Chapter 12 - The strategic imperative
12.1
The last three chapters concentrated mainly on the costs and savings
involved in building and maintaining a naval ship through its life in Australia
compared with overseas. Naval shipbuilding, however, is not exclusively an
economic activity—it is a Defence activity with national security its foremost
concern.
12.2
This chapter focuses on the strategic needs of Australia and how they
shape Australia's policy toward its indigenous shipbuilding industry. It looks
at the uniqueness of Australia's security requirements especially those
stemming from its geographical isolation and the environment in which
Australian ships operate. Against this background, the chapter considers the
importance attached to having an indigenous shipbuilding industry and a
domestic capability to support Australia's naval ships through their working
lives.
Defence capability and the national interest
12.3
Nations feel strongly about having control over the capability and
technology necessary to have operational independence in areas vital to their country's
defence. A country's desire to have an appropriate degree of self-sufficiency when
it comes to protecting its borders, people and broader national interests shapes
its defence procurement policy.
12.4
Australia is no exception. It has adopted a policy that gives great weight
to local industry as an important element of its defence capability.[1]
Defence advised the committee that its strategic aims for industry are centred
on 'having a sustainable and competitive Australian defence industry base to
support a technologically-advanced ADF'.[2]
12.5
The following section focuses on the naval component of Australia's
defence capability. It considers Australia's unique security needs and how they
interact with other considerations such as costs and affordability. The committee's
principal concern is to determine the extent to which Australia should be
self-reliant on the design, construction, maintenance, repair and upgrading of
its naval fleet.
Australia's unique strategic requirements
12.6
Over recent decades substantial changes have taken place in the
international security environment deriving mainly from globalisation, the
activities of terrorist groups, rapid advances in technology and the growing
worldwide demand for energy resources.[3]
In considering its national security, Australia must take account not only of
these worldwide trends but also its traditional security concerns that emanate
from a region characterised by political, ethnic, cultural and religious
diversity. There are latent and active tensions in the region that threaten to
undermine the complex and changing web of relations.[4]
As noted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 'the Asia-Pacific area
is still home to eight of the world's ten largest armies and, after the Middle
East, the world's three most volatile flashpoints—the Taiwan Straits, the
Korean Peninsular and Kashmir'.[5]
More immediately, pockets of political instability among some of Australia's
closest neighbours, such as the Solomon Islands and East Timor, create
significant security concerns.[6]
12.7
Many submitters suggested that the size and nature of the Australian
continent calls for 'a military strategy fundamentally oriented to the maritime
environment'.[7]
They argued that as an island nation with vulnerable northern approaches, Australia
should attach great importance both to its capability to defend its land mass
and people and also to securing its maritime approaches.[8]
12.8
The South Australian and Western Australian governments were among the many
submitters who underlined the importance of Australia having a maritime
capability.[9]
The South Australian government stated:
The physical environment of Australia as an island nation
dictates the criticality of having an independent and effective maritime capability
to contribute to our national defence and security requirements into the
foreseeable future. To deliver this maritime capability, shipbuilding, repair
and maintenance must be recognized as a national strategic industry.[10]
12.9
Its submission suggested that 'any military threat to Australia would
have to be made through or over our maritime approaches'. It observed that 'a
key strategic priority for successive governments has been the capacity to
deploy independent naval strength into the ocean and archipelago areas adjacent
to the continent.[11]
The state government also noted that deploying Australian forces would require 'heavy
lift ships and their effective protection to traverse our nearby archipelagos
and oceans to their area of operations'.[12]
12.10
The Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) similarly contended
that the defence of Australia depends on 'control of the long maritime
approaches to the continent, or at the very least denial to a potential enemy
control of these approaches'.[13]
The Submarine Institute of Australia Inc and the Returned & Services League
of Australia (RSL) also highlighted the uniqueness of Australia's maritime
security needs, including the increasingly critical strategic issues in the
context of energy and trade, which, they argued, demanded unique solutions.[14]
12.11
The RSL's view of Australia's key maritime interests was that it:
would be irresponsible of Australia not to provide itself with
the wherewithal to maximise its maritime security advantages, including an
ability to play its part in maintaining the security of sea-borne trade.
