Chapter Six - Dissenting Report
Senator Bob Brown,
Australian Greens
Senator
Natasha Stott Despoja,
Australian Democrats
Militants may target Australian citizens and interests extremists
see [tourist hotels] as havens of Western decadence a tourist hotel in Bali
would be an important symbolic target. (ONA
Report 27 September 2001)
Intelligence
6.1
The September 11 attack on the Twin
Towers in New
York in 2001 was a shocking event, warning the world
of the reach, intent and capability of extremist Islamic terrorism.
6.2
Australia's
intelligence agencies quickly gathered a considerable amount of information
about terrorism in South East Asia and Indonesia
itself.
6.3
Within 6 months of the realisation by ASIO in December
2001 that JI had converted to a terrorist organisation, the agencies knew:
-
that terrorists were transiting various parts of
Indonesia[318] through its very porous
borders;
-
that they almost certainly had links with
international terror networks including al-Qaeda, and links with Hambali, Imam
Samudra[319] and possibly Amrosi and
other terrorists who plotted the Bali bombings;
-
that there was an abundance of explosives and other
material readily available;[320]
-
that terrorist groups had the intention and
capability to conduct attacks against Western targets, including soft targets
and including Australian interests.[321]
6.4
Australia's
intelligence agencies had been in constant communication with their
counterparts in the US
and elsewhere, and DFAT officials had been monitoring the advice of allied
foreign affairs agencies.
6.5
In December 2001, Indonesia
was assessed by ASIO as being at high risk of terrorist attack. Thereafter, as
every month went by, more and more information emerged about the intensity of
that threat and the capacity of the terrorists to realise it. Osama bin Laden
and others issued unequivocal warnings to the West, even identifying Australia
as a 'crusader' country. The Indonesian government was reluctant to take the
necessary action to address it. It is not clear that the Australian Government
made any representations to Indonesia
to address the increasing threat within its borders.
6.6
In April 2002, the Committee has been told, Australian
and US
intelligence analysts carried out simulations which canvassed scenarios about
possible alQaeda action arising out of the dispersement of terrorists from Afghanistan.[322] The Australian agents were part of
group which built a scenario in which Bali became
identified as an attractive alQaeda target.
6.7
Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Australian
touristsroughly 20,000 per month - continued to flock to Bali, the vast
majority of them ignorant of the assessed level of threat, with very few of
them apparently having consulted the DFAT Travel Advices pertaining to
Indonesia, and probably not one of them aware of ASIO's view that the level of
threat across Indonesia, including Bali, was 'HIGH'.
6.8
In June 2002, ONA had become so concerned about the
terrorist threat in the region that it sought a facetoface briefing with the
Foreign Minister, Mr Downer.
The ONA officials laid out their understanding of JI in particular. In their
list of examples of targets that would be would be attractive to JI was Bali.
The minister was told that Islamic extremists had the intent and ability to
attack such targets as hotels, bars and airports. The DFAT official who was
taking notes at the meeting subsequently briefed other DFAT officers who in
turn sought advice from ONA about 'what evidence or theory is behind the idea
that terrorists might target western interests in Bali?'.
6.9
In July ASIO reported to QANTAS that the threat across
all Indonesia
was high, and that Jakarta and Bali
could not be considered exempt from attack.
6.10
Intelligence reports kept flowing to the government.
These included advice that:
-
'reports of planned terrorist violence in
Southeast Asia are coming more frequently';
-
'suicide attacks have not been part of
militants' modus operandi in Southeast Asia. But that may be changing'.[323]
-
'we have no collateral for but cannot dismiss
reports that Indonesian Islamic extremists intend to launch attacks in
Indonesia in August and in Southeast Asia in September'.
-
'protests in support of Islamic law, attacks on
Christians, raids on brothels and nightclubs, bomb attacks, or terrorist
attacks on US or other Western targets are all possible'.[324]
6.11 The increasingly frequent reports of planned
terrorist violence, and the threats to target Western embassies obtained from
the custodial interviews of alQaeda operative Umar
Faruq, triggered DIO to warn of increasing
evidence of capability and intent to mount terrorist attacks against Western
interests in Indonesia.
