3.1
A vital feature of Inland Rail is its connectivity to sea ports and other intermodal facilities. Its connection with these facilities ensures Inland Rail becomes a pivotal part of Australia’s freight network and supply chain, and complements existing freight transport infrastructure. Specific locations of intermodal and logistical hubs within regions are determined by logistics providers, based on their own service offerings to the freight market through the use of Inland Rail.
3.2
The four primary intermodal facilities referenced throughout the Inland Rail inquiry were: a new intermodal facility in Melbourne; a $35 million Pacific National intermodal facility at Parkes; an existing Pacific National intermodal facility in Acacia Ridge; and a SCT Logistics’ Terminal in Bromelton, where the ARTC also owns land for future intermodal site development. Other proposed intermodal facilities include SCT Logistics’ $18 million intermodal terminal in Wodonga, the Wagner/Pacific National proposal for a freight and logistics hub at Wellcamp (Interlink SQ), and an intermodal facility in Moree. These programs are in addition to 20 other proposals being assessed as part of the Australian Government’s Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program, a $44 million program to support communities and industry to make proposals for projects that interconnect with Inland Rail. The committee heard that the development of additional intermodal facilities would not conclude with the construction of Inland Rail, rather it would present ongoing ‘opportunities to provide connectivity into the existing network, connectivity to ports, and also to provide additional intermodal facilities that will help build the capacity of the project’.
3.3
This chapter considers the connectivity of Inland Rail to the intermodal facilities of Acacia Ridge and Bromelton, and the sea ports of Brisbane and Melbourne. This chapter also considers arguments in favour of Inland Rail traveling to the Port of Gladstone in addition to, or instead of, Brisbane. This chapter concludes with the consideration of the Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program and the prospect of further intermodal facilities being located along Inland Rail’s alignment.
Inland Rail connectivity to the Port of Brisbane
3.4
Throughout the inquiry it was discussed that the Inland Rail project’s alignment would cease at an intermodal facility at Acacia Ridge, 38 kilometres from the Port of Brisbane. From Acacia Ridge a dual gauge (narrow plus standard) railway line, owned and operated by Queensland Rail (QR) would accordingly be used to connect Inland Rail to the Port of Brisbane. This rail corridor would utilise a mothballed track between Dutton Park and the Port of Brisbane that had provided a standard gauge freight service from 1997 to October 2010. The ARTC expected the use of the mothballed track to recommence once Inland Rail became operational.
3.5
The committee heard that the Australian and Queensland governments had determined not to extend Inland Rail to the Port of Brisbane. The rationale for ending Inland Rail at Acacia Ridge, rather than the Port of Brisbane, was based on the 2015 business case and the nature of transporting export goods (coal, grain, cotton, chick peas etc.) to the international market. The business case found that a staged investment into the existing link between Acacia Ridge to the Port of Brisbane ‘could meet demand until 2040–41 (or until 2029–30 if more aggressive land use and complementary investment policies are applied to attract greater volumes to rail)’. Further, the types of goods being transported to the Port of Brisbane could travel directly from northern NSW and Queensland and would ‘not require transhipment at landside intermodal terminals’. These goods either don’t require or cannot (in the case of coal) be double-stacked; meaning Inland Rail’s track upgrades to accommodate double-stacked trains would not be required.
3.6
Various stakeholders disagreed with the decision to not extend Inland Rail to the Port of Brisbane, arguing that the existing rail network was not sufficient for the purposes of freight, largely because freight services would have to compete with Brisbane’s growing passenger network.
3.7
Chief amongst those critics was the Port of Brisbane itself. It explained that each year, the Port of Brisbane handles between 1.3 and 1.4 million shipping containers, which results in four million truck movements. However, only two per cent of those containers are transported by rail, with the rail modal share steadily declining each year over the past decade. In comparison, Botany and Melbourne’s rail modal share is approximately 20 per cent, whilst Fremantle Port’s rail share is 16 per cent. By mid-century, the port anticipates 5.1 million containers being handled each year, with over 13 million truck movements. According to the Port, the existing Brisbane Multimodal Terminal (BTM) is ‘vastly under-utilised’ but is a ‘crucial end node for freight rail in Brisbane’. For these reasons, the Port of Brisbane warned that without action to address this future problem the city of Brisbane will be condemned to significant congestion and safety concerns, with the likelihood of:
…a flood of trucks onto our roads. That will have significant impacts on the community. It will have a significant impact on our economy. It will speak to congestion. It will speak to safety. It will speak to emissions. It is a very stark future.
3.8
The Port of Brisbane was critical of the decision to end Inland Rail at Acacia Ridge because of the shared rail corridor with the passenger network. It warned that as Brisbane’s population grows, so too will ‘patronage numbers as new passenger projects come online’, which will result in freight dealing with a number of concurrent factors that would undermine the effectiveness of Inland Rail including:
…peak-hour curfews, operational restrictions and maintenance and emergency downtime. Essentially, its ability to service the economy will come under pressure. That means the current network, which has condemned us to such a low modal share, will not change the picture one iota in the future. We will have a costly and inefficient system of getting freight to and from the population that needs it, and we'll condemn ourselves to a heavily congested truck future.
3.9
In addition, the Port of Brisbane critiqued the ARTC’s position that the existing rail line was fit for purpose for the next 20 years. The Port was of the view this proposition was:
… quite frankly, ludicrous. We can see in the last 10 years that the percentage of freight route moved by rail has declined from 12 per cent to two per cent, so how can bringing in longer, faster trains with double-stacked containers and stopping them 38 kilometres from the port and then expecting them to get through the same network which has been so inefficient and so costly possibly be fit for purpose? We have this fundamental difference of opinion on that.
3.10
A Deloitte Access Economics report commissioned by the Port of Brisbane concluded that if the Port of Brisbane achieved a rail share of approximately 30 per cent, this would equate to taking 2.4 million trucks off the road by 2035 and would generate social, economic and environmental benefits of up to $820 million per annum. In addition, the connection to the Port of Brisbane would connect inland Australia with the international market and the export supply chain that ‘speaks to the economic competitiveness of this country to get its manufactured goods and especially its agricultural export goods to key global markets’. The Port of Brisbane asserted that without this rail link there would be ‘a handbrake to growth’.
3.11
Regarding the primary commodities to be transported to the port, the committee heard of restricted capacity for coal, with seven million tonnes handled through Brisbane’s port each year and a storage capacity of 12 million tonnes. Queensland Rail also restricts the movement of coal on the existing Ipswich to Port of Brisbane line, meaning the K2ARB project would not transport coal unless agreed to by the Queensland Government. Conversely the port has significant latent capacity ‘for handling increased exports of grains, chickpeas, cotton, barley, wood, woodchips and logs’.
