Appendix 5

Appendix 5

PROPOSAL BY THE AUSTRALIAN NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE A REPLACEMENT NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR AT THE LUCAS HEIGHTS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTRE

ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDER PARAGRAPH 9.3.1 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES UNDER THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION (IMPACT OF PROPOSALS ACT) 1974

It is recommended that the above proposal be implemented in accordance with the following conditions.

ANSTO commitments and undertakings

1. The construction and operation of the proposed reactor at the Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre (LHSTC) must be in accordance with the undertakings and commitments provided by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (Replacement Nuclear Research Reactor, 1997/98, Volumes 1, 2 and 3), and as summarised in Chapter 18 of Volume 3. If there is conflict between the ANSTO undertakings and the recommendations below, the recommendations will take precedence.

Construction environmental management plan

2. ANSTO must prepare a construction environmental management plan (EMP), to the satisfaction of the Minister for the Environment and Heritage, prior to construction commencing. The EMP will address all commitments and undertakings made by the proponent for environmental management during construction, and as summarised in Chapter 18 (Volume 3) of the Final Environmental Impact Statement. The following associated recommendations must also be addressed:

Other construction issues

3. ANSTO must consult with the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority to determine if upgrading of the intersection between New Illawarra Road and the LHSTC entrance is needed, in particular extension of the southbound deceleration lane. Any works required will be completed prior to construction commencing and at ANSTO's expense.

Operational impacts (non-radiological)

4. Monitoring of water quality must continue into the operational phase until sufficient data has been collected to indicate that the site, and stormwater run-off, has stabilised.

5. A Stormwater Control Plan must be developed during the design stage to ensure that the site system is constructed to current best practice and in accordance with NSW EPA guidelines. The plan will also consider options for containment of one-off larger volume spills, such as fire fighting foams. The plan must be prepared to the satisfaction of the Department of the Environment and Heritage.

6. ANSTO must review the Lucas Heights Buffer Zone Plan of Management (1986), in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to ensure measures required for the protection of the environment during the construction and operation of the proposed replacement reactor are implemented, and to ensure that the biological and conservation values of the buffer zone are maintained. The revised plan must be prepared to the satisfaction of the Department of the Environment and Heritage.

Site emissions and monitoring

7. Radioactive gaseous emissions discharged via stacks from buildings associated with radiopharmaceutical production (primarily Buildings 23 and 54) must not increase above existing levels regardless of any future production increases. This requirement should be recognised by ARPANSA as part of its licensing of emissions from radiopharmaceutical facilities at the LHSTC. The objective of this approach is to ensure implementation of existing and emergent technologies to further contain or reduce such emissions.

8. ANSTO, in consultation with ARPANSA, should re-examine the issue of coordination and timing of processes which give rise to gaseous emissions from stacks with a view to minimising the impacts of radioactive gaseous discharges, to the extent practicable.

9. A review of the method of molybdenum-99 production process must be undertaken by ANSTO, in consultation with ARPANSA, to investigate means whereby the isotope can be produced and isolated with decreased releases of subsidiary radioactive waste products. This should be completed to the satisfaction of ARPANSA.

10. A high priority must be given to the review and licensing of radioactive waste discharges to sewer by ANSTO. As part of this, ANSTO should be required to undertake further assessment and analysis to ensure that all possible exposure pathways and future events at the Cronulla Sewage Treatment Plant are taken into account. Monitoring and assessment of individual discharges within the LHSTC is also desirable, to enable understanding of the various sources and their relative contributions. This assessment must be prepared to the satisfaction of ARPANSA and prior to reactor operations commencing.

11. As part of the groundwater monitoring program (see Recommendation 2 above), ANSTO must establish bores at appropriate locations in the LHSTC and the buffer zone to ensure coverage of contaminants from the site overall and aquifer flows downstream of the proposed reactor. The locations and monitoring regimes must be agreed with ARPANSA.

12. ANSTO must consult with ARPANSA with a view to establishing a radiological site characterisation, or 'footprint' for the reactor site and LHSTC/buffer zone in general. The objective of this characterisation is to provide a fundamental basis for ongoing radiological monitoring programs and the detection of radiological trends over time. The current radiological monitoring should be reviewed on the basis of the site characterisation. The characterisation and monitoring review must be completed prior to commissioning of the proposed reactor.

Hazards and risks

13. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), to be prepared at the detailed design stage, must be subject to independent peer review to the satisfaction of ARPANSA.