12.12
Of equal importance to the RSL was for Australia to remain capable of
the sea-borne deployment of its armed forces and of protecting these forces en route
to their destinations.[15]
This need to maintain a naval capability is in the context of rapid changes in
technology. As the RSL noted:
All these considerations demonstrate the ongoing need for a
state-of-the-art and broadly capable maritime combatant force capable of
sustained operations throughout the sea-air gap surrounding the continent and
of deploying to areas of conflict in other parts of the world. This will
require Australia to acquire, maintain and operate modern surface combatants,
submarines, amphibious and troop carrying warships, mine warfare and clearance
diving forces, maritime air forces and maritime logistic support forces.[16]
12.13
The 2000 Defence White Paper also noted the growing sophistication of
naval vessels and improved technology in the region. It cited in particular anti-ship
missiles with longer range, better guidance and more capable systems which
allow several missiles to be launched at a target simultaneously from different
directions. It maintained that the number of types of platform that can launch
these missiles has also increased to include not just ships, but submarines and
several types of aircraft. It expects these trends to continue over the current
decade. For example, it anticipates that the supersonic anti-ship missiles will
enter service in several countries in the region within the next ten years and
the capability to target ships at long range will improve.[17]
Defence contended that:
Over the coming decade it is likely that the capabilities of
submarines being operated by regional navies will improve significantly, and a
number of navies will acquire sub-marines for the first time. Anti-submarine
warfare capabilities will also improve.[18]
12.14
The Victorian government similarly drew the committee's attention to the
growing naval defence capability in the region. It stated:
A review of the acquisition policies and practices of the
largest Asian-Pacific militaries reveals that buyers are seeking more
sophisticated capabilities, particularly long-range precision strike, command
and control and intelligence systems. ...
In particular, China, India, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore
and Thailand have launched ambitious naval acquisition programs intended to
provide their respective militaries with greatly increased regional power
projection capabilities. These efforts will dramatically increase the region's
number of advanced diesel-electric submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious
assault ships and destroyers and frigates with long-range air and missile
defence systems.[19]
12.15
Clearly, there are compelling reasons for Australia to have a navy
capable not only of defending its shores but ensuring the safety of the
surrounding seas. As a large island nation in a region where there is
significant expansion of naval capability, the protection of Australia's
security interests relies heavily on an effective and modern naval force. The general
acceptance that Australia needs such a force opens up debate about the
relationship between self-sufficiency and capability. The section below
considers the importance of an indigenous shipbuilding industry to Australia's defence
capability.
The relationship between defence capability and an indigenous naval
shipbuilding industry
12.16
Defence's 2000 White Paper stated that with Australia's national defence
expenditure accounting for only one per cent of world military expenditure it
would be unrealistic to aspire to complete industrial self-sufficiency.[20]
It noted:
The Government will also seek to make greater use of
off-the-shelf purchases, especially where the additional capability from
Australian specific modifications does not justify the increased cost and risk.
