Chapter 4 - Precipitating industrial conflict
The more that government has withdrawn support from the
sector the more it has wanted to interfere in the system.
Dr Tim Batten, University
of New England[1]
23.1 Section 33-15 of
the bill provides financial incentives to encourage industrial relations
reforms in universities. If universities comply with requirements, like the
National Governance Protocols and Government workplace relations policies, and
the Minister is satisfied with their compliance, individual universities will
obtain an increased grant of 2.5 per cent in 2005, 5 per cent in 2006 and 7.5
per cent in a later year.
23.2 The Government’s
core goal in the industrial relations provisions of its policy package is to
compulsorily introduce individual contracts – Australian Workplace Agreements
or AWAs – into universities. In fact, AWAs offer no greater flexibility than
common law contracts, which most universities already use for up to 20 percent
or more of their employees. Collective Certified Agreements also offer the
‘flexibility’ that the Government is apparently looking for: even staff
employed on conditions of a Certified Agreement can be paid above minimum rates
to reflect labour market circumstances, performance factors and the other
conditions that the Minister has identified.
23.3 The Government’s
interest in forcing AWAs onto the university sector rests on the fact that AWAs
override all other conditions of a Certified Agreement, including floor salary
and conditions. They permit a lowering of conditions as well as diminishing the
role of unions in the higher education sector, an issue which has long
preoccupied this Government.
23.4 Since the ending
of full salary supplementation in 1996, universities have been faced with a
growing dilemma: in order to make ends meet, they have had to rely on internal
productivity gains through containment of salaries and staff numbers, while at
the same time increasing student numbers (especially international and other
fee-paying students). This has inevitably led to a blowout in student-staff
ratios of over 30 per cent.
23.5 Rather than
moving to restore indexation, the Government’s strategy looks to price
deregulation for domestic undergraduate students to provide future revenue
growth. If one assumes there is adequate demand from students, economies of
scale will allow providers to reduce costs and maintain higher income margins.
Conversely, those institutions unable to command premium prices will have to
lower their costs, including their staff hiring costs, to remain competitive.
Inexorably, these institutions will decline in status and quality, fail to
attract the best students and staff, and be forced to cut out those activities
that do not generate income surpluses. They will cease to be what we currently
regard as ‘universities’ and become mere education service providers.
23.6 The industrial
relations clauses of this legislative package, taken alone, have the potential
to derail the legislation. Thus on one level it is difficult to understand why
the Government has accorded them such prominence or of any benefit to
university teaching or research. The major difficulty for the Government in
relation to these industrial relations clauses is convincing anyone that they
are actually relevant to higher education ‘reform’. Nonetheless the committee,
with its long and experienced oversight of the Government’s industrial
relations policy, does see a connection with the higher education sector, and
it is more sinister than might first appear.
23.7 In the
committee’s view, the introduction into universities of Australian Workplace
Agreements would undermine the collegiate spirit which is a characteristic of
universities, and which has so far been maintained in spite of the increased
casualisation of the academic workforce. Universities would indeed be turned
into ‘higher education providers’ – far from the concept of ‘community of
scholars’. However, it appears to be the Government’s view that there is
nothing that is significantly different between a university and any other
‘workplace’ or enterprise, and so it would be unfair to give universities any
selective treatment or exemptions imposed on other workplaces. Notwithstanding
this, the Government’s approach is disingenuously selective: the committee
makes the obvious point that the Government has not sought to ensure that AWAs
are offered to all employees working in government departments.
23.8 The Government
would probably argue that industrial relations in universities, while not an
issue that arouses any wide public interest, will be an issue as long as the
NTEU encourages a form of pattern bargaining that some university
administrations have complained about in submissions to the Crossroads
review. But, it is of interest to the committee that this matter was not raised
by any vice-chancellor at public hearings. Nor was this issue even touched on
in any university submission. The Government senator on the committee did
question witnesses on the evidence provided to the Crossroads review,
leaving some doubt as to how seriously the committee should regard this
evidence. It appears that most stakeholders, if they think about it at all,
regard the issue of pattern bargaining as a minor one. Instead, there was
strong and unanimous opposition to the introduction of AWAs.
