Chapter 1 - Introduction

  1. Introduction

Background and conduct of the inquiry

1.1The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (the Committee) is empowered under its resolution of appointment to conduct inquiries into annual reports of certain agencies.[1]

1.2On 27 November 2024, the Committee resolved that the Defence Subcommittee (the Subcommittee) would conduct an inquiry into the Department of Defence Annual Report 2023–24. Upon the dissolution of the House of Representatives on 28 March 2025, the Committee ceased to exist and the inquiry lapsed. On 24 July 2025, the Committee was re-established and on 27 August 2025, the Committee resolved to re-refer the inquiry to the Subcommittee.

1.3The following key themes shaped the focus of the inquiry:

Progress on the transformation to an integrated focused forceThe Subcommittee reviewed the progress of the Department of Defence (Defence) transforming the Australian Defence Force (ADF) into an integrated, focused force designed to address the most significant strategic risks. The Subcommittee inquired into whether Defence is appropriately prioritised and resourced to:

  • deny any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through its northern approaches
  • protect Australia’s economic connection to the region and the world
  • contribute with its partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific
  • contribute with its partners to maintain the global rules-based order.

Sovereign Defence Industrial PrioritiesA robust, reliable and effective sovereign defence industry is essential for the defence of Australia and its national interests. 2024 saw the release of the National Defence Strategy and Defence Industry Development Strategy. The inquiry examined Defence’s progress towards achieving continuous naval shipbuilding, enhanced self-reliance and resilience of guided weapons and explosive ordnance, fuel supply assurance and innovation, research and advanced capability acceleration.

AUKUSThe AUKUS trilateral security partnership forms a foundation for Australia’s security. Noting the scale of Australia’s commitment, the Subcommittee reviewed progress of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. The Subcommittee also examined Pillar 2 initiatives including enhanced joint capabilities and interoperability with a focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersonic and advanced undersea capabilities.

Uncrewed and autonomous systems and their integration into the Joint ForceDefence is accelerating near-term investments in uncrewed and autonomous systems. The inquiry examined the integration of such systems into the Joint Force and reviewed the progress, policy, legislative regulatory mechanisms and use of artificial intelligence for Defence to test, exercise and employ uncrewed and autonomous systems.

Defence estate, security and resilienceDefence estate is a key enabler and facilities must be both secure and resilient during times of competition and conflict. Force protection, including from asymmetric threats, is essential to defend critical capabilities and infrastructure to ensure they remain effective when they are most needed. The inquiry reviewed Defence’s infrastructure with a focus on survivability and effectiveness.

Australian international defence cooperation and competitionThe Subcommittee reviewed Australia’s international defence cooperation, assistance and responses within the region and to global contingencies.

1.4Before the 2025 federal election, the Subcommittee received 21 submissions and held one public hearing in Canberra during its inquiry. These submissions and transcripts were considered by the Subcommittee during the inquiry.

1.5As part of the new inquiry since the 2025 election, the Subcommittee resolved to invite additional submissions and received nine. The Subcommittee held six public hearings in Canberra, Darwin and Perth during its inquiry and conducted site visits at the following locations:

  • Fleet Base East, Sydney, NSW
  • HMAS Waterhaven, Sydney, NSW
  • HMAS Penguin, Sydney, NSW
  • Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Bungendore, NSW
  • RAAF Darwin, NT
  • Robertson Barracks, Darwin, NT
  • Larrakeyah Defence Precinct, Darwin, NT
  • HMAS Stirling, Perth, WA
  • Henderson Defence Precinct, Perth, WA.
    1. A list of submissions received by the Subcommittee can be found in Appendix A. Details of the Subcommittee’s public hearings, including a list of witnesses, can be found in Appendix B. Transcripts of the public hearings are available on the Committee’s website. In footnotes, references to submissions received before the 2025 election are indicated by “(47th Parliament)”.

