Chapter 8

Ongoing engagement with Afghanistan and support for veterans

8.1
This chapter covers Australia’s ongoing engagement with Afghanistan: how this is occurring and areas of priority, including safe passage, counterterrorism and protecting human rights. It also investigates Australia’s aid program to Afghanistan: the situation on the ground, issues with delivering aid on the ground, protecting development gains and Australia’s current assistance. It also details the role and contribution of grassroots organisations in Afghanistan and diaspora networks as well as managing sanctions regime obligations in providing aid.
8.2
The chapter finishes with examining the support available for Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel and veterans who have been affected by the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.

Ongoing engagement with Afghanistan

8.3
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) spoke to the committee about how Australia is engaging with the Taliban, noting:
Every phase of engagement on Afghanistan has been closely coordinated with Australia’s partners and allies. Australia will remain in lockstep with our international partners to hold the Taliban to account for its commitments and actions, particularly on safe passage, human rights, and counterterrorism.1
8.4
DFAT advised that on 9 September 2021, Australia announced the appointment of a Special Representative on Afghanistan, Mr Daniel Sloper, to lead Australia’s international engagement in the region. Based at Australia’s interim mission in Doha, Qatar, the Special Representative ‘will work closely with partners to advocate for Australia’s key priorities’. DFAT stated that ‘[f]or the next period, Australia’s international engagement will focus on’:
safe passage for Australian citizens, visa-holders and Afghans at risk;
deterring any transnational terrorism resurgence and maintaining our counter terrorist financing efforts;
reinforcing regional stability, including through humanitarian support; and
influencing the Taliban towards respecting human rights, particularly for women and girls, and minorities, and humanitarian principles.2
8.5
At a hearing Mr Sloper elaborated on the guidance given to him, provided further detail on his role, that of his team and spoke about the approaches of other countries:
Australia’s Special Representative on Afghanistan receives guidance directly from DFAT following consultation with the Foreign Minister;
Australia’s Special Representative on Afghanistan leads a team called the interim mission on Afghanistan;
the team is not formally accredited to the Taliban regime but looks after Australia’s interest in the region;
there are approximately 15 other similar missions operating in Doha from other countries, most of which were previously embassies located in Kabul; and
there have been up to 50 positions around the globe working on Afghanistan issues in similar roles to Australia’s Special Representative on Afghanistan. However, the Special Representatives of most countries are not located in the region.3
8.6
Mr Sloper spoke to the committee about the expectations of the international community which are being conveyed to the Taliban:
Certainly, there's very clear understanding by the Taliban about the expectations of the broader international community and that extends well beyond what you or we might characterise as like-minded traditional partners. We've seen multiple formats meeting, most recently the Troika Plus,4 which brought some of the regional neighbours, China and others, together with the United States, that made very clear the same points we had. We expect the Taliban to meet their commitments on security and safety for those wishing to depart—so-called safe passage—that they maintain the commitments they gave in negotiations to the Doha [Agreement] on transnational terrorism resurgence and being a haven for potential terrorist activity, that they also respect human rights, and we push particularly on the access for women and girls to education and employment.5
8.7
Mr Sloper emphasised that the Taliban are being judged internationally by their actions rather than their statements:
As we've increased our interactions, it's very clear they're also aware of our expectations and have a polished response, so we've now moved to a discussion collectively where we've asked for demonstration of the actions, and they need to be verifiable and accountable before you'll see significant movement by any of the countries involved. For example, we don't have people on the ground, as everyone would be aware, but we are in regular contact now with UN agencies and those NGOs [Non-Governmental Organisations] that operate on the ground, both international and Afghan bodies…6
8.8
Mr Sloper discussed further how the actions of the Taliban are being evaluated by the international community and Australia’s role:
…I'm not going to say that this is easy or is a situation that'll be resolved quickly. The process by which the international community plans to hold them accountable is to look at what is of interest to the Taliban and what is of interest to us and to start having a discussion about how actions may be provided in response.
Australia will not be a lead partner in this but will be a partner in the broader coalition of interests. The Taliban, for example, is seeking recognition. It seeks a release of funds that have been frozen through the way it came to power. It's seeking a number of other things from the international community. They formed part of the discussions we are now having collectively about the need for the Taliban to demonstrate its role as the controlling power in Afghanistan and its obligations to the Afghan people before further movement will occur on those issues.7
8.9
As an example of how Australia is engaging with the Taliban in concert with the international community, on 5 December 2021, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs published a Joint Statement on Reports of Summary Killings and Enforced Disappearances in Afghanistan. This statement called on the Taliban to ‘effectively enforce the amnesty for former members of the Afghan security forces and former Government officials to ensure that it is upheld across the country and throughout their ranks’.8

The role of Pakistan

8.10
The committee discussed the importance of engagement with Pakistan as a country which has closer relations with Afghanistan. Mr Sloper added that Australia’s direct engagement with Pakistan is based on shared concerns:
We are engaging with Pakistan on all the same concerns that I outlined earlier. The primary reason for that is that they, as an immediate neighbour of Afghanistan, share those concerns. They participated in and hosted the Troika Plus discussions…in which the group of participants in that meeting articulated again their expectations to the Taliban.
Certainly there are economic, cultural and people links across those borders, and that has led to a close relationship to some elements of the Taliban. But we do need to make the distinction that, while they have those links, they are two very different entities. Pakistan's interests are in a stable, regular Afghanistan that has control over its border and is managing the displacement of people, the security threats and so on. I would characterise them as very similar to ours.
I visited Pakistan the week before last and had the opportunity to meet with senior foreign ministry officials and their special envoy. I can assure you that they have those interests and are actively working towards ensuring that we do have some stability in Afghanistan. I would say they are an important player, but, in the end, they—like us—will need to hold the Taliban itself accountable for its actions.9

Australia’s key priorities

8.11
As detailed above there are a number of areas of focus in relation to engagement with Afghanistan, including: ensuring safe passage for Australian citizens and visa holders and vulnerable Afghans wishing to leave; deterring the resurgence of terrorism; influencing the Taliban with respect to human rights for women and girls and minorities; and humanitarian and development support (aid is discussed further below).

Ensuring safe passage

8.12
Discussing efforts to ensure the Taliban allow safe passage for those wishing to leave, Mr Sloper advised:
In the broad, we have seen a commitment at the senior levels. In practice, that varies, and as you would have seen in media reports and elsewhere, we are aware of individuals who have been harassed. We know there are house searches on occasion. These have been raised directly with senior leadership of the Taliban. We're told these are random, not deliberate acts. We have some evidence to the contrary in certain provinces, but I would say on the whole the passport office has returned to issuing passports. Most of those we're dealing with are able to secure passports, some are concerned about approaching and going through that process. We have some anecdotal evidence of harassment, but to date we've been successful with those we are assisting and advising, and they on their own judgements have made the decision to apply and have secured passports.
At borders, from time to time, we certainly see Taliban guards inspecting documents and going through the process with probably more vigour than what we would want and with harassment, physically sometimes, of individuals, but, again, by and large we've been able to bring people out to date.10
8.13
Mr Simon Newnham, Acting Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, added that:
103 Australian citizens, permanent residents and their immediate family members, plus a number of particularly vulnerable visa holders, have joined…three Qatar government sponsored and facilitated flights…from Kabul to Doha and onwards to Australia. We'd really look for that pipeline to significantly expand, noting, as I said, some visa holders have certainly been included on the capacity that we've been able to secure.11
8.14
As noted in Chapter 6, since the conclusion of the air evacuation in August 2021, DFAT has supported the travel of over 1,700 further Australians, permanent residents, and visa holders out of Afghanistan and onward to Australia.12

