3.1
This chapter provides an update on the evolving situation on the ground in Afghanistan and the dire humanitarian and economic circumstances facing the country. It also explores issues relating to the funding and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crises
3.2
Submitters emphasised the desperate humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, which has been further exacerbated by the economic crisis the country now also faces.
Food shortages
3.3
The Australian Red Cross described the current situation on the ground in Afghanistan as ‘extremely serious’, explaining:
A massive man-made humanitarian catastrophe is unfolding against the backdrop of decades of complex and protracted conflict, combined with a changing climate and a global pandemic…
A key contributor to the current situation is that Afghanistan is experiencing one of the worst droughts and food shortage crises in decades. Severe drought has hit more than 80 per cent of the country, crippling food production and forcing people from their land; 55 per cent of Afghanistan’s population are experiencing high levels of acute food shortages...
On top of this, the Afghan economy is collapsing with very little cash to purchase goods available through the banks due to the freezing of financial reserves. Many Afghan people, including key public sector workers (doctors, nurses and teachers), have not been paid for a long time, putting great pressure on the delivery of key social and health services.
3.4
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) noted that the already dire situation is deteriorating significantly following the onset of heavy winter conditions in November 2021, which will endure until around March 2022. Afghanistan now has ‘the highest number of people in the world in emergency-level food insecurity after a 35 per cent increase from the same time last year’:
There are 22.8 million people facing acute food insecurity, including 8.7 million who are at risk of famine-like conditions. Around 3.2 million children, and 700,000 pregnant and lactating women, are at risk of acute malnutrition. Food costs account for over 82 per cent of a household’s income. Around 690,000 people were displaced in 2021 due to conflict, of which 80 per cent were women and children.
3.5
Similarly, Mr Mat Tinkler, Acting Chief Executive Officer of Save the Children Australia, explained:
Since we last spoke, the needs of Afghans have increased by around 32 per cent, so one-third, over three months. It's hard to believe that a living hell could get worse, but it did during this period. There are now around 13.1 [million] children in need of humanitarian aid, an increase of 3.1 million children in just the last three months. That's around 22.8 million people in Afghanistan who are on the brink of famine right now, so almost Australia's population in urgent need of food support right now. By the middle of the year we expect more than 95 per cent of the population will be living in poverty due to Afghanistan's economic decline. Senators, we are watching the world's worst humanitarian crisis unfold right now. Every day the risk to an increasing number of children's lives becomes both more severe and more urgent.
3.6
A number of witnesses reported that the situation in Afghanistan was unprecedented. For example, Mr Ahmad Shuja Jamal, Special Adviser at the Refugee Council of Australia (RCA) reported that ‘the UN has called it the worst humanitarian crisis in the world’. The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) noted that ‘[t]his level of near-universal poverty in a country has not been seen in recent history’. Mr Nawid Cina, Acting General Manager at Mahboba’s Promise concurred, stating that ‘[w]e have never seen anything like this in our 25 years’.
3.7
Likewise, Ms Fiona McSheehy, Acting Country Director and Director Field Operations at Save the Children Afghanistan, stated:
I've been involved in humanitarian work for more than two decades now, and this is by far and away the most complicated and also deeply saddening situation I've ever been in, as the lead of a team trying to support a population that's been affected by something that's totally outside of their control. The population of Afghanistan is 40 million, of which 50 per cent are children. So 20 million people in Afghanistan are under the age of 18 and have no real future at the moment other than something that's very bleak and very disheartening.
3.8
Save the Children reported that ‘up to one fifth of families in Afghanistan have been forced to send their children out to work as incomes have plummeted in the past six months with an estimated one million children now engaged in child labour’.
Women and girls
3.9
In relation to the impact on women and girls, DFAT also noted:
Restrictions imposed by the Taliban and local authorities are keeping many women humanitarian and health personnel from the front lines. This directly impacts women’s and girls’ access to humanitarian relief and lifesaving health services.
3.10
On the other hand, ACFID explained:
For women, the discrimination they have experienced under the Taliban will be nothing compared to the effects of the collapsing economy which may set their access to healthcare and education back decades. Afghan women’s rights advocate Jamila Afghani said it best: “We are not supporting Afghan women by starving them.”
Brain drain
3.11
‘Brain drain’ was an issue raised by Ms Jackie Fristacky, AM, President of the Australian Afghan Development Organisation (AADO) which she explained has occurred due to skilled people leaving Afghanistan and the Taliban leaving women and minorities out of education and work:
There has been a real brain drain for many generations. There was a brain drain under the Soviets and under the Taliban and there is one now. There is such a need to rebuild lost skills in medicine, teaching, engineering and civil service…it is critical for women who have some skills to be involved in helping build the nation.
…
…[T]he dilemma [is] that, the more people leave, the more skills are lost that are desperately needed locally. This is an issue…If [the Taliban] want to develop the country, they can’t do it with 25 per cent of the population. You’ve got to have the 50 per cent of the population that are women and then the other 25 per cent that are non-Pashtun. That’s a huge amount of the population contributing.
3.12
A potential solution to the issue of brain drain, Ms Fristacky suggested, was to accept Afghans on a temporary basis so that ‘they can learn more in agriculture in our [Australia’s] regional areas and go back with their additional skills’. However, ‘[d]iplomacy is number one, I think, to get the country on an even keel with the financial situation. The Taliban have to open up schools and make things better so that they can use their women. They're supporting women in medicine, nursing and those fields, but we need so many more. So, it is very complex’.
3.13
Mr Cina agreed, stating:
With regard to the brain drain, I do agree. It's also understanding that everyone who is trying to leave Afghanistan needs to leave. Unfortunately, it's the intellectuals, the human rights defendants and the people who are connected to NGOs [non-government organisations] who are most at risk…What it means to evacuate or bring someone here isn't just saving their life; it's creating the potential that can transform this society and their society back home when they're in a position to contribute again.
Health system
3.14
Recent media reports have also emphasised the significant strain on the health system being experienced in Afghanistan, including the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic and the lack of suitable medical supplies equipment.
Economy
3.15
The economic crisis facing Afghanistan has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis.
3.16
World Vision Australia (WVA) described Afghanistan’s economy as ‘in freefall’ and referred to the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reporting which ‘estimates Afghanistan’s GDP has contracted by almost 40% since the Taliban takeover’.
3.17
The RCA submitted that as a result, the ‘dip in economic activity and increase in joblessness has’:
…left many Afghan families in difficult financial situations just as they traditionally make big purchases such as firewood, heaters, coal and other necessities at the onset of winter. Citizens have been unable to access their savings deposited in banks, which are facing a liquidity crisis. A run on banks resulted in long queues and the imposition of withdrawal caps, currently at $400 per week if cash is available. Prices of food, fuel and other consumer goods have spiked as the value of the afghani relative to the US dollar has fallen sharply.