However, total reliance on off-the-shelf purchases is neither achievable nor
desirable. It would risk our forces having inferior technology in key areas
such as combat systems, and place the ADF at a serious disadvantage if local
industry were unable to repair or modify critical equipment in wartime.[21]
12.17
The Defence 2000 White Paper and DMO's 2002 Strategic Plan noted that
the policy of self-reliance had underpinned the Australian Government's
preference for the local construction of major surface ships and submarines
since the 1980s. It stated further:
Our Future Defence Force reinforces the self-reliance policy of
previous White Papers. It states that the ADF needs to be able to defend Australia
without relying on the combat forces of other countries. To achieve this policy
outcome, the Government's stated objective is to have a sustainable and
competitive defence industry base, with efficient, innovative and durable
industries, able to support a technologically advanced ADF.[22]
12.18
This policy stance, as noted in Defence's 2000 White Paper, allows for
the purchase of overseas ships. The 2002 Strategic Plan also explained the
limits on self-sufficiency:
The concept of self-reliance does not imply complete self-sufficiency
in the supply of goods and services. Self-sufficiency is neither affordable nor
practicable due to factors such as Australia’s remoteness, economies of scale,
and the need to access global technologies and supply chains as required. In
conjunction with developing local support capabilities, there must be the
capacity to ensure that support can be drawn from overseas must be retained
whenever necessary. Therefore, careful investment judgements are required in
order to achieve an optimum combination of combat strength and supportability.[23]
12.19
In 2004, Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, restated the
government's preference for self-sufficiency in its procurement policy but
conceded there were practical constraints.[24]
Even so, he stressed that Australia:
must be able to support and maintain our equipment and the
investment in Australia in systems integration, weapons integration, electronic
warfare protection, new generation radar, advanced communications and other
critical areas remain very important.[25]
12.20
The Allen Consulting Group maintained that there has never been the view
that Australia should build all the missiles and military systems that it
requires. It went on to state, however, that while these types of assets and
other hardware can be stockpiled to meet defence needs in any emergency, 'in
other areas there is a need for significant in-country industrial capacity to
maintain defence assets in a state of operational readiness'.[26]
12.21
Chapter 2 discussed the difficulties facing maritime nations wishing to
retain a degree of control over their domestic naval shipbuilding industry for
national security reasons. Many countries provide direct and/or indirect
subsidies to keep their industry viable but even then they do not have the
wherewithal to retain absolute sovereignty over their naval capability. Indeed,
the Allen Consulting Group noted that not even the U.S. can produce everything
it needs purely from its own resources (see chapter 2).
12.22
The UK Ministry of Defence took the view that maintaining control of
domestic defence capability, including the ability to respond to urgent
operational requirements, 'does not necessarily mean "procurement
independence" or total reliance on national supply of all elements'. It
noted further that the degree of control will differ across technologies and
projects:
In many, even high priority areas, we can, and do, rely on
overseas sources, and have made progress in recent years in developing increased
assurances of security of supply, but there are critical areas where not maintaining
assured access to onshore industrial capabilities would compromise this
operational independence and hence our national security.[27]
12.23
Thus, Australia is not alone in endeavouring to reconcile the desire for
self-sufficiency in naval defence capability as a national security priority
with the practical limitations imposed by cost and technology. Indeed, the
tension that exists between the desire to maintain self-sufficiency in naval
shipbuilding for national security reasons and the practical considerations of
affordability was pronounced in evidence before the committee.
12.24
A number of submitters were certain that an indigenous naval
shipbuilding capability should be a critical component of Australia's defence
capability. For example, when the committee asked witnesses why Australia could
not simply purchase the ships it needs off-the-shelf from countries producing
such vessels, the response drew heavily on the strategic argument that Australia
needs to retain some degree of self-sufficiency so that it is not left
vulnerable. Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce stated:
I would say that with warships, whilst not as critical perhaps
as with a submarine, it is just as vital for us in the longer term to
understand what we are buying, to warrant the safety of the ship and to be able
to amend it, to update it and to upgrade the systems. It is not about building
steel, it is about managing the design and build program and ensuring the
quality of what you produce to meet the end customer’s requirement. I do not believe
you can do that by just importing the ship. I do not think it is just the
skills transfer, and the Collins program shows us quite clearly what happens
when you do not make provision for that knowledge transfer.[28]
12.25
The RSL cited the views of Major General Peter Abigail, who stated that there
is a strategic imperative for Australia to have a naval shipbuilding industry.[29]
The Submarine Institute of Australia Inc noted that 'naval shipbuilding
(including large, medium and small surface ships and submarines) is at the high
value/high (smart) end of the technology spectrum and is regarded as a
strategic asset important to Australian security and increased self-reliance'.[30]
Mr Michael Gallagher of Nautronix Ltd, argued that:
The government’s stated policy for strategic self-reliance will
be potentially eroded if we start to move key activities such as shipbuilding
offshore. We need that security. We need to have the flexibility. We need to be
able to respond and react in good time to changing scenarios, particularly
given our geographic disposition and the large maritime area that we are
responsible for.[31]
12.26
In its submission, Defence noted and broadly agreed with the findings of
the 2002 ASPI report that asserted 'There is in fact no strong strategic reason
to build the Navy’s warships here in Australia'.[32]
The ASPI report argued that:
Australia cannot and should not aim for self-sufficiency in
supporting our naval capability. There is simply no way we could design, build,
and equip our own ships without relying on imported systems and technology. The
benefits of self-sufficiency would be low, and the costs very high.
