Chapter 3

Costs of Australia's engagement in Afghanistan

3.1
This chapter provides an overview of the human, financial and other costs of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, including consideration of both the impact on Australians and Afghans.

Costs of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan

3.2
In discussing Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, submitters reported on a number of costs. While the information received regarding the human cost of those who served in Afghanistan was fairly consistent, the estimated financial cost was less conclusive. Some submitters also raised the impact of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan on its international reputation. Others also considered the costs for the Afghan people, including lives lost as well as the humanitarian and economic crises they now face.

Human costs

3.3
The Department of Defence (Defence) advised the committee that:
Tragically, 41 Australians died on operations in Afghanistan, making the ultimate sacrifice in the line of duty. More returned home with lasting physical and mental injuries, and we have lost further Defence personnel since they returned home.1
3.4
Mr Hugh Poate, whose son was killed while serving in Afghanistan in 2012 by a Taliban-recruited Afghan soldier who committed an insider attack, highlighted the loss of life and impact on Australian soldiers post-war:
The costs to Australia were 41 lives lost in Afghanistan (40 killed in action and one from a non-combat related incident) and 261 wounded. Additionally, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare stated there were 419 suicides in serving, reserve and ex-serving ADF personnel between 2001 and 2017 who had served in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. These figures have since been officially adjusted upwards. Anecdotally, this figure is now estimated to be in excess of 500 deaths. These deaths are part of the flotsam of war and, regrettably are still rising.2
3.5
The psychological cost of the war on the Australian soldiers, and the large number of suicides among veterans of the Afghanistan conflict, created public pressure for a Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide which was established on 8 July 2021.3
3.6
The Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Australia) stated the ‘human costs of this 20-year long war in which Australia has been actively involved have been staggering and—like war-induced suffering everywhere—are likely to continue for generations’.4
3.7
Similarly, Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN) submitted that this human cost:
…has left an indelible mark on the lives of members of the ADF and their families and the communities from which they come. In many cases these scars will continue for lifetimes.5

Financial costs

3.8
The committee received a range of evidence on the financial cost of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan since 2001, with estimates provided by submitters and witnesses ranging from $7.8 billion to $13.6 billion.6
3.9
Most estimates of the costs of Australia’s military engagement are derived from a combination of figures in Defence annual reports, portfolio budget statements as well as figures from NATO reports. Using these sources, the Parliamentary Library estimates that the total cost of Australian operations from November 2001 to mid-2020 equates to around $8.3 billion.7
3.10
The Australians for War Powers Reform stated that ‘Australia spent $7.8 billion on the war in Afghanistan to June 2021’.8
3.11
The committee also asked relevant government departments what work the Australian Government has done to calculate the costs of the various components of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, and what the best available estimates are. The committee received the following answers.
3.12
In answer to a question on notice, Defence reported:
$8.4 billion was spent by the Department of Defence on Operations SLIPPER and HIGHROAD between 2001 and 2021. This does not include other costs incurred on other operations in the Middle East, including in Iraq and in supporting our presence in the region.9
3.13
DFAT also reported:
DFAT had a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2021. The total operating cost for DFAT’s operations during that time was approximately $566 million.10

Impact on Australia’s reputation in the international community

3.14
A number of submissions provided perspectives on the impact of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan on its international reputation.
3.15
SAWA-Australia submitted:
Australia has suffered international reputational damage through its military defeat in Afghanistan, the hasty closure of its Embassy in Kabul and the poorly-planned and executed evacuation of Afghan nationals seeking refuge, particularly for those people who worked with Australian troops and other Australian interests. This damaged reputation has been compounded by the government’s reluctance to date to provide a greater number of Humanitarian Visas to people at risk from the Taliban regime.11
3.16
Mr Phil Gorman, a retired ship’s officer, agreed that the ‘reputational costs [of our involvement in Afghanistan] are immense and far reaching…Our international reputation is severely damaged and all our diplomacy undermined’.12 To mitigate the damage to Australia’s reputation, Mr Gorman stated ‘[a]ctions rather than words are required to mitigate the harm. It will take decades of good governance, statesmanship, fair dealing, aid, skilled diplomacy and just outcomes’.13
3.17
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Australia (WILPF) also raised the missed opportunities for Australia to engage in its region whilst preoccupied with our involvement in Afghanistan in support of allies:
…our future national security is best assured by Australia becoming a respected and reliable international partner working closely with our Asian and Pacific neighbours.14

