This chapter will examine the response of Commonwealth and NSW
Government agencies to the contamination at RAAF Base Williamtown. Key issues
raised during the inquiry included:
coordination of the response;
environment regulation issues;
remediation and management of RAAF Base Williamtown; and
Many of those affected by the contamination expressed frustration that
they had not been notified earlier by government agencies as to the potential
risks of contamination. Ms Washington told the committee it has been 'difficult
for anyone to stomach the most fundamental question: if Defence, the EPA, Port
Stephens Council and Hunter Water all knew about the contaminants exiting the
base in 2012, why wasn't our community given the benefit of the same
information?'. In particular, she noted, earlier notification would potentially
have allowed people to have had 'less exposure to the contaminants'.
There was strong criticism of Defence's approach to community
notification. In particular, Defence had prepared an internal report in May
2003 on its use of firefighting foam which included a key finding that based on
'past and current practices, there is a risk that PFOS/PFOA has contaminated
Defence land as well as neighbouring properties, creeks, dams and reservoirs'.
The PFA stated:
In reviewing the timelines of the ADF response to the use of
PFOS and PFOA and actions once the leak was determined, the PFA believes that
the ADF demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the potential severity of the
issue. Certainly the timeframes and the lack of immediate action demonstrate
that the ADF do not comprehensively appreciate the role and responsibility it
has within the community.
The summarised timeline in Chapter 2 contains some of the detail
regarding how information regarding the nature and extent of the contaminants
on and around RAAF Base Williamtown emerged. In particular, the Stage 1 and
Stage 2 environmental investigations undertaken by Defence were viewed as
critical to the understanding of the extent of the contamination.
Mr Buffier from the NSW EPA told the committee that the Stage 1 report 'did
not identify a clearly defined route by which contaminants were finding their
way to humans, known as an exposure pathway' and therefore 'did not provide
sufficient information at the time to notify the community'. However, he noted
it was of sufficient concern for the NSW EPA to request that Defence conduct 'further
investigations into the extent of off-site contamination and the potential
Mr Buffier outlined how the NSW EPA took a risk management approach to
the issue of when to inform the community regarding the issue. On the basis of
the Stage 1 report, the NSW EPA considered it was 'not appropriate, with our
paucity of knowledge at the time, to inform and alarm the community'. Further,
it expected 'better information [from Defence] for the community relatively
Defence provided the preliminary Stage 2 report to the NSW EPA and other
stakeholders on 4 August 2015. Mr Buffier explained that on the basis of the draft
Stage 2 report 'there was now a likely exposure pathway, and on a precautionary
basis we took the view that we should take steps to close off those pathways'.
Mr Buffier noted that PFOS was a chemical of concern:
The report told us that we now had it not only offsite in
surface water and in sediments but also offsite in groundwater and, most
significantly, in biota. That told us that we had a clear and credible pathway
to human health exposure. So if you accept that the chemical might cause
concerns once it is ingested by humans and there is an exposure pathway, then
that was the significant change in information that warranted the swift
response by us once that came to light.
[W]e worked closely as government agencies to respond to its
findings, in particular closing its exposure pathways, including the
establishment of the Williamtown investigation area, the closure of fisheries
and oyster operations in Tilligerry Creek and Fullerton Cove, where there was a
high likelihood of biological impact. On the day we made those decisions, 3
September, we issued a media release, and the next day, on 4 September, we did
a letterbox drop to all the residents in the investigation area. 
The NSW EPA described a 'reluctance' on the part of Defence to issue a
media release at that time. In these discussions there appear to have been
conflicting views regarding the potential liability for any precautionary
measures taken following an announcement.
Mr Grzeskowiak from Defence commented that its 'preferred mechanism would have
been for Defence to engage the community at the time we had the final verified
report'. He stated:
My personal advice was that we would much rather have
organised some form of meeting in this area and talked to people as a way of
getting that message out. That was Defence's preferred approach. We thought
that a media statement late in the evening would raise alarm, and that is
clearly what has occurred.
In its timeline of events leading to notification of the community, the
Defence submission made an observation regarding the preliminary Stage 2
Typically these reports are not relied upon for community
advice or formal decision making due to potential for significant errors being
detected during quality assurance/technical verification stages.
In his interim report of the NSW EPA approach to RAAF Base Williamtown,
Professor Mark Taylor found that, while the NSW EPA's actions from August 2015
period have been appropriate, it has been 'reactive':
The public could have been informed earlier in a comprehensive
fashion had action been taken sooner by the EPA. Specifically, these actions should
have focussed on the extent of contamination in the community where the EPA has
carriage of responsibility.
However, Professor Taylor also highlighted that a lack of clarity in
responsibilities for environmental regulation of Commonwealth Government land
and agencies had hindered the capacity of the NSW EPA to influence the
A number of problems with the engagement and communication of
information to the community by government agencies were identified following
the announcement of the fishing closures and precautionary measures in
September 2015. For example, Ms Kate Washington MP noted that from the outset
the media has been the main source of information for affected residents. She
Whilst I appreciate that conveying news of potential
contamination in any manner would be difficult, many residents took umbrage
with the manner in which they were informed. Moreover, not all affected
residents engage with the media and so learning of the news via neighbours, was
The PFA and the CFCL condemned the lack of information, commitment and
consultation demonstrated by Defence. They described:
Minimum communication to the community and stakeholder groups
from [Defence] regarding their activities, any mitigation activities and intention
to assist or compensate. Information has only been filtered through DPI or the
Community Reference Group.