Counterterrorism and law enforcement

8.15
In relation to concerns about terrorism and violent extremism resulting from the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, Mr Newnham, DFAT, advised of the possible implications for Australia:
I think it would be fair to say that the ascendancy of the Taliban may have serious counterterrorism implications for us. Terrorist networks may strengthen, there may be threats to the international and regional security posture and groups may strengthen their positions. Much depends, of course, on the response of the Taliban; the outcomes of its conflict with ISKP [Islamic State Khorasan Province] and other groups that operate in Afghanistan; and, indeed, the level of sanctuary for others and the level of regional control that is exercised by the Taliban. I would describe as a medium- and longer-term concern too the flow of people, terrorists and resources, including in the region…. we've of course worked for 20 years to degrade the capability of terrorist networks in this part of the world and, going forward, our focus is very much on deterrence, detection and counterterrorism efforts, particularly with partners. You will see that come through in statements made, for example, in the Quad and other leaders-level commentary. Our options include countering malicious cyberactivity, reducing the appeal of the rise of the Taliban and countering disinformation regarding that ...13
8.16
General Angus Campbell AO DSC, Chief of the Defence Force, emphasised that while the outcome is as yet unclear in Afghanistan, the effort of the international community is ‘seeking to encourage, to persuade, to see the Taliban meet their responsibilities now as an organisation that is in control of Afghanistan, not to see international terrorism re-emerge from Afghanistan’.14 Mr Sloper, DFAT, added:
As the general has said, obviously we want to deter as much as possible the possibility of Afghanistan being controlled by the Taliban or, possibly in the future, by others and being a haven for terrorist activity or for resources or people moving through that territory that pose a threat to Australia and others. There's a range of tools to counter the threat from extremists. Partly that's working with global, regional and other networks to track information and to get a better understanding of what is occurring. Part of it is engaging with the Taliban directly, collectively with others, to make sure—we want them to be held accountable for their actions, which has been talked about in earlier evidence.
We also have tools that you may be familiar with in terms of countering violent extremism narratives through social media. Finally, of course some agencies work to deter terrorism through operational means. But, as the general said, it is an open question with regard to Afghanistan at the moment. Nonetheless, it is a key priority for us and others to make sure those commitments are met. That extends well beyond what we would characterise perhaps as our like-mindeds—cooperation and effort to bring these messages to the partners shared by the immediate neighbours and others we're working with on this issue.15
8.17
Mr Sloper provided further detail on the areas of concern where work is underway with partners:
The security in Afghanistan is likely and the current humanitarian crisis is likely to drive further displacement and instability. That can lead to criminality, which could also lead to terrorism. Think of narcotics, for example, and human trafficking, risks associated with that as well. There is the safe haven question…and, as you've suggested, a victory narrative about what is perceived as the success of the Taliban in coming to power. On all of these issues there is work underway.16
8.18
Mr Sloper elaborated on the key tasks:
There are four primary tasks coming from the analysis at the moment: one is tracking and understanding the re-establishment of Afghanistan or its territory as a safe haven where the terrorist organisations are moving or planning to move; the degree to which the Taliban is accepting or not of that activity, what connections it itself may have with those organisations and meeting commitments to contain them; countering any attempt by groups…to propagate victory narratives, and that can be through social media and other means, and addressing that in reverse; and also understanding other resourcing around the world that may lead to financial support and other support for terrorist groups, and understanding, if you like, the architecture around that. We're working with like-mindeds, as we have before, to counter the narrative. We're trying to build cooperation with traditional partners and some others in terms of the monitoring and understanding, and this builds on work on terrorism that other agencies lead as well, domestically as well as internationally. It's not a new exercise, but it's got a sharper focus now because of the risks we are now seeing emerging from Afghanistan.17
8.19
The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) submitted that the international community ‘continues to assess security and other implications of the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan’, and added:
Prospects for Afghanistan’s immediate region and broader security implications are likely to be contingent on several factors, including: the Taliban’s domestic legitimacy and international recognition; its ability to govern and maintain control internally; its relationship with, and possible accommodation of, terrorist organisations in Afghanistan; and how, and the extent to which, neighbouring countries and the international community engage with a Taliban government. These factors are all linked.18
8.20
Home Affairs submitted that Australia’s counter-terrorism response to events in Afghanistan ‘will need careful and continuing assessment and calibration’. It stated that it will continue to work with international counterparts to support efforts towards three counter-terrorism goals:
1. Prevent the re-establishment of Afghanistan as a safe haven for transnational violent extremism
Efforts will be led by diplomacy and supported through intelligence efforts. Information exchange will be a key. The Department will work with Australia’s international partners and regional neighbours to understand the developing situation in Afghanistan, and advocate for and contribute towards efforts that address any emerging terrorist and violent extremist threats to Australia and its interests.
2. Counter the appeal and proliferation of violent extremism driven by the Taliban’s resurgence
A Jihadist ‘victory narrative’ may reinforce the appeal of Sunni religiously motivated violent extremism, increasing the risk of terrorist recruitment, support and attacks. Social cohesion and countering violent extremism efforts will be critical elements in managing an increased risk of domestic radicalisation. As such, the Department will continue to focus on the online environment, including working with industry to reduce the availability of violent extremist content online, and developing compelling strategic communications to minimise the resonance of the Taliban’s resurgence as a negative security influence within the Australian community.
3. Limit the travel of terrorist sympathisers and fighters from Australia and our region to Afghanistan to support terrorism and/or enhance their fighting capabilities.
While COVID-19 travel restrictions currently mitigate this threat, Australia has strong counter-terrorism laws designed to discourage Australians from fighting in overseas conflicts, supporting terrorist organisations, and endangering their lives and the lives of others; including passport cancellations where criteria are met, foreign incursions and recruitment offences, and offences relating to membership, support for, or association with terrorist organisations. The Department will continue to work strongly with Southeast Asian partners to address the risk of foreign fighter movements to and from Afghanistan.19

AFP engagement on issues relating to Afghanistan

8.21
As for ongoing engagement in relation to Afghanistan, Mr Ian McCartney, Deputy Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (AFP), explained that no AFP members were in Afghanistan and they are not in contact with the Taliban nor the Afghan police force at this time, however:
…the AFP's engagement on issues relating to Afghanistan is largely managed through our post in Islamabad [in Pakistan], which we've maintained since 1984. Through that post we work with agencies in Pakistan to support law enforcement efforts particularly focused on people smuggling, terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering. We're also providing support to the Office of the Special Investigator as it investigates potential criminal offences by members of the Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan.20
8.22
Mr McCartney also noted that the AFP is increasing its capacity to two officers in Islamabad, Pakistan ‘and we will use it as a base in terms of assessing, from an AFP perspective, the threat from Afghanistan’.21
8.23
The AFP advised that while the Taliban ‘is not currently a listed terrorist organisation, the Australian Government has implemented the United Nations Security Council Taliban Sanctions Regime into Australian law’. This regime ‘imposes restrictions in relation to the supply of arms, military services and providing or dealing with assets of designated persons or entities’.22
8.24
In terms of Australia’s terror threat, the AFP confirmed that they are watching the security situation with domestic security agencies and international partners. Mr Ian McCartney, AFP, detailed potential threats:
One is obviously what we've seen with ISKP in Afghanistan in terms of the threat that would be posed by ISKP both domestically in Afghanistan and potentially externally. The second threat is in terms of whether the events in Afghanistan have been an inspiration point for sympathisers in Australia or an inspiration point for terrorist sympathisers in South-East Asia, particularly in countries such as Indonesia. But we haven't seen that. Obviously we will continue to watch, but we haven't seen the increase of threat.23

Supporting the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan

8.25
Australia has supported human rights in Afghanistan including for women and girls. The committee investigated how the Taliban takeover is affecting the gains made over the last 20 years in relation to the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan.
8.26
Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad, a PhD candidate at Melbourne University, spoke to the committee about the situation for women and girls under the Taliban in the late nineties:
…the Taliban imposed strict regulations on women and girls, preventing them from going to schools and universities, having a profession and exercising their basic right to leave the house without a male guardian.24
8.27
The committee spoke with Her Excellency, Ms Hasina Safi, appearing in a private capacity, the Minister of Women’s Affairs in Afghanistan under the previous government, who took the committee through progress for women and girls over the last 20 years:
Basically, we started from awareness back in 2001. From awareness, we went to capacity building. From capacity building, we came to advocacy. From advocacy, we moved to participation. From participation, we moved to meaningful participation.25
8.28
Ms Safi spoke about the situation prior to the takeover by the Taliban in 2021:
…there was very dedicated and hard work and commitment of Afghan women prior to all the social and normal challenges which they had, but definitely we made it and we came here. Coming to meaningful participation, we had many quotas, such as the 27 per cent of women in the parliament. We had women in the cabinet. We had women as deputy ministers. Lately we had women as deputy governors. For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, Afghan women had the opportunity to get into local politics. Not only that but we have many teachers, professors, engineers and women in social media, and in business now.26
8.29
Ms Raz Mohammad provided some figures in relation to education for girls and opportunities for women:
Since the collapse of the Taliban, in 2001, Afghanistan and Afghan women have come a long way. Although the progress concerning women's rights has remained very slow in the past 20 years, there have been challenges…including the Taliban's targeted attacks on women activists and girls' education. Despite that, the enrolment of girls in schools increased from 0.08 per cent in 2001—almost nothing—to 40 per cent in 2020. Afghan women worked hard to exercise their rights. They joined government positions and security forces and attended university…27
8.30
Ms Safi advised that there had been work undertaken to assess priorities for women going forward:
There were six specific areas where we were planning to work: women's economic empowerment, participation in local and national governance, access to justice, and also programming by themselves in national priority programs, which was based on the coordination of international partners, gender equality and women's empowerment.28
8.31
As far as the current situation for women and girls, Ms Sitarah Mohammadi, Afghanistan-Australia Advocacy Network advised that:
As the Taliban are now in control of the country, women’s and girls’ rights are once again restricted, and they are confined to their homes. Women and girls are no longer able to resume their education or attend university and employment.29
8.32
Ms Mohammadi provided further detail:
…regarding women and girls, they have already been told to wear full-length burkas and coverings that pretty much cover their entire bodies. That sense of freedom or liberation that they gained over the last 20 years in terms of choosing what to wear and how to express themselves has completely gone. Education, employment—all of that has completely evaporated since 15 August and the return of the Taliban. The future looks grim for them.30
8.33
Ms Raz Mohammad confirmed this situation:
…since the August takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, the Taliban have reimposed their old rules, forcing women to stay indoors and banning girls from attending secondary and high schools. Although in some provinces, as Minister Safi mentioned, they have been allowing girls to attend secondary schools, since two days ago there has been regression from that, and they have rebanned them from attending secondary schools in Herat. This makes Afghanistan the only country in the world which bans girls from attending schools…31
8.34
Save the Children Australia also drew attention to the suspension on girls returning to secondary school, noting that it remains unclear if girls will be allowed to return. The possible effects of this were highlighted:
Restricting access to education will have a catastrophic impact across Afghanistan. It is not only a violation of child rights but will undermine any attempts to move the country beyond long-term dependence on aid. Prior to the Taliban taking control, Afghanistan’s education system was ranked amongst the top eight at most “extreme risk” globally, with 3.7 million children out of school, at least 60 per cent of whom are girls. Australia must ensure that respect for the rights of women and girls forms the cornerstone of any dialogue with the leadership of Afghanistan. As an important donor, Australia must also ensure that education funding is prioritised as part of humanitarian and development budgets.32
8.35
Mr Nawid Cina, the Acting General Manager, Mahboba’s Promise, an Australian aid organisation founded 25 years ago by Mahboba Rawi, which assists widows and orphans in Afghanistan, told the committee about the current situation with the schools they run:
Everything is closed. A lot of our schools are high schools for girls, so everything remains closed. It depends on the regions as well. For now, all of our projects, outside of emergency aid—that's the main thing we're focusing on—are on hold, and the people who are on our lists are in hiding. We're in a kind of hibernation mode.33
8.36
Dr Nouria Salehi AM, Executive Director, Afghan Australian Development Organisation (AADO) also reported that the Taliban:
…asked us indirectly to start the science teacher training for only 100 male teachers. We didn't say no or yes. We are waiting because previously we were teaching male and female teachers together, so now we are waiting until they open the schools for girls and then we can teach both. Maybe we can teach 100 male teachers and 100 female teachers, not only male teachers. I'm also waiting for the government to decide if we can continue teaching in Afghanistan. But we have another program, life skills for women in the villages. They are happy that we continue with this one, and we have got 150 women in five villages that we are teaching right now.34
8.37
Mr Arif Hussein, Senior Solicitor, Refugee Advice and Casework Service, spoke about his fears for the gains achieved for women and girls over the last 20 years:
I think the issue here is that there have been a lot of gains in the last 20 years, and it's been done with the help of Australia's involvement there, but women in Afghanistan and girls in Afghanistan also fought really hard for those gains. We had women who were leading political movements, women lecturing at universities and about 27 per cent of the parliament made up of women in Afghanistan. That was what Afghanistan was, just before August 2021.
Right now, there is a lot of talk about Taliban 2.0, saying that, just because they're on social media and things like that, they have changed, but the evidence we see right now is that nothing has changed about the current Taliban versus the Taliban that was in power in the 1990s. Currently, in most places in Afghanistan, girls are not allowed to go to school. If you see the recent interim cabinet released by the Taliban, most of them are men from one particular ethnic group, and there are no women included. It is clear that the gains that we talked about—the gains that the Prime Minister talked about, saying, 'We will continue to maintain those gains and we will continue to be there for women and girls,'—have gone, and now it's time for us to do something about it and at the very least to try to get as many people at risk out of Afghanistan as possible.35
8.38
Ms Sarah Dale, Principal Solicitor and Centre Director, Refugee Advice and Casework Service, added:
It's also important to reflect on the fact that a female activist was shot on the weekend for the work she had done to advance women's rights. This is certainly no longer a theoretical risk; this is a risk that we are watching unfold before our very eyes.36
8.39
Dr Salehi, AADO, responded to a question about media reports that girls were being sold, stating:
It's not for $2,000; it's for between $200 and $500 that they are selling their girls to people. Because they don't have anything to eat, they are selling their daughters and buying material for the other children. Yes, it happens. I remember it happened in 1974 in Afghanistan because of the drought, and now it's happening again.37
8.40
Amnesty International noted that women have staged protests:
Despite the myriad threats now presented to women’s rights, women across the country have been holding protests to demand that the Taliban respect women’s rights and implement a more inclusive government that reflects the country’s diversity. While some protests were allowed to continue peacefully, some were violently repressed by the Taliban using force that was not necessary or proportionate in the circumstances. Protests were violently dispersed using unlawful and disproportionate force against peaceful protestors by the Taliban in several cities including the capital Kabul where they beat protestors with batons, used tear gas, threatened them with guns and aerial firings…38
8.41
Ms Safi made the following suggestions: to prioritise assisting those who wish to leave; encourage standards, e.g. for education for those who remain; and encourage the Taliban to define the participation of women in the government.39 Ms Safi also expressed the view that in relation to the provision of aid there should be an emphasis for it to get to women (see below).40
8.42
Ms Raz Mohammad also made some suggestions in terms of international platforms and advocacy:
…I think that the international community, including Australia, should monitor the Taliban's activity. They should pressure the Taliban to stop intimidating Afghan women and to allow girls to go to school. These are the first steps in terms of starting a budget allocation…
The Human Rights Council of the United Nations has created a committee to be a watchdog on the Taliban's activity. I think we can push more through those international mechanisms to make the Taliban accountable for whatever they're doing right now…the Taliban does not have a head we can refer to, but we can hold them accountable in terms of the fighters. It's very arbitrary right now what they are doing in different provinces, so we have to hold them accountable by these means and financial assistance.41
8.43
On 24 August 2021, a joint statement on Afghan women and girls’ human rights was read at the Special Session of the Human Rights Council on Afghanistan on behalf of Australia, Spain and a group of countries.42

