- AUKUS
Overview
4.1In September 2021, the Australian Government announced a new trilateral security partnership with the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US) known as ‘AUKUS’, through which Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). The purpose of the agreement is to enhance cooperation, provide long-term strategic benefits for the three parties, and promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
4.2AUKUS will deliver up to conventionally armed, eight nuclear-powered, submarines to Australia. The SSNs will improve Australia’s deterrence capability and strengthen interoperability between AUKUS partners, enhancing Australia’s national security and its ability to contribute to long-lasting regional security. The agreement will also facilitate trilateral industrial cooperation to develop advanced capabilities, improve supply chain resilience, and uplift the workforces and infrastructure of all parties to the agreement.
4.3This chapter will provide background information on the AUKUS partnership before exploring related issues that were raised in evidence presented to the Subcommittee. The chapter is not a comprehensive review of the AUKUS agreement but instead an examination of the implementation of the program and progress reported in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24.
4.4This chapter will provide background information on the AUKUS partnership which will be used to contextualise commentary on Australia’s progress within the agreement to date.
Background
4.5Submarines play an important role within Australia’s strategic environment. As a maritime nation, Australia utilises submarines to protect its trade routes, sea lines of communication and sovereign maritime approaches. The Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) states that ‘maintaining a submarine capability advantage over potential adversaries is critical for [Australia] defending itself and working with its partners’.
4.6The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) currently operates six diesel electric Collins class submarines which were delivered between 1996 and 2003. The intended lifespan of these submarines is 30 years, meaning the vessels are due to be retired from 2026. While the fleet is due to undergo a life-of-type-extension from 2026, the Australian Government identified the need to replace them with more advanced models in its 2009 Defence White Paper. This need for improved capability was reiterated with greater urgency in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update which acknowledged that Australia’s circumstances were changing, particularly with many countries in the Indo-Pacific accelerating their military modernisation.
4.7The Australian Government explored multiple replacement options through its Future Submarines Program before announcing the acquisition of SSNs under AUKUS. The benefits of SSNs over conventional submarines include superior stealth, speed, manoeuvrability, survivability, and endurance.
Pillars of AUKUS
4.8The AUKUS agreement is comprised of two pillars. Pillar 1 establishes a pathway for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, while Pillar 2 focuses on developing a range of advanced capabilities aiming to share technology and increase interoperability between the armed forces of each AUKUS partner nation.
Pillar 1 – Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines
4.9Pillar 1 of AUKUS focuses on the supply and delivery of eight conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. In March 2023, the leaders of the AUKUS nations announced the Optimal Pathway which will deliver to Australia a nuclear-powered submarine capability. Through the 2024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP), the Australian Government will invest $53–$63 billion in Pillar 1 from 2024–25 to 2033–34.
4.10The Optimal Pathway identified three key goals:
- DELIVER Australia a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability as soon as the early 2030s.
- ELEVATE all three nations’ industrial capacity to produce and sustain advanced and interoperable nuclear-powered submarines for decades to come.
- EXPAND our individual and collective undersea presence in the Indo-Pacific and contribute to global security and stability in the region.
- The Optimal Pathway is a phased approach which will ensure that Australia can safely operate, maintain and regulate naval nuclear propulsion technology, deliver SSN capability, improve responsiveness to the changing strategic environment and transform trilateral industrial bases to support SSN production, cooperation and maintenance. Radioactive waste will be generated by the use, maintenance and decommissioning of SSNs which the ASA has stated it will manage according to international best practice.
- The three phases of the pathway are:
- Phase 1 – Personnel uplift and Submarine Rotational Force-West
- Australian military and civilian personnel will be embedded within the UK and US Navies and industrial bases to accelerate relevant training.
- The US and UK will increase SSN port visits to Australia to allow Australian sailors to join foreign crews for training and development.
- From as early as 2027, the UK and US will establish a rotational presence of one UK Astute class submarine and up to four US Virginia class submarines at HMAS Stirling in WA. This initiative will be known as Submarine Rotational Force-West.
