- Australian international defence cooperation and competition
Overview
7.1Australia’s involvement in the global and regional security environment is vital to both the nation’s national security and to the maintenance of a rules-based international order. A rules-based international order where Australia is positioned as an important strategic partner to nations around the world is not only crucial to the security of the nation, but also to its prosperity and stability.
7.2This view is reflected in the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), which states:
To respond effectively to the strategic environment we face, Australia must work even more closely with our international partners to maintain regional peace and prosperity and ensure a favourable regional strategic balance. These partnerships are also critical to protect Australia’s economic connection to the world and support the global rules-based order.
7.3This chapter will examine the Australian Government and Department of Defence’s (Defence’s) efforts to support international defence cooperation and strengthen Australia’s position within the world. The chapter will also explore matters relating to international defence competition and how they should be navigated.
Australia’s international defence cooperation
Strategic direction
7.4The NDSoutlines the Strategy of Denial as the cornerstone of Australia’s current defence strategy. Shaping Australia’s strategic environment is identified as one of Defence’s objectives under the strategy, within the following parameters:
Defence must focus its international engagement on maintaining regional stability in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Northeast Indian Ocean. This includes:
- deepening engagement between the [Australian Defence Force] and its close partners in the region to build trust and confidence;
- developing security partnerships that demonstrate a collective resolve and capability to withstand military coercion;
- leveraging Australia’s strong diplomatic, intelligence and security relationships to reinforce Australia’s reliability as a partner and commitment to transparency;
- developing strong defence industry links that support a favourable regional and global strategic balance;
- contributing to strategic stability mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict; providing reassurance to regional partners through transparent statements of strategic intent and capability;
- working with partners to enhance Australia and the region’s resilience;
- and contributing to a region that reinforces agreed rules and supports regional architecture.
- Australia’s strategic goals for international defence cooperation provide a useful baseline for measuring the effectiveness of Defence’s activities in this space. In the remainder of this chapter, these goals will be used to reflect on how Defence is performing.
- Mr Bernard Philip, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy, Department of Defence, spoke to the advantages of focusing Australia’s defence policy on international cooperation, stating:
Our entire defence policy is premised on working with partners as the default position for the obvious reason that it allows us to have greater influence collectively than it does operating on our own. That's certainly a core objective of our defence international engagement going forward.
Australia’s strategic alliances
7.7Australia maintains strategic alliances with nations across the globe, including traditional partners with whom Australia shares enduring partnerships. Australia is also developing partnerships with non-traditional partners to the benefit of a rules-based international order.
7.8Australia’s traditional strategic partners include its Five Eyes partners (the intelligence alliance between Australia, the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and New Zealand). As some of Australia’s most long-standing strategic partners, the Five Eyes nations are central to Australia’s international defence relations. In the Defence Annual Report 2023–24, Secretary of Defence, Mr Greg Moriarty AO, discussed the particular importance of Australia’s relationship with the US:
Australia’s Alliance with the United States is fundamental to our national security and the [Australian Defence Force’s] capacity to generate, sustain and project credible military capability… Defence continues to work in close partnership with the United States across the full span of our bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation, including enhanced force posture cooperation and the implementation of AUKUS.
7.9Similarly, Mr Moriarty emphasised the importance and recent progress of Australia’s relationship with the UK:
Australia and the United Kingdom have a comprehensive and modern defence relationship. March 2024 saw the signing of the updated agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Defence and security cooperation. The agreement included the addition of a status of forces agreement, making it easier for our forces to operate in each other’s countries, and in support of our shared commitment to global and regional security.
7.10Australia’s key strategic alliances extend beyond its traditional partners. Recently, Australia has significantly developed its relationships with nations across the Indo-Pacific, including with India, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In the Defence Annual Report 2023–24, Mr Moriarty outlined Australia’s growing relationships and cooperation with each of these nations:
India is a top tier security partner for Australia. In 2023, we achieved a series of historic firsts in our growing defence partnership: Australia hosted Exercise Malabar — a Navy-led exercise with India, the United States and Japan; an Indian submarine visited Perth; Australia and India conducted a trilateral sail with Indonesia; and India’s Navy made a ground-breaking visit to Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
Our unprecedented strategic alignment with Japan continues to drive closer cooperation between the [Australian Defence Force] and the Japan Self–Defense Forces. In August 2023, the Japan–Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement came into effect enabling more sophisticated practical cooperation between our forces. Defence is also deepening the Australia–Japan–United States trilateral defence relationship through increasing the complexity of our trilateral training and exercises to build interoperability and enhance collective deterrence.