Overseas development assistance to Afghanistan

8.44
Noting the government’s core objectives in Afghanistan, ‘to fight terrorism and to support our alliance interests’, DFAT ‘coordinated development and humanitarian assistance in support of our objectives’ and ‘[a]s the international campaign against terrorism progressed, Australia increased its assistance program to Afghanistan’.43
8.45
By way of background, Australia has provided over $1.5 billion in development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since 2001.44 DFAT outlined the achievements of Australia’s efforts in development and humanitarian assistance:
We have focused much of our efforts on support to women and girls—and, with our partners, we made significant gains. This includes dramatic improvements in women’s education, health and participation, and in preventing violence against women. For example:
life expectancy increased from 44 years to 64 for women and 61 for men;
access to education for children increased from 0.8 to 9.2 million children, of whom 39 per cent were girls;
maternal mortality rates reduced from 1,100 to 396 deaths per 100,000 live births;
women’s representation in politics increased from zero per cent in 2001 to 27 per cent in 2020; and
through our support to the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, we helped provide treatment to over
80 per cent of malnourished children under the age of five.45
8.46
DFAT acknowledged that while ‘Australia helped support meaningful gains in the lives of Afghans[,]…Afghanistan remains one of the most difficult environments in which we deliver assistance’.46
8.47
World Vision Australia advised that ‘Afghanistan’s economy and health and education systems are almost entirely dependent on aid, including World Bank funding'.47

Situation on the ground

8.48
The committee was told that Afghanistan is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis and there is an immediate need for humanitarian assistance. Currently access to international funds are frozen, food insecurity due to drought is causing widespread hunger, the health sector is fragile and crumbling exacerbated by COVID-19, there is violence and displacement as well as concerns about the protection of children and the rights of women and girls. Submitters,48 recent media49 and others50 have indicated that Afghanistan is at risk of state and economic collapse.
8.49
DFAT highlighted the current financial situation in Afghanistan:
…Afghanistan, as part of the challenge it's facing now, is extremely lacking in liquidity in its financial sector—illiquidity, if you like. I think there's currently one financial institution doing limited transactions, which is exacerbating the economic deterioration. That's partly due to sanctions and partly due to cautiousness about the change in power and the obligations financial institutions have in those circumstances. So I don't think there is, at least through traditional transactional means in the financial sector, funds flowing in or out. That's not to say that, of course, funds might be entering the country through other means. There is a traditional exchange system across the region with moneylenders and swaps and so on. I don't think anybody is actively sending money in from a government perspective at this stage…51
8.50
Ms Brigid O’Farrell, Policy and Advocacy Adviser, Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), elaborated on the frozen assets:
We understand that $9 billion is the amount of money that sits in US financial institutions, which is the government's reserves. Overnight, virtually, $8 billion of aid flow, which sits with the World Bank, was turned off. That was the primary source of funding for key service sectors, principally the health sector, which you've heard evidence about, and the education sector.52
8.51
Ms O’Farrell added information about the impact on the ground:
We understand that there are conversations with like-minded countries—former donors to the ARTF, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund—about releasing some of the most critical funding streams, particularly in health and education. Unless we do that, the economy is going to collapse. We've already seen doctors unable to treat patients because they can't get enough medical supplies. Doctors, teachers and nurses have gone without salaries being paid since 15 August. If this situation continues, the suffering will only worsen. People will take desperate measures, as you've already heard, like selling children. People will leave the country. There will be increased flows of refugees. It will also destabilise the country and cause widespread insecurity and, possibly, further terrorism.53
8.52
World Vision Australia noted that ‘[a]lmost half the population – 18.4 million people (8.2 million children) are currently facing emergency and crisis levels of food insecurity in Afghanistan, while emergency levels of acute malnutrition exist in 27 of the country’s 34 provinces’.54 Mr Christopher Nyamandi, Country Director, Save the Children Afghanistan, told the committee about the effects of current food shortages:
What we see now from that transition is a reduction of violence, but then we see children starving to death; we see children freezing. As I'm talking to you right now, here in Kabul, 15 minutes from where I am, I saw a report yesterday about two children who died. Some of the images I was shown were horrific. These are not just numbers; these are families that are grieving and children who, unfortunately, are starving to death today. I think one of the witnesses here spoke about the importance of agency as we go towards winter, the importance of making resources available right now to save lives. Save the Children has 2,200 aid workers across the country, across 18 of the 34 provinces. That funding was going to be made available for us to provide nutritional supplies, to provide the medical response. That would go a long way in preventing some of the deaths that are going to happen in the coming weeks and months. The operating environment is difficult. We look to Australia and developed countries to impress upon the international community to find a political solution to some of the operational challenges that we face in Afghanistan…55
8.53
Ms Nadine Haddad, Senior Policy Adviser, Conflict and Fragility, World Vision Australia, also spoke about the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, emphasising the impact on children as well as the health system:
As the UNDP put it, we are facing a full-on development collapse on top of humanitarian and economic crises.
As we speak to you today, nine million children will go to bed hungry; 18 million people are facing a record level of acute hunger. They don't know when or who is going to deliver the next meal. Now, this figure is projected to go up to almost 23 million. One in two children are facing severe acute malnutrition without immediate assistance, many are slowly dying from starvation with many out of sight. On top of this, the health system is collapsing. COVID-19 is not the only health challenge. We are seeing measles, diarrhoea and polio on the rise again. These are not just immediate threats to life; the unfolding crisis also threatens to undo decades of development gains, where Australia and the international community have invested billions of dollars of support. What we do need to do now is protect these gains…World Vision is committed to standing with the people of Afghanistan. We will support and deliver aid. We do so based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence but our ability to do so is hindered by the lack of financial means and channels.
We know the children of Afghanistan can't wait. We need to do three things. We need to act now and act fast but we also need to think long-term ...56
8.54
In relation to displacement, Dr Louise Olliff, Senior Policy Adviser, Refugee Council of Australia (RCA) submitted that there are currently ‘5.7 million people currently displaced within and outside Afghanistan’.57
8.55
Mr Muzafar Ali, Community Representative, Co-Founder, Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, provided more detailed information in relation to displacement:
Recently, we saw that the Taliban displaced hundreds of the families in the Gizab district, which is part of Oruzgan. The victims are the Hazara people who have supported the international forces in Afghanistan. The Taliban issued an order and gave them three hours to leave their homes, where they had been living for decades. All of a sudden, in three hours, the families were displaced and were out of their homes. On 14 August the Taliban took control of the area, and on the 19th they were ordered to leave the place. Subsequently, in one day, the Taliban sympathisers came from the different districts, like Deh Rawod and Chora to take these lands. And I would say this is not just one incident that happened; it was a coordinated attempt to displace the people who worked with the international forces and supported international efforts, and to replace them with their own sympathisers. That's a very systematic example that we saw in Gizab.
It's not just Gizab, unfortunately, but it's happening in the Daykundi Province, which is a neighbouring province with Oruzgan. This is happening in the Baghran district of Helmand. And all of the victims I mentioned in these areas are from one particular ethnicity, the Hazaras. These displaced people, unfortunately, are without their homes, including their women and children, at this time when we are facing a very harsh winter. It's a long and harsh winter. Even for humanitarian aid to reach them is extremely difficult.58
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Mr Ali added:
For these women and children, and those who are living in the mountains, literally, without their homes, I think we need to focus on different layers of humanitarian aid. One is to provide shelter for them. Currently, the Oruzgan elder told me, no humanitarian aid is allowed to reach to Hazara people by the Taliban authorities. Even in Kabul, the aid distribution is happening to certain areas, and it doesn't [get to] to the Hazara population. We are talking about these areas where it's extremely difficult to reach but that's where the real victims, the real displaced people, are living. They need food, medicine and somewhere to spend the night. It's extremely cold. There are diaspora communities raising funds on their own and they're trying to save a little bit to do something from their part but that's not enough. Diplomatically, Australia needs to put more pressure on the Taliban to let this humanitarian aid reach these people in remote valleys before the first snowfall, which will mean the roads will be blocked for four months and we will probably see a human catastrophe.59
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International talks have been held with a focus on avoiding a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. DFAT reported that the most recent talks hosted by Pakistan and involving the US, Russia and China, have now concluded:
They were the [T]roika [P]lus talks. They were the second format of the meeting previously held in Moscow. Not all attendees were present at the last one. The US didn't attend. This time almost all got there. Yes, we are in direct contact with the United States on those talks. We usually get read-outs on them both before and after about what they're focused on. Pleasingly, the statement that came out of that meeting showed agreement between the range of participants on what expectations we have of the Taliban….60