6.12 Similar advice was issued on 9 August by
ASIO, warning that Indonesian-based Islamic
extremists may be planning a series of coordinated actions across Indonesia in the August/September period.
The
nature of the action was not well defined but appeared likely to range from
demonstrations to terrorist attacks. ASIO assessed the threat of terrorist
attack against Australian interests in Indonesia remained HIGH and noted the following:
>
The reports suggested Western interests, principally US,
but also British and Australian, were among the intended targets.
-
The information was fragmentary, uncorroborated and of
unknown credibility. Some aspects possibly reflected circular reporting of
earlier discredited threats.
-
The number and nature of the reports, however, taken in
the context of the raised threat in Indonesia, collectively warranted updated
threat advice[325]
6.13 However, the Travel Advice to tourists
remained unchanged from 2001, at HIGH.
6.14 The debriefing of al-Qaeda operative Umar
Faruq had delivered valuable information
into the hands of the intelligence agencies. According to ONA's 13 September 2002 report,
Faruq's disclosures 'reinforced earlier reporting that al-Qaeda has access to
the extensive Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network criss-crossing Southeast
Asia.'
6.15 DIO reported on 26 September 2002, 16 days before the Bali
blasts, that:
We assess that local JI
capability will restrict any attack to small arms or improvised explosive
devices. Although this might obviate mass-casualties, if timing and location
come together a large number of casualties could result.[326]
6.16 In the post-September 11 2001 context, the regional
intelligence pictureif still seeming somewhat surrealwas well fleshed out. In
the case of Indonesia,
it was a frightening picture, and it was staring Australian government
decision-makers in the face.
6.17 Unlike most other Indonesian islands, Bali
did not have a Muslim majority but did have a great concentration of
nightclubs, bars and hotels seen as 'soft targets'. Bali
was a highly predictable target, attracting some 1.4 million tourists each
year. Kuta, with its nightclubs, bars and other congregating points, had a
population of perhaps 7,000 Westerners, principally Australians, on 12 October 2002. Three of every four
Australians visiting Indonesia
were in Bali. It was a prime target and the government
had been alerted.
Travel advice
6.18 During the first half of 2002, while
intelligence agencies were becoming increasingly agitated about the terrorist
threat in Indonesia,
DFAT's Indonesian Travel Advice was not commensurate with that agitation. It
was not until July 2002 that the Travel Advice began to pick up on the dangers.
6.19 Even so, the warnings in the Travel Advice,
to the extent that they did refer to terrorist activity, were hardly likely to
raise much concern in the mind of the wouldbe Bali tourist. While there was
references to bombs having exploded, including in areas frequented by tourists,
the headline in each Travel Advice concluded with the words: 'Tourism services
elsewhere in Indonesia are operating normally, including Bali'.
6.20 While "operating normally" in the
sense that there had been no disruptions to tourism services in Bali,
those services were nevertheless operating under a significant threat of
terrorism. For this reason, the reference in the travel advice to tourism
services operating normally was misleading. Not only did it fail to counter the
average tourist's false perception that Bali was especially
safe, but it fostered the misconception that Bali was
exempted from HIGH risk.
6.21 The public advice regarding tourism services
in Bali 'operating normally' did not accurately reflect
the intelligence available to the Government. Bali was a
predictable target. It was mentioned as a possible target to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs in June 2002 and it had been the location of a fictional attack
in a training scenario involving Australian intelligence officers.
6.22 Given the thousands of Australians in Bali
at any given time, coupled with the evidence concerning soft targets and the
fact that Bali had been mentioned as a predictable terrorist target, the travel
advice should not only have sought to counter the prevalent view that Bali was
a safe haven, but should have specifically warned that tourist areas including
Bali were highly threatened.
