Chapter 5
Alternatives to a New Reactor
5.1 While the majority of inquiry participants acknowledge the wide benefits
of neutron science, a number advocate alternative options for the generation
of neutrons over the proposed new reactor. Suggested alternatives roughly
fall into the categories of:
- different technologies for the generation of neutrons;
- reliance on other countries, both in terms of importation of radioisotopes
and the provision of so-called `suitcase science' opportunities for
Australian researchers; or
- refurbishment of HIFAR.
5.2 Individually, none of these alternatives could replicate the very
broad capacity of the proposed new reactor. However, as argued by a number
of nuclear opponents, a combination of the alternatives potentially could
satisfy most of Australia's nuclear needs. Accordingly, the Committee
has considered each of these options in turn, evaluating them in terms
of safety, cost, viability and effectiveness against the long-term commissioning,
operation and decommissioning of the proposed new reactor.
Alternative technologies – spallation sources and cyclotrons
Spallation sources
5.3 Currently there are two technologies capable of producing neutrons
– nuclear reactors and spallation sources. Reactors produce neutrons
through the process of nuclear fission, that is, the splitting of a heavy
nucleus into similar but generally unequal masses, with the emission of
neutrons, gamma rays and a great deal of energy. [1] In contrast, spallation sources produce neutrons
by directing a beam of high energy protons on to a heavy metal target,
often uranium. This process induces nuclear reactions which release an
intense neutron flux. Spallation sources essentially are nuclear physics
facilities which do not embrace wider nuclear technologies. [2]
5.4 According to ANSTO, the very high fluxes of neutrons that spallation
sources are capable of producing would be suitable for certain types of
research including basic physics, condensed matter studies and transmutation
of radioactive waste. However, cost and maintenance requirements weaken
the case of spallation sources as viable alternatives to research reactors.
ANSTO submits that the minimum cost for the basic accelerator component
of a spallation source is at least $300 million, and this is excluding
additional costs of ancillary research instrumentation and facilities.
The large spallation facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the
United States is budgeted at $1.99 billion. Yet the Committee was advised
by ANSTO that such facilities are designed as research tools only, and
do not provide any capacity for bulk radioisotope production or commercial
irradiations. ANSTO argues that:
A decision by Australia to acquire such a facility would be a decision
for a significant rebalancing of the national research effort, in terms
of both the quantum of resources committed to it and the direction of
research. [3]
5.5 The high costs and limited capacity afforded by spallation sources
is confirmed in PPK's draft EIS on the replacement reactor. Furthermore,
the EIS notes that spallation sources are not designed for continuous
operation, and thus there are no international examples of them being
used for routine production of medical and industrial radioisotopes. PPK
observes:
Commercial production of neutron-rich radioisotopes by an operational
spallation neutron source has neither been demonstrated nor proposed.
[4]
5.6 Nevertheless, a number of inquiry participants noted rapid developments
occurring within the field of spallation technology, in addition to the
waste and safety advantages of spallation sources over research reactors.
Dr Jim Green of the University of Wollongong argued that within the field
of scientific research, spallation sources already are competitive with
research reactors. Furthermore, there is potential for the development
of multipurpose spallation sources with various applications in science
and medicine, and commercial uses such as silicon doping. [5] In particular, the Belgian Myrrha/ADONIS research
program offers great potential to broaden the future capacities of spallation
sources. According to Dr Green, this program indicates that:
… a single spallation source could produce most or all of world
demand for Mo-99, the capital costs would be considerably less than
a reactor, and a spallation source could be used for research and industrial
applications as well as isotope production. [6]
5.7 However, currently the Myrrha/ADONIS innovations are at the conceptual
stage only, and unlikely to be proven viable for many years yet. [7]
Although advocates of spallation technology such as Dr Green are optimistic
that it could develop sufficiently rapidly to become a viable alternative
to a new reactor, once HIFAR is decommissioned in the next decade, few
others within the nuclear science community share this confidence. Rather,
the consensus is that despite showing great potential, spallation sources
have not yet reached the point of being a genuine alternative to research
reactors. [8]
5.8 In support of this conclusion, ANSTO notes that all countries with
either operating or planned spallation sources also have ready access
to research reactors. The two types of neutron sources are considered
complementary, rather than alternatives to each other. [9]
Cyclotrons
5.9 In addition to spallation sources, cyclotrons were cited by a number
of inquiry participants as a possible alternative to the proposed new