Challenges with delivering aid on the ground

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In relation to providing aid on the ground in Afghanistan, Mr Timothy Watkin, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), reported that the Taliban ‘have indicated that they want humanitarian assistance to continue’. He added:
They seem to recognise that they are not capable of alleviating this current crisis themselves and they have had engagement, as has been reported, with UN agencies, US aid and others. In some instances, as you refer to, they are looking at practical arrangements to facilitate humanitarian assistance with NGOs. At the same time, however, we know from past occasions that they have instituted repressive policies against NGOs and civil society in the past, and there are concerns that this will re-emerge. We've seen some evidence, which I think you heard about earlier today, that some NGOs in the country are already facing some form of repression. That is obviously a matter of deep concern for us and the Australian NGO community. Obviously, there will be a need to engage, but at the moment it has been quite light.61
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Ms Jackie Fristacky AM, President, AADO advised that the ‘World Food Program has an authorisation through the Taliban, so if there are problems in provinces or districts distributing there is a document from the Taliban leadership saying this can get through and not to hinder the aid distribution. That is helpful because there are erratic elements’.62
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Ms Fristacky reported on their experience of providing assistance:
AADO is a development organisation. But, given the dire situation, we have been providing essential food supplies to families in the Kabul area and earlier in Kandahar. The Taliban did intercept some of the people that were distributing the food supplies. They didn't hinder them, but they did intercept them. I think part of it was more security so that the supplies that were being delivered weren't being seized in the streets before they were delivered…63
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Dr Salehi, AADO, also reported:
They have approached them [AADO staff] a few times. Once it was because they didn't want them distributing the food on the streets for people. They didn't like it; they said no.64
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Mr Nyamandi, Save the Children Afghanistan, advised that:
Save the Children has been more successful to negotiate access with the Taliban. I think the biggest issue that we are negotiating on is for senior aid workers to be allowed to work, and we have seen positive signals on that. However, it's clear that the Taliban authorities do not have the capacity. They do not have the resources and, in some ways, they do not have the political will to move on some important pieces. There is a general lack of a sense of urgency. If children are dying in Kabul, you can imagine what is happening in remote districts that we do not have access to. It would be important to exert a little bit more pressure so that there is a sense of urgency on what needs to be done to save lives.65
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Ms O’Farrell, ACFID, told the committee about the challenge of access to funding for humanitarian assistance due to sanctions:
You asked about the main challenge to providing humanitarian assistance on the ground and that at the moment is actually financial access. What we are hearing universally from organisations, and this goes for the UN as well as NGOs, is that currently they are unable to transfer funds into the country because of the sanctions and the fact that banks are department-risking and being overly cautious in the way they interpret and apply the sanctions regime. The most effective and efficient way to address that obstacle is by providing a safeguard for humanitarian purposes into the 1988 UN Security Council sanctions regime that comes up for review in December. We would strongly encourage the committee to make recommendations to the Australian government that we play a leading and constructive role in December when it comes up for review. We would refer you in particular to the Somalia humanitarian safeguard, which has proven effective and workable in that process as well. There are multiple precedents as well—Syria, Yemen. That is the main obstacle we see in enabling assistance to reach the people of Afghanistan.66
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Mr Mat Tinkler, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, International Programs, Save the Children Australia, also emphasised:
…it is really important to note that in many parts of Afghanistan aid agencies have been working alongside the Taliban for 30 or 40 years, so this phenomenon of having to deliver vital life-saving support in territory controlled by the Taliban is not new. It is not necessarily a question of recognising the Taliban formally but there are ways to engage in a principled way to ensure that we can constructively continue to do our jobs, deliver life-saving support, and that is very possible and continues to happen…on a daily basis.67

Protecting development gains

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Noting that ‘Afghanistan is one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world’68, World Vision Australia highlighted that significant development gains have been achieved in Afghanistan over the last 20 years:
Changes are visible in ordinary villages around the country, where farmers now use climate-smart agricultural techniques, local committees manage and repair irrigation infrastructure, trained midwives help ensure safe births, and girls’ education is valued. Significant development gains have been achieved, especially in the areas of economic development and livelihoods, women’s empowerment and education, civil society, health and water, hygiene and sanitation. The narrative that Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan was “fruitless” or “unsuccessful” does not at all apply to its humanitarian and development work in the war-torn country. These accomplishments are still there, beneath the headlines of recent rapid changes – but they are fragile, and facing a challenge greater than any other in the past two decades.69
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World Vision Australia cautioned that the significant development gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan are ‘at risk of being lost if Australia and the international community do not restore their development assistance to the country’.70

International assistance

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Mr Waktin, ACFID, updated the committee on some aid commitments from other governments:
The [United Kingdom] has doubled its assistance to approximately A$537 million. The US has added $363 million to its humanitarian assistance. At the G20 meeting on 13 October, [President of the European Commission] Ursula von der Leyen announced 700 million euros to the economic catastrophe in Afghanistan. But the most useful comparator on this is Canada because of the similar size in GDP. It announced A$54.6 million in humanitarian aid in addition to its existing $30 million program.71

