5. Uncrewed/autonomous systems and their integration into the joint force

Overview

5.1Advancements in uncrewed and autonomous systems have significant implications for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in terms of both future capabilities and the emergence of threats. Definitions of key terms are provided to frame the ensuing discussion:

• Uncrewed systems: refer to remotely pilotable but fully human-controlled vehicles, that can be used within the aerial, ground or maritime domains. They are normally referred to as ‘drones’, ‘unmanned aerial/aircraft vehicles’, ‘unmanned ground vehicles’ and ‘unmanned surface vessels’.[1]
• Autonomous systems: refer to intelligent machines which can operate without human intervention by using artificial intelligence (AI), with the ability to receive and process information and make independent decisions. Various examples of such technologies exist, including both autonomous aircraft and autonomous submarines. These systems are also sometimes referred to as ‘drones’.[2]
  2. Evidence presented to the Subcommittee often used these terms interchangeably. For the purposes of this chapter, they will be referred to as uncrewed and autonomous systems.
  3. This chapter will discuss how the Australian Government has recognised the importance of uncrewed and autonomous systems through key policy documents such as the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS)and the Defence Industry Development Strategy (DIDS). As a result, the Department of Defence (Defence) has initiated the integration of both uncrewed and autonomous systems into the ADF. Submitters, while supportive of Defence’s integration of uncrewed and autonomous systems, raised concerns regarding Defence’s focus on high-end systems and Australia’s manufacturing capabilities.
  4. This chapter will also discuss opportunities and challenges relating to uncrewed and autonomous systems as well as international and domestic policies that will affect their integration into Australia’s strategic environment.

The integration of uncrewed and autonomous systems into the ADF

Strategic recognition of the need for uncrewed and autonomous systems

5.5The Australian Government has recognised that uncrewed and autonomous systems will play a key role in the future of the ADF. This recognition is demonstrated by the inclusion of such systems in key strategy documents. In the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 it is reported that Defence is ‘accelerating near-term investments in uncrewed aerial systems and counter uncrewed aerial systems [and] remote autonomous systems’.[3] The NDSand its supporting 2024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP)call for investing, developing and introducing various uncrewed and autonomous capabilities with the purpose of supporting the integrated, focused force and Australia’s Strategy of Denial (discussed in Chapter 2).[4]

5.6The IIP proposes investment in:

• highly advanced, extremely capable autonomous systems able to operate and survive in contested warfighting environments, including the MQ‑28A Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft and the Ghost Shark uncrewed underwater vehicle;
• smaller, low‑cost and expendable robotic and autonomous systems that could be deployed in larger groups across the maritime, land and air domains.[5]
  7. The IIP also includes:

Investment in a range of uncrewed and autonomous systems that can work together and complement crewed systems on a range of missions that will support a Strategy of Denial, hold potential adversary forces at risk and increase the potency of our capabilities.[6]

5.8The Australian Government has committed to providing over $10 billion in investment into uncrewed and autonomous systems.[7] The IIP specifies that $4.3–$5.3 billion of this investment will support the acquisition of uncrewed aerial systems for the Air Force.[8]

5.9The DIDS’s Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities (SDIP), which includes the ‘development and integration of autonomous systems’ (discussed in Chapter 3), also emphasises that uncrewed and autonomous systems will be a focus for future ADF capability.[9] As previously noted, Defence is seeking to encourage industry capability in this area so that it may readily access, develop and deploy these technologies as required.

Current investments into uncrewed and autonomous systems

5.10Defence has committed to various projects which will provide significant new uncrewed and autonomous capabilities to the ADF. The NDS and IIP focus on sophisticated high value projects, including:

• The MQ-4C Triton: Defence partnered with the United States Navy to acquire four Triton aircraft. The MQ-4C Triton is a high-altitude, long endurance remotely-piloted aircraft. It will complement Australia’s P-8A Poseidon aircraft in performing maritime patrol and response. The project’s current total approved budget is $2.45 billion.[10]
• Ghost Shark Program: The Royal Australian Navy and Anduril Australia have collaborated to pursue the development of the Ghost Shark.[11] The Ghost Shark is a stealthy, long-range autonomous undersea warfare vehicle capable of disruptive intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and striking targets.[12] Following Anduril Australia’s successful delivery of three prototypes, the Australian Government announced its $1.7 billion investment to acquire a fleet of Ghost Sharks.[13]
• Ocius Bluebottle: The Royal Australian Navy partnered with Ocius to deliver a total of 15 Bluebottles. A Bluebottle is a solar, wind and wave-powered uncrewed surface vessel (USV) capable of ‘persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance’.[14] Bluebottle USVs are already being used to patrol Australia’s northern waters.[15] The official cost of a single Bluebottle unit is not public knowledge; however, based on reports, it is estimated to be approximately $1–1.2 million.[16]
• MQ-28A Ghost Bat: The Royal Australian Air Force partnered with Boeing Australia to produce the Ghost Bat, the first military aircraft to be designed and manufactured in Australia in over 50 years.[17] The Ghost Bat program is an example of collaborative combat aircraft technology, meaning an uncrewed air vehicle which can collaborate with crewed platforms to perform functions normally undertaken by traditional fighter aircraft. Following successful delivery of multiple prototypes, the Australian Government announced in December 2025 that it would invest an additional $1.4 billion of funding to acquire an initial fleet of operational aircraft.[18]
  11. Air Vice-Marshal Nicholas Hogan CSC, Head, Air Force Capability, Royal Australian Air Force, provided further detail on the role of the Ghost Bat, stating:

MQ-28 Ghost Bat… has now matured to a point where it's flown over 170-odd hours in over 100 flights… it's proved that it can move autonomously under control. We would call it semi-autonomous… we always have a person in control of it. We are able to remotely control that from a ground station or from another aircraft, and that can cooperate with our aircraft in what we term ‘collaborative combat aircraft’. So we are certainly moving forward in ways that allow us to reduce the pressure on our people in order to allow our people, our most important asset, to get after things that are more important than, as we might say, just looking over the fence and seeing what's happening.[19]

5.12Since the release of the NDS and IIP, Defence has also pursued the acquisition of lower cost capabilities. For example, in August 2025, Defence announced the acquisition of 300 drones from Australian companies at a cost of $1.5 million, with further projects planned.[20]

Perspectives on Defence’s acquisition of uncrewed and autonomous systems

5.13Submitters were generally supportive of the various programs that Defence is pursuing to acquire uncrewed and autonomous systems.[21] However, concerns were raised that Defence is placing too much focus on high-end systems as opposed to a more balanced approach that would include both high-end sophisticated systems and low-cost expendable capabilities.[22]

5.14The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) stated that:

While [high-end] systems should be funded by the Australian Government, they are not a complete solution to how the ADF should approach autonomous systems and AI in future force development.[23]

5.15Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Senior Lecturer in Aviation at the University of New South Wales, emphasised the need for Defence to adopt a balanced approach in its acquisition of uncrewed and autonomous systems, stating:

The ADF must recognise the need to balance between investing in complex, highly capable systems and high-volume, low-cost technologies that can provide quick and simple solutions for a range of security challenges. This includes investment in developing uncrewed systems. For example, along with investments into Boeing’s Ghost Bat program, designed to fly into battle with manned fighter jets; investments in small [Uncrewed Aerial Systems] will meet the requirements of cost-effective and fast delivery, as well as value for money.[24]

5.16Major General Michael Ryan (Retd) offered a different perspective, discussing the need for a balance between imported and indigenous uncrewed and autonomous systems, between crewed and uncrewed systems, and between long-range and short-range systems.[25] Major General Ryan also discussed the need for Australia to significantly increase its acquisition of uncrewed and autonomous systems, stating:

The Australian Army is many drone battalions short of where it should be. The Air Force is multiple drone squadrons short. The Navy should have hundreds of surface drones and subsurface drones to prevent or, at least, challenge future Chinese naval circle-work around our country.[26]

5.17In its submission, Anduril Australia referred to the importance of Defence’s integration of uncrewed and autonomous systems, particularly their future significance to the ADF:

If Australia is to field a credible future force in this decade and beyond… traditional platforms must be complemented by large numbers of [Robotic and Autonomous Systems] and… Command and Control systems to operationally employ them at-scale.[27]

Australia’s manufacturing base

5.18The Subcommittee heard that Australia’s manufacturing sector is capable of producing high-quality and sophisticated products for both the civilian and military markets.[28] Some submitters, however, raised concerns regarding Australia’s ability to manufacture at scale the uncrewed and autonomous capabilities that Defence requires.[29]

5.19In its evidence to the Subcommittee, C2 Robotics asserted that it ‘[believes] that the single biggest relevant factor for force generation today is a country’s capacity for industrial mass production of autonomous systems.’[30] C2 Robotics drew comparisons between China and Australia’s manufacturing capabilities, with reference to its ‘Speartooth’ Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (LUUV) project, stating that:

China’s capabilities are vastly ahead of Australia and its allies. China’s industrial capacity has achieved staggering dominance across consumer grade, mass produced electronics, drones, electric vehicles, battery systems and similar. If C2 Robotics had been a Chinese company, then building Speartooth would have been far easier due to the ability to access such a broad industrial base, and manufacturing at scale would be easier again. Moreover, Speartooth is essentially an underwater electric vehicle; China is expected to manufacture 10 million electric vehicles this year. This is sobering to consider because there are Chinese companies already developing LUUVs.[31]

5.20Due to Australia’s need to manufacture at scale to respond to foreign capabilities, it was suggested that Australia must better account for manufacturing considerations in national defence strategies. ASPI argued that the 2026 National Defence Strategy should include details of a ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’[32] approach to military technological innovation, development and production.[33] Similarly, Dr Molloy criticised the development and integration of autonomous systems SDIP for not considering the need for large-scale manufacturing.[34]

5.21Dr Molloy argued that there is a need for Australia to develop and refine its current defence manufacturing strategies to prioritise delivery at scale and at speed.[35] According to Dr Molloy, Australia ‘[does not] prioritise uncrewed systems well enough’, noting that:

I think we are lacking, of course, in capacity in terms of numbers and scale. However, it is important to invest in and support the industrial base—with our Australian industry. They are absolutely talented… I think what we are missing is that prioritisation of the importance of these systems… At some stage we'll be developing them, but, again, ‘at some stage’ is not clear enough, and the pace—whether by 2030 or by 2040—is not fast enough. There are many countries who are doing it with a rapid pace, and I think we need to keep up with that and seize those opportunities where our industries are at the forefront. We can be world leading in these efforts, but… We’re not there yet.[36]

5.22Major General Ryan explained why sovereign production capacity is required by discussing the potential amounts of low-cost uncrewed and autonomous systems that the ADF will require in the event of a conflict:

It's a little bit more difficult than saying how many $500 drones. Ghost Shark drones do not cost $500. Clearly we need some long-range drones that are going to be very expensive. We're going to need hundreds, maybe thousands, of those, but we're going to need the medium and shorter range drones, and of those we're probably going to need tens of thousands or the capacity to build hundreds of thousands if we go to war. It's really about productive capacity and how many we'd need to produce, because the vast majority of short- and medium-ranged drones never reach their target. When it comes to long range, we need thousands or tens of thousands. For short-range drones, we probably need hundreds of thousands.[37]

5.23Major General Ryan asserted that production capacity is ‘not going to happen without government policies to support the procurement of Australian-made drones’.[38] Major General Ryan also noted that it is going to take time to reach the point where industry has the capacity to support such production.[39]

Opportunities and threats associated with uncrewed/autonomous systems

5.24Evidence presented to the Subcommittee detailed how innovations in robotics, automation and AI are redefining modern warfare and enabling the proliferation of uncrewed and autonomous systems within operational environments. While the proliferation of such technologies is providing opportunities for the development of sophisticated new capabilities for the ADF, these technologies are also available to foreign threat actors.[40]

5.25Submitters identified the many capabilities that advances in autonomous and uncrewed systems will bring to modern warfare and the ADF, such as:

• increased reconnaissance and surveillance abilities – including battlefield visibility and the ability to patrol Australia’s coastlines
• the ability to utilise autonomous and uncrewed systems in conjunction with traditional forces
• the ability to utilise autonomous and uncrewed systems in hazardous environments in place of human operators – including in frontline operations
• predictive analytical systems for both maintenance and logistics
• the ability to deploy high-volume, low-cost technologies in place of expensive conventional solutions
• the reduction in workload on humans managing military operations
• addressing risks in Australia’s traditional approach of reliance on small numbers of expensive platforms
• the ability to use AI to rapidly assess strategic, operational and tactical information to support human decision makers.[41]

Uncrewed and autonomous systems

5.26During the inquiry, uncrewed and autonomous systems were identified as a key capability and as both an opportunity and a threat. Uncrewed and autonomous systems are becoming increasingly prevalent in modern conflicts due to their cost-effectiveness, rapid producibility and versatility, with their uses including reconnaissance, surveillance and offensive purposes such as targeted strikes.[42]

5.27Dr Molloy discussed the role of uncrewed and autonomous systems within current and future conflicts:

Drones are here to stay. They will be present in any future conflict… I can give you some facts: in 2010 only three countries possessed armed drones; in 2024 we have 118 countries that possess armed drones, and these numbers are increasing exponentially… because they represent the two important intersections in military affairs: the precise nature of weapons and the rise of robotics. When combined, they are flown remotely at no risk to the operator and they are capable of delivering a lethal effect. Of course, because they are cheaper and more available, that takes us to the point where every country is in a race to develop more advanced autonomous systems at the same time as thinking about how to bring the cost down—we also need to remember the cost imposition strategy. They represent quite an important and influential type of weapon. They could be a delivery mechanism, if you want to call them that, but there are different types and different functions. They will be present. They will enhance traditional defence capabilities, and they will work alongside them. They are not only tools—they are already becoming partners. We are going to be working with these systems on current and future battlefields.[43]

5.28Uncrewed and autonomous systems usage in conflicts is growing exponentially, as is evident from their use in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Russia and Ukraine are both increasingly using uncrewed and autonomous systems for offensive purposes—hundreds of thousands are used per month by both sides and numbers continue to surge as production capabilities increase.[44]

5.29The effectiveness of uncrewed and autonomous systems as an offensive capability in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is compelling evidence of Australia’s need to pursue the acquisition and development of this technology. This was observed firsthand by the Committee delegation when visiting Poland and meeting with Ukrainian military personnel.

5.30A primary benefit of using uncrewed and autonomous systems in conflicts is cost effectiveness. Dr Molloy offered the example that $500 uncrewed and autonomous systems can be used to strike a $20 million tank, making them a highly efficient weapon.[45] Traditional weapons currently used to strike armoured vehicles, such as the FGM-148 Javelin missile, can cost over $200,000 per unit.[46]

5.31Mr David Goodrich OAM, Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Anduril Australia, also discussed the role of uncrewed and autonomous systems in providing cost-effective defence options, stating:

I think that it's absolutely unquestioned that the role of autonomous systems and drones and software-centred capabilities are going to play—and need to play—a much more prominent role in the arsenal that is available to every defence force around the world. We are of the view that we cannot afford to be shooting $5 million missiles at a $50,000 drone. That is something that is economically impossible, even for a country the size of the United States, let alone for a country the size of Australia. We have to be thinking of ways in which we can team the exquisite, crewed capabilities with a range of different autonomous, cost-effective, easy-to-produce capabilities to get, colloquially speaking, much more bang for our defence buck.[47]

5.32‘Drone swarms’ were a key opportunity and threat identified by submitters.[48] ‘Drone swarms’ refer to the use of large numbers of uncrewed and autonomous systems to carry out attacks targeting infrastructure or military assets that tend to overwhelm defensive capabilities. Epirus expanded on the threat of drone swarms, stating:

The proliferation of [Uncrewed Aerial Systems], particularly drone swarms, has introduced new complexities in military operations. These threats are highly versatile and can be deployed in large numbers, posing a significant challenge to traditional defence strategies.[49]

The challenge of countering drone swarms lies in their adaptability and the difficulty in distinguishing between a harmless drone and one carrying an explosive payload or other weaponry. Additionally, swarms can be difficult to track due to their decentralised control and low visibility, making it harder to predict their movements and intentions.[50]

Counter-uncrewed aerial systems

5.33Uncrewed and autonomous systems have significant destructive potential, making it important for Defence to possess effective counter capabilities (counter-UAS). The IIP acknowledges this in its discussion on the need for integrated air and missile defence, noting that ‘the development of counter‑small uncrewed aerial systems in response to the proliferation of uncrewed aerial systems and loitering munitions’ will be a key response capability.[51]

5.34In November 2024, Defence launched Project Land 156 to acquire a suite of counter-small uncrewed aerial systems to protect personnel and military assets as part of a $1.3 billion investment over the next decade.[52] Defence has since appointed Leidos Australia as Systems Integration Partner for the project in a contract valued at $45.9 million. It has also awarded various other contracts worth a total of $16.9 million among 11 vendors, including to five Australian companies for the delivery of various counter-UAS capabilities and technologies.[53]

5.35In May 2025, the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) announced Mission Syracuse, an initiative to seek sovereign solutions from Australian industry and research organisations to support and enhance Defence’s counter-UAS capabilities. ASCA’s website states that:

Mission Syracuse complements LAND 156 to deliver a comprehensive [counter small UAS] capability system for the ADF that is able to detect, track, identify and neutralise adversaries through a comprehensive, layered and distributed defensive approach.[54]