Findings
6.23 In terms of DFAT's Travel Advice, the main
Committee report has argued cogently that it failed to contain the one factual
piece of advice that was most relevant to tourists travelling to Bali
was that Bali was just as much at risk of terrorist attack as anywhere else in
Indonesia.
6.24 The DFAT Travel Advice failed to counter the
flawed assumption embedded in the mind of the average Australian touristthat Bali
was a safe haven. It failed to convey adequate warning to travellers to Bali.
6.25 Australia
had significant intelligence about the extent and imminence of the terrorist threat
to Australian interests in Southeast Asia more
generally. It was clear that groups in Indonesia
had the intent, capability and resources to mount terrorist attacks, and that
Australian interests were not exempt from this high risk.
6.26 This risk was evolving in a context that
included:
-
calls by al-Qaeda for an international jihad
against the West;
-
Indonesia's domestic political situation which
had become increasingly precarious and unstable;
-
the invasion of Afghanistan (involving Australia),
and events in Palestine, being regarded by many Muslims as an attack on Islam
-
a diaspora of fighters in SE Asia after the fall
of the Taliban;
-
simmering resentment in Indonesia about
Australia's actions in East Timor; and
-
a statement by Osama bin Laden specifically
condemning Australian 'crusader forces'.
6.27 The Australian government was receiving
regular and more insistent reports that conveyed a consistent upgrading of the
level of threat, not only in the regular written reports of the agencies, but in meetings and briefings at
high levels of officials up to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
6.28 When
ONA briefed Minister Downer about JI in June 2002, the Minister inappropriately
asked ONA officials for advice about whether consular advice should be changed.
ONA is not a policy agencyits task
is intelligence assessments. The Minister did not ask the DFAT official present to develop advice from the
relevant sections of DFAT (namely SE Asia Division, Consular Branch and the
Australian Embassy in Jakarta) and to report back to him.
6.29 It was a serious lapse. The minister, having
been briefed personally about an issue considered to be of sufficient
seriousness to warrant a facetoface discussion with the head of Australia's peak intelligence agency and key
officials, then failed to ask his Department to provide formal advice on the
matter. Especially is this so when it was the minister himself who, as a result
of the ONA briefing and the examples of Western targets they judged to be on
JI's hitlist, immediately thought of the implications for consular advice.
6.30 The government was not alerted
or, if it was, no commensurate public action ensued. Mr Downer could have taken the evidence of the danger of an attack to
cabinet. He could have used his
considerable influence to persuade the Indonesian authorities, who appeared
unwilling to recognise the terrorist danger, to act. The ministers inaction
contributed to Australias unpreparedness for the attack in Bali.
6.31 More recently Mr Downer said of the FBIs failure to pass on to Canberra, from the Jabara interrogation in August 2002,
the Bali bombing mastermind Hambalis intention to
attack soft targets in the region. I am sure it was nothing more than an
oversight, but it wouldnt have added to the sum total of the knowledge we had
.
6.32 The Minister's comment is
unsatisfactory and the Jabara episode warrants more scrutiny and analysis.
6.33 It is not possible for
this committee to judge whether the destructive intent of the Bali
bombers might have been interdicted.
6.34 The limitations on the
committee, and the gravity of the issues which have not been resolved, warrant
the recommendation of a judicial inquiry into the Bali
bombings.
Recommendation
A Royal Commission should be set up to fully assess the performance of
agencies and government in the lead up to the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002
and, more particularly, to help prevent any similar attack on Australians or
Australian interests in the future.
Senator Bob Brown Senator Natasha StottDespoja
Timeline to terror
Date
|
Event and source
|
1998
|
|
|
Osama bin Laden
states that there is no difference between military personnel and civilians.
ASIO, 1.54[327]
|
|
|
1999
|
|
April 19
|
Terrorists bomb Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta (?JI).
|
April
|
ONA co-ordinates
National Assessment dealing with Islamic terrorism and Osama bin Laden
(OBL). Conclusion: The main danger to Australian interests is
collateral damage from attacks on US or UK targets, including in the Asia Pacific.