Our defence relationship with the Republic of Korea also grew significantly in this period, with increased Republic of Korea participation in Exercise Talisman Sabre and Pitch Black, and inaugural participation in Operation Render Safe and Indo-Pacific Endeavour. In June 2024, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP hosted the first Australia–Japan–Republic of Korea defence ministers’ meeting to increase trilateral defence cooperation and collective deterrence.
Regional strategic alliances
7.11The prioritisation of the Strategy of Denial indicates that Australia’s strategic focus continues to be its own region—the Indo-Pacific. The Annual Report and Defence’s October 2025 submission to the inquiry demonstrate how the Australian Government and Defence are actively and effectively seeking to engage in the region to the benefit of Australia’s national security and in support of the Strategy of Denial.
7.12The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 provides the following examples of Defence’s efforts:
- In 2024, Australian Defence Force (ADF) and other partner nations deployed specialist personnel to Nauru to safely dispose of explosive remnants from World War II under Operation Render Safe.
- In 2024, the Royal Australian Air Force, through Operation Solania, contributed to the Pacific Island Forum Fishery Agency’s coordinated maritime surveillance operation to detect activities such as illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing.
- In 2024, Australia’s Pacific Support Vessel Reliant deployed to the Pacific where it delivered a range of stores to Pacific nations, including small boats, a fire truck donated by Fire Rescue Victoria and a shipping container of emergency radio network equipment to Samoa.
- In March 2024, Australia signed a peacekeeping partnership arrangement with Vietnam, underpinning a comprehensive strategic partnership. Defence’s submission provided further examples:
- Support for the Pacific through the Defence Cooperation Program, with the 2023–24 budget totalling $248.3 million, and the planned budget for 2025–26 being $335 million.
- In July 2023, Defence deployed a Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan aircraft (military transport) under the Defence Pacific Air Program to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief supplies to Bougainville in Papua New Guinea following the Mount Bagana eruption.
- In August 2024, Australia and Indonesia signed the Australia–Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement, the first treaty-level defence agreement between the countries. Defence’s submission states that ‘this agreement strengthens the capacity for our militaries to work together and reflects a shared commitment to upholding the rules-based order in the region’.
- In October 2024, ministers from various Pacific nations endorsed the Pacific Response Group to enable more effective military co-deployment to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Headquarters for this group have since been established at the Gallipoli Barracks in Brisbane.
- In November 2024, Defence released the Defence Partnership for the Future Statement to mark the 40th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–Australia Dialogue Relations. The statement commits Australia to various projects, including Australia’s delivery of the inaugural ASEAN–Australia Maritime Security Symposium and the ASEAN–Australia Senior Defence Dialogue.
- In December 2024, Australia and New Zealand signed the updated Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations.
- In October 2025, Australia and Singapore signed an updated Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
- In October 2025, Australia and Papua New Guinea signed the ‘Pukpuk’ Mutual Defence Treaty, Australia’s first new alliance in more than 70 years.
- Defence’s evidence to the inquiry focused on its achievements in the Pacific, but Mr Bernard Philip, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy, Department of Defence, also noted the importance of the Indian Ocean:
The Indian Ocean is obviously an integral part of Australia's geography and one in which we seek to apply the same Strategy of Denial as we do in the rest of Australian territory… Part of that has been having our Fleet Base West on the Indian Ocean at HMAS Stirling. We have been very active in the architecture within the region. I think it's fair to say that it's less-developed architecture in the Indian Ocean than it is in East Asia or in Europe, but we have certainly been very active leaders within [Indian Ocean Rim Association] and other Indian Ocean mechanisms. Under the defence strategic review, endorsed by the National Defence Strategy, we have brought the Indian Ocean and particularly the north-east Indian Ocean into what we call our primary area of military interest, running through the north-east Indian Ocean through maritime South-East Asia and into the Pacific. That has given us direction to enhance our relationships in the Indian Ocean region.