5.36In December 2025, Defence successfully conducted a live-fire demonstration of counter-uncrewed aircraft systems as a part of Project Land 156. The demonstration featured a command-and-control system integrated with advanced sensors and effectors that neutralised a drone threat.[55]

5.37Major General Ryan discussed the range of counter-UAS capabilities that are available and outlined those that are already being developed by Australian companies:

There are a bunch of different technologies to counter drones. When it comes to small, short-range drones, this can mean electronic warfare, jamming, spoofing—it can be shooting them down with a shotgun in some circumstances, or AI-targeted machine guns. For higher-flying, faster drones, it looks like small drone interceptors, which the Ukrainians have developed at about $5,000 a pop to bring down $50,000 Shahed drones. There are a range of different types of counter drone, and we're starting to see both microwave technology and laser technology mature. Indeed, there are Australian companies that are doing this very thing right now—they're at the leading edge of counter-drone technology.[56]

The international and national policy landscape

The international landscape

5.38There has been international debate concerning the use of autonomous systems, particularly lethal autonomous systems, which are equipped with weapons. These discussions have focused on how current international laws and frameworks regulate the use of autonomous systems and if there is a need for new regulations.

5.39The international community has considered how current international laws that influence the conduct of warfare apply to the use of autonomous systems for military purposes. International humanitarian law(IHL) is regarded as a key means of regulating the use of autonomous systems in warfare.[57] Also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict, IHL is ‘a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare’.[58]

5.40Key principles of IHL include:

• the distinction between civilians and combatants
• the prohibition to attack those not directly engaged in hostilities
• the prohibition to inflict unnecessary suffering
• the principle of necessity
• the principle of precaution
• the principle of proportionality.[59]
  41. IHL’s purpose is to maintain a level of humanity in armed conflicts in order to save lives and reduce suffering.[60] Autonomous systems, however, challenge the principles and purpose of IHL. In traditional warfare, human actors are accountable for their actions and compliance with IHL. Autonomous systems operate without human input, which complicates accountability and traceability should an incident occur where the principles of IHL have been followed. Should such an incident occur, it is not necessarily clear who should be accountable.[61] The degree of human input necessary for targeting decisions to be made by autonomous systems has as a result been an ongoing matter for international debate.[62]
  42. Some submitters to the inquiry believe that Australia’s use of autonomous systems must take place in compliance with IHL and that consideration should be given to specific national regulation that guardrails the use of autonomous systems.[63] RAND Australia (RAND) emphasised that there is still work to be done in the international space to regulate the implementation and use of autonomous capabilities into military doctrines. RAND called the lack of effective international regulation or cohesive policy a ‘significant hurdle to be overcome’.[64]

The national landscape

5.43In its February 2025 submission to the inquiry, Defence acknowledged the importance of complying with Australia’s international and domestic legal obligations in its implementation of uncrewed and autonomous systems.[65] Defence stated that it is ‘committed to using AI-enabled technologies responsibly, with careful consideration of the opportunities and risks, consistent with our international legal obligations’.[66] Notably, in reference to the integration of uncrewed and autonomous systems, the IIP highlighted that:

All weapons and weapon systems acquired by Defence will comply with Australia’s domestic and international legal obligations and will be subject to legal reviews prior to employment in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions.[67][68]

5.44RAND noted that the ADF has recently revised its Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare ‘which now features a three-part framework that incorporates traditional review processes alongside a new functional review aimed at evaluating emerging technologies such as uncrewed/autonomous systems and AI’.[69]

5.45In 2024, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources published the VoluntaryAI Safety Standard which provides practical guidance including guardrails to support the responsible use of AI in Australia.[70] While the guardrails are designed for general use, certain principles are applicable to Defence’s implementation of autonomous capabilities, including:

• Establish, implement and publish an accountability process including governance, internal capability and a strategy for regulatory compliance.
• Enable human control or intervention in an AI system to achieve meaningful human oversight.
• Inform end-users regarding AI-enabled decisions, interactions with AI and AI-generated content.[71]
  46. Security & Defence PLuS emphasised the need for more action to support the integration of autonomous capabilities into the ADF, including:

continued investment in research focused on trustworthy AI—systems whose decision-making processes are interpretable, robust, and ethically compliant. For instance, autonomous or semi-autonomous drones, ground vehicles, and maritime vessels can enhance operational effectiveness when deployed with appropriate safeguards. This includes ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law and adopting strict procedures to prevent unintended escalation.[72]

