Chapter 2

Interim Report on East Timor

Chapter 2


Portuguese colony

2.1 The declaration of the independence of East Timor by Xavier do Amaral on 28 November 1975 brought to an end the period of colonial rule by Portugal which had begun in 1701 with the appointment of the first Governor, Antonio Coelho Guerreiro. Portuguese association with Timor went back to 1512, when Portuguese adventurers arrived from Malacca, which had been conquered by Affonso de Albuqueque the year before, in search of the sandalwood for which the island had long been known. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Timor and the neighbouring islands of Flores and Solor were the scene of imperialist and missionary rivalry between the Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish and English, with the Dominican order of missionary friars acting as the principal agents of the Portuguese. By 1701, the Dutch had succeeded in driving their rivals out of the eastern parts of the archipelago, except for the Portuguese who had been forced to move their base to Oe Cusse. In 1769, Dutch pressure forced a further move to Dili, which then became the Portuguese capital, although Oe Cusse remained a Portuguese enclave.

Portuguese departure and civil war

2.2 Xavier do Amaral, first President of independent East Timor, was the president of FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente). FRETILIN had won more support than any other political grouping in the elections for village chiefs organized by the Portuguese administration in early 1975, the first democratic elections ever held in the territory. These elections were a consequence of the changes that had swept through Portugal and the Portuguese empire following the Lisbon coup of 25 April 1974 which caused the overthrow of the dictatorial regime which had ruled for the previous fifty years. Portugal was preparing to grant independence to all its overseas provinces, and in East Timor encouraged the formation of political parties.

2.3 FRETILIN's main rival was the UDT (Unio Democratica Timorense). In January 1975, the two formed a coalition for national independence. A third party, APODETI (Associaco Popular Democratica Timorense), pressed for integration with Indonesia. The leader of APODETI, Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, had long-standing connections with West Timor, and during the Japanese occupation of Timor during World War II had been one of the leaders of the colunas negras (Black Columns), forces recruited locally to assist the Japanese Imperial Army. The FRETILIN-UDT coalition broke down at the end of May 1975, and on 11 August UDT attempted to take over the administration of the province by force. This was resisted by FRETILIN, who had the support of most of the East Timorese troops in the Dili barracks. The last two weeks of August saw armed conflict between supporters of FRETILIN and UDT, while the Portuguese governor withdrew with the officers of his administration to the island of Atauro. By mid-September, FRETILIN was in control of the province, and had set up a provisional administration. Many of the defeated UDT leaders and their supporters took refuge in West Timor.

2.4 By this time those in Indonesia who were opposed to the creation of an independent East Timor were gaining ascendancy. Operasi Komodo, designed to bring about the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia by subversive means, was formulated by General Ali Moertopo, Deputy Chief of Bakin (the intelligence agency), and adopted at a Security Council meeting in October 1974. Opponents of FRETILIN from among the supporters of APODETI and UDT who had gone to West Timor co-operated with Indonesian special forces after September 1975 in operations designed to destabilize the FRETILIN regime. On 16 October, five journalists and cameramen who were working for Australian television were shot and killed during an Indonesian attack on the town of Balibo, near the border with West Timor. Indonesian attacks increased over the following weeks and on 20 November the important mountain base of Atabae came under sustained attack, leading to its capture two weeks later. The fall of Atabae precipitated the FRETILIN leadership's decision to declare the independence of East Timor on 28 November.

Indonesian invasion

2.5 Following the declaration of independence, representatives of UDT, APODETI and other minor parties issued a declaration on 30 November proclaiming the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. On 7 December 1975, Indonesia activated Operasi Seroja, a combined military, naval and airborne invasion of East Timor commencing with an assault on Dili by a force of 10,000. The capture of Dili was accompanied by massacres, wholesale looting, rapes and indiscriminate destruction, which set a pattern for the conduct of the Indonesian armed forces which was followed over the next twenty-three years. On 16 July 1976, the Indonesian Parliament passed a bill (signed into law the following day) incorporating East Timor into the unitary state of Indonesia as its 27th province. Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo was appointed first provincial governor.

