- Defence estate, security and resilience
Overview
6.1‘Defence estate’ refers to the property, facilities and infrastructure that are owned and managed by the Department of Defence (Defence). Defence estate is a key enabler of Defence’s capabilities and its capacity for force projection, underpinning the nation’s resilience to threats. It is critical to Australia’s national security that Defence estate is both secure and resilient to a full spectrum of threats.
6.2Defence is responsible for the management and protection of $41.4 billion worth of land, buildings, infrastructure, plant and equipment and intangibles. The Integrated Investment Program (IIP) proposes to invest an additional $14–18 billion towards this estate by 2033–34.
6.3This chapter will examine the various funding initiatives aimed towards expanding Defence estate detailed in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 and the associated concerns related to its security and resilience that were raised throughout the inquiry.
Defence estate initiatives
6.4Defence estate plays a significant role in the 2024 National Defence Strategy, which states that ‘Defence must focus force posture efforts and resourcing on bases most appropriate to the strategic circumstances’. This involves increased investment into Australia’s northern network of Defence bases, ports and barracks to strengthen Australia’s force projection, reinforcing its Strategy of Denial to ensure a more secure Indo-Pacific. Ongoing and planned works across the northern bases include upgrades to airfields, fuel supply and storage, accommodation, security and training areas, with 2023–24 expenditure for approved capital works projects totalling approximately $1.1 billion.
6.5The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 provides further details of some of these projects, including:
• providing enhanced facilities and infrastructure, including airfield upgrades, under the RAAF Base Tindal Redevelopment Stage 6 and United States Force Posture Initiative Airfield Works and Associated Infrastructure Program at RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory;
• providing berthing, training, maintenance, logistics and support facilities to support new maritime vessels at various bases, including HMAS Coonawarra in the Northern Territory and HMAS Cairns in Queensland; and
• upgrading facilities and infrastructure at the Bradshaw Field Training Area, Kangaroo Flats Training Area, Mount Bundey Training Area, and Robertson Barracks Close Training Area in the Northern Territory.
6.6In a submission to the inquiry, Defence provided additional detail on work underway across the northern bases:
• RAAF Base Darwin and Mount Bundey Airfield, Northern Territory. Defence is maintaining aircraft pavements, lighting and airfield drainage at these locations, valued at $351.7 million;
• RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory. Defence is constructing a new aircraft apron and aviation fuel farm, and upgrading and extending the runway and taxiway, valued at $1.071 billion; and
• RAAF Base Learmonth, Western Australia. Defence is improving the airfield, including widening and strengthening the runway and taxiway, valued at $662.2 million.
6.7Beyond northern bases, Defence recognises the contribution southern bases make towards supporting Australian Defence Force (ADF) training, military logistical capability, research and technology, and explosive ordnance storage, maintenance and disposal. This is reflected in investments of $127 million towards the Henderson Defence Precinct and $8 billion towards upgrading HMAS Stirling to support the delivery of AUKUS.
6.8In 2023, in response to recommendations made in the Defence Strategic Review, the Australian Government initiated an independent audit of Defence’s estate and infrastructure. Its purpose was to assess if Defence estate was able to meet operational and capability requirements, both at the time of the review and in future. This audit is yet to be released as the Australian Government has instructed Defence to ’undertake further analysis to understand the impacts of the audit’s findings and recommendations’.
Issues faced by Defence estate
Threat resilience
6.9Submissions to the inquiry highlighted the importance of Defence estate’s security and resilience. Submitters shared Defence’s view that the security and resilience of Defence estate, particularly in times of competition and conflict, is of critical importance to national security due to its role in supporting the ADF’s operational effectiveness and Australia’s ability to project force.
6.10RAND Australia (RAND) cited various potential threats to defence estate, including natural disasters, cyber and physical attacks, disruption of access to online services, asymmetric and insider threats. The University of New South Wales (UNSW) acknowledged the challenges posed by ‘the needs of ongoing maintenance across a very large and aging estate’.
6.11RAND and UNSW both noted that despite the Defence estate funding initiatives detailed in the Annual Report, there was little indication of Defence’s work to address these threats and challenges to Defence estate resilience. RAND noted that while the absence of detail does not necessarily reflect an absence of action, any progress achieved was not well reflected in the annual report.
