Chapter 9 - China and the
North Korean nuclear issue
9.1
This chapter examines China's
recent role in multilateral efforts to disarm North
Korea of its nuclear weapons program. U.S.–North
Korean tensions have placed China
in a difficult situation. Its long-time support for the North Korean regime and
non-interventionist approach to diplomacy has had to be balanced with an increasingly
cooperative relationship with the U.S.
and a common desire for regional peace and stability. The issue has demonstrated
China's skill and
persistence in bringing Washington
and Pyongyang to the negotiating
table and finding common ground.
Background
North
Korea and China
9.2
North Korea—officially
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)—is one of the few remaining
communist states. It is the world's most militarised nation relative to
population size.[536] In 2003, an
estimated 1.14 million North Koreans were in active forces, with 7.45 million
in reserves, from a population of 22.2 million.[537] With a faltering economy and
widespread shortages of basic staples and energy supplies, North
Korea relies crucially on aid from China.[538] China
is the DPRK's largest trading partner and its biggest financial and diplomatic
supporter.[539] North
Korea has often viewed international
humanitarian aid as a threat to its dogmatic policy of Juche or self reliance (see paragraph 9.54).
9.3
The DPRK and the People's Republic of China
have enjoyed friendly relations since the establishment of diplomatic ties in
1949.[540] During the Korean War (1950–1953),
China intervened
to protect the Pyongyang regime and
in 1961, the countries signed the Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.[541] Article 1 of the Treaty states that
'the Contracting Parties
will continue to make every effort to safeguard the peace of Asia and the world and the security
of all peoples'. However, Article 2 states:
In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected
to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being
involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately
render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.[542]
9.4
This article has attracted recent attention in
the context of a pre-emptive U.S.
attack on North Korea.
It is unclear, however, as to whether China
would intervene directly in this event.[543]
China has
traditionally been reluctant to deal with the international community on
security issues relating directly to North Korea.
Notably, in 1993–94 it abstained from multilateral efforts to achieve a
resolution on North Korea's
nuclear disarmament.[544] In 1999, China's
Premier Zhu Ronggi
insisted: 'North Korea
is a sovereign nation, and it is nothing to do with us whether North
Korea develops guided missiles or nuclear
weapons'.[545]
9.5
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks,
however, China
has increased its support for the U.S.
(see chapter 4). China
gave unconditional support to the U.S.
war in Afghanistan
and voted in favour of anti-terrorist resolutions in the UN Security Council. It
has also been increasingly apprehensive about North
Korea's nuclear ambitions. Since 2002, the
Chinese leadership has faced mounting pressure from the U.S.
to become involved in multilateral discussions with North
Korea on the imperative of Pyongyang's
nuclear disarmament. China
and the U.S.
have a common concern for regional peace and stability, which has 'conveniently
created a synergy between the two countries'.[546]
9.6
However, China
differs from the U.S.
over the nature of, and response to, the problems that North
Korea poses. It has rejected the use of
sanctions against North Korea,
preferring instead to strengthen aid and trade ties. Under Kim
Jong Il's presidency (1997–), North
Korea has remained deeply committed to its
Stalinist philosophy and policy of self-reliance. It is suspicious of China's
controlled market economy.[547] Nonetheless,
China continues
to encourage two-way trade and bilateral economic cooperation as a basis for
'friendship, mutual benefit and common development'.[548]
The 1994 Agreed Framework and U.S.–North
Korean tensions
9.7
U.S.–North Korean nuclear tensions have been simmering
for more than a decade. The Clinton
administration had opted for a direct bilateral approach to gain North
Korea's consent to halt its nuclear program.
In 1994, the U.S.
and North Korea
signed the Agreed Framework. Under
the terms of the Framework, Pyongyang
would shut down its plutonium facilities and accept enhanced monitoring by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, the U.S.
would provide North Korea
with a package of economic, diplomatic and energy-related benefits.[549]
9.8
In June 2001, six months into President
George W. Bush's
first term, the U.S.
revised its policy on North Korea.[550] The President promised further to
lift sanctions and increase assistance for North
Korea if Pyongyang
agreed to:
-
start to take serious, verifiable steps to
reduce the conventional weapons threat to South Korea;
-
improve implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework; and
-
constrain its missile exports.[551]
9.9
Following the attacks on New York
and Washington in September 2001,
President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address identified North
Korea as 'a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while
starving its citizens'.[552] The
President's speech asserted that Iraq,
Iran and North
Korea formed an 'axis of evil'. Both the U.S.
and South Korea
fear that North Korea
may miscalculate and attack South Korea
in the belief it can acquire permanent advantage.[553] The U.S.
has similar fears about miscalculation with regard to China's
relations with Taiwan
(see Chapter 7).