Systematic oppression, as reported to the Committee by Amnesty International and other observers

2.6 The massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on 12 November 1991, and the killings and repression in the days following, provide the best known example of the regime of terror to which East Timor was subjected. The Committee was informed by Amnesty International Australia that at least 100 people were killed and up to 200 disappeared after having been taken away by the security forces. Neither the graves of the dead nor the fate of those who disappeared were ever clarified by the Indonesian government. [1]

2.7 In its submission to the Committee, Amnesty International Australia summarised the violations of human rights that occurred in East Timor between 1975 and 1997. The major areas of concern were restrictions on peaceful expression of political views, the widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of detainees, 'disappearances' of people taken into military custody, extra-judicial executions, unfair trials, and restrictions on human rights monitoring. Amnesty found that abuses were most severe at times of political tension or heightened military activity. Attacks on Indonesian forces frequently led to widespread arrests and ill-treatment of people suspected of some sympathy with the resistance. There were few reported cases of Indonesian police or soldiers being held accountable for abuses and the sentences given by military courts were quite inadequate when compared to sentences given by Indonesian civil courts. In most cases, only low ranking soldiers were held accountable. For much of the period, Indonesian forces viewed the collection of information about human rights abuses as a serious offence and even in the latter part of the period when this was no longer so, they certainly did not encourage human rights bodies. Torture victims were routinely warned not to make their experiences public. Indonesia was very reluctant to fully co-operate with UN human rights experts, such as the Rapporteur on Torture and the working groups on arbitrary detention and extra-judicial executions. [2]

2.8 The Committee was informed by Amnesty International Australia that Indonesian forces used civilian groups of pro-integration East Timorese to harass or detain suspected supporters of independence since at least 1990 (e.g. 'ninja' groups) and increasingly after 1995 with groups such as Gadapaksi and Halilintar. Informants were widely used. New para-military groups ('militias') were formed in late 1998. They were given much greater freedom of action and encouraged to intimidate pro-independence supporters. [3]

2.9 Amnesty International Australia also said that, while there were many political trials in the mid to late 1980's, Indonesian security forces had increasingly moved to detaining suspected resistance supporters for periods ranging from several days to several months. Torture was frequently used. The armed forces and para-military groups frequently arrested people in violation of Indonesian law, which restricts arrests to the police. A compliant judiciary never examined this violation or took seriously allegations of torture. Tensions created by joblessness among the Timorese and the relative prosperity of Indonesian migrants at times flowed over into incidents that were handled very harshly by the Indonesian authorities leading in turn to human rights abuses. [4]

2.10 Mr G.E. Lambert, a retired Justice of the Family Court of Australia, presented to the Committee as part of his submission, 'Operation Indictment: War Crimes committed by Indonesian military and security forces against the peoples of East Timor', dated March 1999. The purpose of this document was to identify and provide such established facts relating to 44 cases as could, in the opinion of Mr Lambert, cause a war crimes tribunal to validly find that they constituted war crimes perpetrated by personnel of Indonesian military and para-military forces against citizens of East Timor during the period between 3 September 1975 and March 1999.

2.11 The Committee received evidence that torture was used routinely as a means of control:

it became a routine, a way of life, over in East Timor for a while, and much of it probably was able to occur without necessarily the endorsement of all members of the Indonesian military, but the climate was so unstable and there was virtually complete impunity for actions. As a result, it was a very pervasive process. [5]

2.12 When asked if any of the forms of torture gave rise to an opinion that the Indonesian security and intelligence forces might have been trained to use torture systematically, Dr Kaplan, of the Victorian Foundation for the Survivors of Torture, commented:

If you study in detail the methods that were used…. you will see that certain sorts of methods were used…. I think it is from the consistency of certain methods that are used that one could argue that it is likely that people have been trained and that these are not haphazard methods. [6]

2.13 Indonesia is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Torture. In 1992, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Professor Koojimans, said that torture was endemic in East Timor in police and army interrogations. [7]