In the first 7 meetings of the Community Reference Group
there was no consistency in [Defence] representatives - with 8 different people
representing at the first 7 meetings.
Lack of any consistency in responses between different [Defence]
representatives regarding compensation and activities.
A large amount of questions through the Community Reference
Group are responded to by the ADF as requiring responses at a later date.
The Port Stephens Council was also critical:
[T]here was and continues to be no clear coordinated communications
strategy. This would have greatly assisted in ensuring key messages were
consistent and confusion in the community was managed for such a high profile
issue. Coupled with the apparent impromptu and piecemeal communications from
various agencies was the fact that undated fact sheets were distributed to the
community, while key agencies such as the EPA were reliant upon Council for the
communication of matters on social media due to the lack of an EPA presence on
Council also had concerns that the agencies with lead
communication responsibility were also those furthest removed from the public,
meaning they were somewhat out of touch with the needs of the local community.
The first community meeting, which was held out of the area and at a venue that
serves alcohol, is an example of this. The meeting was poorly facilitated and
at times lacked the tact, diplomacy and compassion the audience required. It
was also far too long, with presentations from various government agencies
prioritised over community participation.
Professor O'Kane, who chairs the Expert Panel, noted that NSW Government
agencies were using multiple methods to engage with the affected community. In
particular a community drop-in centre has been established at a local school
'where people can go and talk to representatives of various agencies like
Health, or Water, or DPI fishing' on a one-to-one basis. She described it as a
'powerful communication mechanism because there is no time limit' and '[p]eople
can sit and talk as they need to'.
Ms Washington also characterised the community drop-in sessions as successful
'providing a forum for residents to ask questions of experts and agencies
one-on-one [and also] a much-needed forum for people to share their concerns
and experiences with other residents'. However, she reported:
Gaining appropriate and consistent information from [Defence]
has been challenging for residents, businesses and myself. This lack of
information has created a space for rumour and misinformation to propagate and
Reports of conflicting information being given to residents
from [Defence] and the EPA are especially concerning as it fuels the mistrust.
Ms Washington advocated 'a one-stop-shop approach whereby residents
could contact one number with any concern'. She argued it 'should not have been
the residents' responsibility to determine which agency, or level of government,
could address their particular concern'.
The NSW Farmers' Association recommended that 'Defence, as the polluter,
chair the Community Reference Group and take greater responsibility for
engaging with the community and the industries operating in the affected
Mr Grzeskowiak outlined that Defence first met with community members on
16 September 2015 and had been involved with the NSW Community Reference Group.
We have an individual on the ground, Air Vice Marshal Greg
Evans. He has been there for some weeks now. His role is to be our main point
of contact with the community. We have established a website, a hotline and an
email line. We have done letterbox drops to people where we think we need to go
and offer them the opportunity of having their bores or water tanks tested. We
are trying to engage as much as we can.
The response to contamination at RAAF Base Williamtown from September
involved a large number of government agencies and other stakeholders. Mr
Buffier, from the NSW EPA, characterised it as a complex situation which
'involves multiple state and federal agencies, a number of new specialist
working groups, including the Expert Panel, the Community Reference Group and
the Elected Representatives Group'.
Defence reported that it was 'working closely with key Federal stakeholders
Departments of Health, Environment, Infrastructure and Regional Development,
and Air Services Australia to ensure a consistent strategic management
approach'. It was also 'working closely with state and local authorities and
councils to ensure a consistent policy approach'.
However, the Port Stephens Council considered the chain of command and
hierarchy across government agencies was 'not clear':
With a large number of agencies involved...it appeared as
though the community and agencies were confused as to who does what. For
example, the Office of Chief Scientist issued media releases on similar content
areas before the EPA, which was confusing for the community. It was apparent
from a Council perspective that there were too many players, too many subcommittees
and no clear and defined leadership and ultimate accountability. Further, no
clear strategies or project plan exists that Council has seen spanning the entire
scope of works across various agencies.
The Port Stephens Council stated:
The weekly technical phone meetings/hook ups, whilst
admirable in the attempt to coordinate agencies, [proved] unsuccessful. The
majority of the actions identified in this forum were continually deferred or
carried over with little real progress made. These meetings just reinforced
Council's view that the process was cumbersome - there appeared no
accountability to follow through and deliver on actions.
It recommended a coordinated approach be considered similar to that used
for the April 2015 storm and flood disaster recovery process. It argued that
the 'appointment of a coordinated, staffed body which is seen to be independent
of government allows for the necessary actions to be determined and allocated
ensuring each agency knows exactly what is expected of it'.
Testing times and differing
Tensions between Defence and NSW government agencies were apparent
during the inquiry. Defence commented that its 'direct access to the NSW Government
Williamtown Expert Panel has been limited as Defence is not a member'.