ONA, 1.38
|
April
|
Possibility of OBL
links with Indonesian terror groups such as Laskar Jihad being explored. ASIO,
1.39
|
1999--2000
|
Thousands slaughtered in Moluku in Islam
extremist attacks on Christians and retaliation. JI involved.
|
|
|
2000
|
|
During 2000
|
ONA advises: the security apparatus that has held
militant Islam in check has been gradually dismantled and Islamic Jihad
groups, such as those now operating in Maluku, could become a permanent
threat to communal harmony elsewhere in Indonesia . ONA, 1.41
|
August
|
DIO reports that Al-Qaeda
has the potential to influence terrorist action elsewhere in the world
through its support and encouragement of proxy terrorist organizations. DIO,
1.42
|
AugustSeptember
|
Two embassies and the Indonesian Stock
Exchange bombed in Jakarta.
|
Late 2000
|
ONA Research
Report notes that in Indonesia militant groups are becoming more
assertive; they could increasingly turn to terrorism .. ONA, 1.43
|
December 24
|
Christmas Eve bombings of churches in four
Indonesian cities (by Hambali, Imam Samudra and others, but this is not then evident).
|
December 28
|
Pekanburu church bombed. Singapore police later blame JI.
|
|
|
2001
|
|
|
JI runs 'dozens' of training camps
throughout Indonesia.
|
Early 2001
|
ONA convened a meeting
to inform intelligence collectors of the higher priority it was giving to radical
Islam in Indonesia and its external links. Collection agencies made a concerted
effort to increase coverage of Islamic extremists.. ONA, 1.44
|
May
|
DIO indicated that
Indonesia provide(s) fertile ground for extremist
groups with diverse motivations and international connections.
|
July 22
|
Gereja HKBP bombed
in Jakarta (?JI). DIO, 1.46
|
August 1
|
Atrium Mall (Christian church) bombing in Jakarta by JI (Imam Samudra later found to be
responsible).
|
August 15
|
Jakarta Embassy Bulletin to Australian Citizens Living in
Indonesia: Bali is calm and tourist services are operating
normally. Australian tourists on Bali should observe the same prudence as
tourists in other parts of the country. DFAT, 2.38
|
August
|
DFAT Travel Advice: Tourist services are operating normally on
Bali and Lombok. 2.36
|
September
|
Research project
by ONA and its US counterparts reports that of more immediate concern is the
potential for growth of Islamic militancy and international Islamic
terrorism, especially given the difficulties Jakarta is likely to face in
restoring law and order .. ONA, 1.45
|
September
|
DIO reported 'extensively
on the growth of radical and extremist Islam in the region consistently and
well before September 2001. There was
clear agreement across the (intelligence) community about extremism and the
capacity for terrorist attacks within South-East Asia. DIO, 1.46
|
SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS DESTROY
NEW YORK'S TWIN TOWERS
September 23
|
Jakarta's Atrium Mall bombed again.
|
September 27
|
ONA report states:
-
' The threats by Muslim extremists of
violence against the citizens and assets of the US
and its close allies must be taken seriously;
-
Militants may target Australian citizens and
interests';
-
. A tourist hotel in Bali
would be an important symbolic target.
(It also observed
that there was: no sign that Laskar
Jihad plans to target hotels on Lombok or
Bali though extremists see them as havens of
Western decadence). ONA, 1.49
|
September 28
|
ASIO raised the threat
level for Australian interests in Indonesia to HIGH, based on :
-
'reporting
indicating that a number of Islamic groups in Indonesia were taking a unified approach against
USled actions directed at al-Qaeda.
