Chapter 6
Issues Identified by the 1993 Research Reactor Review
6.1 The Committee is required under the terms of reference to examine
whether the issues raised by the 1993 Research Reactor Review have been
satisfactorily addressed in the context of the decision to proceed with
a new reactor at Lucas Heights. Many of these issues have been discussed
in detail or in passing in the previous chapters of the report. In this
chapter the Committee re-examines those issues by way of conclusion to
the report.
The Research Reactor Review
6.2 Under the chairmanship of Professor Ken McKinnon, the Research Reactor
Review (RRR) was undertaken in 1993 in order to advise on whether Australia
required a new research reactor. The RRR took the form of a public inquiry,
attracting over 400 submissions and involving more than a dozen public
hearings across Australia. Its final report found that HIFAR operated
well within international safety standards. The RRR also concluded that
there was no imperative at the time to make an immediate decision on a
new reactor. The RRR advocated deferment of the final decision for approximately
five years, in order to allow for a number of interim concerns to be addressed.
If, at the end of that period, those concerns were met, the RRR advised
that it would be appropriate to proceed with a new nuclear reactor.
6.3 The specific conditions identified by the RRR as prerequisites for
proceeding with a new reactor were as follows:
- a high-level waste site had been firmly identified and work started
on proving its suitability;
- there was no evidence that spallation technology could economically
offer as much as or more than a new reactor;
- there had been no practical initiation of a cyclotron internationally
to produce technetium-99m;
- there was good evidence of strong and diverse applications of neutron
scattering capability in Australian science, including many young scientists,
and a range of industrial uses; and
- it remained in the national interest as a high priority. [1]
6.4 The Committee has considered each of these conditions in turn, evaluating
key developments that have occurred over the past five years in relation
to each category.
Establishment of a high-level waste disposal site
6.5 The RRR emphasised the need for a high level radioactive waste disposal
site as a means of managing the spent nuclear fuel produced by HIFAR and
any possible new reactor. The RRR considered spent fuel rods to be high
level waste. It judged international opinion to favour the conditioning
and direct disposal of spent fuel rods in preference to reprocessing.
6.6 Since 1993, according to ANSTO and other significant players in the
nuclear industry, reprocessing has become a viable commercial operation
undertaken by various countries including the United States. In line with
this development, in September 1997 the Howard Government announced a
budget of $88 million for the offshore reprocessing of spent fuel rods
currently held at Lucas Heights. It was envisaged that after 10 to 20
years the reprocessed wastes would be returned to Australia but as intermediate
level waste, rather than high level waste.
6.7 As noted by PPK in its draft replacement reactor EIS, this spent
fuel management strategy differs from that envisaged by the RRR in that
it avoids Australia having to establish a high level radioactive waste
repository. [2] ANSTO claimed that the high-level waste disposal
problem has been resolved with the proposed establishment of a National
Radioactive Waste Repository in South Australia. The proposed repository
is expected to be adequate for the storage of all intermediate and low
level wastes, including those returned to Australia after reprocessing
overseas.
6.8 Some inquiry participants, including the Australian Nuclear Association,
endorsed the proposed waste management strategy. Other groups alleged
that the definitions of waste levels had been manipulated in order to
satisfy the RRR's waste management conditions. The Sutherland Shire Council
argued that the Federal Government's waste management plans are inadequate,
and that Lucas Heights is at risk of becoming a de facto waste repository
for the foreseeable future and ultimately a site for fuel processing/reprocessing.