The Chair of the Expert Panel, Professor Mary O'Kane noted that Defence had
initially been invited to be observers but that the 'general feeling of my
colleagues was that it did not allow free discussion' and the invitation was
A key point of difference between Defence and NSW Government agencies
appeared to be in regard to the program for sampling and testing of the
contamination in and around RAAF Base Williamtown. Defence advised it was
currently undertaking an environmental investigation in line with the National
Environment Protection (Assessment of Site Contamination) Measure 1999 (NEPM):
Defence is taking approximately 900 samples of ground water,
surface water, soil, sediment and biota in and around RAAF Base Williamtown.
This activity is known as the Stage 2B Environmental Investigation and includes
the development of a human health risk assessment, an ecological risk
assessment, an assessment of remediation options and development of a
remediation plan. This process is intended to be completed by August 2016, with
interim reporting in June 2016.
Defence noted that the Expert Panel advised that 'additional sampling
beyond the NEPM guidelines are required as part of the Stage 2B Environmental
Investigation sampling plan'. Defence stated:
Based on current information, it is too early to determine
whether the sampling methodology outlined in the NSW Government Williamtown
Expert Panel’s Scoping Document will be necessary. In accordance with the
process outlined in the ASC NEPM, an assessment of the source-pathway-receptor
linkages will be undertaken before the sampling program is finalised, so that
it appropriately reflects the exposure potential associated with each pathway.
The need to undertake the sampling recommended by the NSW Government
Williamtown Expert Panel is being evaluated as the potential exposure pathways
Professor O'Kane highlighted that the focus of the Expert Panel was
providing results to the affected communities 'as quickly as possible' and
stated it was really concerned about timely engagement from [Defence]'. She
[W]e need to understand the exposure pathways for the
chemicals, and we have proposed a big list of sampling for food and liquids. It
is not happening at the speed that we think is important, particularly because
we have a fishing ban on and various other advisories. The other issue is we
have requested more environmental samplings from our water working group,
cleared by the Expert Panel. That is not moving at a speed that we would like,
because that also informs what we do in the exposure pathways works. There is a
level of concern from the New South Wales government and its agencies on that
Mr Clearly from Hunter Water noted that the speed of Defence environment
investigations had been a frustration. He considered 'a lot more work can and
should be done to understand where the contamination is and how it is moving
through the groundwater and the surface water'. He suggested '[a]dditional
monitoring bores need to be put on Defence land, additional sampling needs to
be undertaken, and then more detailed technical investigations need to occur to
characterise where the contaminants are and how they are moving'.
Mr Buffier from the NSW EPA argued:
The New South Wales EPA and expert panel have provided advice
on the scope of a comprehensive human health risk assessment and it now needs
to be finalised. Defence needs to meet the full costs of this sampling and
analysis, although to date many of these tasks have been undertaken by New
South Wales agencies to speed up the process.
Part of the NSW Government's assistance package for the Williamtown
area, announced on 23 December 2015, included an investment in a 'new Liquid
Chromatography-Mass Spectrometer, to speed up testing of soil, water, biota and
Environmental regulation issues
The scale of the issues of environmental regulation on Defence sites was
highlighted by Mr Colin Tinder, a former Defence environmental manager. He
described a '200-year legacy of contaminated sites on and off the Defence
The Defence estate is larger than that managed by most State
National Parks Services and Defence land contained many places that were of
national significance in terms of environmental and heritage conservation...Literally
thousands of instances of legacy contamination [are] known to exist at Defence
sites (many of which dated from WWII) – including contamination arising from ordnance
use (conventional and chemical), landfills and burial pits, fuel leaks, chemicals
(including cocktails of hydrocarbon solvents), metals – including mercury, and
even radioactive materials.
The relationship between the Commonwealth, state and territory and local
governments regarding environmental regulation has been described as a
'scrambled egg'. An analysis by Dr Chris McGrath from the University of
Queensland in 2012 observed that 'the three tiers of government in Australia
have become so entwined that it often becomes difficult to distinguish their
roles in a logical, neat way'. He noted:
The first key thing to understand is that state governments
were historically responsible for environmental management, and they still
often resent the Commonwealth intruding into these matters. State, territory
and local governments still handle the vast bulk of day-to-day decisions and
administration of land and water management such as around 250,000 town
planning approvals a year. In contrast, the main Commonwealth environmental law,
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth),
deals with only around 400 referrals each year.
In November 1997, the Council of Australian Governments agreed in
principle to Heads of Agreement on Commonwealth and State roles and
responsibilities for the Environment (Heads of Agreement). The Heads of
Agreement do not appear to clearly delineate the responsibilities of
Commonwealth agencies (such as Defence) in relation to compliance with state
environment and planning laws. For example, relevant listed exceptions to
compliance include matters relating to 'on-ground airport management' and
'national defence'. However, it also outlines that where exceptions are
permitted, 'Commonwealth activities will, as far as possible, be undertaken in
a way that seeks to achieve at least the equivalent requirements of State
Defence stated that it operates under federal environmental legislation
but that it also 'seeks to comply' with the intent of state or territory
Defence is required to meet the obligations of the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) in the conduct
of activity which has potential environmental impacts. The EPBC Act covers
matters of national environmental significance and actions affecting
As a matter of operational practice Defence undertakes
environmental testing and investigations consistent with State environmental
obligations to monitor environmental impacts and develop appropriate mitigation
measures, if required.
