Footnotes

Executive summary

[1]        See chapter 6, paragraphs 6.64–6.73.

[2]        Notion taken from comments made in ASC, Submission 17, p. 10.

Chapter 1 - Introduction and conduct of the inquiry

[1]        Under Standing Order 25(4) the committee shall inquire into and report upon matters referred to its predecessor committees and not disposed of by those committees, and in considering those matters may consider the evidence and records of those committees relating to those matters.

[2]        Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 9 May 2006), p. 15. Rear Admiral (Ret'd) W.R. Rourke, suggested that the term large naval vessels might reasonably include vessels of some 1200 tons and more, and could extend to vessels of some 25000 tons or more. Submission 1, p. 3. See also, Aerospace, Industrial and Marine Technology Pty Ltd, Submission 15, p. 1.

Chapter 2 - Current trends in Naval shipbuilding

[1]        China as an emerging global power provides a good example of this trend in military modernisation. See Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, China's emergence: implications for Australia, March 2006, pp. 81–86.

[2]        Submission 35, p. 8.

[3]        Ministry of Defence, Policy Paper, Paper no. 5, Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002, p. 7.

[4]        Vice Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, Ms Allison Stiller, Rear Admiral Charles Hamilton, II, statement before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding, 5 April 2006, p. 6.

[5]        Dr Donald C. Winter, Secretary of Navy, 'Sea Air Space Exposition', Marriott Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., 4 April 2006, p. 3.

[6]        Dr Donald C. Winter, Secretary of Navy, 'Sea Air Space Exposition', Marriott Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., 4 April 2006, p. 4.

[7]        Dr Donald C. Winter, Secretary of Navy, 'Sea Air Space Exposition', Marriott Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., 4 April 2006, p. 4.

[8]        The UK Ministry of Defence explained that in the 1990s new market conditions emerged, brought about by constrained budgets, increasingly technologically advanced solutions and the drive for greater efficiency, which forced 'radical restructuring within and across national borders'. Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No. 5, Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002, pp. 8–9.

[9]        Submission 9, p. 17.

[10]      Submission 9, p. 18.

[11]      See for example, John Sprat, 'Naval shipbuilding—last chance', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, June 2004, p. 19. See also comments by Dr Paul Richard Brabin-Smith, 'Priorities for Defence innovation in Australia, The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA, August 2006, p. 31 and Mark Thomson, 'Competition in Australian Defence procurement', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA, August 2006, p. 73.

[12]      Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No. 5, Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002, pp. 8–9.

[13]      Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No. 5, Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002, pp. 8–9.

[14]      Vic Emery, Managing Director, BAE Systems Naval Ships, 'An Industry Perspective on UK Naval Construction', Naval Construction in the 21^st Century' conference, Newcastle, UK, 12 and 13 October 2004.

[15]      Vic Emery, Managing Director, BAE Systems Naval Ships, 'An Industry Perspective on UK Naval Construction', Naval Construction in the 21^st Century' conference, Newcastle, UK, 12 and 13 October 2004.

[16]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 70.

[17]      Peter Dombrowski, 'The Globalization of the Defense Sector? Naval Industrial Cases and Issues', Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 2002, p. 9 of 16. http:www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/12_ch11.htm (accessed 4 September 2006).

[18]      Peter Dombrowski, 'The Globalization of the Defense Sector? Naval Industrial Cases and Issues',  Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 2002, p. 11 of 16. http:www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/12_ch11.htm (accessed 4 September 2006).

[19]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 27.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 22.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 20.

[22]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 20.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 87.

[24]      See for example, Vice Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, Ms Allison Stiller, Rear Admiral Charles Hamilton, II, statement before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding, 5 April 2006, p. 10.

[25]      Vice Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, Ms Allison Stiller, Rear Admiral Charles Hamilton, II, statement before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding, 5 April 2006, p. 10.

[26]      Submission 36, p. 7.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 61. See also statement by Mr Kim Gillis, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 39.

[28]      Submission 26, p. 3.

[29]      Curt Weldon, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2003–H.R. 4546, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Subcommittee meeting jointly with Military Research and Development Subcommittee, 20 March 2002, p. 8.

[30]      Ronald O'Rourke, CRS Report for Congress, Potential Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, updated 25 May 2005, p. CRS–68. He noted that 'the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late Cold War peak of 568 at the end of FY 1987'.

[31]      Admiral Mike Mullen, Opening Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2006.

[32]      Admiral Mike Mullen, Opening Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2006.

[33]      Scott C. Truver, 'U.S. Shipyards Navigate between a Rock and a Hard Place', U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings,  March 2004 and also Vice Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, Ms Allison Stiller, Rear Admiral Charles Hamilton, II, statement before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding, 5 April 2006, p. 9.

[34]      Scott C. Truver, 'U.S. Shipyards Navigate between a Rock and a Hard Place', U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, March 2004.

[35]      Scott C. Truver, 'U.S. Shipyards Navigate between a Rock and a Hard Place', U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, March 2004.

[36]      Vice Admiral Phillip Balisle, Naval Sea Systems Command, 'Building more efficient support for Navy's ships, 28 March 2005, excerpts from interview reproduced Federal Times.com. See also Scott C. Truver, 'U.S. Shipyards Navigate between a Rock and a Hard Place', U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, March 2004.

[37]      National Security Assessment of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, May 2001, Executive Summary. See also paragraphs 2.11–2.12.

[38]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 42.

[39]      Section e, The Arms Export Control Act. See also Peter F. Verga, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 2000, www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/pub/dami-fd/10.31.200.1300.ppt (accessed 20 September 2006).

[40]      U.S. State Department, http:www.pmdtc.org/itar_index.htm (accessed 29 September 2006).

[41]      Ministry of Defence, Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 73.

[42]      Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No. 5, Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002, pp. 8–9.

[43]      Günter Verheugen, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Enterprise and Industry, European Maritime Policies and Perspectives, Maritime Industries Forum, Bremen, 25 January 2005.

[44]      Assembly of WEU, the Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, The Future of the European Naval defence industry, 6 December 2005, p. 3 of 19. A Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions stated bluntly that 'Wide-ranging co-operation between yards is still hampered by diverging operational requirements from national navies.' Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 13.

[45]      Keith Hartley, Director, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, Naval Shipbuilding in the UK and Europe: A Case for Industrial Consolidation?, n.d., p. 2.

[46]      Keith Hartley, Director, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, Naval Shipbuilding in the UK and Europe: A Case for Industrial Consolidation?, n.d., p. 2.

[47]      Keith Hartley, Director, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, Naval Shipbuilding in the UK and Europe: A Case for Industrial Consolidation?, n.d, p. 2.

[48]      See paragraphs 2.31–36 and chapter 9—Productivity paras 9–14.

[49]      Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 'LeaderSHIP 2015: Defining the Future of the European Shipbuilding and Repair Industry—Competitiveness through Excellence', 2003, p. 14.

[50]      Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Defence procurement, 23 September 2004, pp. 4–5.

[51]      Submission 26, p. 3.

[52]      Submission 26, p. 3.

[53]      Ministry of Defence, Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 73.

[54]      The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 12.

[55]       The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 12.

[56]       The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 14.

[57]      See for example, Professor Martin Edmonds, Director, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 'UK shipbuilding: a new Direction?', 2001.

[58]      The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 15.

[59]      The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, pp. 15–16.

[60]      Ministry of Defence, Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 73.

[61]      Keith Hartley, Naval Shipbuilding in the UK and Europe: A Case for Industrial Consolidation, n.d., p. 5. He made the same observation about the French government.

[62]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 10.

[63]      See statement by Mr Kim Gillis, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 46.

[64]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 44.

[65]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 45.

[66]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 46.

[67]      The European Community, Overview of the international commercial shipbuilding industry, Background Report, First Marine International Limited, May 2003, p. 18.

[68]      The European Community, Overview of the international commercial shipbuilding industry, Background Report, First Marine International Limited, May 2003, p. 18.

[69]      The European Community, Overview of the international commercial shipbuilding industry, Background Report, First Marine International Limited, May 2003, p. 17.

[70]      Submission 9, p. 17.

[71]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 12.

[72]      Submission 7, p. 5.

[73]      Submission 22, p. 12. See also evidence from Rear Admiral Rourke, (retired), Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 105.

[74]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, pp. 20–21.

[75]      Submission 9, p. 14.

[76]      The Hon. Francis Logan and Mr John O'Hare, Government of Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 93; ADI, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 3.

[77]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 19.

[78]      Submission 9, p. 14.

[79]      Submission 9, p. 14.

[80]      Submission 9, p. 14.

[81]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 3.

[82]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 3. See also ADI, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 3.

[83]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 21.

[84]      First Marine International, First Marine International findings for the global shipbuilding industrial base benchmarking study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, p. 24.

[85]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 3.

[86]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 21.

[87]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 3.

[88]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 12.

[89]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 22.

[90]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 4.

[91]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 3.

[92]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 14.

[93]      Submission 17, p. 9.

[94]      The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 3.

[95]      See Defence Industrial Strategy, Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 74.

[96]      Defence Industrial Strategy, Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 73.

[97]      The RAND Corporation, The United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base: The Next Fifteen Years, prepared for the United Kingdom' Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 69. Note also statements by the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, Australian Division, that it takes at least 15 years for an individual to be educated, trained and developed into a senior professional naval architect capable of providing suitable advice in relation to a naval shipbuilding project. It stressed that such expertise cannot be switched on and off on a project basis. Submission 14, p. [2].

[98]      The RAND Corporation, The United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base: The Next Fifteen Years, prepared for the United Kingdom' Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 69.

[99]      The RAND Corporation, The United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base: The Next Fifteen Years, prepared for the United Kingdom' Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 69.

[100]    See for example, Submission 17, p. 9.

[101]    Defence Industrial Strategy, Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 74.

[102]    Statement of Cynthia Brown, President, American Shipbuilding Association, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 30 March 2004.

[103]    Keith Hartley, Director, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, Naval Shipbuilding in the UK and Europe: A Case for Industrial Consolidation?, n.d.

[104]    Richard E Self, President, Advanced Technology Institute and Executive Director, National Shipbuilding Research Program, before the House Armed Services Committee, Projection Forces Subcommittee, 4 April 2006; Roscoe Bartlett, Projection Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 5 April 2006.

[105]    John F. Schank, The RAND Corporation, 'Trends in the United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base. Lessons for the United States', Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower, 6 April 2006, p. 7.

[106]    First Marine International, First Marine International findings for the global shipbuilding industrial base benchmarking study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, p. 27.

