Chapter 8 - Australia and Indonesia
Australia’s relations with Indonesia
8.1
Undoubtedly, Australia’s role in East Timor’s independence has had a deleterious effect on relations between Australia and Indonesia. This was acknowledged by DFAT at the hearing on 6 December 1999.[1]
8.2
On 16 September 1999, the Indonesian
Government abrogated the 1995 Australia-Indonesia Agreement to Maintain
Security. Political and Security Affairs Minister Feisal Tandjung cited Australia’s decision to review or cancel a
number of bilateral military activities as among the reasons for Indonesia’s decision, and said that the
attitude and actions of Australia were no longer consistent with the spirit and letter of the
Agreement.[2]
8.3
Many prominent Indonesians and the Indonesian
media, including the national broadcaster, Antara, blamed Australia for Indonesia’s loss of East Timor and for organising the Interfet operation in securing East Timor in preparation for UNTAET, the
United Nations interim administration. They also accused the Australian media
and some Australian critics for their broad-brush criticism of Indonesia and Indonesians for what
happened in East Timor, rather
than focussing on those responsible for the mayhem.
8.4
The Committee does not support any Australian
criticism levelled generally at Indonesians over East
Timor because it is convinced that most Indonesians
would have been horrified by the destruction and murder that occurred in the
territory, if they had been given accurate information about it.
8.5
Unfortunately, there was considerable distortion
of the truth in Indonesian criticisms of Australia, especially by some Indonesian media, which even accused the
Australian military of atrocities in East Timor that had been perpetrated by militias. Although the intensity of
the campaign to discredit Australia has subsided, the sniping at Australia has continued and Australia is still unfairly regarded as a scapegoat for the machinations of
the TNI, which were the main cause of Indonesian embarrassment over East Timor.
8.6
Having been one of the few countries to give de jure
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East
Timor, and having supported Indonesia over East Timor
since incorporation in 1976, Australia was regarded by Indonesia as a staunch supporter. It was, therefore, perhaps irksome, from an
Indonesian point of view, for Australia to be in the forefront of moves that led eventually to East Timor’s independence. It was also
embarrassing for Indonesia to have an Australian dominated Interfet force
secure East Timor, which an Indonesian force of three or four times the size
earlier could not, or so General Wiranto led everyone to believe.
8.7
Since December 1999, relations between Indonesia and Australia have remained strained. Prominent Indonesians still publicly
criticise Australia and a
proposed visit to Australia by President Wahid has
been postponed several times. In late October 2000, the biennial Ministerial
Forum between Australian and Indonesian Ministers was postponed by Indonesia at short notice.
Mending relations
8.8
DFAT Deputy Secretary, Mr Dauth, said there
was a sound working relationship with Indonesia at many levels but, at the political level, the strains were
evident and were not going to be resolved quickly.[3]
8.9
Since President Wahid was elected to office, he has
travelled widely overseas but not to Australia. Although the Australian Government has invited the President to
visit Australia, and the invitation has been accepted, the proposed visit has
been postponed several times by Indonesia.
8.10
In November 1999, Dr van Langenberg questioned
whether the Indonesian Government would be amenable to a high profile summit
meeting with Australia. He thought it would not fit into the current foreign
relations priorities of the current administration:
So there is, on the one hand, a kind of Asian agenda which has
been largely borrowed, I guess, from the Malaysian priorities of recent times;
it was an agenda that the Habibie regime too, to some extent, was also trying
to develop. On the other hand there is this Middle Eastern agenda and then there
is the agenda of rebuilding Indonesia’s influence. Australia is very marginal
in this scenario and I do not see that any kind of Australia-Indonesia summit
is going to receive much sympathetic response in Jakarta at the moment.[4]
8.11
The Committee was advised by Mr Bob Lowry in
September 1999 against rushing into mending relations with Indonesia until the
new government in Indonesia had acted to carry out the reforms necessary to
make a transition to a more democratic state.[5]
Although those basic reforms have been carried out and a new democratic
government elected, the fragility of the democratic system has complicated the
process of rebuilding the bilateral relationship.