In relation to its response to the contamination at RAAF Base
Williamtown, Defence stated:
The National Environment Protection Council Act, 1994
(Cth), allows for the making of National Environment Protection Measures...One
of those National Environment Protection Measures is the National Environment
Protection (Assessment of Site Contamination) Measure 1999 (the ASC NEPM).
Australian States and Territories are responsible for implementation of the
NEPM through relevant statutory controls in each jurisdiction. Defence is
committed to acting in a manner consistent with relevant jurisdictional
environmental legislation and regulations.
The ASC NEPM provides a means to support the protection of
human health and the environment by establishing a nationally consistent
approach to the assessment of site contamination. The ASC NEPM is intended to
be used by all parties associated with site contamination including regulators,
site assessors, environmental auditors, land owners, developers and industry.
The NSW EPA, through the Contaminated Land Management Act 1997
and the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, regulates
contaminated land in NSW. However, Ms Buffier noted that the NSW EPA does not
have regulatory powers over Defence and thus little power to influence
Defence's response times to contamination issues. Further, there is no ready
avenue for the EPA to undertake independent action, because it is financed on
the basis that it has regulatory powers to compel polluters to undertake the
Mr Buffier argued that there needs to be a regulatory regime to
incentivise Defence to adhere to the same environmental standards applied to
the rest of the community, and there needs to be an authority to regulate
...Defence has been slow to accept responsibility for actions
needed to deal with the contamination and provide necessary information. If
this contamination was caused by industry or by another New South Wales government
agency, such as Hunter Water, the response would have been different because
the EPA has clear powers to regulate those sectors...Throughout all of this
process we have sought a cooperative approach with Defence on environmental
issues impacting state land, but the EPA has not been in a position to compel
Defence to respond in a timely and effective manner. This has resulted in state
agencies needing to step in to do some of that work. This issue has starkly
highlighted a gap in both the regulation and accountability of government
agencies such as Defence for pollution and contamination. Whereas the EPA can
regulate state agencies and regularly holds them to account through penalty
notices, there is no equivalent body regulating Commonwealth bodies and holding
them to account for their actions in relation to contaminated land. 
An absence of federal oversight of Defence's environment activities was
also highlighted in the NSW EPA's briefing note to the responsible NSW Minister
on 29 May 2013 which observed:
Given [Defence] is a federal agency, EPA has no statutory
control. In a similar situation in Sydney where contamination has entered
"NSW land" from a [Defence] site the EPA has been advised by the federal
agency concerned that they have exemption from certain State laws. [Defence]
has previously advised EPA that environmental oversight of its operations is by
the federal Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Populations and
Communities (SEWPaC). The [Defence] cover letter noted it had not informed
SEWPaC as the contamination has been determined not to cause a significant impact
to the environment under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999.
Mr Buffier told the committee that, due to its concerns, the NSW EPA
attempted to escalate the issue by notifying the Department of the Environment.
The Department of the Environment acknowledged that it received correspondence
from the NSW EPA on 18 November 2013 notifying it of site contamination
investigations being undertaken at Williamtown RAAF Base and 'for any further
actions you may consider necessary'. The Department of the Environment did not
respond to this letter and has not had any further correspondence with the NSW
EPA on the matter.
A number of submissions to the inquiry considered that legislative
reform was necessary to correct this absence of regulatory clarity. For
example, the Port Stephens Council noted that there had been concern expressed
'about the relationship between regulator and polluter, which has been seen in
some quarters as being too close, while the legislative capacity for the NSW
Government to regulate the Commonwealth is seen to be insufficient'.
It appears that Defence is a self-regulating entity without
oversight from an independent environmental regulator. The lack of any
connection between Commonwealth and state legislative provisions relating to
significant pollution and contamination situations on Commonwealth land has contributed
to the current inadequately managed situation. Council believes there are very
real opportunities to improve the legislative link between the Commonwealth and
the states to ensure environmental pollution and contamination incidents are
Consideration should be given to the appointment of a
Commonwealth environmental regulator and implementation of an environmental
regulatory framework overseeing [Defence] activities on Commonwealth land;
Consideration should be given to a comprehensive review of
Commonwealth and state legislation relating to mandatory notifications to
environmental agencies across all states when pollution and contamination
incidents result from Commonwealth activities;
Consideration should be given to a comprehensive review of
legislative provisions to allow state-based environmental agencies (i.e. NSW
EPA) to have a greater regulatory role in environmental and contamination
incidents involving the Commonwealth. This review must consider a broader
regulatory role for the state environmental agencies in the investigation and
management of pollution and contamination situations where the pollution and
contamination has caused significant impacts off Commonwealth land.
Mr Gorfine from the Williamtown and Surrounds Residents Action Group
held similar views:
[W]e would hope at the end of this inquiry that, as an
absolute minimum, proper legislative changes are enacted and put in place to
ensure that New South Wales EPA or an equivalent body has the teeth to regulate
and control pollution events over Commonwealth lands.