reactor, specifically for the production of medical radioisotopes. Cyclotrons
are a type of particle accelerator in which a strong electrical field
is used to accelerate subatomic particles (protons or deuterons) to very
high speeds while they are being constrained in a circular path by a strong
magnetic field. Subsequently, the particles are directed onto a target
of the material being irradiated. Irradiation of the specific targets
results in the formation of new isotopes which can be extracted by means
of chemical separation and used for specific purposes. [10]
5.10 In its draft EIS of the replacement reactor proposal, PPK advises
that most medical radioisotopes can be produced only in either a nuclear
reactor or by a cyclotron. [11] Currently two cyclotrons are operating in Australia
– the National Medical Cyclotron at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital
in Sydney and the Centre for Positron Emission Tomography at the Austin
and Repatriation Medical Centre in Melbourne. Both cyclotrons produce
a range of neutron deficient medical radioisotopes, which complement reactor
produced medical radioisotopes. However, given that cyclotrons are not
a source of neutrons, they cannot be considered a complete alternative
to a replacement nuclear reactor. For example, ANSTO advises that cyclotrons
could not be used for research and development based on neutron beams,
nor provide expertise in the nuclear fuel cycle considered necessary for
Australia's national strategic interests. [12]
5.11 Furthermore, although cyclotrons are used primarily for medical
isotope production, their capacity to produce Technetium-99, a key component
of nuclear medicine, is in the elementary stages only. Various inquiry
participants noted the research of Dr Lagunas-Solar of the University
of California in this regard. However, few expressed confidence that it
offers an imminent alternative to reactor produced radioisotopes. As noted
by the Australian and New Zealand Society of Nuclear Medicine:
There remain significant technical and logistical obstacles to be overcome
before this technology will be sufficiently mature to be considered
as a viable alternative to reactor production of Tc-99m for Australia's
medical needs. [13]
5.12 Conversely, other inquiry participants promoted cyclotron technology
as a genuine option to reactor produced isotopes, particularly if it is
considered as a package with other reactor alternatives, such as the use
of spallation sources and importation of radioisotopes. Dr Jim Green argued:
In the short term, already 20 to 25 per cent of Australia's medical
isotopes are produced in cyclotrons. The other 75 per cent are imported.
In the not too distant future, it should be possible to produce over
90 to 95 per cent of Australia's needs for medical isotopes using cyclotrons
or spallation sources. [14]
5.13 In support of his position, Dr Green argued that cyclotrons have
important advantages over reactors in respect of radioactive waste; capital
operating and decommissioning costs; and the production of PET radioisotopes
for functional diagnostic imaging. [15] Dr
Caldicott echoed Dr Green with respect to the waste benefits of cyclotrons
over reactors, and the fact that, internationally, there is a strong trend
away from research reactors. On this note Dr Green claimed that:
Around the world in the last 50 years, over 600 research reactors have
been built. Over half of those have been closed and we are down to something
like 270 and falling quite fast. In comparison, the number of cyclotrons
is increasing steadily. With the number of spallation sources, we are
up to half a dozen with another eight under construction. [16]
5.14 ANSTO and the Australian Nuclear Association present a different
account of international trends in the construction of nuclear facilities.
According to ANSTO, multipurpose research reactor infrastructure is not
declining. Rather, improvements in technology have allowed the effectiveness
of each neutron produced in a modern well-equipped research reactor to
increase up to 1000 fold in some applications. [17]
Furthermore, Dr Hardy, Secretary of the Australian Nuclear Association,
stressed that a number of countries, such as Germany and France, are investing
vast amounts in advanced research reactors; in one case as much as $A700
million. Dr Hardy highlighted these examples as evidence that other developed
countries with extensive experience in the nuclear industry have settled
on advanced reactors as the optimal technology for the 21st century. [18]
Alternative technologies and Australia's national strategic interest
5.15 In contrast to the proposed new reactor, neither spallation nor
cyclotron technologies would provide expertise in managing the nuclear
fuel cycle. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) rejected
these technologies as genuine alternatives to a replacement reactor because
they fail to serve Australia's national strategic interest. DFAT argued
that the limited nuclear activity associated with alternative technologies
would restrict domestic expertise, hampering Australia's ability to meet
its nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. [19] ANSTO reinforced this view, arguing the case
for technical expertise on nuclear matters in order for the Australian
Government to play an influential role in international affairs and maintain
intelligence assessment standards.