9.10
On the one hand, China
was concerned at President Bush's
'axis of evil' rhetoric. The Foreign Ministry stated shortly after the State of the Union address: '[the]
consequences will be very serious if [the United
States] proceeds with this kind of logic'.[554] On the other hand, China
supported the U.S.
government's approach to engage Pyongyang
in multilateral, rather than bilateral, negotiations.[555]
9.11
The multilateral efforts to resolve the North Korean
nuclear issue can be divided into seven key stages:
-
the October 2002 visit of U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Mr James Kelly to Pyongyang;
-
the April 2003 talks between North Korea, the U.S.
and China;
-
the first Six-Party talks in August 2003 between
North Korea, the U.S., China, South Korea, Russia and Japan;
-
the second Six-Party talks in February 2004;
-
the third Six-Party talks in June 2004;
-
the fourth Six-Party talks in July 2005,
culminating in the September 2005 disarmament pact; and
-
the fifth round of Six-Party talks in Beijing in
November 2005.
All five rounds of the Six-Party
talks to date were hosted by China
in Beijing. The remainder of this
chapter looks at China's
participation in each of these stages.
North
Korea's admission of nuclear rearmament
9.12
On 25 October
2002, North Korea
admitted it was trying to produce highly enriched uranium in violation of the
terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework
(see paragraph 9.7). At the same time, the U.S. Defence Department announced
its intent to resume military talks with China,
citing China's
vitally important role in bringing a peaceful end to the North Korean nuclear
issue.[556]
9.13
In November 2002, the U.S.
successfully persuaded the Korean Peninsula Development Organization to cease
oil shipments to North Korea.
These shipments had been a core U.S.
responsibility under the terms of the Agreed
Framework. The following month, North Korea
expelled IAEA officials from its Yongbyon nuclear plant.[557] On 10 January 2003, North
Korea became the only nation to withdraw
from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) following U.S.
accusations that it was conducting a uranium enrichment effort to make bombs.[558] In withdrawing from the NPT, Pyongyang
was seeking U.S.
recognition of North Korea
as a nuclear state and to have one-to-one talks with the U.S.
on the issue.[559] However, its public statements
made no reference to using these weapons.[560]
9.14
The U.S.
was unwilling to hold bilateral talks with North
Korea. Shortly after Pyongyang's
10 January announcement, U.S. President George
Bush stressed the importance of a peaceful
multilateral resolution:
What this nation [the U.S.]
will do is use this as an opportunity to bring the Chinese and the Russians and
the Japanese and the South Koreans to the table to solve this problem
peacefully.[561]
9.15
As North Korea's
most important ally and the principal source of outside aid, China
is a vital player in efforts to resolve peacefully the North Korean nuclear
issue. Australia
regards China
as a key intermediary in persuading North Korea
to participate in nuclear disarmament talks. On 13 February 2003, the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister,
the Hon Alexander Downer, acknowledged China
as 'a most important influence on North Korea,
especially in terms of Chinese access to North Korean leader Kim
Jong Il'.[562]
On 3 April, Minister Downer recognised that China
was making 'a substantial effort to try to persuade the North Koreans...to engage
in a multilateral dialogue...'[563]
China's
entry into the multilateral dialogue
9.16
Beginning in March 2003, Hu
Jintao's Presidency has strongly advocated a
multilateral approach to the U.S.–North Korean impasse. The U.S. Library of
Congress explained China's
motivation in the following terms:
Beijing reportedly
fears the profoundly destabilizing effects of either a robust nuclear-armed North
Korea, which could set off an arms race in
the region, or the collapse of the regime, which could send thousands of
refugees over the border into China.[564]
9.17
An arms race in East Asia would leave China surrounded by
nuclear powers. Russia, India and Pakistan already have
nuclear weapons programs: both Japan and Taiwan are widely
believed to have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons quickly.[565] China's strategy to avert an arms race has been
to resist coercive measures that may unnecessarily provoke Pyongyang. In July 2003, for example, China voted against a proposed Security Council
resolution condemning North Korea's nuclear program and withdrawal from the
NPT. China reasons that a patient, cooperative attitude to Pyongyang offers the best prospect for the DPRK's
full disarmament and thereby defusing the region's nuclear ambitions.[566] It has refused U.S. calls to use sanctions to pressure North Korea to participate in the multilateral process.[567] Beijing's preferred
option for encouraging North Korean involvement in the talks was to increase
its aid of food, money and oil.
