A note on terminology

Conventionally powered attack submarines like the Collins class are collectively referred to as SSK; however, an SSK armed with guided missiles is routinely designated SSG. An SSK with air independent propulsion (AIP) technology is occasionally designated SSP. A small SSK suitable for coastal or riverine environments may be designated SSC.

Conventionally armed nuclear-powered attack submarines carry the NATO designation SSN. A nuclear submarine that carries ballistic missiles with a nuclear warhead is an SSBN. These ballistic missiles are very large and SSBNs are consequently much larger than SSNs. Australia does not possess, has no plans to acquire, and is prohibited by international agreements from acquiring nuclear weapons or SSBNs.

Background

The replacement of the Collins class submarines has proved to be a difficult problem for successive Australian governments. Changes in technology and in the strategic environment induced the government to approach the US asking for access to nuclear powered submarines (SSN) and then in 2021 to cancel an existing contract for acquisition of French Attack class conventional submarines (SSK).

Speaking on The National Security podcast, the Deputy Secretary Strategy, Policy, and Industry in the Department of Defence, Hugh Jeffrey, stated that SSKs would find stealth more and more difficult to achieve:

One thing that, when we were first looking at this momentous change several years ago, that focussed my mind was the assessment that we would not be able to maintain our current undersea activity into the near future with conventional submarines … due to the modernisation that we are seeing in the region and the advances in detection and the challenges that conventional submarines would have in that environment. [at 36:25 mins, emphasis added]

Jeffrey noted Australia was not the only country to realise the need for and attempt to access naval nuclear propulsion technology, but Australia’s close relationships with the US and UK facilitated success. The AUKUS agreement provides a 3-phase pathway for Australia to acquire nuclear powered submarines without acquiring the underlying nuclear propulsion technology.

The Attack class SSK cancellation exposes Australia to a capability gap as the Collins class age out of service. The Australian Government plan is to bridge the gap with delivery of 3 US Virginia class SSNs beginning in the 2030s while an SSN-AUKUS submarine is designed and then built by the UK and Australia in the 2040s. This paper examines the step up in capability offered by the Virginia class SSN. The SSN-AUKUS will have ‘a huge amount of commonality’ with the Virginia class and is expected to have higher capability.

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian defence industry is already building up its SSN operational and sustainment expertise through training and personnel exchanges. The first maintenance of a US SSN has been carried out at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia. From as early as 2027, the UK and the US plan to establish a rotational presence of one UK Astute class submarine and up to 4 US Virginia class at HMAS Stirling. This initiative is known as Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) and will increase operational availability of US and UK SSNs in the Indo-Pacific and facilitate further training of Australian personnel.

The deteriorating strategic environment

From the 2020 Defence strategic update on, Australia has acknowledged that strategic competition between the US and China is driving strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. The National defence strategy: 2024 (NDS24) explained that the resulting tension and uncertainty brings an increasing risk of military escalation or miscalculation that could lead to a major conflict in the region with little warning (p. 11).

NDS24 confirmed that Australia faces its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War and that our strategic circumstances have continued to deteriorate, consistent with the trends identified in the 2023 Defence strategic review (DSR).  

Jeffrey argued in a May 2024 address that the post-Cold War global order is over and that Australia now finds itself in a struggle amongst states as they compete to shape a new world order:

That struggle won't be contained and it won't be quick. It will span hard and soft power domain, trade and economics, innovation and technology…

We must recognise this struggle as structural, not incidental. And that it will drive elevated levels of uncertainty and risk for at least the next decade. I think our overriding job in Defence is to help ensure that this struggle doesn't tip over into confrontation. I think the critical early lesson is to recognise that the battle for Ukraine is actually the first war of this struggle. We should also recognise this as a failure of deterrence. We need to ensure that this failure isn't repeated, especially in our region. [emphasis added]

The formation of an ‘axis of adversaries’ between Russia, China, North Korea and Iran significantly increases the chances of a conflict in one region spreading to another. Deputy Prime Minister Marles observed that after China and Russia signed a no-limits agreement in February 2022 on the eve of the Russian invasion, the conflict in Ukraine became highly relevant to, and was shaping, the Indo-Pacific.