Costs for the Afghan people

3.18
Evidence received by the committee discussed a range of impacts of the twenty-year war on the people of Afghanistan and noted what it cost them.
3.19
Mr Gorman summarised the impact of twenty years of war on Afghans:
Over 47,000 Afghan civilians killed with uncounted numbers wounded.
Unexploded ordnance continues to kill and maim.
Hundreds of thousands have been rendered homeless or displaced.
An impoverished country on the brink of economic collapse; lacking clean water, sanitation and healthcare, with half the population facing starvation due to drought.15
3.20
Amnesty International also submitted that:
The 20-year war is estimated to have taken the lives of at least 47,245 civilians with many more injured, in addition to over 66,000 Afghan national military and police, 51,191 Taliban and other fighters,
72 journalists, and 444 aid workers.16
3.21
In accordance with its United Nations Security Council mandate, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has compiled successive reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, using a consistent methodology since 2009.17 These annual reports have been prepared jointly with the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. The reports attribute over 60 per cent of civilian casualties from 2009 to 2020, to
Anti-Government Elements who were in armed opposition to the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. For example, in 2012, 81 per cent of civilian casualties were attributed to Anti-Government Elements, such as the Taliban and other non-State armed groups taking a direct part in hostile acts in pursuit of political and ideological objectives. These casualties were often the result of deliberate and planned attacks, frequently with indiscriminate effects. In this timeframe, suicide and non-suicide improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted killings and ground engagements conducted by Anti-Government Elements were the dominant causes of civilian casualties.
3.22
Additionally, Mr Arif Hussein, Senior Solicitor at the Refugee Advice and Casework Service, discussed the displacement of Afghans due to the war:
…we saw millions of Afghans being internally displaced and forced to flee Afghanistan and find their way to places like Australia. Thousands of people from Afghanistan fleeing the Taliban and the insecurity in Afghanistan have also made it to Australia.18
3.23
IPAN also raised the costs to the Afghan people in terms of lives lost and the number of people displaced, noting that ‘Afghanistan continues to be one of the deadliest places in the word to be a child’.19
3.24
Ms Sitarah Mohammadi from the Afghanistan-Australia Advocacy Network discussed the dangers now faced by Afghans following the resurgence of the Taliban:
As the Taliban and other armed groups, particularly the Islamic State Khorasan Province, are targeting and committing human rights violations against the people of Afghanistan—in particular ethnic and religious minorities such as the Hazara people—reports emerging from international organisations, including Amnesty International, have already reported the torture and massacre of Hazara civilians in captured villages throughout Afghanistan. Amnesty International have further reported extrajudicial killings of surrendered Hazara Afghan army soldiers, and they have reported civilians being targeted and killed in late August. Hazaras are also facing ethnic cleansing by the Taliban, who continue their policy of forcefully confiscating and dispossessing Hazara families of their ancestral lands and properties throughout the country.20
3.25
Voices of Influence Australia submitted that:
The real cost is reflected in the trauma, cultural disconnection, dehumanization and conflict experienced by Afghani peoples and communities and the Afghani-Australian community during Australia's twenty-year military engagement. In line with Australia's international law obligations of state responsibility and its duty therein to make full and complete reparations for any material or moral injury cause (International Law Commission, 2001), Voices of Influence Australia strongly urges that the Australian Government issue a formal apology to acknowledge wrongdoing and allow the process of community building and healing to begin.21