9.18
China's
formal entry into the multilateral dialogue on the North Korean nuclear issue
began in Beijing in April 2003 with
three-way talks between Chinese, U.S.
and North Korean officials. Minister Downer strongly supported the meeting,
stating: 'we now hope that a multilateral forum will evolve from these initial
three-party talks'.[568] A press
statement from the U.S. Department of State shortly before the talks
acknowledged: '[w]e
appreciate China's efforts to achieve the international community's shared goal
of a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons'.[569] Moreover, the Chinese government's
preparedness to arrange and host the talks reflected its eagerness to use
dialogue, rather than sanctions, as a means to exert greater pressure on North
Korea. The talks were successful to the
extent that the parties displayed a willingness to negotiate and agreed to keep
channels open for further discussions. The
Australian Financial Review wrote:
The Beijing talks
provided a form of accommodation that was acceptable to both sides. The
important factor was China's
pivotal role. It is North Korea's
prop, providing it with energy, food and other resources it needs to survive in
the absence of a tradeable output or a viable domestic economy.[570]
9.19
Following the April
talks, the Economist noted that North
Korea had 'appeared remarkably cavalier in
its dealings with its chief economic benefactor in the last few months'.[571] For instance, it had failed to
consult China
before telling the U.S.
in 2002 that it had a uranium-enrichment program.[572] The Economist highlighted the significance of China's
involvement in the trilateral talks, but saw them as a second-best option for
the U.S.:
Suspicious that North Korea would simply use talks to buy more
time to build more weapons, and determined that other countries with an
interest in the nuclear issue be involved in keeping North Korea to any future
deal, Washington had at first insisted that South Korea and Japan have a seat
at any talks too. The tripartite discussions in Beijing
involving China,
the closest North Korea
has to a friend, were a face-saving formula. They were also a breakthrough,
since China has
in the past shied away from any hint of pressure on North
Korea...[573]
The first round of Six-Party talks—August
2003
9.20
The first Six-Party talks took place on 27–29 August
2003. The new participants were South Korea,
Japan and Russia.
During the talks the U.S.
set down its demand that North Korea
commit to 'complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement' of its nuclear programs.
North Korean delegate Kim Yong
Il stated that the DPRK would continue to develop a nuclear deterrent unless
the U.S. agreed
to a non-aggression treaty.[574]
Although a written joint statement was not achieved, the talks did establish
agreement:
-
to resolve the issue through peaceful means and
dialogue;
-
that the security concerns of North Korea should
be taken into consideration;
-
to explore an overall plan to resolve the
nuclear issue in a just and reasonable manner and in a simultaneous and
incremental way;
-
that in the process of negotiations, any action
or word that may aggravate the situation should be avoided;
-
that dialogue should continue to establish trust,
reduce differences and broaden common ground; and
-
that the Six-Party talks should continue and the
specific date and venue should be decided through diplomatic channels as soon
as possible.[575]
9.21
China
strongly supported these objectives. However, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs conceded it was 'fully aware of the complexity of the [North Korean]
question and the difficulties and twists in-between'.[576] Many attributed the summit's shortcomings
to a breakdown in the U.S.–North Korea relationship.[577]
9.22
In early October 2003, North
Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Mr Choe Su-hon
declared to the United Nations that it had resumed the operation of a five megawatt
nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and had processed 8,000 steel rods to provide
plutonium for nuclear weapon development.[578]
North Korea
noted that it had no plans to export these weapons, only to use them in defence
against U.S.
aggression. The U.S.