3.12
According to the Port of Brisbane, a major barrier to a dedicated freight line to the port is the absence of consensus for a rail corridor through the city. In order to achieve this consensus, the Port of Brisbane called for the release of the Australian and Queensland governments’ corridor assessment study that was completed in 2018. It argued the release of this study would support community engagement, discussion and ultimately corridor consensus. This consensus would then enable governments to preserve and gazette the corridor, and ‘[o]nly then can we genuinely have a fighting chance of developing a business case and seeing how we can implement and deliver that connection’. The Australian Logistics Council and the National Trunk Rail also called for the release of this study, to act as a signal to the private sector and the broader community to engage with the project.
3.13
Building upon the 2018 study, the Australian and Queensland governments commenced a 2019 detailed study into a dedicated rail freight connection to the Port of Brisbane. The 2019 study provides a further analysis of corridor options including ‘demand analysis and a market sounding exercise [to] explore private sector interest in designing, constructing, owning and operating a dedicated freight connection extending from the northern terminus of Inland Rail to the Port of Brisbane’. The Australian and Queensland governments committed $40 million to the study, due to be completed by the end of 2022.
Alternative route options
3.14
The National Trunk Rail disagreed with the current approach and alignment being considered by governments, for rail connections to the Port of Brisbane. It advocated for an alternative dedicated freight train tunnel starting from Queensland Government-owned land at Ebenezer to the Port of Brisbane:
Our proposal involves two eight-kilometre tunnels separated by Pine Mountain Quarry. We are envisaging a commercial model which delivers private financing and delivery, with construction and commercial risks also borne by the consortium.
3.15
The rationale behind a dedicated freight train tunnel is its ability to mitigate the adverse impacts of rail on the Brisbane population and therefore gain the necessary social license needed to proceed with the project. In order to finance this proposal, the National Trunk Rail proposed either a PPP model or a concession:
There are two models and there is one that we favour. The first model would be simply an availability payment, a traditional PPP model that would have the government bearing all of the commercial risk. The alternative would be a concession. Our modelling to date suggests that that would be around 50 years. That concession would give the successful consortium the right to develop the connection and collect access charges on the connection. But, importantly, it requires access to the Ebenezer intermodal terminal and then the connection to the port. We see them as integral parts of the one piece of infrastructure.
3.16
An alternative was also proposed by the QTA, consisting of an intermodal hub in Toowoomba supported by a dedicated truckway to Brisbane and its port. Anticipated benefits of its proposal include better flexibility compared to rail, reduced double handling of goods and efficiency through the processing of agricultural goods for export in Toowoomba. The QTA argued that a dedicated truckway would address the ‘extraordinary cost’ of financing a dedicated freight rail corridor to Brisbane:
You've only got to look at the extraordinary cost—I think there have been eight or nine business cases now for the Acacia-Ridge-to-port link. Without sounding rude, it doesn't matter how many times you do it; it's just going to get more expensive. Because of the nature of the challenges of that route, you're going to end up doing more tunnelling than less tunnelling, and the more tunnelling you do the more expensive it's going to be. It's also then fixed capital expenditure that you're not likely to be able to vary too much in the next 40 or 50 years. So we would argue that there are upgrades that you could do to that rail line to improve it markedly, particularly for bulk, and you'd probably look more to a truckway solution for containerisation. That's the sort of thing we'd like to see in a feasibility study to look at the options and weigh how that might be better blended.
3.17
Utilising road transport at Toowoomba for transporting goods from Inland Rail to Brisbane was also supported by Inter-Port Global Consolidated Holdings (Inter-Port Global). It explained that trucks leaving Toowoomba could travel to Brisbane within 85 minutes, whereas an Inland Rail train between Toowoomba and Acacia Ridge will take three hours. It also questioned the rationale for an Acacia Ridge and Bromelton connection at a cost of $1.5 billion, arguing that the freight task for Brisbane could be serviced by a Toowoomba/Ebenezer intermodal connection.
3.18
Both Ebenezer and Toowoomba are being considered as part of the Department of Infrastructure’s ongoing studies into intermodal sites along Inland Rail’s alignment.
Committee comment and recommendation
3.19
The committee has serious concerns about the connectivity of Inland Rail to the Port of Brisbane. The committee questions the rationale that the existing rail infrastructure between Acacia Ridge and the Port of Brisbane will adequately meet the projected demands of Inland Rail until 2040–41, primarily because of the shared corridor with Brisbane’s growing passenger network.
3.20
Whilst the committee provides cautionary support for the current position, it is concerned that any barriers and delays to a dedicated freight line could undermine the success and useability of Inland Rail in the future. The committee is supportive of current efforts by the Australian and Queensland governments to develop a business case for a dedicated freight line and requests that the study’s findings are publicly released upon its completion.
3.21
The committee recommends the Australian and Queensland governments publicly release the business case study of a dedicated freight line to the Port of Brisbane upon its completion.
3.22
With regard to the alternative route options provided by National Trunk Rail and QTA, the committee sees both options as potential alternatives if the existing alignment does not proceed. The National Trunk Rail’s proposal is likely to mitigate many of the adverse impacts of Inland Rail on Brisbane’s populous, but it will be incredibly expensive to construct a dedicated freight tunnel connecting Ebenezer to the Port of Brisbane. The committee questions whether governments and the private sector would be able to garner the necessary support to progress this alignment for the sole purposes of freight.
3.23
The QTA’s proposal for a dedicated truckway or the use of road freight transport connecting Toowoomba to Brisbane is another viable option, particularly if there is significant disruption to the construction of Inland Rail between Gowrie and Brisbane. The potential of a hybrid rail-road model could provide a reasonable alternative. The committee anticipates the results of the joint Australian and Queensland governments’ study into Inland Rail’s intermodal terminals for south east Queensland, and expects further clarity on how best to move freight through Brisbane to be addressed as part of this study.
Port of Gladstone
3.24
The committee was advised of an alternative proposal for Inland Rail, known as the Surat Basin corridor. The Surat Basin proposal would potentially see Inland Rail travel from Toowoomba to Miles and then north to Wandoan and Banana. Inland Rail would then travel to Gladstone and connect with the Port of Gladstone. Proponents for a Gladstone corridor argued it become either an additional section to the existing Inland Rail project or an alternative to the Toowoomba to Brisbane corridor.
3.25
Advocates for a Gladstone connection argued the primary rationale for it was Inland Rail’s import-export task, which is set to double by 2033 to 15 million containers a year through the ports of Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne, with an estimated movement of 500,000 B-triples through heavily populated and congested urban landscapes. A Gladstone Port connection would support this task by providing unconstrained growth capacity as Australia’s forth major east coast port, would become the closest major port to Asia, and is capable of hosting the largest container ships. Inter-Port Global Consolidated Holdings was of the view that port-to-port freight has been overlooked, and a Gladstone alignment would ‘improve the business case of ARTC because it will put more freight on the rail than they will get currently’. The Gladstone Regional Council made clear that the economic case is compelling, with an estimated net present value of $4.5 billion and a business case return of $1.6 billion. It called for ‘clear and unequivocal support for the link of inland rail to Gladstone’ across all levels of government. Mayor Matthew Burnett summarised the anticipated benefits of a Gladstone alignment:
Forty-seven per cent of the inland rail cost covers only 10 per cent of the distance, being Toowoomba to Brisbane, with no estimates available from Acacia Ridge to the Port of Brisbane. God only knows how much that would cost. The extension to Gladstone can be done for $3.8 billion cheaper, three years earlier—on the basis that the Brisbane link ever gets built—and would open up regional development in Queensland. A fully integrated, efficient and cost-effective east coast supply chain would not only improve regional economies along the rail network but would be a strategic asset in both the state and national economies.