Instead of construction of an appropriate repository for highly radioactive
wastes deriving from spent fuel or residues from treatment overseas,
ANSTO and the Federal Government have chosen to manipulate definitions
of nuclear waste. Notwithstanding whether high level or intermediate
level nuclear waste is derived from the fuel in question, both require
disposal in a geological repository, according to international best
practice. Such a repository is not even under investigation. [3]
6.9 The Sutherland Shire Environment Centre expressed a similar concern,
arguing that regardless of how it is described, the waste arising from
reprocessing must be managed and disposed of in the same manner as that
of high-level waste. Indeed, the Environment Centre submitted that the
radioactive residue arising from reprocessing is classified by the United
States Department of Energy as high level waste. [4]
6.10 However, ANSTO defended Australia's classification of spent fuel
wastes on the grounds that the definitions used are based on International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criteria as published in the Safety Series
No. 111-G-1.1, 1994 Classification of Radioactive Waste. ANSTO
cited the IAEA guidelines as indicating that:
… the lower value of about 2kW/m3 is considered reasonable to
distinguish HLW from other radioactive waste classes, based on the level
of decay heat emitted. Below 2kW/m3 wastes are either ILW or LLW. [5]
6.11 The cemented waste to be returned to Australia from Dounreay after
reprocessing will have a heat rate of 0.006 kW/m3. ANSTO claimed that
the spent fuel wastes can therefore legitimately be classified as intermediate
level radioactive wastes. As such, the wastes can be appropriately stored
at the proposed National Waste Repository. Similarly, in respect of future
processing, ANSTO will make it a condition of contracts that the waste
to be returned to Australia must satisfy internationally recognised heat
loadings for intermediate level waste, not high level waste. [6]
Developments in spallation technology
6.12 In 1993 the RRR noted the potential of accelerator-based spallation
sources as a partial alternative to a new reactor, particularly if scientific
purposes were judged as the major rationale for a new reactor. [7] However, the RRR added that should Australia decide
to proceed with the spallation option, a small reactor of approximately
one megawatt power would still be required for the production of radioisotopes,
unless advances in cyclotron technology proved viable.
6.13 As discussed in chapter 5, the weight of inquiry evidence indicates
that regardless of developments in the field, a spallation neutron source
could not support the range of nuclear activities Australia requires.
While some spallation sources are capable of producing a limited range
of radioisotopes, this does not include mainstream radiopharmaceuticals
commonly used in nuclear medicine. Other posssible systems, such as the
Belgian ADONIS and Myrrha concepts, are only at a conceptual stage. In
any event, neither has the capacity to meet Australia's strategic interests.
6.14 Despite the claims of some witnesses that spallation sources offer
a competively viable option to nuclear reactors, the majority of witnesses
considered that the technology is not sufficiently mature to satisfy Australia's
requirements. [8] As noted by ANSTO, countries
with either operating or planned spallation sources also have ready access
to research reactors. The two types of neutron sources are considered
complementary, rather than alternatives to each other. [9]
Production of Technetium-99m by cyclotron
6.15 The RRR pointed to rapid advancements in technology for the production
of Technetium-99m by cyclotron. Nevertheless, given the stage of development
of the technology in 1993, the RRR concluded that it was premature to
attempt to settle the debate surrounding cyclotron radioisotope production.
In the early 1990s there were no cyclotrons producing Technetium and no
plans internationally to construct a large enough cyclotron for that purpose.
ANSTO, PPK in its draft EIS and the majority of inquiry participants argued
that cyclotron technology remains insufficiently developed today. It is
not used anywhere in the world on a commercial basis. [10]
Research reactors are considered the only proven facilities for bulk production
of Mo-99, the precursor for Technetium-99m.
6.16 In support of this position, ANSTO noted discussions occurring at
a 1997 meeting of IAEA Consultants on Mo-99/Tc-99m technologies, conducted
in Cape Town, South Africa. The consensus view of major Mo-99 producers
was that the use of cyclotrons was not a realistic option likely to alter
the practice of nuclear medicine in most situations. Funding to support
Dr Lagunas-Solar's research on the use of cyclotrons for the production
of Technetium-99 was said to be diminishing. [11]
ANSTO noted the following comments on the internet site of the University
of California, where Dr Lagunas-Solar is based:
The production of 66-h 99Mo and the manufacturing and distribution
of 99Mo 99mTc generators have become essential factors in the current
practice of nuclear medicine. The low cost and excellent record of availability
for most regions of the world, have practically eliminated the need
to develop alternative production methods for 99Mo and/or 99mTc. However,
the production of 99Mo is based solely upon reactor methods and no viable
alternative has been developed. [12]
6.17 However, a very different interpretation of Dr Lagunas-Solar's work
was presented to the Committee by Dr Jim Green, who claimed that ANSTO
has consistently misrepresented Dr Lagunas-Solar's research on cyclotrons
and their capacity to produce Technetium-99m. According to Dr Green, ANSTO
has selectively quoted from the University of California internet site,
andrecent results of Dr Lagunas-Solar's research have been promising.