continued to reject Pyongyang's
demands for a non-aggression pact. However, on 20 October, President
Bush offered China's
President Hu Jintao
a five nation security guarantee that would include North
Korea if it dismantled its nuclear weapons
programs. The U.S. Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, commented: 'we will be fleshing out
these ideas with our partners in the Six-Party framework and pursuing them with
the North Koreans'.[579]
The second round of Six-Party talks—February
2004
9.23
The second round of Six-Party talks was held in Beijing
from 25–28 February 2004. In the lead-up to the second round of talks, China
had cast doubt on whether North Korea
had a program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, thereby undermining
the U.S. demand
of complete nuclear dismantlement.[580]
Some commentators agreed with China's
view, notwithstanding U.S.
officials' concern that Beijing's
position was weakening their demands.[581]
The Washington Post reported a month
before the talks that 'Chinese and U.S.
aims appear to be diverging'.[582] Days
before the talks, there were reports that foreign countries were restricting
aid donations to North Korea
amid concern of Pyongyang's nuclear
program.[583]
9.24
The North Korean delegates arrived in Beijing
insisting that compensation must precede any freeze of its nuclear program. The
U.S. continued
to insist that North Korea
commit to 'complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement' of its nuclear
programs. Again, however, the Six-Party talks failed to reach written agreement
on the basic aim of peacefully resolving the issue. The only point of consensus
was the broad 'commitment to a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula'.[584]
9.25
North Korea
denied U.S.
allegations that it had a highly enriched uranium processing program. It also
disagreed with the U.S.
on the issue of complete dismantlement, arguing that some nuclear facilities
were needed for electricity generation. To this end, North Korean officials
distinguished between civilian and military nuclear programs, claiming only to
have offered to freeze its nuclear arms programs.[585]
9.26
Although the U.S.
was reportedly disappointed with the lack of progress on the multilateral front,
it claimed that Pyongyang was more
isolated than ever.[586] This isolation
advanced the 'five versus one' situation often referred to by U.S.
officials as a basis for the participation of China,
South Korea, Japan
and Russia in
sanctions against North Korea.[587] China's
Chief Delegate, Vice Foreign Minister Mr Wang Li, referred to the 'extreme lack
of trust' between the two parties.[588]
The third round of Six Party
talks—June 2004
9.27
The third round of Six-Party talks was held in Beijing
from 23–26 June 2004. It was marked by an emergency meeting between North
Korea and China
concerning Pyongyang's threat to
test a nuclear device. Once again, no progress was made on the key issue of
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North
Korea's nuclear program. The U.S.
did, however, make its first comprehensive proposal for dismantlement. It
called for Pyongyang to declare its
nuclear facilities and materials, suspend their operation, allow IAEA officials
to return and negotiate steps to be taken in dismantlement.[589] In return, North
Korea would receive Japanese and South
Korean oil and a multilateral guarantee that the U.S.
would not attack.[590] On 24 July 2004, North
Korea's Foreign Ministry described the U.S.
plan as a 'sham offer'. The Ministry stated that its proposal for eventual
disarmament was based on 'reward for freeze'.[591]
9.28
The lack of progress at the June 2004 talks was
attributed to both Pyongyang's intransigence
and inflexibility by Washington.[592] Part of the blame was directed at the
U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Vice President, and non-proliferation
specialists in the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council.[593] Their approach was to isolate North
Korea economically and diplomatically and
oppose any negotiations with or concessions to North
Korea. Another U.S.
faction of East Asia experts within the State Department
and the NSC favoured negotiations before more coercive methods.[594] The presentation of a plan at the
June 2004 talks suggests that this faction was exerting some influence. As the
Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, noted in July 2004, 'the
Americans have been more constructive in that they came to the last round of
six-party talks and put forward the bare bones of some sort of a deal...'[595]
9.29
Chinese efforts to resolve the nuclear issue continued
in the ensuing months. In July 2004, Professor
Zhu Feng of
the University of Beijing
commented:
Never in the diplomatic history of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) has the country been so deeply or extensively involved in a controversial
regional issue to which it was not a direct party.[596]
9.30
In August 2004, Mr
Downer attended talks in Pyongyang
with the North Korean President and Foreign Minister. He stressed that the
nuclear issue was of major concern for the international community at large:
'it is not just an issue between the DPRK and the United
States'.[597]
He also highlighted the common elements in the packages proposed by Washington
and Pyongyang such as a nuclear
freeze and eventual dismantlement, assistance, a security guarantee and the
lifting of sanctions.[598] However, a
spokesman for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
Given that the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. was
spawned by the latter's extremely hostile policy toward the former, the U.S.