6.12Serco Australia (Serco) stated that Defence’s aging infrastructure is poorly aligned with current threats and modern warfare:
Many facilities were built decades ago, are dispersed, and are not designed to withstand modern threats such as precision strike, cyber disruption, or sabotage. The scale, age, and dispersion of the estate create vulnerabilities not only for Defence operations but also for industry efficiency, workforce mobilisation and national resilience.
6.13To address issues with Defence estate, Serco recommended that Defence:
- Adopt standardised, replicable estate models that can be delivered at scale across multiple sites, reducing bespoke design costs and accelerating delivery.
- Embed resilience and survivability in design, ensuring facilities are hardened against emerging asymmetric threats and capable of supporting rapid force projection.
- Use estate renewal as a productivity lever, anchoring regional economies, supporting sovereign supply chains, providing training opportunities and building workforce pipelines in strategically significant regions.
- Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral David Johnston AC RAN, made a statement in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 on Defence’s ongoing efforts to build its resilience:
Over the next decade we will also strengthen the ADF’s ability to withstand, endure and recover from disruption, including through investments in Australia’s northern bases, guided weapons and explosive ordnance, an integrated and resilient theatre logistics system, enterprise data and [Information and Communication Technology] capabilities, and enhanced cyber capabilities.
6.15The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 recognised the impact that climate change will have on ADF capability, capacity and infrastructure. To address this impact, Defence noted its use of the Defence Climate Assessment Tool:
Defence is implementing sophisticated software models, including the Defence Climate Assessment Tool (shared by the United States Department of Defense) to provide location-specific climate risk assessment to inform estate planning and decision-making. This process identifies different strategies to improve resilience, including adaptation measures for critical infrastructure, which can be aligned to the wider Defence strategy.
6.16When appearing before the Subcommittee, Defence provided additional examples of ongoing work and future plans to support the resilience of its estate:
- long-range and high-speed missiles
- missile defence capabilities, such as:
- AIR6500: a command-and-control system for the Integrated Air and Missile Defence system
- Jindalee Operational Radar Network: a long-range radar system that enables the detection of incoming threats, including missiles
- space-based sensors
- passive defence measures such as bunker systems
- airfield and runway upgrades
- communication systems improvements.
- Mr Andrew Hodgkinson, Assistant Secretary, National Defence Strategy Policy and Development, Strategy Policy and Industry Group, Department of Defence, stated that efforts to improve Defence estate resilience are ongoing:
Measures that can improve resilience and measures that can improve preparedness and responsiveness are part of what we're looking at and investing in... Over time, you will see more of those enhancements rolled out to a larger number of bases and in more apparent ways across northern Australia.
Fuel security
6.18Fuel security is integral to the resilience of Defence estate and general military capability. The Defence Strategic Review identified that Defence required a more effective and less vulnerable fuel distribution system than what existed at the time of the review.
6.19The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 discussed Defence’s ongoing work to improve the resilience of its fuel network, some of which began before the review was completed. Defence provided an overview of its progress with its Defence Fuel Resilience Program, which commenced in 2018 and is scheduled for completion in 2039–40. The program’s purpose is to reduce enterprise risk, increase fuel supply chain resilience, and optimise total cost of ownership. Aspects of the program include:
- Risk Reduction program: A program to address the highest priority safety risks across the Defence fuel network through infrastructure upgrades and governance improvements. The program is expected to be completed by 2025–26.
- Capability Uplift program: Defence reported that this program is delivering risk reduction improvements which have included the signing of contracts with industry partners to improve fuel security in support of Defence preparedness and operations. The program commenced in 2021 and is scheduled to be delivered across five years.
- Network Resilience program: A program designed to deliver a resilient and effective Defence fuel network. The first component of this program was scheduled for delivery in July 2024 and will establish a reserve fuel holding, increase distribution assets and will establish a reserve fuel holding, increase distribution assets and sustain the fuel network contract from 2026–27.