23.9 A useful
overview of the continuing industrial disharmony which has characterised
Government policy since 1996 was provided to the committee in Armidale by Dr
Tim Batten. He points out that the proposals in the policy, and reflected in
the bill, accentuate the trend in industrial relations that has existed for
some years. The more government has withdrawn support from the sector the more
it has wanted to interfere in the system. He continues:
The previous round of enterprise bargaining was made much more
difficult than it needed to be, largely because the so-called Kemp agenda made
it so fraught with difficulty. Until recently, indications were that the
present round of enterprise bargaining might be less difficult in that respect.
However, the industrial relations details released on Monday of this week by
ministers Abbott and Nelson are extremely disappointing in what they signal.
...The third point is that the package seems certain to lead to an increased
stratification of a sector already too differentiated by access to funds and
resources. The fourth point is that the proposals fail to address in any
meaningful way the real workplace issues that face university staff, increasing
unacceptably high student to staff ratios, unpaid overtime in the general staff
and greater stress in the sector.[2]
23.10 This depressing
warning of likely strife contrasts with evidence the committee heard from many
other witnesses, especially vice-chancellors, of a currently prevailing
harmonious and optimistic industrial outlook. The committee can only urge the
Senate to reject this legislation, acknowledging that university staff and
management will have to decide between them whether to fight among themselves
over AWAs or whether to form a common front in opposition to the Government’s
policy.
Recommendation
That the industrial relations conditions as contained in the draft
guidelines issued on 3 November 2003 be rejected because they would only serve
to damage the quality of the core teaching and research functions of
universities, would undermine staff conditions and unfairly target the valuable
contribution of unions.
Recommendation
Clause 33-15 increases in assistance for higher education
providers meeting certain requirements
The link in clause 33–15 requiring compliance with the centrally
determined National Governance Protocols and the Howard Government’s industrial
relations policies in order to gain funding, be rejected by the Senate because
it is unfair, unworkable, and unnecessary.
Industrial blackmail
23.11 Industrial
relations is a serious issue in this inquiry because of the financial
implications for universities in their compliance or otherwise with
requirements listed in clause 33-15 of the Higher Education Support Bill. This
states that:
a higher education provider’s basic grant amount for a year is
increased ... if (a) the Commonwealth Grant Scheme Guidelines impose on higher
education providers ... (ii) requirements based on the workplace relations
policies of the Australian Government; and (b) the Minister is satisfied that
the provider met those requirements...
23.12 The import of
(a) is that funds will only be made available if the Senate does not disallow
such guidelines. The import of (b) is that, even if funds are available,
universities will not have access to them if they do not comply with the
requirements specified in the guidelines.
23.13 If universities
agree to sign up to the protocols on AWAs they will take a share of the $404
million which has been set aside as additional funding for 2004-06. The
committee notes the varying reactions to this offer, which is provoking
strained relations between university administrations and staff. The
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney has stalled the signing of an
enterprise agreement until the fate of the legislation becomes clear. In a
contrasting decision, the Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University
has signed off on a recently negotiated enterprise agreement. The committee can
only speculate on whether this example will be followed by other universities,
and whether it is the beginning of the ‘common front’ referred to above. This
funding is to continue as part of Backing Australia’s Future, where the
Government has established a workplace productivity program under which $55.2
million will be provided in 2006-07.
23.14 The committee
asked NTEU witnesses at the University of New England what the effect would be
on UNE of the industrial relations statement issued by Ministers’ Abbott and Nelson
on 22 September 2003. The response was interesting in regard to the dynamics of
enterprise bargaining negotiations over time:
The impact would be something like this. The last round of
enterprise bargaining was extremely difficult. That is an understatement. There
were local factors in that which I will not specify. I do not want to damage
present relations, which have improved quite a bit since two years ago.