[107]    Vice Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, U.S. Navy Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, et al, before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding, 5 April 2006.

[108]    Chairman Roscoe Bartlett, Opening Statement, Hearing on the Evolving Missions of the U.S. Navy and the Role of Surface and Subsurface Combatants, 15 March 2006, House Armed Services Committee.

[109]    Vice Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, U.S. Navy Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, et al, before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Shipbuilding, 5 April 2006.

[110]    John F. Schank, The RAND Corporation, 'Trends in the United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base. Lessons for the United States', Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower, 6 April 2006, p. 1. He told a U.S. Senate committee that 'This effort will be challenging, because it follows a period of reduced warship demand that has led to consolidation and reduction in the capacity of the UK shipbuilding industrial base and in the oversight resources available to the MOD'. See also Lord Drayson, uncorrected transcript of oral evidence, House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence taken before Defence Committee, 'Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes', 25 October 2005.

[111]    John F. Schank, The RAND Corporation, 'Trends in the United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base: Lessons for the United States', Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower, 6 April 2006. He explained further: 'By a strategic plan, we mean one that would require that the MOD define its shipbuilding goals and future courses of action for the next several decades, establish a schedule or roadmap to achieve its plan, and identify future investments that would be needed, for example in facilities or workforce skills', p. 2.

[112]    John F. Schank, 'Trends in the United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base. Lessons for the United States', Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower, 6 April 2006, p. 2.

[113]    Professor Martin Edmonds, Director, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 'UK Shipbuilding: a new direction', 2001, http://www.global-defence.com/2001/SeaSpart3.html (accessed 10 November 2005).

[114]    Defence Industrial Strategy, Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 77.

[115]    Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 87.

Chapter 3 - A brief history of Australia's Naval shipbuilding industry

[1]        Charles Murton, 'Historic Williamstown', Williamstown Historical Society Museum, http://www.labyrinth.net.au/~crmurton/historicwtown.html (accessed 19 May 2006).

[2]        History of Garden Island, see http://www.gardenisland.info/1-02-000.html (accessed 11 May 2006).

[3]        R. G. Parker, Cockatoo Island: A History, Thomas Nelson (Australia), Melbourne, 1977, p. 10. National Archives of Australia, The History of Cockatoo Island dockyard, http://www.naa.gov.au/Publications/research_guides/guides/dockyard/chapter01.htm (accessed 11 May 2006).

[4]        National Archives of Australia, The History of Cockatoo Island Dockyard, http://www.naa.gov.au/Publications/Research_Guides/guides/dockyard/pages/chapter01.htm (accessed 5 May 2006). HMAS Warrego had been built in Scotland and dismantled for reassembly at Cockatoo Island.

[5]        History of Garden Island, http://www.gardenisland.info/1-02-000.html (accessed 11 May 2006).

[6]        Captain Cook Graving Dock, http://www.gardenisland.info/1-02-010.html (accessed 11 May 2006).

[7]        Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Construction of Facilities for the Australian frigate project, Williamstown dockyard, Melbourne—Phase B, Parliamentary Paper No. 189/1985, 1985, p. 3. The dock was called the Alfred Graving Dock.

[8]        Historic Williamstown, http://www.labyrinth.net.au/~crmurton/historicwtown.html (accessed 11 May 2006). See A. Bunnett, G. Halliburton and P. Webb, 'The Southern base of the RAN: A short history of HMA Naval Dockyard, Williamstown', Naval Historical Review, http://www.navyhistory.org.au/review/71-1.pdf (accessed 11 May 2006).

[9]        A. Bunnett, G. Halliburton and P. Webb, 'The Southern base of the RAN: A short history of HMA Naval Dockyard, Williamstown', Naval Historical Review, http://www.navyhistory.org.au/review/71-1.pdf (accessed 11 May 2006).

[10]      Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Construction of Facilities for the Australian frigate project, Williamstown dockyard, Melbourne—Phase B, Parliamentary Paper No. 189/1985, 1985, p. 3.

[11]      'History of hard work and strife', Herald Sun, 15 June 2006, p. 66.

[12]      Australian Heritage Commission, Linking a nation, 2003, http://www.ahc.gov.au/publications/national-stories/transport/chapter2.html (accessed 11 May 2006).

[13]      J. H. Straczek, Sea Power Centre Australia, General RAN history, RAN in the Second World War, http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/general/ww2.html (accessed 20 May 2006).

[14]      Dr Paul Earnshaw, 'Australian Naval Shipbuilding—1960s to the present', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, January–March 1998, p. 22.

[15]      Dr Mark Thomson, Setting a course for Australia's naval shipbuilding and repair industry, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Report, August 2002, p. 16. He wrote that: 'the Daring class ships were delivered years late, and cost twice as much as the same class of ships built in Britain. The River Class suffered three-fold cost escalation during the project.

[16]      Dr Paul Earnshaw, 'Australian Naval Shipbuilding—1960s to the present', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, January–March 1998, p. 23.

[17]      Commodore G. J. Willis, Royal Australian Navy: A survey of future needs, Parliamentary Paper No. 138/1972, Commonwealth Government Printing Office, Canberra, August 1972, pp. 25–26.

[18]      Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Construction of Facilities for the Australian frigate project, Williamstown dockyard, Melbourne—Phase B, Parliamentary Paper No. 189/1985, 1985, p. 3.

[19]      Commodore G. J. Willis, Parliamentary Paper No. 138/1972, Royal Australian Navy: A survey of future needs, Commonwealth Government Printing Office, Canberra, August 1972, p. 26.

[20]      Stanley S. Schaetzel, Local development of defence hardware in Australia, Working Paper No. 100, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, June 1986.

[21]      Mr Bill Rourke RADM (Ret'd), 'The Australian Frigate Project', Letters to the Editor, Australian Defence Journal, no. 128, January–February 1998, p. 3 http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dfj/adfj128.pdf (accessed 23 May 2006).

[22]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 15.

[23]      Mr John C. Jeremy, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 28 June 2006, p. 62.

[24]      Stanley S. Schaetzel, Local development of defence hardware in Australia, Working Paper No. 100, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, June 1986.

[25]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 15.

[26]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 13.

[27]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 15.

[28]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 17.

[29]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, pp 27 and 29.

[30]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 13. The 1986 JCPA report concluded that the FMS contract 'did not adequately protect Australia's interest especially in negotiations between the US navy and the shipbuilder'.

[31]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, pp 31 and 33. On another occasion, the RAN inquired why it was not consulted when Ballistic Laminate was fitted to FFG 01-02 ships. There were also a number of examples of poor workmanship by Todd Pacific Shipyards on the hull of FFG-02.

[32]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 35.

[33]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 36.

[34]      K. F. Brigden, Report of the Auditor-General, Parliamentary Paper No. 234/1983, p. 15.

[35]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 75.

[36]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 69.

[37]      The French agency from which the Commonwealth purchased the Production Package was the Direction Techniques des Constructions Navales.

[38]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 73.

[39]      K. F. Brigden, Report of the Auditor-General, Parliamentary Paper No. 234/1983, 6 September 1983, p. 16. Derek Woolner, Procuring change: How Kockums was selected for the Collins class submarine, Research Paper No. 4, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 11. It was suggested that the problem may have been as fundamental as translation difficulties.

[40]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 73.

[41]      Senator the Hon. Anthony Messner, Minister for Veterans' Affairs, Senate Hansard, 21 October 1982, p. 1697. The Minister’s response also contained an answer to the issue of the international competitiveness of an Australian build: ‘As to whether the French and/or South Koreans could build a ship in less time than it will take to build HMAS Success, it has to be acknowledged that Australia's policy in relation to this kind of development is for work to be undertaken in Australia. Consequently, the question of vessels being built in other countries does not arise’.

[42]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 75.

[43]      K. F. Brigden, Report of the Auditor-General, Parliamentary Paper No. 234/1983, 6 September 1983, p. 25.

[44]      Paul Earnshaw, 'The Australian Frigate Project', Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 126, September–October 1997, p. 9.

[45]      The committee heard from Mr John O'Callaghan, head of the Australian Industry Group Defence Council, of the important commitment made from 'people like Sir James Killen' (Minister for Defence 1975–1982) to building major naval surface ships and submarines in-country. Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 41.

[46]      Derek Woolner, Procuring change: How Kockums was selected for the Collins class submarine, Research Paper No. 4, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 10.

[47]      Paul Earnshaw, 'The Australian Frigate Project', Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 126, September–October 1997, p. 10.

[48]      See The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 14 October 1986, p. 1928.

[49]      Paul Earnshaw, 'Australian Naval Shipbuilding—1960s to the present', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, January–March 1998, p. 26.

[50]      Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Construction of Facilities for the Australian frigate project, Williamstown dockyard, Melbourne—Phase A, Parliamentary Paper No. 98/1984, 1984, p. 8.

[51]      The Hon. Gordon Scholes, 'Construction of two FFG–7 frigates at Williamstown Naval Dockyard: Ministerial Statement', Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 12 October 1983, p. 1659.

[52]      Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Review of Defence Project Management, Parliamentary Paper No. 19/1986, Report 243, Vol. 2, Canberra, 1986, p. 57; Paul Earnshaw, 'The Australian Frigate Project', Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 126, September–October 1997, p. 10.

[53]      A premium is essentially a subsidy paid by government to secure a local build. The question of premiums will be discussed in detail in chapter 14.

[54]      Paul Earnshaw, 'The Australian Frigate Project', Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 126, September–October 1997, p. 10.

[55]      Paul Earnshaw, 'The Australian Frigate Project', Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 126, September–October 1997, p. 18.

[56]      The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 19 March 1987, p. 1091.

[57]      The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 19 March 1987, p. 1091.

[58]      The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 19 March 1987, p. 1091.

[59]      See The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 24.

Chapter 4 - Australian Naval shipbuilders

[1]        ASC, Annual Report 2005, p. 2.

[2]        The original proposal was for ten vessels. By May 1999, this number was reduced to six. Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 12.

[3]        Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 5. Patrick Walters, 'The Cutting Edge: The Collins experience', Strategic Insights, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2006, p. 4.

[4]        Mr Derek Woolner, Procuring change: How Kockums was selected for the Collins class submarine, Research Paper No. 4, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 3.

[5]        Mr Derek Woolner, Procuring change: How Kockums was selected for the Collins class submarine, Research Paper No. 4, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 3.