5.47ASPI outlined the need for Australia to establish its own ‘dedicated defence policy for autonomous systems and AI-enabled capabilities’ to ensure that Australia can responsibly integrate autonomous capabilities in accordance with international responsibilities.[73]

5.48Major General Ryan stated that Australia does not have to start from scratch in developing policies to support the integration of uncrewed and autonomous systems:

There are a lot of academic articles on this where you would get the impression we're starting from zero on this issue. We're not. Military institutions have 5,000 years of history of how to establish trust in military institutions, how to oversee subordinates and how to establish and confirm accountability in these kinds of things. So we already have a very good knowledge base of how to do that with humans. It's really about how we translate that for an era of AI. So we're already a long way down that path when it comes to transparency, accountability and making sure people act in accordance with the laws of armed conflict and the laws of Australia. It's just making sure we can have the same oversight mechanisms for machines and AI at the same time. We already have many of the baseline theories and processes there. We just need to translate them for AI.[74]

Committee comment

5.49Uncrewed and autonomous systems are a fact of modern warfare—they are a capability which the ADF must both possess and have countermeasures against.

5.50Given the importance of uncrewed and autonomous capabilities within modern conflicts, the Committee believes Australia could benefit from relevant enhancements to the National Defence Strategy. The NDSand the supporting IIP provide direction on investment into uncrewed and autonomous systems, including for both sophisticated, higher cost options and smaller, low‑cost and expendable options. As there was evidence presented indicating a disproportionate focus on sophisticated systems, the Committee believes that further specifications for ‘smaller, low‑cost and expendable’ options are needed.

5.51The Committee believes that the Australian Government must support Defence’s ability to protect Australia by investing in Australia’s manufacturing base to ensure it can produce uncrewed and autonomous systems at speed and scale in the event of a conflict. This will ensure that Defence has access to a continual supply of expendable systems and that these technologies are up to date, rather than mass acquiring expendable systems in anticipation of potential conflict, only for them to become obsolete by the time they are required. The Committee acknowledges that the Defence Industrial Development Strategy includes the ‘development and integration of autonomous systems’ as a priority and encourages Defence to continue work in this space to ensure it is best prepared for a possible future conflict.

5.52The Committee recognises that Defence is in the process of acquiring and integrating a variety of uncrewed and autonomous capabilities, including countermeasures. The Committee is confident that Defence’s acquisition of a variety of capabilities will enhance the capability and lethality of the ADF to the benefit of Australia’s integrated, focused force and our Strategy of Denial.

5.53The Committee is not privy to the full list of capabilities Defence expects to acquire and is only aware of the capabilities it witnessed or discussed during various site visits of Defence bases. The Committee, therefore, is not positioned to critique the balance of Defence’s acquisitions of uncrewed and autonomous systems. The Committee encourages Defence to ensure that it appropriately balances acquisitions to ensure coverage of the suite of capabilities required by the ADF in the uncrewed and autonomous space.

5.54The Committee notes that uncrewed and autonomous systems are both an opportunity and threat. Uncrewed and autonomous systems will deliver a variety of important capabilities to the ADF which will enhance both its effectiveness and lethality. However, foreign threat actors may also have access to such capabilities. It is an imperative that Defence has access to countermeasures.

5.55Uncrewed and autonomous systems are becoming more prolific in modern conflicts and benefit from cost-effectiveness, mass producibility and effectiveness as a weapon. They present both an opportunity for Australia to enhance its own effectiveness and a significant threat to ADF personnel, ADF infrastructure and national infrastructure. Counter-UAS capabilities are therefore a necessity, which the Committee notes is being addressed by Defence through projects such as Project Land 156.

5.56The Committee is of the view that the ADF’s integration of uncrewed and autonomous systems must be done with respect to both international law and national policy. The Subcommittee received limited evidence to how Defence specifically ensures that it is complying with international policy. However, the Committee was satisfied that the ADF are complying with international and domestic requirements. Nevertheless, this space will develop as the international community continues to debate the use of autonomous systems in warfare. The Committee’s view is that the Australian Government should remain abreast of developments in this space and endeavour to work towards practical outcomes.

5.57The Committee recommends that as part of the 2026 National Defence Strategy and the 2026 Integrated Investment Program planning cycle, the Australian Government should have due regard to the role of smaller, low-cost and expendable uncrewed and autonomous systems.

5.58The Committee recommends that the next iteration of the Defence Industry Development Strategy articulates how the Australian defence industry would be supported to rapidly scale production and deliver capabilities, including uncrewed and autonomous systems at speed.