8.12
Dr Kingsbury, too, suggested that Indonesia
would move slowly in redressing relations with Australia. He told the Committee
in November 1999 that:
I think there is a sense that this will be done and it should be
done but that it will be done slowly and it should be done slowly. It may not
get back to the level of chumminess perhaps that we saw under Keating. But,
then again, that was very superficial and it really did not accurately reflect
the nature of the underlying relationship.[6]
8.13
On 8 June 2000, at the funeral of Japan’s
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in Tokyo, Prime Minister John Howard and Indonesian
President Abdurrahman Wahid held their first face-to-face meeting. Addressing
the Nihon Keizai symposium on the future of Asia a few hours before his
meeting with Mr Howard, the President said: ‘We have to make peace with East
Timor and Australia, because the three countries will become the anchor of
stability in the area ... Because of (the need to maintain stability in the
area), we have the duty to be good to each other, to be friends’.[7]
8.14
Similar sentiments were expressed to the
Committee by Mr Dupont in September 1999:
we probably need to do what our ambassador in Jakarta is doing
at the moment, which is to say, ‘Look, at the end of the day we have to live
with each other. We have to do business. We need to see East Timor in the
context of our overall relationship.’ We must continue to have this
relationship because the alternative is conflict and hostility. This is not in
anyone’s interest. That is all very well for me to say, but the difficulty is
getting the message through to powerbrokers. This is the real problem.[8]
8.15
Another witness to comment along similar lines
was Mr Aspinall, a lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the University of New
South Wales. In November 1999, he said that:
There is no question it is going to be a very challenging time,
not only because of the [internal] regional challenges ... which Indonesia faces,
but also due to the complexity of Indonesia’s new political system, in
particular the spectrum of political forces represented in the government.
However, my underlying feeling remains that, once the initial transition in
East Timor is achieved, there is enough long-term ballast in the relationship,
but, even more so, there are underlying interests or motivations for the two
countries to restore relations to their previously good level. Matters of
geography, economic cooperation and so on will remain and will obviously
influence both governments, no matter what particular challenges arose in terms
of Indonesia’s particular political make-up.[9]
8.16
As close neighbours, the Committee believes, and
re-affirms, that it is in the long-term interests of both Australia and
Indonesia to develop a strong and enduring relationship. However, there is
little point in being precipitate in trying to form a new relationship until
there is a readiness on both sides to embrace one. Given Indonesia’s loss of
East Timor and the enormity of the political changes that have occurred since
the downfall of President Soeharto, it is not surprising that there are many
uncertainties in Indonesia at the moment. These domestic tensions have not been
conducive to rebuilding relations with Australia, particularly as many
well-placed Indonesians still harbour grievances against Australia over both
the loss of East Timor and the continuing international concern over the
militias and displaced East Timorese living in squalid refugee camps in West
Timor. However, in time, the mutuality of interests should bring about a
rapprochement in relations.
8.17
As DFAT pointed out, not all levels of the
relationship have suffered the significant downturn experienced at the
political level. DFAT should continue to shore up support at these working
levels as a basis for improving political relations in due course. DFAT should
also try to maintain trade and people-to-people contacts between the two
countries.
Building a constructive
relationship
8.18
Dr Maley pointed out that the bilateral
relationship had given the appearance of being one-sided in the past, noting
that Australian Prime Ministers had visited Indonesia on about 15 occasions in the
past 20 years, but an Indonesian President had not visited Australia since
1975. The East Timor crisis and the introduction of a new democratic system in
Indonesia have provided an opportunity to develop a more balanced relationship.[10]
8.19
A number of witnesses also expressed the view
that equality should be a fundamental plank in the new relationship and that
Australia should maintain the moral values on which its society was built.[11] Consistent principled policies
would also serve Australian interests better in the long term than short-term
pragmatic ones.