7.15RAND Australia (RAND) provided evidence supporting the importance of the role of Defence cooperation in the region:
The Defence Annual Report highlights the importance of Australia’s international relationships to our continued security. As a regional middle power, Australia gains significant advantage through collective security, acting as a positive partner in an interlinked system of alliances, partnerships and relationships that underpin the international rules-based order. The Department of Defence plays a key role in Australia’s capacity to shape the actions of our neighbours, deter aggression, and secure our vital trade lines.
7.16RAND also discussed the specific importance of the ADF and how its international cooperation efforts could go even further:
The Department of Defence is… an important contributor to Australia’s influence in our own region. The [Australian Defence Force] plays a significant role in supporting the stability and security of the region through security cooperation efforts, the provision of training to regional military and security forces, and responding to crises, including [Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief]. As such, Australia’s level of collaboration with ASEAN will become increasingly important as the region transitions into a period of increasing great power tension. It is, therefore, in Australia’s interests to support our neighbouring states in developing their capabilities in order to resist coercion, particularly over ongoing territorial disputes. This could take the form of deepening military and industrial cooperation efforts, ranging from further multinational exercises and potentially to the co-development of emerging military capabilities with ASEAN partners.
7.17Ms Jennifer Parker, Non-Resident Fellow at the Lowy Institute, praised the Australian Government and Defence for its work leading to the ‘Pukpuk’ treaty with Papua New Guinea, stating that:
Papua New Guinea geographically is critical to Australia's defence. We learned that during World War I. We learned that during World War II. So the ability to forward project and protect Papua New Guinea will be critical to Australia's defence, so I think the Pukpuk treaty was, honestly—I'm critical of many things the current government has done—a masterstroke, and I think they should be proud.
7.18Ms Parker also commended Defence’s overall work in its international cooperation efforts, stating:
If I were to write down a scorecard of Australia's work on its defence strategy and resourcing its defence strategy, I think I would give a high score to its defence partnerships.
7.19Ms Parker highlighted Australia’s significantly improved relations with Japan and India as particularly significant asserting that in relation to Japan:
I’m not sure that we could be any closer except for if Japan were part of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement.
International engagement
7.20The Australian Government and Defence engage with other countries across the globe. The following topics were raised specifically throughout this inquiry; they do not represent the full extent of Australia’s engagement.
The United States’ presence in Australia
7.21This inquiry received evidence regarding the US’s presence in Darwin.
7.22Since 2012, Darwin has hosted rotations of US marines for six months at a time, known as US Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D). MRF-D is part of the United States Force Posture Initiatives—a collection of initiatives designed to strengthen the alliance between Australia and the US—and demonstrates the growing relationship between the ADF and the US Marine Corps. US Marines rotate through Northern Australia, undertaking a range of joint exercises and training with the ADF and other regional partners such as Indonesia, Philippines, Timor-Leste, Malaysia and Japan.
7.23Ms Susan Bodell, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Division, Strategy Policy and Industry Group, Department of Defence, discussed the importance of the US’s presence in Darwin, stating:
The US rotational presence throughout the region but also in our northern region is really vital for deterring actions that may threaten the stability and prosperity of the region… [It] obviously [helps] build the capability of some of those nations that come and operate alongside us and US forces. But, anytime we bring together parties of those natures, it's also sending a really important deterrence message. So we see having that rotational presence as an excellent opportunity to enhance our interoperability with a number of partners, whether they be from the Pacific or South-East Asia or further afield.
7.24One submitter argued that Australia’s sovereignty is being eroded by the increasing presence of US personnel in Australia. However, the US’s presence in Australia is likely to remain a part of the Australian Government’s approach to national security. This is evident from the NDS, which specifically calls for Australia to further deepen and expand its defence engagement with the US.
Support for Ukraine
7.25Australia has supported Ukraine since Russia launched its illegal and immoral war of aggression in February 2022.
7.26The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 and Defence’s October 2025 submission provide details of Australia’s support for Ukraine:
- As of 2024–25, the Australian Government has provided a total of $1.3 billion to Ukraine across multiple support packages. This included $500 million of military assistance in the 2024–25 period.
- Australia is supporting Ukraine through Operation Kudu, which involves the training of Ukrainian armed forces by rotations of ADF personnel. This operation is part of the UK’s multinational training mission, Operation Interflex. Operation Kudu has so far successfully trained over 2,900 Ukrainian military personnel.