- Phase 2 – Acquisition of US Virginia class SSNs
- Australia will purchase three US Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines from the early 2030s onwards. This will expand capacity and address capability gaps caused by the retirement of the Collins class submarines. Australia will also have the option to seek approval to purchase up to two additional Virginia class submarines if required.
- Phase 3 – Delivery of SSN-AUKUS
- AUKUS partners will deliver SSN-AUKUS–a trilaterally-developed submarine based on the UK’s next-generation design that incorporates technology from all three nations.
- Australia and the UK will begin constructing SSN-AUKUS submarines in their domestic shipyards by the end of the decade. Delivery of the first Australian built SSN-AUKUS is intended for the early 2040s, while the UK intend to deliver their first by the late 2030s.
- The below infographic represents the intended timelines for Australia’s pathway to nuclear-powered submarine capability:
Figure 4.1Pathway to Australia's nuclear-powered submarine capability
Source: Australian Submarine Agency, Pathway to Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine Capability, p. 2.
Pillar 2 – Advanced capability development
4.14Pillar 2 of AUKUS concerns how the AUKUS nations will cooperate to develop advanced capabilities and emerging technologies. The IIP does not specify exactly how much the Australian Government will invest in Pillar 2 from 2024–25 to 2033–34.
4.15Pillar 2 is organised into eight working groups:
- innovation
- information-sharing
- undersea capabilities
- quantum science
- artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy
- advanced cyber
- hypersonic and counter-hypersonic
- electronic warfare.
- Collaboration between the UK, the US and Australia will involve an open-ended, multilateral arrangement which will include military industrial integration and multi-nation force interoperability. This integration is intended to benefit the AUKUS partners by providing a platform to develop technologies which may be utilised by each of the parties.
- Development of advanced capabilities includes a focus on undersea warfare capabilities, such as data-sharing between buoys for submarine detection, and testing of AI-enabled assets and machine-learning models. Pillar 2 also refers to boosting ‘space domain awareness’ networks which involves partner integration in space monitoring and will advance space mobility.
Progress of AUKUS
4.18Progress on implementing AUKUS has been made both during the period covered by the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 and in the time since its publication.
Progress reported in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24
4.19The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 details various milestones achieved by Australia in the 2023–24 calendar year for both Pillar 1 and Pillar 2.
- Under Pillar 1, the following milestones were achieved:
- In July 2023, the Australian Government established the ASA within the Defence portfolio,to deliver on and be accountable for Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
- In March 2024, the Australian Government announced that ASC Pty Ltd (Australia’s sovereign submarine builder and sustainer) and BAE Systems Australia had been selected to build Australia’s SSN-AUKUS submarines at Adelaide’s Osborne shipyard.
- In the 2023–24 period, RAN officers and sailors undertook training in the UK and the US in preparation for Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarine capability. This included RAN officers being posted to the US’s Virginia class submarines after graduating from their training.
- Throughout 2024, the Australian Government passed legislation to support the AUKUS treaty. This included the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024, the Defence Amendment (Safeguarding Australia’s Military Secrets) Act 2024, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act 2024 and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Act 2024.
- Under Pillar 2, the following milestones were achieved:
- The Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator which was established May 2023 is playing a role in supporting the development of technologies and translating them into defence capabilities for both the ADF and for the AUKUS partners.
- In December 2023, AUKUS defence ministers unveiled a suite of projects under Pillar 2, including the AUKUS maritime autonomy exercise series, trilateral anti-submarine warfare and resilient and autonomous AI technologies.
- In late 2023, autonomy and AI technologies were tested through the Trusted Operation of Robotic Vehicles in a Contested Environment trial. Under the trial UK, US and Australian technologies were combined to ‘test leading-edge artificial intelligence in uncrewed robotic vehicles, investigating their ability to complete missions and preserve network connectivity in a contested environment’.