But the overriding factor, or an extremely strong factor, in how
enterprise bargaining was conducted last time was the Kemp agenda and a
university administration having to second-guess what the minister at the time
would approve or disapprove. Until now, in this present round of enterprise
bargaining—which is well under way in this university and has gone extremely
positively compared to last time—the IR component of the Nelson package had
been more of a minor nuisance than an overriding factor which was determining
the course of events. As of Monday, however, that seems to have changed. If you
look at the events at Sydney University just in the last 24 hours, you will see
an indication that university administrations are now going to be very
reluctant to engage in genuine enterprise bargaining.[3]
23.15 This is how the
Government precipitates industrial conflict. The introduction of AWAs was
always going to face serious challenges, but by sabotaging enterprise agreement
negotiations, the Government presumably expects that AWAs will at least get a
foot in the door of universities.
23.16 The committee
notes that Edith Cowan University submitted to the Crossroads review
that it supported government action to reduce pattern bargaining. At the
hearing in Perth, Vice-Chancellor Millicent Poole was critical of the linking
of an industrial relations policy to the rest of the package. The deputy
vice-chancellor stated that the university did not think the reforms would
provide it with any more flexibility than it currently had. ‘...we do not think
either side of politics recognises the extent to which employment conditions
have changed in universities’.[4]
It should be noted that Edith Cowan University is the second or third lowest
funded university in the country, arguably being underfunded to the extent of
at least $5 million per year. In the absence of indexation of grants to cover
wage rises, the anxieties of Edith Cowan and universities in a similar position
are understandable. The point to note here is that the Government is using the
promise of industrial relations changes as a kind of substitute for adequate
funding for wage increases: a ploy which is too transparent to be taken
seriously.
Pattern bargaining allegation
The charge of pattern bargaining needs to be addressed. The
Government has conducted a legislative campaign directed against industry
unions on this issue for years, without success. It has no relevance in regard
to university salaries and conditions, which are negotiated at the university
level. The NTEU puts a floor under the salaries to be negotiated, but the
outcome results in significant variations in salaries and conditions within
institutions and across the sector. The extent of pattern bargaining engaged in
by Commonwealth agencies exceeds that carried out by the NTEU.
23.17 Critics of the
NTEU salary floor should also appreciate the undesirable effects of wide
variations in salaries offered by universities. Australian universities, which
operate in a global market, already lag behind a surprisingly large number of
countries in terms of salary levels. All universities want to offer good
salaries to attract and hold staff. If the Government intends that AWAs will
have the desirable effect of depressing wages in some institutions, then this
can only result in a greatly diminished quality of education on offer at these
universities.
23.18 The Government’s
insistence that Australian Workplace Agreements be offered to university staff
in any round of enterprise bargaining has already realised the potential to
cause disruption, or at least disharmony, throughout the sector. It is little
wonder that vice-chancellors have been highly critical of these provisions in
the bill. The inclusion of these provisions, together with the governance provisions,
have made it much harder for the Government to retain the support of its normal
supporters.
23.19 This was most
apparent in the evidence given by Professor Alan Gilbert, who described the
industrial relations guidelines as an example of ‘bureaucracy run riot’. He
went on to say:
I think the guidelines subvert the very idea of a workplace
agreement. I have been an objector for a long time to the fact that the unions
have a gatekeeper role which can mean that a university like mine, which I
think has a superb industrial relations environment, can be forced by the
union’s gatekeeper role to do things that we know will damage the academic
community. The government is doing exactly the same thing as the union. It is
giving itself a gatekeeper role and saying, ‘Unless you create a standardised
approach to IR we will not provide you with funds.’ I think it is indefensible.[5]
23.20 Professor
Gilbert spoke of his pride in achieving a much higher productivity and a very
large degree of flexibility in relation to workplace agreements at Melbourne University,
but he deplored any action that would push the university into a
confrontationist course and tear a collegial community apart. That is something
that is worth more than the money, in his belief.[6]
23.21 Another
vice-chancellor, Professor Peter Sheehan spoke to the committee in more
troubled tones about the threat of disruption. He clearly regarded the
inclusion of industrial relations and AWA provisions as a provocation:
I think workplace agreements are still to some extent selective.
