Pre-border and border biosecurity measures
3.1
Australia's multi-layered biosecurity system, as noted in Chapter 1, incorporates both pre-border and border biosecurity measures. This chapter considers key elements, primarily focusing on matters relevant to foot-and-mouth (FMD) and lumpy-skin-disease (LSD), and where relevant, to varroa mite and plant biosecurity more broadly.
Australian support for regional capability and capacity development
3.2
Australia provides regional leadership and supports capability and capacity development in neighbouring countries as a way of safeguarding the region, limiting the spread of diseases and pests, and preventing biosecurity incursions into Australia. Support is through the provision of technical advice and financial aid, including through partnership programs, in conjunction with state and territory jurisdictions, industry and representative bodies.
3.3
Australia and Indonesia have a long history of collaboration in animal health and the control of infectious diseases going back to at least the 1970s. Australia has implemented a range of specific measures to support Indonesia since the start of its LSD and FMD outbreaks, including:
$1.5 million in funding, including 1 million FMD vaccinations;
$500 000 to Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) to enhance the Indonesian feedlot sector's response to FMD and LSD;
$5 million for technical expertise, vaccine distribution and technical support to Indonesia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea (PNG) comprising personnel, logistical support, and diagnostic and epidemiological work; and
a further $10 million in overseas aid funding to support the FMD and LSD response in Indonesia including 3 million vaccines, seed funding for a livestock identification system, the provision of personal protective equipment and disinfectants, staff training, and biosecurity expertise.
3.4
In total the Australian government has provided around 5 750 000 doses of FMD vaccines and 435 000 doses of LSD vaccines to aid Indonesia's response.
3.5
These measures have been supported by intelligence from Indonesian chief veterinary officers and officials, as well as Australian staff in Indonesia, and the provision of technical and industry advice from Australia.
3.6
The National LSD Action Plan supports continuing government and industry international engagement and capacity building in the region, with Australia to take a lead role in assisting its neighbours, including providing ongoing support to Indonesia to strengthen their LSD response.
3.7
Most submitters who commented on pre-border measures supported the Australian Government's actions in order to minimise risks to Australia and address food security issues for Indonesia. The Australian Livestock Exporters' Council and the Red Meat Advisory Council (RMAC) told the committee of the importance of intergovernmental relations, with the latter stating 'our bilateral relationships with Indonesia are critical for the longer-term success of our sector, and it's vital that any decisions made around tourism or support for Indonesia take into account that longer-term economic dependency on each other'. However, some witnesses including the National Farmers' Federation (NFF), thought that there was greater scope to involve industry partners.
Trade and import controls
3.8
Australia has a range of trade and import controls in place to minimise biosecurity risks for Australia. In relation to FMD, high-risk goods may only be imported from countries or zones that Australia has assessed as FMD-free (without vaccination), while lower risk goods may be permitted from countries where FMD is endemic, but goods need to have been processed.
3.9
Australia enhanced its import conditions for commercial meat, dairy and peat products from Indonesia following the FMD outbreak, with over 2 300 permits varied or suspended to reduce the risk of an FMD incursion. In September 2022, the Minister announced a ban on the importation of meat products for personal use from all countries not recognised as being FMD-free, and during October 2022, restrictions were also implemented in relation to unregulated animal-based pet food.
3.10
The National LSD Action Plan commits to the review of current import policies for products from LSD-affected countries, improved communication in relation to trade issues, and the development of a strategic approach to minimising export trade disruptions in the event of an LSD incursion in Australia.
3.11
The department also conducts other trade preparedness work in conjunction with other departments and industry.
3.12
Wilmot Cattle Company told the committee that more could have been done to restrict high risk food imports earlier, suggesting that an immediate ban on all imported food products under 10 kilograms originating from countries with FMD and other significant diseases should have been put in place.
Off-shore surveillance and intelligence gathering
3.13
DAFF also undertakes strategic intelligence gathering and horizon scanning activities offshore to better anticipate, identify and analyse emerging biosecurity risks, including monitoring the disease and pest status of trading partners.
3.14
DAFF has enhanced its intelligence gathering and sharing activities and offshore surveillance, through the support of a range of FMD and LSD surveillance programs, including through sentinel herds in PNG and Timor-Leste.
3.15
Property Rights Australia argued that the government's FMD and LSD pre-border response could have been improved by using offshore sentinel herds in South Asia.