Australian assistance

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DFAT advised that in relation to the provision of development and humanitarian aid:
Australia helped support meaningful gains in the lives of Afghans. But delivering this work effectively required assured levels of security and stability. As conditions worsened, Australia like other donors, adapted its approach to delivering assistance ...72
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In relation to the current aid situation DFAT submitted that:
Australia is continuing to support humanitarian outcomes in Afghanistan. This includes responding to the humanitarian crisis currently facing the country, combined with an enduring commitment to the welfare of women and girls.
Humanitarian needs in Afghanistan are acute and growing as a result of the security situation and collapse of the financial system and many government services, all compounded by the effects of a prolonged drought and COVID-19. Around half the population (18 million people) require humanitarian assistance.
We are addressing humanitarian needs in a coordinated way with our partners, including to influence the Taliban’s behaviour. On 13 September [2021], the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that Australia would contribute $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan from 2021–24. This includes:
around $65 million in immediate lifesaving assistance and support to Afghanistan, and neighbouring countries hosting Afghan refugees, and
$35 million to address the protracted nature of the crisis out to 2024.
This package will be delivered through UN partners, who have well-developed procedures to meet UN sanctions obligations and operate in Taliban-controlled areas. All have demonstrated strong capacity to manage DFAT’s risk and safeguards policies.73
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The Foreign Minister’s announcement of 13 September noted that this $100 million commitment:
…builds on our one and a half billion-dollar expenditure for Afghanistan’s development over the last 20 years. We stand ready with our international partners to provide further support to Afghanistan people as the crisis evolves.74
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At a hearing, Mr Gary Cowan, First Assistant Secretary, North and South Asia Division, DFAT, provided further detail on the humanitarian assistance being provided:
The brief overview would be that we've pivoted what was our bilateral aid program to really lift what we're doing in a humanitarian sense. It has a specific focus on women and girls. It avoids providing support to the Taliban. As the foreign minister announced on 13 September, we will provide $100 million in a humanitarian support package, and that's designed to help meet the crisis in three ways. The first way is through providing food and shelter, health clinics, education, reproductive health services and protection of women and girls. The second way is to support neighbouring countries who now host Afghan refugees and to mitigate the possible irregular migration impacts of people smuggling. The third is that, given that we understand this will be quite a protracted crisis, we're providing longer-term humanitarian support for basic health services— food, shelter, women and children—and we will be directing that assistance mainly through trusted UN partners, including to make sure that we're complying with [the] sanctions regime.75
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Mr Cowan detailed the funding for the three parts of the package and which organisations the funding will go to, noting that the first two parts totalling $65 million will be provided this financial year and $35 million has been allocated in the two years out to 2024:
…The first part is a repositioning of what had been our bilateral aid program, focusing on humanitarian needs and especially immediate needs in Afghanistan. We anticipate that a bit over $22 million of that will be provided to the World Food Program, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the UN Population Fund for food, shelter and sexual reproduction health services There will also be, we anticipate, $18 million through the World Bank for essential health and education services. So that's for things like health clinics, supplies and education services. And there will be about $4½ million for gender services and research, including to UN women, focusing very much on the empowerment of women and girls. That's the first part.
The second part is some new funding from the humanitarian emergency fund, and that's going to be allocated to neighbouring countries, including, of course, Pakistan, which you've been discussing—those countries which are hosting Afghan refugees. The idea there is to support them but also mitigate against possible irregular migration impacts and people smuggling. In that case, we anticipate the assistance will go to UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Food Program and the ICRC…
…That program is $20 million altogether. It includes $5 million to the UN Refugee Agency supplementary appeal, which was announced in August, to support refugees in neighbouring countries.
Finally, the third part: we anticipate that the humanitarian acute need will be protracted, and so $35 million of the $100 million is allocated out for the next couple of years, at least in our planning, to the UN Population Fund, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and World Food Program for basic health services, food and shelter to women and children.
So that's the way that we've planned it out. As you can see, the idea is to provide it through trusted essentially UN, mainly UN, partners, and the thinking there is that they will be best equipped to provide that in difficult circumstances but also in a way that is compliant with the sanctions regime that we have to apply.76
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Mr Watkin, ACFID, welcomed the Australian Government’s commitment to preserving the development gains made over the last 20 years, but noted that what they are seeing and hearing about the situation on the ground is that ‘far greater assistance is needed and it is needed urgently’. Mr Watkin added:
There are well-founded warnings from the World Bank and others that, unless we move quickly, the Afghan economy is likely to collapse and so too is the state. This means instability; widespread desperation; further human rights abuses; and violence, including the possibility of terrorism. This risks even greater displacement and refugee flows out of Afghanistan...77
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Mr Watkin discussed Australia’s aid contributions comparing it with spending on military involvement:
The Australian government, prior to the fall of Kabul, had an intention to provide $51 million in official development assistance in 2021–22. We welcomed the announcement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of an increase to $65 million this year and then $35 million in ongoing humanitarian assistance between 2021 and 2024. Five million dollars of that official $20 million has gone to the UNHCR's Afghanistan situation supplementary appeal. To reference a comparison to defence spending, we spend as part of our military involvement about $500 million per year. That is 10 times what we provide in aid at the moment…78
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Ms O’Farrell, ACFID, clarified:
…of the $65 million, $45 million of that was a repositioning of the original $51 million, so in essence it's been a $20 million commitment of new additional funding since the fall of Kabul by the Australian government.79
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ACFID recommended that:
the Australian government urgently increase funding and provide at least $100 million annually on a multiyear basis and support development as well as humanitarian action;
Australia must take an active and leading role in multilateral efforts to resolve operational challenges which are restricting the provision of life-saving aid; and
the Australian government must strengthen efforts to support safe passage for those seeking to leave Afghanistan.80
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Dr Olliff, RCA, called for:
…a scaling up of a coordinated humanitarian response to the multiple crises facing Afghanistan right now. We encourage Australia to use its aid and diplomacy to greatest effect through supporting calls for the establishment of an independent international human rights monitoring mechanism, providing greater financial support to organisations working on the ground and continuing to facilitate the emergency evacuation of those facing heightened risks who were left behind in the hasty evacuation. This includes people in areas where local community divisions were exacerbated during the time of the engagement of Western forces and where the Taliban is now seeking retribution…81
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World Vision Australia recommended that the Australian Government ‘urgently deliver a $30 million food security package (in additional funding) to address crisis levels of hunger in Afghanistan’. It also recommended that the government fast-track flexible funding to allow humanitarian NGOs to meet urgent humanitarian needs while upholding humanitarian principles’.82
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World Vision Australia also noted that while the Australian Government has invested $1.5 billion in Afghanistan’s development over the last two decades, ‘Australia’s aid to Afghanistan was as high as $165 million in 2011–12, but it dropped more recently to around $80 million per year from 2017–20 and to around $50 million per year from 2020–22’.83
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Nonetheless, World Vision Australia acknowledged the substantial gains seen in Afghanistan ‘[s]upported by the influx of aid since 2002’ in which ‘Afghanistan has made remarkable gains across many development indicators over the last 20 years’84:
The United Nations Development Programme regularly monitors and tracks national-level development outcomes through its Human Development Index. The Index considers metrics such life expectancy at birth, education outcomes, and standards of living (as measured by gross national income per capita) to calculate an overall measure of human development. In 2020, Afghanistan achieved a human development score of 0.511, which is substantially higher than its score of 0.302 in 2000.85

Assistance without recognition

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It was emphasised to the committee that humanitarian and development aid work can occur through engagement without the need to formally recognise the Taliban regime. For example, Ms Fristacky, AADO, told the committee:
No country in the world to date has recognised the Taliban. They are still de facto as an imposed power. So I can't see Australia moving, and nor should we, because we need to retain that as a lever. We don't have too many levers to talk to the Taliban about, so we need an international lever on that. But recognition is not a precondition for humanitarian aid at all or development aid in key areas, as long as it is provided through local sources. Aid can go through local sources; it doesn't have to go through the government at all, and that's what the World Food Program is doing ...86
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Ms O’Farrell, ACFID, also elaborated on this point:
There is no interest from the aid and development community to recognise the Taliban. There are ways and there need to be ways to provide assistance without granting any kind of legitimacy or recognition. We would refer the committee to the EU [European Union] conditionality framework, which has been developed setting out five criteria for how the EU proposes to engage with the Taliban to provide vital humanitarian assistance. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, has said that Afghan people shouldn't pay the price of the Taliban sanctions.87

Role of grassroots organisations in Afghanistan and diaspora networks

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Mr Cina, Mahboba’s Promise, told the committee about the work of Mahboba’s Promise on the ground in Afghanistan:
The charity is entirely grassroots in nature in Afghanistan. The work is dedicated towards building orphanages and schools, and a range of vocational training programs that seek to uplift the most vulnerable women and empower them economically to participate in society in a self-sufficient way. There are 500 widows we support monthly as well. In terms of our connections here, we've been a well-known public charity. Former Governor-General Dame Quentin Bryce is our patron. We have public support from people like Elizabeth Broderick AO, the longest-serving Sex Discrimination Commissioner, and Marie Bashir, the previous Governor of New South Wales.88
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Mr Cina outlined the organisation’s role in providing aid on the ground in Afghanistan given the severity of the humanitarian crisis:
…We've been able to shift only because of how grassroots the organisation is and how connected it is to local communities, so we managed to get a lot of people to come on board to help with us our emergency aid for internally displaced people. There's a camp where we're supporting about 4,000 people. There's no-one else supporting it. That's shelter, food, medicine costs— everything. It's coming back slowly, but we are not seeing many NGOs on the ground, especially in a coherent, consistent manner. It's not a question anymore of NGOs filling in gaps. The need is great everywhere, and I think there's a great opportunity for the Australian government to leverage off the experience of organisations like ours that have these grassroots connections and that have been able to survive and pivot when many have not been able to do so, and administer more aid. This is the greatest camp that we've ever serviced, but there are thousands more, and it's just an issue of being financially able to reach them.89
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Professor Felicity Gerry QC, appearing in a private capacity, emphasised to the committee the importance of the grassroots movement of women in Afghanistan:
One of the things that I've learned from working with some of these amazing, highly educated and skilled women is that the grassroots movement of women in Afghanistan is incredible. It is really worth understanding the strength and power of the women at grassroots level…it is an incredible resource because it is communication with women who are heading up households and communities. It's really worth understanding that the past 20 years built up women's positions of power and responsibility at grassroots level and not all that has been lost…but I think there's sometimes a feeling that all is lost, and the impression I have from working with these incredible women is that all is not lost and that's why Australia is important.90
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The committee also heard from the AADO, registered with ACFID, which has been running educational and community projects in Afghanistan since 2002 in partnership with skilled local people. Ms Fristacky, AADO, submitted a number of development aid areas to prioritise: development aid in agriculture to reduce reliance on humanitarian aid; the need to harvest solar power in villages and cities for ‘water pumps, for lighting, for heating, for cooking, for recharging phones and computers, and to support online communications and learning’.91
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Dr Olliff, RCA, highlighted the need to be:
…supporting and listening to diaspora communities in Australia who have links to Afghanistan. This is a time of enormous anguish, and the impact of the Taliban taking control has sent shock waves through communities across Australia where there are many people who have personally suffered at the hands of the Taliban and who are now seeing history repeating for their families, communities and loved ones. Our government, we believe, can do this by (1) expediting and facilitating the reunion of families by addressing the significant barriers to family reunification, which we have outlined in our submission; and (2) providing a pathway to permanency and safety for the over 5,000 Afghan nationals who are currently living in Australia on temporary visas or who are subject to offshore processing of immigration detention. We can also support affected communities by establishing a diaspora advisory group to inform ongoing government engagement in areas such as remittance channels, aid, humanitarian relief efforts and diplomatic engagement. We have many experts and thought leaders in this country within the diaspora.92
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Mr Ali, Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, drew the committee’s attention to a model used in Europe which supports the involvement of diaspora communities in humanitarian action:
I believe that you can get resources through diaspora organisations, and other countries are doing that much more effectively. In Europe, they have [DEMAC—Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination]93, a European funded initiative to support diaspora communities in humanitarian responses, and they work with the Afghanistan diaspora in Europe to support their humanitarian interventions. Currently in Australia, from my knowledge, there's very little engagement with diaspora communities that are very active in Afghanistan. It's not the only answer but it is one answer to work with communities that are very motivated and have incredibly deep connections. I'm really pleased to see the committee is talking to one of the organisations, Mahboba's Promise. There are organisations set up by members of the Afghanistan diaspora that are doing incredible work in Afghanistan. How can we listen and support some of that action much more systemically as a country?94
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Mr Ali provided examples of how diaspora groups can provide knowledge on the ground to assist with the distribution of aid:
First, I would say that in my experience working with the United Nations in Afghanistan, sending aid to the really needy people is a massive challenge. How to identify beneficiaries in NGO terms and to deliver to them is always more difficult than getting the aid itself. But I would say diaspora communities have this connection which the NGOs lack on the ground. Diaspora communities consist of different, diverse groups in most cases with different knowledge on the ground, and sometimes the NGOs or the organisations lack this local knowledge. When we talk about the humanitarian support, humanitarian aid, particularly targeting to one particular area or one particular cohort of people, that makes the effort specific to where it goes. For example, when we talk about Giza district, UNHCR have never been able to go there. They have no clue where these villages are where people have been displaced. But the diaspora communities have the knowledge of the area and how this aid could go. In this particular case, I would say even though the diaspora groups may lack this organisational knowledge and power to take big or massive humanitarian aid to a large number of people, they are more effective in delivering the little items to really needy people up there…95
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Mr Ali also made another suggestion of how diaspora communities could provide assistance:
…include diaspora communities to help the department or the authorities to identify…individuals. The country of Afghanistan is diverse and sometimes it is so interconnected or complex that it is very hard, even for UNHCR, who has been dealing with these cases and issues for a long time. They make mistakes in their judgement.96
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AADO suggested DFAT engage further with NGOs such as AADO ‘who have contacts in Afghanistan and deliver programs through local Afghan personnel using informal networks’. It was noted that ‘NGO organisations like AADO, despite their substantial expertise, on-ground knowledge, proven programs, and significant potential to support Australia’s national interests in development, do not fit into any dedicated DFAT funding category’. It was suggested that DFAT establish:
a funding stream for NGO organisations involved in delivering international development in furtherance of development objectives for Afghanistan. Australia’s international reputation and the capacity to deliver programs in such development would be enhanced by this new funding stream for development aid.97
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Noting that there are currently a range of Australian NGOs operating in Afghanistan and that they are ‘an important part of the humanitarian and development landscape’, ACFID was of the view that ‘Australia should leverage its existing networks on the ground to support local NGOs and civil society during this critical time’. ACFID suggested that the government ‘fund Australian NGOs and Afghan civil society to implement a multi-year locally led development program that focuses on advancing the rights of women and girls’.98
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Mr Nyamandi, Save the Children, also indicated that while ‘multilaterals are important for the work that's happening in Afghanistan…it is important that aid comes as directly as possible to the NGOs and civil society organisations that are in Afghanistan’. Mr Nyamandi added:
We…have the capacity. We have a record of doing this kind of work, including in Taliban controlled areas, for the past 40 years. I really would encourage the Australian government to consider the efficiency and effectiveness of working directly with NGOs and civil society organisations or the like.99
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The RCA recommended that the Australian Government ‘should increase funding to humanitarian organisations that are on the ground in Afghanistan to ensure adequate response to vulnerable communities in the context of heightened humanitarian needs’. The RCA also recommended that the Australian Government ‘should support the call for an independent mechanism to monitor and report on violations and abuses, to collect evidence, advance accountability and deter further crimes in Afghanistan’. 100
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When asked about engagement with diaspora-run charities that are operational on the ground, Mr Newnham, DFAT responded:
…I know they are groups with which we have engaged a great deal over time and continue to, including as part of the evacuation process. They are well known to us and have an important role to play. I would defer to colleagues but what I would say is we are in the early stages of managing a very fraught set of circumstances in Afghanistan. We're highly acutely aware of the food shortages, the humanitarian crisis that is prevailing, the health system, the threats to human rights, women and girls' empowerment issues.101