[6]        ASC, Submission 17, p. 1. Upon announcing the through-life support contract, the Defence Minister, the Hon. Robert Hill, and the Minister for Finance and Public Administration, the Hon. Nick Minchin, explained that 'ASC will integrate capability enhancements, such as a new combat system and a heavyweight torpedo, to ensure that the technical capabilities of the submarines are maintained'. The Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, and the Hon. Nick Minchin, Minister for Finance and Public Administration, 'Submarine refit contract signed today', Media Release, 8 December 2003.

[7]        Dr Paul Earnshaw, 'Australian Naval Shipbuilding—1960s to the present', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, January–March 1998, p. 41.

[8]        Mr Neil James, Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 44.

[9]        The Australian Submarine Corporation (later ASC) was formed in August 1985 through a joint venture between Kockums, the Australian Industry Development Corporation, Wormalds International and Chicago Bridge and Australia Iron. Kockums was a 49 per cent shareholder of ASC when ASC was selected as the prime contractor for the submarines in May 1987.

[10]      Mr Patrick Walters, 'The Cutting Edge: The Collins experience', Strategic Insights, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2006, p. 6.

[11]      Mr Patrick Walters, 'The Cutting Edge: The Collins experience', Strategic Insights, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2006, p. 5. Derek Woolner noted that the project was 'revolutionary in that it required those companies bidding for the RFT [Request For Tender] to provide detailed information on their plans to involve Australian industry'. Mr Derek Woolner, Procuring change: How Kockums was selected for the Collins class submarine, Research Paper No. 4, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 11.

[12]      Mr Greg Tunny, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 13. Patrick Walters has noted that ASC managed 1600 individual contractors, of which nearly 80 per cent were Australian. 'The Cutting Edge: The Collins experience', Strategic Insights, February 2006, p. 5.

[13]      Mr John O'Callaghan, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 21.

[14]      Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 14.

[15]      Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters, June 1999, p. 5 www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/collins.html (accessed 20 June 2006).

[16]      Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 13.

[17]      Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 15.

[18]      Mr John O'Callaghan, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 18.

[19]      Mr Gregory R. Copley, Future Directions International, Submission 28, pp. 8–9.

[20]      Mr Patrick Walters, 'The Cutting Edge: The Collins experience', Strategic Insights, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2006, pp. 2 and 9.

[21]      Mr Derek Woolner, 'The air-warfare destroyer: Managing defence procurement', The business of defence: Sustaining capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 72.

[22]      Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 9.

[23]      Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. iv.

[24]      Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters, June 1999, www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/collins.html (accessed 20 June 2006).

[25]      Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters, June 1999, www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/collins.html (accessed 20 June 2006).

[26]      The fixed price figure comes from Dr Paul Earnshaw, 'Australian Naval Shipbuilding—1960s to the present', Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, January–March 1998, p. 40.

[27]      Mr Derek Woolner, 'The air–warfare destroyer: Managing defence procurement', The business of defence: Sustaining capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 72.

[28]      Mr Derek Woolner, 'Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement', Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 12.

[29]      Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters, June 1999, p. 17, www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/collins.html (accessed 20 June 2006).

[30]      Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters, June 1999, www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/collins.html (accessed 20 June 2006).

[31]      Mr Derek Woolner, Getting in early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Research Paper No. 3, 2001–02, Parliamentary Library, p. 47. Mr Woolner also noted that building a prototype is 'what Navy now recognises should have been done'. Rear Admiral William Rourke (retired) put the same argument to the committee: 'there is a need to have an increased gap between the lead ship of a class and its successor. The lead ship needs to be evaluated and given the all clear before the successor is completed'. Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 101.

[32]      Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters, June 1999, www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/collins.html (accessed 20 June 2006).

[33]      Mr Patrick Walters, 'The Cutting Edge: The Collins experience', Strategic Insights, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2006, p. 7.

[34]      See Commander Rob Elliot, 'Replacement Combat system for the Collins class soon to be operational!', Navy Engineering Bulletin, March 2006, http://www.navy.gov.au/publications/engineering/march2006/replacementcombat.html

[35]      Mr Greg Tunny, Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 5.

[36]      The Hon. Dr Brendan Nelson, 'Pride in the ANZAC spirit', Herald Sun, 15 June 2006, p. 62.

[37]      The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 15 August 1989, p. 5.

[38]      The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, pp. 25–26.

[39]      Tenix Defence Pty Ltd, Submission 26, p. 1.

[40]      Tenix Marine Division is one of four divisions within Tenix Defence, which is a branch of the Tenix Group. See http://www.tenix.com/Main.asp?ID=27 (accessed 10 September 2006).

[41]      Ms Denise Ironfield, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, p. 6.

[42]      The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 23.

[43]      Tenix Defence Pty Ltd, Submission 26, p. 2.

[44]      Ms Denise Ironfield, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, p. 7.

[45]      The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 24.

[46]      Ms Denise Ironfield, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, p. 9.

[47]      The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 24.

[48]      The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 10 May 1989, p. 2343.

[49]      Ms Denise Ironfield, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, p. 11.

[50]      Ms Denise Ironfield, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, p. 19.

[51]      Defence Materiel Organisation, 'Projects', http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1348/sea1348p2.cfm (accessed 8 November 2006).

[52]      Mr Bob Wylie, 'Supplying and supporting Australia's military capability', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 58.

[53]      See Department of Defence, 'HMAS Westralia passes the weight to Nuship Sirius', Media Release, 16 September 2006, http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=6010 (accessed 2 November 2006).

[54]      Lieutenant General David Hurley, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2 006, p. 1.

[55]      Mr Kim Gillis, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 43.

[56]      Kim Gillis explained to the committee that the decision to take the fuel out was to make it safe for welding, 'which meant that we only did that infrequently—once every four or five years'. Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 44.

[57]      Tenix, 'DELOS delivered early', 21 August 2006, http://www.tenix.com/News2.asp?ID=192 (accessed 2 November 2006).

[58]      References to ADI throughout this report reflect the company name at the time the evidence was taken.

[59]      ADI superseded the Office of Defence Production which had been established within the Department of Defence to improve the competitiveness of government owned dockyards and defence establishments. Graeme Cheeseman, The Search for Self-Reliance, Australia’s Defence since Vietnam, 1993, p. 42.

[60]      The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 10 May 1989, p. 2345.

[61]      The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 10 May 1989, p. 2345.

[62]      Lieutenant General David Hurley, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 26.

[63]      Tasman Economics, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the minehunter coastal project, Final report, January 2002, p. 9.

[64]      Tasman Economics, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the minehunter coastal project, Final report, January 2002, p. 9.

[65]      Tasman Economics, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the minehunter coastal project, Final report, January 2002, p. 13.

[66]      Tasman Economics, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the minehunter coastal project, Final report, January 2002, p. 10.

[67]      ADI quoted in Tasman Economics, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the minehunter coastal project, Final report, January 2002, p. 11.

[68]      Mr Geoff Smith, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 2.

[69]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 28.

[70]      'Big achievements in FFG Upgrade project', Pursuit 68, August 2006, p. 5,
http://www.adi-limited.com/default.asp?page=228

[71]      'HMAS Melbourne upgrade progress', Login to ADI–Thales Australia, May 2006, p. 7.

[72]      Mr Geoff Smith, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 10.

[73]      'Big achievements in FFG Upgrade project', Pursuit 68, August 2006, p. 5,
http://www.adi-limited.com/default.asp?page=228

[74]      Australian National Audit Office, Management of Selected Defence System Program Offices, Audit Report No. 45, 2004–05, p. 20. FFGSPO: Fast Frigate Guided System Program Office.

[75]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 28.

[76]      'SEA1390—The FFG Upgrade Programme', The Navy, Vol. 68, No. 1, January–March 2006, p. 4.

[77]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 28.

[78]      The Hon. Peter Costello, 'Foreign Investment Proposal: Thales Australia Holdings Pty Ltd—Acquisition of remaining 50 per cent interest in ADI Limited', Media Release, 12 October 2006.

[79]      Thales Australia, 'Treasurer gives the go ahead to Thales Australia', News Release, 13 October 2006, p. 1.

[80]      Australian Shipbuilders Association Ltd., Submission 36, Annex B.

[81]      See the Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 10 May 1989, p. 2345; The Hon. Kim Beazley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives Hansard, 22 March 1988, p. 1110.

[82]      Lieutenant General David Hurley, Opening Statement, Public Hearing, 18 August 2006.

[83]      This is not to say that Austal and Incat are unable to compete with builders of large steel warships in terms of certain Defence capability requirements.

[84]      Submission 7, p. 1.

[85]      Mr Bob Wylie, 'Supplying and supporting Australia's military capability', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 58.

[86]      Defence has since ordered two further patrol boats from Austal. This was approved in the 2005 federal budget.

[87]      Mr Bob Wylie, 'Supplying and supporting Australia's military capability', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 58.

[88]      Austal, 'Enhanced protection for Australian waters', Media Release, 5 May 2004, http://www.austal.com/index.cfm?objectid=44AB08E1-A0CC-3C8C-D9C40983CCA33C24 (accessed 2 October 2004).

[89]      Austal, Submission 7, p. 1.

[90]      Austal, Submission 7, p. 5.

[91]      Australian Shipbuilders Association, Submission 36. See also Mr Craig Clifford, Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 14.

[92]      Incat Australia, 'Defence Menu', http://www.incat.com.au/defence_fs.html (accessed 2 November 2006).

[93]      Mr Craig Clifford, Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 13.

[94]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 32.

[95]      Mr Craig Clifford, Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 12.

[96]      Department of Defence, 2006 Defence Capability Plan, 2006–2016, p. 141.

[97]      Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, ASC chosen to build Air Warfare destroyers, Media Release, 31 May 2005.

[98]      Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, 'Purchase of Aegis combat system for destroyers', Media Release, 9 December 2005.

[99]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 29.

[100]    Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, 'Purchase of Aegis combat system for destroyers', Media Release, 9 December 2005. Lockheed Martin is the supplier of the Aegis system to the U.S. Navy.

[101]    Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, 'Purchase of Aegis combat system for destroyers', Media Release, 9 December 2005.

[102]    Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, 'Preferred designer chosen for AWD contract', Media Release, 16 August 2005. The competing firms were Blohm+Voss and the Spanish firm Navantia.

[103]    Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, 'Preferred designer chosen for AWD contract', Media Release, 16 August 2005.

[104]    This decision will take place at 'Second Pass' stage in mid-2007. The classification of the Navantia design as 'military off-the-shelf' is made by the Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 17.