- Defence also highlighted an annual $450 million fuel supply contract with Viva Energy Refining Ltd to refine and supply fuel for the ADF. This is in addition to the Defence Future Energy Strategy which provides Defence with an approach to transitioning its platforms to use clean energy. Early activities will focus on ‘enabling the integration of lower-carbon liquid fuels into the Defence Fuel Supply Chain’.
- In its submission to the inquiry, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) acknowledged Defence’s efforts towards strengthening fuel supply resilience but criticised the absence of discussion in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 of supply chain vulnerabilities that impact fuel security and the potential disruptions they can have on ‘Defence’s capability projects, infrastructure and the timely supply of fuel, food and equipment’. Anduril Australia emphasised Australia’s need for a strategy to facilitate a demand-driven supply chain for fuel.
- Mr Pat Sowry, First Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Division, Department of Defence, detailed efforts to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities for fuel supply, some of which were driven by Defence efforts to transition to renewable energy:
In terms of what abilities we have to reduce supply chains for diesel generation in more regional or remote sites, we've been doing quite a bit of that over the recent years in terms of piloting our ability to achieve reductions, which all contribute to reducing emissions and extending the requirements for resupplying diesel to those remote sites.
6.23Brigadier Mark Baldock, Director General, Fuel Capability, Joint Capabilities Group, Department of Defence, highlighted some of the supply chain benefits of using sustainable aviation fuel and renewable diesel:
The use of sustainable aviation fuel—I would add renewable diesel—offers Defence and Australia a way of diversifying its supply chains away from the importation. There is an opportunity and a pathway for a domestically made fuel from domestic feedstock, because it's important that both of those characteristics are met so we would reduce our reliance on the importation... We've demonstrated that there's no impact to aircraft power. There's no impact to maintenance, no impact to engines. The technical term is that it's a drop-in replacement. That means we can drop sustainable aviation fuel and renewable diesel into our normal tanks that we hold mineral based diesel and mineral based aviation fuel in. So there are no additional vehicles required, no separation of stock amongst storage tanks and so on… it achieves the diversification of the supply chain to improve fuel security.
6.24When visiting RAAF Darwin, the Subcommittee observed a fuel facility funded by the United States Force Posture Initiatives infrastructure program. The facility, valued at US$76 million, enhances air cooperation between Australia and the US, improves RAAF Darwin’s operational capabilities, and is reflective of the US’s engagement with fuel storage in the northern bases.
Energy transition
6.25Beyond contributions to improved fuel security, the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 reported on Defence’s transition to renewable energy sources and its supplementary role in estate resilience. Accelerating Defence’s transition to clean energy was recommended in the Defence Strategic Review as a way to improve sovereign alternative energy production capabilities and enhances estate resilience through diversified energy sources.
6.26The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 noted the Defence Net Zero Strategy, which will see Defence reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 43 per cent from 2005 levels by 2030, with the ultimate goal of net zero to be achieved by 2050. Defence affirmed that the strategy will be implemented without compromising Defence’s preparedness, operational effectiveness and capabilities requirement.
6.27The aims of the strategy are:
1accelerate emissions reductions with secure, renewable electricity;
2transition to low-emission fuel alternatives;
3increase energy efficiency and explore carbon sequestration to cut emissions and costs; and
4integrate a unified approach with enabling functions and resources to achieve net zero.
6.28This energy transition is underway across the Defence enterprise, guided by the Defence Net Zero Implementation Plan. The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 states that ‘initial activity under the strategy will involve an estate-led approach, focusing on increasing energy efficiency and renewable energy, as well as changing policies, processes and approaches to procurement’.
6.29Defence has begun implementing renewable energy and energy security initiatives under the Defence Renewable Energy and Energy Security Program, including the installation of:
- 13.2 megawatts of large-scale solar photovoltaic systems at two sites in the Northern Territory Robertson Barracks (10 megawatts) and RAAF Base Darwin (3.2 megawatts);
- 1.2 megawatts of large-scale solar photovoltaic systems at Australian Defence Satellite Communications Station Geraldton in Western Australia; and
- three small-scale solar photovoltaic microgrids with battery energy storage systems across Yampi Sound Training Area in Western Australia and Beecroft Air Weapons Range in New South Wales.