Progress since the Defence Annual Report 2023–24
4.20AUKUS has continued progressing since the publication of the Defence Annual Report 2023–24. In its first submission to the inquiry, the Department of Defence (Defence) notes the following milestones:
- AUKUS partners have established an export licence-free environment to streamline the export, re-export and transfer of goods and technologies between AUKUS countries. Since September 2024, this has resulted in each nation’s industrial, higher education and research sectors being able to export military and dual-use goods, technologies and services between each other without the need for licences.
- Since its establishment in 2024, the Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum has operated as the primary interface between AUKUS governments and industry representatives to inform policy, technical, and commercial frameworks.
- In March 2024, AUKUS partners launched the first Pillar 2 innovation challenge focused on electromagnetic spectrum technologies and capabilities that provide a competitive advantage to electromagnetic targeting.
- In April 2024, AUKUS defence ministers announced principles for engaging additional partners on opportunities to collaborate under Pillar 2. This included consultations with Japan on improving interoperability with Japan’s maritime autonomous systems, which has since become an initial area of cooperation.
- In June and August 2024, Defence held the first and second Australian Advanced Capabilities Dialogue. The dialogue, through classified and unclassified briefings, brought together stakeholders from Australian industry and academia.
- In September 2024, AUKUS defence ministers announced that ongoing consultations to identify additional opportunities for collaboration under Pillar 2 were being conducted with Canada, New Zealand and Republic of Korea.
- Additional recent milestones include:
- In August 2024, AUKUS partners signed the Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion agreement which enables the sharing of submarine naval nuclear propulsion information, and the transfer of material and equipment to Australia for the construction, operation and sustainment of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. In November 2024, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommended binding treaty action be taken for the agreement.
- In March 2025, the Australian Government released Australia’s AUKUS Submarine Industry Strategy. The strategy is intended to provide clarity for industry in relation to AUKUS, increasing confidence within the sector to enter AUKUS supply chains.
- In July 2025, the UK and Australia signed the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement which will further support the delivery of Australia’s first locally constructed nuclear submarines. The treaty will underpin the development of the required workforce, infrastructure and regulatory systems for Australia to produce and operate a nuclear submarine capability. The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommended binding treaty action be taken on the agreement in October 2025.
- The Australian Government has announced infrastructure upgrades and enhancements to support AUKUS in Western Australia. At HMAS Stirling, the Australian Government has committed $8 billion to prepare the base to host Submarine Rotational Force-West and Australia’s own future submarine fleet. At HMAS Henderson, $12 billion has been committed to develop the base into a world class shipbuilding and sustainment precinct. While the primary intended purpose of this investment is to support continuous naval shipbuilding, the precinct will also contribute to AUKUS.
Opportunities and challenges of AUKUS
4.22Submissions to the inquiry discussed opportunities and challenges related to AUKUS. While submitters are largely supportive of the AUKUS agreement, various areas for improvement have been highlighted.
The strategic value of AUKUS
4.23Submitters largely agree that AUKUS is of great significance to Australia’s strategic position and national security, with the deepening of cooperation between the UK, US and Australia creating opportunities for significant technological progression within a rapidly changing security environment. The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and Security & Defence PLuS stated:
The AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is both timely and essential, reflecting the growing complexity of security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Heightened geopolitical competition, combined with rapid technological progress, demands that Australia develop cutting-edge capabilities in coordination with close allies. The move to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS Pillar 1 underscores the importance of technological superiority, interoperability, and a shared commitment to maintaining stability in the region.
4.24Defence echoed this assessment and emphasised the role that nuclear submarines will come to play in the National Defence Strategy:
As you're well aware, the nuclear-powered submarines are an enormous capability boost for Australia and an investment in the capability that they bring, including the ability to provide stealthy, survivable, lethal undersea systems that can operate at longer ranges. That capability is absolutely fundamental to our ability to achieve what is described in the National Defence Strategy as a Strategy of Denial, which involves deterring military actions that threaten our interests and deterring any country within the region from considering projecting force against Australia or initiating a conflict within the region.
