- Progress on the transformation to an integrated focused force
Overview
2.1In 2024, the release of the National Defence Strategy (NDS) signalled a ‘shift from a balanced force capable of responding to a range of contingencies, to an integrated, focused force designed to address Australia’s most significant strategic risks’. This shift was the result of changes to Australia’s strategic environment which necessitated a new approach to the defence of Australia and its interests.
2.2This chapter will open with a background discussion on Australia’s strategic shift, followed by an explanation of what is meant by an integrated, focused force. Using the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 as the foundation, it will then examine progress on the transformation to an integrated focused force in three key areas: capability, force structure, and force posture.
What is an integrated, focused force?
The policy background
2.3The 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU)was an important document on the pathway toward an integrated, focused force. Highlighting that Australia’s strategic environment had deteriorated more rapidly than previously anticipated in the 2016 Defence White Paper, the DSU ended the long-standing assumption in Defence planning of ‘a 10-year warning time for a major conventional attack against Australia’. The DSU articulated three new strategic objectives for Defence planning: to shape Australia’s strategic environment; to deter actions against Australia’s interests; and to respond with credible military force, when required.
2.4In 2023, the Australian Government commissioned an independent Defence strategic review to assess whether Australia had the necessary defence capability, posture and preparedness to defend Australia and its interests in the strategic environment now being faced. Delivered in 2023, the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) introduced the strategic concept of National Defence, a coordinated whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance its interests.
2.5In assessing Defence capability, the DSR highlighted a significant weakness in the existing ADF force structure:
The current Australian Defence Force (ADF) force structure is based on a ‘balanced force’ model that reflects a bygone era. It does not adequately address our new strategic environment.
2.6A ‘focused force’ is a force designed to address the nation’s most significant military risks. The capabilities required to address identified threats will also provide latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and crisis.
2.7The DSR stated that the ADF needed a much more focused force that can respond to current risks. In addition, the DSR discussed the need to shift from a Joint to an Integrated Force. Whilst the Joint Force operated through the combined effects of Navy, Army and Air Force working together, the proposed Integrated Force would harness this cooperation across five domains: maritime, land, air, space and cyber.
2.8A number of critical capabilities were identified to support the Integrated Force, including undersea warfare, integrated targeting, enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains, enhanced maritime capabilities, and all-domain integrated air and missile defence. The DSR recommended that Defence’s capability investment program be rebuilt in line with the Review’s force structure design priorities, with projects being delayed or cancelled to enable funds and workforce reallocation to higher priority capabilities.
2.9The 2024 NDSformally signalled the adoption of National Defence and the shift from a balanced force capable of responding to a range of contingencies, to an integrated, focused force designed to address Australia’s most significant strategic risks. Central to the design of the focused, integrated force is the Strategy of Denial, a concept first introduced in the 2023 DSR. In broad terms, the Strategy of Denial aims to deter conflict before it begins, prevent any potential adversary from coercing Australia through force, support regional security and prosperity, and uphold a favourable strategic balance.
2.10Published alongside the 2024 National Defence Strategy, the rebuilt 2024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP) set out the specific capabilities the Australian Government will invest in to give effect to the 2024 NDS and shift the ADF to an integrated, focused force.
An integrated, focused force
2.11The adoption of National Defence and the shift from a balanced force to an integrated, focused force design represents a fundamental change in Australia’s strategic thinking. As explained by Major General Matt Pearse, Acting Head of Force Design, Department of Defence:
The Australian Defence Force is undergoing a generational shift from a balanced force to a focused force, which is optimised for operations in our immediate region. A balanced force refers to a military structure that maintains a broad range of capabilities across all domains—air, land, sea, space and cyber—without prioritising any particular area. An integrated force is the model outlined in the 2024 National Defence Strategy. It prioritises capabilities that are most relevant to Australia's strategic environment, particularly in our immediate region, and ensures that those capabilities are connected across domains.[12]
2.12To achieve this transformation, the 2024 NDS announced six immediate investment priorities addressing issues in capability, force structure and force posture:
- acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS to improve our deterrence capabilities;
- developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer-range and manufacture munitions in Australia;
- improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases;
- initiatives to improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled Defence workforce;
- lifting Australia’s capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into ADF capability, in close partnership with Australian industry; and
- deepening Australia’s diplomatic and defence partnerships with key partners in the Indo-Pacific.