3.16
In relation to plant diseases and pests, plant industries highlighted gaps in pre‑border data collection and surveillance. The Plant Industry Forum/Citrus Australia referenced the importance of integrating the freight industry into the biosecurity system, through training and container traceability. With regard to container traceability, the Freight and Trade Alliance noted that the 'inability to risk assess based on container history due to the lack of data' was a likely contributor 'to a spike in khapra beetle incursion in recent times'.
Committee view
3.17
Based on the evidence received during the inquiry, the committee concludes that Australia's pre-border measures have been largely effective. The committee recognises the long-standing support for international partners in relation to local, regional capacity and capability development and surveillance. In particular, the committee commends recent government and industry efforts to support Indonesia in its response to FMD and LSD.
3.18
The committee notes that ongoing initiatives and opportunities exist to further this work, including as part of the National LSD Action Plan and international partnerships such as the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).
3.19
Given the risks posed by the import of unregulated meat products potentially carrying diseases, including FMD, the committee considers that the department's decisions to impose further import restrictions should have been made earlier. Decision-making by the department needs to better consider the competing interests of importers against those of Australia's producers and consumers.
3.20
The committee sees potential in enhancing the freight industry's role in pre‑border biosecurity processes through additional training and traceability measures. Whilst supportive of these measures, the committee foresees significant challenges with the development of a pre-border container traceability system. Despite this view, the committee is supportive of ongoing work in this space.
3.21
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry review its food import risk frameworks to ensure that they are fit for purpose and that decisions under the frameworks are accelerated where required.
Border biosecurity measures
3.22
Biosecurity measures are also implemented at the border to stop or detect biosecurity risks before they can spread and include the development of effective operational frameworks and procedures, regulatory systems, as well as surveillance, border control and screening arrangements, and education and awareness activities.
Passenger assessment and screening
3.23
The Australian Government has established a range of border biosecurity measures for airline passengers entering Australia. Additional measures applied from July 2022, after reports of FMD in Indonesia and Bali. Measures included:
assessment of 100 per cent of passengers against biosecurity risk profiles, with higher risk passengers flagged and subject to screening such as x-ray, detector dog or manual baggage inspection;
all passengers using the SmartGates or in manual immigration lines asked whether they have been in Indonesia and subject to further assessment, including targeted questioning and screening;
passengers who declare biosecurity goods or high risk activities on the Incoming Passenger Card referred for biosecurity assessment;
real-time biosecurity assessments completed by biosecurity officers in baggage collection areas with passengers referred for biosecurity screening as needed; and
sanitisation foot mats for travellers arriving directly from Indonesia, along with additional staff to support implementation.
3.24
Related measures such as the declaration of biosecurity zones under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (the Biosecurity Act), additional powers for biosecurity officers, additional staff, additional training, and the redeployment of detector dogs have supported the implementation of these measures.
3.25
DAFF advised that airline passenger entry is a 'highly compliant pathway' with passengers declaring 98 per cent of FMD risk products, additional products seized, and compliance and enforcement action taken as required. Since April 2019, 726 people have been fined $2 664 and 20 visas have been cancelled because of biosecurity related offences. Colin Hunter, of the department's Biosecurity Operations Division told the committee that:
I can assure you that the full weight of the law is being applied at the border through the Infringement Notice Scheme. Where appropriate, we work with Border Force and our enforcement colleagues to take those matters to the courts where an infringement notice is not appropriate.
3.26
Submissions to the committee highlighted several areas in which stakeholders felt that more could have been done. The Australian Livestock and Rural Transporters Association (ALTRA) and Green Shirts Movement Queensland considered the risk to be so significant that Australia's border with Indonesia should have been closed to non-essential travel until FMD was under control in Indonesia.
3.27
In contrast, the Australian Livestock Export Corporation Limited (LiveCorp) warned that any decision to close borders needed to be based on 'very strong scientific justification' given the significant lasting trade, reputation, and economic effects.
3.28
Australian Dairy Farmers and Property Rights Australia observed that the Australian Government response was too slow, even after FMD was confirmed in Bali, with the latter stating:
Emergency measures on almost every count seemed to be slow to be approved and slow to roll out … We also note from the evidence of Mr. Mettcalf [sic], Secretary of DAFF, that evidence of FMD was informal until 9th May when Indonesia reported it to the World Organisation of Animal Health. This was a 'trigger'. WE believe that waiting for a formal response from the country of origin before any measures are taken may not always be an appropriate response and may lead to a fatal delay.