- The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 detailed other planned initiatives such as additional solar installations, feasibility assessments of other low-emission technologies, and partnering with industry to develop alternatives fuels and energy storage to improve energy resilience, capability resilience and cost efficiency.
- The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 also provided an overview of the work of the Security and Estate Group Sustainability Initiatives Forum, a forum held quarterly to identify opportunities for base service contractors and other suppliers to improve Defence estate’s sustainability. Defence reported that the 2023–24 Sustainability Initiatives Forum focused on strategic aims one (renewable energy) and three (energy efficiency) of the Defence Net Zero Strategy and that works had been undertaken at more than 25 bases to further these goals. These interventions included various energy efficiency upgrades to lighting, hot water, rooftop solar, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, as well as enhancements to plants and equipment. Defence stated that of the $49.5 million allocated towards sustainability initiatives, it expected a return on investment of $7 million annually in reduced energy and maintenance costs, and a yearly reduction of 20,000 tonnes of emissions.
- When questioned about the resiliency of the renewable energy networks, Mr Sowry provided details on contingency measures:
Primarily at the moment it's solar farms supported by battery energy storage systems, and what we're looking at is regional networks to support those. Where we might lose a particular node, we can connect using other nodes, but we also use load shedding and other electricity or power energy management systems to meet the resilience requirements if we lose connectivity, whether it's through a hostile attack or a severe weather event.
6.33Defence stated that its renewable energy sources were supported by diesel-powered central emergency power generation systems. Defence added that there is capacity for additional battery storage for the existing solar power generation, further increasing energy resilience.
Defence estate audit
6.34Submitters to the inquiry raised concerns regarding the length of time between the independent Defence estate audit being completed in December 2023, and its findings having not yet been released.
6.35ASPI was critical of the lack of reference to the audit and its findings in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24, stating:
The omission of the Defence estate audit findings from the [Defence Annual Report 2023–24] raises concerns about transparency. Releasing the audit is essential for maintaining public trust and accountability, as it evaluates whether the Defence estate can meet evolving operational needs and impacts future operational readiness, planning and investment. Transparency, in this instance, goes beyond good governance. It is essential that the Defence estate is fit for purpose and capable of supporting Australia’s security needs.
6.36Dr Andrew Dowse, Director at RAND Australia, also noted this lack of transparency and the impact it had on scrutinising the audit’s utility:
I do acknowledge that, when Defence gets into the details about vulnerabilities and deficiencies in the resilience of its estate, it goes beyond what's possible in a public report… But I do not have visibility of how much analysis Defence is doing of its estate. I know that there is a requirement for an estate audit, but I'm not aware that that includes a measure of resilience. I would very much recommend that such analysis be undertaken and that those measures of the different mechanisms that could be put in place to increase the resilience of the state be prioritised across the estate and be entered into the investment program.
6.37When questioned about the audit’s release, Mr Sowry said:
I think it would be reasonable to expect that, once the government determines how it wants to approach the recommendations in the audit, elements, if not all of it, will become public.
6.38Defence clarified that ongoing work within the Capital Facilities and Infrastructure Branch was ‘deconflicted’ from the audit’s outcomes so that projects currently being delivered would be used in the future. Defence also stated that the audit would have ‘relatively limited impact’ on informing industry engagement and advised that engagement relating to estate was facilitated through biannual briefings with industry and the IIP.
Strategic direction
6.39Defence operates in a continuously evolving strategic environment influenced by shifting geopolitical circumstances. Submitters to the inquiry suggested that Defence estate could benefit from a more comprehensive strategy to ensure that any threats to resilience resulting from this environment can be efficiently and effectively addressed.
6.40Submissions supported the shift in strategic direction towards strengthening Australia’s northern bases. ASPI stated that the shift in priority areas was evident in the increased funding but also reflects ‘Australia’s worsening strategic circumstances and diminished strategic warning time’ and criticised the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 for not conveying the urgency of this situation.
6.41ASPI raised the problem of improvements to Defence estate being reactive to changing strategic circumstances, rather than the result of a comprehensive integrated plan. ASPI stated that the lack of planning in tandem with the size and complexity of Defence estate has resulted in incremental growth and sunk costs.