- Beyond these immediate investment priorities, the longer-term would see Defence expand capabilities in the following areas:
- undersea warfare to undertake a broad range of missions to project force, hold a potential adversary force at risk and maintain persistent situational awareness;
- targeting and long-range strike to provide a greater capacity, at longer ranges, to deter any attempts to project power against Australia;
- space and cyber capabilities that strengthen situational awareness, the ability to project force and decision advantage;
- amphibious capable combined-arms land system, enabled by Navy and Air Force combat capabilities and supported by Navy’s amphibious capability, to optimise the Army for littoral manoeuvre and control of strategic land positions, and to enable the ADF to undertake rapid stabilisation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations;
- maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control operations that provide Defence with the ability to deny the use of an area of the sea when needed and provide the ADF with freedom of action;
- expeditionary air operations to project force into Australia’s primary area of military interest to deter attempts to project power against Australia or target Australian interests, and maintain persistent situational awareness;
- missile defence to protect critical Defence infrastructure, Defence facilities and the ADF from long-range and high-speed missile capabilities;
- theatre logistics to support the ADF’s ability to concentrate forces and sustain protracted operations during a conflict;
- theatre command and control that enables integrated ADF forces to plan and act at speed in order to exercise effective command and control during a conflict and remain resilient during disruptions to command and control networks;
- a Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance enterprise to build stocks, strengthen supply chains and support a domestic manufacturing capability; and
- northern bases to ensure the ADF can project deployed forces and continue to operate through disruption.
- The Subcommittee noted the commitment of Defence to transition from a balanced force to an integrated, focused force. Submitters were generally supportive of the Australian Government’s direction to the ADF to shift from a balanced force to an integrated, focused force. For example, RAND Australia (RAND) commented that:
The approach to transform the ADF into an integrated, focused force is commendable and appropriate, given Australia’s strategic environment. The Defence Annual Report reflects activities to progress that transformation.
2.15While noting the scale of the task, the University of New South Wales (UNSW) also voiced support for the transition and commended Defence for the progress outlined in the Defence Annual Report 2023–24. UNSW stated that given Australia’s strategic objectives and alignment, it is ‘essential that future capabilities are developed, built, and maintained on a foundation of agreed open architectures and published standards’.
2.16However, there remain a few voices of dissent. Major General Michael Ryan (Retd) offered that:
The secret is that no democracy has ever been able to predict the next war, so the NDS is somewhat arrogant in thinking we can predict it without naming who the potential adversary is and then building a focus force around it. I propose that the next national defence strategy really needs a more balanced force. A balanced force offers lots of different options to the government of Australia for when we get surprised—because we will get surprised.
2.17Whilst not specifically offering an opinion on the merit of the strategy transition to an integrated, focused force, responsive to the changing geostrategic realities, Ms Jennifer Parker, Non-Resident Fellow, Lowy Institute, said that:
In the broad, the current government has done a lot of great work in terms of clearing up our strategy. It does build, of course, on the strength of the previous government and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, which was the first real public message to the Australian community that the world was changing.
Progress on the transformation to an integrated, focused force
2.18Discussions around the integrated, focused force often centre on Defence capability investment and the acquisition of equipment. However, it is important to note that the ADF’s transformation is being delivered across three key areas: capability, force structure and force posture.
Capability
2.19Capability is more than a weapon system or piece of technology. It is the integrated effect delivered by multiple elements working together. For example, a Defence capability is made up of the hardware, operated by trained and available personnel in an organisational structure, supported by maintenance, ammunition and appropriate infrastructure.
2.20The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 stated that as of 30 June 2024, Defence managed 568 major projects and 99 minor acquisition projects with a total acquisition cost of $245 billion.