Multiple countries in the Indo-Pacific are investing in new and sophisticated weapons characterised by greater range and speed. Defending the sea-air gap to the north no longer provides protection against a military strike on Australia (p. 15). For example, in 2024 China successfully test fired a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the range to reach any part of Australia (Figure 1).

Figure 1           Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launch

Source: SatTrackCam Leiden (b)log, A Chinese ICBM test launch at full range, into the central Pacific, on September 25, plotted from the Navigational Warnings (HYDROPAC 3118/24, HYDROPAC 3121/24) and a NOTAM (A3054/24), 25 September 2024.

North Korea has a similar capability. China’s new H20 stealth bomber is also assessed to have the range to reach any part of Australia from land bases in China (p. 33).

A contested environment – submarine forces in the Indo-Pacific

The US Congressional Commission on the National Defense Strategy 2024 (USCNDS 24) assessed that, after 2 decades of focused military investment, China is now outpacing the United States and has largely negated the US military advantage in the Western Pacific (p. v). It acknowledged China had the largest navy in the world and it continues to modernise.

China is also the world’s largest shipbuilder with a building capacity ‘roughly 230 times as large as that of the United States’. A September 2024 report assessed that China is building 3 new SSNs each year, more than double the US rate of 1.2–1.4 new SSNs per year.

Figure 2 below provides a visual approximation of the extent of undersea competition in the Indo-Pacific in 2024. Only forces home-ported in the Indo-Pacific are represented (this excludes the Russian fleet in the northern Pacific and the various Atlantic fleets); but other countries, including Russia, the UK and France, also regularly operate high-capability submarines in the Indo-Pacific.

Note that the performance, armament, in-service availability, and ages of these submarines vary widely, and they are only broadly comparable. But Russia is sharing submarine technology with China and a 2023 report argued that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the latest Type 095 Chinese nuclear submarine are approaching the latest Russian Akula SSN.

Figure 2           Comparison of submarine forces based in the Indo-Pacific 2024

Source: Parliamentary Library calculations. Assessments of submarine capability and currency of information vary. For consistency, all values except US are sourced from Submarine Proliferation Resource Collection (nti.org). US numbers are sourced from SUBPAC Submarines | Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (navy.mil) in order to limit the numbers to submarines routinely available in the Indo-Pacific. North Korea reportedly has an additional 41 small and mini conventional submarines armed with torpedoes that are not represented.

Australia’s primary strategic defence objective changed to deterrence

Australia’s overall defence strategy remains ‘denial’ (p. 22). Three previously equally weighted objectives underpin that strategy:

• Shape Australia’s strategic environment.
• Deter actions against Australia’s interests.
• Respond with credible military force when required.

In response to the deteriorating environment, NDS24 states that ‘deterrence is now Australia’s primary strategic defence objective’ (p. 22). (Note that Australia’s defence objective is conventional deterrence; it is not pursuing ‘strategic deterrence’ which relies on nuclear weapons.)

Deterrence involves convincing a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. It requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. As Shadow Minister for Defence Andrew Hastie has explained:

Deterrence, in the end, is deeply psychological. You want to haunt the mind of your opponent. To instil fear and anxiety in them. You are sending a price signal, that war will be costly—a price signal that saps their will to fight.

Some strategic analysts question whether conventional deterrence is the best strategy for Australia when the 2023 Defence strategic review concluded ‘there is at present only a remote possibility of any power contemplating an invasion of our continent’ (p. 25).

However, Australia has a range of vulnerabilities, including trade and supply routes, undersea cables and resources including fisheries, seabed minerals and oil and gas. The vulnerability of submarine cables (see Figure 3) has been highlighted by recent attacks on cables overseas.

Figure 3           International submarine cables inside designated protection zones

Source: The Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2024 | Australian Army.

Is deterrence the best strategy for Australia?

There are strategic commentators who argue that neither US nor Australian security is directly threatened by China and that a more expensive forward defence posture is unnecessary. However, that position must be informed by both a careful assessment of the risks and recent changes in warfare driven by rapid technological innovation.