2.14 Bishop Hilton Deakin, Chair of the East Timor Human Rights Centre, told the Committee:

One of the greatest difficulties that the Indonesian strategists have had to face in East Timor is that for 24 years they have built up an extraordinary reservoir of terrible memories among the East Timorese people. It is unfortunate but whenever the word `Indonesia' is mentioned, the East Timorese people think of this. They think of 200,000 to 250,000 people who have either been put to death or have been starved to death over the 24 years. There are some very horrific stories…. Every family, I think, has been affected by this. [8]

2.15 Throughout the entire period following the invasion in 1975, East Timorese armed resistance to Indonesian forces was never entirely suppressed. More importantly, the great majority of the people never accepted the legitimacy of incorporation into Indonesia, and there was never a formal surrender by the resistance. The massacre of unarmed mourners at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on 12 November 1991 was captured on film and reported around the world. This created a most adverse international reaction to Indonesian rule in the territory, and marked a turning point in world opinion on the question. The United States suspended military assistance to Indonesia, and the international arm of the resistance supported by Portugal and the other Lusophone states became increasingly effective. The award of the Nobel Prize for Peace to Jos Ramos Horta and Bishop Ximenes Belo in 1994 increased the moral authority of the resistance.

Asian economic crisis and the demise of President Soeharto

2.16 The Asian financial crisis, which began in Thailand in mid-1997, was especially severe in Indonesia and, by May 1998, had caused President Soeharto to resign the presidency to his deputy, Dr B.J. Habibie.

President Habibie's decision to allow 'popular consultation'

2.17 President Habibie announced in June 1998 that Indonesia would be willing to grant 'genuine autonomy' to East Timor, and shortly afterwards thirty Timorese political prisoners were released. On 5 August 1998, preliminary agreement was reached between Indonesia and Portugal in New York on East Timor's proposed 'special autonomy' status in UN-sponsored tripartite talks involving Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. On 27 January 1999, the Indonesian Government announced that it would be prepared to consider granting independence to East Timor if its people rejected the planned offer of autonomy/special status within Indonesia. However, such a move would not take place until the People's Consultative Assembly convened after the June elections. The head of the armed forces and defence minister, General Wiranto, said on 28 January 1999 that the armed forces would respect a decision to allow East Timor to separate in a dignified manner if that was how matters progressed. [9]

Indonesia/Portugal/United Nations agreement of 5 May 1999

2.18 Continuation of the United Nations-sponsored tripartite talks led on 5 May 1999 to an agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations for an act of 'popular consultation' of the people of East Timor on a proposal for autonomy. Indonesia had resisted calls by Portugal for a referendum on self-determination, but by the 5 May agreement consented to a jejak pendapatan, translated into English as a 'popular consultation'. The question to be put to the voters was: 'Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?' or 'Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?' Eligible voters were to be 17 years or older, born in East Timor or with at least one parent born in East Timor, and persons married to persons in either of the first two categories. At Indonesia's insistence, Indonesia undertook to 'ensure a secure environment' for a free and fair vote. This agreement included the following provisions:

1. A secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor. Responsibility to ensure such an environment as well as for the general maintenance of law and order rests with the appropriate Indonesian security authorities. The absolute neutrality of the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) and the Indonesian Police is essential in this regard.

3. Prior to the start of the registration, the Secretary-General shall ascertain, based on the objective evaluation of the UN mission, that the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process.

4. The police will be solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The Secretary-General, after obtaining the necessary mandate, will make available a number of civilian police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites.

2.19 In an Unpublished Memorandum by the United Nations Secretary-General, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal `the main elements that will need to be in place in order to enable him to determine that the necessary security conditions exist for the start of the operational phase of the consultation process'. These included:

1. as an urgent first step, the bringing of armed civilian groups under strict control and discipline;

3. the prompt arrest and prosecution of those who incite or threaten to use violence against others. …

4. assumption by the Indonesian Police of sole responsibility for the maintenance of law and order;

5. redeployment of Indonesian military forces;

8. the immediate institution of a process of laying down of arms by all armed groups, to be completed well in advance of the holding of the ballot.