3.26
To support the case for a Port of Gladstone alignment, the Central Queensland Regional Organisation of Councils (CQROC), in partnership with Regional Development Australia Central and Western Queensland (RDA) commissioned an economic analysis of a Toowoomba to Gladstone corridor. The analysis found potential in reconfiguring Inland Rail to include a connection to the Port of Gladstone, which could reduce the cost of Inland Rail by an estimated $4.8 billion and unlock additional resource developments across the Surat Basin (agriculture and coal).
3.27
The cost benefit analysis for the Toowoomba to Gladstone connection was found to be 1.58 on a four per cent discount, which advocates argued ‘provides a more economically desirable outcome than the development of Inland Rail to the Port of Brisbane, which presents a BCR of 1.01’. In addition, the region would benefit from a $6.5 million contribution to Gross Regional Product (GRP) per annum, with 45 full time equivalent (FTE) jobs per annum. By 2032, it was estimated that the alignment would result in $1,617.0 million GRP per annum and 7,166 FTE (if additional coal mines become operational and produce 20 million tonnes per annum).
3.28
Advocates for the Gladstone connection agreed that a Gladstone link could co-exist with a Brisbane corridor because Inland Rail would still need to service its domestic freight task by connecting to an intermodal site in or near Brisbane. As previously noted, Inter-Port Global was in favour of a Toowoomba option as the most economical. Gladstone Regional Council proposed that a Gladstone corridor could be built whilst the issues with an Acacia Ridge alignment are addressed. The Southern Brisbane Suburban Forum commented that a Port of Gladstone connection would support the decentralisation of Queensland’s freight infrastructure and wealth.
3.29
Mr Everald Compton, described as the father of Inland Rail, was of the view that the Brisbane proposal is ‘totally unnecessary, financially unviable and socially destructive’. He explained the solution is for Inland Rail to terminate at Toowoomba, where an intermodal facility would then service goods to and from the Sunshine Coast, the Gold Coast, Ipswich and Brisbane by truck, which was viewed as more efficient than rail through those areas. Inland Rail would then travel from Toowoomba to Gladstone, via Wandoan and Banana because:
There is an already approved and dedicated track there, which I worked on for many years, and it is still in existence. To get to Gladstone from Toowoomba is cheaper than to get from Toowoomba to the port of Brisbane. It is absolutely logical. In addition to ARTC's opposition to the solutions, they have destroyed the livelihoods and the lifestyles of far too many farmers and suburban residents by gutting their farms and homes when adequate alternative corridors existed. There was no need for them to have caused the havoc that they have.
3.30
In order to progress the Gladstone alignment, the committee was advised that Inter-Port Global was pursuing private ownership and funding for the project. It was also open to a PPP or for the project to be funded via government equity in alignment with the majority of Inland Rail’s projects.
3.31
The Australian Government completed two studies into a Port of Gladstone alignment, the first in 2017 and a second in 2020. In the most recent Inland Rail Gladstone Link Prefeasibility Study, AECOM found that an extension to the Port of Gladstone would not be ‘economically viable at this time, with potential demand for the connection not sufficient to justify the capital cost, estimated to be up to $5 billion’. The report identified three key commodity classes — coal, intermodal and agricultural bulk, none of which provided the economic rationale for a Gladstone link. AECOM’s BCR for the project was 0.67 at a four per cent discount, far lower than the 1.58 figure provided by Toowoomba to Gladstone (T2G) Inland Rail Economic Analysis. The report concluded that further analysis should be conducted ‘should there be improved market demand in the future’. Advocates for the Gladstone link objected to the report’s findings.
Committee comment and recommendations
3.32
The committee sees value in further consideration of an Inland Rail link to the Port of Gladstone as a means to further diversify Australia’s access to international markets and to enhance regional Queensland’s economy. The proposed Gladstone link, existing alongside the Toowoomba to Brisbane corridor, could potentially resolve many of the current limitations of Inland Rail in Brisbane, such as offering a viable alternative pathway for coal exports and reducing the freight import-export demand on Brisbane. A Port of Gladstone connection provides an opportunity to diversify and future-proof the movement of freight across Queensland.
3.33
The committee commends local governments, Inter-Port Global and other stakeholders on their efforts to develop a coherent and considered proposal for an Inland Rail corridor to the Port of Gladstone. This success is reflected in Inter-Port Global’s commentary that it is pursuing private investment for the project. The committee does, however, recognise these efforts are not being supported by the current position of the Australian and Queensland governments.
3.34
The committee calls for the Australian and Queensland governments, in partnership with local governments, industry representatives and other stakeholders, to facilitate a thorough investigation into a Toowoomba to Gladstone extension to the Inland Rail project. This investigation should include consideration of the project’s financing options.
3.35
The committee recommends the Australian and Queensland governments, in partnership with local governments, industry representatives and other stakeholders, conduct a thorough investigation into an extension of the Inland Rail project to the Port of Gladstone.
3.36
In order to determine the economic benefits of a Surat Basin corridor, the committee reiterates Recommendation 2, which requests the Australian Government incorporates in its independent review and update of the 2015 Inland Rail business case an assessment of the Toowoomba to Gladstone project. This review should consider the Toowoomba to Gladstone corridor as an integrated part of the Inland Rail project, and consult widely with industry to determine the level of support for the project.
Acacia Ridge and Bromelton intermodal facilities
3.37
The Kagaru to Acacia Ridge and Bromelton (K2ARB) project is a planned modification of an existing track that is part of the Queensland Rail network. According to the Inland Rail Route History 2006–2020 (Route History report), this track is intended to connect with two intermodal facilities — one being a major intermodal facility in Acacia Ridge, and the second an SCT Logistics facility in Bromelton that connects with the SCT’s rail services between Victoria and Queensland (via Sydney), which was added to the alignment in 2017.
3.38
The project’s route was first identified as part of a 2006 North-South Corridor Study, with recognition that the Acacia Ridge facility would remain Brisbane’s interstate intermodal terminal in the ‘medium term and implicitly assumed that the entry to Brisbane for Inland Rail would be via the existing interstate railway from the south’. This position was later reinforced with the adoption of the Southern Freight Rail Corridor (SFRC) for Inland Rail, by the 2010 Inland Rail Alignment Study (IRAS) and as the recommended route by the 2015 Inland Rail Implementation Group (IRIG). The ARTC’s Route History report details the K2ARB project and specified the rationale for an Acacia Ridge terminal. The Route History report stated that:
At the time of the 2010 IRAS, Acacia Ridge was Brisbane’s only intermodal freight terminal on the standard gauge railway. In planning Inland Rail, it was always recognised that trains utilising Inland Rail and needing to go to the Port of Brisbane would be able to do so via the existing dual gauge rail connection between Acacia Ridge and the port.