3.18
A contributing factor to the economic crisis has been the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) sanctions regime. This is discussed in further detail below.
3.19
Another factor has been the United States’ (US) response to the Taliban’s resurgence, in which it froze more than $7 billion in Afghan government reserves held in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. However, the US also issued sanctions exemptions in September and December to allow for the flow of aid.
United Nations actions on humanitarian aid to Afghanistan
Security Council resolution on sanctions exemptions
3.20
On 22 December 2021, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2615, which is intended to ‘[clear] the way for aid to reach Afghans in desperate need of basic support, while preventing funds from falling into the hands of the Taliban’. The resolution exempts humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic needs from sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 2011 and 2015.
3.21
Key provisions of the resolution allow for ‘the processing and payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources, and the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of assistance’. The UNSC ‘strongly encouraged providers to use “reasonable efforts” to minimize the accrual of any benefits—whether as a result of direct provision or diversion—to entities or individuals designated on the sanctions list’.
3.22
DFAT noted that ‘[b]y operation of the law, section 2B of the Charter of the United Nations Act, [Resolution 2615] has automatic effect in Australia’. Therefore, ‘the provision of humanitarian assistance and other activities to support basic services covered by the exemption do not constitute an offence under Australian sanctions law’.
UN humanitarian and refugee response plans
3.23
On 11 January 2022, UN agencies launched the Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan (HRP) and Afghanistan Situation Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP). The HRP requires USD $4.4 billion in international funding in 2022, making it the world’s largest humanitarian appeal for a single country. It will aim to meet the needs of around 22.1 million Afghans in 2022. Under the RRP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is seeking an additional USD $623 million in funding to support 5.7 million displaced Afghans and local communities in five neighbouring countries. A ‘pledging conference’ for these two plans is expected to be held in March 2022.
3.24
ACFID noted some potential issues that may arise in delivering the HRP:
The impact of these plans is highly dependent on several factors, including the extent to which donors such as Australia respond to the current UN appeal. The ability of the UN to deliver on the plan will also be influenced by the ongoing cash liquidity crisis and the ability of international and domestic actors to maintain a strong enabling environment for humanitarian action.
…
Unless the international community responds quickly to meet the UN appeal and resolve the banking and liquidity crisis, the situation will deteriorate further, and the economy and state will be under severe pressure and at-risk of collapse. This would lead to instability, widespread desperation, further human rights abuses and violence, including terrorism. Greater displacement and refugee flow out of Afghanistan is a likely consequence.
3.25
Furthermore, ACFID discussed what contribution Australia should make to the HRP, noting that Australia is yet to contribute:
As of 10 February 2022, the OCHA [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] Financial Tracking Service reported that the $4.4bn (USD) HRP for Afghanistan has received funding of $419m (USD). The United States ($308m USD) and United Kingdom ($98.7m USD) are amongst countries who have made contributions…
As a guideline for Australia’s minimum contribution, Oxfam Australia’s ‘fair share’ analysis finds that Australia’s fair share to the HRP is AUD 105,179,665 (approximate $105.2 million AUD). This calculation is based on the relative size of the Australian economy compared to all High and Upper Middle-Income countries (1.78%) and converting USD to AUD at the average exchange rate of (0.7514 for 2021). This uses the latest available data from the World Bank and the Reserve Bank of Australia.
3.26
In answer to questions on notice, DFAT stated that its funding of UN humanitarian partners contributes to the delivery of the HRP and RRP. DFAT added that future funding would be considered by government and ‘DFAT will continue to carefully monitor the evolving humanitarian context, including the capacity and access of humanitarian partners, to inform any subsequent decisions on funding allocations’.
Issues relating to the delivery of humanitarian aid
Impact of UNSC Resolution 2615 and Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis
3.27
The Australian Red Cross explained the impact of the UNSC sanction on Afghanistan as well as on the work of NGOs:
The humanitarian and economic crisis in Afghanistan has been exacerbated by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Taliban sanctions regime, which resulted in Afghanistan’s financial assets being frozen and the banking system becoming paralysed…
Financial sanctions under the UNSC Taliban sanctions regime, and its implementation under Australian law, have been the source of uncertainty for Australian humanitarian actors such as Red Cross, operating in, or otherwise providing assistance to, Afghanistan…
Without appropriate safeguards, sanctions offences may potentially risk capturing funding, incidental payments or relief consignments made during humanitarian operations. Due to these risks, humanitarian organisations have often erred on the side of caution when considering their involvement in Afghanistan, either delaying or restricting their operations despite the urgent and growing humanitarian needs in the region. Like other humanitarian agencies, Red Cross had to invest significant internal resources before any public funds could be sent to support the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], despite it having a clear humanitarian mandate under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols to undertake relief activities.
3.28
Submitters were hopeful that the passage of UNSC Resolution 2615 would assist humanitarian aid reach Afghanistan, but also noted that this has not immediately resolved financing challenges. Save the Children Australia stated:
Despite the recent passage of UNSC Resolution 2615 supporting humanitarian exemptions to the sanctions regime…many NGOs are still facing financing challenges related to cash liquidity, banking transfers and bank de-risking practices that, ultimately, impede the flow of humanitarian assistance and permit further dissolution of critical, local infrastructure.
3.29
Similarly, Ms Brigid O’Farrell, Policy and Advocacy Advisor at ACFID, explained that the UNSC’s humanitarian exemption ‘initially was met with a huge sigh of relief, because it was much needed. The challenge is that it's not really making that great a difference in reality. Banks are still refusing to remit funds into Afghanistan, which means that the usual funding flows are just not there’.
3.30
Mr Timothy Watkin, Head of Government Relations and Media at ACFID, pointed to the importance of ‘unblocking the economic freeze and the liquidity crisis, which is severely damaging humanitarian funding getting through and cash for the people of Afghanistan’.
3.31
Ms Fristacky commented:
While accepting that foreign funds shouldn’t be allowed to filter through to extremism, we agree on the critical need to restore liquidity to Afghanistan in ways that can be reconciled with sanctions. Indeed, the US, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] and the UN are scrambling to try and do that through various mechanisms.
3.32
Ms McSheehy explained that the ‘issue is a lack of money coming into the country by the international institutions who are not supporting the banking sector to have confidence that they are not going to break any sanctions by putting money into Afghanistan…[and] Afghanistan can’t resolve this issue by itself’.
3.33
Save the Children Australia outlined a number of challenges with banking transfers and bank de-risking practices being faced by NGOs:
[Save the Children] is concerned that there is now a capacity gap for banks and financial institutions in their ability to follow through with the exemptions. For example, banks and financial institutions frequently do not understand, or misunderstand, what constitutes a 'humanitarian' activity and therefore what transactions would be permitted under general licenses and exemptions that have been granted. Additionally, it is unclear whether banks will choose to proactively manage risk based on the granting of licenses instead of continuing with existing de-risking practices.