2.20 Under the Agreement, the United Nations would set up a mission to conduct the vote under Indonesian protection, with observers from Indonesia, Portugal and other nation states and international organisations. Two hundred registration and voting centres would be set up in East Timor and in other places around the world with significant East Timorese populations (Indonesia, Australia, Portugal, Mozambique and the United States). The voting day was to be 8 August 1999.


2.21 The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established to conduct the popular consultation under the protection of the Indonesian armed forces and police. UNAMET, headed by Mr Ian Martin, began operations in Dili on 3 June 1999. The mission eventually included 241 international staff members, 420 United Nations Volunteers, a police contingent, UNCIVPOL, of up to 280, a team of 45 military liaison officers, and about 4,000 local East Timorese staff.

2.22 In accordance with an agreement reached on 27 April 1999 between President Habibie and Prime Minister John Howard, 51 Australian Federal Police were committed to UNCIVPOL in East Timor. The Committee wishes to place on record its appreciation of the outstanding service given by these officers under the most difficult of circumstances. There is no doubt that many lives were preserved by the presence and actions of the unarmed UNCIVPOL officers, especially in the days following the vote. The UNCIVPOL commitment to East Timor continues, and the Committee expects the Government to continue to provide appropriate support and resources to the contingent.

2.23 Fifty officers of the Australian Defence Force formed part of the 300-strong UNAMET contingent of Military Liaison Officers (MLOs), who had the task of liaising with the Indonesian military, police and armed factions. [10] They, like the UNCIVPOL officers, had a demanding and important role to undertake, and the Committee acknowledges their commitment and professionalism.

2.24 The East Timor Human Rights Centre told the Committee that, concurrent with progress toward ascertaining the will of the East Timorese people through the mechanism of the 'popular consultation,' the first half of 1999 had seen an alarming escalation in frequency and severity of human rights violations in East Timor compared with previous years. For example, the number of extra-judicial executions rose from a total of 51 during 1998 to 215 for the period from January to June 1999. Figures gathered by the Centre for enforced disappearance increased from 21 in 1998 to 68 for the first six months of 1999. Overall, the Centre said, there was a significant increase in the number of violations of the right to individual liberty, the right to integrity and security of the person, including torture and other inhumane treatment, rapes and property destruction. [11]

2.25 The Centre also told the Committee that there had also been an increase in the number of internally displaced people living in life-threatening conditions. The number of internally displaced people at the end of June was estimated by sources available to the Centre to be about 50,000 to 80,000, and most of them were beyond the reach of humanitarian assistance. During the week prior to the vote, in Suai in south-western East Timor, pro-integration supporters cut the water supply to more than 2,000 refugees who had sought refuge in the church grounds. The bupati, the local government official responsible for water supply to the area, refused repeated demands from UNAMET to reconnect the water supply, until finally the United States Government applied pressure on Jakarta. [12]

2.26 The Committee was informed by the Centre that the vast majority of the violations were at the hands of the pro-Indonesian militia groups which were backed by the Indonesian army, with widespread campaigns of terror and intimidation at Liquia, Viqueque, Ermera, Suai, Maliana, Manatuto, Bobonaro, Ainaro, and in Dili, which resulted in many deaths and wounded people. Indonesia failed in its obligations to carry out effectively its responsibility for law and order and the protection of all civilians in the lead-up to the referendum as specified in the 5 May accords. The Secretary-General was forced to postpone the vote twice, first to 22 August, and finally to 30 August. In spite of the delays, security, which was in the hands of the Indonesian TNI and police, did not improve.

2.27 The Centre also informed the Committee of alleged violations by Falintil. [13] The Committee deplores all violations of human rights in East Timor, and urges the need for reconciliation among all parties.