[105]    Air-warfare destroyer alliance, 'Industry and Defence—working together to deliver a formidable air warfare capability to the Navy', http://www.ausawd.com/ (accessed 7 November 2006).

[106]    See Derek Woolner, 'The Air-warfare destroyer project', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 74.

[107]    Mr Greg Tunny, Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 8.

[108]    The Hon. Nick Minchin, 'ASC sale', Media Release, 16 August 2006.

[109]    ASC, 2005 Annual Report, p. 2.

[110]    Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2006–07 http://www.aspi.org.au/events/recentEventDetail.aspx?eid=26 (accessed 6 November 2006).

[111]    The Hon. Nick Minchin, 'ASC sale', Media Release, 16 August 2006.

[112]    Mr Geoffrey Barker, 'The politics of defence acquisition', The business of Defence: Sustaining capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 82.

[113]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 17.

[114]    The Hon. Robert Hill, Media Release, 15 August 2005, http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=5039 (accessed 8 November 2006).

[115]    See Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union, Submission 21, pp. 5–6; Returned and Services League of Australia (RSL), Submission 6.

[116]    The estimate comes from Mr David Miller, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2005, p. 5.

[117]    Mr David Miller, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2005, p. 5.

[118]    Mr Geoff Smith, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 6.

[119]    Mr Geoff Smith, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, pp. 9–10.

[120]    Mr Geoff Smith, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 7.

[121]    Mr David Miller, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2005, p. 19.

[122]    See South Australian government, Submission 9.

Chapter 5 - SME suppliers

[1]        Submission 20, p. 1.

[2]        Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 20.

[3]        See for example, Professor Martin Edmonds, Director, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 'UK Shipbuilding: a new direction?', Lancaster University, 2001; Nautronix, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 36; and Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, Keynote Address, Defence & Industry Conference, Canberra, 21 June 2005.

[4]        Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 40.

[5]        Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 17.

[6]        Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, pp. 36 and 37.

[7]        Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 29.

[8]        Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 42.

[9]        Submission 23, p. 17.

[10]      Tasman Asia Pacific, Impact of Major Defence Projects: a Case Study of the ANZAC Ship Project, Final Report by Denise Ironfield, prepared for the Australian Industry Group Defence Council, February 2000, p. vi. See also Submission 23, p. 16.

[11]      Mr David Miller, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 1.

[12]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 23.

[13]      The Allen Consulting Group, Building the Air Warfare Destroyers: How does Williamstown rate?, February 2005, p. 24.

[14]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 68.

[15]      Tasman Economics, Impact of major defence projects: A case study of the minehunter coastal project, Final report, January 2002, p. 13.

[16]      Mr Geoff Smith, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 2.

[17]      Submission 39, p. [4].

[18]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, pp. 43–44.

[19]      Submission 29, p. 10.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 85.

[21]      Submission 13, p. 4.

[22]      Submission 30, p. 1.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 54.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 20. He said, 'Tasmania’s marine engineering workshops provide an impressive array of quality goods. Innovation and skill are qualities in which we have a high investment. Custom design casting and machining services in both ferrous and nonferrous metals by APCO result in high-quality products as diverse as hydraulic cylinders, water jets, deck hatches, bulkhead seals and piping system fittings, cast in aluminium and stainless steel. APCO hydraulic cylinders are in use in many countries, including Europe and the UK, interceptor kits, motion control hydraulic cylinders and two-square metre T-foil sets are supplied to the USA military'.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, pp. 21–22.

[26]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 24.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 24.

[28]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 27.

[29]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 25.

[30]      The organisations include: Tasmanian Manufacturing Industry Council; Tasmania Maritime Network; Department of Economic Development; Australian Industry Defence Network (Tasmania) and Industry Capability Network Tasmania

[31]      Submission 30, p. 2.

[32]      Submission p. 2. Haywards Group has agreed in principle to become the lead contractor working to a prime contractor. This company is Tasmania's leading heavy steel fabricator with expertise in large scale projects and has a skilled workforce of over 140 personnel and substantial workshops, design office and corrosion management facilities. North West Bay ships Pty Ltd is to support the Haywards Group with the 'necessary specialist maritime project management and additional marine manufacturing support'.

[33]      Submission 30, p. 3.

[34]      Submission 30, p. 3.

[35]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 29.

[36]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 29.

[37]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 61.

[38]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 39.

[39]      Submission 10, p. 3.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 28.

[41]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 28.

[42]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 30.

[43]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 32.

[44]      Submission 27, p. 3.

[45]      Submission 27, pp. 3–4.

[46]      Submission 23, p. iv.

[47]      Submission 23, p. 16.

[48]      See quote by the UK Ministry of Defence in chapter 2, paragraph 2.10.

[49]      Mr Peter Croser, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 43.

[50]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 61.

[51]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 33. See also Mr Bonner, Weir Strachan and Henshaw, Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 24. Mr Bonner told the committee that it is inevitable that the platforms going to be built in Australia will have overseas equipment. He stressed the importance of establishing relationships with overseas equipment suppliers in the early design and procurement period. Indeed, Weir Strachan and Henshaw identified a range of equipments that were not being supported well in Australia and moved to fill that void. In some cases, however, it talked to 'people overseas and formed licences and have contracts'.

[52]      Submission 25, p. 7.

[53]      Submission 34, p. 2.

[54]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 8.

[55]      Submission 35, p. 8.

[56]      Submission 35, p. 9.

[57]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, pp. 37–39.

[58]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 39.

[59]      Submission 10, p. 1.

[60]      Submission 35, pp. 9–10.

[61]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 24.

[62]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 20.

[63]      Submission 25, p. 4.

[64]      Submission 25, p. 7.

[65]      Submission 35, p. 2.

[66]      Submission 35, p. 2.

[67]      Submission 35, p. 2. Raytheon are involved in a number of major programs in which they are responsible for systems integration, including:

[68]      Submission 35, p. 5.

[69]      Michael Gallagher, Nautonix, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 40.

[70]      See for example David Bonner, Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 19.

[71]      Submission 25, p. 7.

[72]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 25.

[73]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 26.

[74]      Submission 35, p. 2.

[75]      Submission 35, p. 3.

[76]      Submission 35, p. 3.

[77]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 14.

[78]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 40.

[79]      See for example, David Bonner, Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 26.

[80]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 16.

[81]      According to Lockheed Martin, their Aegis Weapon System 'is the world's premier naval defense system and the sea-based element of the United States' Ballistic Missile Defense System. It is 'a radar and missile system seamlessly integrated with its own command and control system, capable of simultaneous operation defending against advanced air, surface and subsurface threats.' The system capabilities are on 67 U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers on station around the world with plans underway to install the system on an additional 22 U.S. Navy destroyers. It is 'the primary naval weapon system for Japan, it is part of two European ship construction programs—the Spanish F-100 and the Norwegian New Frigate—and the Republic of Korea recently selected Aegis for its newest class of destroyers, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=11357&rsbci-13000&, accessed 29 November 2006.

[82]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 30 October 2006), p. [19].

[83]      Chapter 2, paragraph 2.10, contained in quote Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No. 5, Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002, pp. 8–9.

Chapter 6 - Infrastructure

[1]        See for example, The RAND Corporation, The United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base: The Next Fifteen Years, prepared for the United Kingdom' Ministry of Defence, 2005 (The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report), p. 3.

[2]        See The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 90.

[3]        The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 3.

[4]         The UK's Naval Shipbuilding 2005 Report, p. 90.

[5]        Submission 17, pp. 14–15.

[6]        For example Level 4 refers to shipyards that have continued to advance their technology during the 1980s and 1990s. Generally a single dock, with good environmental protection, short cycle times, high productivity, extensive early outfitting and integration of steel and outfit; together with fully developed CAD/CAM and operating systems. Level 4 is better than industry averages but not up to leading standards.

Level 5 represents state-of-the-art shipbuilding technology. It is developed from level 4 by means of automation and robotics in areas where they can be used effectively, and by integration of the operating systems, for example, by the effective use of CAD/CAM/CIM. There would be a modular production philosophy in design and production. The level is also characterized by efficient, computer-aided material control and by fully effective quality assurance. In summary, state-of-the-art use of technology and industry-leading business processes, facilities, systems, management and workforce.

[7]        See for example, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 30.

[8]        Submission 17, pp. 14–15.

[9]        Submission 23, p. 25.

[10]      Submission 9, p. 35.

[11]      Submission 22, p. 11.

[12]      Submission 36, p. [3]. See also comments by Thiess, Submission 22, p. 11.

[13]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 5.

[14]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 5.

[15]      Submission 36, p. [7].

[16]      Submission 36, p. [7].

[17]      Submission 36, p. [7].

[18]      Defence Materiel Organisation, The Australian Naval shipbuilding and repair sector strategic plan, August 2002, p. 14. SEA 4000 is the AWD Project, JP2048 is the Amphibious Watercraft replacement, Amphibious Ships, Strategic Lift Ship Capability and Sea 1654 includes the replacement for the Success.

[19]      Defence Materiel Organisation, The Australian Naval shipbuilding and repair sector strategic plan, August 2002, p. 14.

[20]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 31.

[21]      Submission 23, covering letter from the Minister for Science and Innovation, The Hon. Mr Francis Logan MLA.

[22]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 82. See also p. 91.

[23]      Submission 23, p. 26.

[24]      Submission 23, p. 26.

[25]      Submission 23, pp. 25–26.

[26]      Submission 23, p. 26 and Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 93.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 93.

[28]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 44.

[29]      Submission 16, pp. 1–2.

[30]      Submission 23, p. 26.

[31]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 26.

[32]      Submission 16, p. 1.

[33]      Submission 23, p. 27.

[34]      Submission 23, p. 27.

[35]      The Hon Francis Logan, Minister for Energy, Science and Innovation, Government of Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 82.

[36]      The Hon Francis Logan, Minister for Energy, Science and Innovation, Government of Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 82.

[37]      Submission 16, p. 2.

[38]      Submission 23, p. 27.

[39]      Submission 23, covering letter from the Minister for Science and Innovation, Mr Francis Logan MLA.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 27.

[41]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 22.

[42]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, August 2002, p. C–3.

SEA 4000 is the AWD Project, JP2048 is the Amphibious Watercraft replacement and Sea 1654 includes the replacement for the Success.

[43]      Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Setting a Course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, An ASPI Policy Report, August 2002, p. 15.

[44]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 22.

[45]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. v.