3.39
In the ARTC’s 2015 Inland Rail Business Case, Acacia Ridge was identified as a key intermodal terminal for the project, with multiple references to its place within the Inland Rail project, including the Port of Brisbane extension. The use of Acacia Ridge’s intermodal terminal was also noted in the ARTC’s November 2019 submission; but it was also made clear that the Australian and Queensland governments would ‘need to determine the location/s of intermodal terminals’ in metropolitan Brisbane. The submission explained the history of Acacia Ridge as a long-established industrial area and that the ARTC ‘expects that current major intermodal terminal at Acacia Ridge will remain a significant terminal for Inland Rail serving the Brisbane metropolitan area for the foreseeable future’. Bromelton and Ebenezer were also identified as potential intermodal terminal locations at the time.
3.40
In order to support the development of Brisbane’s intermodal terminals capable of hosting Inland Rail, the Australian Government allocated $10 million for a joint business case. This business case study, once complete, will provide guidance on terminal locations, ‘market access/operating models, financing options and value capture opportunities’. The Department of Infrastructure intends to have the study finalised in mid-2022.
Mixed messages on Acacia Ridge
3.41
Throughout the inquiry there has been confused and contradictory messaging conveyed by the Department of Infrastructure and the ARTC about the use of the Acacia Ridge intermodal terminal. Public information, such as the Route History report, and the K2ARB project’s website and factsheet, all make reference to the Inland Rail ceasing at Acacia Ridge.
3.42
During the inquiry’s public hearings, the ARTC consistently made reference to Inland Rail’s connection to Acacia Ridge, as per the agreement with the Queensland Government. For example, on 30 January 2020 the ARTC advised the committee that ‘the Inland Rail brief is to build inland rail to Acacia Ridge’, which would then facilitate Inland Rail’s connection to the Port of Brisbane via an existing dual-gauge connection built in 1995. Subsequent hearings with the ARTC on 13 August 2020 and 19 November 2020, as well as the ARTC’s appearances at regular Senate Estimates, all appeared to reconfirm the intended end-point of Inland Rail to be Acacia Ridge.
3.43
In the later stages of this inquiry, the Department of Infrastructure appeared to backtrack from the Acacia Ridge terminal, and at times directly conflicted with the ARTC. An example of this conflict can be found during the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee Senate Estimates hearing on 22 March 2021. At this hearing, the Department of Infrastructure and the ARTC communicated contradictory accounts on the location of the intermodal terminal. The committee asked the ARTC whether Inland Rail ‘finishes at Acacia Ridge, for $14.4 billion?’, to which the ARTC responded with ‘Correct’. The ARTC also reiterated that the rail connection between Acacia Ridge to the Port of Brisbane was ‘outside the remit of the current Inland Rail scope’ and that the ‘rail line finishes at Acacia Ridge’; however, the business case into a Port of Brisbane connection was ‘looking at potential options for port connections between Acacia Ridge and other locations, and the Port of Brisbane’. At the same Estimates hearing, the following exchange occurred between the Legislation committee, the Department of Infrastructure’s Secretary, Mr Simon Atkinson and a representative from the Significant Project Investment Delivery Office (SPIDO):
Mr Hallinan: SPIDO is looking at significant projects, as the title suggests, in particular, projects that are complex in nature and major, so substantial expenditure, and potentially things where there may be commercial returns or other things. Two good case studies that would be worth giving you as an example are the intermodal terminals at the top and the bottom of the Inland Rail network. They're two of the major projects that we're looking at first.
Senator STERLE: Okay, right. Why those two?
Mr Hallinan: I think it would be easiest to describe as: projects 14 and 15 are required to complete the Inland Rail project with the two terminals, top and bottom, and we want to get them right.
Senator STERLE: This is Acacia Ridge, and this is somewhere in Melbourne?
Mr Atkinson: Yes. Not wanting to say where the locations are—it's about big, complex, bespoke projects that need to be managed.
Senator STERLE: Okay. I'd better clear that. Are you sure it's Acacia Ridge at the top? It's not, is it? You're not putting any money into Acacia Ridge, are you?
Mr Atkinson: That was why I said I didn't want to say that.
3.44
At that time, the Department also updated the committee on the status of the K2ARB project, which involved the preparation of the draft primary approval documentation in December 2020; however, the review had been placed on hold until the Queensland Government made a determination whether the project would be declared a coordinated project.
3.45
These matters were further explored during the committee’s hearing in Melbourne on 22 April 2021. The Department of Infrastructure and the ARTC informed the committee that the location of the intermodal facility was not fixed and that ongoing work was being conducted to determine the most suitable location for Brisbane’s intermodal facilities. The ARTC also informed the committee that the Queensland Coordinator-General had determined not to declare the K2ARB project to be a coordinated project, meaning an EIS process would not be followed and the Queensland Government would not work directly with the ARTC. Instead, the project would progress under a different planning approval process but ‘have the same rigour as an EIS but it’s not what’s called a coordinated project in Queensland’. The ARTC explained it would be the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads leading the process:
The difference in the EIS…is that the coordinated projects are progressed by the Coordinator-General. When you progress a planned approval within an existing corridor, like that one, and you have operational ability to do so, part of the state regulation is that the determination, we believe, is made by TMR. We’re working with them presently to make sure we understand that correctly.
3.46
The committee pressed the ARTC as to whether there remained a possibility of the discontinuation of the K2ARB project, with the ARTC responding that ‘[t]here’s always a possibility as we’ll go through planning approval authorities that it won’t be granted, and so we’d have to look at other alternatives’. The Department of Infrastructure added that any changes to the project ‘would be a matter of government policy, but certainly, as we consider those matters, should there be other cases to be made, then we would consider those cases’. The Deputy Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure, who had only been engaged with the Inland Rail project for 12 months, proceeded to suggest that Acacia Ridge had only been nominally identified as the final terminal location for Inland Rail, saying that:
… the final terminal location for Inland Rail, while it was notionally identified as Acacia Ridge, has always had a question mark while I've been in the role as to what it will be. So when I provide a response that says it's under consideration, it literally has been under consideration my entire time in the role. It's not a certainty that Acacia Ridge will be the outcome. It was something to be finalised through business case development. Through that business case development we would consider what the sector considers to be appropriate. We don't really want to have an intermodal terminal or a terminal in a location that doesn't make sense for business. We'd like to have a terminal that makes sense for everybody and is providing the best benefit for the community at the least cost and the least 'disbenefit'.