- In the 2023–24 period, Operation Kudu also involved the deployment of a Royal Australian Air Force E-7A Wedgetail aircraft (a surveillance aircraft used to provide an early warning system for possible threats) and approximately 100 ADF personnel to Germany to support the multinational effort to provide early warning for potential Russian attacks outside of Ukraine.
- In February 2024, Latvia established a Drone Coalition to support Ukraine’s drone capabilities. The coalition consists of 20 nations (including Australia) which plan to deliver one million drones to Ukraine to support its war against Russia.
- In December 2025, the Australian Government announced that it would provide a $95 million package of military assistance to further support Ukraine and that it would impose further targeted sanctions relating to Russia’s shadow fleet (vessels which use a variety of tactics to conceal their origins to move sanctioned cargo) designed to target Russia’s war economy revenue. The military support package includes:
- a $50 million contribution to the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (a NATO initiate to supply Ukraine with critical military equipment)
- a $43 million contribution of ADF materiel and equipment, including tactical air defence radars, munitions and combat engineering equipment
- a $2 million contribution to the Drone Capability Coalition.
- The Committee during its delegation visit to the UK had the opportunity to visit ADF personnel participating in Operation Kudu. The delegation attended a site visit where it received a briefing from ADF personnel and a demonstration of the trench warfare system and drone operation. The delegation then met with a Ukrainian military officer to discuss the training program and Australia’s support for Ukraine. Major General Michael Ryan (Retd) commented on the importance of Operation Kudu, stating:
We're helping train junior Ukrainian leaders who aren't getting that training at home because of time constraints and these kinds of things. It's also exposing our soldiers to combat veterans of the most modern war possible. But it's not just our trainers that are part of Operation Kudu. We have Australians embedded in US and NATO forces in Germany that are helping coordinate a range of different support mechanisms for Ukraine. Operation Kudu and activities like it are vital.
7.29Major General Ryan also suggested that Australia could do more to support Ukraine:
Where Australia needs to step up more, however, is the Drone Coalition for Ukraine that Australia signed up to under the leadership of Latvia. We've done very little to contribute to that, and I think we need to step up our commitment, whether monetary or other ways, to that drone coalition to help the ADF [learn about] modern drone warfare.
Lessons learnt
7.30Submitters to the inquiry reflected that Australia should draw on lessons learnt from Ukraine to enhance its own understanding of modern warfare.
7.31Ms Parker reflected that Australia could learn from Ukraine’s battlefield management capabilities:
One of the key lessons, I would say, from Ukraine, and the ability to fight a war, is that increased centralisation of management, and command and control, is a problem. Because the more centralised your organisation is, the more you require a command and control backbone, the more you eat up decision-making capacity. So I think that decentralisation of some elements of defence, re-empowering the services and the chiefs of services, and other elements of defence, could be important. So I think it's about finding the balance between centralisation, which is what I'm taking integration to mean, effectively, and decentralisation to make sure you have that robustness in your decision-making.
7.32Major General Ryan cautioned that lessons learnt from Ukraine must be understood in context, and that certain lessons are not necessarily new:
I recently published a report that looked at how we translate Ukraine lessons for the Pacific, looking at the different geographic terrain, weather, political and technological environment. It's quite different in the Pacific, and we can't just take Ukraine lessons and flop them down over Taiwan or flop them down over Australia. There are a whole range of contextual differences that we need to take care where we translate them.
7.33Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, University of New South Wales, proposed various ways in which Australia could learn from Ukraine, including:
- Ukraine’s use of low-cost drones for offensive purposes
- Ukraine’s use of drones to support the defence of its territory
- the opportunity for Defence, government, industry and the public to continuously learn from insights provided from real battlefield experience, including the potential for ADF personnel to learn directly from Ukraine’s soldiers
- the potential for Australia to use the Drone Coalition as a joint platform for knowledge and research sharing.
The role of training exercises
7.34Domestic and international training exercises play an important role both in supporting the ADF’s preparedness and in maintaining Australia’s relationship with its partners. The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 provided an overview of the main activities and exercises the ADF led and engaged in, including:
- Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE): The IPE is Defence’s flagship regional engagement activity. Its purpose is to support the Australian Government’s focus on deepening diplomatic ties and defence partnerships across Southeast Asia and the Northeast Indian Ocean and to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to a peaceful, secure and prosperous region. IPE 2023 involved various military exercises, workshops, training opportunities, sporting events and cultural activities, including a joint maritime interoperability training exercise between the Royal Australian Air Force and the Indian Navy.