8.20
Mr Dauth told the Committee that DFAT was
confident that, over time, the relationship with Indonesia could be rebuilt. He
went on to say: ‘But the government’s view is very clearly that this will be
done on the basis of mutual effort and mutual benefit. In the future that
relationship will be stronger, in our view, for the fact that it will not
constantly be undermined by East Timor in the way in which it was for the
previous 25 years.[12]
Later, Mr Dauth emphasised it ‘will be a relationship between equals’.[13]
8.21
Mr Mark Plunkett urged that it was important
that Australia now more than ever listen to and form an unconditional,
constructive relationship with Indonesia. ‘It really is about trying to
determine what your enlightened self-interest is but, more importantly,
understanding what their enlightened self-interest is. And you are not going to
get what you want unless they get what they want. So you have got to engage in
role reversal and you have got to actively listen’.[14] Dr Kingsbury
emphasised the need for frank communication in the relationship and for each to
be confident in being able to express concerns, where necessary, about each
other’s policies. [15]
In other words, each side needs to listen and talk to each other, and try to
understand the other’s perspective and come to an understanding accordingly.
8.22
Although Australia and Indonesia have mutual
interests, each also has its own individual interests and values. The Committee
believes that Australia should promote our national interests and uphold our
democratic values in relations with Indonesia and other countries. Undoubtedly,
Indonesia will do the same. A frank and open relationship will help avoid
confusion, ambiguity and marked changes in approach, which will help to develop
consistency, reliability and trust.
8.23
Dr Kingsbury added that the occasional minor
diplomatic spat or tussle, which would occur from time to time, should not
necessarily mean that everything had to fall apart as a consequence: ‘It is a
question of keeping things in perspective and in context and just being a bit
gentle about how we view things, but nonetheless being fairly open and fairly
honest and fairly transparent in that process.’ [16]
Democratic Indonesia
8.24
Dr William Maley noted there were a lot of
young, open-minded, educated Indonesians who were appalled by what had happened
in East Timor, and whose aspiration for the future of their country was to see
it develop as a democratic and much more liberal state than it had been during
the Soeharto period. Those sorts of groups should be engaged by the Australian
Government, NGOs, and Parliament. The more links that could be built with the
liberal and democratic forces in Indonesia and in other countries of the
region, the better placed Australia would be to cope with troubles in the
future, because partnerships based on shared values were much more robust than
alliances based on a sense of transient interest.[17]
8.25
Mr Aspinall suggested that, in order to maintain
long-term healthy relations with Indonesia, Australia needed to differentiate
between the sometimes pressing short-term considerations of fostering good
relations at the governmental level and keeping one eye on the long-term
developments at the grassroots of Indonesian society and their possible
implications for future political change. He regarded this as being a failure
of Australian foreign policy in the past. Australian Governments previously had
had a fascination with the successes of the Soeharto government, despite
considerable evidence concerning its growing unpopularity from at least the
early 1990s.[18]
8.26
The Australian Government and Parliament need to
keep in touch with public opinion across the spectrum of Indonesian society. In
the Committee’s Interim Report of 30 September 1999, the Committee recommended
a visit to Indonesia by an Australian parliamentary delegation to discuss
issues of importance to both sides with Indonesian parliamentarians. Such a
visit has not yet taken place. The Committee reiterates its call for such a visit
and recommends that overtures be made to the Indonesian Parliament to seek
their agreement to it.
Further Australian involvement
in Indonesia
8.27
One of the speculative criticisms unfairly but
frequently levelled at Australia has been that intervention in East Timor
represented only the first of a number of intrusions into Indonesian domestic
politics. Some Indonesians and Indonesian media have accused Australia of
planning further interventions in domestic Indonesian politics to support the
breakaway of other parts of Indonesia—such as West Papua, Aceh and Ambon—where
there has been domestic conflict.
8.28
Australia has made it clear that it has no
intention of involving itself in other Indonesian trouble spots. The Australian
Prime Minister emphasised this point during a meeting with President Wahid
while in Tokyo for the funeral of the former Japanese Prime Minister. Critics
of Interfet and Australia’s role in it sometimes conveniently forget that
Interfet had a United Nations mandate and that Indonesia formally allowed its
intervention in East Timor. In addition, although Australia was the dominant
contributor to the force, it included contributions from many other states,
including some ASEAN states.