Going forth from that, there need to be in place proper
checks and balances along the way if there is a pollution event on Commonwealth
land. There need to be reporting requirements, and failure to report those
contamination events must have consequences.
The need for better interaction between the Commonwealth and state and
territory environmental regulators was also highlighted during the committee's
inquiry. For example, the NSW Farmers' Association observed:
Unfortunately the NSW EPA has no jurisdiction over a
Commonwealth entity like the Department of Defence. Although Defence did engage
with the EPA early in its examination of the problems PFOS/PFOA might have
caused at the base, it is unclear how this ongoing engagement was managed and
what policy governed it. Further, it is unclear how frequently Defence engaged
with the EPA throughout its examination of the facts-on-the-ground at
It recommended a protocol be established 'to govern interaction between
federal departments, including Defence, and the EPA (or equivalent) to ensure
that jurisdictions can have confidence that their constituent industries and
communities are not threatened by the effects of polluting activities'.
A key problem identified during the inquiry was that there are no
national environmental standards in Australia for levels of the chemicals that
have been used in firefighting foams. Defence emphasised that the National
Health and Medical Research Council does not specify levels for these chemicals
in the national Australian drinking water quality guidelines.
Mr Grzeskowiak from Defence told the committee:
There are no health standards in Australia for tolerance of
this chemical in drinking water at whatever level and there are no state or
territory equivalent standards either. There are not many places in the world
where those sorts of standards are in place. There are a few standards emerging
in the US and the UK that we are aware of, and we are using them. It is clear
that globally this is still an emerging contaminant that is not fully
In January 2009, the US EPA's Office of Water established a provisional
health advisory of 0.2 micrograms per liter (μg/L) for PFOS and 0.4
μg/L for PFOA to assess the potential risk from short-term exposure of
these chemicals through drinking water. However, other jurisdictions have
adopted different standards.
On 19 May 2015, Defence published Defence Contamination Direction #8
– Interim Screen Criteria. The directive explains these criteria 'are based
on industry collaboration and current understanding' with the intent 'to
support the progression of relevant activities on the Defence estate in a
nationally consistent manner'.
In particular, it set out interim screening levels for the following:
ground water (Human health – drinking water) - PFOS 0.2
μg/L; PFOA 0.4 μg/L; and
surface water (Human health – consumption of fish) - PFOS 0.65
ng/L; PFOA 300 ng/L.
In his interim report on the NSW EPA's management of contaminated sites,
Professor Mark Taylor recommended the NSW EPA 'should set interim guidelines
for PFOS/PFOA for a range of environmental samples including soil, sediment and
groundwater, as a matter of priority, pending finalisation of national
guidelines'. He also recommended the NSW Government engage with Commonwealth
and other agencies and experts to establish national guidelines for PFOS/PFOA.
Remediation and management of contaminated areas
Conflicting evidence was received regarding the remediation options for
RAAF Base Williamtown and its continued environmental management. A number of
submitters argued Defence should prioritise remediation so further contaminants
would not leave RAAF Base Williamtown. This was considered a priority to
prevent further movement of contaminants but also to provide certainty for
residents and businesses that levels of contaminants would not increase in the
future. For example, the NSW Farmers Association recommended that 'Defence
immediately detail its plan for how it will achieve remediation so that
surrounding communities and industries can be assured that they can go about
their business with security'.
Addressing contamination in Lake Cochran, in particular, was seen as an
urgent priority. For example, Mr Buffier from the NSW EPA stated:
Defence needs to take immediate action to address the
migration of further contamination from the Williamtown base, with the goal
that, by the end of June 2016, a successful containment strategy for Lake
Cochran and other identified hotspots of contamination on the base is in place.
It is quite feasible to replace Lake Cochran in another facility—a lined
facility that would ensure there was no contamination coming from the area.
However, Defence stated that despite 'research worldwide, few effective
or viable large scale remediation techniques have been identified'. Defence
indicated that 'it is unable to put a timeline on remediation at this time...[but]
will continue to investigate potential remediation options'.
In response to the repeated calls for measures to 'block stormwater egress off
the base and...stop groundwater traversing across the base', Defence stated:
There is no feasible way to stop water leaving the base
because measures to prevent this would effectively create a dam. This could
create flooding and potentially affect civil and military operations on the
airfield. However, there may be opportunities to prevent localised contamination
spreading by the use of either physical barriers or chemical binding additives.
All of these potential solutions require further significant
technical design feasibility studies as part of a range of potential options
for containment and remediation. Currently the effectiveness of these solutions
could not be guaranteed and could potentially hasten the spread of
contamination. Defence is currently investigating remediation options as a
Mr Grzeskowiak stated Defence's engaged engineers and consultants have
not suggested solutions to prevent contaminated water leaving the base. He told
the committee that methods described at the hearing 'were unlikely to stop
contaminated water leaving the base under all circumstances':
The simplistic view of building a dam or something that stops
all run-off from the base would put Newcastle Airport out of action the next
time there was a heavy rainstorm, simply because it would become flooded. So it
is not a credible scenario.