2.21The Department of Defence has made considerable headway in implementing the 2024 NDS and progressing the transformation to an integrated, focused force. Through the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 and two submissions over the course of the inquiry, the Department of Defence presented extensive lists of investment activity across 11 capability priority areas. Key highlights of the Defence Annual Report 2023–24 are as follows:
- Invested $1.6 billion to expand and accelerate the acquisition of 42 high-mobility artillery rocket systems for Army;
- Signed contracts with Lockheed Martin Australia to domestically produce guided multiple launch rocket systems;
- Commitment of $765 million to deliver the second tranche of the Joint Air Battle Management System to support an enhanced, integrated and coordinated air and missile capability;
- Purchase of more than 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles to be integrated into Hobart class destroyers as part of the ADF’s long-range strike capability;
- Purchase of 20 C-130J Hercules aircraft;
- Signed contracts with Hanwha Defence Australia to deliver and support 129 locally built Redback infantry fighting vehicles for Army.
- The February 2025 submission provided additional examples:
- Successful live firing of Naval Strike Missile during Exercise RIMPAC, leading to Navy subsequently declaring Initial Operating Capability for the Naval Strike Missile on the Hobart class destroyers in September 2024;
- Government selected a design by Damen Shipyards Group as the preferred option for the ADF’s Landing Craft Heavy under a program that will bolster national defence by establishing a new littoral fleet;
- The first 14 of the newly acquired M1A2 system enhanced program v3 (SEP v3) main battle tanks have been delivered to 3rd Brigade, with the new fleet comprising 75 upgraded M1A2 SEPv3 tanks by 2025;
- Delivery of the tenth UH-60M Black Hawk to Australia, with all 40 aircraft due to be delivered by 2030;
- Delivery of the last of Australia’s 72 F-35A Lightning II aircraft under AIR 6000 Ph 2A/B.
- Domestic manufacturing facility for Raytheon-Kongsberg National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System launchers opened in Mawson Lakes, South Australia.
- In a follow up submission in November 2025, Defence presented the following key points:
- Investment of $1.7 billion to acquire dozens of Ghost Shark autonomous drones capable of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike operations, as well as the ability to be armed with torpedos and sea mines;
- Accelerated delivery of a larger and more lethal surface combatant fleet with the selection of the upgraded Japanese Mogami class frigate as the preferred platform for Navy’s future fleet of general purpose frigates;
- Successful firing of a Precision Strike Missile for the first time at the Mount Bundey Training Area in the Northern Territory, making progress towards boosting Australia’s long range strike capability;
- Investment of up to $2.1 billion has been made for additional stocks of advanced AIM-120D-3 and AIM-120C-8 medium-range missiles, designed to counter threats at extended ranges.
- Initial tests were completed on the first MQ-4C Triton remotely piloted aircraft system, based at RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory and the second and third aircraft arrived at the facility in May 2025;
- Announced an initial rolling wave of contracts to 11 vendors, including five Australian companies, to rapidly deliver counter-drone technologies through Project LAND 156;
- Signing of an Australia-US Memorandum of Understanding for production, sustainment and follow-on development of the Precision Strike Missile.
- Major General Pearse summarised Department of Defence progresss follows:
From a capability point of view, Defence is delivering with sharper emphasis on long-range strike, persistent surveillance, resilient logistics, and integrated multi-domain operations. Key milestones include the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles, naval strike missiles and high-mobility artillery rocket systems, known as HIMARS, and delivery of advanced platforms such as the MQ-4C Triton, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the UH-60 Black Hawk. We've also established a Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, with more than $4.1 billion committed to sovereign missile manufacturing, and have launched the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator, ASCA, with $3.4 billion invested to fast-track technologies like autonomous systems, quantum and direct energy.
2.25The Subcommittee observed that neither of the Defence submissions mentioned the cyber and space domains in relation to the transformation to an integrated, focused force. Mr Andrew Hodgkinson, Assistant Secretary, National Defence Strategy Policy and Development, Department of Defence, provided the following detail:
There's continual progress in improvements to our network capabilities, both defensive cyber capabilities and Defence's and [the Australian Signals Directorate’s] ability to undertake other types of cyberoperations. You might recall that one of the outcomes of the Defence strategic review was some organisational changes around the way we undertake space operations within Defence. There have been a range of activities progressed in the space domain, I know, including with our US allies, including the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability that is progressing in WA.