Committee delegation to the United Kingdom and Poland

1.7Members of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade had the opportunity to visit the United Kingdom and Poland as part of the Presiding Officers’ outgoing delegation program. The purpose of the program is to strengthen inter-parliamentary relationships, to enable Australian parliamentarians to exchange ideas, information and experiences with international counterparts and to support the representation of the Australian Parliament and Australian perspectives in multilateral forums.[2]

1.8The visit supported the Subcommittee’s inquiry by focusing on the United Kingdom’s experience in the AUKUS trilateral partnership and Poland’s national security with interest in the nation’s experience and perspective of the Russia–Ukraine War. This report is informed by insights gained during the visit.

1.9Committee Chair Hon Shayne Neumann MP, Committee Deputy Chair Senator Dean Smith, Subcommittee Chair Senator Deborah O’Neill, Subcommittee Deputy Chair Mr Colin Boyce MP and Mr Steve Georganas MP undertook a program of private briefings and site visits as part of the delegation.

1.10The delegates heard from a range of experts, including:

  • ADF personnel conducting training activities for Ukrainian Armed Forces recruits
  • Representatives of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence and the Australian Submarine Agency
  • Representatives of the United Kingdom’s Department of Business and Trade
  • Representatives of Australian and United Kingdom government, economic and industry stakeholders
  • The United Kingdom’s AUKUS All Party Parliamentary Group
  • The United Kingdom International Relations and Defence Committee
  • The United Kingdom’s House of Commons Defence Select Committee
  • Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister, Krzysztof Gawkowski, Minister of Digital Affairs & Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity and officials from the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the National Research Institute and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister
  • Poland’s Vice Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Karol Dymanowski and Colonel Robert Tkaczyk, Director, Eastern Division, Department of Military Foreign Affairs
  • The Australia–Poland Parliamentary Friendship Group
  • Poland’s Sejm Committee on National Defence
  • Poland’s Sejm Committee on Foreign Affairs & Special Envoy for Ukraine
  • Ukraine’s Deputy Minister for the Development of Communities and Territories, Mr Artem Rybchenko
  • Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Economy, Environment & Agriculture, Mr Adrii Teliupa
  • Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defence, Ms Hanna Hvozdiar
  • Poland’s Undersecretary of State for State Assets, Mr Konrad Gołota
  • Ukrainian House Foundation
  • Poland’s Undersecretary of State for the Interior and Administration, Mr Maciej Duszczyk
  • Poland’s representative of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Mr Kevin J. Allen.
    1. The Committee’s program supported its understanding of the United Kingdom’s experience within the AUKUS trilateral partnership and of Poland’s key national security concerns, including its experiences related to the Russia–Ukraine War. A full report from the delegation will be provided to the Parliament in early 2026.

Key Defence documents and terms

1.12This report will refer to various Defence documents and terms. To provide context, this section will outline these documents and terms.

1.13Defence Strategic Review 2023 (DSR)An independent review into Defence’s capability, posture and preparedness to defend Australia and its interests. The review found a need for a major reassessment of Australia’s defence strategy and consequently provided a list of recommendations to the Australian Government. Notably, the review recommended the need for the development of a National Defence Strategy.[3]

1.142024 National Defence Strategy (NDS)Developed by Defence in response to the DSR. The National Defence Strategy endorsed many of the DSR’s recommendations to address Australia’s most significant strategic risks and set a direction for the ADF which was centred around a Strategy of Denial.[4]

1.15Strategy of DenialIn response to intensifying geostrategic competition, Defence has adopted a ‘Strategy of Denial’ aligning Australia’s current primary strategic defence objective of deterrence.[5] As per the 2024 National Defence Strategy, the Strategy of Denial is:

Designed to deter a potential adversary from taking actions that would be inimical to Australia’s interests and regional stability. The Strategy of Denial involves working with the US and key partners to ensure no country attempts to achieve its regional objectives through military action. By signalling a credible ability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, this strategy also seeks to deter attempts to coerce Australia through force. Both objectives involve altering any potential adversary’s belief that it could achieve its ambitions with military force at an acceptable cost.[6]

Benefits of the Strategy of Denial include reducing the likelihood of the outbreak of conflict and limiting the risk of adversaries coercing Australia through force, as well as contributing to regional stability and a favourable strategic environment for Australia.[7]