3.47
The Department of Infrastructure added that the prospect of increasing the number of intermodal facilities within south east Queensland would facilitate a reduction in the freight volume reliant upon the Acacia Ridge facility ‘by dispersing the load to an alternative terminal/s’. During a Budget Estimates hearing on 24 May 2021, the Department clarified that the Inland Rail termination sites under consideration are Acacia Ridge, Bromelton, Ebenezer and two sites in Toowoomba. The study into the terminal locations was being led by the Queensland Government, and had only commenced in late 2020. The Department anticipated the terminal locations being announced at the end of 2021.
Community commentary on the Acacia Ridge intermodal facility
3.48
The committee received various accounts about the detrimental impact Inland Rail would have on local residents and infrastructure in and around the Acacia Ridge region. The Logan City Council articulated many of these concerns, pointing out that the region is ‘one of the largest and fastest-growing cities in Australia’. By 2040, it is anticipated that the Logan region’s population will double to over 330,000 residents, with 38,000 of those people living one kilometre away from the Inland Rail corridor. Logan City Council Mayor, Mr Darren Power outlined the community’s concern and his concern with the Inland Rail project due to its anticipated impact on the quality of life for local residents:
With the introduction of Inland Rail, [the] frequency [of train movements] is expected to increase to 45 trains a day, running 24 hours a day, by 2040. In addition to the increased frequency, these trains could be up to 3.6 kilometres long, and about 40 per cent of each would have capability to be double stacked. These are substantial increases. It's clear the impacts will be significantly over and above what residents expected when they moved into the area. Yet the ARTC is still referring to this section as an enhancement project due to the existing interstate line. I find this deeply concerning. The increased noise will become unbearable for some residents along the line, many of whom are shiftworkers. Vibration and increased emissions are also areas of concern for the community. These hardworking people have spent years tirelessly chipping away at the mortgages on their homes, which are their most valued and treasured assets, only to have them devalued overnight with no recourse. My fellow councillors and I demand accountability from the ARTC and the state and federal governments in managing the environmental impacts, which have the potential to degrade people's quality of life along the corridor.
3.49
A key concern shared by various stakeholders of the K2ARB project was the capacity of Acacia Ridge’s intermodal facility and surrounding infrastructure to host the increased volume of goods carried by Inland Rail. The QTA was critical of the intermodal facility at Acacia Ridge, arguing it is highly contained, has limited capacity and any expansion would be costly. Based on estimates provided by the QTA, for each 1,800 metre train there would be approximately 250 containers, amounting to 125 truck movements per train. When asked whether the existing road infrastructure in Acacia Ridge is capable of carrying those additional trucks, particularly when the ARTC anticipates 14 trains per day using Inland Rail by 2026, the QTA responded with:
The short answer to that would be no. At the moment, we currently run about four million truck trips per annum between the port and the surrounds of Acacia Ridge. Over the next 20 years, that will blow out to about 13 million.
3.50
For this reason, the QTA emphasised the importance of ‘end treatments to Inland Rail’ at both Brisbane and Melbourne, and added that ‘with the arrival of this traffic, we need some alternatives where you blend both a road and a rail solution to be able to distribute’. A similar point was made by Roads Australia, which highlighted that Inland Rail relies upon ‘road connections to operate effectively, particularly at intermodal sites’.
3.51
The Chair of the K2ARB Community Consultation Committee (CCC), Mr Gary Hardgrave, outlined the community’s concern about the capacity of Acacia Ridge to accommodate an increase in trucks from Inland Rail:
As the independent chair I don't have a view as such, so I can only tell you what I'm hearing from people…Even from the Regional Development Australia point of view, our concern as an RDA was that the numbers on Acacia Ridge are going to see a tripling of trucks on local roads by 2050. When I was a federal member I championed the cause against local trucks because there is no truck traffic management plan for south side Brisbane. It will be devastating for south side Brisbane if the plan is to just terminate it all at Acacia Ridge because it'll just put more and more trucks on local roads which are not designed for it.
3.52
Mr Hardgrave explained that there was ‘genuine concern’ within the community that Acacia Ridge was ‘not purpose built for the task, and to deliver the sort of additional freight truck tasks onto south side roads would be devastating for the areas from Acacia Ridge to the port of Brisbane’. He added that the ARTC itself was not in a position to address this issue because it was the recommended alignment made by the Queensland Government:
…it is the plan that the Queensland government has put forward. The Queensland government told the Australian government that this is the route that they recommend. So the ARTC are simply trying to make the route, as it's been decided, work according to the engineering and environmental factors concerned.
3.53
A similar concern was also shared by the Southern Brisbane Suburban Forum. It pointed out that the ARTC had a very defined scope that prevented it from addressing the concerns of local residents, particularly in relation to traffic congestion caused by the Acacia Ridge intermodal facility. The Forum’s spokesperson, Mr Max Hooper explained the issue of congestion was an externality ‘where the true costs of commercial economic decisions are offloaded on to a third party without the costs of those impacts being adequately factored in’. Mr Hooper took the view that the limited scope of the ARTC prevents it from addressing the project’s broader impact on the Acacia Ridge community. He added that without integrated planning across all levels of government to address these factors, such as rail access charges and congestion on the suburban rail network, the issues will ‘be significantly worsened with the completion’ of Inland Rail.
3.54
The committee asked the QTA whether it had been consulted or part of any conversation to discuss truck movements at Acacia Ridge. The QTA stated that it had not, but it would ‘be delighted to have those conversations’, particularly in regard to its proposed rail-truck solution. The QTA added that its proposal may not necessary be the solution, but it would set in motion ‘broader lateral thinking about the concepts that are being considered in the feasibilities’ and that a:
…blend might end up working is a matter for consideration, but we're saying that we'd like to broaden the remit and what the feasibility study ought to look at, because it's been quite myopic, in our view, in terms of where it's taken its considerations.
3.55
Rather than continue with the development of Acacia Ridge, the QTA proposed a re-think of the project, arguing that Acacia Ridge was at capacity:
We've still got plenty of opportunity, I would argue, to think a bit differently about how we handle what I might call the 'terminus ends' at Melbourne and Brisbane. When you look at the challenges of drawing all the freight from across the state into an intermodal facility and then distributing it to wherever it needs to go by rail or road—and you've now got the combination of a very capable area up in Toowoomba and the growth at the port of Brisbane—it's timely to look at where you might put the right focal point for that intermodal exchange. I would argue that Acacia Ridge has reached its capacity limits. To grow Acacia Ridge is going to be extraordinarily expensive, to build the capability between Acacia Ridge and the port just for rail is going to be extraordinarily expensive, and I just think it's time to stand back and rethink, given all of the other investments that have occurred, particularly in the south-east, in the last 20 years, and look at a different opportunity as to how we might handle freight generally right across Queensland.