3.34
Submitters recommended that Australia, in coordination with international financing institutions and other donor governments, explore the use of existing mechanisms or the establishment of new mechanisms that will allow for the swift dispersal of funds within Afghanistan and identify solutions to the current liquidity crisis. Mr Watkin stated:
There are a lot of assurances that the Australian government could provide around the sanctions change that the UN has made. DFAT has made some significant quick moves to implement that exemption, and we have welcomed that, but the Australian government needs to give confidence to banks and to other finance institutions so that money can flow to humanitarian organisations who are literally propping up lives and livelihoods around the country.
3.35
ACFID recommended that the Australian Government urgently brief relevant Australian financial institutions on the UNSC humanitarian exemption to the Taliban sanctions regime and how this has been implemented in Australian law to prevent banks blocking financial transfers for humanitarian purposes due to their own de-risking.
3.36
Save the Children Australia submitted:
We urge the Australian Government to leverage all diplomatic mechanisms through advocating to the UN Security Council, the Human Rights Council, and Ambassadors to Washington, to ensure that the banking system in Afghanistan is restored.
3.37
It submitted that additionally, the Australia Government should:
Issue 'comfort letters' to key financial institutions to ensure that they feel sufficiently covered to resume the processing of Afghanistan transactions.
Issue further, targeted and clear communications, beyond that already on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website, that ensures financial institutions have full confidence that they can support the transfer of funds for humanitarian purposes on behalf of NGOs in order to avoid unnecessary delays.
3.38
Mr Andrew Walter, First Assistant Secretary, Legal Regulatory Division, DFAT, explained that DFAT had provided advice to both the aid and financial sectors to ensure the changes under the exemption were understood:
[DFAT] reached out to the aid sector at the beginning of January and explained that to them. Subsequently, we had a hookup with the aid sector to talk through those issues. We have also been in contact with the financial sector [including banks and other institutions that DFAT normally work with] as recently as yesterday [1 February 2022] to point out that there is this exemption, how it operates and how it works in Australian law. We will continue to liaise with the financial sector and the aid sector to make sure they understand the exemption to the sanctions regime…We've had general information on the website since 11 January and we…will follow up on that to see if there is any further assistance they require with understanding the operation of the exemption.
3.39
DFAT’s website states:
Australia has implemented the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Taliban sanctions regime into Australian law to promote the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. The Taliban is no longer considered a terrorist organisation and is involved in political processes in Afghanistan. However, sanctions continue to apply in relation to persons and entities designated for the purposes of the Taliban sanctions regime.
Issues arising from a lack of access to money
3.40
In relation to the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, Ms Fristacky stated ‘the biggest problem isn’t the drought or the lack of food, rather it’s the disappearance of cash in the economy’.
I think it's widely accepted that [the liquidity squeeze] is an unforeseen occurrence, in terms of the impact on the economy, and [Australia] and others are looking to how that might be facilitated or addressed within the regime of the sanctions and our pressure on the Taliban, in terms of seeking positive influence on key interests of the international community.
3.42
In discussing the availability of currency in Afghanistan, Mr Sloper acknowledged that there was still quite a lot of Iranian currency, but that the Taliban were encouraging the use of local currency and had recently ‘allowed the importing of US dollars in hard currency’. It was also being explored whether:
…exchanges between businesses holding local currency, within Afghanistan, through an offshore account, in exchange for US hard dollars and payments made through third parties overseas [was possible].
For everyday people they're predominantly using the local currency, but there are restrictions on the amount individuals can withdraw from banks each week, and, in addition to that, some banks do run out of hard currency or local currency. Then there is a pause for a number of days until they can access currency to allow the release of funds again to individuals.
3.43
Ms McSheehy explained the impact of the liquidity crises on the ground:
A lack of money in country is forcing the banks in Afghanistan to limit the amount that they are releasing on any one day. So the standard Afghan can go into a bank and can withdraw $100 a day and that's it. They can't withdraw any more. Businesses are allowed withdraw five per cent of what their balance is. The banks won't allow them to withdraw any more than that. Every time you go in to get some money out of a bank, you have to queue for two to three hours. The economy is seizing due to a lack of money in the country, so unless the international institutions, and hopefully the Australian government, can find a way to encourage other states to change their approach, and unless there is an opening-up of money coming into Afghanistan, essentially, the entire economy is being starved of oxygen and eventually it will die.
3.44
Mr Sloper also discussed the amount of money both individuals and businesses could access in Afghanistan:
My understanding is that it's changed over time, but the current restriction is up to a certain amount per week. It varies, in dollar terms, because of currency exchanges and so on. It was about $200 per week, when I last checked, but that does [change] very regularly. For businesses, I think the percentage is higher than the five per cent, but they're not allowed to use funds, even if they are available, towards transactions fully. They can only contribute a portion, and then they have to deposit more funds into the bank to withdraw, say, 40 per cent, which is often the figure. So the banks are looking to obtain currency on a regular basis, notwithstanding that many businesses might have greater amounts in savings at this time.
3.45
Ms McSheehy described some of the difficulties Save the Children were having due to the lack of access to money in the country:
We're also giving out cash to families in order for them to buy stoves and fuel. It's desperately cold here at the moment. We've been doing that since the start of the year. We've been able to provide a lot of cash to people. Last week US$400,000 went out to families. The difficulty we're having, and I think it's been touched on previously, is the access to money coming into the country...There's a massive lack of cash within the country that's fuelled by a lack of work for people. In the mornings, if I go around Kabul, the streets are lined with men sitting in wheelbarrows waiting for a day's labour. If I go back three hours later most of them are still there because there's simply no work.
Without work there's no money. Without money there's no ability for parents to feed their children. It's the most ridiculous situation I've ever been in. It could be so easily resolved by both increasing the amount of money to come into this country and opening up the flow of money.
3.46
Mahboba’s Promise noted that ‘[p]rior to the Taliban taking over Kabul, Mahboba’s Promise took actions to ensure that they had financial liquidity and were able to continue to work during the chaotic situation that soon ensued’. For example, within the first days of the Taliban taking over they had withdrawn all of their money from banks.
3.47
It was raised in evidence that many aid and development organisations were ‘relying on the hawala network or local money lenders’ because:
…the usual process of working through money, through the international financial institutions—Western Union, MoneyGram, StoneX and those kinds of operators—it's just not worth the hassle for them at the moment. I think there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of clarifying and providing clear guidance about exactly what the humanitarian exemption permits and giving those types of organisations confidence to be able to work with humanitarian organisations.