5.59The Committee recommends that the Australian Government ensures regulations of Defence's use of autonomous systems are fit for purpose and have due regard for international humanitarian law.

Footnotes

[1]United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), What Are Uncrewed Systems? Unpacking Terms and Classifications, 2 July 2024, www.unidir.org/event/what-are-uncrewed-systems-unpacking-terms-and-classifications/ (accessed 3 November 2025).

[2]International Committee of the Red Cross, Autonomy, artificial intelligence and robotics: Technical aspects of human control, August 2019, p. 7.

[3]Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2023–24, October 2024, p. 7.

[4]Department of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy, April 2024, p. 40; Department of Defence, 2024 Integrated Investment Program, April 2024, p. 21.

[5]Department of Defence, 2024 Integrated Investment Program, April 2024, p. 21.

[6]Department of Defence, 2024 Integrated Investment Program, April 2024, p. 21.

[7]Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, ‘Key milestone in development of Australian made combat drone’, Media Release, 16 June 2025.

[8]Department of Defence, 2024 Integrated Investment Program, April 2024, p. 63.

[9]Department of Defence, Defence Industry Development Strategy, February 2024, p. 19.

[10]Department of Defence, Triton Remotely Piloted Aircraft System, www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/projects/triton-remotely-piloted-aircraft-system (accessed 16 November 2025); Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget Statements 2024-25: Budget Related Paper No. 1.4A, May 2025, p. 120.

[11]Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, ‘First Autonomous Undersea Vehicle ‘Ghost Shark’ Prototype Ready’, Media Release, 18 April 2024.

[12]Anduril Australia, Anduril Australia to Build Ghost Shark Factory, 14 August 2024, www.anduril.com/article/anduril-australia-to-build-ghost-shark-factory (accessed 17 November 2025).

[13]Hon Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister, and Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry ‘Equipping the Royal Australian Navy with next generation autonomous undersea vehicles’, Media Release, 10 September 2025.

[14]Commodore Michael Turner, Director General, Maritime Integrated Capabilities, Royal Australian Navy, Committee Hansard, 19 November 2025, p. 17.

[15]Julian Kerr, ‘Navy to acquire Bluebottle USVs’, Australian Defence Magazine, 1 December 2022; Ocius, Royal Australian Navy extends Ocius contract for Bluebottle Uncrewed Surface Vessel Operations for 2025, 24 December 2024, www.ocius.com.au/blog/2024XmasUpdate (accessed 1 December 2025); Commodore Turner, Director General, Maritime Integrated Capabilities, Royal Australian Navy, Committee Hansard, 19 November 2025, p. 17.

[16]Julian Kerr, ‘Navy to acquire Bluebottle USVs’, Australian Defence Magazine, 1 December 2022; Naval News, ‘Australia’s OCIUS Sells two Bluebottle USVs to the USA’, 20 May 2024.

[17]Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, ‘Key milestone in development of Australian made combat drone’, Media Release, 16 June 2025.

[18]Hon Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister, and Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, ‘Funding boost for Australian-made Ghost Bat’, Media Release, 9 December 2025.

[19]Air Vice-Marshal Nicholas Hogan CSC, Head, Air Force Capability, Royal Australian Air Force, Committee Hansard, 19 November 2025, p. 16.

[20]Department of Defence, ‘Growing sovereign industrial base with 300 drones delivered to Defence’, Media release, 19 August 2025.

[21]University of New South Wales (UNSW), Submission 14 (47th Parliament), p. 8; Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Submission 16 (47th Parliament), p. 12.

[22]Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), p. 6; UNSW, Submission 14 (47th Parliament), p. 8; ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), p. 13.

[23]ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), p. 12.

[24]Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), p. 6.

[25]Major General Michael Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 7.

[26]Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 7.

[27]Anduril Australia, Submission 9 (47th Parliament), p. 1.

[28]Mr Steven Camilleri, Co-founder and Chief Technical Officer, Spee3D Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 19 November 2025, p. 2.

[29]C2 Robotics, Submission 7 (47th Parliament), p. 4; Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), p. 7; ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), p. 12.

[30]C2 Robotics, Submission 7(47th Parliament), p. 4.

[31]C2 Robotics, Submission 7 (47th Parliament), p. 4.

[32]The Fourth Industrial Revolution refers to the use of smart technologies to enhance manufacturing efficiency and capability.

[33]ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), pp. 12–13.

[34]Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), p. 7.

[35]Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), p. 7.

[36]Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, UNSW, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 3.

[37]Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 9.

[38]Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 9.