should begin the work to find a solution to the issue with dropping its hostile
policy toward the DPRK...It is clear that there would be nothing to expect even
if the DPRK sits at the negotiating table with the U.S. under the present
situation.[599]
9.31
North Korea
boycotted the round of Six-Party talks planned for September 2004. China
sent several top officials to Pyongyang
in an effort to persuade North Korea
to attend, but their efforts were unsuccessful. China
continued its strategy of downplaying North
Korea's nuclear activities and focused
instead on the need to rebuild the U.S.–DPRK relationship. In late September, the
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaozing
publicly questioned claims made by North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe that
his country had turned its plutonium into nuclear weapons.[600] Mr Li blamed the breakdown of the proposed
fourth round of Six-Party talks—scheduled for September 2004—on the
'exceptional mutual lack of trust between the DPRK and the United States'.[601] Other commentators attributed the
boycott to Pyongyang's belief that a
Democrat victory in the November U.S. Presidential election may provide it with
greater flexibility in the negotiations.[602]
As for Sino–U.S. relations, Secretary of State Powell
commented shortly after President Bush's
re-election that they were the best they had been in more than 30 years.[603]
9.32
On 10 February
2005, Pyongyang declared
it was a 'full-fledged nuclear weapons state' and suspended its participation
in the Six-Party talks.[604] It
demanded that future talks must prioritise a significant reduction of U.S.
military power in and around the peninsula, and announced its intention to
remove fuel rods for the production of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium.[605]
9.33
China's
concern, however, was to ensure that Pyongyang
returned quickly to the negotiating table. It was reported that Mr
Yang Xiyu, a
senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official, had told journalists that President
Bush's reference to Kim
Jong Il as a 'tyrant' in April 2005 had
'destroyed the atmosphere for negotiations'.[606]
It is significant that China
was the only nation to continue high-level direct contacts with the North
Korean leadership in the months following the February statement.[607] It was partly China's
influence that led to the U.S.
and North Korea
meeting bilaterally as part of the July 2005 Six-Party talks.
The fourth round of Six Party
talks—July 2005
9.34
The opening of a new round of Six-Party talks on 26 July 2005 began with conciliatory
rhetoric from both the U.S.
and North Korea.
Pyongyang emphasised its
determination to denuclearise the peninsula: Washington
affirmed its acceptance of North Korea's
sovereignty and hinted that immediate regime change was not imperative.[608] For China,
these were encouraging signs. Throughout the process of the multilateral talks,
it had urged the U.S.
to soften its language and North Korea
to return to the negotiating table. Both objectives were now realised.
9.35
On the first day of discussions, the U.S.
assured North Korea
that it would not attack, thereby meeting Pyongyang's
demand for an assurance of non-aggression. However, North
Korea disagreed with U.S.
demands that its complete, verifiable and permanent dismantlement of nuclear
weapons must precede aid and security guarantees.[609] The other point of disagreement was the
definition of 'denuclearisation'. North Korea
insisted that U.S.
nuclear weapons must be removed from South Korea.
The U.S. and South
Korea insisted these weapons had been
removed three years earlier.[610]
9.36
It was China
that initiated progress at the talks by drafting a proposed agreement on broad
principles for ending North Korea's
nuclear weapons program. The U.S.
supported the various drafts. On 29
July 2005, the chief U.S.
envoy to the talks, Mr Christopher
Hill noted: 'we give a lot of credit to the
Chinese for putting this all together'.[611]
Later, he praised China for 'really trying to push to get to resolution of this
round...I think the Chinese side has done a very good job of trying to meet
various needs'.[612] The New York Times noted of Mr Hill:
He regularly complimented his 'Chinese hosts' and spoke of the
draft joint statement as the 'Chinese draft text'. Not only did this play to
China's desire to be seen as an international diplomatic player, but it also
placed implicit pressure on North Korea, since the draft under consideration
was a 'Chinese text', not an American one.[613]
9.37
Nonetheless, after 13 days the talks failed to secure a
statement of principles. The U.S.
took issue with North Korea's
insistence that the DPRK still had the right to build light-water reactors to
generate electricity.[614] It was
agreed that talks would recommence on 29
August 2005.