The broader debate over whether Australian strategy should focus on the defensive application of force near Australia’s borders or use a forward defence posture is not addressed in this paper. A selection of resources for further reading are provided at the end of the paper.

A vast operating area

Peace and security in the vast area of the Indo-Pacific and beyond to the east (Figure 4) is critical to Australia’s national interests, given it is a maritime trading nation. Australian submarines have for decades been assigned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and deterrence tasks across this area.

Australia’s future submarines must be capable of operating in a contested environment anywhere in the Indo-Pacific: from the Sea of Japan to Kiribati to Antarctica to the Red Sea. However, the slow transit speed of an SSK means it could take more than a month to transit to those areas from its base at HMAS Stirling. It was the demands of Australia’s maritime geography that prompted the Navy League to lobby in 2009 for the government to commit to acquiring SSNs as a replacement for the Collins class.

Figure 4           Key sea lanes and military facilities in the Indo-Pacific

Source: Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa, Reuters, 31 January 2024.

In September 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles argued that it was a strategic imperative and ‘utterly essential’ for Australia to have a ‘first rate, long‑range submarine capability and the only way we achieve that is through a nuclear‑powered submarine capability’.

The capability upgrade: SSK v SSN

According to strategic analyst Ross Babbage:

SSNs deliver a far higher level of capability than diesel-electric boats. They are in a completely different class in terms of speed, range, endurance, sensor scale, weapons loads, and operational flexibility. 

Detailed information about the capability of submarines (particularly range, diving depth and endurance) is closely held. However, there is some publicly available information to allow comparison.

Table 1 uses the current Collins capability as a baseline and compares both a more modern conventional submarine, the Japanese Soryu class (which Australia considered buying) and the Viriginia class SSN. Note that some of the published data on speed, range and endurance is inconsistent. In general, Table 1 uses the lowest value among the reliable sources.

Table 1            Comparison of Collins and Soryu class SSGs and Virginia Class SSN

Sources: Jane’s, Jane’s Fighting Ships, (London: Jane’s Yearbooks, 1972– ), pp. 30, 437, 934; Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World : their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, (Annapolis, Maryland : U.S. Naval Institute, 2013) pp. 20–21, 844–845; US Navy, Attack Submarines – SSN, Submarine Industrial Base Council ‘Virginia Class SSN’; Royal Australian Navy ‘HMAS Rankin’; Naval Technology, SS Soryu Class Submarines 26 February 2021; Center for Strategic & International Studies Missile Threat website ‘Harpoon at a glance’ and ‘Tomahawk at a glance’.

The high dollar cost and opportunity cost of an SSN deterrent

The Deputy Prime Minister stated that the cost of the nuclear powered submarine program would roughly amount to 0.15% of GDP for the life of the program, which Prime Minister Albanese estimated could be ‘between AU$268 billion and AU$368 billion’. In 2023, the Parliamentary Budget Office estimated the amount to be A$367.6 billion in out-turned dollars, which included a A$122.9 billion contingency.  However, it is important to note that the AUKUS deal also offers Australia an opportunity to learn from over 75 years of US and UK experience and quickly develop a very high-tech manufacturing base with export opportunities supporting both the US submarine industrial base and the wider AUKUS industrial base.

Adding Australia to the SSN submarine manufacturing and sustainment base and other AUKUS pillar II capabilities, like missile production, will broaden Western industrial capacity and improve supply chain resilience – a key contribution in itself to regional deterrence.

While the ‘opportunity cost’, or other capability forgone to buy SSNs, is a critical issue, this paper does not analyse whether SSNs are the best option for Australia either in terms of overall military strategy or the broader national interest.

Any review of the trade-offs has to consider the cost and effectiveness of any other option to achieve the integrated deterrence that the government has identified as critical to Australian national security. Some have argued that better deterrence could be obtained by acquiring
B-21 stealth bombers (p. 19).