[46]      Rear Admiral (retired) Scarce, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 34.

[47]      Submission 9, p. 32 and Admiral (retired) Scarce, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 34. According to Thiess 'SA is tendering to build a CUF to be used by ASC for the AWD project. $120m will be spent on a new ship lift and transfer system as well as in dredging and new wharves'. Submission 22, p. 11

[48]      Rear Admiral (retired) Scarce, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 34.

[49]      Rear Admiral (retired) Scarce, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 30.

[50]      Submission 9, p. 32.

[51]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 30.

[52]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 31.

[53]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), pp. 29–30.

[54]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 43.

[55]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 43.

[56]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 20.

[57]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. v.

[58]      The Allen Consulting Group, Building the Air Warfare Destroyers: How does Williamstown rate?, report to the Government of Victoria, February 2005, p. 28.

[59]      Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Plan, August 2002, p. C–1.

[60]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 4.

[61]      Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Plan, August 2002, p. C–1.

[62]      Defence Materiel Organisation, Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, August 2002, p. C–1.

[63]      ASPI, Setting a course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, An ASPI Report, August 2002, p. 15.

[64]      The Allen Consulting Group, Building the Air Warfare Destroyers: How does Williamstown rate?, report to the Government of Victoria, February 2005, p. 29.

[65]      The Allen Consulting Group, Building the Air Warfare Destroyers: How does Williamstown rate?, report to the Government of Victoria, February 2005, p. 29.

[66]      The Allen Consulting Group, Building the Air Warfare Destroyers: How does Williamstown rate?, report to the Government of Victoria, February 2005, p. 29.

[67]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 7.

[68]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 5.

[69]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 5.

[70]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 5.

[71]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 66.

[72]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 66.

[73]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding Repair Sector Strategic Plan, August 2002, p. 13.

[74]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding Repair Sector Strategic Plan, August 2002, p. 13.

[75]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, August 2002, p. C–4.

[76]      ASPI, Setting a course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, An ASPI Report, August 2002, p. 15.

[77]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, pp. 13 and 14.

[78]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 10.

[79]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, pp. 9–10.

[80]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 10.

[81]      Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, August 2002, p. C–8.

[82]      Submission 22, p. 11

[83]      Submission 29, pp. 4, 8.

[84]      Submission 41, pp. 1–4.

[85]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 21.

[86]      Submission 9, p. 35.

[87]      Submission 22, p. 11.

[88]      The Allen Consulting Group, Building the Air Warfare Destroyers: How does Williamstown rate?, Report to the Government of Victoria, February 2005, p. 30.

[89]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 18.

[90]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 29.

[91]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 35.

[92]      Andrew Fletcher to Senator Steve Hutchins, 1 September 2006.

[93]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 16.

[94]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 16.

[95]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 66.

[96]      Mr Gregory Tunny, CEO, ASC Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 9.

[97]      The Allen Consulting Group, Building the Air Warfare Destroyers: How does Williamstown rate?, Report to the Government of Victoria, February 2005, p. 27.

[98]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 37.

[99]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 49.

[100]    Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 49.

[101]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 30 October 2006), p. [10].

[102]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 30 October 2006), p. [10].

[103]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), p. [10]. Defence noted that being mindful of competing Australian projects that also require substantial metal fabrication labour, the AWD Program, in conjunction with industry partners ASC and Raytheon, is currently undertaking a series of industry engagements to better understand Australian industry’s capacity and commitment to undertake the task of building the AWD modules. Initial indications appear positive, but will need to be confirmed in due course.

[104]    Submission 22, p. 11.

[105]    Submission 15, p. 1.

[106]    Submission 15, p. 1.

[107]    Submission 15, p. 1.

[108]    Submission 7, p. 3.

[109]    Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 65.

[110]    Submission 23, p. 27.

[111]    Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 84.

[112]    Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 35.

[113]    Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 35.

[114]    Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 35.

[115]    Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 35.

[116]    Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 36.

[117]    Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 36.

[118]    See for example, AMWU Submission 21, p. 3.

[119]    Submission 11, p. 1.

[120]    Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 19.

[121]    Submission 26, p. 7.

[122]    Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 21.

[123]    Submission 11, p. 1.

[124]    Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 21.

[125]    Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 75.

[126]    Submission 17, p. 10.

Chapter 7 - Workforce and skills

[1]        Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 14.

[2]        Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education References Committee, Bridging the skills divide, November 2003, pp. 3–4.

[3]        DEWR, Skills in Demand Lists State and Territories—2006, p. 39.

[4]        DEWR, Skills in Demand Lists State and Territories—2006, p. 39. www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/BF83E4CC-1E8F-4630-95C7D9F3A6108A9A/0/SkillsinDemandMarch2006.pdf, (accessed 19 May 2006).

[5]        DEWR, Skills in Demand Lists State and Territories—2006, www.workplace.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/BF83E4CC-1E8F-4630-95C7D9F3A6108A9A/0/SkillsinDemandMarch2006.pdf, (accessed 19 May 2006).

[6]        National Industry Skills Initiative, Engineering Working Group, 2001, Engineering Skills Shortages, p. 4.

[7]        National Industry Skills Initiative, Engineering Working Group, 2001, Engineering Skills Shortages, pp. 11–13.

[8]        ACIL Tasman, November 2004, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, p. 18.

[9]        Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, pp. 63–65.

[10]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 65; Austal Ships, Submission 7, p. 9.

[11]      Austal, Submission 7, p. 9

[12]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 6.

[13]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, pp. 6–7.

[14]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 1.

[15]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 6.

[16]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, pp. 6–10.

[17]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 8.

[18]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 3.

[19]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 5.

[20]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 7.

[21]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 10.

[22]      Answers to questions on notice, Attachment A, p. 1.

[23]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 41.

[24]      DITR, Submission 38, p. 4.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 71.

[26]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, pp. 54, 60–61.

[27]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 50.

[28]      Tenix, Submission 26, p. 6.

[29]      Mr John Rothwell, Executive Chairman Austal Ships, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 66.

[30]      ACIL Tasman 2004, Skill shortages and the amphibious ships project, Report prepared for the Australian Shipbuilding Advisory Group, in ACIL Tasman, February 2006, Naval Shipbuilding in Australia, A background briefing, Attachment to South Australian government, Submission 9, p. 34.

[31]      ACIL Tasman, February 2006, Naval Shipbuilding in Australia, A background briefing, Attachment to South Australian Government, Submission 9, p. 33.

[32]      ACIL Tasman, February 2006, Naval Shipbuilding in Australia, A background briefing, Attachment to South Australian Government, Submission 9, pp. 35–36.

[33]      Tenix, Submission 26, p. 6.

[34]      Thiess, Submission 22, p. 10.

[35]      Mr Pat Johnston, National Organiser, AMWU, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 52.

[36]      Rear Admiral Trevor Ruting, Committee Hansard, 28 March 2006, p. 24.

[37]      Mr Terence Booth, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 55.

[38]      Thiess, Submission 22, p. 10.

[39]      ACIL Tasman, November 2004, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, p. 93.

[40]      Mr Robert Player, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 53.

[41]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 3.

[42]      Mr Kim Gillis, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 49.

[43]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 23.

[44]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 24.

[45]      Mr Pat Johnston, National Organiser, AMWU, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 52.

[46]      The Hon Andre Haermeyer, Victorian Minister for Manufacturing and Export, Minister for Financial Services and Minister for Small Business, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 16.

[47]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 49.

[48]      Government of South Australia, Submission 9, p. 36.

[49]      Submission 31, p. 25.

[50]      Submission 26, p. 6.

[51]      Rear Admiral Trevor Ruting, Committee Hansard, 28 March 2006, p. 12.

[52]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 16.

[53]      See Challenger TAFE, Western Australia Department of Education and Training, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006.

[54]      Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 51.

[55]      Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 51.

[56]      Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 51.

[57]      Mr John Rothwell, Executive Chairman, Austal Ships, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 64.

[58]      National Industry Skills Initiative, Engineering Working Group, 2001, Engineering Skills Shortages, Appendix 1, p. iv.

[59]      Submission 21, p. 12.

[60]      Mr Pat Johnston, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 48.

[61]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 43.

[62]      Mr Geoff Smith, ADI, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 9.

[63]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 12.

[64]      See for example Austal, Submission 7, [pp] 5–6; Submarine Institute of Australia Inc, Submission 3, pp. 16–17; ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 9; Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 3. See also Chapter 2.

[65]      Mr David Kobelke, Director, Industry Capability Network, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, pp. 21 and 27.

[66]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 25.

[67]      ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 6.

[68]      ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 6.

[69]      Mr Michael Gallagher, CEO, Nautronix Ltd, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, pp. 34 and 37.

[70]      Mr Michael Gallagher, CEO, Nautronix Ltd, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 35.

[71]      ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 6.

[72]      South Australian Government, Submission 9, p. 15.

[73]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 34.

[74]      For example: the intellectual property rights for the Collins class submarines rest with the Swedish  firm Kockums, which was acquired by Howaldtswerke–Deutche Werft in 2002; the ANZAC frigates were designed by the German firm Blohm+Voss GmbH, a division of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems; the contract for the AWD design will be contested between Spanish firm Navantia and the American firm Gibbs & Cox; and the contract for the LHD design will be contested between Navantia and the French firms Armaris and DCN.

[75]      ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 6.

[76]      ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 6.

[77]      The Submarine Institute of Australia, Submission 3, p. 9.

[78]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 5 and Submission 34, pp. 2–5.

[79]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 6.

[80]      Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 12.

[81]      Mr John Jeremy, Member of Council, Australian Division, Royal Institute of Naval Architects, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 55.

[82]      Mr Peter Croser, Managing Director, Gibbs & Cox Australia Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 40.

[83]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 36.

[84]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), pp. 3 and 10.

[85]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 6.

[86]      Raytheon Australia, Submission 35, p. 3.

[87]      Raytheon Australia, Submission 35, pp. 2–3.

[88]      ACIL Tasman, November 2004, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, p. 97.

[89]      ACIL Tasman, November 2004, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, p. 98.

[90]      Submission 34, p. 2.

[91]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 3.

[92]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 3.

[93]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 25.

[94]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 25.

[95]      See for example Australian Industry Group, Submission 8, [p.] 4; Mr Jamie Mackaway, Director, Industry and Community Planning, Department of Education and Training Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 58.

[96]      ACIL Tasman, November 2004, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, p. 35.

[97]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 12.

[98]      Rear Admiral Ruting, Committee Hansard, 28 March 2006, p. 6.