Defence noted that it had 'recently completed a remediation program at
Point Cook, while the program was not initiated to remediate PFOS/PFOA, amounts
of these contaminants were detected during the remediation program'. It stated:
Remediation of just under a hectare was undertaken by many months
of continuous burning of soil at very high temperatures. Large scale aquifer
remediation is problematic. Defence continues to investigate options for large
scale remediation of groundwater in situ.
The geology around RAAF Base Williamtown also appeared to be a major
factor contributing to the difficulties of remediation. Professor Ravi Naidu
from CRC CARE described the geology as 'quite unique':
There is a surface sandy layer that allows things to move
through and then you have a clay layer within a depth of three or four metres,
or maybe five. What we found was a lot of contaminants are locked at that depth...
[The clay] holds onto these contaminants. The water table
goes to a depth of four metres and so every time you have precipitation, for
instance, the water table rises and, as it rises, it gets in touch with these
low contaminants which are released. When the water table goes down again, it
carries with it those contaminants. Of course, water moves, and it moves it
from the hot zone beyond the soil zone. You also notice PFCs moving rapidly in
the three- to four-metre zone and, when they hit the clay layer, that is where
they normally sit. Because they are quite recalcitrant, they do not degrade and
therefore they will be there for a very long time unless you lock them up there
or dig them out.
However, Professor Naidu was of the view that scientific and technical
expertise existed to deal with the contamination:
I think the approach here would be passive coupled with
active remediation. Passive is what should contain the plume, and active is
when you start remediating the plume. That is the approach that needs to be
taken. There is absolutely no doubt that once your contaminants get into the
subsurface environment, you are looking at a very heterogeneous, complex
system. And for a heterogeneous, complex system you never have a simple
solution. It is not cheap; it costs money.
During community statements at the public hearing on 22 December 2015,
Mr Des Maslen, who operates an environmental management company, also told
the committee that a viable remediation program exists for the contamination
from Lake Cochrane.
A large capital works project is currently underway at RAAF Base
Williamtown for the development of facilities and infrastructure for the New
Air Combat Capability Project. Several submissions argued these works should be
halted until PFOS/PFOA contamination issues on the site are resolved. The
Williamtown and Surrounds Resident's Action Group argued that due to the unique
hydrology of the land there should be a moratorium 'placed on any significant
developments or proposed developments within the red zone until such time as
NSW Health, NSW EPA and expert hydrological advice advises otherwise'.
Similarly, Mr Lindsay Clout from the FCRAG stated:
Defence have been engaged in major development works on the
base, which include extensive earthworks on a known contaminated site and
pumping groundwater that has been hindering excavation and foundation works.
These works had been underway for some time, with no controls in place for the
spread of the contamination until we, the community, protested. Now we are told
Defence are preparing a management plan, which I can tell you has not seen the
light of day, and magically two carbon filtration machines have been acquired
to treat groundwater, but they tell us these machines cannot be used to stop
the pollution leaking from Lake Cochran.
Defence noted that the facilities and infrastructure works currently
being undertaken at RAAF Base Williamtown were subject to an environmental
management plan which incorporated the treatment of ground water encountered
during the conduct of the works.
Defence noted that it was using the activated carbon filtering process around
the works for the New Air Combat Capability project. Mr Grzeskowiak stated:
The environmental legislation we work under requires that we
have to do dewatering if we are going to be digging. The water that is taken
out of the aquifer is sampled. If it is above a certain level, it is put
through an activated carbon filtering process to reduce the contaminant below
that level and then it is put back into the ground after the works are
finished, which is again in accordance with the environmental legislation that
we work under.
Defence also stated that, on current projects at RAAF Base Williamtown,
all disturbed soil is being tested for PFOS/PFOA and being stockpiled on site
while remediation options are investigated. Any contaminated water which is
being encountered during excavation is being treated to safe drinking water
levels before being introduced back into the environment.
The Port Stephens Council stated:
At RAAF Base Williamtown, significant civil works are
currently being undertaken as a part of the Joint Strike Fighter upgrade
involving the movement of large volumes of soil and likely the interception of
ground water. Council has not been provided any information explaining the
civil works and the interaction of these works with the existing contamination
situation. It is suggested that Defence consider providing information
explaining the works and the link with the contamination.
Contamination on other Defence and
PFOS and PFOA remain significant residual contaminants at many sites
globally, for example, at many of the world's 49,000 airports (including 450
civilian and military airports in Australia). Foams containing these chemicals
have also been deployed on fires at traffic, truck and railway accidents and
even building fires. As at airports, the chemicals can escape into the
surrounding urban or rural environment and contaminate water supplies.
Mr Grzeskowiak for Defence described the extensive previous use of firefighting
foams containing PFOS/PFOA in Australia and overseas:
[T]hese firefighting foams—never mind the other products and
materials that have used this chemical—would have been widely used by both
military and civil airfield firefighters, plus the rural fire services, plus
metropolitan fire services, plus probably at any industrial site that was
processing hydrocarbons at a scale—refineries, large fuel storage depots, those
sorts of things. So we know that the chemical has been used extensively
worldwide for quite a long time, since certainly the early seventies, for
firefighting and a range of other applications.