3.56
The committee sought clarification from the ARTC about its end of service offerings, specifically its consideration of the impact of Inland Rail on the Acacia Ridge community. It advised the committee that it was ‘undertaking detailed assessments of the impacts of Inland Rail in the Kagaru to Acacia Ridge and Bromelton section and meets regularly with officials from the Queensland Government’. Reference was made to the intermodal business case for Brisbane that will provide details of the broader impact of Inland Rail on local infrastructure; however, no money would be made available under the Inland Rail budget for the business case due to existing under the Queensland Government’s jurisdiction.
3.57
The Department of Infrastructure added that it was aware of the concerns of local stakeholders regarding additional truck movements in and around Acacia Ridge and ‘monitors the public views and discussions’. It had not met with local representatives to discuss these issues; however, departmental officials based in Toowoomba have attended K2ARB CCC meetings since 2018 to hear the views expressed by CCC members and attendees. Stakeholders’ concerns were also being actively considered as part of the joint business case studies into intermodal facilities and the Port of Brisbane connection. As previously noted, the Department of Infrastructure raised the potential for additional Inland Rail intermodal facilities in Brisbane and surrounding areas to reduce the demand on the Acacia Ridge facility and dispersing the freight volume across alternatives terminal/s.
3.58
The Department added that the ARTC was ‘working with relevant state and local authorities, and communities, to progress and accommodate…aspirations and requests’ if outside of the project’s scope. Governance arrangements were also being used to deliver regular consultations and ‘[w]here appropriate the Department will engage with various stakeholders (including state and local jurisdictions) to consider and investigate opportunities that may fall outside ARTC’s scope for delivering Inland Rail’.
Committee comment and recommendations
3.59
It is apparent to the committee that the current management of the K2ARB project and its interconnection with local infrastructure is inadequate. Whilst the ARTC is tasked with engaging and consulting with local communities and landholders, it is limited in its capacity to respond to their concerns if they relate to matters outside of the Inland Rail project.
3.60
In order to adequately address community concerns, the committee would like to see greater participation by all levels of government with responding to community concerns. Primary amongst those concerns is the capacity of Acacia Ridge’s infrastructure to host the increased truck movements caused by Inland Rail. Similar consideration must be given to other proposed locations for intermodal facilities.
3.61
The committee also is of the view that enhanced consultations between all levels of government, local residents groups, trucking, freight and logistics companies operating from Acacia Ridge and other proposed intermodal terminals is needed, to develop improved end-of-line connectivity between Inland Rail and local infrastructure. This process should seek to determine the region’s capacity to support additional truck movements generated by the completion of the Inland Rail project.
3.62
The committee recommends the Australian and Queensland governments, in partnership with local resident groups, local governments, trucking and other freight and logistics companies, establish an Acacia Ridge and Bromelton working group to conduct an audit of existing road infrastructure of Acacia Ridge and other proposed intermodal locations in south east Queensland.
3.63
Throughout this inquiry it appeared apparent that Acacia Ridge would be one of the intended intermodal terminal destinations for Inland Rail in Brisbane. Whilst the committee understood a study was taking place into other potential intermodal terminals, the 2015 business case, the Inland Rail Implementation Group report, the Route History report, and, commentary made by the ARTC all put forward a consistent message that Acacia Ridge would become an intermodal terminal for Inland Rail. Had this not been the case, there were numerous opportunities throughout this inquiry for the ARTC and the Department of Infrastructure to correct this presumption made by the committee and other stakeholders.
3.64
The messaging conveyed by the ARTC and the Department of Infrastructure became inconsistent and opaque in the final stages of this inquiry. As demonstrated in this chapter, the views of the ARTC and the Department of Infrastructure lacked consistency and communicated a very different position from each other. Views were later aligned, but it remained blatantly clear that there was a failure to coordinate a coherent message about the status of this project.
3.65
The committee understands that the current intended outcome for Inland Rail in south east Queensland is for a number of intermodal terminals that disperse the freight demand across numerous sites. The committee supports the rationale for a multi-modal solution for Brisbane, which will address many of the issues identified by the community of Acacia Ridge.
3.66
Whilst supportive of a multi-intermodal solution, the committee is critical of the overall approach taken by the ARTC and the Australian and Queensland governments. A preferred approach would have been to replicate that taken for the Tottenham to Albury project, which is to provide a clear message that the precise location of the Inland Rail intermodal terminal was yet to be determined by the Australian and Victorian governments. The failure to apply a more precautionary approach to the K2ARB project has caused significant confusion about the status of the Inland Rail project and the intended end-point(s) of the Brisbane corridor. The ARTC and the Australian and Queensland governments must ensure all future communication is coherent and aligned to prevent further confusion about the Inland Rail project.
3.67
Overall, it is the committee’s view that the management of the end-points of the Inland Rail project in Brisbane has been unacceptable. The committee cannot understand how the Inland Rail project’s intermodal terminal locations in Brisbane are yet to be determined, especially when the original location (Acacia Ridge) formed the basis of the 2015 business case, and the construction of the Inland Rail project has already commenced. It is a failure of the Australian and Queensland governments for this uncertainty to remain, despite over a decade of investigation into the Inland Rail corridor.
3.68
A further point of concern is the viability of the Inland Rail project without the Acacia Ridge terminal. As previously discussed, a contributing factor for Acacia Ridge’s initial inclusion into the Inland Rail project was because of its connectivity to the Port of Brisbane. It remains unclear whether Acacia Ridge is to remain a preferred intermodal site, and if Acacia Ridge is no longer deemed appropriate for hosting an intermodal facility, what impact that decision would have on the project, and the underlying economic assumptions made by the 2015 business case. The committee has serious concerns about the connectivity of Inland Rail to the Port of Brisbane, and whether any decision to exclude Acacia Ridge as a terminal further jeopardises the project’s connectivity to the export market. The committee expects any decision made regarding the potential intermodal sites for Inland Rail in south east Queensland to maintain and/or strengthen the economic viability and industry expectations of the Inland Rail project. To ensure this decision is made in the best interest of local communities and Australian tax payers, the committee expects the Australian and Queensland governments to release the business case study into south east Queensland’s Inland Rail intermodal terminals once complete.
3.69
The committee recommends the Australian and Queensland governments publicly release, upon its completion, the business case study into south east Queensland’s Inland Rail intermodal terminals.
3.70
A further concern is the Queensland Government’s decision to not declare the K2ARB project as a coordinated project. The committee can appreciate the ARTC had advocated for this project to be a coordinated project, and is supportive of the ARTC’s statement that it would work with the Queensland Government to ensure the process remains to the standard set by an EIS process. The committee expects the ARTC to ensure that a high level of transparency, stakeholder consultation and participation is applied to the project’s approval process.
3.71
The committee recommends the Australian Rail Track Corporation, in partnership with the Queensland Government, ensures the Kagaru to Acacia Ridge and Bromelton project is reviewed to the same level of transparency, stakeholder consultation and participation as other coordinated projects in Queensland.