4.25In its submission to the inquiry, Defence again emphasised the role that the tangible capacity provided by AUKUS would play in enacting Australia's Strategy of Denial. Serco also recognised that the ‘generational uplift in capability’ through AUKUS would supplement Australia’s strategic shift and help address the expanding long-range strike, naval power, and unmanned systems of regional competitors.
4.26The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) stated that Australia’s Strategy of Denial could be supported by the technology priority areas of Pillar 2 and their ‘potential to generate tactical and operational surprises and defeat and decisive military advantage’. ASPI said that this could be further supported by Pillar 2 facilitating capacity sharing, including the arming of future Virginia class SSNs and SSN AUKUS.
4.27Defence has cited Australia’s military technological superiority as an essential factor in deterring potential adversaries. As nations within the Indo-Pacific continue to develop their military capabilities, submitters identified AUKUS as a critical opportunity for Australia to secure an advantage by collaborating with the UK and the US to propel its collective capabilities beyond those of potential adversaries.
4.28RAND Australia (RAND) recognised the challenge in maintaining this superiority, stating that ‘as the paradigm of warfare shifts in response to the emergence of disruptive technologies such as AI, even the US is challenged to maintain a technological advantage’. RAND identified the importance of Pillar 2 in retaining a strategic advantage in the region, describing it as a ‘coordinated effort to achieve advantage in key emerging technology areas’.
4.29RAND also identified barriers that are impeding the progress of AUKUS, including a lack of direction for how AUKUS nations should focus their efforts and overcome bureaucratic barriers:
There is not a formalised, replicable mechanism for focusing trilateral efforts — even within AI as a technology focus area. Instead, actors within each state ecosystem are pursuing their own priorities based on their respective national requirements. AUKUS members have not successfully implemented a mechanism for jointly designating (and, crucially, jointly funding) specific priority challenges, or for jointly committing to long-term investments in mutually designated targeted use cases. Nor have the AUKUS members established formal mechanisms for resolving bureaucratic barriers, instead continuing to overcome such barriers on a case-by-case basis, albeit with a general level of success.
4.30RAND argues that Australia must address these challenges to support AUKUS Pillar 2 to avoid ‘legal, political, structural and regulatory obstructions’ which have negatively impacted collaboration between Australia and its strategic partners in the past.
4.31Mr David Goodrich OAM, Executive Chairman and CEO of Anduril Australia, pointed to Australia’s long-time alliance with its AUKUS partners and the strategic benefits leveraging this alliance for AUKUS could provide:
We [Anduril] are investing significantly around the world in massive facilities to produce capabilities that the allies need. AUKUS Pillar 2 is an opportunity to work smarter together and to invest, from the alliance's perspective, in one place to do one thing and in another place to do another thing, with potentially distributed manufacturing of those things, no matter where they are developed, in all three countries. That's a smart way to use the alliance and the trust and the relationship that goes back decades, and sometimes a century, in a very compelling way, where our adversaries do not have that luxury. So I think what we need to be thinking of is using the scarce resources that we have to get better bang for our buck.
4.32Ms Jennifer Parker, Non-Resident Fellow at the Lowy Institute, discussed the importance of Australia’s maritime domain and the potential for nuclear-powered submarines to protect critical shipping lanes. Ms Parker noted Australia’s reliance on seaborne supplies and the role SSNs would play in a Strategy of Denial:
The knowledge that a nuclear-powered submarine would be potentially operating in that vicinity means that naval task groups are unlikely to try and operate there. AUKUS and nuclear-powered submarines have a range of roles, from insertion of special forces to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. But, in terms of protecting our seaborne supply, they restrict the ability of a potential adversary to interfere with our seaborne supply, which I think is critical.