-
'these
groups regarded Australia as a soft target alternative to the US . ASIO, 1.52
|
20012002
|
Between the New York bombings and Bali bombings, ONA hosts 13 meetings of the
National Intelligence Collection Requirements Committee to provide guidance
on terrorism collection priorities. ONA, 1.50
ASIO made
'dramatic resource reallocations': We
devoted our resources overwhelmingly to counter-terrorism. ASIO, 1.51
|
17 OCTOBER AUSTRALIA SENDS TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN
October 17
|
ASIO considers the Afghanistan
deployment to have raised Australias
profile as a terrorist target but that the announcement itself did not change
the threat of terrorist attack in Australia
or against Australian interests abroad. ASIO, 1.53
|
November 3
|
Osama bin Laden (OBL)
broadcast names Australia and crusader Australian forces. 1.54
|
November 9
|
Church bombed in north Jakarta.
|
November 9
|
The OBL statement 'must
be seen within the context of (O)BL statements since 1996, which consistently
have laid down general markers for subsequent terrorist action'. ASIO, 1.54
Looked at against (Osama bin Laden)s
track record, ASIO considers this statement will have force, and
significance, for at least the next 18 months.
the statement will be seen as particular
encouragement for individuals or groups in Indonesia who are followers of (O)BL, and who may have
the capability to commit violent acts.
More importantly however, (O)BLs al-Qaeda network does have the
capability and means to carry out an act of terrorism in Indonesia.
The only question in respect of Australian interests there, is one of
intent. In this context, since at
least 1998, (O)BL has been explicit in stating there is no distinction
between military personnel and civilians; both Australian official
representation in Jakarta and other identifiable Australian interests
certainly would be seen as extensions of the Australian crusader forces.'
|
November 9
|
DFAT determined that the (travel) advisories did not need further
strengthening. DFAT, 3.56
|
Early November
|
Grenade thrown into the grounds of the Australian International School in Jakarta, clearly showing the increased threat to
Australians in Indonesia. 1.55
|
November
|
US agencies convinced of links between OBL
and south-east Asian radical Islamic groups:
eg al-Qaeda training camp in Sulawesi
revealed. 1.56
|
November 29
|
ONA report notes unsubstantiated claims
of international terrorist camps in Indonesia. ONA, 1.56
|
November 29
|
Laskar Jihad says it will establish a presence in Lombok
as a platform for ridding Bali and nearby island of
non-Muslim communities. ONA, 1.57
|
December 2
|
Riau church attack. Man paid
by Imam Samudra arrested and jailed.
|
December
|
Jemaah
Islamiyah conversion to a terrorist organisation
recognised after the Singapore
bombings plot and capture and interrogation of terrorists. ASIO, 1.58
|
December
|
Report on 146 organisations: Many younger Indonesian Muslims have been
attracted to the ideas of Osama bin Laden .. These external influences have
also inculcated a belief that it is legitimate for Indonesian Muslims to
engage in jihad anywhere within Indonesian borders'. ONA, 1.60
|
|
|
2002
|
|
|
Clive Williams: In 2002 there
was perhaps a failure to pick up on the growing anger among Indonesian Muslim
extremists about the US-led war on terror and the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza.' 1.62
|
January
|
Dr Gunaratna: Al-Qaeda operative Fathur Rohman al-Ghozis testimony revealed:
a huge network of trained al-Qaeda operatives and sympathisers at
work in South East
Asia, about which
more will doubtless be learned in the months and years ahead. 1.74
|
January 6
|
SE Asia offers 'a range of soft and
symbolic targets for anti-Western Islamic terrorists and the most
vulnerable and numerous of Western interests in the region are tourists and
expatriate business people. DIO, 1.61
|
January 16
|
ONA and ASIO: Joint report outlines 'planned terrorist attacks
against Western targets in Singapore' and the evolution of Jemaah Islamiyah into a terrorist organisation. 1.63
|
February 21
|
DIO report notes
-
there
must be individual associations between JI members and al Qaeda'.
-
We
cannot discount the possibility [of operational terrorist cells] as detection
of cells is likely to be difficult '
-
'Weapons
and explosives expertise is freely available in the region, and high-interest
individuals can be difficult to track .. 1.64, 1.65
|
April
|
ONA attends US-sponsored seminar where the
consensus is that terrorist activities are likely to be dispersed, with al-Qaeda
contributing to operations in various parts of the world.