Key SSN advantages explained

Hugh Jeffrey argued that as a 3-ocean nation (Indian, Pacific and Southern oceans) with a unique ratio of population size to territory, the critical space for deterrence is the undersea domain. According to Jeffrey, Australia’s undersea capability must necessarily have range, endurance and stealth:

No other platform matches the stealth, endurance and mobility and mix of capabilities that a nuclear-powered submarine provides; and its increasingly clear, based on our own assessments that conventional submarines won’t have the range or endurance in the coming decades, or indeed the stealth, to meet Australia’s requirements [emphasis added].

It is worth noting that, given critical decisions made by the current and previous governments, acquiring a more advanced conventional attack submarine is probably no longer a realistic option because it is unlikely any could be made available in time to cover the gap caused by Collins class ageing out of service.

Stealth – SSNs have a better indiscretion rate

Stealth is the foundation of the deterrence offered by submarines. A submarine has a lethal capacity to detect and disrupt operations that an adversary cannot ignore. Not being able to identify the location of that submarine introduces complexity into the military calculations of an adversary. If a submarine is detected, an adversary can ‘fix’ it, calculate its future possible operating area and ultimately attack it. Detection immediately limits the area in which adversary forces are at risk.

A submarine is most easily detected and most vulnerable when it is in port. It also risks detection, and is more vulnerable to attack, every time it surfaces or raises a mast above the surface.

Retired submariner Rear Admiral Monty Khanna (Indian Navy) describes the indiscretion rate as an important parameter for measuring a submarine’s ability to remain covert:

Indiscretion Rate is the percentage of time that a submarine has to expose a part of itself above the surface measured against the total time spent at sea. In conventional submarines, the requirement to become indiscrete is primarily driven by the requirement to charge batteries; a process that requires several masts to be exposed above the sea surface [emphasis added].

SSKs typically become indiscrete daily

An SSK recharges its batteries by surfacing, or travelling close to the surface and using a snorkel (snorting), to run its diesel generators. For example:

[The Russian Project 636M Kilo class operated by China] typically needs to come up to snorkeling depth every day for two to three hours to recharge its batteries, assuming a 10% – 12% indiscretion rate, thus greatly increasing the risk of detection. At best, a Kilo-class submarine can stay submerged at slow speed for about three days before needing to snorkel.

During snorting a submarine becomes indiscrete because it is generating a detectable signature which uniquely identifies it as a submarine. The signature is a combination of factors:

• Several masts are visible above the surface, which can be seen and may also generate a visible wake on the ocean surface.
• The masts can also be detected on radar.
• The diesel generators are acoustically very noisy and generate a thermal signature.
• Sensors and communication equipment may emit a detectable electromagnetic signature.

Submariners use multiple techniques to hide snorting activity and minimise signatures; however, AI-assisted satellite and drone surveillance have already compromised the capacity of SSKs to remain undetected while snorting and it is expected to become increasingly difficult.

Geographic challenges around Australia force SSKs to become indiscrete

Retired Australian submariner and past president of the Submarine Institute of Australia, Peter Briggs, noted in 2016:

Australia’s geography poses particular challenges for a transit northward through the Indonesian archipelago—narrow straits create several choke points to be negotiated enroute. To avoid surveillance or casual observers in the approaches, strait and egress areas, these choke points must be transited covertly. The prevalent ocean current flows southward, adding to the energy requirements.

According to Briggs, a submarine needs a dived 8-knot speed of advance to negotiate these straits covertly; and this is a difficult task for any SSK, even one fitted with AIP. The load on the battery means a conventional submarine has little option but to snort while navigating the straits, or as soon as it is clear of the straits, leaving it vulnerable to surveillance. An adversary can position its own assets near the straits to detect, fix and target submarines while they are forced to snort at periscope depth. The SSN avoids this vulnerability because it does not have to snort at all and can maintain both the ‘hotel load’ (for example, air purification, cooking, lights, cooling, combat system) and a more than adequate speed of advance.

For nations with smaller and shallower maritime zones such as Singapore, where the submarine is not forced to become indiscrete frequently, SSKs are still a formidable capability.