[99]      Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 13.

[100]    Lt Gen. Hurley, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 29.

[101]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 2.

[102]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 1.

[103]    ACIL Tasman, November 2004, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, p. 34.

[104]    Engineers Australia, Submission 24, pp. 1 and 26.

[105]    Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 1.

[106]    Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 1.

[107]    Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 26.

[108]    See for example, Government of Western Australia, Submission 23, p. 21.

[109]    Mr Mike Lawson, General Manager, Aerospace Defence and Australian Industry Participation Branch, DITR, Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 80.

[110]    ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Australia Pty Ltd, Submission 34, p. 2. The Strategic Lift Ship Capability is currently planned for delivery in 2016–2018 and the Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ship (HMAS Success replacement) is planned for delivery in 2015–2017. See Defence Capability Plan 2006–2016, pp. 67–69 and p. 134.

[111]    Government of Western Australia, Submission 23, pp. 21–22.

[112]    Queensland Government, Submission 29, p. 12.

[113]    Department of Defence, Submission 20A, p. 13.

[114]    Returned and Services League of Australia Ltd (RSL), Submission 6, p. 3 and p. 5.

[115]    Mr Gregory Copley, Director and Acting Chief Executive, Future Directions International Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 16.

[116]    Government of South Australia, Submission 9, p. 26.

[117]    Government of South Australia, Submission 9, pp. 5, 26.

[118]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 42.

[119]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 42.

[120]    Skilling Australia's Defence Industry, www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/sadi/index.cfm, (accessed 8 May 2006).

[121]    South Australian Government, Submission 9, p. 16.

[122]    Skilling Australia's Defence Industry, www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/sadi/SOR.cfm, (accessed 8 May 2006).

[123]    Skilling Australia's Defence Industry, www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/sadi/SOR.cfm, (accessed 8 May 2006).

[124]    Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), pp. 42–43.

[125]    See for example Mr John O'Callaghan, Australian Industry Group Defence Council, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 21.

[126]    South Australian Government, Submission 9, pp. 32–33.

[127]    Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 46.

[128]    Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 46.

[129]    Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 46.

[130]    Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 46.

[131]    Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 46.

[132]    Mr Gary Collins, Executive Director, Client Services, Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 23.

[133]    Mr Robert Player, Challenger TAFE, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 47.

[134]    Submission 29, pp 13–19.

[135]    Mr Gary Collins, Executive Director Client Services, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 23.

[136]    Submission 26, p. 7.

[137]    Mr Pat Johnston, National Organiser, AMWU, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 43.

[138]    Mr David Kobelke, Director, Industry Capability Network, Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 29.

[139]    Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 48.

[140]    Parliamentary Library, 2006, Skilled migration to Australia, https://www.aph.gov.au/Library/intguide/SP/Skilled_migration.htm, (accessed 15 June 2006).

[141]    Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, General Skilled Migration, http://www.immi.gov.au/migration/skilled/index.htm, (accessed 15 June 2006).

[142]    Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Do you have an occupation in demand? www.immi.gov.au/migration/skilled/advice_doc/gn_modl.htm, (accessed 19 May 2006).

[143]    Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Do you have an occupation in demand? www.immi.gov.au/migration/skilled/advice_doc/gn_modl.htm, (accessed 19 May 2006).

[144]    Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Sponsoring a temporary overseas employee to Australia, http://www.immi.gov.au/allforms/booklets/1154.pdf (accessed 15 June 2006).

[145]    Senator Vanstone, Answer to Question No 1669, Senate Hansard, 14 June 2006, p. 102. Data refer to primary onshore visa grants.

Chapter 8 - Intellectual property

[1]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), Question W5.

[2]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), Question W7.

[3]        ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 9.

[4]        Professor Paul Dibb, 'A Defence industry development strategy', The business of defence: sustaining capability, CEDA Growth No. 57, August 2006, p. 18.

[5]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question W9.

[6]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question W9.

[7]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question W9. See also chapter 2, paragraphs 2.27–2.30.

[8]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question W9.

[9]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question W9.

[10]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 6.

[11]      See for example Lt Gen. Hurley, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 29.

[12]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question W7.

[13]      Submission 17, p. 6.

[14]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 30.

[15]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question W7.

[16]      ACIL Tasman, November 2004, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, p. 98.

[17]      Dr Richard Brabin-Smith AO, 'Defence Innovation in Australia', The Business of Defence Sustaining Capability, CEDA Growth No 57, August 2006, p. 27.

[18]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), p. 1.

[19]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), pp. [2–6].

[20]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), pp. [7–8].

Chapter 9 - The comparative economic productivity of the Australian shipbuilding industrial base and associated activity with other shipbuilding nations

[1]        First Marine International, Findings for the Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, p. 3.

[2]        First Marine International, Findings for the Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, p. 14.

[3]        Compensated Gross Tonnage is the measure of work content that forms the basis of the productivity estimate. It is the international gross tonnage (a measure of internal volume) of the vessel multiplied by a compensation coefficient which represents the complexity of the vessel design. It allows the productivity of different shipyards to be compared even though they may be ...the man-hours required by a particular shipyard to execute the work content are determined by multiplying the CGT for the vessel by the productivity of the yard in terms of man-hours per CGT. First Marine International, Findings for the Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, p. 13

[4]        First Marine International, Findings for the Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, p. 33.

[5]        First Marine International, Findings for the Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, p. 33.

[6]        Question 1, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006).

[7]        See for example, Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce, Port Adelaide Maritime Corporation, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 21; ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 14. ASC's submission stated: 'it is very difficult to make direct comparisons between the cost efficiency of Australia's naval shipbuilding industry and those in foreign countries. in nearly every case Australia has built significantly different ships to those built elsewhere and, coupled with the fact that comparative pricing data rarely exists, assumptions about life-cycle costing and the relative costs of through-life support differ'.

[8]        Submission 24, p. 22.

[9]        Submission 9, p. 5.

[10]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 80–81.

[11]      For example, the Western Australian government, the AMWU and Tenix refer to distortions in the naval shipbuilding market created by government interventions which make robust international comparisons of the costs of naval shipbuilding in different countries difficult. They believed that it was unsafe to make direct comparisons between the costs of building in Australia with overseas countries who receive government benefits in the form of subsidies and protective legislation to support/protect the local industry.

[12]      Submission 23, p. vi.

[13]      Submission 21, p. 7.

[14]      Submission 26, p. 3.

[15]      Submission 36, p. 7.

[16]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, pp. 67–68.

[17]      Submission 6, p. 4.

[18]      Question 1, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006).

[19]      Mr Lawson, DITR, Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 71.

[20]      Submission 7, p. [4].

[21]      DITR noted that Austal and Incat 'have designed and exported naval ships based on indigenous commercial designs. They have been able to capture economies of scale based on having unique capabilities and intellectual property in the aluminium fast ferry businesses, which they have been able to carry over into naval vessels'. DITR, Submission 38, p. 2.

[22]      Submission 36, p. 7.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 3.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 2.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 28 April 2006, p. 2.

[26]      Submission 9, p. 26. See also Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, which stated it belief that a viable naval shipbuilding industry is possible in Australia based on past performance and potential future Defence demand. Submission 18, p. 1. See also Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 21.

[27]      Submission 6, p. 3.

[28]      Submission 1, p. 4.

[29]      Submission 22, p. 12.

[30]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 7.

[31]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 3.

[32]      AMWU, Submission 21, p. 3.

[33]      Submission 21, p. 3.

[34]      Denise Ironfield, Tasman Asia Pacific, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, Final Report, Prepared for Australian Industry Group Defence Council, February 2000 and Tasman Economics, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the Minehunter coastal project, Final Report, January 2002.

[35]      Submission 8, p. [2].

[36]      Submission 8, p. [2].

[37]      Submission 36, p. 7.

[38]      Submission 3, p. 14.

[39]      Submission 3, p. 13.

[40]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 19 May 2006), p. 34.

[41]      See for example, David John Truelove, Submission 12, p. [5]; ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 15.

[42]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 5. Professor Keith Hartley maintained that 'small-scale production means a sacrifice of learning economies. A labour learning curve shows how the man hours to build each ship decrease as more ships of that type are built. For a group of 25 UK and US naval ships programmes, the average learning curve was 87%. This suggests that if an output of a class is increased from 6 to 12 ships, man hours per ship will fall by some 13%'. Keith Hartley, 'Naval Shipbuilding in the UK and Europe: A Case for Industrial Consolidation'. See also John Craggs, Damien Bloor et al, Naval CGT coefficients and shipyard learning, Ministry of Defence (UK), 2003.

[43]      Submission 17, p. 15.

[44]      Submission 17, p. 15.

[45]      Submission 31, p. 5. The South Australian government contended that the available data suggests that Australian productivity would be on par with Europe and North America but would be unlikely to match the economy of scale that can be achieved by Japan, Korea or China. It argued that Australia would need to consolidate shipbuilding skills and infrastructure if it were to derive economy of scale of benefits. Submission 9, p. 5.

[46]      DITR, Submission 38, p. 1.

[47]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), question no. 20.

[48]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 39.

[49]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), question on notice, p. 15.

[50]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 45.

[51]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 45. The Submarine Institute of Australia Inc stated that:' the case of the Anzac ship program prices for overseas construction were not sought from potential shipbuilders. However, based on submarine cost data, it is estimated that the premium for construction of all Anzac ships in Australia was probably slightly less than for the submarines because of their lower complexity and lesser sensor/weapon fit'. Submission 3, p. 13.

[52]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 46.

[53]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, pp. iii and 46.

[54]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. iii.

[55]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 40.

[56]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 40.

[57]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 40.

[58]      Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, pp. XIV and 88.

[59]      Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, p. 88.

[60]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 31.

[61]      Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine, 2000, chapter 2.

[62]      RAN, Australian Maritime Doctrine, 2000, chapter 7.

[63]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 4. See also Mr Peter Hatcher, CEO ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Australia Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 8.

[64]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 8.

[65]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 16.

[66]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 17.

[67]      Submission, p. 2.

[68]      ACIL Tasman, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry, Helping align defence industry, defence industry policy, and defence strategic planning, November 2004, p. 31.

[69]      Department of Defence, Answer to question on notice from 28 March 2006, Overview.

[70]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 12.

[71]      Submission 25, p. 7.

[72]      Submission 19, p. 3.

[73]      Submission 19, p. 2.

[74]      Submission 19, pp. 2–3.

[75]      Submission 19, p. 2.

[76]      Submission 2, p. 2.