14. The assumptions used in deriving the Reference Accident effectively constitute design parameters for the proposed reactor and must be incorporated in the final design to the satisfaction of ARPANSA. In the event of changes, such that the Reference Accident examined may no longer be valid, agreement to any major design changes must be sought from the Minister for the Environment and Heritage prior to design finalisation.

15. The PSAR must demonstrate that the design of reactor components (eg reactor pool, beam tube penetrations) effectively excludes the failure of these components for earthquakes of lower frequency than the design basis earthquake, to rule out a fast loss of coolant accident as a credible incident. This will need to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of ARPANSA.

16. The consequences resulting from loss of off-site electricity for water supply and fire fighting purposes must be examined as part of the PSAR. If risks are significant, on-site power provisions for water pumps should be provided to the satisfaction of ARPANSA.

17. The safety implications of an inter-linked store for spent fuel elements must be assessed in detail in the PSAR, to the satisfaction of ARPANSA.

18. The final design of the reactor should include a fixed and possibly automatic fire suppression system within the containment building, to the satisfaction of ARPANSA. The PSAR should also examine the need for a drencher system for the cooling towers.

19. The risk of a common mode failure involving both HIFAR and the replacement reactor during the commissioning period, and resourcing requirements to ensure adequate infrastructure and staffing safety, must be addressed as part of the PSAR to the satisfaction of ARPANSA. The results of the PSAR analysis should also be reflected in emergency plans.

20. In the event of dual operation occurring for a longer period than six months, ANSTO must obtain separate approval and authorisation from ARPANSA. This authorisation should specify safety, infrastructure and occupational requirements to ensure that doses are minimised during any extended commissioning period.

21. The Safety Analysis Report for the reactor must include provision for ongoing monitoring and audit of the frequency and severity of external events to ensure that assessed risks to the replacement reactor remain valid and acceptable, taking into account new developments in the vicinity of the reactor over time.

Emergency management plan

22. Existing emergency plans and arrangements must be updated and subject to independent review at the detailed design stage and prior to the proposed reactor becoming operational. This must be completed to the satisfaction of ARPANSA. The independent review of the plans should include opportunities for input by relevant State emergency agencies and the general public.

23. The emergency management plan must also include a specific plan aimed at facilitating community understanding of credible hazards and risks from the reactor, mitigation measures, emergency arrangements and implications for the community. The plan should consider the best combination of media to achieve the above objectives. The plan must be prepared to the satisfaction of the Minister for the Environment and Heritage, in consultation with the Minister for Industry, Science and Resources and the Minister for Health, prior to the reactor being commissioned.

Community consultation

24. ANSTO must develop a specific program for ongoing community consultation and dissemination of information during the design, construction and commissioning phases of the reactor, to the satisfaction of the Minister for the Environment and Heritage.

25. A high priority must be given by ANSTO to finalising a 'Community Right to Know Charter' between ANSTO and the community. This charter, as a minimum, must establish principles for information exchange, the obligations of parties in providing and using information, timely mechanisms for dispute resolution, and a process for periodic review and update. The use of a recognised mediator to facilitate completion of the charter should be considered. If a charter has not been agreed within 12 months of the date of these recommendations, the outstanding issues of dispute should be referred to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage for resolution, in consultation with the Minister for Industry, Science and Resources and the Minister for Health.

Nuclear wastes

26. Reactor construction should not be authorised until arrangements for the management of spent fuel rods from the replacement reactor have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of ARPANSA and the Minister for the Environment and Heritage.

27. The Minister for Industry, Science and Resources and the Minister for Health should give timely consideration to strategies for the long term management and eventual permanent disposal of Australia's long-term intermediate-level nuclear wastes, and associated issues.

ANSTO environmental management system

28. ANSTO must continue, as a high priority, to review and upgrade its environmental management systems (EMS) to achieve ISO 14000 standards. The EMS should be certified by a suitably accredited independent body and be in place prior to the replacement reactor being commissioned.

Compliance with commitments and recommendations

29. ANSTO must report to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage on measures taken, or to be taken, to implement the above recommendations, including the undertakings and commitments referred to at Recommendation 1. This is to be done by way of an initial written report to the Minister prior to construction commencing and thereafter at six monthly intervals until all recommendations have been addressed to the satisfaction of the Minister for the Environment and Heritage. These reports must be made publicly available by ANSTO, following their acceptance by the Minister.