Universities have been singled out. There are a number of professions in which
workplace agreements are not running current. Enterprise bargaining, the role
of the unions and their position with respect to AWAs are really explosive
issues. The government knew about that. When I say I was disappointed I was
hoping for some kind of wording that would allow access to funding. What I fear
now—and that is why I use the term ‘disappointed’—is that our access to those
funds will be blocked by the confrontation and conflict ahead.[7]
23.22 Concerns about
disruption and disharmony were also expressed by the Vice-Chancellor of
Victoria University of Technology:
... the industrial conditions in the package are a shock to us. I
am a new vice-chancellor, and one of my aspirations is to build a sense of
trust and confidence with the staff. I am personally on record as supporting
more flexible arrangements and greater choice in employment conditions for
academics, but the industrial criteria in this package give me little room for
a constructive dialogue about some critical issues with Victoria University
staff. I have not mentioned that the industrial conditions put our financial
situation in more dire straits—that is, the $9 million to $12 million, which we
face losing in the transition period, and the $1 million to $3 million
thereafter are at the outer ends if we do not achieve the industrial conditions
which allow us to receive an additional 2.5 per cent per annum.[8]
23.23 The evidence of
Professors Sheehan and Harman convey some idea of the additional pressures
placed on vice-chancellors by ill-considered legislation. Along with many other
provisions in the Higher Education Support Bill, the industrial relations
requirements virtually guarantee that vice-chancellors will be caught in the
dilemma of whether to threaten the collegiate harmony of their institutions or
go for the money. Professor Gilbert doubts that it is worth the cost. But, as Professor
Poole, pointed out to the committee in Perth, he was in the fortunate position
of being able to do so.[9]
23.24 A number of
vice-chancellors have described how their universities provide common law
contracts to cover different categories of employees, and that these are much
more flexible and less cumbersome than AWAs. The fact that this arrangement
works well, and is accepted by the NTEU, is probably sufficient evidence for
the Government to assume that AWAs go beyond what is needed. As the NTEU
submission noted in regard to common law contracts:
There is nothing in any of the NTEU’s Certified Agreements that
prevents the payment of additional salaries, bonuses, allowances or the
granting of additional leave or family-friendly arrangements.
Moreover, where employers have sought to negotiate these, NTEU
Agreements provide for common-law contracts (‘senior performance management
contracts’) which enable flexibility in respect of senior staff positions,
displacing the certified agreement provisions in areas such as discipline,
termination, performance, leave loadings, redundancy and salary increases.[10]
23.25 The committee
noted the importance placed on harmonious industrial relations by all
university stakeholders. Relations between staff and administrations in some
universities have not always been good. The understanding of the potential
dangers of a return to industrial instability for the long-term wellbeing of
universities has probably resulted in an acceptance on the part of both
academic and general staff, and university management, that doctrinaire stances
and ‘efficiency first’ policies are out of place. There has clearly been much
compromise achieved. As the committee heard from an NTEU member in Perth:
I believe that if you look at our productivity gains—if you look
at the increase in almost any measure, from staff-student ratios to however you
care to measure productivity—this has been a very productive sector. The
existing system has led to very little in the way of industrial strife and to
great increases in flexibility. One thing that is often not realised is how
much the sector has changed in the last decade or two. Our management now has
the ability to reward performance; they have the ability to offer overt award
payments linked to market forces; they have the ability to input merit and
strategic factors. So there is great flexibility to reward good performance and
performance above the norm.[11]
23.26 Adding further
weight to vice-chancellor opinion, Professor Daryl Le Grew summed up in broad
terms the sense of exasperation felt by university leaders at the Government’s
apparent inability to grasp some simple points about AWAs and the nature of the
university as a workplace:
On the basis of the industrial relations reforms, we find that
what is being proposed is unworkable. We think that our capacity to negotiate,
as we do, with our staff is compromised by an overemphasis and strictures that
are being put in place by provisions of AWA’s. I would like to point out, and I
have pointed this out in other places, that the University of Tasmania already
has quite a flexible approach to the way in which we construct our
employment—we build it on the base of our collective agreements, and we think
that is a good thing. Over the top of that we have L to K agreements, common
law contract agreements and negotiated performance pay agreements across the
university—these are transparent agreements that occur every year. So we have a
raft of flexibility that we think achieves all that the government wants to
achieve. We do not know why there is a continuing and obsessive commitment to
something which appears to be more ideologically driven than logically driven
at the present time. We are interested in outcomes and we can present the
government with outcomes. We think we have done that, but we do not seem to be
getting that through.[12]
23.27 As the committee
argues in this chapter, Professor Le Grew’s achievement of good outcomes is not
something that the Government is interested in: it is the way these outcomes
are to be achieved which is at the core of clause 33-15.