One scenario canvassed the possibility of
terrorist attack on tourist facilities in Bali.
We actually used the scenario of al-Qaeda
elements linking up with terrorists in South-East Asia and attacking Bali .1.66, 1.67
|
Early 2002
|
Al-Qaeda has a presence in Indonesia which gives it the capability to conduct
terrorist acts in and from Indonesia. ONA, 1.68
|
Early 2002
|
We (ONA) 'were concerned that there was a
local capability in Indonesia that was not necessarily reliant on al-Qaeda
we were in fact dealing with a homegrown movement this was a pretty hard
message to sell at the time. ONA, 1.70
|
May
|
Globalising Terror seminar at University of Tasmania attended by experts on terrorism.
A. Muir:
The modern world provides terrorist groups with a plethora of
potential targets (including) a vast array of people and facilities
associated with the burgeoning tourism industry In terms of bombing targets
there is a well discernable trend for attacking the softer vulnerabilities of
liberal democratic states, primarily those of a social and economic nature.
Dr Rohan
Gunaratnas report The Bomb and Terror: trends
and possibilities notes the January 2002 al-Ghozi testimony and
describes JI spiritual leader Abu
Bakr Bashiyar
as most vocal, always exhorting the people to join the jihad and utterly
opposed to compromise'. 1.71, 1.72, 1.73, 1.74
|
June
|
Al-Qaeda's Omar al-Faruq spirited out of Indonesia for interrogation.
|
June
|
ONA wanted to draw to the Governments
attention by means other than written reports its conclusions on the
existence of a regional extremist network with connections to al-Qaeda. ONA,
1.75
|
June 18--19
|
Foreign Minister Downer briefed on 'the
domestic, regional and international radical Islamic movements and the
potential for terrorist activityfrom JI in particular'.
We were trying to make the impact on the
minister and explain the danger we knew that there was no shortage of
explosives available to them in Indonesia .
Much, but not all, of the briefing was
confined to Indonesia.
In South-East Asia we knew there was no shortage of
explosives and no shortage of weapons.
We made these points clear. We
said that basically they had the intention, they had the capability, and
getting access to the kinds of equipment they needed would be no problem.
The briefing alluded to possible targets including hotels,
nightclubs and the airport. ONA, 1.76. 1.77
|
Late June
|
Writes to ONA: 'What evidence/theory is behind the idea
that terrorists might target Western interests in Bali?'.
No reply. DFAT, 1.192
|
June 27
|
Al-Qaeda is actively supporting
extremists in particular fostering a relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah. ONA, 1.80
|
July
|
The general threat to Qantas (and) to
Australian interests in Indonesia (is) currently assessed as HIGH.
Australias profile as a potential target of terrorist
attack by Islamic extremists has been raised by our involvement in the War on
Terrorism.
Islamic extremists in the region have
shown a capability and intent to conduct terrorists attacks
Islamic extremists associated with both
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and/or al Qaida are known to have transited both
airports (Jakarta and Denpasar-Bali) in the past.
Hambali is still at large in Indonesia.
'Given the JI presence in Indonesia, neither Jakarta nor Bali could be considered exempt from attack.
ASIO, 1.80
|
July
|
Of this period, Mr Denis Richardson recalls we had
the threat level to Australian interests in Indonesia at high We could not separate out Bali from the rest of Indonesia. We
were very conscious of the terrorist threat posed by JI and we were very
conscious that it could pose a threat quite differently to Laskar Jihad.
ASIO, 1.83
|
July 26
|
reports of planned terrorist violence in Southeast Asia are coming more frequently suicide
attacks have not been part of militants modus operandi in Southeast Asia.