5.16 However, as noted earlier, a number of opponents of the new reactor
proposal question the argument that Australia must maintain domestic nuclear
capacity in order to remain influential in international nuclear fora.
On the contrary, through prolonging the use of nuclear technology, Australia
may be seen as adding to proliferation problems rather than seeking to
address them. Dr Jim Green expresses a common view of opponents to the
replacement reactor proposal:
I think the best thing Australia could do on the security front in
a highly fluid situation is to firstly close the reactor. That in itself
would have a powerful symbolic effect. Secondly, it should take the
lead in the development and export of non-reactor technology such as
cyclotrons and linear accelerators. [20]
Relying on foreign nuclear capacity
5.17 As an alternative to the continued operation of a nuclear reactor
in Australia, a number of inquiry participants advocated accessing nuclear
capacity from overseas, both in terms of importation of radioisotopes
and opportunities for Australian scientists to work in foreign nuclear
facilities. In this sense, many of the gaps in nuclear capacity associated
with the proposed alternative technologies just discussed possibly could
be overcome.
5.18 Several witnesses claim that the global isotope industry is now
sufficiently developed to provide a reliable, commercial source of radioisotopes.
In 1993 the Research Reactor Review (RRR) was not convinced of the viability
of importation, specifically in respect of Australia's high standards
in the delivery of nuclear medicine. [21] Since that time, however, the international market
has become more sophisticated, with a number of countries relying on importation
of radioisotopes to some extent. Dr Jim Green and Dr Helen Caldicott both
stress the extensive opportunities associated with importation, specifically
of molybdenum. In the words of Dr Caldicott:
…there is a reactor in Canada producing most of the molybdenum
in the world. In fact, the USA and Britain import their molybdenum.
They do not make it any more. So we are behind the eight ball. We do
not need to produce it, and the whole argument is invalid. [22]
5.19 Similarly, Mr Jim Fredsall, a professional nuclear engineer of extensive
experience, argues that the international distribution system for radioisotopes
is “established and efficient”. [23]
Both Mr Fredsall and Professor Barry Allen noted that ANSTO currently
relies on imported radioisotopes during HIFAR shutdown periods. Cost comparisons
between imported versus locally produced radioisotopes can be seen as
favouring importation, once the extent of Commonwealth government subsidisation
of reactor operations is taken into account.
5.20 Nevertheless, while the scope for importation may have improved
in recent years, many inquiry participants doubt the viability of this
option, both on the grounds of reliability and ethics. According to ANSTO,
transport times render Australian importation of molybdenum from international
suppliers in Europe and the United States a marginal activity. This is
because there is an inherent incompatibility between the half-life of
molybdenum-99 and transportation times over very long distances. [24] The Australian and New Zealand Association of
Physicians in Nuclear Medicine (Inc) share these concerns, and also raise
the potential problem of restrictions on the maximum amount of radioactivity
that can be imported legally and safely into Australia. [25]
5.21 To date, ANSTO's experience of importing molybdenum-99 and other
radioisotopes has been tainted by transport delays, resulting in major
disruptions to deliveries which prevent supplies arriving on a regular,
predictable basis. The South Australian Government expresses a common
response to this, predicting that ultimately importation would degrade
the capacity of nuclear medicine departments by delaying medical treatments
and limiting capacity for research.
5.22 However, according to some advocates of the importation of radioisotopes,
risk of transportation delays have been significantly overstated. Dr Jim
Green cites the case of the South African Atomic Energy Corporation which
exports radioisotopes to a number of countries, including Australia, with
delays affecting less than 0.5% of shipments. [26]
Moreover, while conceding that there are a small number of radioisotopes
with half lives too short to allow for importation, Dr Green argues that
such isotopes are used infrequently, and alternative medical procedures
are available to replace most or all of them.
