most organisations would welcome additional funding. For example, Tourism
Australia stated that it looks for a whole-of-government approach wherever possible
given that its funds 'are meagre when compared to other national tourist
offices working in our source markets'.[27]
Funding for public diplomacy, however, is finite and budgeting priorities must
be established. Mr Matthew Cameron-Smith, Tourism Australia, stated:
There are markets that we do not target because we do not have
the funds to target those markets. We have to decide which of the 23 markets,
for example, are most appropriate to this country and where we can actually
derive the most economic benefit for Australia. They are the markets that we
are active in.[28]
14.32
Mr Greg Nance, Australian Sports Commission, contended that sport for
development has a great public diplomacy effect and indicated that the ASC 'could
go a lot further with this if resourced adequately. It is a good story'.[29]
According to
Mr Nance, if funding were provided on top of the $2 million that ASC already receives
from AusAID, ASC could 'reach farther for longer with the programs that we are
undertaking now'. He gave the example as noted previously:
Last year I was at the Pacific Islands Forum education
ministers’ meeting in Fiji, where I spoke, representing our programs. After our
presentation, which went for half an hour, every one of the countries
represented at the forum approached us to bring the programs into their
country.[30]
14.33
When asked to provide a ballpark figure on the additional costs required
to take the program into all of those countries, he replied:
There are 13 countries and we concentrate on four at the moment.
If you multiply by a factor of 3½ or something like that on top of the $2
million, you are there. With $6 million to $8 million we could reach all of the
Pacific nations with programs that we believe are very successful and built on
a lot of experience from our own system here in Australia.[31]
Funding cultural diplomacy
14.34
The committee also received strong representations on government funding
for cultural diplomacy. Ms Jane Cruickshank, Australian Film Commission (AFC),
informed the committee that increased funding in 2004 enabled the AFC 'to
expand the breadth of the Embassy Roadshow program to establish Australian film
festivals in key countries where there are identified diplomatic and cultural
outcomes'. She noted that continued support of this funding would enable the
AFC 'to expand Australia’s international presence and develop Australian screen
culture, and assist the strategic and diplomatic interests of Australia'.[32]
She maintained that the AFC cannot meet demand:
I have a list of requests for assistance to bring Australian
films into other territories. Because our funding is targeted at AICC targets,
they are the ones that we have to prioritise. For anything else we say,
‘Unfortunately, we wish you well with this festival but we cannot assist you at
this stage'.[33]
14.35
Dr Gerard Vaughan, National Gallery of Victoria, observed correctly that
the cultural organisations who came before the committee would say that more
money would help. Speaking on behalf of his own institution, he said:
We would like to send more exhibitions overseas, particularly of
Australian art. They are not easy to get up and running because, as I have
said, overseas directors usually see them as a financial risk. If there were
another source of money to underwrite them, or at least to underwrite some of
the costs, I think that would be very helpful.[34]
14.36
He suggested that the idea of some federal money expanding the national
exhibitions touring support program 'to overseas would be a good one.'[35]
Other organisations such as the Major Performing Arts Group also recommended
substantial new funding.[36]
14.37
The committee is in no doubt that the organisations cited above, as well
as many others, could increase and improve their contribution to public
diplomacy with more government support. But there are limits to government
funds and the question then arises whether, within the overall budget, the funding
made available to cultural diplomacy is adequate and appropriate.
14.38
Many of those engaged in cultural diplomacy suggested that Australia
does not adequately fund its cultural diplomacy. It is a case of weighing up
the overall benefits of supporting cultural activities, which involves economic
and public diplomacy benefits, against the initial investment. Dr Vaughan said:
...it is coming back to whether or not government in Australia
sees it as a good thing to have contemporary Australian art [promoted overseas],
for government and national reasons—not just from the perspective of the
individual galleries. If that is to be the case, I would suggest that some
subsidies would have to be provided.[37]
14.39
By way of illustration, he noted:
I want to emphasise that, with the great and notable exception
of European Masterpieces that went to America, we send very few complete
exhibitions overseas. The ones that we have sent, because of the funding
issues, have tended to be fairly small and modest. I can see possibilities for
the future.[38]
14.40
Dr Vaughan cited Museums Australia, a peak body that represents the
interests of all museums and art galleries of Australia, as 'chronically
underfunded'.[39]
14.41
Ms Carroll, Asialink, stated that comparatively Australia's public
diplomacy is 'poorly resourced'.[40]
In its submission, Asialink acknowledged competing priorities for Australia's public
diplomacy but noted that no region is more geographically, politically and
economically important to Australia than Asia.