1.162024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP)Developed alongside the NDS to set out the specific Defence capabilities that the Australian Government will invest in to support the NDS.[8]

1.17Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA)In July 2023, the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator was established to support and deliver advanced technologies to the ADF. Its purpose is to accelerate the delivery of technologies by working in partnership with industry and universities.[9]

1.18Australian Submarine Agency (ASA)In July 2023, the Australian Submarine Agency was established to ‘safely and securely acquire, construct, deliver, technically govern, sustain and dispose of Australia’s conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia, via the AUKUS partnership’.[10]

1.19Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum (ACIF)The Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum is a trilateral government and industry forum which brings together industry associations and senior government officials from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United Sates of America to discuss issues relating to AUKUS Pillar 2. The first meeting of the forum was held in April 2024 and a second meeting was held in July 2024.[11]

1.20Defence Industrial Development Strategy (DIDS)The Defence Industry Development Strategy provided a framework and principles for Australia’s defence strategy. The DIDS recognised the role of sovereign defence industry within Australia’s NDS and provided an update to Defence industry policy to support its development to meet the NDS’s requirements.[12]

1.21Sovereign Development Industrial Priorities (SDIPs) The DIDS identified seven priorities required to meet the capability priorities identified within the DSR. These priorities are known as the Sovereign Development Industrial Priorities. The priorities are:

  • maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade of ADF aircraft
  • continuous naval shipbuilding and sustainment
  • sustainment and enhancement of the combined-arms land system
  • domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions
  • development and integration of autonomous systems
  • integration and enhancement of battlespace awareness and management systems
  • test and evaluation, certification and systems assurance.[13]

Structure of report

1.22This report contains seven chapters that are comprised of this introduction and six chapters that reflect the key themes of the inquiry. The chapters have been ordered to present a logical throughline as Defence’s efforts to transform the ADF to an integrated focused force informs a significant portion of Defence’s work in other areas that the Subcommittee inquired in to.

1.23Chapter 2 examines the progress of Defence transforming the ADF into an integrated, focused force.

1.24Chapter 3 discusses defence industry and Defence’s progress in its Sovereign Industrial Defence Priorities.

1.25Chapter 4 examines the progress and significance of the AUKUS agreement.

1.26Chapter 5 explores Defence’s increased focus on uncrewed and autonomous systems and their integration into the Joint Force.

1.27Chapter 6 examines the resilience of Defence estate and the role it plays in Australia’s force posture.

1.28Chapter 7 discusses Australia’s international defence cooperation.

1.29The report includes appendices that list submissions made to the inquiry and public hearing details.

Acknowledgements

1.30The Committee thanks all submitters and witnesses who presented evidence to the inquiry. The Committee also wishes to thank Defence staff who facilitated site visits, the ADF personnel and US Marines who provided tours on site visits, and staff from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade who facilitated the Committee’s delegation to the UK and Poland.

1.31Finally, the Committee specifically highlights the work of all ADF personnel and thanks them for their important work in protecting Australia.

Footnotes

[1]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Resolution of Appointment, www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Resolution (accessed 5 November 2025).

[2]Department of the House of Representatives, Annual Report 2023–24, October 2024, p. 45.

[3]Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023, April 2023, p. 99.

[4]Department of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy, April 2024, p. 7.

[5]Department of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy, April 2024, p. 21.

[6]Department of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy, April 2024, p. 22.

[7]Department of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy, April 2024, p. 22.

[8]Department of Defence, 2024 Integrated Investment Program, April 2024, p. 6.

[9]Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator, Who we are, www.asca.gov.au/about/who-we-are (accessed 5 November 2025).

[10]Australian Submarine Agency, About, www.asa.gov.au/about (accessed 18 November 2025).

[11]ADS Group, AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum July meeting summary, August 2024, www.adsgroup.org.uk/knowledge/aukus-advanced-capabilities-industry-forum-july-meeting-summary (accessed 21 November 2025).

[12]Department of Defence, Defence Industry Development Strategy, February 2024, p. vi.

[13]Department of Defence, Defence Industry Development Strategy, February 2024, pp. 18–19.