8.29
Dr Crouch pointed out relevant characteristics
of Australia’s and Indonesia’s military structures, which militated against
military operations of one against the other. Broadly speaking, Australia has a
powerful air force and navy while the army is small. The navy and the air force
are quite capable of meeting an hypothetical Indonesian invasion threat. If
Australia wanted to intervene in Indonesian affairs militarily, the navy and
air force are of limited use; Australia by itself does not have a great
capacity to put men on the ground.[19]
The Interfet and subsequent deployments of troops to East Timor stretched
Australia’s capacity almost to the limit.
Northern Territory and eastern
Indonesia
8.30
The Committee was told by the Northern Territory
Government that the Territory had focussed its relations with eastern Indonesia
rather than with Jakarta, although they operated an office in Jakarta with
local staff. Eastern Indonesia is part of the BIMP-EAGA region, which is the
less-developed areas of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.[20] The Territory is an observer
on one of its working groups. Strong relationships have been developed between
the Northern Territory and provincial administrations in eastern Indonesia, and
these relationships have survived ‘rocky periods in the past’.[21] The Territory was confident
that it would weather the current difficulties with Indonesia.
Australian defence co-operation
with Indonesia
8.31
The 1999-2000 Budget allocated $7.25 million to
defence co-operation with Indonesia. The Defence Department told the Committee,
with regard to training opportunities under the Australia-Indonesia defence
co-operation program:
Our training focus is shifting to complement the priority areas
identified in the Future Directions paper. More in-country training is being
conducted by MTTs that employ a train-the-trainer approach, thereby training
more personnel and reducing costs. ABRI is keen to take up all ADF training
offers and to explore new ways of achieving our objectives. There is
considerable potential to increase our cooperation in strategic planning
processes and human and financial resource management.[22]
8.32
Over the period 1994-95 to 1999-2000, the
numbers of Indonesian personnel participating in ADF training programs were:
1999-00 |
200 (approx.) |
na |
1998-99 |
197 |
137 in Australia; estimated 60 in Indonesia |
1997-98 |
201 |
111 in Australia; 90 in Indonesia |
1996-97 |
236 |
125 in Australia; 111 in Indonesia |
1995-96 |
290 |
129 in Australia; 161 in Indonesia |
1994-95 |
160 |
128 in Australia; 32 in Indonesia[23] |
8.33
Opposition to defence co-operation between
Australia and Indonesia, particularly military training, was expressed by a
number of witnesses.[24]
Mr Anthony O’Connor, Amnesty International, said:
when the first exchanges of Kopassus troops for joint training
with the SAS occurred, we had just released a report on the events in Aceh from
1989 to 1992 ... We do not believe that there should be a defence cooperation
program of the type that existed before. The minister said last year, when he
suspended the joint training with Kopassus, that he understood that a process
of reform or of improving professional standards and accountability was under
way and that he expected that the cooperation would resume when those internal
reforms were completed.[25]
8.34
Dr Damien Kingsbury, Executive Officer, Monash
Asia Institute, and Dr David Bourchier, a lecturer in Asian studies at the
University of Western Australia, also expressed concern that, in the past,
Australia had engaged in training with the Kopassus, described as having ‘been
at the cutting edge of human rights abuses’.[26]
Dr Kingsbury gave some weight to the benefits Australia obtained from
engagement with the Indonesian military but was doubtful as to whether, on
balance, the relationship was beneficial.[27]
Other witnesses were opposed to any kind of co-operation with the Indonesian
military.[28]
8.35
Dr Kingsbury was of the view that if training in
Australia was meant to impart certain responsibilities or notions of respect
for human rights and civilians, it had been an abject failure.[29] Dr Helen Hill said:
you cannot change the culture of an organisation by bringing
individuals out of their situation, giving them some training and then sending
them back. The change of culture needs to come partly from the top and partly
from the bottom and be worked on within the organisation.[30]
8.36
Dr Harold Crouch said that, when it came time
for Australia and Indonesia to restore military relations, the focus should be
firmly on defence, and not on contributing to internal security: ‘A force like
Kopassus is clearly an internal security force. We had no business to be
training them. That has backfired now, as we see’.[31]
8.37
Mr Michael Scrafton, head, East Timor Policy
Unit, Department of Defence told the Committee:
In terms of the Indonesian army and specifically the most
contentious element, Kopassus, the training has been very specific. The
intention of the training with Kopassus and the Indonesian army has been in two
major areas - primarily about basic military skills training. It is nothing to
do with insurgency training or managing internal security issues, but primarily
in the areas of basic training and infantry skills.[32]
8.38
Asked by the Committee what was meant by ‘basic
military skills and basic infantry skills’, Air Commodore Kerry Clarke,
replied:
The sorts of skills that we are talking about are basic cleanliness,
health, safety, organisation in the sense of discipline and responsibilities of
the individual soldiers in the command chain—that sort of basic building block
which makes the difference between the average person perhaps out in a hostile
environment and a professional soldier. Those are the sorts of skills we are
talking about.[33]
8.39
Earlier, on 8 June 1999, Mr Hugh White, Deputy
Secretary, Department of Defence, told the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Legislation Committee during an estimates hearing that:
More broadly, our SAS cooperation with Kopassus has been limited
to two types of activity. The first is counter-terrorism training and that is
training in particular in counter-hijack techniques. Successive governments
have put a high priority on that for the very direct reason that, as so many
Australians travel through Indonesia by air, the chances of Australian lives
being at risk in any aircraft hijack situation in Indonesia is quite high.