Dr Lagunas-Solar himself wrote to the Prime Minister in September 1997
indicating that:
… [a] method has been developed and proved to be a viable alternative
to the reactor-based supply of Tc-99m. This new method is capable of
producing large quantities of Tc-99m, renders a pure product comparable
in radionuclidic purity, dosimetry and imaging resolution to the existing
reactor-based product, and can be established in cyclotron facilities
similar to the one operating in Sydney by ANSTO. [13]
6.18 Dr Lagunas-Solar made the additional point in his correspondence
to the Prime Minister that ANSTO had been using outdated and/or incomplete
information to review his work and had not sought Dr Lagunas-Solar's participation
in such reviews. Consequently, Dr Green argued that ANSTO had actively
misrepresented the potential of Dr Lagunas-Solar's work, and in doing
so perpetuated a mistaken belief amongst policy makers and ANSTO staff
that Dr Lagunas-Solar has abandoned his cyclotron technique. [14]
6.19 The controversy surrounding the status Dr Lagunas-Solar's research
points to the need for a thorough examination of the issue in the context
of a Public Inquiry. As the Committee concluded in Chapter 5, the option
of a mix of technologies, combined with the importation of medical isotopes,
as a viable long term solution merits fuller consideration.
Evidence of strong and diverse neutron scattering capability in Australian
science
6.20 Neutron scattering refers to the displacement of a beam of neutrons
by the atomic structure of a material. [15] The 1993 RRR noted the capacity of this technique
to perform non-destructive investigation at sub-micron levels of the structure
and properties of a wide range of physics, materials, crystals, polymers
and biological areas. [16] Despite the potential
of neutron scattering, the RRR indicated that investment in this field
could be justified only if Australia enjoyed a critical mass of scientists
and intensity of research effort in the area.
6.21 In its draft environmental impact assessment of the proposed new
reactor, PPK noted that there was good evidence of strong and diverse
applications of neutron scattering capability in Australian science, including
among many young scientists. ANSTO reinforced this observation, arguing
that the Australian neutron scattering community has a long and distinguished
tradition of producing high quality research.
6.22 According to ANSTO, HIFAR is widely used in postgraduate training
and research. Between 1993 and 1996 the number of university research
projects utilising HIFAR increased by approximately two thirds, and access
to the key neutron scattering instruments has been fully booked since
1993. Furthermore, there has been a trebling in the use of overseas neutron
scattering facilities by Australian research scientists.
6.23 ANSTO claimed, however, that HIFAR's research capacity is not able
to meet current scientific demand for instrument time. [17]
The present capacity of HIFAR also limits industrial applications of the
technology. Advanced reactor sources have been used by scientists in other
countries producing significant industrial benefits from neutron scattering.
Such developments have occurred across a broad range of fields including:
polymers/polymer processing, the petroleum industry, residual stress in
materials, semiconductors used in electronics, high temperature super-conductors,
alloys and pharmaceuticals. [18] According
to ANSTO, Australian industry is keen to make greater use of this research
potential, especially the wider opportunities offered by the proposed
new reactor.
6.24 In contrast, the Sutherland Shire Council called into question ANSTO's
research output since 1993. The Council claimed that since the time of
the RRR there has been an increase in ANSTO's research paper output but
a decrease in scientific citation. In light of this, the Council argued:
… the scientific and industrial output of ANSTO requires close
scrutiny, relative to the investment costs involved in a new reactor
(and waste management). [19]
6.25 To some extent, the Australian Academy of Science presented a similar
picture to that of the Sutherland Shire Council. The Academy noted that
the publication rates of material related to the work of HIFAR appear
to have peaked in the period 1975-80. [20]
At the same time, however, the Academy noted that since 1980 there has
been a discernible growth in Australia publications based on work based
on the use of overseas neutron facilities. In this sense, a decrease
in publications from HIFAR based research could actually be argued as
justification for a new reactor, in terms of providing Australian researchers
with sophisticated technology that would obviate the need to seek alternative
facilities abroad. According to the Academy, `big science' facilities
are essential for Australian scientific education and research, with benefits
extending far beyond the training which students receive in specialised
experimental techniques. [21]
Domestic nuclear capability and Australia's national interests
6.26 The RRR recognised the link between nuclear capability and national
security, in particular Australia's participation in nuclear safeguards
and non-proliferation activities [22] Accordingly,
in offering qualified support for the possible construction of a new reactor,
the RRR included continuing national interest imperatives as a precondition.