Therefore, this region must be the top focus of Australia’s
public diplomacy efforts going forward, and this vision needs to be
communicated clearly to all agencies, partners and stakeholders.[41]
14.42
Asialink noted in its submission that Australia Council funding
for Asia 'was 35% of their international spend in 1993 and was down to 23% in
2006' (currently available figures).[42]
It observed further the increasing investment in public diplomacy by Asian governments
and other institutions. Asialink cited countries such as Singapore and Korea which
are dramatically increasing their spending in line with their European
counterparts. As noted previously, China in particular is actively pursuing its
public diplomacy in the region which includes promoting its culture. Asialink
noted:
The investment by the Chinese Government in the establishment of
over 120 Confucius Institutes in almost 50 countries and regions is also an
example of the increased focus of China on their reputation and image in the
world. The Chinese Government ambitiously intends to establish 1000 Confucius
Institutes by 2020.[43]
14.43
Asialink drew attention to what it believed was 'a disturbing
trend'—the increasing under-representation of Australia in significant regional
events. It provided the following example:
- Singapore Biennale 2006 had 46
Asian artists, 25 EuroAmerican, 22 others and 1 Australian;
- Shanghai Biennale 2006 had 49
Asian artists, 39 EuroAmerican, 4 others and 1 Australian;
- Taipei Biennale 2006 had 25 Asian
artists, 14 EuroAmerican, and no Australians.[44]
14.44
Ms Carroll gave the example of Indonesia. Citing from information
contained in a 2004 report, she said:
The British, the French, the Germans, the Dutch, the Japanese, the
Russians, the Indians are all investing in cultural centres in Indonesia and we
do not...The Dutch spent $300,000 on their cultural programs in Indonesia...The
British spent $3.9 million in Indonesia, promoting Britain culturally in Indonesia.
I know what we spend. It would be less than half a million dollars, and Indonesia
is our next-door neighbour...[The French spent] 1.6 million. The Indians spent
$400,000; the Russians spent $150,000 promoting Russian culture in Indonesia.
The Australia–Indonesia Institute spends $200,000, the Australia Council spends
less than $50,000.[45]
14.45
Ms Carroll noted that Australia is also geographically isolated and
concluded:
In light of the fact that we have these negative realities, we
should be spending more than these other people that we are seeing in the same
boat as ourselves, because people keep saying to me and to Jenny, and to all of
us who are travelling in the region, ‘You’re missing the boat here. You’re not
taking advantage of your advance, which you had.’[46]
14.46
In its submission to the inquiry, Asialink noted that Australia's budget
for cultural diplomacy activities is well below that of other developed
nations. It stated:
Australia spends just 17 cents per capita on cultural diplomacy,
compared to Germany which spends approximately $3, and the UK, which spends an
impressive $19 per capita.[47]
14.47
Ms Carroll explained that the figures came from 'a mixture of public
documents, like annual reports, and we got the Australian figure from DFAT'. She
was prepared to accept that the problem in comparing statistics 'is one of
definition and what you include'. She explained:
DFAT saw those figures and their response was, ‘But we didn’t include
Radio Australia,’ which was true, but neither did we include BBC World. We had
a discussion in the office about including language training in this, and the
decision was to do so, on the basis that language training—which does make a
lot of money for the British because they have cornered that market pretty well—is
a part of cultural or public diplomacy.[48]
14.48
Dr Strahan informed the committee that he found the figures produced by
Asialink misleading. To his mind, Asialink derived its figure of 17 cents by
taking one aspect of DFAT's general budget—the International Relations Grants
Program of
$3.5 million. He noted that many of DFAT's general public diplomacy programs
have 'a cultural component, and trying to separate them out at that level is
just not productive'. He then explained:
From the British figures, according to the FCO’s own figures,
total public diplomacy spending in the United Kingdom is around £600 million a
year. That is the equivalent of $A1.4 billion or $24 per person, which is a
little bit higher than the figure that Asialink had, but fairly close.