5.23 Issues surrounding the importation of radioisotopes are not confined
to the reliability of supplies. The questionable ethics of relying on
other countries to maintain nuclear capability, rather than Australia
providing for itself, and in the process, managing its own risks, was
noted by the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre. Mr Michael Priceman
commented that:
If you are importing reactor-based radioisotopes here, you are pushing
the problem on to another country again. [27]
5.24 The Committee notes, however, that certain countries have chosen
to produce and export radioisotopes on a commercial basis. The ethical
argument against radioisotope importation therefore carries less weight
than concerns regarding the reliability of supplies.
5.25 In addition to the possibility of importing radioisotopes, foreign
nuclear capacity may also offer opportunities for Australian scientists
to work abroad and thus continue research work even in the absence of
an Australian reactor. However, as with the radioisotope importation option,
relying on overseas facilities for Australian research is likely to be
problematic, and certainly would limit opportunities. As noted by Dr Hardy
of the Australian Nuclear Association, `suitcase science' is a privilege
available to limited numbers of Australian scientists:
Not all our scientists are able to get on to (advanced) facilities
overseas. Even if you gave them the money, they would not necessarily
be able to get on to them there because those overseas want them for
their own scientists. [28]
5.26 Furthermore, the Australian Institute for Nuclear Science and Engineering
notes the high cost of undertaking research overseas, and argues that
it cannot be seen as a clear alternative to local nuclear research capacity.
In order to optimise research, the Institute argues that first class Australian
facilities are prerequisites to the use of external facilities, and indeed:
… advocates of complete reliance on external facilities in all
areas of what they choose to label `big science' seem to be oblivious
to the irresponsibility of their advice. [29]
5.27 In this sense, it is difficult to perceive overseas research opportunities
as a genuine alternative to the research work either currently conducted
at HIFAR or that will be possible if a new reactor is built.
Make do with HIFAR
5.28 As another alternative to a new reactor, the possibility of persevering
with HIFAR for a few more years while alternative technologies continue
to be refined was noted in evidence to the Committee. Given that various
alternative technologies appear to be approaching the point of viability,
making do with HIFAR in the short term could possibly offer sufficient
time for reactor alternatives to become a feasible option. However, the
Committee believes that this is a particularly optimistic scenario, dependent
upon unrealistical expectations of rapid development in alternative technologies
and the extension of HIFAR's life beyond most reasonable predictions.
5.29 In 1993 the RRR found that, pending safety problems forcing closure
and decommissioning, it would be “reasonable to assume the continued
availability of HIFAR, with operational costs at about current levels,
for the next decade.” [30] In order to
test this finding, the Commonwealth Department of Industry, Science and
Resources (DISR) commissioned a `remaining life study' of HIFAR by the
US consultants Failure Analysis Associates Inc California. The findings
of the study were released earlier this year with the general conclusion
that HIFAR was in good condition with no obvious evidence of major damage
or age related degradation. [31]
5.30 Nevertheless, the Committee notes the Nuclear Safety Bureau's view,
that beyond approximately 2003, HIFAR will require significant upgrading
in order to satisfy safety requirements. Indeed the NSB warns that:
… unless the reactor is to be shutdown around about 2003 or shortly
after it, we would expect to see some major upgrading and analysis of
the plant against modern safety standards. [32]
5.31 Therefore, as it is highly unlikely that alternative technologies
would be adequately developed to take over from HIFAR beyond 2003, an
expensive and time consuming refurbishment of the current reactor would
be necessary if it were not superseded by a new reactor. According to
the new reactor EIS, an indicative timetable and cost estimate for refurbishing
HIFAR suggests it would take six years to complete with a shut down period
of at least 15 months for final commissioning. ANSTO predicted that the
cost of this process is likely to exceed $150 million, and even then,
there is the risk that failure of a major component may require closure
of the reactor. [33]
Competing science and technology research priorities
5.32 The commitment of approximately $300 million to the construction
of a new reactor was criticised by a number of inquiry participants as
a misdirection of already scarce science and technology funding. Opponents
of the replacement reactor, on these grounds, include Professor Barry
Allen, Research Director of the Centre for Experimental Radiation Oncology,
St George Cancer Care Centre, who had previously worked at Lucas Heights
for 30 years. While acknowledging that the proposed replacement reactor
could serve a useful purpose, Professor Allen argued:
It is a question of research priorities - where this money comes from,
whether it is going to impoverish science and technology in Australia
for the next 20 or 30 years, and whether it is going to take us into
the 21st century, open up new technologies, new fields of research and
development and new commercial opportunities. I would have to say I
do not believe the latter is likely to happen. [34]
5.33 A similar view was presented by Dr Jim Green of the University of
Wollongong, who argued that the benefits of the proposed replacement reactor
would not compensate for a reduction in Australian medical research funding.