Space domain
2.26The space domain was raised in a number of submissions and public hearings, predominantly in relation to the lack of Australia’s sovereign space capability. Ms Parker highlighted the criticality of space capability to the ADF:
You need resilient space capability, and you need sovereign space capability. The idea that we could rely on the US or civilian providers for our space capability to support our command-and-control backbone and our targeting, in my view, is ludicrous. There are two reasons. Firstly, the US will always prioritise their operations. Of course they would, as should we. There have been times in our history, many times, where we have lost space capability because they have prioritised it to other things. Secondly, relying on civilian space capability was a key lesson from Ukraine when they relied on Starlink, which they have used for a lot of their operations effectively. But, during one of their uncrewed surface vessel operations in the Black Sea where they were trying to attack a base in Crimea, Starlink was turned off and their [Uncrewed Surface Vehicles] went unserviceable and were lost. We must invest in that capability.
2.27The Australian Policy Strategic Institute (ASPI) discussed the need for advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to support Australia’s investment in long-range strike. ASPI reasoned that the ADF cannot ‘strike deep’ if it cannot ‘see deep’. Originally promoted as a requirement under Project DEF-799 Phase 2 which sought to acquire sovereign-controlled space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, ASPI recommended space-based ISR capabilities on sovereign satellite constellations must be fully supported via a ‘plan for acquisition or development of the satellites and their deployment and operation to support joint operations’.
2.28ASPI argued that the ADF must be able to defend its space capabilities due to their critical role in supporting the integrated, focused force. While acknowledging that Australia does have an optical space surveillance telescope and a Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) to support Australia’s capacity for space domain awareness, it was considered that such facilities are more useful in supporting operations in Australia’s air and maritime approaches. ASPI proposed that Australia needs to identify and focus on space control as a key task in the 2026 NDS and IIP, stating that ‘greater investment in space-based ISR is needed now to ensure space resilience and access against adversary counterspace threats’.
2.29The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 stated that:
Investment in space capabilities that enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, provide resilient communications, and counter emerging space threats are the highest space domain priorities in the National Defence Strategy.
2.30The IIP includes $9–12 billion in funding for enhanced space capabilities, including the aforementioned DARC, integrated with locations in the UK and US to provide continuous detection, tracking and identification of objects in deep space.
2.31Approaching three years of operation, Space Command is a relatively new command that transitioned from the Air Force to Joint Capabilities Group on 1 July 2023. Major General Greg Novak, Commander, Space Command, Department of Defence, provided an explanation to the Subcommittee of the fundamental importance of terrestrial infrastructure on the ground to support in-orbit space capability. He noted the global footprint of space capabilities for the ADF and the level of collaboration with Australia’s international allies and domestic industry. Additionally, there are command and control nodes dispersed across Australia.
2.32Major General Novak provided evidence related to the importance of space partnerships:
There is a line that's often used by space leaders across our Defence community, which is that space is the epitome of a team sport, you won't get after or achieve all of your aspirations if you try to do it on your own—it's too big, it's too expensive and there are physical limitations to what you can get from your part of the world.
2.33Major General Novak observed that Australia offers a lot to international partnerships in the space domain, including geography to support launch and space observation, commonality of systems with its major partners and a long history of combined operations that can be leveraged. The ADF is a key contributor to the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative. Separately, the ADF supports Operation Olympic Defender, a US led combined operations arrangement with the Five Eyes partners plus France and Germany. This allows the ADF to synchronise space operations and ensure collective strength.
2.34Importantly, Major General Novak highlighted the importance of CSpO and Olympic Defender in positioning the ADF to make well-informed future force decisions related to modernisation and capability uplift to support national contributions across all different mission sets.
There will always be Australian national interest government direction that drives our priorities, but, where those interests are aligned, we're making sure that we're working with our partners to do that capability development and uplift in an aligned way.
Force structure
2.35The shift to an integrated, focused force requires a significant change to the force structure of the ADF, which must be integrated across the five domains—maritime, land, air, space and cyber. Major General Pearse offered the following description of the force posture transformation:
From a force structure point of view, transformation is not just about new kit; it's about changing how we think, plan and operate. Defence is restructuring several of Army's units and formations to reflect revised force structure requirements, particularly for long-range strike and littoral manoeuvre. We've also released our defence workforce plan, which outlines how we'll grow and adapt our workforce to future needs. This includes expanded recruitment pathways, improved support for families, and enhanced training and delivery of skills for the National Defence Strategy priorities.