Future ‘nuclear battery’ AIP systems

Kirchberger and Carlson considered reports that China is developing a ‘nuclear battery’ (a very small micro-reactor). They hypothesised that a nuclear battery AIP system in an SSK ‘could support submerged transit speeds of up to 9 – 10 knots while meeting all hotel loads and the electrical power requirements of the nuclear plant auxiliaries’. The ample electrical power offered by a nuclear battery would potentially allow a full spectrum of atmospheric control equipment, offering a capacity to remain submerged indefinitely and conserving the main submarine battery for propulsion.

SSKs can be quieter

SSKs have a small advantage in noise signature when quietly on station. The improved Russian Project 636 Kilo class SSK is so quiet it has been dubbed the ‘Black Hole’; and a Collins class running on battery and lying motionless on the seafloor is effectively silent. The advantage can only be employed during necessarily limited periods when the SSK is able to switch off systems.

The quiet, but not silent, reactor on an SSN must remain constantly running and might be detected using modern technology; but it is likely that the noise of simply moving through the water is more detectable than the reactor. SSNs also have internal systems to further reduce noise.

SSN indiscretion rate is near zero

As SSNs are not required to snort to charge batteries and have sufficient power to continuously run equipment to manage the atmosphere, their indiscretion rate is near zero. The energy density of the nuclear fuel is so high that the reactor does not ever need to be refuelled throughout the life of the submarine. Managing the fuel use of an SSN is a issue affecting the length of service of the submarine rather than an immediate tactical problem.

SSNs are not a complete stealth solution. Both SSNs and SSKs are vulnerable to open-source tracking and to detection of other signatures – for example, magnetic fields. Hydrodynamic noise is also unavoidable for any submarine due to its movement through water.

SSNs also emit a thermal signature since the reactor must be cooled constantly and hot water discharge is a byproduct; however, this thermal signature is far lower than that of an SSK running a diesel engine.

Mitigation of submarine signatures is under constant development, and, given the secrecy of the submarine services, it is unclear whether the Collins has any real advantage in acoustic stealth or how much of a problem the acoustic signature of an SSN is operationally. In any case, there are 2 factors that also contribute to stealth and are arguably much more important in the context of the vast operational area around Australia – persistent speed and endurance.

Speed – an SSN’s high persistent speed provides tactical flexibility

‘Battery anxiety’ was an issue for submarine captains long before smartphone users became sufferers. The top dived speed for an SSK of about 20 knots is only available for short bursts because it uses so much battery power. It can only sustain that speed for 15 minutes to an hour. A sustained speed of 6.5 knots is a more realistic baseline for calculating SSK cruising speed and the maximum submerged transit speed of a submarine utilising a conventional AIP system is only 4–6 knots. That is a problem when submarine-hunting surface ships and SSNs can achieve and sustain speeds of over 30 knots.

A Virginia class SSN has a higher dived speed than even the most modern SSK, but more importantly, it has a much higher persistent speed. The faster an SSK goes, and the more often it needs to change depth, the faster the battery drains and the sooner it needs to recharge and become indiscrete, but an SSN can manoeuvre without depleting its immediate future capacity. This high persistent speed means an SSN can better track surface ships and other SSNs.

An SSK also cannot commit its total battery capacity to propulsion because it requires energy for the hotel load. By contrast, an SSN can maintain its hotel load and use its higher speed persistently without trading away immediate future manoeuvring capacity.

Figure 5 below illustrates the contrast in potential transit times and time on task at 6.5 knots for an SSK and 20 knots for SSNs. The Virginia class has the endurance to complete each of these transits dived, while the Collins has to snort frequently, risking detection each time.

Figure 5           Transit time and time on station comparison for SSNs and SSKs

Source: AUKUS: U.S. Navy Nuclear-Powered Forward Presence Key to Australian Nuclear Submarine and China Deterrence, The Heritage Foundation

Due to the Virginia class SSN’s near zero indiscretion rate and its speed, an adversary has to consider that 5 days after a Virginia class SSN dives off the coast of Fremantle, it might be conducting surveillance and posing a threat anywhere in the Indo-Pacific and remain undetected for weeks or months. An adversary fleet can therefore be held at risk across the entire Indo-Pacific for extended periods by a single SSN.