Strategically it would result in a major reduction in overall capability. So we
will import all or most of the design work needed for our major warships, and
all or most of the sophisticated weapons and systems that make up a large
proportion of the value of our ships.[33]
12.27
Clearly it is beyond the means of any country to retain absolute control
over all aspects of its defence capability. Delineating the point at which a
country relinquishes its control over the design or construction of a major defence
acquisition depends on the weight it gives to security, economic and other national
interest considerations.
The relationship between defence capability and an indigenous naval ship
maintenance and repair industry
12.28
Although Defence acknowledged that industrial capability had 'always
been a critical partner for the Australian Navy, essential to the delivery and
sustainment of warships throughout their life', it was prepared to accept that
Australia did not need the capability to construct its naval vessels.[34]
The strategic argument applying to the maintenance and repair of naval ships is
different. Indeed, a number of key studies have underlined the importance of being
able to repair, maintain and upgrade vessels in-country. Although the 2002 Strategic
Plan did not suggest that a shipbuilding industry was essential it found that 'Without
an effective long-term repair & maintenance regime the very function and
purpose of the Navy are jeopardised'.[35]
12.29
It acknowledged up front the strategic importance of Australia's naval
shipbuilding and repair sector. It stated forcefully that the repair and
maintenance of naval vessels is vital to operational effectiveness of the fleet.
The Strategic Plan adopted the tenet that 'the development and sustainment of
NSR capabilities and skill-sets is critical to the long-term delivery and
management of naval capability and to the viability of the sector'.[36]
12.30
It left no doubt that Australia's self-reliant defence could not be
assured unless the capabilities exist in Australian industry to maintain,
modify, upgrade and repair the nation's warships.[37]
The plan spelt out the requirement for 'competent ship repairers supported by
an experienced workforce able to repair and maintain equipment that spans a
range of technologies from the early 1960s to today's leading edge'. In its
view, they need to be able to respond promptly to pressing operational
requirements and have the capability to meet the demands that arise during
periods of increased operational commitments, including the urgent repair of unforseen
work such as major battle damage.[38]
12.31
The ASPI report reinforced this view stating that the real strategic
priority is to have the ability to repair and maintain our ships, including the
ability to keep them in operation during conflict.[39]
It highlighted the impracticality of not having this capability:
The transit times to foreign maintenance locations would be
prohibitive in peacetime and operationally compromising in wartime.[40]
12.32
The majority of evidence presented to the committee supported the view
that Australia should have a naval shipbuilding and repair industry. Many
participants in the inquiry, however, saw a direct and critical link between
maintaining the country's defence capability and having an Australian naval
shipbuilding and repair industry.[41]
It should be noted that the 'modification and adaptation of a vessel through
its service life to meet unanticipated capability requirements and changes in
technology such as obsolescence' are included in activities associated with
ship maintenance and repair.[42]
12.33
The South Australian government pointed out that all significant
maritime nations maintain a core naval shipbuilding and repair capacity. This applies
not only to the major maritime powers but also to medium-size countries, such
as Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Canada and, in our region, South
Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand. It argued that Australia's
'great distances from major North American and European suppliers means that