6.27 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) told the Committee
that national interest reasons for a new reactor not only remain a high
priority but, in some respects, have become a more important and pressing
consideration than in 1993. In particular, DFAT stated that the formulation
of national security and nuclear non-proliferation policy advice to the
government is specifically dependent upon a new reactor. ANSTO supported
this view:
Changed government policies on uranium mining, possible new safeguards
agreements, and the expanding use of nuclear technologies in Asia, all
point to an increased need for nuclear expertise in the national interest.
[23]
6.28 As noted in chapter 5, however, a number of inquiry participants
rejected the argument that nuclear capacity is necessary to protect Australia's
national interests. Witnesses including Dr Jim Green of the University
of Wollongong and the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre contended that
Australia could set an influential example internationally by choosing
to pursue alternative technologies over nuclear science.
6.29 The Committee notes that this issue needs to be addressed in the
context of Australia's strategic interests and global role – questions
that extend beyond the Committee's terms of reference. The strategic dimension
of the new reactor debate did not receive the attention it warrants in
the evidence to the Committee. The Committee believes that the question
of Australia's nuclear research capability and national interests should
be a central consideration in a full Public Inquiry into the new reactor.
Further review
6.30 The RRR concluded that it was not appropriate for a second stage
review to follow its report and that upon reporting the RRR should be
wound up. This occurred. However, the RRR also stated that if a new reactor
were envisaged at some later stage then it should be assessed by a new
panel possibly operating under the Environment Protection (Impact of
Proposals) Act 1974. [24]
6.31 This approach was supported by Dr Jim Green. Dr Green questioned
the entire EIS process, regarding it as a `multi-million dollar bureaucratic
whitewash'. [25] There was also a significant level of dissatisfaction
in the local community about their involvement in the EIS process. The
EIS process is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
6.32 Regarding the issue of holding another public inquiry into the new
reactor prosposal, Senator Forshaw questioned the Sutherland Shire Council
about their views:
Senator FORSHAW—Does the council have a view about whether or
not there should be a public inquiry?
Dr Smith—Council preferred to ask that the minister take all of
our written submissions into account in detail rather than have a public
inquiry. But we are making a submission to the new bill for the amended
EPIP that a provision for public inquiries on major developments does
take place in the future.
CHAIR—And given the fact that your points were not taken account
of. I think the mayor indicated that you provided a list of requests—
Dr Smith—Or conditions.
CHAIR—or conditions, and I think the mayor said that they did
not take up the offer or the option of those conditions.
Dr Smith—No.
Senator FORSHAW—There would be time available now, given the conditions
that the minister has put on it. You could well hold a public inquiry
in that period of time.
Dr Smith—I am not sure under the act whether, after the minister
has made a decision on the environmental acceptability, he could then
open up the investigation again to an inquiry—now that he has made
his recommendation to the action minister. I would have to check that.
[26]
6.33 It is interesting to note, however, that in the lead up to the Government's
announcement of a new reactor at Lucas Heights the Mayor of Sutherland
Shire, Councillor Schreiber, wrote to various members of Federal Parliament,
including Senator Forshaw, requesting “support for a public inquiry
process into any proposed expansion of the Lucas Heights establishment”.
[27] This position was in keeping with the
long held position of the Council opposing any further expansion of the
Lucas Heights Reactor.
6.34 Similarly, when the decision was announced on 3 September 1997,
the public reaction of the Mayor and the Council was one of outrage particularly
given that the announcement for a new reactor was made on the same day
as the proposed Holsworthy airport was rejected by the Government. In
the words of Mayor Schreiber, as reported in the Engadine District
News, on 9 September 1997,
In a media release issued on Wednesday, September 3, the Mayor of Sutherland
Shire, Councillor Schreiber, said “I went to bed last night with
the prospect of aircraft noise above my head and woke up with a nuclear
reactor instead”.
6.35 Yet, within a few days, and without any apparent reason, the Council
on the casting vote of the Mayor, reversed its position to one of support
for a new reactor at Lucas Heights provided it does not include a re-processing
facility and that the spent fuel-waste is no longer stored there after
5 years. [28] During the Committee's hearing
Mayor Schreiber emphasised that the Council's acceptance of a new reactor
was conditional:
We put in our submission the concerns that we have with the long-term
storage of waste at Lucas Heights and with that being turned into an
area that will have waste there for the duration. We have always wanted
an agreement made for the waste not to be there any longer than five
years, even with the new replacement reactor.