Concerns about the loss of development gains made in the last 20 years

3.26
Over the past twenty years, Afghanistan achieved many development gains due to the support and efforts of international forces and governments, however, a number of submitters raised concerns that those development gains may be lost under Taliban rule.
3.27
Ms Azadah Raz Mohammad, a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne, commented on the uncertain future for those left in Afghanistan:
The post-2001 generation of Afghans was a generation of hope. My generation was a generation of young men and women who, despite shortcomings, attended schools and universities and had professions. Now these young men and women are at grave risk, for dreaming about and working very hard for a better Afghanistan. Their hard work and dreams are shattered now. They are either hiding in Afghanistan, at serious risk or facing an uncertain future, or they were evacuated from Afghanistan in August, with their loved ones still at risk and constantly being intimidated by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
This devastating situation and the devastating developments could have been prevented if there had been a responsible withdrawal…we knew that the international community's presence in Afghanistan was not guaranteed; we didn't take it for a guarantee. But we also believed in reaching a peaceful settlement with the Taliban—a responsible withdrawal that made sure that the hard-gained progress of the past 20 years, especially concerning women's rights and the rights of minorities, was not lost overnight.22
3.28
Ms Mohammadi, Afghanistan-Australia Advocacy Network, submitted:
Since the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban to power, the Taliban have continued to destroy homes, displace thousands of people and reintroduce their draconian rules, synonymous with their previous regime in the late 1990s. As the Taliban are now in control of the country, women's and girls' rights are once again restricted, and they are confined to their homes. Women and girls are no longer able to resume their education or attend university and employment.23
3.29
Similarly, the Refugee Council of Australia (RCA) indicated that they:
…hold grave concern that actions like the curtailing of education and work rights for women and girls, land confiscation and extrajudicial killing directed at minority groups have closely followed the Taliban regaining executive power in Afghanistan.24
3.30
However, the RCA also noted that:
…some legacy lives on in the education attained by the women and girls of Afghanistan whose learning can be paused but not undone. Finding ways to strengthen and support Afghanistan’s civil society to attain its own goals for its society—many of which align with those of Australia’s—will be vital for addressing the significant challenges faced.25
3.31
Similarly, Professor Felicity Gerry, Queen's Counsel in Crockett Chambers in Melbourne, expressed hope that not all women’s gains would be undone and discussed the role of international community:
…although the Taliban have seized power, the international community is in a position to ensure the visibility of women in positions of power and responsibility and to ensure the recognition of women's issues. One way of doing this in relation to Afghanistan is to listen to, respect and include those women who over the last 20 years or longer have become educated, have taken part and have been in positions of power and responsibility within Afghanistan. There are many women who are highly qualified and experienced in governance in Afghanistan ...26
3.32
Mr Simon Newnham, Acting Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), acknowledged:
Australia has made a major contribution in Afghanistan. A generation of Afghans have seen a better world, but much of this progress is now at risk. With our partners, we will do what we can to ensure that as much as possible is preserved.27
3.33
The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) also noted:
In recent months Prime Minister Morrison, Foreign Minister Payne and Defence Minister Dutton have acknowledged the significance of these achievements and vowed to continue Australia’s development assistance to the people of Afghanistan to ensure development gains are protected.28
3.34
However, Mr Hussein, Refugee Advice and Casework Service, argued that Australia needed to do more to help the people of Afghanistan:
When Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced our complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, like his international counterparts in the UK and Canada, he specifically mentioned that Australia remains committed to helping Afghanistan preserve the gains of the last 20 years, particularly for women and girls…So far, we have not seen any actions or commitments from the Australian government that match our two decades of engagement in Afghanistan. We have not seen any actions or commitments that match the promises that we made to the Afghan people in our longest war. We have a moral obligation to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, and Prime Minister Scott Morrison must announce, and commit to, a significant increase of our humanitarian intake, preferably a substantial multiyear commitment. We need to see those in Australia on temporary protection visas afforded permanency. We need to see efficient family reunion. We need to see the world not leave behind the people of Afghanistan, including Australia.29

Crises facing the Afghan people

3.35
Evidence received by the committee indicated a number of crises now facing the people of Afghanistan as a result of the twenty-year war which ended with resurgence of the Taliban.
3.36
Ms Carina Ford from the Law Council of Australia noted the humanitarian crisis now being faced by Afghanistan:
The withdrawal of NATO allied personnel from Afghanistan and the consequential return to power of the Taliban has resulted in a humanitarian crisis within Afghanistan and a significant influx of Afghan asylum seekers to neighbouring countries.30
3.37
Mr Poate criticised what he saw as the Australian Government’s lack of foresight in relation to the refugee crisis resulting from the war in Afghanistan:
Historically, almost every war has had refugee repercussions. This seems to be an issue that was not factored into Australia’s strategy for the war in Afghanistan—if it had any strategy at all. The outcome of the war has created a current refugee crisis.31
3.38
Mr Timothy Watkin, Director of Policy and Advocacy, ACFID, also underscored the significance of the current situation in Afghanistan, stating:
If there's one point we want to press upon you today, it is the scale of the humanitarian crisis unfolding across Afghanistan and the urgency that is needed in response…We are sounding the alarm that the worst is yet to come as winter sets in and temperatures drop. Over half the country is living in extreme poverty, 23 million people are forecast to face acute hunger, in the middle of a pandemic the health sector is hanging by a thread and the situation is so desperate that starving Afghans are being forced to sell their own children to feed the rest of their family.32
3.39
Mr Nawid Cina, Acting General Manager, Mahboba’s Promise, emphasised to the committee that ‘[t]his is the worst Afghanistan has ever been. There are
11 million children in potential starvation. It's the worst humanitarian crisis since Yemen’.33
3.40
The impending collapse of the economy was another important factor feeding into the humanitarian crisis. The former Ambassador of Afghanistan to Australia, Adjunct Professor Mahmoud Saikal, explained:
The Taliban, during their 27 years of existence, have constantly challenged the international humanitarian and human rights laws. Their continuous war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, together with the recent drought and COVID-19, have come together to create a humanitarian catastrophe. The Afghan people are in the grip of severe shortages of food, cash, medicine, clothes and shelter.
…the humanitarian situation is worsening as we speak, as time passes. If you compare the humanitarian situation now to where we were three months ago, it's rapidly going down. The economy of the country is on the verge of collapse. People are running out of cash, basically. When I talk to my friends and relatives in Kabul—I come from Kabul—they say: “We're running out of cash now. We don't know how to buy groceries on a daily basis.” This is the main point that has occupied everybody's mind, as Afghans in the region and the rest of the world: what to do about the economy of the country and what to do to stop the worsening of the humanitarian situation.34
3.41
Further information on the humanitarian situation and assistance is contained in Chapter 8.