We've seen in the US comfort letters and assurances being given, and I think that needs to happen urgently and on a much wider scale.
3.48
Save the Children Australia emphasised the urgency in addressing liquidity issues in the country, as well as the challenges of using hawalas for NGOs:
[T]he longer the liquidity crisis extends, the more local humanitarian and development infrastructure will degrade as national and local [NGOs] and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) begin shuttering their doors. Local NGOs/CSOs are disproportionately impacted by liquidity issues and will be unable to operate soon if a solution is not found as these local organisations to do not have access to the same financial infrastructure as the UN and INGOs which enable “work-arounds”. In addition, local organisations are often unable to utilise hawalas given their additional fees. This creates a downstream impact for the sustainability of services and the localisation agenda as a whole. The liquidity crisis prevents international humanitarian actors from developing a functional exit strategy that will reduce Afghanistan’s long-term dependence on aid as there will be significantly fewer local and national organisations with expertise and capacity for successful handover.
3.49
Ms McSheehy gave an example of the impact of the costs associated with using hawalas:
Save the Children uses four hawala agents who we have formal agreements with and who have been through a due diligence process. Their administration rates differ from around four per cent to 15 per cent, and if we hadn't had to pay the hawala cost associated with the cash mentioned earlier—the $400,000 we gave out last week to individuals—we would have been able to support another 250 families. There are six people in a family, so that is over 1,000 more people we would have been able to support had we not had to pay the hawala fees.
3.50
WVA agreed that utilising the hawala network came at a great cost to NGOs:
At the moment, World Vision Afghanistan have a live budget of around US$8 million. We've been able to get the majority of that money into country via the hawala network, which comes at a great cost to us. With fees of around seven per cent, you're looking at in excess of US$600,000 wasted on bank fees. This is because we don't have a banking option available to us at the moment. Yet, given the need on the ground, we need to get the money in there somehow. At the moment, that is the price of doing business, in a way, but it is unacceptable as a humanitarian organisation, when the need is so great on the ground, to be having to be slugged with those fees.
3.51
Mr Patrick Thomas, Head of Low Income, Fragile and Humanitarian Contexts at WVA, added that the banking restrictions also have an impact on paying their staff:
We are able at this stage to use some local banks to pay our staff; however, that comes with a monthly cap on just how much we can actually withdraw. This puts our staff at a disadvantage, as some of them are having to wait for their salaries. This is very concerning, given that many humanitarian agencies such as World Vision are having to expand their staff and grow their staff numbers to meet the need on the ground, so we can't really afford to have a workforce that are having to wait for their pay as well. This is a dual issue that we're facing here.
3.52
DFAT acknowledged that some aid agencies were using hawalas, but had concerns about that system because ‘the rates are rising rapidly and that financial transfers are not transparent. [Australia] and other financial institutions are not able to determine where and how those funds might be transferred, and through whose hands’. Mr Sloper also noted that others were now looking at ‘drawing on the UN importing of hard currency’ which ‘will be done directly with businesses. Then they will ideally have the funds available to the international NGOs and others operating there, and by paying US currency to their staff or other currencies, it will then allow it to flow into the economy’.
3.53
A number of witnesses expressed concern that preventing money flowing into Afghanistan was at the detriment of the already suffering population.
Ms Nadine Haddad, Senior Policy Lead: Conflict and Fragility at WVA, explained the dilemma:
[A]t this stage, it is not a black or white situation. The severity of the situation is far too much for anyone to comprehend. It is not a matter of whether the Taliban meets [the] condition[s of the international community]—for example, we are pushing for the rights of women and girls and the alternative is to let them die of starvation or freeze to death. It is a severe situation, and the priority of humanity must take over while we ensure that there are sufficient safeguards that money does not go to the Taliban leadership.
3.54
Similarly, Mr Tinkler noted that he did have ‘some sympathy for the sentiment around donors and international actors wanting to hold out for principled commitments from the Taliban’, however:
I think the situation we are facing is that the gravity of people's need is such that we can't wait forever for the perfect set of agreements with the Taliban. If we do, we will have literally millions of people dying from hunger in the course of this year, and we're already seeing that.
What you have in international NGOs like Save the Children, World Vision and other aid agencies is a set of organisations that, by our presence and way of working, by the way we engage with the Taliban, by the principles we set around how and when we will deliver aid, guarantee a certain level of assurance for donors and governments that money that is channelled through us will be used for the purpose for which it is intended, be it education, health or what have you. We are engaging every day according to a set of principles, setting limits…around things like women's access to the work we do. So I think we as an international community need to rely on the humanitarian system that exists and the principles that organisations like Save the Children and World Vision use every day in our work, rather than holding out forever for a set of principled agreements at a leadership level from the Taliban that might never arrive and in the meantime watching millions of people perish.
3.55
Ms McSheehy also agreed, stating:
[F]undamentally, we can hold out forever to get the Taliban to say they will never do anything bad again, but in the meantime millions and millions of people are at risk of starvation through a political stand-off. The majority of the population—40 million people—are being put on hold almost while waiting for the authorities to share a particular view that the rest of the world wants to see. For someone like me, who is in Afghanistan at the moment, that is a very difficult position to hang onto, because we're essentially starving millions of people. Twenty million kids in Afghanistan at the moment are at risk of a very uncertain and bleak future because we're holding out on a political situation and wording that might never come. For me, I'm sorry, but that's unacceptable.
Cryptocurrency
3.56
The committee noted media reports that some Afghans may be receiving emergency aid payments in the form of cryptocurrency and queried whether aid and development NGOs thought it was an effective way to get aid payments into Afghanistan.
3.57
However, evidence provided by aid and development organisations indicated that cryptocurrency is something that most ‘are not currently looking at’ and is seen as ‘a less than ideal solution’. Ms O’Farrell explained:
At the end of the day, people still need hard cash to be able to pay for groceries in a market, so I think the main priority is trying to free up the banking sector within Afghanistan.
3.58
Save the Children reported that their staff in Afghanistan ‘will not use cryptocurrency given the lack of adoption, inadequate infrastructure, and mounting regulatory issues surrounding cryptocurrency’ and noted that:
On the ground analysis has found that Afghanistan remains, increasingly so, a cash-based economy and is turning towards neighboring currencies (e.g., Pakistani and Iranian currencies) rather than the adoption of cryptocurrency … [O]ur staff note the lack of a robust and reliable electrical and internet infrastructure, making adoption untenable for deployment of programmatic operations across 10 provinces.
3.59
In order to utilise a website such as binance.com, Save the Children would have to transfer:
… the money to the account of a money changer in Kabul, and the money changer would then pay out cash to the NGO. However, the money changer requires a written contract with each transaction, supporting the transparency of the transaction.