Popular consultation

2.28 Despite the ability of the pro-integrationist militia to act throughout the province to attempt to intimidate voters from registering and from voting for independence, 451,792 individuals did register. The vote proceeded on 30 August, with 98.6 per cent of registered voters voting. The Indonesian authorities were able to maintain peace and public order throughout the province on the day of the poll. The independent Electoral Commission ascertained that 78.5 per cent of voters rejected the option of autonomy within the Unitary Republic of Indonesia in favour of independence. [14]


2.29 The Committee was told by Mr Mark Plunkett, an accredited international observer with UNAMET during the period of the popular consultation, that in the days after the announcement of the result of the popular consultation, the Indonesian military put into operation plans to transport large numbers of East Timorese to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia. This was accompanied by an unrestrained rampage of killing, looting and burning throughout the territory by the militias, encouraged and assisted by the regular armed forces and police. An undetermined number of independence supporters, including their children, were murdered. [15]

2.30 USAID has reported that as of 16 September 1999, the Government of Indonesia's Task Force for Coordination and Implementation of Disaster Relief had registered 164,817 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps and shelters throughout West Timor and nearby islands. It drew attention to the fact that these were registered IDPs and the actual total may be much larger. It went on to say that latest figures on IDPs were not available but were estimated at 200,000 or more. [16] By 26 September, the East Nusatenggara refugee co-ordination centre in Kupang had registered 232,672 East Timorese in West Timor. [17]

2.31 The reasons for their forced transportation were not clear but several reasons have been canvassed publicly, including the depopulation of the western part of East Timor to facilitate partition; their use as hostages; giving the impression of a civil war; or just as an act of retribution for their vote for independence. Whatever the reasons were for this mass transportation, there is evidence that it was premeditated, having been planned before the popular consultations on 30 August 1999. [18]

2.32 The rest of the population, 600,000 according to Red Cross estimates, fled to the mountains, leaving the burnt out remains of Dili and other towns deserted. [19] The Bishop of Baucau, Basilio do Nascimento, was assaulted (his hand sustained a knife wound when he reportedly attempted to defend people sheltering in his house from the militia and Indonesian troops) and forced to flee to the mountains, and Bishop Ximenes Belo was driven out of his Dili residence and forced to flee first to Baucau and from there to Darwin. [20] For the first time in East Timor, Catholic and Protestant clergy, and nuns, were assaulted and murdered. [21]

2.33 A report dated 3 July 1999 signed by Mr H R Garnadi, assistant to the Minister for Internal Politics and Security, outlined plans for evacuation of all Indonesian officials and pro-Indonesian residents of East Timor and destruction of vital facilities, and predicted social chaos. It was disclosed to UNAMET and the media on 19 July. [22] UNAMET and the Australian Government were, however, taken by surprise by the extent and ferocity of the violence and destruction, which by 14 September had forced the head of the UNAMET mission, Mr Ian Martin and most of his staff to leave Dili for Darwin, leaving only a staff of twelve volunteers in Dili, located for their safety in the enclosed premises of the Australian consulate.

Moral responsibility of Indonesia

2.34 The transportation of an estimated 233,000 East Timorese to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia clearly implies that there was detailed planning, including for the requisition of aircraft, shipping and land transport, well in advance of the date of the vote. There was a pattern observable in the violence following the vote, indicative of detailed prior planning. One of the UNAMET-accredited observers, Mr James Dunn, stated: 'That attack was very carefully planned and orchestrated. It was clearly directed in three phases: one, to frighten the media out of East Timor; the second was to hole up UNAMET and keep them in; and the third then was to punish terribly the Timorese people.' [23] This premeditated action by the militias and the TNI was in breach of the undertaking given by the Indonesian Government in the agreement of 5 May to preserve peace and security in East Timor in the interim phase between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of its result, regardless of the outcome, and to guarantee the security of the personnel and premises of UNAMET.