In its submission, Defence indicated it had undertaken a review of its
estate to identify further areas for investigation:
AFFF containing PFOS/PFOA has been used extensively around
the world for both military and civilian purposes to suppress class B liquid
fuel fires. AFFF has been used at a wide range of airfields, fuel storage
depots, vehicle yards, on Naval platforms etc.
Following a Defence estate-wide desk top review of Aqueous
Film Forming Foam (AFFF) use, 16 sites have been identified as a priority for
further investigation (Category 1 Properties). These sites have been selected
based on Defence's understanding of how AFFF was used at each site and any
information known about water use and hydro-geology in the area. This is based
on the information Defence has up to this point. We will continue to review as
we better understand the nature of this emerging contaminant.
Defence will undertake community consultation as it conducts
environmental investigations at other bases.
Mr Colin Tinder, a former Director of Environmental Impact Management at
AFFF contamination would not only be a matter of risk that
exists at RAAF Williamtown. With similar practices having been adopted around
Australia it is likely, in fact probable, that AFFF will be found in the soil
at most other sites where fire fighting training and equipment testing has been
conducted. Sites like RAAF Base Townsville drain to the World Heritage Area of
the Great Barrier Reef.
While AFFF contamination of the environment is a serious and
troublesome issue and that has had serious effects on the livelihood and well
being of Defence's neighbours at Williamtown, it is likely to be present at
multiple more Defence sites. It can also reasonably be assumed that it will
also occur off-site.
Ms Beatty from the PFA also highlighted potential national implications
for the fishing industry of PFOS/PFOA contamination:
We are also concerned that this is not a unique situation and
has the potential to impact on other commercial fishing industries throughout
Australia. We strongly urge consideration of remediation activities in any
areas in Australia identified as at risk.
There were also indications other contaminants may be leaving Defence
facilities. For example, Mr Gorfine from the Williamtown and Surrounds
Residents Action Group noted that independent water testing which has been
conducted has 'come back not only with PFOS and PFOA levels but with other
hydrocarbons such as avgas [aviation gasoline] and other potential pollutants'.
Ratification of Stockholm
In response to a question on notice, the Department of the Environment
noted that 'listing of PFOS on the Stockholm Convention in 2009 does not enter
into force for Australia until the domestic treaty making process is complete
and an instrument of ratification has been transmitted'.
The Department of the Environment indicated this process was proceeding:
The Department is continuing to develop a complete picture of
all PFOS use in Australia, and refining options for implementation of the
Stockholm Convention requirements. This has included consultation with impacted
business, industry and state and territory governments, among others. The next
step will be the release of a regulation impact statement on the regulatory
implications of ratification under the Convention for consultation, including
cost benefit and regulatory burden analyses which have been commissioned by the
The National Toxics Network recommended urgent regulatory action to
ensure Australians are protected from ongoing exposure to PFCs. It urged the
Australian Government to 'immediately ratify and take action on the persistent
organic pollutants in the Stockholm Convention including the listing of PFOS in
Defence indicated that the issue of compensation is 'a matter separate
to financial assistance and will depend upon a determination as to liability
and quantification of losses attributable to actions by the Commonwealth'. It
[It] is too early to make any decisions as to compensation,
as both the extent and effects of the contamination are not currently
understood, and will not be understood for some time as environmental
investigations continue. Legal issues relevant to compensation are informed by
evidence and interpretation of evidence – both as to the sources of
contamination, actions that give rise to an alleged loss, the actual loss
claimed and possible contributory causal issues. There are a range of
investigations and considerations that are in train – covering scientific,
environmental, engineering and health matters. Defence is closely involved in
these and will take them into account when considering claims for compensation.
This view was repeated at the public hearings. Mr Grzeskowiak told the
committee is was 'too early for formal acceptance of liability' and 'there was
no formal proposition for a compensation scheme'. However, he noted Defence was
working with some people who are in the process of making claims against
Defence, representing the Commonwealth, for reimbursement of some costs.
Mr Grzeskowiak acknowledged that Defence was 'aware of a community expectation
that there might be compensation', but he could not 'comment on what the
government might decide in due course'.
[T]he testing we are
doing is to try to understand the nature of the contaminant and where it is;
the research we are doing is to try to understand, from global research, what
the likely health effects might be. They are being done in a professional and
systematic way...We know the community is concerned, and yet the research we have
done tells us that there are no proven health links between adverse health
outcomes and exposure to these chemicals. We know that in the Australian
community there is a background level of exposure that we would all have.
The Defence Legal Counsel, Mr Michael Lysewycz stated:
We read and
sympathise with the statements by community members who are apprehensive about
suffering loss. When it comes to compensation, there are different ways in
which people may suffer loss. We will have to look at each one of those to
establish potential liability and actual loss and see how that can be
redressed. In other cases, we have been particularly responsive to claims as
they come through. We do not shy away from the responsibility—the Commonwealth
does not—but there are certain thresholds that have to be passed before we can
actually pay money out of the public purse...
All I can say is that
the law concerning liability and assessment of compensation and quantum is
quite complex. We try to do that as quickly as possible once we have the
evidence. Going back to the earlier point about admission of liability, I can
tell you that I have not advised the department on liability because I do not
have the evidence on which to base that assessment.