But that may be changing. ONA, 1.84
|
July 26
|
We cannot dismiss reports that
Indonesian Islamic extremists intend to launch attacks in Indonesia in August and Southeast Asia in September. (pre-Ramadan warning)
attacks on Christians, raids on brothels and nightclubs,
bomb attacks, or terrorist attacks on US or other Western targets are all
possible. (pre-Ramadan warning) ONA, 1.85, 1.86
|
July-- August
|
Warns of increasing evidence of capability and intent to mount
terrorist attacks against Western interests in Indonesia (al-Qaeda operative Umar Faruqs interrogation). DIO, 1.87
|
August 5
|
Warns
of increased threat of a terrorist attack against Western targets,
possibly in August remnants of the regional extremist organization, Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), continue to possess the capability and intent to undertake
future attacks .
JI poses 'a greater threat to foreigners in
Indonesia than do domestic extremist groups. DIO,
1.88
|
August 9
|
Warns:
Indonesian-based Islamic extremists may be planning a series of
coordinated actions across Indonesia in the August/September period.
The threat of terrorist attack against
Australian interests in Indonesia remains HIGH.
'Reports suggested Western interests, principally US, but
also British and Australian, were among the intended targets. The number and nature of the reports
collectively warranted updated threat advice.' ASIO, 1.89
|
August
|
FBI had interrogated Jabara in US: gained information that Jabara had met (Bali bombing mastermind) Hambali in January
2002: Hambali wanted to hit soft
targets like bars and nightclubs. FBI
fails to tell Canberra. FBI Report
Alexander Downer: I am sure it was nothing
more than an oversight. ABC radio,
12.07.04
|
August 22
|
Three associates of Imam Samudra (who supplied weapons) rob Banten
goldsmith's shop. After October 12, it
was alleged this robbery helped fund the Bali bombers.
|
September 13
|
Jakarta Stock Exchange bombed.
|
September 13
|
Interrogation of Umar (Omar) Faruq
reinforced earlier reporting that al-Qaeda has access to the extensive Jemaah Islamiyah network
|
September 23
|
Grenade explodes near US embassy, Jakarta. ONA,
|
September 23
|
Time Magazine cover story:
Omar al-Faruq's interrogation.
He planned to destroy US Jakarta Embassy with a large car bomb. Story says JI boasts a cadre of 20 suicide
bombers waiting and ready to carry out attacks.
|
September 26
|
We assess that local JI capability will
restrict any attack to small arms or improvised explosive devices. Although this might obviate mass
casualties, if timing and location come together a large number of casualties
could result. DIO, 1.93
|
September 26
|
Warning to 'all
Westerners to avoid large gatherings and locations known to cater primarily
to a Western clientele such as certain bars, restaurants and tourist areas'
(ASIO did not monitor such State Department advice). US Jakarta
Embassy
|
October 6--8
|
Statements by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri suggest 'another large scale attack or attacks by al-Qaeda are being
prepared'. 1.98
|
October 10
|
ONA reports that substantial numbers of
terrorists remain free in Southeast Asia, capable of and intent on further attacksincluding against US
targets in Indonesia.
Report states that weapons and explosives are still easily
available in Southeast Asia, and that many potential
attackers with the requisite skills remain active. Key JI leaders, who have even bigger plans,
are still free. ONA, 1.96. 1.97
|
October 10
|
ASIO Threat Assessment issued after bin
Laden and al-Zawahiri statements -- days earlier -- warning that attacks may
be imminent.
The assessment noted that: the attacks could be against US interests
abroad, including against US allies and, while there is no information
specifically related to Australian interests, Australias profile as a potential terrorist target
had increased since 11 September 2001. ASIO, 1.99
|
OCTOBER 12 BALI BOMBINGS 202 PEOPLE KILLED
November 5
|
|
Amrozi arrested
|
November 21
|
|
Imam Samudra arrested
|
December 3
|
|
Muklas arrested
|
|
|
|
2003
|
|
|
August
|
|
Hambali captured in Thailand
|
Abbreviations
ASIO Australian
Security and Intelligence Organisation
DFAT Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIO Defence
Intelligence Organisation
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
ONA Office
of National Assessment