3.72
Finally, the committee has a significant concern with the absence of participation by the Queensland Government and the Department of Transport and Main Roads throughout this inquiry. The committee on numerous occasions sought input from the Queensland Government to no avail. The committee understands the Queensland Government is not obligated to participate in inquiries conducted by the Australian Parliament; however, the significance of the Inland Rail project for Queensland and the need for coordination across jurisdictions warrants state government participation in parliamentary oversight to safeguard the successful completion of the Inland Rail project in Queensland.
Bromelton intermodal facility
3.73
In addition to Acacia Ridge, the proposed alignment for K2ARB travels south to an SCT Logistics’ owned and operated intermodal facility in Bromelton. The Bromelton facility, completed in 2017, is a 140 hectare site situated 50km south of Brisbane that receives four to five trains per week traveling from Melbourne (via Sydney).
3.74
The committee heard that SCT Logistics developed the site prior to the funding announcement for Inland Rail because it was ‘confident that we would be in the right area’ because the ARTC had ‘secured a site not far from us with a view that that may become a terminal in the future’. SCT Logistics added that the facility had been designed to accommodate Inland Rail, with the capacity to receive 1,800 metre, double-stacked trains. Further, the facility was not designed for the export market, but rather for domestic goods that are subsequently distributed to retailers and distribution centres across Brisbane. When asked how the Bromelton facility compared to Acacia Ridge, SCT Logistics responded that:
Bromelton is our site. We did try to get into Acacia Ridge once we set ourselves on operating trains there, but we were really prohibited from going in there. To give you some clarity or some perspective, I think our Bromelton site is probably about twice as big as Acacia Ridge. We are further out and we have to deal with—we're certainly supportive of upgrades to the Mount Lindesay Highway to help our connections in and out of Brisbane and the north of Brisbane, but our terminal at Bromelton has significantly more capacity than Acacia Ridge. We've always felt that Acacia Ridge will be quite constrained into the future just by way of its size.
3.75
Whilst SCT Logistics has invested heavily into the Inland Rail project, it spoke of wanting more clarity around the project, particularly with the issue of north and south termination and jurisdictional responsibility. Mr Geoffrey Smith of SCT Logistics noted that:
… it would be fair to say that, just from a process perspective, we'd be happy to participate in further clarification of the roles of the ARTC, the department of infrastructure and the state governments, particularly on the issue of north and south termination—that's an area that we're vitally interested in. And having some clarity around time frames and what the rollout of that decision-making process looks like would be welcome.
3.76
The Bromelton site, unlike Acacia Ridge, also had support from Mr Gary Hardgrave, who was speaking on behalf of the RDA. He spoke of the benefit of terminating Inland Rail at Bromelton, rather than Acacia Ridge because it would address the challenges associated with Acacia Ridge, and allow for other proposed intermodal terminals, such as Ebenezer, Gatton and Wellcamp, to proceed. Mr Hardgrave contended that the ‘irony of the current plan is that when the freight arrives at Acacia Ridge, it will be put on trucks to held back south again’ and for this reason, ‘there needs to be a bit of a rethink about [the project]. For this reason, proceeding with Inland Rail’s connectivity to Bromelton would allow for ‘an opportunity for a pause on the project to discover how you get it to the port of Brisbane’ and to determine ‘[w]hat freight ultimately arrives at Acacia Ridge’.
Committee comment and recommendation
3.77
The committee sees significant benefit in pursuing Inland Rail’s alignment to Bromelton as a means to progress the project and provide much needed certainty that is currently lacking, particularly due to the delay in the confirmation of other intermodal terminals in and around Brisbane.
3.78
The Bromelton site offers the best greenfield potential for the future expansion of a logistics and freight precinct for the Brisbane and Gold Coast urban areas. This site provides the opportunity for Inland Rail to interconnect with the pre-existing intermodal infrastructure of the SCT Logistics’ terminal, as well as potential for future growth with the ARTC owned site.
3.79
The committee recommends the Australian Rail Track Corporation and the Australian and Queensland governments prioritise the development of the Inland Rail Bromelton intermodal terminal.
Melbourne intermodal facility and connectivity to the Port of Melbourne
3.80
The Victorian portion of Inland Rail will end at a new intermodal terminal in Melbourne that joins with an ‘existing standard gauge line that connects both to the existing major Melbourne terminal complex at Dynon as well as to the Port of Melbourne (Swanson, Appleton and Victoria Docks)’.
3.81
As of June 2021, the exact location of the intermodal terminal had not been determined. Encompassing the second stage of the Tottenham to Albury (T2A) project, the ARTC noted that the stage was ‘temporary on hold whilst a study is undertaken to determine the location, configuration and timing of the new intermodal terminal in Melbourne’.
3.82
There are two proposed sites for the new intermodal facility. The first is the Western Interstate Freight Terminal (WIFT) located near Truganina, and the second proposed location is the Beveridge Interstate Freight Terminal (BIFT) located north of Melbourne. There is currently no terminal capable of accommodating Inland Rail’s service offering of double-stacked 1,800 metre trains, providing the rationale for building a new terminal(s). Since mid-2019, the Australian and Victorian governments have been exploring the two potential sites through the development of a detailed business case. As of May 2021, the business case had not been completed, despite its reported delivery scheduled between 2019 and late 2020; however, the Australian Government in its 2021–22 Budget delivered on 11 May 2021 announced up to $2 billion for the Melbourne intermodal terminal. The Budget paper noted that an equivalent contribution would be provided by the Victorian Government.
3.83
The committee heard a range of views regarding the location of the intermodal terminal. The Victorian Transport Association (VTA) referenced Qube and SCT Logistics funding the BIFT, whereas the WIFT has had a number of transport companies locate to that area due to the location of the port rail shuttle. The Port of Melbourne expressed its preference for the development of the WIFT, and called for the ‘commitment for the development of the Webb Dock rail link to ensure that all container terminals at the Port of Melbourne are directly connected to Inland Rail’. This direct rail shuttle connectivity to the Port of Melbourne was also supported by the ARTC and referenced in its submission:
Nearly 80% of international freight moving through the Port of Melbourne has origins and destinations within a radius of about 40km of the port. Road transport is the dominant mode of transport for port related containers (90%). As such, there is potentially a strong market for a port rail shuttle to move imports/exports. The Port of Melbourne lease requires a Rail Access Strategy under statutory obligation. As such, Inland Rail is a key factor at the Port of Melbourne and a critical element in ensuring a sustainable and competitive land transport sector.
3.84
The development of the Webb Dock rail link is in accordance with the Port of Melbourne’s Port Development Strategy 2050 and the Port Rail Transformation Project. Under the Port Rail Transformation Project, in excess of $125 million has been invested to ‘build and enhance existing rail infrastructure while also transforming the nature of how rail works at the port’. This investment is driven by forecasting that by 2050 the total container trade volume at the Port of Melbourne ‘will triple, from around three million to nine million over the next 30 years’.
