Additional Comments – Australian Greens
As with the Select Committee's previous reports, the 4th
report concentrates a range of informed commentary on the proposed National
Broadband Network (NBN) and hence is a valuable resource. The Australian Greens
agree with many of the majority's recommendations. However, our views diverge
at a number of important points, including from the general tone of outraged
hostility that infuses much of the majority's commentary. The following
discussion takes the majority's recommendations as a convenient starting point
for detailing our views.
The Australian Greens do not agree with the majority that
the absence of a cost‑benefit analysis alone justifies abandoning the
NBN. As we remarked in the committee's third interim report, a cost-benefit
analysis would certainly be useful, especially on specific, concrete aspects of
the NBN proposal where such an analysis would be more meaningful (such as
aerial vs underground cabling). However, a cost‑benefit analysis for the
project as a whole would be a far more speculative endeavour than the majority
suggests and would not result in a clear and incontestable conclusion with
regard to whether the NBN should proceed. Such an analysis would need to
anticipate and evaluate the range of uses that will be enabled by a nationwide
high speed network over the course of its lifetime and their economic and
social impacts, and then pit those against the likely costs and impacts of not
building the network, or building a different sort of network. Certainty will
not be found through this kind of crystal ball gazing.
The difficulty in making these kinds of judgements also
raises questions about analyses that seek to judge the worth of the NBN by
focussing exclusively on its commercial prospects. Even if it is true that the
NBN will not generate a return that is of commercial interest to the private
sector, or will not repay taxpayers' investment within the various forecast
timeframes, this does not mean that the project is worthless and should not be
pursued. Such a conclusion is akin to arguing that transport infrastructure
should not be built because it will not generate a profit for the Government. The
reasons for making these kinds of public investments are found in the broader
social and economic outcomes that they enable.
However, the majority's broader point that this project has
been rushed ahead in the absence of adequate planning is well made. Commencing
construction of the network before receiving the implementation study
and finalising the broad range of important issues the Implementation Study
raises is an obvious example of the Government's unduly hasty approach. This
rush to implement has unnecessarily undermined confidence in the feasibility of
the project, and has also resulted in the information vacuum that the majority
refers to throughout their report. As is detailed in the majority report, the
absence of adequate public information about the timing of the rollout, the
costs for consumers (i.e. costs that are not wholly within the control of
retailers, such as the potential connection fee mentioned in the final
paragraphs of the majority report), the differences and advantages of high
speed broadband, what it will mean in terms of new equipment and access to the
private property of consumers, and so on, has led to a flurry of inquiries to
consumer organisations, local governments being unable to plan their activities
and look for opportunities to combine works and share infrastructure (e.g.
digging one trench for many purposes), and other avoidable outcomes.
Consequently, we endorse a number of the majority's
recommendations concerning greater public dissemination of information to key
stakeholders and the general public. Majority recommendations 3, 4, 10, 27 and
28 are all targeted at this information deficit from different angles, and we
support those aspects of them.
We have no quarrel with recommendation 5 seeking
clarification of NBN Co's position with respect to development consent and
landowner consent requirements, however we would add that NBN Co should not be
permitted to circumvent local control of planning or individuals' rights to
control access to their own homes. To reduce the likelihood of opposition and
costly delays to the NBN's rollout, we urge NBN Co to engage early with local
government and consumers so that a cooperative approach can be agreed before
the rollout is scheduled to begin in their area.
Majority recommendations 15–17 are aimed at mitigating the
risks that NBN Co will no longer act in the interests of consumers once it has
been privatised. As a private, profit-driven monopoly, it will have no
incentive to continually upgrade its infrastructure and services, or to
continue to service new premises in sparsely populated and therefore uneconomic
areas, or to keep the public informed of its service performance. If
privatisation is to proceed, regulation of the sort detailed in these
recommendations will certainly be needed. The Implementation Study also
suggests some important safeguards against consumer-unfriendly monopoly
conduct, such as ensuring that there is strong competition at Layer 2 prior to
privatisation. However, the Greens remain of the view that the only truly
effective means of safeguarding against these risks is to keep this monopoly in
public hands where it can be run exclusively for the benefit of end users. If
we can not prevail on that point, then a far more detailed public discussion of
the safeguards that must be implemented prior to privatisation will be
necessary. We will have much more to say on this point if things proceed to
that stage.
The Greens support recommendations 8, 19 and 20 on enhanced
engagement with consumer groups. Unlike the majority, we have no problem with
the following suggestion from ACCAN:
...board position should be deemed to be a person who
represents the interests of end users. This would mirror arrangements at the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Productivity Commission
which define specific roles for people with expertise in consumer issues.[1]
The majority rejected this suggestion on the grounds that it
could give rise to a conflict between the board's fiduciary duty to
shareholders and the interests of consumers. To us, that simply highlights the
problem with privatisation. We have no difficulty granting end users priority
over shareholders.
Majority recommendations 25–26 seem sensible given the
evidence submitted by the Communications and Information Technology Training
(CITT). The media accounts of safety incidents in Tasmania appear to have been
exaggerated, but given the potential safety risks and the workforce needs that
CITT foresees, and the potential costs if rollout is delayed due to workforce
shortages, planning ahead to ensure that there are sufficient skilled workers
to efficiently handle the rollout is sensible.
Finally, we wish to draw attention once more to the careful
management that will be required to manage the 'digital divide'. The majority
drew attention to the Implementation Study's scaling back of the service that
will be delivered by wireless and satellite to 7 per cent of the population. It
now seems that they will have a dramatically poorer level of service. This is a
concern, given the range of essential services that are expected to be
delivered over the NBN, and the aspirations for greater engagement with
Government online that have been outlined in the Government 2.0 project. It
appears that the lower level of service that will be available via wireless and
satellite is an unavoidable consequence of the technology at this time. However,
this is no reason for complacency. To ensure the 7 per cent enjoy equitable
social and political participation, Government must lay plans for complementary
service delivery to compensate for the digital divide, as suggested by ACCAN,[2]
and Government and NBN Co must always be on the lookout for an upgrade pathway
to bring the 7 per cent back into the fold. This latter challenge is another
area where consumers will be ill-served by a privatised NBN Co with a fiduciary
duty to its shareholders to not upgrade services especially in
remote areas where its investment will be poorly repaid.
The other aspect of the digital divide that requires further
thought and planning is social. Some Australian households do not even have
computers, and some have limited means to secure access to high speed
broadband. Again, we wish to endorse ACCAN's thoughtful contribution on this
point:
ACCAN sees a role for NBN Co in the delivery of basic,
low-band width services, possibly in fulfillment of a USO obligation placed on
the wholesaler. We envisage that NBN Co should have a duty to work with
retailers to deliver specific services for low income consumers and other
classes of consumers for whom the market alone may not deliver adequate or
appropriate services. It may be necessary to expressly legislate for a class of
access that is in fulfillment of a USO obligation.[3]
This is one good option for overcoming the social aspect of
the digital divide. We are also well disposed toward Professor Gans' suggestion
that a basic level of broadband access, sufficient to access essential
Government services, be provided free to all, and an income-tested subsidy be
introduced to ensure that low income families can purchase basic computer
equipment (see paragraphs 6.145 and 6.146 of the Committee's Third report). Doubtless,
there are also other good suggestions. Further thought, consultation and
planning on this point is required.
Senator Scott Ludlam
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