According to Dr Green:
… almost one in three medical research projects in Australia are
to be given the boot. There is no way that building a reactor is going
to save more lives than restoring those funding cuts. There is absolutely
no doubt about that at all, and it will cost approximately a tenth as
much. [35]
5.34 However, in considering these concerns, the Committee was mindful
of the Chief Scientist's opinion that science and technology initiatives
do not necessarily compete against each other for funding. In the words
of Professor John Stocker, Chief Scientist:
… the Government does not set aside an overall sum of money for
science and technology, such that expenditure on one project has to
be at the expense of expenditure on others. Rather, priority-setting
is a matter for individual departments and agencies, where expenditure
on science and technology has to compete with other demands. Within
this decentralised structure, proposals for major items of research
infrastructure are considered on their merits as they arise. [36]
Conclusion regarding alternatives to the replacement of HIFAR
5.35 Given the large amount of public expenditure involved (at least
$300 million plus recurrent costs for 40 years or more) the Committee
would have preferred to have had more evidence on the benefits of spending
such funds on other scientific and medical areas of research rather than
a new reactor.
5.36 Whilst this should also be further considered in a Public Inquiry
the evidence presented to us does not lead us to conclude that either
cyclotrons or spallation sources can provide a complete alternative to
a new reactor at this point of time.
5.37 However it may be that funding for a package of such measures, combined
with the importation of medical isotopes, is an alternative long term
option to the proposed investment in a single reactor.
5.38 The Committee supports the approach adopted in the Research Reactor
Review that these issues need to be thoroughly investigated by an independent
panel prior to any final decision.
Footnotes
[1] Submission No.29, p.16.
[2] PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement
Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume
1/ Main Report, p.6-4 & 6-7.
[3] Submission No.29, p.16.
[4] PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement
Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume
1/Main Report, p.6-5.
[5] Submission No.1, p.4.
[6] Submission No.1A, p.2.
[7] Innovations include the ADONIS and Myrrha
concepts being developed in Belgium. The ADONIS, or Accelerator Driven
Operated Nuclear Irradiation System is a proposal for a low energy spallation
source. The Myrrha concept is an extension of ADONIS, and is conceived
as a small scale accelerator driven spallation system, especially as a
modular and flexible research installation which is upgradeable to embody
future technologies.
[8] Among others, this is the position of the
Australian and New Zealand Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine;
the Australian Nuclear Association; and the Australian Institute for Nuclear
Science and Engineering.
[9] Submission No.29, p.26.
[10] Submission No.29, p.18.
[11] PPK Environment & Infrastructure,
Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement,
Volume 1/Main Report, p.6-9.
[12] Submission No.29, p.18.
[13] Submission No.8, p.8.
[14] Evidence, p.E114.
[15] Submission No.1, p.16.
[16] Evidence, p.E119.
[17] Submission No.29A, Section 17, Alternative
Technologies, p.3.
[18] Evidence, p.E140.
[19] Submission No.27, p.1.
[20] Evidence, p.E116.
[21] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report
of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August
1993, p.95.
[22] Evidence, p.E178.
[23] Submission No.6, p.3.
[24] Submission No.29B, p.3.
[25] Submission No.9, p.10.
[26] Submission No.1, p.15.
[27] Evidence, p.E57.
[28] Evidence, p.E135.
[29] Submission No. 23, p.2
[30] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report
of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August
1993, p.32.
[31] Failure Analysis Associates Inc., Remaining
Life Study of the High Flux Australian Reactor, Technical Report and
Non-Technical Report, February 1997. Prepared for the Commonwealth
Department of Industry, Science and Tourism.
[32] Evidence, p.E94.
[33] PPK Environment & Infrastructure,
Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement,
Volume 1/Main Report, p.6-27.
[34] Evidence, p.E98.
[35] Evidence, p.E115.
[36] Correspondence to the Committee from Professor
John Stocker, Chief Scientist, 11 May 1998.