6.42While supportive of investment in Australia’s northern bases, the Australian Industry Group (Ai Group) raised concerns around the allocation and transparency of funds:
The Government outlined a $3.8 billion investment to enhance military infrastructure in northern Australia, which is a welcome step. However, greater transparency is needed regarding how this funding will be distributed. It remains unclear whether it includes previously announced projects, such as the $1.1 billion investment at RAAF Base Tindal or the $568 million for runway upgrades on Cocos Island. To strengthen Defence infrastructure, a dedicated portion of the $3.8 billion should be explicitly allocated to enhancing facility security, resilience, and force protection measures. Greater clarity on these investments will help ensure Australia's Defence estate is fit for purpose in an increasingly complex security environment.
6.43Ai Group argued that given its importance to national security, Defence estate should be a foundational element of a broader national resilience strategy. It also suggested that such a strategy should give increased attention to the security and resilience of Defence estate against asymmetric threats.
6.44Submissions raised concerns regarding Defence’s reliance upon national critical infrastructure. There was concern that any adverse impacts on national infrastructure would impact Defence operations and subsequently threaten Defence’s overall resilience. Australians for War Powers Reform suggested that fall-back locations from which Defence could operate, if necessary, could help to address this concern.
Committee comment
6.45The strategic value of Defence estate cannot be understated. It enables critical Defence activities and plays an integral role in Australia’s force posture and threat resilience. For these reasons, the resilience of Defence estate to the full spectrum of threats in the current strategic environment is paramount.
6.46While the Committee has confidence in Defence to protect its property, facilities and infrastructure, there is a lack of transparency and communication regarding its approach to addressing physical, cyber or asymmetric threats. The Committee acknowledges that full transparency of the protection of these assets is not feasible but cautions that the current lack of transparency is problematic when scrutinising assets worth $41.4 billion.
6.47The Committee’s concern with transparency extends to the prolonged release of the 2023 independent audit into Defence estate. While it is again appreciated that aspects of the audit will consider sensitive security matters, the overriding lack of transparency and ongoing delays to its release makes it difficult for industry and the Australian public to engage with the important work of Defence. This engagement is what builds social licence and trust to subsequently create a stronger Defence force. If the report is too sensitive to release as it is, the Committee believes that a redacted version should be released by Defence as a show of good faith.
6.48The Committee supports the ongoing and planned initiatives to improve Defence estate resilience referenced in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24. The Committee is also supportive of the increased focus on Australia’s northern bases to strengthen the national force posture and Strategy of Denial. The Committee believes that continued efforts in this region will create a more stable and secure Indo-Pacific.
6.49The Committee supports Defence’s efforts towards improving fuel security. The implementation of the Defence Fuel Resilience Program is having a tangible impact— in the fuel storage facilities observed by the Subcommittee on its site visit to Larrakeyah Defence Precinct, for example—and is increasing the resilience of Defence estate and Australia’s military capability. Despite these efforts, the Committee is concerned that Defence’s fuel security is highly exposed and that its security is not reflective of the importance it has in estate resilience.
6.50The benefits to resilience provided by Defence’s renewable energy transition were of interest to the Committee. More diverse sources of energy result in in a more adaptable Defence force and estate that can withstand a wider variety of threats. The Committee encourages Defence to continue with its energy transition contingent on reliability to ensure continued operations.
6.51Submitters’ concerns around a lack of cohesive plan for Defence estate were shared by the Committee. Beyond the significant financial investment that Australia has made in Defence estate, the Committee believes the lack of planning undermines its resilience.
6.52Given Defence estate’s strategic value, the Committee believes that it should play a larger role in the 2026 National Defence Strategy. This will provide a clearer path forward for estate and better safeguard its security and resilience. The Committee also encourages efforts towards improving resilience to be transparently reported on, to the extent possible, in the Defence Annual Report.
6.53The Committee recommends that the planning cycle for the 2026 National Defence Strategy puts due regard on Defence estate security and resilience.
6.54The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence release a public version of the 2023 independent audit into Defence estate as soon as practicable.
6.55The Committee recommends the Department of Defence considers how to strengthen fuel security of Defence estate through the Defence Fuel Resilience Program.