Industry engagement
4.33Submissions from defence industry were broadly supportive of the Australian Government’s intentions to involve industry in the rollout of AUKUS but raised concerns with the lack of direction provided and subsequent difficultly in practically engaging with the project.
4.34The Australian Industry and Defence Network (AIDN) and the Australian Industry Group (Ai Group) both voiced these concerns in relation to the function of the ASA and the lack of effective consultation between the agency and industry. Ai Group claimed that ‘the ASA is engaging minimally with defence industry,’ limiting their access to industry expertise. AIDN shared concerns around the lack of consultation and reported that it has been difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises to engage with the ASA.
4.35Dr Jeffrey Wilson, Head of Research and Economics at the Ai Group, also emphasised the importance of timely industry engagement in the procurement process:
It's often said in defence industry that, by the time a request for tender or a procurement document is issued, a lot of the decisions around procurement and Australian defence industry participation have implicitly been made. So, when the department says, 'This is the capability we want,' and we design it, that already structures outcomes as to the extent and where and what Australian industry presently has and could also potentially and realistically develop on project timelines to be able to be part of that.
4.36In addition to timeliness, the Subcommittee also heard evidence that there is a lack of direction for industry on how they could best support AUKUS. Babcock Australasia noted that while progress had occurred since the announcement of the Optimal Pathway, there is still a need for more collaboration and clarity regarding acquisition, sustainment planning and execution:
Clarity will allow industry to build the right partnerships and right investments to contribute to the Optimal Pathway’s success. This is especially important for key aspects of Pillar 1 such as a Nuclear Skilled Qualified Experienced Personnel workforce, governance, infrastructure, to decommissioning. Governance of these complex assets, from cradle to grave of nuclear infrastructure are aspects that must be addressed as early as possible.
4.37Ms Kate Louis, Head of Defence and National Security at the Ai Group, also raised concerns relating to access to information and transparency, and the effect it has upon industry’s involvement with AUKUS:
The transparency problem, as we see it, is that our members say to us, 'We do not have the information that we used to have. We need to have it in order to make those investment decisions'... I would say there is a spectrum. Some of the environmental working groups do a fantastic job and have been holding classified briefings; some of them, less so. And for some of them it is just a lack of transparency—and I am using that word again. But it is still quite difficult for industry to know where to invest and how to invest, despite the classified briefings, which I know Defence is putting effort into and increasing. One of the reasons is that the ability to hold a classified briefing for a very large number of people is limited by the spaces and so forth.
4.38To better support industry’s involvement with the delivery of AUKUS, the Ai Group made the following suggestions:
- Australia should develop a formal industry-government forum for AUKUS Pillar 1 to ensure regular and direct engagement between Defence, industry and other relevant parties.
- Australia should develop a clear sustainment model for Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines which aligns with strategic and operational needs.
- Australia should develop a commercially viable ecosystem which can support the high capital costs and complexities associated with nuclear-powered submarines.
- DroneShield characterised the importance of Australia being a partner of AUKUS as a means for Australian industry to develop capability domestically, enabling Australia to pivot from being a country that is reliant on importing capabilities to one that is positioned to develop its own and become self-sufficient.
- In a submission to the inquiry, Epirus discussed the potential benefits for Australian industry following recent changes to the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The US amended ITAR in response to AUKUS, enabling the transfer of technologies and cooperation between nations. Epirus explained that the changes made to ITAR enable Australia to access cutting-edge US technologies, markets, and defence industry, which will benefit national security and the ability for Australian defence industry to partner with US companies. Epirus said that this would benefit Australia’s defence posture and solidify its position as a key partner.
Worker mobility
4.41The Subcommittee repeatedly heard about the impact of worker mobility challenges on AUKUS. In its submission to the inquiry, Serco Australia (Serco) stated that all three AUKUS nations were facing shortfalls in submarine production and sustainment and that Australia had a shortage of the engineering, nuclear stewardship, specialist trades, sustainment supervisors, and supply chain professionals required to deliver the Optimal Pathway.