[77]      Submission 3, p. 18.

[78]      Submission 4, The Navy, vol. 67, no. 4, p. 18.

[79]      Submission 9, p. 8.

[80]      Roscoe Bartlett, Projection Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 5 April 2006.

[81]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. i.

[82]      AMWU, Submission 21, p. 13.

[83]      ACIL Tasman, Naval Shipbuilding in Australia, A background briefing, February 2006, Attachment to South Australian government Submission 9, p. 47.

[84]      Output measures relate to commercial shipbuilding while input measures cover all shipbuilding. DITR, Submission 38, pp. 10–11.

Chapter 10 - The comparative economic costs of maintaining, repairing and refitting large Naval vessels throughout their useful lives when constructed in Australia vice overseas

[1]        See for example, Nautronix, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 36; the Western Australian government, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 85; Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 28 (para 5.6) and Graham Harris, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 24; Susan Smith, Executive Officer, Australian Industry and Defence Network Inc, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 29; ADI, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 7.

[2]        ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: a background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 49.

[3]        ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 49.

[4]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), question 1.

[5]        Department of Defence, question 1, answer to written question on notice following hearing on 28 March 2006.

[6]        ASC Submission 17, p. 14. See also Government of South Australia, Submission 9, paragraph 6.8.1, p. 27.

[7]        ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 50

[8]        ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 51.

[9]        See for example, Graham Harris, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 24; Susan Smith, Executive Officer, Australian Industry and Defence Network Inc, Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 29; ADI, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 7; Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE), Submission 19, p. 3; DISplay, Submission 40, pp. 4 and 5.

[10]      Submission 1, p. 5.

[11]      Submission 3, p. 13.

[12]      Submission 25, p. 7.

[13]      Submission 25, p. 7 and Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, pp. 2–3.

[14]      Submission 17, p. 19.

[15]      Submission 22, p. 3.

[16]      Submission 2, pp. 2–3.

[17]      Submission 31, p. 5.

[18]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 85.

[19]      Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, pp. 38–39.

[20]      Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, pp. 49–50. The figure is reached by deducting 7.12 per cent from the principal ($45 million in year one) for each of the 25 years.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 89.

[22]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 90.

[23]      Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Submission 38, p. 15. See also ASC, Submission 17, p. 19.

[24]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006) p. 9.

[25]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 99.

[26]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 99.

[27]      Question 1, p. 3.

[28]      Submission 17, p. 19.

[29]      Australian Manufacturing Workers Union, Submission 21, p. 8.

[30]      ASC, Submission 17, p. 19.

[31]      ASC, Submission 17, p. 19; DITR, Submission 38, p. 15; Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 23.

[32]      Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 24.

[33]      South Australian government, Submission 9, p. 21; Gibbs & Cox Australia, Submission 10, pp. 5–6.

[34]      Mr Greg Tunny, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 9. The contract is worth $125 million annually for 25 years.

[35]      See for example, Australian Industry Defence Network Inc, Submission 2, p. 2.

[36]      See also ASC Pty Ltd, Submission 17, p. 19.

[37]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 2.

Chapter 11 - Economic benefits

[1]        Submission 31, p. 5.

[2]        Submission 31, p. 6.

[3]        Submission 30, p. 3.

[4]        Submission 31, pp. 5–6.

[5]        Tasman Economics and Tasman Asia Pacific are the forerunners to ACIL Tasman.

[6]        Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, pp. 43–49; Tasman Economics, January 2002, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the Minehunter Coastal Project, pp. 53–76.

[7]        ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 55.

[8]        Tasman Economics, January 2002, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the Minehunter Coastal Project, pp. vii and 75.

[9]        Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, p. 44. The input-output multiplier analysis tends to overstate the flow-on effect of projects on the wider economy because it does not factor in the economic effects between industries and it cannot take into account of the impact of a change in demand when there is no excess capacity. In other words, the input-output multiplier analysis does not take into account the constraints that can apply in an economy.

[10]      Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, p. iv.

[11]      Tasman Economics, January 2002, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the Minehunter Coastal Project, p. 75; Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, p. 46.

[12]      Submission 13, pp. 1–2.

[13]      The study was commissioned by the South Australian government as background information for its submission to this inquiry.

[14]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, pp. 67–68.

[15]      DITR, Submission 38, p. 17.

[16]      DITR noted that in the study of the ANZAC project, productivity gains reported in a survey of businesses involved with the project were unrealistic, so a more moderate assumed productivity growth figure of three per cent was used in the model. For the Minehunter study, the productivity growth figure used reflected business survey results, that is, 2.24 per cent improvement in 35 per cent of project sub contractors' 'non–Defence' work.

[17]      DITR, Submission 38, p. 19.

[18]      Treasury advice quoted by Defence, answers to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), question 17, p. 44.

[19]      Treasury advice quoted by Defence, answers to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006) question 17, p. 44.

[20]      Submission 20, p. 28.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, pp. 92–94 and 97.

[22]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 27.

[23]      Submission 23, pp. 28–29.

[24]      Submission 31, p. 6.

[25]      Submission 26, p. 7.

[26]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, pp. 2 and 20.

[27]      Submission 6, p. 5.

[28]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 3.

[29]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 60.

[30]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 61.

[31]      Tasman Economics, January 2002, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the Minehunter Coastal Project, p. vii.

[32]      Tasman Asia Pacific, February 2000, Impact of Major Defence Projects: A case study of the ANZAC Ship Project, pp. vii and x.

[33]      Submission 6, p. 5.

[34]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 42.

[35]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 38.

[36]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 38.

[37]      Submission 6, p. 6. Speech at the Australian National University titled ‘Whole of Nation Concepts—Industry Perspectives’ by Hector Donohue AM, General Manager, Strategic and Business Development, Tenix Defence Systems, October 2003.

[38]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 62.

[39]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, p. 64.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 34.

[41]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 3.

[42]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 35.

[43]      ACIL Tasman, Naval shipbuilding in Australia: A background briefing, 9 February 2006, pp. 66–68.

[44]      Submission 3, p. 15.

[45]      Submission 3, p. 8.

[46]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, pp. 26–27.

[47]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 39.

[48]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 41.

[49]      Submission 6, p. 3.

[50]      Submission 6, p. 3.

[51]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 49.

[52]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 20.

[53]      Submission 21, pp. 13–14.

[54]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 20.

[55]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006) question 52, p. 48.

[56]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006) question 27, pp. 17–18.

Chapter 12 - The strategic imperative

[1]        Australian Government, Department of Defence, Australia's National Security, A Defence Update 2005, p. 19. The Government's Defence Update 2005, recognised that its defence capability is 'the most potent of the range of instruments Australia employs to promote and support its security interests'

[2]        Department of Defence, Overview, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006) p. 1.

[3]        See for example, Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, pp. 15–26; Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 15. See also Department of the Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine, 2000, chapter 2.

[4]        See for example consideration of the region's security concerns in Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, China's emergence: implications for Australia, March 2006, pp. 127–172, 194 and chapter 11. Although this report is focused on China, it provides an overview of security concerns in the East Asian region.

[5]        Commonwealth of Australia, Advancing the National Interest, Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, 2003, p. ix.

[6]        See for example consideration of the region's security concerns in Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, China's emergence: implications for Australia, March 2006, pp. 171–3, 177. Australian Government, Department of Defence, 'Operation Astue, 25 May 2006, http://www.defence.gov.au/opastute/default.htm (accessed 26 May 2006).

[7]        Government of South Australia, Submission 9, p. 10; Gregory Tunny, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 18; Rear Admiral (Retired) Kevin Scarce, Port Adelaide Maritime Authority, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 21; Government of Western Australia, Submission 23, pp. 9–10; Gregory R. Copley, Future Directions International, Submission 28, pp. 3–5.

[8]        Government of South Australia, Submission 9, p. 10; Gregory Tunny, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 18; Rear Admiral (Retired) Kevin Scarce, Port Adelaide Maritime Authority, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 21; Government of Western Australia, Submission 23, pp. 9–10; Gregory R. Copley, Future Directions International, Submission 28, pp. 3–5.

[9]        See also Aerospace, Industrial and Marine Technology (AIMTEL) Pty Ltd, Submission 15, p. 2. AIMTEL recommended that Australia continue to procure Australian made ships for the benefit of its future skills base and that any economic matters be treated under the banner of training to maintain our independence. See also the Australian Association for Maritime Affairs Incorporated, Submission 13, p. 4.

[10]      Submission 9, pp. 4 and 11. The submission listed the factors that make giving an effective marine capability a priority: notably, one of the longest coastlines in the world, territorial seas and exclusive economic zone amounting to an area greater than the continent itself. See also Mr Gregory Copley, Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 2.

[11]      Government of South Australia, Submission 9, p. 10.

[12]      Submission 9, p. 10.

[13]      Submission 21, p. 2.

[14]      Submission 3, p. 2. The RSL noted important factors determining Australia's defence planning. They included:

[15]      Submission 6, p. 2.

[16]      Submission 6, p. 2.

[17]      Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, p. 25.

[18]      Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, p. 25.

[19]      Submission 31, p. 44.

[20]      Department of Defence, Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p. 99.

[21]      Department of Defence, Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, pp. 100–101.

[22]      Submission 21, p. 2. Defence Materiel Organisation, Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector, Canberra, 2002, p. 43; Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p. xi.

[23]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, September 2002, p. 17.

[24]      Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, Opening Address, Pacific 2004 International Maritime Exposition and Congress, Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre, 3 February 2004.

[25]      Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, Opening Address, Pacific 2004 International Maritime Exposition and Congress, Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre, 3 February 2004.

[26]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 19.

[27]      Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 2005, p. 15.

[28]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 38.

[29]      Submission 6, p. 6.

[30]      Submission 3, p. 14.

[31]      Committee Hansard, 3 April 2006, p. 35.

[32]      Submission 20, paragraphs 1.6–1.7, p. 2. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Setting a Course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, An ASPI Policy Report prepared by Mark Thomson and Simon Harrington, August 2002, p. 11.

[33]      Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Setting a Course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, An ASPI Policy Report prepared by Mark Thomson and Simon Harrington, August 2002, p. 10.

[34]      Submission 20, paragraph 1.1, p. 1.

[35]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, September 2002, p. 12.

[36]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, September 2002, p. 7.

[37]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, September 2002, p. xi.

[38]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, September 2002, p. 12.

[39]      Submission 20, paragraphs 1.6 and 1.7, p. 2.