Attempting to find and fix that submarine would require an adversary to commit substantial resources, potentially removing key resources from other tasking.

More manoeuvrable and survivable

High persistent speed makes an SSN more manoeuvrable than an SSK and provides increased tactical flexibility. High persistent speed also substantially improves the SSN’s survivability if detected because it can use its higher dived speed for longer to more effectively evade torpedoes and pursuers and avoid being forced to the surface.

Endurance – SSNs can stay on task longer in a contested operational area

Dived endurance is critical to submarine effectiveness. Briggs has stated:

Dived endurance, the ability to remain submerged without having to expose the submarine by recharging the battery, is a critical (I would say life or death) characteristic of submarines, particularly to meet Australia’s requirements to operate in areas where the sea and air space isn’t under our control. It improves tactical mobility, effectiveness, flexibility and survivability in both transit and patrol area operations.

Endurance also translates to capacity to stay on task. The operational time on task of an SSK is limited by the endurance of its battery and any restrictions on its opportunity to recharge (such as surveillance in the area). Even if an SSK is not moving when conducting ISR activities, the battery is being used for the hotel load. If it cannot snort without risk of detection in the operating area, it will have to move away to recharge. It also must maintain enough battery reserve to conduct emergency manoeuvring if it is detected or has an emergency.

As noted above, the constant power supply of the SSN can continually maintain its hotel load and manoeuvre capability. It also does not need to leave an operational area to refuel, and its dived endurance and time on task is effectively limited only by the food it can carry.

Flexibility – nuclear propulsion permits bigger boats and payloads

SSNs have more available power so they can be bigger, carry more armament and have room for alternative payloads (for example, special operations deployments, operation of autonomous underwater vehicles or ISR). The Virginia class has superior features to support special forces, including a reconfigurable torpedo room, which can accommodate a large number of personnel and all their equipment for prolonged deployments.

The larger boat is more comfortable for the crew and a higher electrical capacity permits more advanced sonar and tactical systems. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the contrast in the space and technology in the control rooms of the submarines.

Figure 6           Control room of Collins class submarine HMAS Sheean

Source: CPOIS Damian Pawlenko, Royal Australian Navy, 22 November 2016.

Figure 6 shows the Collins class bulky optical periscope, but the Virginia class has a digital periscope, which provides more room and an improved layout. The image can also be viewed by more than one person at a time, offering the commanding officer enhanced situational awareness.

Figure 7           Control room of USS Hawaii, a Block I Virginia class submarine

Source: Petty Officer 1st Class Victoria Mejicanos/United States Navy, 23 August 2024.

Armament – SSNs can carry heavier, longer-range missiles

The additional size and power of SSNs permits heavier armament loads. The Block IV Virginia class is fitted with a vertical launch Tomahawk missile system, which has a range of 1,250–2,500 km and a land attack capability. The Collins class has a Harpoon missile system, which has a lighter warhead with a range of 90–240 km and is designed as an anti-ship system. The submarines both deploy Mk48 heavyweight torpedoes for attacking surface ships and other submarines, but unlike the Collins class, the Virginia class does not have to use its torpedo racks for storing missiles and can carry more armament overall.

Conclusion

SSKs are most useful for nations with smaller and shallower maritime zones, where the submarine is not forced to become indiscrete as frequently. It is unlikely that even a more advanced SSK with an AIP system could provide the level of stealth, speed and endurance necessary for the tasks required of Australia’s submarines through the vast operating area of the Indo-Pacific.

A single Virginia class SSN is a powerful deterrent because its armament, stealth, speed and endurance combine to hold an entire adversary fleet at risk anywhere in the Indo-Pacific and for months at a time. The shorter range and smaller armament load as well as lower speed and stealth limit the area in which an SSK can hold adversary forces at risk. Lower endurance reduces the time that threat can be maintained.