- Exercise Talisman Sabre (TS): Conducted biennially since 2005, TS is the largest military exercise undertaken in Australia. The exercise is jointly designed by the US and Australia, with various nations invited to participate in a series of training activities intended to test skills in combat readiness and the interoperability between all participants. TS 2023 saw Australian and US military personnel deployed alongside participants from Canada, Fiji, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea, Tonga and the UK.
- Exercise Malabar: Exercise Malabar is an annual maritime field training exercise led by the Indian Navy, with participation from the ADF, the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force and the US Navy. In 2023, the Royal Australian Navy hosted Exercise Malabar for the first time, which involved ‘high-end anti-submarine, air-defence and gunnery exercises, aviation and communication operations, replenishment at sea between ships, and cultural and sporting activities’.
- Exercise Keen Edge: Historically a bilateral exercise between Japan and the US, Australia was invited to participate in Exercise Keen Edge 2024. ADF personnel were deployed to Hawaii and Japan for the exercise which sought to ‘improve interoperability, practise command and control in a dynamic scenario, and test communications across different locations’.
- Exercise Bersama Shield: Exercise Bersama Shield is an annual exercise held for members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA)—a non-binding defence pact between Australia, the UK, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore to consult each other in the event of an attack or threat against Malaysia or Singapore. Exercise Bersama Shield 2024 was held in Malaysia and provided joint maritime, land and air tactical training operations in a multi-threat environment intended to enhance interoperability and strengthen relationships between the FPDA nations.
- Exercise Balikatan: Exercise Balikatan is an exercise held annually between the Philippines, the US and Australia aimed at maintaining a high level of military readiness and enhancing response capabilities. Exercise Balikatan 2024 also included France and 14 additional nations that participated through the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ international observer program. The exercise involved ‘maritime security, sensing and targeting, air and missile defence, dynamic missile strikes, cyber defence, and information operations’.
- Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC): Hosted by the US, RIMPAC is considered to be the world’s largest international maritime exercise. RIMPAC 2024 provided ADF personnel with experiences across a range of scenarios, including humanitarian assistance and disaster response, maritime security operations, sea control and complex warfighting. The exercise involved participation from 29 nations, 40 surface ships, three submarines, 14 national land forces, more than 150 aircraft and approximately 25,000 personnel.’
- Exercise Pitch Black: Hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force, Exercise Pitch Black is a biennial exercise which provides aircraft training exercises. Pitch Black 2024 brought together 20 nations (including Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, India, the UK and the Netherlands), 140 aircraft and 4435 personnel. The exercise’s purpose is to support the RAAF’s ability to integrate with allied forces.
- Group Captain James Collisson, Director, Regional Air Development Team – North, Royal Australian Air Force, reflected on the importance of training exercises and their contributions to Australia’s international defence cooperation:
Across the number of years that I've been up here, I think the exercise program that we have in the north has been critical to developing those relationships with our partners across the Asian region—in fact, across a bunch of different regions throughout the world.
7.36Major General Matt Pearse, Acting Head of Force Design, Department of Defence, referred to Australia’s integrated training exercises with Indonesia as an example of how exercises have developed in recent history and the extent to which Australia is engaging:
The level of training and integration has matured over the past few years, and has continued to deepen, to the point now where we do more than a thousand training activities with regional countries on an annual basis. Now there's no such thing as a standard activity. One of those training events might be a handful of people, maybe a dozen people, and another one might be several hundred people. It's a training activity, but the numbers are numerous and it's in order to build up trust, in the first place, and then competency and understanding of where each other's capacities and shared interests are where we can work together.
The role of language skills and the acquisition of languages of than English
7.37Language plays a fundamental role in international defence cooperation. The ability for Defence personnel to communicate with international counterparts enhances interoperability and contributes to bilateral cooperation.