3.60
DFAT summarised its approach to dealing with the issue of liquidity in Afghanistan, noting that it has been working with the US and other like‑minded countries, as well as with the UN. Mr Sloper explained:
[T]he United States, ourselves and others have encouraged each other to talk to our financial institutions about the impact of the sanctions and what that may mean, to allow those who do have operations or those institutions that deal with others who have operations in Afghanistan to facilitate the transfer of funds.
Separately, [Australia is] also working with the United Nations, which is exploring a number of different options to address the liquidity issue, both to help the Afghan people and also the delivery of humanitarian assistance. These include direct importing of cash, which was a practice prior to the change in power in August last year, where the Reserve Bank used to import hard currency. On a small scale, it's going in now but it's insufficient to meet the demand at present, so we're looking at other alternatives, which might be announced over the next few weeks, that the UN will organise.
There is still work underway as to how, within the sanctions regime and carve outs, the United States or others might be able to assist the [Da Afghanistan Bank] itself to facilitate payments in the normal fashion, particularly payments relating to basic services. But there's yet to be agreement on how that might occur.
Delivering aid
Concerns about the Taliban
3.61
During the committee’s public hearing, concern was raised that the Taliban may be taking some aid before it reaches its intended recipients. In response,
Mr Sloper advised that there are ‘measures in place and we are confident that that isn’t occurring’ for the most part. It is ‘a genuine concern,’ however:
The United Nations is confident at the moment that the aid is flowing through to the people most in need. Partly that's because, even before the change in power, there were many services delivered by NGOs or the international community—not all, certainly. And, to date, until the carve-out resolution passed by the UN Security Council in December, there has been very clear pressure from all of us on those in country to assist the Afghan people but also to monitor and verify so that no benefits, financial or otherwise, flow to the Taliban. The Taliban have accepted that we are doing this outside their systems. But, as I noted before, there are localised sets of interference, and we are raising them regularly. So there is that risk there, and, in part, that is why the assistance we are providing is being channelled through international partners who have experience on the ground and have worked in conflict zones and in parts of Afghanistan previously that were controlled by the Taliban. In working on those relationships, they're trying to monitor and verify that assistance goes through.
Experiences delivering aid on the ground
3.62
A number of aid and development organisations also gave evidence that aid was getting through without interference by the Taliban. These accounts are outlined below.
3.63
Mahboba’s Promise explained their experience in delivering aid since the resurgence of the Taliban:
Our work has significantly expanded, with the primary focus on humanitarian assistance. We never stopped. Even on the first day the Taliban took over and even alongside an evacuation process we were always able to distribute aid…There are about 30,000 people that we are reaching as a small not-for-profit. We have strong links on the ground. The only reason we have been able to continue is that we were able to pivot to local staff and local communities that we have built into, or else our infrastructure would have also crumbled with the evacuation process.
3.64
Mahboba’s Promise added:
Mahboba’s Promise currently operates in four regions across Afghanistan, being Kabul, Badakhshan, Takhar and the Panjshir Valley. We are currently planning to expand to the Kandahar region in the coming months.
In each of these regions, Mahboba’s Promise projects are strongly embedded into local communities and continue to operate in the current hostile environment. In some of the regions, Mahboba’s Promise as an organisation has been operating for decades.
Having these grassroots connections with local communities has allowed Mahboba’s Promise to take the relevant actions necessary in its operating model to continue to administer humanitarian aid and assistance in Afghanistan.
3.65
Ms Fristacky stated that the AADO continues its work through the current crises:
We are running five literacy, numeracy and life skills courses for women in rural villages in the Kabul province. They are running continuously in women's homes. A larger home houses 20 women. The courses are over 12 months. At the end, they are provided with a sewing machine on graduation and they are able to earn a livelihood with that through sale or barter for food or other essentials. Our other major program is science teacher training. We are currently doing this. We have modules in maths, biology, physics and chemistry. We say they are all vital in health and engineering fields and access to health care and building homes, schools, hospitals, deeper wells, water storage and the like to meet basic needs in accordance with the sanctions. A high priority, of course, is training women teachers for the reopening of girls secondary schools, which we have been advised is scheduled for March but we need that to be confirmed. AADO has also been involved in training for other high-demand vocational skills in farming and building, especially carpentry, but we lack funding to continue this.
3.66
Ms McSheehy described some of the activities being currently undertaken by Save the Children in Afghanistan:
We have mobile health teams delivering health and nutrition support to communities that don't have access to any other health care. We've increased the number of mobile health teams that we have. We've increased the number of people within the mobile health teams. We're supporting more and more patients on a daily basis. We simply can't keep up. We're working more days in more villages with more patients. The stocks that we have to support the population, that might have been okay to cover six months previously, will run out well before the six months are up due to the increase in consumption of medicines and nutritional products. We're increasing the number of school classes that we're running for Afghan children—that's both for girls and for boys—because it's one of the ways to keep them out of child labour and child marriage. It's a way to keep them safe. We can't actually keep them in school if they're too hungry to come to school. So we also have to feed them, and we're doing that through the mobile health teams.
Contact with the Taliban
3.67
A number of witnesses from aid and development organisations commented on their contact and dealings with the Taliban.
3.68
Ms Haddad explained that WVA ‘have worked in the past in Taliban‑held areas and…have mechanisms that ensure the funding does not go to the wrong hands. It goes to the people, the children, that we serve’. For example:
We set up mobile health units and nutrition—what we call mother and baby tents, where we roll out infant and young child feeding programs. We set these up in collaboration with communities. The community leaders have already been vetted. We know who they are and we know that the funding goes directly to support these spaces, to support supplies coming to these spaces. We're not in the business of diverting funds to somewhere that has not been vetted.
3.69
Similarly, Ms McSheehy agreed that NGOs were well-versed in working alongside the Taliban:
Working with the Taliban is not new for agencies that have been in Afghanistan for a while. We've been working with the Taliban in Taliban controlled areas for the last 20 years, so we have strong systems in place to allow us to have confidence that our money that is raised outside of Afghanistan is going to the places where it needs to be at the time it needs to be. There's a tendency to think this is all new and the aid agencies are having to adapt to the new regime. We're certainly having to adapt to the changing environment, but it's nothing that we haven't had to adapt to in the 45 years we've been here. We have constantly had to adapt over that period. We have confidence in our systems. We have confidence in our due diligence checks; every single supplier is vetted at the highest level. We are confident that the money that comes into Afghanistan is used for what it's supposed to be used for and is not diverted.
3.70
Regarding the AADO’s activities, Ms Fristacky stated:
We have certainly had contact. They visited the AADO premises in Kabul and intercepted aid being distributed but didn't prevent the aid from being distributed…Our aid is getting through…We have photographs of it being distributed through local people.