[39]Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 9.

[40]Dr Molloy, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, UNSW, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 4; Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 7.

[41]Security & Defence PLuS, Submission 1 (47th Parliament), p. 1; Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Submission 11(47th Parliament), pp. 1–2; UNSW, Submission 14(47th Parliament), pp. 8–9; ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), pp. 11–12; Austal Australia, Submission 17(47th Parliament), p. 7.

[42]Australian Army Research Centre, How are Drones Changing Modern Warfare?, 1 August 2024,

www.researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/how-are-drones-changing-modern-warfare (accessed 12 November 2025).

[43]Dr Molloy, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, UNSW, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 2.

[44]Dr Molloy, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, UNSW, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 5; Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 9.

[45]Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, UNSW, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 5.

[46]Australian Defence Magazine, ‘Australia approved to refill Javelin stocks’, ADM, 20 August 2024.

[47]Mr David Goodrich OAM, Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Anduril Australia, Committee Hansard, 25 November 2025, p. 13.

[48]Epirus, Submission 5 (47th Parliament), p. 5; ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), p. 13.

[49]Epirus, Submission 5 (47th Parliament), p. 5.

[50]Epirus, Submission 5 (47th Parliament), p. 5.

[51]Department of Defence, 2024 Integrated Investment Program, April 2024, p. 64.

[52]Max Blenkin, ‘Global drone attacks put LAND 156 in the spotlight’, Australian Defence Magazine, 1 July 2025; Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, ‘Albanese Government ramps up investment in counter-drone capabilities for ADF’, Media Release, 27 August 2025.

[53]Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, ‘Accelerating the acquisition of drone and counter drone technology’, Media Release, 24 July 2025; Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, ‘Albanese Government ramps up investment in counter-drone capabilities for ADF’, Media Release, 27 August 2025.

[54]Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator, Mission Syracuse, www.asca.gov.au/activities/missions/mission-syracuse (accessed 10 November 2025).

[55]Department of Defence, Army tests counter-drone technology, www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2025-12-24/army-tests-counter-drone-technology (accessed 13 January 2026).

[56]Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 9.

[57]UNIDIR, The Interpretation and Application of International Humanitarian Law in Relation to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, 6 March 2025, www.unidir.org/publication/the-interpretation-and-application-of-international-humanitarian-law-in-relation-to-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems (accessed 12 November 2025); Craig Martin, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems and Proportionality: The Need for Regulation’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law vol. 57, no. 1.

[58]International Committee of the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law?, www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (accessed 15 November 2025).

[59]International Humanitarian Law Centre, Basic principles of IHL, www.diakonia.se/ihl/resources/international-humanitarian-law/basic-principles-ihl (accessed 15 November 2025); International Committee of the Red Cross, Principles of Precautions in Attack, www.ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule15 (accessed 15 November 2025).

[60]Australian Red Cross, Protecting people in war, www.redcross.org.au/ihl (accessed 15 November 2025).

[61]Neil Davison, ‘A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under international humanitarian law’, UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 30, pp. 16–17.

[62]UNIDIR, The Interpretation and Application of International Humanitarian Law in Relation to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, p. 25; Tim McFarland, ‘Minimum Levels of Human Intervention in Autonomous Attacks’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 27, no. 3.

[63]Security & Defence PLuS, Submission 1 (47th Parliament), p. 2; RAND Australia, Submission 4 (47th Parliament), p. 7; ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), p. 12.

[64]RAND Australia, Submission 4 (47th Parliament), p. 7.

[65]Department of Defence, Submission 21 (47th Parliament), p. 5.

[66]Department of Defence, Submission 21 (47th Parliament), p. 5.

[67]Department of Defence, 2024 Integrated Investment Program, April 2024, p. 21.

[68]Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions requires states to conduct legal reviews of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare in order to determine whether their use is prohibited by international law.

[69]RAND Australia, Submission 4 (47th Parliament), p. 7.

[70]Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Voluntary AI Safety Standard, August 2024, p. iv; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Safe and responsible AI in Australia: Proposals paper for introducing mandatory guardrails for AI in high-risk settings, September 2024, p. 35.

[71]Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Safe and responsible AI in Australia: Proposals paper for introducing mandatory guardrails for AI in high-risk settings, September 2024, p. 35.

[72]Security & Defence PLuS, Submission 1 (47th Parliament), p. 2.

[73]ASPI, Submission 16 (47th Parliament), p. 7.

[74]Major General Ryan (Retired), Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 4 November 2025, p. 10.