7.38Defence’s international engagement is calibrated to supporting regional stability, building partnerships and enhancing interoperability. This includes a focus on language capabilities to increase the effectiveness of international operations. The 2016 Defence White Paper recognised the importance of expanding cultural and language capabilities to Defence’s regional operations, stating:
Defence will expand cultural and language capabilities to increase its effectiveness in operating in the region and collaborating with international partners. Defence will develop higher levels of cultural understanding of our region, including more intensive training for those who work routinely with regional partners. Defence will increase the number of personnel with intermediate and advanced language skills to support our enhanced international engagement, with a focus on languages in the Indo-Pacific region.
7.39Language training is provided by the Defence Force School of Languages (part of the Australian Defence College) which provides training in 18 languages to help develop the language capability requirements of Defence.
7.40Defence through the Defence International Training Centre (part of the Australian Defence College) also provides English language training and cultural familiarisation courses for foreign military members. English often plays a central role in the facilitation of multinational cooperation.
7.41Defence’s approach to language teaching has been criticised and it has been recommended that Defence reorient its program so that it is focused on Australia’s region:
The ADF needs a language training program focused on its region, shifting from an outdated focus on Middle Eastern languages. Linguistic interoperability and cross-cultural intelligence are necessary for building a trusted, sustainable partnership in the region.
Competition
7.42Australia’s defence policy and spending is guided by the strategic environment in which it operates. Recent Defence policy documents, including the NDS, note that Australia operates within a changing strategic environment. A central factor to Australia’s strategic environment is the increasing strategic competition between the US and China, alongside an unprecedented conventional and non-conventional military build-up within the Indo-Pacific region.
Strategic direction
7.43The NDS provides direction for how Australia will respond to its unstable strategic environment. Directions include:
- collaborating with the US and other key partners to support shared interests including the maintenance of regional peace and prosperity and ensuring regional balance which supports all countries to peacefully pursue their objectives free from coercion
- maintaining a favourable regional strategic balance
- ensuring that international law is followed.
- The NDS calls for support through a ‘coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests’.
- Defence policy documents do not explicitly identify Australia’s specific strategic competitors. For example, the NDS identifies concerns relating to China’s interests, intentions and tactics, but it does not claim that Australia and China are in direct competition. It also identifies concerns regarding actions taken by Russia, Iran and North Korea which have undermined global peace and stability. The Defence Annual Report 2023–24 makes no reference to strategic competition at all.
- Evidence received for this inquiry focused on Australia’s relationship with China. The remainder of this section will therefore focus on Australia and China’s relationship. The Australian Government’s approach to its relationship with China is discussed in both the NDS and in Defence’s submission. The NDS states:
While Australia and China have different values and political systems, a stable and constructive relationship is in the interest of both nations. The Government will remain patient, calibrated and deliberate in its approach to China, cooperating where we can, disagreeing where we must and engaging in Australia’s national interests.
7.47Defence’s submission to the Subcommittee further explains the Australian Government and Defence’s position on China. It highlights Australia’s ongoing work with China to improve our relationship, conveying that:
It is in the interests of both Australia and China for the bilateral relationship to stabilise. Australia continues to engage in defence dialogue with China. Australia–China defence dialogue occurs principally between ministers, respective defence attachés, Australian defence officials and the People’s Liberation Army Office for International Military Cooperation.
Criticism of Australia’s approach
7.48Some submitters considered that the Australian Government and Defence should be clearer on whom Australia is competing against, so as to justify Defence spending and to support public understanding of the work of Defence.
7.49The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) discussed this issue in its submission, asserting that:
The [Defence Annual Report 2023–24] says little about who Australia is competing against, and it is silent about China. Rather than explain the threats Australia’s face in plain language to the public, ministers have relied on abstractions and euphemisms, such as ‘a worsening strategic environment’ and ‘great power competition’. This hampers public understanding of Defence’s work, including cooperation with allies and partners, and diminishes the social licence for increased defence spending.
7.50Major General Ryan compared the perspective of Poland and its adversarial relationship with Russia with Australia’s approach to discussion of its adversaries, stating that:
The Poles, they had a very honest conversation and dialogue between politicians and citizens about the threat posed by Russia. We haven't quite had that honest dialogue between politicians and citizens in this country, because the National Defence Strategy talks about deterrence by denial. It doesn't say who we are trying to deter. What are Australians paying their tax dollars to the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence for? Who are they protecting us against? Who are we trying to deter from dropping the region into some catastrophic conflict?