3.71
Dr Nouria Salehi, AM, Founder and Executive Director of AADO, added:
Recently, they changed their attitude to us and they asked us to train more and more male science teachers. We trained 100 in the current group, but we asked them if next time in March we could start training 100 female teachers. They haven't said no. They said we will receive a letter from them, so we are waiting, though I haven't seen anything yet.
3.72
Mr Thomas noted an experience that WVA had with the Taliban which caused some disruption to their activities but was subsequently resolved, stating:
[W]e did have a situation two weeks ago where members of the Ministry of Vice and Virtue entered NGO premises in a province in western Afghanistan, and this is an example of where the attempted interference has cost us time. Because what it meant in the end—and in solidarity with other humanitarian aiders within this province—was that operations were suspended for three days while the interference was investigated and the UN was consulted. They were able to reach out to the Ministry of Vice and Virtue, as well as the governor of this province, to hold a dialogue that emphasised the importance of NGO humanitarian-actor independence, particularly around the independence of our female staff and their ability to do their jobs. We are happy to say that at the end, it was the governor of this province that emphasised the importance of our independence as a precursor to our ability to respond to these needs on the ground. So, it was the governor himself that spoke directly to the Ministry of Vice and Virtue, asking them to please not enter NGO premises in the future—it was unacceptable—and that anything would need to go through them, in concert with the UN agencies.
3.73
It was added that there wasn’t really any consistency across the Afghan provinces regarding attitudes towards women, with some areas and members of the Taliban more conservative than others. Mr Thomas stated:
…at the moment we're seeing a very ad hoc application of unwritten policy, province to province. It's really hard to give a read that would be applicable across the entire country at the moment. I think that's one of the challenges we're facing—that a lot of these principles that we're having to work to are not written down and they come and go for the province. So it is pretty difficult to navigate the landscape at the moment because it does keep changing, and it keeps changing as the Taliban consolidate their own governance structure, policies and positions.
3.74
Ms McSheehy commented on whether the Taliban were asking them to pay fees, taxes or whether they were being influenced to provide aid in a particular area:
Not specifically by the Taliban. We're not being asked to pay any fees, any taxes, other than the normal taxes of state functions of payment on salaries. People in Australia have to pay taxes on their salaries; people in Afghanistan have to pay taxes on their salaries. As an organisation, we are not being asked to pay anything that we shouldn't be paying…[Furthermore,] we are being asked to work in different locations, but that's by the communities themselves, who have no-one supporting them. It's not by the Taliban.
3.75
Additionally, it was pointed out that the Taliban:
…are very well aware that they cannot support the population. When you get [to] figures of 97 per cent of the population living below the poverty line, that is not something that any state can resolve by themselves, so the authorities want aid agencies here. They want aid agencies to support the population…So there is a point of leverage here from aid agencies to speak out on behalf of the situation.
[T]here is too heavy of a burden at the moment on the UN to be shouldering the dialogue with the Taliban to achieve widely agreed governance principles for humanitarian organisations to operate with. Province by province, we're seeing different rules being applied that humanitarian agencies are needing to abide by. We have been fortunate enough to have UN OHCHR doing a terrific job, in partnership with us, to communicate to the Taliban on our behalf for any incidents that we see or any interference with our independence. That channel of communication has been good up to now, and it has been a mechanism that we've been tapping into quite frequently to ensure that we can continue operating effectively. But, as I say, that burden at the moment has been put on humanitarian agencies and UN agencies to ensure that we can continue programming.
3.77
Therefore, Mr Thomas commented:
[W]e really do need governments and the international community to assist in that regard, and to have dialogue with the Taliban, to ensure that we can have agreed-upon governance principles that ensure that, long term, humanitarian agencies can continue to operate effectively, efficiently and without interference.
3.78
In a recent update, Save the Children Australia advised the committee that in early February 2022, their Afghanistan offices received a document from the Taliban’s Emirate of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy titled “Monitoring and control plan of NGOs activities for distribution of urgent humanitarian assistance food stuffs and non-food stuffs”. Save the Children explained the possible implications of the document raising concerns about being able to implement programs and deliver aid as well as the possible effect on donor confidence:
This document lays out a plan for government ministries and local sector offices to monitor the effectiveness of all NGO programs and the development of a technical committee responsible for potential management of NGO activities and distribution of aid. Save the Children is concerned about our ability to implement high quality programs and deliver life-saving aid to the most vulnerable, adhering to core humanitarian standards, should this document be enforced, as this shift would allow unprecedented influence over who receives aid and how aid is delivered. Additionally, Save the Children has concerns that, despite recent the recent UNSC Resolution 2615…enactment of the activities outlined in this document will significantly decrease donor confidence and, ultimately, critical aid from reaching the 22.8 million Afghans in need of humanitarian assistance.
3.79
However, Save the Children advised that ‘to date, our office in Afghanistan reports that this document has not been enforced’.
Australia’s level of humanitarian and development funding
3.80
DFAT stated that Australia is ‘continuing to work through trusted UN partners to deliver the Foreign Minister’s $100 million commitment of humanitarian assistance to respond to the crisis in Afghanistan from 2021 to 2024’, which was announced in September 2021. DFAT submitted that Australia remains ‘on track to deliver $65 million in assistance this financial year’.
3.81
Additionally, in answer to a question on notice from supplementary estimates, DFAT noted that ‘Australia’s total funding to the World Food Programme in the 2020-21 financial year was $107.268 million’ whereby some of that funding has been used to reach ‘11.8 million people in Afghanistan with food and nutrition assistance’.
3.82
According to DFAT, of the amount of money committed this year, $22.5 million has been disbursed on the ground so far ‘with $14.5 million to the World Food Programme for nutrition and livelihoods, $3.5 million to the United Nations Population Fund for protection and sexual health, and $4.5 million to the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund for emergency health’. Additionally, Mr Marc Innes-Brown, First Assistant Secretary of the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan Division at DFAT, stated:
…there will be another $42.5 million disbursed before the end of this financial year. Of that, we are in the very final stages of contracting and then disbursing around $20 million from our humanitarian emergency fund, which will go to partners to support internally displaced people in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries [such as Pakistan and Iran] that are hosting refugees. So we are very hopeful of getting that amount out the door very soon.
3.83
In response to the Australian Government’s announcement to commit $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, Mr Tinkler stated:
We welcomed the Australian commitment of $100 million previously announced, but I think on this the devil is in the detail. There was $52 million of that which was already committed and there was $35 million to be spent across the forward estimates, leaving around $13 million of new and targeted funding dedicated to this crisis. For context: we spent $10 billion over two decades on our military engagements, so half a billion dollars a year of funding in Afghanistan. Just in the last week we've seen the Australian government announce $1 billion for reef protection, $50 million to koala conservation and $60 million announced today for countering violent extremism. These are all no doubt important domestic priorities but, put against the fate of 13 million children on the brink of starvation in Afghanistan, the reality is that our commitment of new and targeted funds amounts to less than a dollar a day for every starving child in Afghanistan right now.