3.85
In addition to its recommendation for Inland Rail and the Port of Melbourne connecting at the WIFT, the Port recommended the ‘terminal has an international freight component to leverage the full component of the Inland Rail’, meaning the facility would have the capacity to receive both domestic and international freight. To support this connectivity to international supply chains, the Port of Melbourne highlighted the importance of a planned approach for the selection of ‘an optimum number and location of the regional intermodal terminals along Inland Rail…[to] get the full benefits to the domestic and international supply chains’, whilst also recognising the importance of efficiency requirements. The Port of Melbourne ‘does not see the limitations of double stacked containers access to the port as a constraint’.
3.86
Whilst Inland Rail’s connection to the Port of Melbourne was primarily supported, alternative alignments and sea port connectivity were proposed. Mr Michael McLean called for Inland Rail to travel to the Port of Geelong, based on his understanding that the Port of Melbourne was near capacity. Mr Peter Anderson from the VTA agreed that a Geelong proposal would be beneficial, but suggested a connection to Lara would be preferred as a means to capitalise on background plans for a new port at Bay West past Point Cook.
3.87
The committee sought clarification with the Port of Melbourne whether it was nearing capacity. In response, the Port of Melbourne made clear that it was not at capacity, rather ‘has capacity for containers well beyond the existing capability of the port today’ as shown in its 30-year plan. The Port’s Chief Executive Officer, Mr Brendan Bourke advised that clear plans were in place for the next several decades to stage additional capacity as trade demand grows. This future capacity of the Port was confirmed by a 2017 Infrastructure Victoria study, which found no requirement for an additional port in Victoria for quite a number of decades and that Geelong was not suitable for Victoria’s second port (due to its inability to host large ships). A future port would likely be located between Geelong and Melbourne. The Department of Infrastructure confirmed that there are no plans for Inland Rail to connect with the Port of Geelong.
Committee comment and recommendation
3.88
The planning and intended location(s) of Inland Rail’s intermodal terminal(s) in Melbourne, in comparison to Brisbane, has been managed in a consistent and considered manner. This consistent, clear and considered approach has demonstrated a coherent message that Inland Rail’s operations will interlink with WIFT and/or BIFT and interconnect with the Port of Melbourne’s rail infrastructure. This consistency has enabled industry to pivot their operations to those locations as a means to foster the integration of Inland Rail into the broader freight supply chain.
3.89
The committee can appreciate that the situation faced by Victoria in comparison to Queensland is far less complex, namely due to existing rail infrastructure within the state being utilised for the purposes of Inland Rail. The Inland Rail project appears to be far less divisive with residents and other stakeholders in Melbourne. The committee encourages the ARTC and the Victorian Government to maintain this favour with Melbourne’s residents and industry.
3.90
The committee commends the proposal put forth by the Port of Melbourne for the intermodal freight terminal to include an international freight component to leverage the full potential of Inland Rail, and is supportive of similar considerations being made at all intermodal terminals with direct connection to the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane. This proposal reveals the innovative potential that can be harnessed by governments and industry with the establishment and integration of Inland Rail into the broader national and international freight supply chain.
3.91
The committee recommends the Australian, Queensland and Victorian governments, in partnership with the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane, consider measures to implement and upgrade Inland Rail’s intermodal freight terminals to facilitate an international freight capability.
3.92
The committee notes alternative port proposals put forth by other stakeholders, specifically the Port of Geelong. Whilst the committee understands that the Port of Melbourne is not nearing its capacity, the Port of Geelong may be a future port terminal to be investigated in the longer term.
Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program
3.93
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, a key to Inland Rail’s success is its seamless interconnectivity with the existing freight infrastructure and road and seaport networks. Thus it is vital that Inland Rail is supported by strategically located intermodal facilities that capitalise on and support the economies of rural, regional and urban communities. Intermodal facilities, such as the Parkes National Logistics Hub (Australia’s largest intermodal site) and the intermodal connections at Toowoomba (via Wellcamp Airport), demonstrate the value and benefit of Inland Rail.
3.94
While intermodal facilities provide important opportunities for local economies, their integration into the Inland Rail network must be balanced with Inland Rail meeting its service offerings, meaning not all population centres along the route can host an intermodal facility. This point was emphasised by the ALC, which submitted that opportunities to develop intermodal infrastructure along Inland Rail must be located in places that ‘can provide efficient links to other key freight infrastructure, particularly road connections’. It recommended that all levels of government ‘should proritise and expedite planning approvals for intermodal terminals that can clearly demonstrate a capacity to link Inland Rail efficiently [to] other key rail and road freight routes’.
3.95
In order to inform the strategic place of intermodal facilities, the Australian Government allocated $44 million to establish the Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program. The program has two streams, the first is the Productivity Enhancement Program to explore improvements to the interface between supply chains and Inland Rail and the second is the Country Lines Improvement Program that assesses proposed improvements to country rail lines that intersect with Inland Rail. As of May 2021, there were 16 successful projects identified in round one and fifteen projects in round two. Funding provided by the Program supports the development of business case studies to ‘understand the costs and benefits of their developed proposals and make a case for private or public investment’. The Department of Infrastructure advised the committee that business case proposals would not be published and as of 31 March 2021 approximately $11.23 million (GST exclusive) of funds had been allocated.
Committee comment and recommendation
3.96
The committee is very supportive of the Australian Government’s Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program as a means to both support community and industry capacity to develop an enhanced interface with Inland Rail’s network. The committee does, however, recognise the importance of balancing improved and increased interface opportunities with the efficiency requirements of Inland Rail.
3.97
Improved interface with Inland Rail must be guided by evidence and transparency. Whilst the committee is supportive of the measures in place to foster the development of business case proposals, it is concerned with the Department of Infrastructure’s decision to not publish completed business cases, especially if those business cases result in material changes and/or additions to the Inland Rail project.
3.98
To increase transparency and accountability, the committee calls for the publication of selection criteria and the assessments made by the Department of Infrastructure. In addition, any successful proposals funded under the Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program must be published and detail a clear benefit to the Inland Rail project. In the case of NSW, the Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program must interlink with NSW infrastructure planning under the Special Activities Precincts, such as those already connected to Inland Rail at key regional consolidation centres such as Moree, Narrabri and Parkes.
3.99
The committee recommends the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications enhances transparency and accountability of the Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program by publishing:
the selection criteria and assessments made by the department; and
successful proposals that may result in material changes and/or additions to the Inland Rail project.
3.100
In addition, the committee recommends the department ensure the Inland Rail Interface Improvement Program interlinks with NSW infrastructure under the Special Activities Precincts, such as those already connected to Inland Rail at key regional consolidation centres such as Moree, Narrabri and Parkes.
3.101
The committee is also supportive of the ALC’s recommendation that all levels of government prioritise and expedite planning approvals for intermodal terminals that have clearly demonstrated a capacity to efficiently link Inland Rail to other key rail and road freight routes.
3.102
The committee recommends the Australian Government supports state and local governments efforts to prioritise and expedite planning approvals for intermodal terminals that have clearly demonstrated a capacity to efficiently link Inland Rail to other key rail and road freight routes.