23.28 University
administrators dislike being dictated to by governments and officials who lay
claims to competence in the field of management. They regard this, rightly, as
unwarranted intrusion in their autonomy and their efficient operations. As the
committee was reminded by Professor Alan Robson, Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University
of Western Australia:
We are totally opposed to tying funding increases to the
introduction of Australian workplace agreements or to being dictated to about
how to organise industrial relations within the university. Despite what people
might think, universities are very good at human resource management, and they
have negotiated significant industrial reform which has been in the best
interests of both the staff and the university.[13]
Objections to AWAs
23.29 The NTEU
submission stated that there are only two reasons to use an Australian
Workplace Agreement in higher education: either to deprive employees of rights
they would have under a certified agreement or to meet the ideological
prescriptions of the Government. It claimed that since most universities do not
want to reduce conditions and already have ‘flexibility’, it is not surprising
that there is no clamour, even among employers, for AWAs in higher education.[14]
23.30 South Australian
NTEU members were asked what was unacceptable about the offer of an AWA to
university personnel. The reply was that some staff might be vulnerable to
pressure or may be talked into AWAs as a result of their inexperience. As one
witness described it:
We are saying that there is the potential for people coming in
at ground level, particularly young people—and I would not say particularly
women, but in many of these low level 3 and level 4 general staff
positions a lot of them are women. I could certainly see an environment where
they would be told. We have already had the example in our university of
advertisements for general staff positions containing words that are outside
the agreement. I see it as a ‘thin end of the wedge’ thing. I would not be at
all surprised to know that in some areas of my university there would be
managers in this position putting pressure on people to sign AWAs.[15]
23.31 The committee
believes it likely that the AWA measure is an attempt to undermine collective
bargaining over the long-term, although it doubts that this would ever be
achieved. In the committee’s view, such an outcome would, in any case, be
undesirable. It is not only that university employees are likely to have more
‘political savvy’ than employees in many other organisations, but there is also
likely to be a wary or skeptical attitude to advice that AWAs are in the best
interest of employees. It would need to be shown that AWAs delivered salary
packages as generous as those of other contracts and agreements. AWAs have no
purpose in universities other than to place those who accept them on lower
levels of salaries and conditions.
23.32 As the committee
heard from NTEU members in Perth:
The only reason I can see for introducing the AWAs, given that
we have a number of systems in place to reward over performance, is a punitive
one to drive down wages and costs. We already have the flexibility to encourage
and reward performance and also to respond of administering to market forces.[16]
23.33 Another
objection to AWAs was that they are regarded as extremely disruptive and
costly. The cost is in relation to their negotiation and registration. Perhaps
a more important objection was their likely adverse effect on staff morale.[17]
Other impositions on unions
23.34 The Government’s
industrial relations policy in regard to universities even extends to
prohibiting universities from providing rent-free accommodation. The NTEU
submission includes the following:
According to a report in The Age on Wednesday 6th August 2003, “Canberra Plan to Hit Staff Unions”, this agenda might include a
requirement that the union’s on-campus offices be removed.
This proposal shows a gross ignorance of the important role
played by staff representatives within universities through union
organisation. Universities are large organisations and the NTEU Branch and its
local officers, play an important role in consulting management and are usually
represented on a range of university Committees and Branch Enterprise
Agreements which also require the university, and the union, to play a role in
consultation over staff issues. Many union representatives are required, as
part of contributing to the collegial processes of university life, to
contribute their views to university decision-making. This invariably involves
the commitment of many hours of unpaid time.[18]
23.35 The NTEU says
that in these circumstances, it is not surprising that universities have
entered into arrangements with other unions, so that they are able to utilise
or rent modest office facilities within universities. The presence of such
offices and facilities make the process of consultation and representation more
efficient. The committee agrees with the NTEU that ‘any proposal to link the
funding of education programmes to decisions by universities about how they
allocate their office-space would be merely laughable if they did not also constitute
an egregious interference in institutional autonomy.’[19]
The committee, unfortunately, is unlikely ever to know the original sources of
these bizarre attempts to cleanse university campuses of any physical presence
of organised staff or student representative bodies.