4.42Serco identified several issues that were contributing to these shortages:
Visa and immigration – Current visa pathways are not designed for rapid movement of highly specialised defence roles. Even when personnel are available, processing delays and restrictions on work duration can limit timely contribution.
Security clearances – Clearances are not mutually recognised across AUKUS partners, resulting in duplication and lengthy vetting, even for allied civilian experts who already hold equivalent credentials.
Credential recognition gaps – Engineering and trade qualifications, and certifications, are not consistently portable across borders. Differences even within Australia’s state systems exacerbate the problem.
Fragmented coordination – Responsibility for workforce generation and planning is dispersed across multiple agencies and stakeholders. Practical arrangements for coordination, assignment, and governance remain underdeveloped.
4.43To address these issues, Serco propose a government-led workforce mobility framework that includes the establishment of a dedicated AUKUS skills visa that would allow expedited processing for submarine-related roles. Other parts of this framework include a trilateral mechanism for security clearance recognition, reducing duplication of training through AUKUS-related credential equivalency pathways and a workforce mobility taskforce within a single government agency to coordinate visas, credentialing and clearances.
4.44This view was shared by Austal, who stated that current visa restrictions are hindering the transfer of skilled workers between AUKUS nations and that ‘the ability to move employees more freely, particularly through mechanisms like the AUKUS passport, would facilitate better knowledge transfer and enhance project execution’.
4.45BAE Systems Australia described the current security clearance environment as ‘not agile enough’ and voiced support for the streamlining of security clearances mutually recognised security clearances between AUKUS nations to ‘support the seamless delivery of the AUKUS program and mobility of a skilled workforce across AUKUS and Five Eyes partners’.
4.46UNSW said that the considerable research and development requirements of AUKUS underlined the importance of worker mobility to facilitate the research necessary for its successful implementation:
In moving forward it will be important for Government to get the balance right between investing in mid to high technology readiness level research(to realise capability within the next 5–10 years) against ensuring adequate investment in basic or fundamental research that provides the foundations for future innovations 10 to 20 years from now.
4.47To help address this issue, UNSW recommended the implementation of ‘AUKUS-inspired mobility schemes focused on applied research and training that align directly with AUKUS Pillars 1 and 2’ and an education scheme to promote workforce mobility among AUKUS members. This scheme would target undergraduate and postgraduate/post-experience levels and aim to strengthen the pipeline of career pathways into key AUKUS-related priority areas.
4.48Defence and the ASA acknowledged Australia’s challenge in creating the 20,000-person workforce over 30 years that is required to deliver AUKUS but highlighted that the US and UK were also undergoing their own industrial uplifts. Given these developments, Defence cautioned against oversimplifying the process to import workers:
I think we need to be careful about making it too easy for AUKUS partner industry specialists to come to Australia. It needs to be complemented… by appropriate government-to-government engagement, so that any collaboration we do between industry bases is genuinely for mutual benefit and not to the detriment of AUKUS partners.
4.49The ASA outlined the current and ongoing efforts to build the required workforce, including the Defence Industry Pathways Program and Shipbuilding Employment Pathways program, as well as collaboration with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on ‘visas and opportunities that might be available into the future’.
Social licence
4.50Social licence in relation to AUKUS was raised during public hearings. An issue regarding social licence is the disposal of nuclear waste generated by the AUKUS program.
4.51The ASA detailed ongoing initiatives to build social licence with the local communities hosting AUKUS facilities as well as within the broader Australian public. These initiatives include direct community engagement sessions, online resources and public consultations around infrastructure and environmental proposals.
4.52Despite this work, the ASA acknowledged there was more work to be done in building social licence and addressing misinformation on the environmental impact of AUKUS and the nuclear waste it creates:
One of the big things is that there is a lack of understanding, and we probably haven't provided enough information to the community on where we're exactly at and some of the positive stories… to see the progress of the infrastructure on the island and understand the constraints that we work in and underneath in terms of the regulations, both through the naval regulator and also through the environmental protection and control.