There, therefore, seemed a high strategic interest or a high national interest
in Indonesian forces being as competent as possible in performing those very
difficult and complex types of operations.
Secondly, there has been interaction between the SAS and
Kopassus in normal war roles. This training is not in anyway oriented towards
counterinsurgency or internal security operations. There has been no occasion
on which SAS forces have in anyway been involved in operations with Kopassus in
Indonesia under any circumstances.[34]
8.40
Some witnesses pressed the desirability of
making public the names of Indonesian officers who underwent training in
Australia, so that their subsequent performance could be checked.[35] The Committee accepts that it
has been consistent government policy over decades not reveal the names of participants
in international training programs.
8.41
Mr Mark Plunkett was of the opinion that
military co-operation between Australia and Indonesia ought to be maintained:
‘it is folly if you walk away when the relationship gets a bit rocky ... you have
to keep the relationship going at all costs’.[36]
He also referred to his experience as special prosecutor with the UNTAC in
Cambodia in 1992-93 where he observed the close and effective relationship
between the Australian military and the Indonesian military, and commented:
‘That is a good foundation for relationship building which we ought to maintain
... But part of our assistance and training ought to go across to things like
conflict management training to demonstrate that it is possible to get what you
want without having to use force’.[37]
8.42
Mr Robert Lowry
said that there was enormous expertise that Australia could make available to
the Indonesian military if they decided that it was in
their interest to become an effective apparatus of a democratic state: ‘they do
need to reform the armed forces from the very top to the very bottom. To do
that, they will need a lot of assistance, not only in terms of finance, which
basically has to come from the Indonesian government, but in terms of the
technology and the know-how to frame the policies that are needed and to help
with the training, the implementation of the legal reforms and so on’.[38]
8.43
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson thought there
was no foundation whatsoever for believing that the Australian Defence Force
had trained Indonesians in techniques and doctrines which had led to human
rights abuses in East Timor. He said:
I know that the Australian Defence Force has not engaged with
the Indonesian armed forces, ABRI, on internal security operations. They have
indeed engaged in counter-terrorist operations, which have been about an
international or a regional counter-terrorist regime. But the focus of that
activity has essentially been about developing an external regional security
perspective. So I think it is wrong to say the techniques that they have picked
up they have picked up as a consequence of their dealings with the Australian
Defence Force. On the contrary, their activity has displayed a marked lack of
professionalism.[39]
8.44
Air Commodore Kerry Clarke said that, without the
co-operation and baseline relationship that Australia had established over the
years with the TNI, the introduction of military observers and the evacuation
of Australian, United Nations and internally displaced personnel could not have
occurred during the crisis in East Timor in September 1999. The TNI had been
very co-operative in that activity and the personal relationships on the ground
in Dili were ‘pivotal’ to its success and to the success of the initial
footprint of Interfet on the ground. He said:
The relationship between the TNI commander at the time and
General Cosgrove was professional and effective, and we are justifiably proud
that the TNI cohabited with Interfet and, in fact, that they subsequently
withdrew after the MPR [Majelis Permusyawarakatan Rakyat] decision without any
confrontation between TNI and Interfet personnel. So, the basis of a
relationship that has formed over the years stood us in good stead at the time.[40]
8.45
Mr Michael Scrafton drew attention to the wider
benefits of the good relationship with the Indonesian armed forces that had
been built up as a result of the defence cooperation program, referring to the
precautions taken for the safety of Australian citizens in Jakarta when the
Soeharto regime fell in 1998 amid public disorder:
it was largely as a consequence of the good relationship we had
built up that the Indonesians did something very unusual in terms of