having an indigenous shipbuilding industry greatly enhances our defence
self-reliance'.[43]
It added:
Maintaining an Australian shipbuilding and repair capability is
a critical element in providing the government with options to deliver defence
and foreign policy objectives in this uncertain strategic environment.[44]
12.34
Building on this line of argument, the Government of Western Australia
was of the view that a reliance on off-shore industry to maintain, repair,
upgrade or modify navy vessels puts Australia's defence interests at risk. It maintained
that:
...if a dispute occurred between Australia and a regional country,
third country governments may be reluctant to permit their industries to
support Australian naval combatants. It is equally plausible that overseas shipbuilders
and repairs may accord the task of supporting Australian naval combatants
involved in such a dispute lower priority than other business. The consequences
for Australia of inadequate off-shore support could be serious: The ability of
the Australian Defence Force to conduct naval operations on its terms could be
seriously impeded and the Australian Government’s ability to conclude
hostilities in a way that protected and advanced Australia’s interests could be
substantially compromised.[45]
12.35
With equal force, the Submarine Institute of Australia Inc underlined
the importance of Australia having the industry 'continually engaged so that in
the unfortunate but potential event of battle damage or accidental damage,
major repairs can be conducted expeditiously within country; design experience
is especially important in this case'.[46]
12.36
As noted above, Defence saw no strong strategic reason to build the
Navy's warships in Australia. It did, however, place a high priority on
self-sufficiency in the through-life support of its naval ships.[47]
Indeed, two of its key stated strategic aims are clear about the importance of retaining
control over the repair and maintenance of its naval vessels. Defence stated
that its aims are:
-
the ongoing sustainment of a vibrant, competitive, cost effective
Australian maritime industrial capacity able to conduct repair and maintenance,
upgrade and systems integration of Navy's surface ships and submarine force;
and
- an industry disposition that can efficiently support the Navy
fleet basing strategy.
12.37
It explained that the strategy would continue maintenance and
home-porting of major surface ships on the East Coast in Sydney at Fleet Base
East and the West Coast near Perth at Fleet Base West. With regard to the
submarines, full cycle dockings are carried out in South Australia with the
remainder of submarine maintenance activities carried out at Fleet Base West.[48]
12.38
On strategic grounds, the argument supporting the existence of a naval
ship repair industry in Australia presented a stronger case than for having a
naval shipbuilding industry. Even so, the relationship between the two sectors,
particularly any interdependence between shipbuilding and ship repair, must
also influence national security concerns and warrants the committee's
consideration. The following section looks at nature of the relationship between
the naval shipbuilding industry and the repair industry and whether it has
implications for defence marine capability and national security.
Connection between shipbuilding and maintenance, repair and upgrades
12.39
As noted above, Defence's policy allows for ships to be purchased
overseas. Defence has made clear, however, that 'the most important thing that
the shipbuilding industry can add to the Defence of our country is the onshore
capability for upgrade of the platforms and maintenance through-life...we need to
develop enough skills in the country to maximise Australian content in the
upgrade and maintenance cycles'.[49]
DMO's 2002 Strategic Plan, which accepted that ships may be able to be built
overseas, also made clear that there was no practical alternative for
conducting repair and maintenance of the Fleet in Australia.[50]
The 2005 Allen Consulting Group study, however, drew a very firm connection
between in-country build and the capability to maintain and repair the vessel.