  • 1
    Department of Defence (Defence), Submission 20, p. 2. See also: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Submission 22, p. 1 and Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), Submission 19, p. 12.
  • 2
    Mr Hugh Poate, Submission 57, p. 10. See also: Independent and Peaceful Australia Network, Submission 12, p. 4 and Mr Phil Gorman, Submission 5, p. 3.
  • 3
  • 4
    Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Australia), Submission 40, p. 4.
  • 5
    Independent and Peaceful Australia Network, Submission 12, p. 4.
  • 6
    Australians for War Powers Reform, Submission 23, p. 23;
  • 7
    Nicole Brangwin and Thea Gellerfy, ‘Background to the Afghanistan withdrawal: a quick guide’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper Series, 2021–22, 26 August 2021, www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp2122/Quick_Guides/BackgroundToAfghanistanWithdrawal
    (accessed 26 November 2021).
  • 8
    Australians for War Powers Reform, Submission 23, p. 23; Emeritus Professor William Maley, Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Dr Nishank Motwani and Dr Srinjoy Bose, Submission 15, p. 1.
  • 9
    DFAT, answers to questions on notice from public hearing held 15 November 2021, Canberra (received 3 December 2021), Question No. 21.
  • 10
    DFAT, answers to questions on notice from public hearing held 15 November 2021, Canberra (received 3 December 2021), Question No. 21. Note: Additionally, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) indicated that it had not specifically calculated its past or projected future costs relating to Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan. See: DVA, answers to questions on notice from public hearing held 15 November 2021, Canberra (received 26 November 2021), Question No. 4.
  • 11
    SAWA-Australia (SA), Submission 14, p. 4.
  • 12
    Mr Phil Gorman, Submission 5, pp. 3–4.
  • 13
    Mr Phil Gorman, Submission 5, p. 4.
  • 14
    Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Australia, Submission 47, p. 3.
  • 15
    Mr Phil Gorman, Submission 5, p. 3. See also: Independent and Peaceful Australia Network, Submission 12, p. 5.
  • 16
    Amnesty International, Submission 33, p. 4 referencing Ms Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘Costs of the Afghanistan war in lives and dollars’, AP News, 17 August 2021.
  • 17
    Note: whilst UNAMA reports began in 2007, the application of a consistent methodology has been applied since 2009. Therefore, the earlier reports from 2007 and 2008 follow a previous reporting system and are included on the UNAMA’s website for reference purposes only. See: https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports
    (accessed 8 December 2021).
  • 18
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 28.
  • 19
    Independent and Peaceful Australia Network, Submission 12, p. 5.
  • 20
    Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 14.
  • 21
    Voices of Influence Australia, Submission 63, pp. 4–5.
  • 22
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 4.
  • 23
    Ms Sitarah Mohammadi, Afghanistan-Australia Advocacy Network, Committee Hansard,
    11 October 2021, p. 14.
  • 24
    Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 59, p. 1.
  • 25
    Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 59, p. 1.
  • 26
    Committee Hansard, 15 November 2021, p. 4.
  • 27
    Committee Hansard, 11 October 2021, p. 19.
  • 28
    Australian Council for International Development, Submission 53, p. 8.
  • 29
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 29.
  • 30
    Ms Carina Ford, Member, Migration Law Committee, Federal Litigation and Dispute Resolution Section, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 15.
  • 31
    Mr Hugh Poate, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 2.
  • 32
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, p. 38.
  • 33
    Mr Nawid Cina, Acting General Manager, Mahboba’s Promise, Committee Hansard,
    8 November 2021, p. 35.
  • 34
    Committee Hansard, 8 November 2021, pp. 61–62.

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