The FCO figures are derived by adding up what they expend on the
general FCO programs, what the British Council expends, what they expend on
websites and what the BBC World Service expends. Out of that total you get
around £600 million, according to their figures. By contrast, if you were to
add up our comparable programs, Australia spends about $455 million per year. That
includes our scholarships program, which is now very large. That gives us a
figure of about $22.50 per capita, which is actually pretty close to the
British figure; it is a little lower but not significantly so.[49]
14.49
As noted previously, Ms Carroll conceded that it is very difficult to
make international comparisons on public diplomacy spending 'because people
define these things differently'. She added, however: 'I can give you a thousand
figures, and it all shows the main point which is that...Australia spends so
little'.[50]
14.50
Mr Chris Freeman believed that there was considerable scope for
increasing Australia's cultural activities. He suggested, as one alternative, 'to
simply boost the Australia Council', which, in his view, is already an expert
body. He said, 'give them the money but give them instruction to actually get
out there and promote Australian culture in a more effective way than perhaps
they have been doing already'.[51]
Additional funding
14.51
In the May 2007 Budget, the Australian Government provided $20.4 million
over four years to enhance Australia’s cultural diplomacy and improve market
access for Australia's cultural exports. This budget allocation, for a program
'Australia on the World Stage' will be implemented through the AICC. Its budget
over the next four years will increase from $1 million this financial year to
$3.6 million next year, then rise to $5 million, to $7.8 million and in the
fourth year to $7.9 million.[52]
14.52
The minister announced that this injection of funds represents 'a
six-fold increase in the AICC’s budget and will take Australia’s cultural
diplomacy and cultural export promotion to a new level'. He regarded the
additional allocation as a 'very substantial increase in funding for
international multi-cultural promotion' which is going to be 'an important
enhancement to our diplomacy'.[53]
14.53
This budget allocation is intended to 'help create a better
understanding of Australia in our region and further abroad'. The initiative
includes increased funding for: major programmes in key countries including
China, Indonesia and the United States; an expanded promotion of Australia’s
world-class film industry, using the reach of Australia's network of diplomatic
missions; a new programme of grants to enable artists and performers to tour
internationally; visits to Australia by international cultural decision-makers;
and marketing material, website development and the promotion of Australian
culture through international television broadcasting.
Committee view
14.54
The committee acknowledges the valuable contribution made to Australia's
public diplomacy by the many various government agencies and government
supported or sponsored organisations as well as NGOs. The committee welcomes
the increased funding allocated to cultural diplomacy, especially the
initiative 'Australia on the World Stage' announced in the 2007–08 Budget.
Undoubtedly it will allow Australia's cultural institutions to make an even
larger contribution to Australia's image abroad. In light of the proven
capability of these institutions to contribute to Australia's public diplomacy
and their willingness and enthusiasm to do more, the committee believes that
the government should consider either a significant expansion of the program or
strengthen its commitment to supporting their public diplomacy activities more
widely.
Conclusion
14.55
Throughout this report, the committee has drawn attention to a range of
government activities that portray a positive image of Australia. Whether it is
in the area of development aid or humanitarian assistance, education, trade,
investment, tourism or art and culture, these activities reach beyond overseas
governments to wider audiences and help to enrich and strengthen Australia's
international reputation. Clearly, increased funding to those engaged in Australia's
public diplomacy would improve their capacity to do more to promote Australia's
interests abroad. The committee, however, believes that, at the present time,
the government's top priority should be determining the effectiveness of its
public diplomacy programs. With this in mind, the committee has recommended
that the government take steps to ensure that its public diplomacy programs are
evaluated.
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