It concluded:
...in undertaking local build of both the Collins and ANZAC
classes Australia put itself in the position whereby it has significant parent
navy responsibilities for both classes of ships and has achieved a high level
of self-reliance in maintaining them.[51]
12.40
Many submitters made a similar connection between the acquisition of the
skills necessary for the effective and efficient maintenance, repair and
upgrade of a ship to an in-country build.[52]
They believed that the two sectors were linked and could not, or should not, be
separated. The Western Australian government tied navy preparedness—and by
extension the credibility of Australia's maritime strategy—to a dependency on
local industry support. This in turn rests on the construction of naval vessels
in-country:
...the case for construction of naval combatants in Australia
rests primarily on the contribution that such activity makes to the preparedness
of the naval units operating the vessels so constructed. Navy preparedness is
based on the availability of vessels and their crew and is currently measured
in Unit Ready Days (URD). The number of URD achieved by naval combatants
depends fundamentally on the efficiency and effectiveness with which they are
supported in-service. In-service support of naval combatants comprehends their
routine maintenance, their repair should they sustain damage, their upgrade so
as to remain competitive in military terms and their adaptation to meet the
requirements of specific missions.[53]
12.41
The Western Australian government considered that:
Australian industry involvement in the supply of naval ships is
a means of conditioning our companies and workers for support of navy preparedness.
Local construction of navy ships is therefore an investment in local industry
capability for support of Australian Navy preparedness; it is not an end in
itself.[54]
12.42
The Western Australian government cited the cases of the Collins class submarines
and the ANZAC ships where Australians working on the construction of both
vessels gained the platform, system and engineering knowledge and crucial
skills that would carry over to support the ships through their life.
Arrangements are now in place dedicated to the in-service support of the
Collins and ANZAC vessels that 'make for rapid response to and resolution of
defects as well as facilitating the routine and ad hoc maintenance requirements
and engineering support'.[55]
12.43
Taking the same approach, the AMWU stated that:
Beyond the economic costs, it is vital to Australia’s
independence that we have an indigenous capacity to support, repair and upgrade
our naval vessels. Local construction is inexorably linked to this. We must
avoid repeating the situation we faced in 1982 when during the Falkland Islands
conflict the Royal Navy froze export of all spare parts for the Oberon class
submarines.[56]
12.44
The Submarine Institute of Australia Inc argued that it is important to
have the industry 'continually engaged so that in the unfortunate but potential
event of battle damage or accidental damage, major repairs can be conducted
expeditiously within country; design experience is especially important in this
case'.[57]
Mr Greg Tunny, Managing Director and CEO of ASC Pty Ltd, told the committee:
...at any one point in time over the life of a vessels we do not
necessarily know that we can go back to where we got it from to get the latest and
greatest upgrade enhancement that we need at an affordable price within an
affordable time to meet an emergent contingency which may be coming on us very
rapidly. If we have not built it, we do not necessarily have the capacity to do
that in country.[58]
12.45
It should be noted that DITR informed the committee that part of the
reason 'that more complex vessels are self-built rather than purchased is that
building them is a way of developing the domain knowledge required to maintain
and operate the vessel'.[59]
Indeed, officers from DMO made a direct and strong connection between the
construction of a ship and the development of a skills base needed for future
ship builds and repairs. They saw local involvement in the construction of a
ship as setting the necessary foundations on which to build future ships in
Australia. Mr Warren King, Deputy CEO of DMO, told the committee:
...we would not embark on the AWD program as a nation today if it
had not been for all the skills sets that have been built up and which are
broadly retained in the industry base as a result of Collins, Anzacs and
minehunters.[60]
Referring to when the AWD build is finished, DMO's Chief
Executive Officer Dr Stephen Gumley added:
But when we look at the size of the skill base, the many
hundreds of engineers that ASC employed to build the AWD, those people,
hopefully, will be ready for the next round, whenever that might be. It is the
generic skill base that matters more than the specifics of any particular class
or company.[61]
12.46
He further emphasised the critical link between skills needed to
maintain and upgrade a vessel with a local build:
In the shipping area, it really is the upgrade and maintain
capability. To get that...we have been able to piggyback off the successful
builds of Anzac and Collins. It is my hope that, with the successful build of
AWD and whatever might happen with the LHD, we will have a base for the next
phase, whatever that might be.[62]
12.47
When asked pointedly whether it was possible to sever the link between the
construction of a naval vessel and its through-life support, Defence's response
was qualified. It believed that the connection was not always strong. It told
the committee that in many cases it was preferred to maintain the link by
having ships constructed in-country. Even so, it stated that 'it is possible to
meet the strategic imperative to maintain and modify Navy ships in Australia
without building ships in Australia'. It found only a small linkage between the
need to build ships in Australia and to maintain them when ships are relatively
simple. It stated that 'As complexity grows, the link becomes stronger. Patrol
boats and the refit of the oiler SIRIUS are at the simple end, while the frigates,
submarines and AWD are at the other end'.[63]
12.48
Defence cited a number of projects involving the purchase of ships from
overseas where repair and maintenance was successfully carried out in Australia.