2.36The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 highlighted that the Australian Army had rapidly implemented direction from the DSR and 2024 NDS, prioritising delivery of an amphibious-capable combined arms land system optimised for littoral manoeuvre and control of strategic landing positions.
2.37Brigadier Matthew Quinn, Director General, Capital Facilities and Infrastructure, Department of Defence, defined littoral as ‘the areas of sea that influence the land and the areas of land that influence the sea’.
2.38The scale of the littoral manoeuvre capabilities planned for the ADF is worthy of attention. The Australian Army will acquire and operate 18 landing craft medium and eight landing craft heavy across three units based in South-East Queensland, Northern Queensland and Darwin. In preparation for this considerable expansion in littoral capability, the Australian Army commenced reforming and relocating units and formations to reflect the revised force structure requirements from 28 September 2023.
2.39During the inquiry, members of the Subcommittee visited Robertson Barracks in the Northern Territory and were briefed on 1st Brigade’s transformation to support littoral operations. It became apparent to Subcommittee members that increasing littoral operations capability will require a significant change to the ADF’s force posture, with a considerable number of Defence families likely relocating to Australia’s north in the coming years.
2.40Dr John Coyne, Director, National Security Program, ASPI, outlined a number of issues associated with the change in force posture to support the littoral focus:
Defence made the decision some 18 months ago to move – and I don’t have the exact number here – 700 troops from South Australia to Townsville. In doing so, they didn’t engage with the local government, didn’t engage with the state government and have continued to say that the movement of soldiers over the period of about a year or two won’t have an impact on local housing.[42]
2.41More broadly, Dr Coyne observed the lack of clarity offered to the Northern Territory community about the amphibious bases and capabilities, specifically regarding funding and basing arrangements. Dr Coyne stated that ‘the littoral capability shift needs to really focus on engagement with the community’.
2.42Dr Coyne also highlighted some of the liveability challenges associated with drawing families to Northern Australia. For instance, there is no longer a private maternity ward in Darwin, requiring women to travel interstate for private services. Additionally, the distance and costs of flights for a family to travel from Darwin to the closest capital city of Brisbane could be a disincentive.
Force posture
2.43Force posture relates to how the ADF is geographically located, structured and logistically sustained. As outlined in the 2024 NDS, Defence needs to be prepared to deliver military capabilities from Australia, support and sustain deployed forces, and make efficient use of training areas. Specifically, Defence’s domestic force posture is to:
- deliver a logistically networked and resilient set of bases, predominantly across the north of Australia, to enhance force projection and improve Defence’s ability to recover from an attack
- maintain a resilient network of southern bases focused on force generation, sustainment, health networks, and logistics nodes to sustain combat operations and support the projection of Australian forces
- increase protection of bases and provide the ability to withstand disruption in crisis or conflict
- enable enhanced US and key partner training and cooperation on Australian territory where these activities are in the national interest; adopt climate adaptation strategies and energy resilience
- adopt civil-military arrangements for infrastructure in the event of a crisis or conflict.
- The Department of Defence Annual Report 2023–24 highlighted a number of areas of work to strengthen the ADF’s force posture, including:
- Work to baseline Defence’s estate and infrastructure, and commence improvements to Defence’s northern bases, including through the investment of nearly $700 million to support Apache helicopter basing at RAAF Base Townsville, Queensland
- Upgrades to infrastructure at naval bases and shipyards, including through the establishment of a strategic partnership between Defence and Austal Limited at Henderson Shipyard on 23 November 2023.
- Defence’s February 2025 submission to the inquiry reported further progress, with Defence commencing construction of a $200 million Deep Maintenance and Modification hangar at RAAF Base Edinburgh to facilitate the specialist maintenance of the ADF’s Boeing 737 variant military aircraft—including P8-A maritime patrol aircraft and E-7A Wedgetail aircraft.