23.36 Amendments to
the Workplace Relations Act are planned in order to empower the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission to end protected industrial action, by
requiring the AIRC to take particular account of the welfare of particular
classes of people, who will happen to be those in the care of health, community
services or education systems, including students. This measure, which removes
the right to strike, is almost certain to be strongly opposed by all unions
concerned. The committee, in its workplace relations oversight capacity, will
almost certainly be dealing with this legislation when it is introduced.
23.37 The NTEU submits
that under the existing legislation, employers have applied, and on one
occasion succeeded, in obtaining orders against the NTEU from the AIRC to cease
industrial action, and the NTEU has complied. The union argues that the
discretion currently vested in the AIRC is appropriate.
The very words of 170MW(a) already implicitly direct the
Commission’s attention to industries such as health, education and essential
services. There is no need to further amend the Act, unless the intention of
the Parliament is to render merely formal the right of employees in health,
education or community services to take protected industrial action.[20]
23.38 In this respect
the Government’s proposed amending legislation mirrors its other attempts to
strengthen legislation needlessly because the original intent was clear. It is
unlikely that the Government will be any more successful in this attempt at
amending the act than it has been previously.
Real industrial relations issues
23.39 The attempt in
the legislation to impose AWAs on universities, provocative as it is, is not
the point at real issue in the continuing challenge of providing appropriate
and beneficial conditions of employment in universities. This issue might not
be addressed directly in any ‘reform’ legislation, but it is directly relevant
to the proper funding of universities. The serious cut-backs in university
funding since 1996 have led to a marked deterioration in conditions of
employment, especially for academic staff, and have resulted in greatly
increased teaching loads which have affected the quality of the education
provided to students.
Deterioration in employment conditions
23.40 The NTEU has
submitted that since 1994 there has been a 44 per cent increase in the ratio of
students to teaching staff in universities. Added to this is the increased
workload, much of it unpaid overtime, necessary to conduct courses that bring
in fee-paying students, and to engage in other activities to raise income from
private sources. Anecdotal evidence of an ‘out of control’ workload is also
supported by research: McInnis[21]
found that levels of job satisfaction among academics had fallen from
67 per cent in 1993 to 51 per cent in 1999. Their dissatisfaction was
related to salaries, conditions, and declining opportunities to pursue
professional interests.
23.41 The study found
that 40 per cent of academics work more than 50 hours per week, while 55 per
cent reported increased workloads over the last five years. McInnis concluded
that the quality of teaching and research is threatened by such working
arrangements. During 2000, a major study was undertaken into stress levels in
universities.[22]
The study involved 17 universities, and a total of 8,732 responses. The
response rate was 25 per cent, and analyses suggest that the sample is
representative.
23.42 The NTEU points
out that staff in higher education have carried the brunt of declining
resources and increased student loads. Suggestions in the Backing
Australia’s Future package that high priorities were ‘effective performance
management systems’, and that probation and promotion decisions be linked to
student evaluation published on the institution’s website, could reasonably be
seen as deliberately designed to exacerbate the problems identified by the
research.[23]
23.43 The committee
has always championed effective quality assurance processes at all levels of
education and has often criticised governments for failing to provide them, but
finds it very disturbing that governments should be intruding into areas where
that intervention is likely to represent a serious threat to university
independence and to academic freedom. The proposal in Section 8 of Backing
Australia’s Future that academic salaries be linked to student evaluations
and management ‘perceptions’ is a concept strongly opposed by the committee
because of its potential to destroy the collegiate spirit which is part of the
intellectual life of universities. This idea is borrowed from the corporate
sector: one of many instances where policymakers appear to be confused about
the role of universities and why they cannot be like business entities and
remain universities. As Professor Daryl Le Grew made obvious in his evidence to
the committee:
What [this legislation] does not recognise...is that the staff of
a university are its intellectual property, its intellectual capital. Without
that intellectual capital nothing happens. We recognise that our staff are
probably not as well remunerated in comparison to international standards as
they might well be. We would love to be in a position, on balance, with regard
to the university’s overall budget, to improve that situation.[24]
Casualisation
23.44 This committee’s
2001 report, Universities in Crisis, gave detailed evidence of the
unfortunate trend toward casualisation of university employment, with
devastating effects on academic staff and on teaching. Universities have sought
to cope with the financial pressures on them by increase in casual hourly paid
staff.