3.84
ACFID and Save the Children Australia reiterated the recommendation provided in their initial submissions that Australia should increase its humanitarian funding to a minimum of $100 million in new funding. ACFID provided further detail on their recommendation:
This increase to $100m (AUD) should occur this fiscal year 2021-22. ACFID has also recommended that Australia commit $100m (AUD) on a multi-year basis. While the situation remains uncertain, multi-year commitments provide predictable and flexible funding for UN and humanitarian agencies. It creates significant efficiency and effectiveness gains and represents best practice in situations of recurrent, chronic or protracted crises. The initial $35m (AUD) committed to 2024 is welcome but does not reflect the reality on the ground and the long-term support that is required.
3.85
ACFID also compared Australia’s contribution to that of the US and the United Kingdom, stating:
The United Kingdom has doubled assistance to Afghanistan in this financial year to £286m (GBP) to support health services, food, water, shelter and education. Since October 2021, the United States has increased aid to nearly $728m (USD) for 2021-22 providing further shelter, healthcare and food.
3.86
WVA and Micah Australia also urged Australia to urgently commit $100 million in humanitarian assistance per annum, including at least $30 million as a food security package, as additional funding, via the Australian Humanitarian Partnership (AHP) to address crisis levels of hunger in Afghanistan.
3.87
ACFID argued that the AHP is an effective ‘channel for supporting NGO-led humanitarian responses in complex environments’. The AHP:
…uses Australian Government resources to leverage NGO networks and expertise, to deliver effective humanitarian assistance. For each response, the partnership selects the NGOs best placed to respond to those in need quickly, safely and effectively. The AHP has delivered assistance in a wide range of politically sensitive and operationally challenging environments including Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Given the operating environment for humanitarian actors in Afghanistan has become clearer in recent months, and the proven effectiveness of AHP in responding to crises in other country situations, we strongly encourage the government to support the work of Australian NGOs with an existing presence in Afghanistan through this channel.
3.88
Mr Thomas explained why the additional funding was important:
We need a plan of action that scales the need and the resources to meet them, a plan of action from Australia that is more than $20 million in aid per year. We are asking for an increase to $100 million in aid, with at least a $30 million increase in this fiscal year to focus on food security. We're asking for a plan of action that goes beyond the humanitarian response and hones in on relief and development initiatives that can help families pick up the livelihoods they once had. We're asking for a plan of action that requires efforts to insular inconsistently applied parameters that inhibit humanitarian agencies are replaced with widely agreed government principles so we can operate in an environment that enables effectiveness and efficiency…We also need a plan of action that requires us to take note of the challenges of the Afghan economy and pursue efforts to assess and address the ongoing liquidity issues. It is crucial that the generous donations from this government as well as from the Australian people can reach the intended targets.
Long-term needs
3.89
Some submitters highlighted the need for Australia to contribute to longer-term development assistance funding in Afghanistan, in addition to funding for short-term humanitarian relief efforts. For example, the AADO noted that Afghanistan faces a critical need for assistance in development planning and investment in rural communities, including in areas such as agriculture, animal husbandry, irrigation and water storage, solar and hydroelectricity power for cooking, heating, cold storage and freezing works. AADO re‑iterated its prior submissions recommending that the Australian Government ‘develop a new funding stream to support the work of NGOs like AADO that capitalise on partnerships with Afghan civil society to support enhanced development objectives’.
3.90
Mr Watkin acknowledged that ACFID’s members ‘do not wish to give any credence or embolden the Taliban in any way’ and ‘were deeply concerned about the situation and the takeover in Kabul last year,’ however:
…we really do need to think about the immediate humanitarian needs and also a longer-term engagement process. I think it's on the international community to think about what that looks like…[W]e need to work out how we're going to continue to support the people of Afghanistan through the development programs that have essentially propped up a sustainable economy and agriculture for significantly long periods of time. This current crisis was caused by a huge withdrawal of liquidity. The frozen assets that we have—$7 billion worth—is stalling the central bank in Afghanistan, causing these problems of finance. This is not an ideal situation for anyone…but we do need to start really thinking about what the long term could look like, and we haven't seen that.
3.91
Similarly, the Australian Red Cross submitted:
Afghanistan is a protracted and complex crisis, therefore there is strong sense in the Australian Government planning beyond immediate humanitarian aid for medium to long term humanitarian assistance. Undertaking this scenario planning collaboratively with its humanitarian partners, including Red Cross, will increase understanding of capacity, risk and access. Consulting closely with humanitarian partners to determine how risks associated with the delivery of humanitarian services can be jointly managed will support the Australian Government to protect the humanitarian space, central to design and implementation of humanitarian assistance.
3.92
DFAT stated that it recognised ‘the protracted nature of the Afghanistan crisis and that short-term humanitarian assistance alone is insufficient’ and submitted in answer to a question on notice that:
Under the Regional Humanitarian Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 2021-2024, DFAT will develop targeted, well-planned multi-year interventions through to 2024, and focus our humanitarian advocacy on three priority crosscutting issues – gender, protection, and disability.
3.93
Mr Thomas also discussed the need for a long-term view to address the challenges faced in Afghanistan:
We have an opportunity to decide how Australia, in partnership with humanitarian agencies, can respond to the current crisis in Afghanistan and how we can help shape the future of the country. It really is this dual role that we now have to face. We have to look at the immediacy and urgency of now but with a focus on long-term goals. Those long-term goals must include enabling the Afghan people to put food on their own tables.
The Australian government has been a key contributor to development initiatives over many years, and its efforts have meant some villages have avoided the worst of drought and food crisis…Australia does have the expertise, Australia does have the resources, though its actions to date have been insufficient. So we must now revamp these efforts to avoid losing much of the development gains we have achieved and invested in for so many years, while keeping an eye on what is urgently needed now, and that is food security packages.
3.94
Micah Australia suggested that:
Working with and through civil society also promotes inclusivity and offers a way to provide services to hard-to-reach communities, vulnerable populations and minorities. Given the Government’s particular focus on supporting the rights of women and girls, supporting NGOs and civil society who share this mission is a clear and tangible way to deliver on this commitment.
3.95
ACFID recommended that Afghanistan be prioritised in Australia’s long-term aid programming, and that Australia should:
adopt a ‘humanitarian plus’ approach to its aid funding by permitting activities which support basic human needs (broadly defined), including agriculture and education; and
fund Australian NGOs and Afghan civil society to implement a multi-year locally led program that supports human development outcomes, with a particular focus on protecting and advancing the rights of women and girls.