- Over the course of the inquiry, the Subcommittee had the opportunity to visit bases in the Northern Territory, including RAAF Darwin, Robertson Barracks and Larrakeyah Defence Precinct. The Subcommittee viewed recently completed projects and infrastructure under development and noted the significant amount of construction activity underway at these Darwin bases. This construction serviced both the normal cycle of infrastructure upgrade to aging facilities and more recent changes to the ADF’s force posture. Funding for this infrastructure was not exclusively from the Australian Government, with the US Government contributing significantly through the US Force Posture Initiative.
- Mr Pat Sowry, First Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Division, Security and Estate Group, Department of Defence, summarised infrastructure activity in northern Australia:
Defence will invest $14 billion to $18 billion to improve the ADF's ability to operate from our northern bases over the decade to 2033–34. Our investment across northern Australia over the decade is currently at $15.17 billion. Our current estimate for northern Australia in 2025–26 is about $1.7 billion, and our Northern Territory forecast for 2025–26 is currently at just over $1 billion. Major works in the NT include $1.6 billion of investment at RAAF Base Tindal to support US force posture initiatives and runway capacity improvements; $747 million for NT training area upgrades; $602 million at Larrakeyah Defence Precinct in new and upgraded infrastructure, including the new Kuru Wharf that you probably saw today; $352 million in improving the airfield and runway infrastructure at RAAF Base Darwin, which also supports the NT community and Mount Bundey; and $389 million at Robertson Barracks for broader base improvements, including base infrastructure and living accommodation.
2.48The availability of suitable living accommodation is critical to force posture, providing Defence the ability to house ADF personnel and accommodate the deployment of international partner forces for exercises and regional contingencies. The quality of living-in accommodation on bases is an important factor when considering the liveability dimension of northern Australia.
2.49Defence currently has a lease of Defence Accommodation Precinct Darwin, which provides over 3,000 rooms. The Subcommittee heard evidence from Brigadier Matthew Quinn, Director General, Capital Facilities and Infrastructure, Department of Defence, indicating that a further $389 million was allocated to the construction of 400 rooms of living-in accommodation at Robertson Barracks, for use by US and Australian personnel. This is in addition to the demountable accommodation, known as Tin City, that has recently been delivered at RAAF Base Darwin for personnel living on the base for up to six months, including US Marines. Brigadier Quinn reported very high levels of satisfaction, particularly from the US Marines, in relation to the quality of the accommodation provided.
Funding and social licence
2.50Whilst the two Defence submissions presented evidence highlighting progress in the transformation to an integrated, focused force, a number of witnesses expressed concerns that the level of Defence funding did not align with the capability aspirations outlined in the 2024 NDS to meet the challenges of the strategic environment. Dr Alex Bristow, Senior Analyst, ASPI, offered the following observation:
Judging from its annual report, Defence is falling far behind the dizzying pace of events around the world. To catch up, Defence will need a significant increase in its budget in the next parliament. There should be cross-party support for the government to allocate Defence spending based on the objectives and capabilities outlined in the National Defence Strategy, rather than targeting a percentage of GDP [Gross Domestic Product].
2.51This was supported by Ms Parker from the Lowy Institute, who provided the following comment about the discrepancy between strategy and available capability:
Where we’ve lagged behind, though, is in our resourcing of our Defence budget. We can argue about three or 3.5 per cent of GDP, or is GDP useful, and all of those elements. The fact is that we don’t have the capabilities within Defence to resource to our current stated strategy.
2.52The Subcommittee observed that some submissions were critical of the lack of reference to who Australia is competing with in Defence documents, and that a more honest conversation with regards to Australia’s strategic environment would enhance public understanding of the work of Defence and continue building social licence for increased Defence spending. Witnesses agreed with this observation, with Major General Ryan drawing similarities with the experience of Poland in managing a challenging European strategic environment in the wake of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Whilst politicians and citizens have had transparent conversations about the threat posed by Russia, he noted the absence of that kind of dialogue in Australia regarding threats to national security and what defence funding is going towards in a degrading strategic environment.