international relations through the TNI and gave us blanket clearance for our
aircraft and helicopters in preparation for a possible evacuation. So, in our
view, there have been very clear benefits to Australia’s objectives in the
region out of the relationship, not least of which were the ways in which we
managed to handle the relationship in East Timor when things got tough there.[41]
8.46
On 3 May 2000, Major General Peter Cosgrove
said, in Adelaide, that Australia’s defence ties with Indonesia had major
benefits during the East Timor crisis. He said the ties may have helped keep
the casualty count low on both sides:
I believe there was a pay-off there through an understanding,
hopefully some level of respect, which defused situations which could have been
much more critical. They predisposed protagonists from my level down to talk
through issues rather than to shoot through them. Maybe our astonishingly low
casualty count on both sides, so to speak, is to some degree testimony to that
factor.[42]
8.47
Speaking at the Brisbane Institute on 17 May,
General Cosgrove defended Australia’s former military ties with the Indonesian
armed forces. He said those who thought the Australian Defence Force’s ties
with Indonesia’s armed forces (TNI) had proved ‘useless’ were wrong. The
military relationship had delivered two benefits that had allowed soldiers to
talk through the issues rather than shoot through them in East Timor: ‘First,
TNI had a clear view of our competence and determination and, secondly, I’m
convinced that from time to time personal relationships and mutual respect had
pay-offs in minimising and resolving misunderstandings at the level of our
troops’ interaction’.[43]
8.48
On 10 September 1999, the Government announced a
review of the defence relationship with Indonesia because of events in East
Timor, as a result of which there was a significant scaling back across a wide
range of activity. The agreement for the framework of activities around which
the defence co-operation took place remained in existence, and there continued
to be a low level of activity in the relationship, but a number of important
elements ceased, including land force exercises and special forces contacts.[44] Although military skills
training has been suspended, staff college level exchanges and educational
activities were continuing.[45]
8.49
On 2 May 2000, Prime Minister John Howard said
that it was too early to talk about renewing Australia’s defence ties with
Indonesia.[46]
8.50
The Committee believes that Australia has the
capacity to assist the TNI become a professional force but until there is a
clear indication that the TNI is prepared to move in that direction, Australia
should not countenance renewing the defence co-operation program. The Committee
does not, however, include military educational exchanges, which have been
continuing, in this context.
8.51
The Committee believes that there are at least
two criteria, apart from the general state of the relationship between
Australia and Indonesia, which should be met before any additional defence
co-operation measures are undertaken.
8.52
The first criterion is a resolution of the
refugee problem in West Timor and the neutralisation of the East Timorese
militias, including prevention of their incursions into East Timor. While the
TNI abrogates its responsibilities in West Timor and fails to comply fully with
Indonesian Government orders relating to refugees and militias, it is not in
the interests of Australia, East Timor or other countries involved in the
rebuilding of East Timor after the ravages of the militias and TNI in September
1999, for Australia to provide defence co-operation to Indonesia. It would
almost be tantamount to condoning TNI actions during and after the destruction.
8.53
The second criterion is clear evidence that the
TNI is dismantling the territorial command structure throughout Indonesia and
that it is becoming a professional defence force rather than mainly an internal
security force. It has been the territorial command structure that has given
the TNI the power to meddle in domestic matters both nationally and right down
to village levels, and given rise to gross human rights abuses perpetrated in
East Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia. As Indonesia now has a democratic
system, albeit in a fragile state, it would be anathema for Australia to
support the TNI or any other element in Indonesia not working to strengthen
democracy.
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