Provision of aid and the interaction with sanctions regime

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Mr Newnham, DFAT, stressed the need to be cognisant of sanctions obligations:
…we have trusted partners, UN World Food Programme and others, that we know have safeguards in place with respect to their own personnel, the expenditure of capital and resources for their projects, as well as widespread remit and influence. It's not to say that those other groups have not been ones we have lent on in the past or may in the future. At this stage, navigating these circumstances we currently have, that's the footprint we have, using those major trusted partners…102
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The AFP spoke about the sanctions regime in relation to sending aid to Afghanistan noting it is still ‘a very fluid situation…’. When asked about sending aid money, the AFP indicated that it would depend on the circumstances but they would need to seek advice via DFAT who manage the sanctions scheme.103
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In relation to concerns about aid funding finding its way to the Taliban, Ms O’Farrell, ACFID, added:
…the international aid and development community has no interest [in money finding its way to the Taliban]. There is zero tolerance for any kind of diversion, and there are really robust mechanisms in place. This is a concern for all agencies—for the UN as much as international NGOs—to prevent that money from benefitting the Taliban. We do understand that there have been conversations about that trust fund and ways that that could be managed by an independent third party ...104
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Mr Tinkler, Save the Children Australia, added:
The thing I would like to emphasise is that independent civil society and humanitarian organisations are your friend in this scenario. Organisations like the Red Cross, World Vision and Save the Children are independent of the Taliban government but have negotiated safe access to deliver principled humanitarian assistance to the population. We have been doing this for many dozens of years. We're doing it now, from donors including Australia and other multinational organisations. There are ways to make sure that funding goes in the hands of the people of Afghanistan—the people that need it—and I really encourage government to consider those options.105

Assisting Australian Defence Force personnel and veterans

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The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has naturally had an impact on the veterans who served there on a number of fronts. Some have found the events disheartening, wondering if their efforts in Afghanistan were in vain.106
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Major Heston Russell (Retd), Managing Director, Veteran Support Force Ltd, spoke of the government ‘failing to set the conditions to better support veterans once we returned from this conflict’.107 Dr Jason Barnett spoke about his experience in seeking support:
Having experience with the DVA system, I can attest to the fact that it is next to impossible to have a claim approved without it taking years. Thankfully, when I lodged my claim, I did not have any financial or mental health issues. I cannot see how this [extending immediate mental health support] will be made possible under the current framework within which DVA and Defence operate. I have colleagues who have experienced the same issues. They make you feel like a liar, a fraud, and a malingerer, psychologically the worst of all for a defence force member.
Mental health starts with physical health, there needs to be a complete change in the way DVA deals with claims. There needs to be a review of how the defence department communicates requirements to DVA, as it is essentially the Defence Department who dictate the terms of veterans to the DVA, i.e. DVA can only do what the Defence Department says and there are inconsistencies with wording in medical records which DVA does not recognise and for which the Defence Department will not take responsibility. The…system is rigged against the veterans.108
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Many veterans are also concerned for the welfare of locally engaged Afghans who served alongside them, including interpreters and security guards. As Afghanistan fell to the Taliban, some veterans burned their military decorations to protest what they saw as the government’s slow response in granting refuge to locally engaged Afghan staff likely to face reprisals from the Taliban.109
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The committee heard from veterans who have dedicated significant time and resources to assisting Afghan nationals who worked with them after they reached out for assistance.110 For example, Mr Jason Scanes, Founder, Forsaken Fighters Australia told the committee:
I have nothing else to gain from this process other than wanting to help those that helped us in Afghanistan, and there are many other veterans that feel exactly the same way.111
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Mr Scanes added:
This issue is having a profound effect on the mental health and wellbeing of many veterans, not just me. They're trying to provide assistance to their interpreters who they still have contact with who have been abandoned in Afghanistan. They have no answers for them. There's no transparency from government. They're trying to provide financial assistance to their interpreters. This is a burden that shouldn't be carried by our veterans. This is a burden for the Australian government. We see them pushing their responsibilities down onto our veterans.112
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Mr Scanes highlighted that ‘the single most damaging thing that a public official can do to a veteran is ignore them’113 and summarised the effect this issue has had on veterans:
I think first of all there's a significant amount of damage being done to our veterans. We're trained not to leave our mates behind, to look after our mates and all those types of things, and the government is stonewalling us and ignoring us for wanting to try and do that. So we're doing that on our own. That is having a profound effect. We've seen veterans burning their Afghan campaign medals et cetera because their interpreters are being left behind in Afghanistan and the government wasn't doing enough ...114
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Mr Hugh Poate, whose son was killed in Afghanistan during an insider attack in 2012, provided his view on how veterans are feeling about their service in Afghanistan:
They're saying they don't feel that their contribution during the war is properly appreciated.115
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Additionally, ahead of these events, in November 2020, the release of the Inspector-General Australian Defence Force (IGADF) investigation report into allegations of war crimes in Afghanistan resulted in a doubling of calls to the DVA Open Arms service showing the impact of these revelations on the mental health of veterans.116 Major Heston Russell (Retd) confirmed the significant psychological impact the release of the IGADF report has had on veterans, particularly in relation to the legacy of their service in Afghanistan:
…for me and those special forces personnel who have been there—and our entire legacy is being brought down to the allegations in the Brereton report, of which some of my guys weren't even deployed during that time—it's really hard to sit down on those quiet days, on Anzac days, on Remembrance days, and connect with that identity that was the best version of us. But no-one cares about it, particularly as we face the veterans mental health crisis at the moment, when every fabric of what we should be proud of in our deployments over there is otherwise seen as something that we should keep quiet because it's immediately linked to war crimes; because we have veterans unable to get employment if they have 'SAS' or 'commando' listed on their CV going for a job; because we, back here in Australia, have allowed that to be become the legacy of our operations. You could just imagine the mindset, let alone the emotional impact, that has had on so many of our veterans.117
8.108
The Australian Psychological Society (APS) was of the view that the Australian Government ‘must respond urgently to the mental health support needs of current and ex-serving Australian defence force personnel and their families. That assistance needs to be made available, without limit, via public, NGO and private-sector services’.118 The APS added:
Given the internecine and traumatising nature of the events that have occurred in the guerrilla warfare style conflict of the Afghanistan crisis (e.g., through the horror created by the Taliban in its use of suicide bombers), it is important that the Government provides appropriate and high quality evidenced-based psychiatric and psychological care, support and interventions, to those affected.119
8.109
The APS indicated that it would ‘be pleased to partner with the government to develop a systematic quality assurance program for the services being provided to Australian defence force personnel and veterans’.120