4.53Defence also provided detail on the environmental protection efforts undertaken when building infrastructure on Garden Island:
We work under the auspices of the [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation] Act, and so far for that we have had a referral and assessment process that commenced 12 months ago, and we had an environmental assessment at the end of May [2025]. That put on 62 controls and conditions that extend out about 60 years in relation to monitoring, reporting, preparatory planning, and management measures and strategies to guide the way we undertake work, going forward.
4.54When discussing the nuclear waste resulting from SSNs and how the waste is disposed of, the ASA specified that it was low level and disposed of in a controlled industrial facility. In terms of the level of radiation those working on SSNs are exposed to, Rear Admiral David Mann, Head Virginia Workforce and Commercial, Australian Submarine Agency, stated they would be exposed to ‘less radiation than you would be from eating a banana, from sitting in front of a large-screen TV or, in fact, from flying on a plane’. It was also added that those working on nuclear submarines are continually monitored for their exposure to radiation. Defence’s broader social licence will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
Committee comment
4.55The Committee is pleased with the progress of AUKUS and recognises its importance in safeguarding Australia’s national security and ensuring regional security. AUKUS will accelerate Australia’s advanced capabilities, improve supply chain resilience, and uplift the nation’s workforce and infrastructure.
4.56Members of the Defence Subcommittee travelled to HMAS Stirling and the Henderson Defence Precinct to observe a Virginia class submarine in November 2025. This, in tandem with the evidence presented to the Defence Subcommittee, demonstrated the strategic importance of AUKUS and the role it plays in Australia’s Strategy of Denial. These site visits also enabled the Subcommittee to see first-hand the facilities and workforce that support AUKUS.
4.57The inquiry’s evidence and site visits underscore that AUKUS requires buy-in from Australian defence personnel, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), larger industry, the higher education and research sectors, and the entire Australian public. It was made clear that given this scale, the success of AUKUS is a whole-of-nation endeavour that will require a collective effort rather than disparate entities working on separate elements.
4.58This requirement for cohesion was evident when hearing about Defence and ASA’s engagement with SMEs and larger industry. The Committee believes that these bodies support and want to engage with AUKUS, but inconsistent or unclear communication lines are slowing progress. A dedicated industry AUKUS platform that provides a clear line between Defence and industry would improve this communication and better secure the successful delivery of AUKUS.
4.59An engaged and skilled workforce is also required to ensure the success of AUKUS. The Committee notes that Defence appreciates the scale of the workforce required to support AUKUS but is concerned with industry’s challenges getting workers into Australia. Evidence presented to the Subcommittee establishes a strong argument for the creation of an ‘AUKUS visa’ between AUKUS partners. This could provide workers with quicker access to Australia and streamline the process of transferring relevant qualifications and security clearances as well as quality of life improvements such as visas for partners and driver’s licences.
4.60When visiting the Henderson Defence Precinct, the Subcommittee was interested to hear the benefits arising from technical colleges that have been established in the UK and how they have created a pipeline between education and employment in AUKUS-related careers. Education initiatives such as this create life-long jobs in the wide variety of industries that support AUKUS and improve worker mobility.
4.61Being a whole-of-nation project means AUKUS needs to secure buy-in from the Australian public. This can be achieved through Defence working to build social licence for the program. The Committee believes that Australians are proud of their Defence force and the success stories arising from AUKUS and the efforts already underway to address related concerns should be promoted. This is another issue that can be addressed through Defence improving communication lines and improving transparency so that Australians can be brought on board.
4.62The Committee recommends that the Defence Delivery Agency and or the Australian Submarine Agency look to maintain consistent and clear communication lines with AUKUS industry in relation to tender, procurement and overall engagement.
4.63The Committee recommends the Australian Government work to consider measures to improve workforce mobility between AUKUS nations, including consideration of visa settings in AUKUS nations to secure the required workforce and improve worker mobility.