Lucas Heights being turned into a repository or into a reprocessing
plant concerns a number of people, mainly in the community. We put this
in our submission on the grounds that we could not support a replacement
reactor at Lucas Heights if these concerns were not addressed. I do
believe that in the report that came out in the EIS there is to be a
12-month period before the building of the replacement reactor goes
ahead and that there has to be a solution found to the problem of the
spent fuel at Lucase Heights. I ask this committee to pursue that and
made sure that is adhered to for the safety of the community. [29]
6.36 Yet when questioned as to what would happen if the reactor was built
but the waste issue still remained unresolved Mayor Schreiber could only
repeat that he and the Council were relying upon commitments given by
the Government
6.37 In response to a question as to whether or not the Sutherland Shire
Environment Centre would support a public inquiry and accept the outcome,
even if it approved the new reactor, Mr Priceman said:
If it were seen to be open and honest, we would accept it. [30]
6.38 The Government view about the need for a further inquiry process
was described by Dr Wellings of DISR as follows:
As I understand it, Minister Hill has made a series of recommendations
to Minister Minchin, and those recommendations are being considered.
A proper process on the EIS has been conducted. … I suspect that
[Minister Minchin] will, within a month, have a response out to those
recommendations from Minister Hill, but I do not think they include
a step to go and have yet another inquiry beyond the reviews that have
taken place. I think that Minister McGauran, the then Minister for Science,
clearly made a decision that was supported in cabinet to have a replacement
reactor and to locate it at Lucas Heights. The process has taken place
in terms of the EIS, and the broad thrust of Minister Hill's recommendations
is clearly that Lucas Heights is a suitable place to build a replacement
reactor. [31]
Conclusion on a Public Inquiry
6.39 The Committee believes that a full Public Inquiry, as provided for
in the EPIP Act (and which was the basis of the Research Reactor Review),
should have been conducted prior to any final decision to build a new
reactor. Such an Inquiry could have finalised the work undertaken by the
Research Reactor Review and would have given greater credibility to the
eventual outcome.
6.40 Whilst the Committee notes that the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) has approved the decision to construct the new reactor at Lucas
Heights, the Committee proposes that a Public Inquiry, similar to the
Research Reactor Review, be conducted into the Government's decision.
Senator M Forshaw
Senator P Cook
Senator B Gibbs
Footnotes
[1] K R McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report
of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August
1993, p.xv.
[2] PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement
Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume
1/Main Report, p.3-16.
[3] Submission No. 25, p.27.
[4] Submission No.7, p.18.
[5] Submission 29A, Section 13 Spent Research
Reactor Fuel, p.1.
[6] PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement
Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume
1/Main Report, p.10-19 and PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement
Nuclear Reactor – Supplement to Draft Environmental Impact Statement,
Volume 3/Supplement,p10-14.
[7] K R McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report
of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August
1993, p.49.
[8] See, for instance, Australian Academy of
Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission No. 29, p.6.
[9] Submission No.29, p.26.
[10] Submission No.29, p.26.
[11] Submission No.29A, Section 17, Alternative
Technologies, p.2 (of landscape pages).
[12] Submission No.29A, Section 17, Alternative
Technologies, pp.2-3 (of landscape pages).
[13] Correspondence from Dr Manual Lagunas-Solar,
Chief Chemistry & Agriculture Program, University of California, Davis
to the Hon. John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, 12 September 1997.
Included as an attachment to Submission 1A.
[14] Submission 1A, p.1.
[15] PPK Environment & Infrastructure,
Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement,
Volume 1/Main Report, p.6-14.
[16] K R McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report
of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August
1993, p.28.
[17] Submission No.29, p.26.
[18] Submission No. 29, p.26.
[19] Submission No. 25, p.28.
[20] Submission No.21, Appendix 1, p.17.
[21] Submission No.21, Appendix 1, p.17.
[22] K R McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report
of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August
1993, p. 104.
[23] Submission No.29, p.27.
[24] K R McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report
of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August
1993 p. 4.
[25] Evidence p. E314.
[26] Evidence p.E333.
[27] Letter of 4 July 1997 and Evidence at
p.E41, 15 April 1998.
[28] Evidence pp.E40-41.
[29] Evidence, p.E324.
[30] Evidence, p.E292.
[31] Evidence, p.E397.