There was high level of frustration expressed during the inquiry
regarding Defence's refusal to commit to compensate those affected by the
contamination from RAAF Base Williamtown. For example, Mrs Beatty from the PFA
described how the handling 'or lack thereof' by Defence in 'discussions
surrounding the "polluter pays" principle and compensation to those
impacted has been highly stressful and unsatisfactory for our industry'.
Professor O'Kane observed that the NSW Government 'has a very strong
principle of polluter pays'. If the contamination was the result of activities
on RAAF Base Williamtown 'it would be Defence and therefore the Commonwealth'
who would bear liability.
We are very concerned that Defence is not responding to the
sense of polluter pays. They are the polluter. We would like to see Defence
being a model polluter in that we would hope that government would always be
the best type of agency when something is happening and polluter-pays is a very
important principle. So we are concerned that we are not getting the response
that we would expect from an industry polluter, for example. We are very
concerned about the timeliness from the point of view of being able to inform
the community, both in Williamtown and more generally.
Appropriate avenues for compensation from Defence and the Commonwealth
were also discussed in detail. For example, Mr Donahoo urged the committee to
recommend the government take a proactive stance and 'agree to voluntary
acquisition of affected properties and to establish a credible compensation
scheme...based on the ex gratia payments scheme with independent arbitrators and
one level of independent appeal'.
Similarly, Ms Washington stated:
Defence knows that
there is contamination and knows there are impacts on the community. Those
impacts are very real, because we have the restrictions already in place, so
Defence is aware that people are incurring costs that they would not have otherwise
incurred. It is not right for those residents to have to wait two or three
years down the track to make a civil claim to recover those losses, because
they are known to be occurring now. I think it is unconscionable for Defence to
not make reparation for those losses as they are incurred as we go through this
process, before the process ends.
She urged the Commonwealth 'to immediately create a contingency fund
from which residents can make claims against and for a line item to be created
in the next federal budget in recognition of the longer term losses which are
likely to result from the processes that are already in train, being a
For the fishing industry, an important consideration in relation to
potential compensation was the question of whether the fishing closures would
become permanent requiring a 'buy-out' of affected commercial fishermen. For
example, Ms Walker from the WCFC stated:
If they do close the
river completely and do a buyout, I believe it needs to take into account the
emotional side of people. It needs to take into account the loss of income that
has occurred and the projected loss of income. My husband expected to prawn and
fish that river every day, just about, for the next 30 years, so I believe that
at least a good period of projected income needs to be taken into account. I
also think costs for retraining or relocating need to be taken into account. If
a fisherman still wants to fish but they cannot fish the Hunter River and they
might want to buy an outside trawler or go somewhere else, I think that needs
to be taken into account as well, because they would all be costs that would be
incurred. It is something that has happened that is not their fault.
The PFA also argued that fishers' business have been impacted and that
under the 'polluter's pay' requirement, Defence is required to financially
compensate those impacted:
In the short term,
the commercial fishing businesses impacted by the closure will require
compensation for business interruption costs. Business interruption costs
should cover the costs associated with the proportion of a business's catch
that is no longer from the areas subject to the Fishing Closure or not
substituted by fishing/relocating in other areas...
Longer term, business
interruption costs may include relocation costs and related expenditure. If
successive testing indicates sustained levels of PFOS above Total Dietary
Intake (TOI) levels for seafood such that longer term or permanent closure is
required , the affected businesses should be offered a permanent buy out using
factors determined by an Advisory Group consisting of the PFA, Commercial
Fishermen's Cooperative, Sydney Fish Markets and the DPI Fisheries. This would
also include the remediation of impacted areas back to preserve and protect
fish stocks in the region
The potential for class action against Defence for compensation was
frequently raised. Mr Grzeskowiak told the committee that Defence was working
with some people who are in the process of making claims against Defence,
representing the Commonwealth, for reimbursement of some costs.
However, legal proceedings were not perceived as an optimal solution for those
affected. For example, Mr John Donahoo told the committee:
[A] class action may
take years to run its course, hence subjecting affected residents to more
distress. Furthermore, considerable extra costs may likely be incurred by the
Commonwealth to pay for the legal costs of the plaintiff and the defendant, and
claimants will forfeit about 30 per cent of any compensation awarded to cover
fees owed to their litigating funding company.
Ms Washington argued that affected residents and businesses 'should not
have to expend their time and energy pursuing a civil action to recover losses
that they have suffered as a result of government agencies':
Similarly the PFA described a class action as an 'unrealistic' solution. It
Class action requires significant resources, time and stress
– something that should not be recommended as a path forward. We should have
functional bureaucratic in place that protect these people...not ostracises and
force them to take a judiciary approach.
Mr Shannon from Shine Lawyers observed that due to the complexity of
liability issues regarding contamination 'a properly handled and engineered
savvy legal Defence team could run citizens around for decades' before any
compensation was decided.
He argued for a pragmatic approach to compensation which did not require a
reliance on 'scientific certainty' regarding the impacts of the contamination.
Science does not do things quickly. This community type
problem will require a community type approach which will be cutting to the
quick, coming with the most probable explanation and understanding and
addressing it in that manner.
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