Channelling aid through the UN or NGOs
3.96
The committee received evidence on the benefits and challenges of channelling aid either through the UN and its agencies or through NGOs on the ground.
3.97
At a hearing, the committee raised the concern that people working for NGOs may be targeted if they are found to be beneficiaries of Australian money in questioning whether it was best for the Australian Government to direct funding through NGOs or through the UN. It was pointed out that the UN had international standing, infrastructure and systems in place to deliver the aid, as well as being able to address issues with the Taliban administration and protect their people on the ground.
3.98
Mahboba’s Promise noted that there ‘are many aid organisations that have strong local networks [on] the ground that can channel direct aid’, suggesting that ‘[t]heir experience needs to be leveraged’. Mr Cina argued that it is not about funding one or the other, but rather both avenues are needed given how extreme the situation in Afghanistan is:
The key point is to target Australian NGOs with strong local and grassroots connections so that the disbursement of that aid is directly channelled to the people and is done in a way where it is done by local communities…It's the reason we've been able to be effective; we're literally working through our local communities and we're able to target people at a far wider scale and in a far more grassroots manner, and that's the strength of us. We're a direct channel; we're not going through anyone else. The UN of course is great, and their infrastructure is rebuilding, but they were not able to adapt as quickly as NGOs like Mahboba's Promise and others were able to. I think there is an argument for both, especially to reach a large group of people en masse. The problem is that 97 per cent of the population is in poverty. The need for aid is everywhere. It's not a question of NGOs covering the UN's gaps. The UN can't cover it—they can't. You need organisations like ours that have the local networks that are within the communities to not cover the gap, but take large proportions of the population…It's about distributing and leveraging opportunity wherever you see it, and how we can help the people best.
3.99
Mr Watkin also highlighted the importance of flexibility in how Australian aid is channelled and the opportunities to utilise NGOs to reach vulnerable groups.
3.100
On the other hand, Mr Jamal stated that the RCA has ‘called for Australia to increase its humanitarian commitment to Afghanistan as part of the UN's humanitarian response plan’ and that it is best practice at this point in time to channel funding through the UN, stating:
[A]t this current juncture, the UN has a confluence of multiple things going for it. First, it is willing to step up. Second, it is capable of scaling its operations across the country. Third, it has a depth of understanding across the country that few other NGOs have. And it also has a dialogue with the Taliban that I think offers it a relative competitive advantage in delivering those services.
[I]t's also important for me to underscore—that other NGOs who are partners with the UN and have joined in the UN's appeal for their humanitarian response plan also offer important critical services. A lot of these NGOs also reach places that the UN cannot, so their role is often complementary.
3.102
Regarding the risks to NGO staff due to their association with Australia,
Mr Cina explained:
[T]here has been a strategic shift in how, for example, we operate. We are not going out and having Australian flags in our dispensations anymore. We are not outwardly coming in as an Australian aid organisation. When we are distributing the funds, they don't know who we are and where we come from. All they see are Afghans and local peoples. So the main blessing there is that we have the reach and we are able to do it. We haven't had any problems since we pivoted our tactics in how we implement. But previously we were very public about being an Australian aid organisation and there were high-profile, connected Australians on the ground. There was an emergency situation and the solution for that, in our case, was evacuation of those people.
3.103
During the hearing, witnesses were questioned as to whether they had approached the World Food Programme or UN agencies to offer their services directly to them given that the Australian Government was directing its humanitarian aid through them. Ms Fristacky of AADO stated that they hadn’t directly been in contact with them, but was something that they could look into, but noted that they had previously contacted the UN about human rights issues but received no response.
The UN business is quite bureaucratic, so we have begun talking to them but it takes a long time. It contradicts the security situation on the ground and the fact that they can't reach everyone; however, we have begun that process, and it will take time.
3.105
As for ACFID, Ms O’Farrell noted that as a peak body they ‘represent 130 humanitarian aid and development organisations’, and Mr Watkin explained their relationship with the UN:
Many of our members are actually delivery partners with the UN, so they have longstanding relationships with UN agencies delivering on the ground. This slight irony about this is that a lot of the NGOs who are working with the UN are delivering aid around Afghanistan anyway, and there is an opportunity for the Australian government to work through NGOs and independent humanitarian organisations more readily. That's why we've asked for the $35 million that we have called for, which would take us up to $100 million a year. It would be [used for] established, trusted Australian programs with NGOs. The Australian Humanitarian Partnership [AHP] is an example of a tried and tested facility that the Australian government uses to partner with NGOs. It could use that additional funding that way.
3.106
ACFID provided five recommendations they suggest would enable the Australian Government to take a coordinated approach that was underpinned by agreed principles for engagement to ensure that the Taliban were held to account, while also ‘ensuring continued support for the basic human needs of the Afghan population’ and ‘help to protect development gains’. The Australian Government should:
advocate for and support international coordination to re-engage the Afghan Central Bank and enable its basic functioning;
use its authority and influence to ensure that private sector organisations (domestic and international) understand the scope of Resolution 2615 to prevent de-risking, including a statement to parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs;
actively support discussions between former donors to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the World Bank about how the fund can be used to support basic human needs in Afghanistan and to unfreeze further funds for the World Food Program and UNICEF;
work more readily with independent humanitarian organisations, NGOs, and civil society organisations and provide tangible support to Afghan human rights defenders and civil society who are putting their lives at-risk and have a critical role to play in upholding human rights, transparency and good governance in the country; and
work with its counterparts and through the UN on monitoring the ongoing human rights situation while ensuring that sanctions and funding freezes do not compound civilian suffering. For example, through the establishment of a UN Fact-Finding Mission for Afghanistan to monitor the human rights situation and hold the Taliban accountable for violations of human rights and its commitments to the inclusion and protection of women and minorities.
3.107
DFAT outlined Australia’s current priorities and approach to delivering aid to Afghanistan. Mr Sloper noted that Australia was ‘not channelling [aid] through government services at this stage’ and emphasised:
[T]o be effective in terms of our influence, we need to be coordinated and consistent and work collectively [with like-minded partners]. To date, the international community as a whole, irrespective of their particular interests, have been very clear about some of those expectations of the Taliban, including on inclusive government and observation of human rights, like women's and girls' rights …
In terms of delivery, we have a record of working with NGOs in Australia and with international NGOs. However, for the reasons we've just outlined, our judgement is that at this stage it's best to deliver through international partners, particularly UN agencies that are on the ground and have experience there. That was also the case prior to the shift in power in August last year, and our humanitarian strategy—that is available on the DFAT website—outlines how, using our aid program, we've focused on providing humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people. Of course, it'll be under review, and, should the situation change and we can build better confidence about verification and monitoring, I suspect we will then look to a broader engagement with others.