7.51Australians for War Powers Reform held a contrary view and argued that Australia should not identify China as a threat, stating:
We reject any assumptions about important defence matters – such as the belief that China poses a grave threat to Australia’s security – that are not supported by irrefutable evidence, robust discussion within our parliament, and strong expert opinion, and we deplore the lack of opportunity for parliamentary or public contributions to decisions about our relationship with China.
7.52While ASPI commended Defence’s strategic approach to the Pacific, it raised the prospect of supporting national defence through a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, stating that:
One of the key goals of Australian defence… must be denying China strategic access in the Pacific. In this regard, it is encouraging that Defence established a new Pacific Division in July 2023 focused on ‘security priorities, including defence cooperation, infrastructure, and maritime security’. The linking of security aims with climate and migration policy in the Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty demonstrates the capacity for joined-up statecraft in the Pacific. But it is not clear from the [Defence Annual Report 2023–24] how Pacific defence cooperation integrates with other branches of government, including the interdepartmental Office of the Pacific housed in [the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade]. Seamless statecraft will remain hamstrung until the [Defence Strategic Review’s] call for a whole-of-government approach to national defence is realised, rather than putting the onus almost entirely on Defence. This could be achieved by making the 2026 [National Defence Strategy] a cross-government strategy. An alternative approach could be an overarching national security strategy.
Committee comment
7.53International defence cooperation is vital to Australia’s security and its position within the international community. The Committee commends Defence for its work in supporting international cooperation, including with Australia’s traditional partners and with Australia’s developing relationships across the Indo-Pacific.
7.54The Committee believes that cooperation with Australia’s traditional strategic partners will continue to be vital to Australia’s national security, particularly through strong, long-standing partnerships such as with the US.
7.55The Committee considers that Australia’s cooperation with non-traditional partners is also important to maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s growing relationships across the Indo-Pacific strengthens its position in the region and provides opportunities for regional partners to pursue shared interests.
7.56The Committee notes the importance of training exercises to both the capabilities of Defence and to Australia’s cooperation with like-minded militaries. Training exercises provide vital opportunities for the ADF to test capabilities across various domains of warfare ranging from high-tech to low-tech in environments designed to simulate real-world combat scenarios. Exposing ADF personnel to diverse training opportunities contributes to the experience of Australia’s highly modernised military and subsequently supports its ability to defend the country from aggressive actions.
7.57Training exercises are vital to Australia’s strategic alliances with its neighbours and the rest of the world. In an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, Australia’s relationships with its neighbours are more important than ever. Engaging in exercises that strengthen these relationships is therefore critical to national security. Furthermore, the joint interoperability experience with strategic partners strengthens Australia’s ability to collaborate with in the region and the global community to continue to maintain a peaceful, secure and prosperous world.
7.58Language training is vital to Defence’s ability to cooperate with its international counterparts. The Committee acknowledges that Defence provides language training to its personnel and that it supports the provision of training to foreign military personnel. However, it did have some concern that Defence may have an overreliance on personnel’s familial inheritance of languages and the recruitment of newly arrived citizens who possess language skills. The Subcommittee did not receive significant evidence relating to Defence’s language training but believes a more deliberate approach to language training would support Defence in its cooperation with its partners.
7.59The Committee recognises that strategic competition strongly influences Australia’s national security interests and efforts to strengthen defence capabilities. The 2024 National Defence Strategy identifies competition between the US and China as a significant driver of Australia’s defence activities. The Committee also understands criticisms that Australia is not transparent enough in relation to strategic competition, and that this may be damaging to the Australian people’s understanding of the need for Defence spending to support national interests. The Committee, however, supports Defence’s preference for working towards a stable and constructive relationship with China.
7.60Based on the Committee’s findings, the Committee recommends increasing efforts across the Indo-Pacific to build and support interoperability in practice and in the defence of democracy.
7.61Further, the Committee calls for more transparent reporting on international defence strategic planning and implementation and its alignment and integration with other arms of government, as well as further multilateral, diplomatic and parliament-to-parliament engagement in support of our national defence.
7.62The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence works with other departments to upskill the language capability Defence personnel in languages other than English, with a focus on languages of Indo-Pacific and Asian languages.
Senator Deborah O’NeillChairDefence Subcommittee27 January 2026
Hon Shayne Neumann MP
ChairJoint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade27 January 2026