Agreement on disarmament—the September
joint statement
9.38
The Six-Party talks resumed in September 2005. It began
with China
pressing the parties to allow North Korea
to retain a nuclear energy program, including a light-water reactor, in return for
the DPRK abandoning its nuclear weapons. This strategy was the basis for the
first of six principles in a joint statement signed by the six parties on 19 September 2005. It advanced the 1994
Agreed Framework from simply freezing
North Korea's
nuclear program to focussing on its abandonment. The six principles were:
- 'that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
in a peaceful manner'. To this end, North Korea
committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs and returning
to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. However, it reserved the right to 'peaceful
uses of nuclear energy'. The other parties agreed to discuss 'at an appropriate
time' the provision of a light-water reactor. The U.S.
confirmed it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean
Peninsula and has no intention to
attack the DPRK;
- that both North Korea
and the U.S.
undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and to take steps to normalise
their bilateral relationship;
- that
all six parties undertake to promote economic cooperation in the fields of
energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China,
the U.S., the Republic
of South Korea and Russia
stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to North
Korea;
- that
the six parties committed to 'explore ways and means for promoting security
cooperation in northeast Asia';
- that the six parties agreed 'to take coordinated steps
to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the
principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action"'; and
- that
the six parties agreed to hold the fifth round of the six party talks in Beijing
in early November 2005.[615]
9.39
Several sources praised China
for its lead role in framing these principles. The chief U.S.
negotiator described the outcome as 'really one of the best examples of
multilateral diplomacy in this part of the world'.[616] The Washington Post noted:
Although only preliminary, the agreement was a triumph for China,
which has undertaken to host and referee the talks on a major Asian security
problem. The mission has been a new exercise in leadership for China,
emerging as a regional leader after years of standing on the sidelines and
preaching non-interference in other countries' affairs.[617]
9.40
Professor Hugh
White, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre at the Australian National
University said of the statement: 'It
appears to be a huge diplomatic coup for China
and a significant softening of the US
position'.[618] Professor
James Cotton
of the Australian Defence
Force Academy
commented:
This policy represents a major modification of the ambitious
Bush axis doctrine. From being implacably opposed two years ago to any form of
concession or reward to a recidivist violator of agreements, the US
is now prepared to contemplate compensation and diplomatic recognition.[619]
9.41
However, Professor
Cotton had reservations about whether the
plan would lead to permanent disarmament.[620]
He claimed that the plan was essentially a return to the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, particularly if Pyongyang
is granted a light-water reactor. The key test was whether Pyongyang
would rejoin the NPT and allow the return of IAEA safeguards.[621]
9.42
Within days, however, the deal seemed to be unravelling.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry insisted: 'We will return to the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty and sign the safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency...upon the U.S.
provision of light-water reactors'.[622]
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mr Qin
Gang, explained he 'didn't think the North
Koreans misunderstood or misinterpreted the joint statement'.[623] Christopher
Hill insisted that 'the North Koreans know
precisely what they agreed to'.[624] Others
were more damming. Professor Robyn
Lim of Nanzan
University commented:
North Korea
does nothing but lie and cheat. Sure enough Pyongyang
is already backing down from Monday's commitment. And the NPT is unravelling.[625]
9.43
Still, some commentators believe that the enforcement
of the six principles will be a test of China's
regional leadership. Mr Charles
Krauthammer wrote in the Washington Post that if the statement of principles holds, 'it
will mark China's
emergence from an economic and demographic dynamo to a major actor on the world
stage, and serious rival to American dominance in the Pacific'. Mr
Krauthammer argued that if China
can succeed where the U.S.
failed, 'it will have shown that the future lies in association with China,
with or without the United States'.[626]
9.44
Dr Peter
Van Ness from the Australian
National University
argued that a successful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue would
have significant benefits for all nations with a vested interest in regional
security. He told the committee that:
...in my opinion Australia
and every other country in the region has a huge stake in the outcome of those
six-party talks and has a huge interest in supporting and encouraging a
negotiated conclusion to those talks. This is particularly since the talks may
in the end...provide the Chinese, and a number of others who are in discussion, a
foundation for security institutions in North-East Asia
to help maintain and sustain stability, interdependence and collaborative
economic development.[627]
9.45
However, while the September statement may have secured
a common goal, the strategy for disarmament and compensation has divided the
six parties. This was apparent in the fifth round of Six-Party talks from 9–11
November 2005.