The Australian Government regards SSNs as a strategic imperative essential to Australia’s future. Despite the strategic imperative, Australia’s own Virginia class submarines will not be operational until the 2030s. Additional deterrence will be provided until then by increasing the availability of UK and US SSNs in the Indo-Pacific through the SRF-West initiative.

Links for further reading

Is a strategy of deterrence the right choice for Australia?

Hugh Jeffrey and Rory Medcalf, ‘Australia’s AUKUS Officials, Part I’, The National Security Podcast, ANU National Security College, 18 July 2024.

Luke Gosling, ‘Deterring at a Distance: The Strategic Logic of AUKUS’, Lowy Institute, 24 June 2024

Michael Pezzullo, ‘The Long Arc of Australian Defence Strategy’, The Strategist, 11 May 2024.

Hugh Jeffrey, ‘Middle Power Deterrence’, Address to Air and Space Power Conference 2024, 8–9 May 2024.

Hugh White, ‘Fatal Shores: AUKUS is a Grave Mistake’, Australian Foreign Affairs 20, February 2024: 6–50.

Elizabeth Buchanan, ‘Pit Stop Power: How to Use Our Geography’, Australian Foreign Affairs 20, February 2024: 69–86.

Ross Babbage, The Next Major War: Can the US and its Allies Win Against China? (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2023).

Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2023).

Sam Roggeveen, The Echidna Strategy: Australia’s Search for Power and Peace (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2023).

Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020).

SSN/SSK capability

Sarah Kirchberger and Christopher Carlson, ‘Mysterious New Chinese N-sub’, Australian Naval Institute, 24 January 2025.

John Blaxland, ‘Australia Can’t Afford an AUKUS About-Face: 5 Things the Critics are Getting Wrong’, The Conversation, 15 September 2024.

Ross Babbage, ‘Deterrence and Alliance Power: Why the AUKUS Submarines Matter and How They can be Delivered’, The Interpreter, 29 July 2024.

Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 5 August 2024).

Peter Clarke, ‘Opinion: For a Subs Commander, Nuclear is the Only Way’, The Australian, 17 March 2023.

Peter Clarke, ‘‘Complete Nonsense’: Retired Admiral Dismisses Turnbull AUKUS Criticism’, Sky News, 10 January 2023.

Brent Sadler, AUKUS: U.S. Navy Nuclear-Powered Forward Presence Key to Australian Nuclear Submarine and China Deterrence, Backgrounder, (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 12 October 2021).

Hugh White, ‘SSN vs SSK’, The Interpreter, 29 September 2021.

Nicole Brangwin, Managing SEA 1000: Australia’s Attack Class Submarines, Research paper series, 2019–20, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 26 February 2020).

Is SSN capability too expensive?

Toshi Yoshihara, Jack Bianchi, Casey Nicastro, Focused Force China’s Military Challenge And Australia’s Response, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 22 January 2025)

Peter Jennings and Jennifer Parker, Does AUKUS Pillar I Provide Capability ‘Bang for Buck’?, Debate papers, (Sydney: United States Studies Centre, 18 June 2024).

Andrew Davies, ‘Sunk Costs: Our High-Stakes Gamble on Nuclear Powered Submarines’, Australian Foreign Affairs 20, (February 2024): 87–100.

Peter Briggs, Can Australia Afford Nuclear Propelled Submarines? Can We Afford Not To?, Special report, (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 16 October 2018).

Can the AUKUS Pathway succeed in delivering SSNs?

Peter Briggs, ‘AUKUS Risks are Piling Up. Australia Must Prepare to Build French SSNs Instead, The Strategist, 5 December 2024.

Justin Burke, ‘Opinion: Dwelling On Untaken AUKUS Paths is Negativity We Don’t Need’, Australian Financial Review, 24 July 2024.

Elizabeth Buchanan and Richard Dunley, Is Australia’s AUKUS Submarine Pathway Really ‘Optimal’?, Debate papers, (Sydney: United States Studies Centre, 18 June 2024).

Jennifer Parker, ‘Opinion: Here are the Facts about Australia’s Nuclear Submarine Program’, Australian Financial Review, 28 May 2024.

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