2.53Ms Parker offered a similar sentiment regarding social licence for increased Defence funding:
Of course, it isn’t easy to talk about money for Defence. That needs to be sold to the Australian public, and we need to have the conversation about ‘where does that come from?’ This is most certainly not an easy conversation.
2.54Ms Parker further offered that:
So I think that there’s still a lot of work to do to explain the public what the changing strategic situation, which I think they acknowledge and certainly the polling reflects, means for their way of life and how that might manifest potentially in the future for Australia.
2.55Ms Parker suggested that an opportunity to engage with the Australian public could be through Defence providing factual, public updates on relevant incidents, such as the circumnavigation of Chinese Task Group 107 around the Australian coast in March 2025. Ms Parker explained:
When we have a bushfire, we have a person from a country fire brigade standing in a uniform explaining the facts. When we have a flood, we have a member of the [State Emergency Service] standing there explaining the facts. When we have a defence incident, we have politicians explaining the fact, which means they become instantly political and contested.
Committee comment
2.56The Committee supports the Strategy of Denial, considering it appropriate for the security environment that Australia faces. The shift from a balanced force to an integrated, focused force is a key component of the strategy and it is clear to the Committee that this transition is well underway.
2.57In terms of capability, it is evident that there has been considerable activity in selecting and acquiring systems and weapons in those areas of priority identified for the shift to an integrated focused force. However, given the history of highly publicised delays in Defence projects, and past issues of transparency, the Committee is concerned that the delivery timeframes will not meet the imperative of Australia’s current strategic circumstances.
2.58Evidence received was critical of Australia’s lack of sovereign space capability, particularly noting that the space domain is fundamental to the employment of ADF capability. Following the Subcommittee’s visit to Headquarters Joint Operations Command, the Committee acknowledges that Australia collaborates extensively with allies and partners in the delivery of space-domain effects. The Committee remains interested in the direction of future force decisions and the extent to which sovereign space capability is leveraged to meet national and international requirements.
2.59A number of submissions and witnesses addressed the inadequacy of Defence funding to meet the requirements of an integrated, focused force. Rather than a percentage of GDP which is often cited as the most appropriate metric, commentators suggested that funding should be matched to what is required to resource the current strategy approved by the Australian Government. The Committee considers that changes to Defence funding should be accompanied with a conversation with the Australian public about the changes being experienced in the current strategic environment, in so doing bolstering Defence’s ‘social licence’. This will be a challenging conversation given the number of competing priorities for Australia’s ‘treasure’, however one that is necessary to ensure Australia is resilient and prepared in uncertain times.
2.60The Subcommittee heard that there was a degree of uncertainty in the Northern Territory related to a shift to littoral operations and changing force structure. In communities where Defence has a disproportionate influence on the local economy, communication is central to ensuring continued support and availability of infrastructure. The Committee strongly encourages Defence to increase consultation with the Territory and local government to support business and community infrastructure planning, especially related to families, relocations, maternity support services and housing.
2.61The Subcommittee was impressed with the amount of infrastructure development in Darwin during their recent site visits. The Subcommittee observed that the standard of accommodation, for ADF and visiting foreign forces, demonstrates the value placed on Australian servicemen and international defence relationships. The Subcommittee recognised that the high standard of accommodation is not just functional but also has potential diplomatic advantages by enhancing relationships with international partners whose personnel also benefit from the accommodation.
2.62The Committee recommends the publicly available 2026 Integrated Investment Program provide more detail related to space domain project timelines and funding allocation.
2.63The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence consider ways to encourage and support Defence personnel and their families in relocating to Australia’s Northern Bases, as a priority, and then more generally.
2.64The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence continues to engage with government in the Northern Territory at both the territory-wide and local levels to ensure housing, community and other supportive infrastructure, especially local maternity services, reflects the expected growth in the number of Defence personnel and families.
2.65The Committee recommends that future Department of Defence reporting, related to critical infrastructure projects funded by the Australian Government and US Force Posture Initiative indicates project timelines and value of funding contribution from respective partners where national security conditions permit.
2.66The Committee recommends that changes to Defence funding continue to be accompanied by a conversation with the Australian public about the changes being experienced in the current strategic environment, including through the biennial National Defence Strategy updates, in so doing generating a degree of ‘social licence’.