The fifth round of Six-Party talks—November
2005
9.46
Again, China's
negotiators paved the way for the talks with a positive preliminary meeting between
Presidents Kim Jong Il and Hu Jintao.
Mr Wang Jiarui, the chief of the Chinese Communist Party's international
department, observed: '...from my observations we have reason to believe that the
fifth round of talks will be on schedule and will lead to results'.[628]
9.47
When the talks began, China's
Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Wu
Dawei, appealed for all parties to be
flexible in their approach to an implementation plan. China
shared South Korea
and Russia's
preference for allowing further aid before disarmament.[629] China's
President Hu had promised
more economic cooperation with Pyongyang
during his meeting with President Kim
in October. The South Korean government also stated its enthusiasm for new
investment initiatives in North Korea,
following the opening of a $US10 million joint textiles company the previous
month.[630] The South Korean National
Assembly also approved a doubling of its North Korean aid budget (to $US2.6
billion) for 2006. In contrast, the U.S.
reiterated its position at the talks that a light-water reactor for nuclear
energy would not be given to North Korea
until it had completely disarmed. Japanese negotiators also took this hard
line.[631] According to David
Sanger of the New York Times, the U.S.
government's focus had been to cut off as many of North
Korea's sources of revenue as it can.[632] Indeed, there is still a view within
Washington that
regime change—not unification—is the key to resolving the nuclear issue.[633]
9.48
Shortly after the talks adjourned, North
Korea proposed a five-step plan for disarmament.
The five stages were to:
-
halt plans for nuclear tests;
-
ban the export of nuclear technology;
-
ban further weapons production;
-
dismantle the nuclear program; and
-
rejoin the NPT and submit to IAEA safeguards.[634]
9.49
North Korea's top negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister
Mr Kim Gye Gwan, emphasised that these steps are conditional on the 'action for
action' principle: 'we will act if action is made...We will never move first'.[635] The sequence of disarmament and
reward will continue to be the vexed issue in future Six-Party talks. There remain
difficult negotiations before any significant steps toward an agreement on
nuclear disarmament can be reached. Kim
Gye Gwan described
the November 2005 talks as:
a beacon guiding the six parties towards progress...But that
beacon at present is far away and, moreover, the mist on the ocean is thick and
sometimes it blurs the beacon.[636]
9.50
Nonetheless, China's
recent influence in Korean Peninsula
affairs cannot be doubted. Ms Anne
Wu, a visiting fellow at the Kennedy School
of Government, wrote in the Washington
Quarterly:
China
has significantly departed from its traditionally low-profile diplomacy in
Korean peninsula affairs with an explicit message that North
Korea must put an end to its nuclear weapons
program. This decisiveness contrasts sharply with Beijing's
onlooker approach to the first North Korean crisis...[637]
Committee view
9.51
The committee recognises China's
role in mediating the Six-Party talks. It indicates that China's
influence on the world stage is extending beyond trade and into security issues
(see also chapter 3). China
is rightly concerned at the prospect of social unrest and political instability
in bordering North Korea,
and at the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the region. For these reasons,
the committee emphasises that China's
involvement in the Six-Party process is driven principally by concern for its
own internal stability. It should not be interpreted as a plan to rival America's
strategic dominance in the Asia–Pacific. It is clear from the Six-Party process
that China wants
to play an important role in international diplomacy and deserves commendation
for this role.
Japan
and the Republic of Korea:
broader interests
9.52
At the same time, it is important to note that both Japan
and South Korea
have reacted to the North Korean nuclear issue mindful of their broader
relationship with China.