It made the following points:
The first four FFGs were supported in Australia before the final
two were constructed here; navy operates the two LPAs constructed in the US and
the Fleet replenishment ships HMAS WESTRALIA constructed in the UK.
Major warship repair and maintenance is conducted by members of
the ship repair panel. Of the four members of this panel (Tenix, ADI, Forgacs
and United-WA) three have not previously conducted major warship construction.
Ship repair generates a significant demand for skills and
knowledge regardless of the construction demand.
12.49
It included the proposed LHD project in its consideration of the
relationship between building and repairing a ship. Defence categorised the LHD
as a low moderate technology basic platform where only a low correlation
between build capability and the maintenance and upgrade capability exists. It
concluded:
The key skills to nurture for the long-term in this technology
area are in systems integration and upgrade. In this sense, the skills used
during platform construction are of less importance in the through life support
phase of ships.[64]
Conclusion
12.50
Without exception, all witnesses accepted that national security
concerns are central to any consideration about whether Australia should have a
naval shipbuilding industry. The government, however, noted that practical and
economic circumstances place limitations on the extent to which Australia can
be self-sufficient in the construction of naval vessels. The argument for
self-sufficiency in maintaining and repairing naval vessels, however, was
stronger especially when it came to the ability to respond to urgent
operational requirements. Defence stated unequivocally that for strategic
reasons there is a high priority on being able to repair, maintain and upgrade
vessels in Australia. It did not accept, however, the necessity to build a ship
in-country in order to have the capability to support it through its service
life. Some submitters argued otherwise. They saw a direct and strong connection
between a ship's build and the knowledge and resources needed to support the
ship especially when a rapid response is required.
12.51
The committee accepts that to protect the nation's security interests, Australia
must have the capability to maintain, repair and upgrade its naval vessels. While
always present, this requirement becomes urgent and critical when the country's
security is under threat. Furthermore, the committee is persuaded by the
evidence that there is a strong connection between Australian involvement in
the construction of a naval vessel and the acquisition of the necessary
knowledge, skills, experience and resources to support effectively that vessel
throughout its life. As noted earlier, however, the committee accepts that Australia
cannot be fully self-sufficient in the construction of its naval vessels.
12.52
The committee underlines the importance of recognising the contribution
that the construction of naval vessels in-country makes to the capability to
maintain, repair and upgrade them—a requirement central to the nation's
security. Importantly, the committee believes that there are critical areas
where reliance on overseas suppliers may compromise operational independence
and ultimately Australia's national security. In such cases, security concerns
must take precedence over economic costs.
12.53
This chapter and the previous one looked beyond the narrow costs of
building and repairing a large naval ship in Australia compared to overseas. They
noted a range of considerations that highlighted the advantages of building
naval vessels in Australia including the broader economic gains that benefit
the Australian economy and the security reasons for building in Australia. The
following chapter summaries the committee's findings to this stage of the
report.
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