Defence

8.110
These events highlight the need to support the mental health of current and former ADF personnel. Defence advised the committee of the support it provides:
Defence is committed to supporting ADF personnel who served in Afghanistan over the twenty-year history of our engagement, including those who delivered the successful evacuation from Kabul. This includes prioritising the mental health of serving personnel and veterans, and preserving the legacy of their achievements. We welcome the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide as an opportunity to learn and strengthen our approach to the mental health and welfare of our people.
Defence continues to provide ADF members access to the most comprehensive mental health care services in Australia, and has invested heavily in research, education, awareness, and improving access to mental health care.
Our demand-driven health system is command-responsive and member-centred. Mental health services that we provide range from education and awareness programs, to treatment and rehabilitation. We utilise a comprehensive network of mental health providers as well as access to specialist mental health services (e.g. psychiatrists) to ensure the needs of serving members are met. This means serving ADF members have access to the right support, especially to those who are vulnerable or at risk.
Non-liability health care is also provided through the Department of Veterans’ Affairs for anyone who has served for at least one day in the ADF. This is also available for Reservists who have been on Continuous Full Time Service, or provided service during disaster relief, border protection services or been involved in service related accidents.
In response to the recent developments in Afghanistan, Defence has developed a set of specific mental health resources to support ADF members and Defence Australian Public Service (APS) employees. These resources include a guide for commanders, managers and peers outlining the range of support and resources that can be accessed, including mental health awareness packages and programs, mental health screening options, and the contact details for routine support.121
8.111
At a hearing, Major General Natasha Fox AM, CSC, Head People Capability, Defence, provided further detail on the support available for those currently serving:
For our current serving members, we have a number of support programs available through the Defence Member and Family Support Branch, which was formerly the Defence Community Organisation. We have a 24-hour helpline that members and families can call. That helpline is staffed by qualified human services professionals—social workers and psychologists—who are able to deal with whatever crisis or conversation might be had at that point in time to a point of stability and can then refer them to an appropriate service. That's whether that be a referral into Open Arms in the Department of Veterans' Affairs or whether there's then a requirement for our health system, where we have more specialised support for defence members, which the Surgeon General can go through. With our family support programs, we can engage our social workers to do compassionate family circumstances assessments to then have more interventions applied for families as might be required. I'll hand now to my colleague the Surgeon General.122
8.112
Specific engagement for those who served in Afghanistan was also outlined by Major General Fox:
There have been over 39,000 defence members and APS personnel deployed to Afghanistan. That's a substantial population, of which we have quite a number still serving. Programs are in place through the Defence Member and Family Helpline, and that branch. When the evacuation commenced, we did receive a small increase in telephone contacts to the helpline, and we did make proactive calls to the families of members who were deployed during that evacuation to check that the families were okay while the members were deployed. That's part of our normal proactive support arrangements. We worked with DVA, as well, who could talk about the process of triaging support and claims in order to prioritise support to our Afghanistan veterans during this period of time as required…123
8.113
Rear Admiral Sarah Sharkey, AM, CSC, Surgeon General, ADF, Defence, told the committee about the available mental health support and psychology services:
…in addition to the comprehensive health support, including mental health support, that we provide to ADF members through the continuum of their service—pre deployment, deployment and post deployment—in relation to the Afghanistan campaign in particular, and noting the particular impact on and vulnerability of that cohort of serving veterans in relation to the context of the Afghanistan withdrawal and NEO [non-combatant evacuation operation], we did develop a very comprehensive commanders and managers' guide. That guide provided commanders, managers and defence personnel with a whole raft of resources and advice in relation to the spectrum of unique challenges that were being faced in that context, in particular acknowledging that COVID imposed some unique constraints on the ability to easily access the normal, face-to-face health resources that that cohort might ordinarily avail themselves of. We distributed that package in early September, informed by our psychology experts et cetera, to provide that really expert advice and the guidance and resource pack to members.
The other thing that I would draw your attention to is that every deploying member that has been to Afghanistan—over the entirety of that campaign but also more recently—is subject to some operational mental health screening through our RtAPS [Return to Australia Psychological Screen] and POPS [Post Operational Psychological Screen] programs, which are also opportunities for individuals to be provided one-on-one counselling and specific advice and resources in terms of mental health support and psychology services. That is delivered to every single member who deploys.124
8.114
The committee asked Defence to share the support mentioned at the hearing which was provided on notice.125

Department of Veterans’ Affairs

8.115
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) acknowledged the ‘profound effect that the recent situation in Afghanistan may be having on members of our defence and veteran community, including their family and friends’.126 Ms Liz Cosson AM, CSC, Secretary, DVA, took the opportunity at recent supplementary budget estimates hearings to reinforce this:
I also take this opportunity to acknowledge the service, sacrifice and loss as a result of Australia's over 20-year commitment in Afghanistan. The recent situation in Afghanistan has impacted the veteran community. I want to reinforce the message to all veterans that their service is greatly valued and to all veteran families that their sacrifice is especially acknowledged and, if needed, support is available …127
8.116
DVA reported that as part of the Australian Government response to support the defence and veteran community it ‘reached out to the families of the 41 Defence personnel who tragically lost their lives in Afghanistan’. DVA also ‘reached out to around 600 veterans and families identified as being particularly vulnerable’. In addition, ‘around 320,000 SMS messages were sent to DVA clients to ensure they are aware of the significant support available to them and how to access it’. As part of this outreach:
The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, the Hon Andrew Gee MP, also encouraged Australians to connect with a veteran in recognition that as a nation, we must all play our part in ensuring our veterans and their families are supported. The Minister also convened two meetings with exservice organisations, family and veteran support representatives to seek their feedback on ways to better connect with the community.128
8.117
At estimates hearings Ms Cosson reported on the feedback received in relation to the text messages:
Certainly, when we sent out the text message to the whole community when we had concerns with how the veteran community was feeling as a result of the emerging issues in Afghanistan, the majority of veterans were very grateful for that…129
8.118
DVA advised that it ‘continues to work with the media and ex-service organisations in particular, to reinforce the message that ‘support is available’ to any veteran or their family if they need it, as well as engaging with the education sector to ensure children of veterans have appropriate support’. DVA added that it also ‘engaged across the Australian Public Service to ensure all agencies with veteran and family staff were aware of the support that is available’.130

Australian Federal Police

8.119
The committee also spoke with the AFP which confirmed that over 140 members served in Afghanistan during the seven-year period. Mr Ian McCartney, Deputy Commissioner, AFP, advised the committee:
…members who are still within the AFP can receive significant welfare support within the organisation. When the events occurred in Kabul, the commissioner sent personal correspondence to each of those 140, including members who had left the organisation. That was an offer of assistance if they required any support, and I note that a number of those officers have reached out to the AFP and it's providing support.131
8.120
Mr Geoffrey Turner, Commander, AFP, added:
…I think it's fair to say that people have an informal network around how they're coping. Obviously, there are processes in place to support those members who have either left or are still with the AFP. But it's fair to say that these things are kept reasonably personal. They don't really talk about these things in an open forum. They probably talk more amongst themselves, those who have actually sought that level of assistance.132
8.121
Mr McCartney confirmed that the AFP is aware of criticism in relation to the claims process through Comcare and is working with Comcare to streamline the process and to ensure their members are receiving the support they require.133

Recognition of service

8.122
Aware of the importance to veterans, at recent Senate supplementary budget estimates hearings, there was discussion regarding plans to reflect the experience of Afghanistan veterans following the end of the 20-year mission. Mr Matt Anderson PSM, Director, Australian War Memorial, told the committee:
The memorial act that governs us says that we need to do three things. We need to speak to the causes, the conduct and the consequences or the aftermath of all of the campaigns that we have been involved with. Right now our gallery development team are in the process of wanting to speak to those who were involved in the evacuation of locally engaged staff and others just as recently as last August, because there's every expectation that that's an important part of the story and that story will be told. We want to make it as expansive and as inclusive as we possibly can, so that it represents the breadth and the depth of the Australian service men and women's experience in Afghanistan and that includes up to and including the evacuation in August.134
8.123
Noting the intention to take a broad approach, when asked about whether the Afghan interpreters and security guards would be included in the story, Mr Anderson replied:
I think it's being considered. We're not into that level of detail yet. Having had the honour of spending some time in Afghanistan in 2015 and 2016, I don't think you can tell that story without the support that was provided. A large part of the story, for example, is train, advise and assist. What we were doing since 2015 in Afghanistan was training, advising, assisting the Afghan national defence and security forces. The work that we were doing mentoring liaison in the provinces involves Afghans. So you can't tell the story of Afghanistan without speaking to the way in which we conducted it, who we conducted it with, the impact of our service on them and the way in which they've supported and facilitated us. It's an important part of the story. It's not the whole story. We're the Australian war memorial, but it is important to tell that story where it's relevant to what we did on the ground.135