The cases of Japan
and South Korea
contrast. As Professor Chung
Min Lee
from the National University of Singapore noted:
...Japanese policy toward the Korean
Peninsula remains a critical facet
of Tokyo's balancing posture vis--vis Beijing,
in that the maintenance of a robust Washington–Tokyo–Seoul strategic triangle
serves not only to coordinate policies toward North
Korea but also as a counterweight to China's
increasingly dominant posture in northeast Asia.[638]
On the other hand:
While Seoul has
taken care to emphasize that it continues to view as fundamental its alliance
with the United States...Seoul's
posture toward Pyongyang has
increasingly coincided with Beijing's
views rather than Washington's.
In part, such a transformation illustrates Seoul's
increasing desire to shape its own 'boutique' foreign and national security
policy by balancing its decades-old alliance with the United
States with new linkages with China.[639]
Australia's
continuing interest in the North Korean nuclear issue
9.53
It was noted earlier (paragraph 9.30) that Australia
has maintained bilateral ties with Pyongyang,
with visits by Minister Downer to the capital in November 2000 and August 2004.
Mr Downer has made clear that Australia supports the Six-Party talks and takes
'every opportunity to tell North Korea that nuclear weapons have no place on
the Korean peninsula'.[640] In November
2005, he told an audience in Seoul:
Japan, China and South Korea are Australia's largest export
markets and stability in this region is important to us...Once the North
verifiably abandons its nuclear programs, Australia is willing to provide
significant development aid, energy assistance and nuclear safeguards expertise
to assist dismantlement...Australia is already one of the major suppliers of
energy products to North East Asia...and this would be a logical area where we
could contribute funding and expertise to a settlement brokered in the
six-party talks.[641]
9.54
The issue of aid is important: more than one-quarter of
North Koreans have relied on the UN's World Food Program since the 1990s
famine.[642] The Australian government
has expressed strong concern at the current humanitarian situation. It is particularly
anxious at Pyongyang's recent decision
to end the World Food Programme's (WFP) emergency distribution programs and restrict
the number of WFP staff and monitoring visits. Mr Downer's
response to the policy announcement was blunt: 'I think it will cost lives that
policy'.[643]
9.55
Encouragingly, in February 2006, the board of the WFP
announced a $US102 million two-year plan for delivering aid to North
Korea.[644]
There has also been a report that North Korea
will ask the UN to resume food aid.[645]
At the time of tabling this report, however, these developments were unclear.
Recommendation 6
9.56
The committee recommends that the Australian government
continue its efforts to encourage North Korea
to abandon its nuclear weapons program and resume full receipt of international
aid. It notes the success of China's
efforts to date in the Six-Party process and urges the Australian government to
continue supporting China
in its efforts to broker and implement a strategy for disarmament.
Conclusion
9.57
Although unresolved, the North Korean nuclear issue has
demonstrated China's
capacity for a strategic and patient approach to multilateral diplomacy. It has
balanced its support for the Pyongyang
regime with its fears that North Korean weapons may lead its
neighbours—particularly Japan and Taiwan—to
adopt nuclear weapons programs.
9.58
To this end, China
has assumed the role of arbiter between North
Korea and the U.S.
Unlike the U.S.,
China's preference
for regime stability in Pyongyang has
seen it favour continuing aid and economic engagement with the DPRK. This
support, and its insistence on North Korean disarmament, made China
the obvious choice to host and lead the multilateral negotiations. It also gave
support to the softer faction within the U.S. State Department and National
Security Council, which favoured negotiations with the DPRK and doubted the
benefits of a North Korean collapse. This has been important to maintain Washington's
engagement in the Six-Party process. Nonetheless, there remains support within
the U.S.
government to isolate North Korea
diplomatically and thereafter, through sanctions.
9.59
The committee recognises that the negotiating process for
North Korea's
nuclear disarmament is likely to be long and arduous. It warns against
expectations that China
will broker a ready solution. That said, the committee does note that China's
role to date has been significant and a fillip for U.S.–Sino relations. Since
the September 2005 statement was signed, the multilateral discussion has turned
to disarmament plans.
9.60
China
and the Republic of South
Korea now have important roles in planning how
the 'action for action' principle is to work. Their approach to concessions is
clearly more flexible than that of the U.S. government. Notwithstanding U.S.
demands for immediate dismantlement, China
may again exert a moderating influence on the U.S.
government's position and shape a workable compromise. It is clear that on this
issue, China will
be vital to the multilateral response.
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