23.45 According to the
NTEU, this has grown steadily during the period 1993 to 2000 as is shown in the
following table:
Table: increase in casual staff
YEAR
|
ACADEMIC
|
GENERAL
|
1993
|
14.6%
|
8.1%
|
2000
|
19.6%
|
11.8%
|
23.46 This is not to
argue that casual academic staff should not be used. Some casual staff with
particular professional or vocational expertise may wish to supplement their
teaching capacity, and casual tutors are traditionally recruited from among
postgraduate research students so as to supplement their income and providing
them with teaching experience necessary for an academic career. Universities
require specialists in some disciplines who may be available only on a casual
basis. Over the past decade, however, casual employment has been increased
simply as a cost-cutting measure. An estimated 40 per cent of all undergraduate
teaching is now done by casual hourly paid staff.
23.47 The employment
of large numbers of casual staff places a considerable burden on the shoulders
of a diminishing number of tenured staff, who are responsible for mentoring and
supervision. More significantly, the casualisation of work itself reduces the
opportunity for junior academic career aspirants to gain tenured appointments.
Most academic and general staff casuals are employed in continuing ‘permanent’
work and most would prefer not to be casual staff. In this, they are
representative of a high proportion of casual employees in all occupations. The
committee notes that they are all suffering the consequences of an employment
strategy promoted by the Government which has elevated employment ‘flexibility’
as ‘holy writ’.
23.48 The committee is
not therefore surprised to see references to more ‘flexible’ employment
practices in Section 8 of Backing Australia’s Future. This confirms the
Government’s intention to encourage even more recourse to precarious employment
in higher education.
23.49 It is clear to
the committee, as it would be to university stakeholders, that there is a clear
policy connection between the Government’s refusal to implement full cost
indexation for Commonwealth grants and its policy of encouraging labour
flexibility in universities. The restoration of full indexation would see a
fall in the rate of casualisation, and may encourage the expansion of tenured or
long-term contracted positions. Vice-chancellors in their desperate attempts to
attract good staff and build ‘communities of scholars’ have been arguing
strongly for indexation. The Government, which understands this campaign, is
just as determined to resist it. Therefore, all universities, especially those
with least access to external funding, will need to wait for a government to be
elected which has some respect for the role they have and some recognition
that, properly funded, they will make the best decisions for themselves.
Conclusion
23.50 Pragmatism has
no place in the Government’s industrial relations policy. It is not sufficient
for processes to work in practice: they must work according to theory. This is
probably why the Government would be willing to accept that AWAs may not be
taken up by any university employee, so long as they were available in
theory. Even so the universities have realized the power that a government
has to use an industrial relations issue to poison what were very good
relations between university administrators and staff. Even without one AWA on
the horizon, their potential to precipitate industrial disharmony is
considerable.
23.51 The committee
understands the overall strategy of the Government, and for that reason looks
at the evolving higher education industrial relations policy with even more
alarm than universities, for whom it appears as a bewildering aberration. It is
not. This is an attempt to precipitate industrial strife, and there is an
uncomfortable logic behind it. For a number of reasons, the committee is
strongly opposed to the offer of AWAs to university employees and the removal
of the current limit on the numbers of casual staff. Their purpose is only to
institutionalise a form of salary fixation which is contrary to the interests
of universities: their staff, their students and the role which they have in
the intellectual life of the nation.
23.52 All references
in this bill that tie Commonwealth Grants Scheme funding to industrial
relations reforms be removed. Such provisions are unnecessary, draconian and
destructive to the effective working of universities. Moreover, such
inappropriate interference by the Government into university industrial
relations detrimental interferes with the collegiate processes well established
in universities.
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