  • 1
    Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Submission 22, p. 5.
  • 2
    DFAT, Submission 22, p. 6.
  • 3
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 25.
  • 4
    Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States (US). See Joint Statement on Troika Plus Meeting, 11 November 2021, Islamabad.
  • 5
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 26.
  • 6
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 26.
  • 7
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 41.
  • 8
    The statement was released initially by the governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Ukraine. See: www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-reports-summary-killings-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan (accessed 6 December 2021).
  • 9
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 43.
  • 10
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, pp. 26–27.
  • 11
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 27. See Chapter 6 for further detail on numbers who have left Afghanistan since 26 August 2021.
  • 12
    DFAT, Answers to questions on notice from public hearing held 15 November 2021 (received 3 December 2021), Question No. 18. See chapter 6 for further detail.
  • 13
    Mr Simon Newnham, Acting Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 42. See also DFAT, Submission 22, pp. 6–7.
  • 14
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 40.
  • 15
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 40.
  • 16
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 40.
  • 17
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, pp. 42–43.
  • 18
    Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), Submission 19, p. 19.
  • 19
    Home Affairs, Submission 19, p. 19 (emphasis in original).
  • 20
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 15.
  • 21
    Mr Ian McCarthy, Deputy Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (AFP), Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 16.
  • 22
    AFP, Submission 34, p. 8.
  • 23
    Mr Ian McCartney, Deputy Commissioner, AFP, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021 p. 16.
  • 24
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 3. See also: Australian Muslim Women’s Centre for Human Rights, Submission 44, p. 5.
  • 25
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 2.
  • 26
    Her Excellency, Ms Hasina Safi, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 2. See also Amnesty International, Submission 33, p. 10.
  • 27
    Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 3.
  • 28
    Her Excellency, Ms Hasina Safi, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 2.
  • 29
    Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 14.
  • 30
    Ms Sitarah Mohammadi, Afghanistan-Australia Advocacy Network, Committee Hansard,
    11 October 2021, p.17.
  • 31
    Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 3.
  • 32
    Save the Children Australia, Submission 52, p. 7.
  • 33
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 36.
  • 34
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 41.
  • 35
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 30.
  • 36
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 32. See also Ms Zahra Nader and Ms Amie Ferris-Rotman, ‘Women’s rights activist shot dead in northern Afghanistan’, The Guardian, 6 November 2021.
  • 37
    Dr Nouria Salehi AM, Executive Director, Afghan Australian Development Organisation, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 43.
  • 38
    Amnesty International, Submission 33, p. 11. See also: Australian Muslim Women’s Centre for Human Rights, Submission 44, p. 5; Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 3.
  • 39
    Her Excellency, Ms Hasina Safi, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 3.
  • 40
    Her Excellency, Ms Hasina Safi, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 5. See also: Her Excellency Hasina Safi, Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad and Professor Felicity Gerry QC, Answers to questions on notice from public hearing held 15 November 2021 (received 24 November 2021).
  • 41
    Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 7.
  • 42
  • 43
    DFAT, Submission 22, p. 1.
  • 44
    DFAT, Submission 22, p. 1.
  • 45
    DFAT, Submission 22, pp. 1–2.
  • 46
    DFAT, Submission 22, p. 2.
  • 47
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 13.
  • 48
    Ms Jackie Fristacky AM, President, Afghan Australian Development Organisation, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 39; Mr Timothy Watkin, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 38; Ms Nadine Haddad, Senior Policy Adviser, Conflict and Fragility, World Vision Australia, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 40. Save the Children, Submission 52, pp. 6–7; World Vision Australia, Submission 55, pp. 8–11; Adjunct Professor Mahmoud Saikal, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, pp. 60, 62.
  • 49
    Alexander Cornwell, 'Children are going to die’, U.N agency warns as Afghanistan verges on collapse, Reuters, 25 October 2021; Eltaf Najafizada, ‘Pakistan Allows India to Send Wheat as Hunger Grips Afghanistan’, Bloomberg, 15 November 2021.
  • 50
    See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan Facing Famine’, 11 November 2021; UN News, ‘Afghanistan’s healthcare system on brink of collapse, as hunger hits 95 per cent of families’, 22 September 2021; UN News, ‘Salaries for Afghanistan health workers sends ‘message of hope’ to millions’, 10 November 2021.
  • 51
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard,
    15 November 2021, p. 44.
  • 52
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 43.
  • 53
    Ms Brigid O’Farrell, Policy and Advocacy Adviser, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 43.
  • 54
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 8.
  • 55
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 40.
  • 56
    Ms Nadine Haddad, Senior Policy Adviser, Conflict and Fragility, World Vision Australia, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 40.
  • 57
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 21.
  • 58
    Mr Muzafar Ali, Community Representative, Co-Founder, Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 25. See also: Mr Barat Ali Batoor, Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, pp. 56–57.
  • 59
    Mr Muzafar Ali, Community Representative, Co-Founder, Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 25.
  • 60
    Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 41.
  • 61
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 40.
  • 62
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 42.
  • 63
    Ms Jackie Fristacky AM, President, Afghan Australian Development Organisation, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 41.
  • 64
    Dr Nouria Salehi AM, Executive Director, Afghan Australian Development Organisation, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 41.
  • 65
    Mr Christopher Nyamandi, Country Director, Save the Children, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 41.
  • 66
    Ms Brigid O’Farrell, Policy and Advocacy Adviser, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 42. See also ACFID, Submission 53, pp. 14–15; AADO, Submission 38, pp. 2–3; Save the Children, Submission 52, p. 9.
  • 67
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 42.
  • 68
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 4.
  • 69
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 3.
  • 70
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 12.
  • 71
    Mr Timothy Watkin, Director of Policy and Advocacy, ACFID, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 42.
  • 72
    DFAT, Submission 22, pp. 1–2.
  • 73
    DFAT, Submission 22, p. 6.
  • 74
    Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘UN High-level Ministerial meeting on the Humanitarian situation in Afghanistan’, Virtual Address, 13 September 2021, www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/speech/un-high-level-ministerial-meeting-humanitarian-situation-afghanistan (accessed 15 November 2021).
  • 75
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 27.
  • 76
    Mr Gary Cowan, First Assistant Secretary, North and South Asia Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, pp. 44–45.
  • 77
    Mr Timothy Watkin, Director of Policy and Advocacy, ACFID, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 38.
  • 78
    Mr Timothy Watkin, Director of Policy and Advocacy, ACFID, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 42.
  • 79
    Ms Brigid O’Farrell, Policy and Advocacy Advisor, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 43.
  • 80
    Mr Timothy Watkin, Director of Policy and Advocacy, ACFID, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 38. See also ACFID, Submission 53, p. 2.
  • 81
    Dr Louise Olliff, Senior Policy Adviser, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 21.
  • 82
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 12.
  • 83
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 4.
  • 84
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 5.
  • 85
    World Vision Australia, Submission 55, p. 5.
  • 86
    Ms Jackie Fristacky AM, President, Afghan Australian Development Organisation, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 41.
  • 87
    Ms Brigid O’Farrell, Policy and Advocacy Adviser, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 42.
  • 88
    Mr Nawid Cina, Acting General Manager, Mahboba’s Promise, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 34.
  • 89
    Mr Nawid Cina, Acting General Manager, Mahboba’s Promise, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 35.
  • 90
    Professor Felicity Gerry, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 6. See also Her Excellency Hasina Safi, Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad and Professor Felicity Gerry QC, Answers to questions on notice from public hearing held 15 November 2021 (received 24 November 2021).
  • 91
    Ms Jackie Fristacky AM, President, Afghan Australian Development Organisation, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 39. See also AADO, Submission 38, pp. 4–6.
  • 92
    Dr Louise Olliff, Senior Policy Adviser, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 21.
  • 93
    The Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination is a global initiative aimed at enhancing mutual knowledge and coordination, communication and coherence between diaspora humanitarian actors and the institutional humanitarian system. See: www.demac.org/about-us (accessed 18 November 2021).
  • 94
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 26.
  • 95
    Mr Muzafar Ali, Community Representative, Co-Founder, Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 26.
  • 96
    Mr Muzafar Ali, Community Representative, Co-Founder, Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 23.
  • 97
    AADO, Submission 38, pp. 7–8.
  • 98
    ACFID, Submission 53, p. 13.
  • 99
    Mr Christopher Nyamandi, Country Director, Save the Children, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 43.
  • 100
    RCA, Submission 59, p. 3.
  • 101
    Mr Simon Newnham, Acting Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 45.
  • 102
    Mr Simon Newnham, Acting Deputy Secretary, International Security, Humanitarian and Consular Group, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 45.
  • 103
    Mr Ian McCartney, Deputy Commissioner, AFP, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021,
    p. 15.
  • 104
    Ms Brigid O’Farrell, Policy and Advocacy Adviser, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 43.
  • 105
    Mr Mat Tinkler, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, International Programs, Save the Children Australia, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, pp. 43–44.
  • 106
    See for example: Kate Banville, ‘‘A distressing time’: end of Afghanistan war takes emotional toll on Australian veterans’, The Guardian, 17 August 2021; Daniel Hurst, ‘’We lost our way’: ex-soldiers regret how Australia got bogged down in Afghanistan’, The Guardian, 18 April 2021; Hamish Cole and Peter Riley, ‘Mental health concerns for veterans due to Afghanistan turmoil’, ABC News, 20 August 2021.
  • 107
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 9
  • 108
    Dr Jason Barnett, Submission 10, p. 4.
  • 109
    Mr Andrew Greene, ‘Veterans burn medals to protest Australia’s ‘failure’ to protect Afghan translators from the Taliban’, ABC News, 19 July 2021.
  • 110
    See for example GAP Veteran and Legal Services, Submission 18; Veteran Support Force, Submission 27; Forsaken Fighters, Submission 58.
  • 111
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 9.
  • 112
    Mr Jason Scanes, Founder, Forsaken Fighters Australia, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 9.
  • 113
    Mr Jason Scanes, Founder, Forsaken Fighters Australia, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 7.
  • 114
    Mr Jason Scanes, Founder, Forsaken Fighters Australia, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 14.
  • 115
    Mr Hugh Poate, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 4.
  • 116
    Mr Matthew Doran, ‘Calls for support from ADF personnel and veterans double in days after Justice Paul Brereton’s findings about alleged war crimes’, ABC News, 24 November 2020.
  • 117
    Major Heston Russell (Rtd), Managing Director, Veteran Support Force Ltd, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 12.
  • 118
    APS, Submission 48, p. 2.
  • 119
    APS, Submission 48, p. 2.
  • 120
    APS, Submission 48, p. 2.
  • 121
    Department of Defence (Defence), Submission 20, p. 4.
  • 122
    Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 44.
  • 123
    Major General Natasha Fox AM, CSC, Head People Capability, Defence, Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, pp. 44–45.
  • 124
    Rear Admiral Sarah Sharkey, Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 45.
  • 125
    Defence, Answers to question on notice from public hearing held 11 October 2021 (received 22 October 2021), pp. 21–25.
  • 126
    DVA, Submission 21, p. 1.
  • 127
    Ms Liz Cosson, DVA, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 27 October 2021, p. 95.
  • 128
    DVA, Submission 21, p. 1.
  • 129
    Ms Liz Cosson, DVA, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 27 October 2021, p. 108.
  • 130
    DVA, Submission 21, p. 1.
  • 131
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 17. See also AFP, Submission 34, p. 10.
  • 132
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 17.
  • 133
    Mr Ian McCartney, Deputy Commissioner, AFP, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021,
    p. 18.
  • 134
    Mr Matt Anderson, AWM, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 27 October 2021, p. 94.
  • 135
    Mr Matt Anderson, AWM, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 27 October 2021, p. 94.

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