2.35 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, made a report on 17 September 1999 following a visit to Darwin and Jakarta, in which she said there was 'overwhelming evidence that East Timor has seen a deliberate, vicious and systematic campaign of gross violations of human rights. I condemn those responsible in the strongest terms'. She urged the Indonesian Government to co-operate in setting up an international commission of inquiry on the alleged human rights violations. [24]


2.36 International concern with the deteriorating situation in East Timor led to calls for armed intervention authorised by the United Nations. President Habibie agreed to this on 12 September. On 15 September, the United Nations Security Council resolved to act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to authorise the establishment of a multi-national force to restore peace and security in East Timor and to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks. The multi-national force was authorised to deploy collectively in East Timor until replaced as soon as possible by a United Nations peacekeeping operation, which would be part of a United Nations transitional administration set up in fulfilment of the 5 May agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations Secretary General. [25] Interfet (International Force for East Timor) was set up with contingents from Australia, Britain, Canada, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States, under the command of Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove, and began deployment to East Timor from Darwin on 20 September 1999. Australia is committed to contributing 4,500 of the 7,500 total strength of the force, and a number of other countries have indicated that they will make formal commitments to Interfet or to the peacekeeping force that will succeed it. [26]


[1] Amnesty International Australia, submission no.46, p.3; Amnesty International, Power and Impunity: human rights under the New Order, London, 1994, pp.50-54, cited in G.E. Lambert, 'Operation Indictment: War Crimes committed by Indonesian military and security forces against the peoples of East Timor', March 1999, p.41..

[2] Amnesty International Australia, submission no.46, p.3.

[3] Amnesty International Australia, submission no.46, p.3.

[4] Amnesty International Australia, submission no.46, p.4.

[5] Mr Paris Aristotle, Director, Victorian Foundation for the Survivors of Torture, Committee Hansard, 27 August 1999, p.304.

[6] Dr Ida Kaplan, Direct Services Coordinator, Victorian Foundation for the Survivors of Torture, Committee Hansard, 27 August 1999, p.305.

[7] U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/SR.21.

[8] Committee Hansard, 27 August 1999, p.345.

[9] Oxford Analytical Daily Brief, 2 February 1999, cited in Frank Frost and Adam Cobb, The Future of East Timor: Major Current Issues, Department of the Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services Research Paper No.21 1998-99, p.4.

[10] The Hon. John Moore, MP, Minister for Defence, Media Release, 3 September 1999.

[11] Ana Noronha, Executive Director, East Timor Human Rights Centre, Committee Hansard, 27 August 1999, p.340-1.

[12] Mark Dodd, 'Military's thugs bring new threat', Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1999.

[13] East Timor Human Rights Centre, Escalating Violations in East Timor: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible? Annual Report of Human Rights Violations in East Timor 1998, Melbourne, 1999, pp.166-7.

[14] Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the Security Council, 3 September 1999.

[15] Mr Mark Plunkett, Committee Hansard, 15 September 1999, p.516-7.

[16] USAID Fact Sheet on the Relief Effort in East Timor, 20 September 1999, reprinted in USIA Washington File, 20 September 1999.

[17] Mark Riley, Mark Dodd and agencies, 'They're free to go home, Alatas vows', The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 September 1999.

[18] Mr Mark Plunkett, Committee Hansard, 15 September 1999, p.516.

[19] Toni Pfanner, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Jakarta, 19 September 1999.

[20] 'Timor bishop injured trying to protect refugees', [reporting Father Jos Carbonel, head of the Salesian order in Indonesia], Agence France Press, 8 September 1999.

[21] James Dunn, 'Again an exit amid tears and rage'; Hamish McDonald and Louise Williams, 'Years of living dangerously', The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September 1999; Ian Timberlake, 'Church accuses Indonesian army of killing nuns, priests', AFP, 28 September1999.

[22] John Martinkus, 'Indonesia expects Timor poll loss, plans evacuations', AAP, 19 July 1999; Geoff Spencer, 'Document predicts chaos in East Timor after vote', and 'Independence activists dismiss predictions of Timor chaos', Associated Press, 20 July 1999; 'Letter no indication of violence in East Timor: Downer', AAP, 21 July 1999; 'Indonesia says Etimor evacuation plan a forgery', Reuters, 21 July 1999.

[23] Four Corners, 20 September 1999. Committee Hansard, 24 September 1999.

[24] United Nations, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in East Timor, 17 September 1999; and Statement by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, 23 September 1999.

[25] United Nations Press Release SC/6727, 15 September 1999.

[26] Statements by the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, 21 September 1999.