[40]      Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Setting a Course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry, an ASPI Policy Report, Prepared by Mark Thomson and Simon Harrington, August 2002, p. 11.

[41]      See for example, Rear Admiral (Retired) Kevin Scarce, Port Adelaide Maritime Authority, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 21; Gibbs & Cox Inc, Submission 10, p. 5; Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 23.

[42]      See DISplay Pty Ltd, Submission 40, p. 4.

[43]      Submission 9, p. 12.

[44]      Submission 9, p. 34.

[45]      Submission 23, p. 8.

[46]      Submission 3, p. 9,

[47]      Submission 20, paragraph 4.7, p. 25.

[48]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 1.

[49]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 31.

[50]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, September 2002, p. xvi.

[51]      The Allen Consulting Group, Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia: Choices and Strategies, May 2005, p. 45.

[52]      The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, September 2002, p. xvi; Display Pty Ltd, Submission 40, p. 10.

[53]      Submission 23, p. 5.

[54]      Submission 23, p. iv.

[55]      Submission 23, p. 9.

[56]      Submission 21, p. 8.

[57]      Submission 3, p. 9.

[58]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 18.

[59]      Submission 38, p. 6.

[60]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 34.

[61]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 34.

[62]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 38.

[63]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 3.

[64]      Department of Defence, answer to question notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), pp. 1 and 3.

Chapter 14 - The role of defence in Australia's Naval shipbuilding and repair industry-informing industry

[1]        Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 31.

[2]        Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 30.

[3]        Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 31.

[4]        See for example the discussion about the reported $6b final cost estimate for the AWDs. The committee notes that the 2006–2016 Defence Capability Plan stated that 'Estimated Phase Expenditure' for the AWDs (Project SEA4000) was between $4.5 billion and $6 billion. In evidence given to the committee, Mr Greg Tunny, Managing Director of ASC Pty Ltd, hesitated in confirming the $6 billion price tag for the AWD project. Defence acknowledged that the 2001–2002 estimated expenditure of $3500m to $4500m was updated in the 2004–2014 DCP to $4500m to $6000m. It explained that the revision in cost estimates 'allowed for the cost of additional capabilities, contingency and price movement'. It was also aware that some commentators were suggesting that the cost of the AWDs may be as high as $8 billion. It concluded that two design options were under consideration that would vary in capability, cost, schedule and risk. The final cost of the AWDs would be dependent upon these decisions. Questions 20, 21, 23, answers to written questions on notice from 18 October 2006.

[5]        Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 21.

[6]        Mr John O'Callaghan, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 19.

[7]        Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, pp. 32–33.

[8]        Engineers Australia, Submission 24, p. 11.

[9]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006, (received 29 October 2006), Question 3.

[10]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), Question 3.

[11]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006, (received 31 October 2006), Question 3.

[12]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006, (received 31 October 2006), Question 3.

[13]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006, (received 31 October 2006), Question 4.

[14]      Department of Defence, Industry Operations Branch, Industry Division, Australian Industry Involvement Manual, p. 1–1. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/aii/manual_inclannexes_5Feb00_contactsremoved.pdf

[15]      Department of Defence, Industry Operations Branch, Industry Division, Australian Industry Involvement Manual, p. 2–1. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/aii/manual_inclannexes_5Feb00_contactsremoved.pdf

[16]      Defence Industry Policy Review Discussion Paper, June 2006, p. 17.

[17]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), Question 15.

[18]      There is no uniform level of Australian industry involvement specified for each project. That is, fixed percentages specifying targeted values of Australian industry participation are no longer part of the tender process.

[19]      These industry capability outcomes may cover specific requirements, such as the ability to modify command and control system software, or they may be more general, such as the ability to undertake deeper maintenance of systems in Australia.

[20]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), Question 16.

[21]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 48.

[22]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 7.

[23]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), pp. 47–48.

[24]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), p. 7.

[25]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), pp. 47–48.

[26]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), pp. 47–48.

[27]      Submission 24, p. 2.

[28]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), Question 12.

Chapter 15 - Strategic planning

[1]        Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 23.

[2]        Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, pp. 23–24.

[3]        Notion taken from comments made in ASC, Submission 17, p. 10.

[4]        See chapter 5.

[5]        Raytheon Australia, Submission 35, pp. 9–10.

[6]        See paragraphs 5.56–66.

[7]        Government of South Australia, Submission 9, p. 35.

[8]        Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 16.

[9]        See chapter 6.

[10]      Submission 9, p. 34.

[11]      Submission 9A, p. 1.

[12]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 22.

[13]      Government of Western Australia, 'WA Defence shipbuilding strategy'.

[14]      Submission 9A, p. 2.

[15]      Major General Peter Haddad, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 21.

[16]      In February 2006, the Western Australian government launched the Defence Industry Skills Taskforce (see paragraph 7.109). The Taskforce's membership includes representatives from the State Departments of Industry and Resources and Education and Training, Challenger TAFE, the defence industry and DMO. See the Hon. Alan Carpenter and the Hon. Ljiljanna Ravlich, 'New Defence Industry Skills Task Force announced', Media Statement, 3 February 2006. The Defence Skills Institute was recently established as a joint initiative of the South Australian government and the defence industry designed to help the state win more defence contracts. The Institute will work cooperatively with governments, industry and leading educational and training organisations to 'take a lead role in identifying and aggregating defence industry education requirements'. See Government of South Australia, 'Defence Skills Institute', http://www.defence-sa.com/pdfs/DSIbrochure.pdf (accessed 23 November 2006).

[17]      See paragraphs 2.84–2.91.

[18]      Mark Thomson, 'Setting a Course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry', a presentation to the Maritime Building, Repair and Maintenance Conference, 26–27 March 2003. Mr Thomson is the Program Director Budget and Management, Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

[19]      Mr Geoff Evans, OBE VRD, 'Shipbuilding a problem for Small Navies', Submission 4, p. 18.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 8.

[21]      Submission 19, p. 2.

[22]      Submission 19, pp. 2–3.

[23]      Submission 19, p. 3.

[24]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 63.

[25]      Submission 9, p. 26.

[26]      Submission 21, p. 2.

[27]      Submission 13, p. 3.

[28]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), question 31, p. 36.

[29]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), p. 36.

[30]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), p. 37.

[31]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), question 4, p. 31.

[32]      ACIL Tasman, A Profile of the Australian Defence Industry: Helping align defence industry, defence industry policy, and Defence strategic planning, commissioned by The Australian Industry Group Defence Council, The Australian Industry Defence Network, the Department of Defence, et al., November 2004, p. xviii.

[33]      First Marine International, Findings for the Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study, Part 1: Major shipyards, August 2005, paragraph 4.10, p. 27.

[34]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, pp. 6–7 and paragraph 1.23.

[35]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), question on notice no. 47.

[36]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), question on notice no. 48.

[37]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), pp. 8–9.

[38]      See also DISplay Pty Ltd, Submission 40, covering letter.

[39]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 22.

[40]      Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 23.

[41]      Submission 24, p. 1.

[42]      Submission 24, p. 1.

[43]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 14.

[44]      Committee Hansard, 27 April 2006, p. 14.

[45]      Paul Dibb, 'A Defence Industry Development Strategy', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA, August 2006, p. 19.

[46]      Chris Barrie, 'Defence Industry Policy', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA, August 2006, p. 11.

[47]      Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p. 98.

[48]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 11.

[49]      Committee Hansard, 4 September 2006, p. 22.

[50]      While the DCP aims to 'provide industry with sufficient guidance to enable broad business planning', submitters pointed to inadequacies in the DCP for planning purposes. For example, Engineers Australia considered that the Defence Capability Plan should attempt to look further ahead than a ten year period. See also Saab Systems Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 12. The committee also notes that DMO produced a naval shipbuilding and repair sector strategic plan in August 2002 but it was not adopted by government.

[51]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006), question 37, p. 5.

[52]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (29 May 2006) question on notice no. 37.

[53]      Richard Brabin-Smith, 'Defence innovation in Australia', The Business of Defence: Sustaining Capability, CEDA, August 2006, p. 31.

[54]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 2.

[55]      Committee Hansard, 20 April 2006, p. 12.

[56]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 27.

[57]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 27.

Chapter 16 - Defence-an informed buyer

[1]        Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 10.

[2]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), questions 58 and 59, pp. 25–27.

[3]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), question on notice no. 60.

[4]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), questions 40 and 60, pp. 25 and 27.

[5]        Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006), question 8, p. 23.

[6]        Submission 1, pp. 7–8.

[7]        Committee Hansard, 19 April 2006, p. 37.

[8]        Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 10.

[9]        Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 27.

[10]      Department of Defence, Submission 20, p. 4.

[11]      ACIL Tasman, A profile of the Australian Defence Industry, Helping align defence industry, defence industry policy, and defence strategic planning, November 2004, p. xxv.

[12]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question 2.

[13]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 18 August 2006 (received 31 October 2006), question 1.

[14]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, pp. 50–51.

[15]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006) question 9, p. 4.

[16]      Department of Defence, answer to question on notice, 28 March 2006 (received 29 May 2006) question 9, p. 4.

[17]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 16.

[18]      Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 27.

[19]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 8.

[20]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 34.

[21]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 9.

[22]      Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 10.

[23]      Committee Hansard, 18 August 2006, p. 10.

Appendix 6 - Extract containing a summary of main issues and points for discussion from a discussion paper published by the committee on 25 August 2006

[1]        Committee Hansard, 3 July 2006, p. 70.

[2]        Allen Consulting Group, 'Future of Naval Shipbuilding in Australia', May 2005, p. 46.

[3]        Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, p. 2.

[4]        See also ASC submission P17, p. 19.

[5]        Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, p. 2.

[6]        Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, question 52, p. 48.

[7]        DITR, Submission 38, p. 1.

[8]        DMO's 2002 strategic plan defined a strategically important industry capability and/or skill-set as one, which, 'if not readily available, would inhibit the performance and execution of ADF capability and operations, and, if denied, may not be able to be obtained within the required operational time-frame'. This definition is given in the main text of this paper.

[9]        Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, p. 7.

[10]      Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, pp. 47–48.

[11]      Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, p. 7.

[12]      Department of Defence, answers to questions on notice, pp. 21–22.

[13]      John O'Callaghan, Australian Industry Group Defence Council, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2006, p. 23.

Appendix 7 - Naval ships built at Cockatoo Island, Balmain and Williamstown dockyards; repair and upgrade activities at Garden Island (1912–1945)

[1]        Australian Marine Engineering Consolidated Limited.