3.29
They advised, along with Jim Fletcher, that the implementation of passenger screening measures has been patchy, with the potential to compromise Australia's biosecurity system. In addition, the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) told the committee that risks were downgraded to reduce long queues and delays at Sydney airport resulting from understaffing.
3.30
Mr Fletcher suggested better training and more thorough implementation of border measures. Several witnesses called for improvements to passenger screening, including the screening of 80 per cent of arriving passengers, luggage inspections for all travellers from Indonesia, additional screening and bans for passengers travelling to rural or peri-urban destinations, additional detector dogs, and the implementation of more advanced x-ray technology.
3.31
DAFF highlighted the challenges associated with screening all luggage, noting:
… there are no reliable costings for the department to conduct full 100% baggage inspections (full unpack and repack) on all arriving Indonesian travellers, as it is not logistically possible to do so at major airports like Sydney and Melbourne.
3.32
The Inspector-General of Biosecurity (IGB) has conducted several reviews into the efficacy and adequacy of DAFF's x-ray scanning and detector dog screening techniques, noting that the use of detector dogs and x-ray machines will support Australia's biosecurity system to an appropriate level. One review noted the importance of continuing to use a combination of 2-dimensional x-ray technology along with detector dogs beyond 2030, while 3-dimensional x-ray capability is under development. $11.7 million over four years additional funding for detector dogs was provided in the October 2022 budget to improve capability.
3.33
Angus Hobson suggested a broader, independent audit of airport biosecurity measures, to identify gaps, quantify additional resources needed and test technological measures.
Border communications and awareness
3.34
The Australian government has undertaken a range of border communications and awareness activities, including changes to passenger card declarations, biosecurity announcements, placement of signage and bins for disposal of foodstuffs, updates to import documentation, and industry awareness raising.
3.35
Following the Indonesian FMD outbreak these communications and awareness raising activities increased. Travellers were given new biosecurity messages and flyers, including FMD-specific advice, with airport broadcasts and additional airport signage also installed. Biosecurity messaging was increased on the Biosecurity, Smartraveller and other government webpages, on social media, via airlines and travel agents, and at Bali holiday accommodation.
3.36
The CCA, WoolProducers Australia and the NFF called for increased industry-government collaboration, and clearer public communications and expert advice in relation to biosecurity issues, including traveller responsibilities. The NFF also called for enhancements to the existing National Biosecurity Communications and Engagement Network.
3.37
Evidence provided by Green Shirts Queensland and Property Rights Australia highlighted lack of awareness of the impacts of an FMD incursion by some Australian travellers, and concern at over-reliance on passenger honesty. One traveller reportedly said, 'I know the name foot and mouth, but I don't know what it is, what it's from or if it affects humans … After they didn't close the border I forgot about it'.
3.38
Property Rights Australia called government messaging and signage 'boring and incomplete' and 'bland and not confronting', arguing that messages about the urgency and importance of biosecurity did not have sufficient impact. Both Green Shirts Queensland and Wilmot Cattle Company argued for improved biosecurity and FMD-specific communications for travellers.
3.39
Green Shirts Australia and Mr Fletcher called for greater transparency and more communications from the Australian Government (for example, in relation to product testing) to ensure that producers are sufficiently informed and to promote cooperation and confidence in the biosecurity system.
Mail and cargo imports
3.40
DAFF has a number of cargo reform projects to manage and streamline incoming mail and cargo screening. System improvements are complicated by continued disruptions to the shipping industry arising from global conflicts and COVID-19, which are forecast to continue into 2023.
3.41
In July 2022, the Australian Government announced increased screening of mail and cargo for traces of FMD, with the implementation of 100 per cent of non‑letter mail inspections for mail arriving from Indonesia and China; and the recruitment of 18 additional biosecurity officers at airports and mail centres.
3.42
DAFF has also undertaken assurance activities to test and measure the effectiveness of its biosecurity measures, including the testing of meat products seized at the border from in bound passengers, and through the mail, as well as purchasing and testing of imported food for sale in Australian stores. Although one sample tested positive for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) fragments of FMD and African Swine Fever (ASF), this finding did not mean that viable virus was present in the product, and it did not change Australia's disease status.
3.43
Several importers, including the Freight and Trade Alliance, drew attention to long inspection delays, labour-intensive systems, and inadequate communications from the department. These submitters noted that delayed inspections have resulted in consequential contractual failures and significant container detention and storage fees for them and their clients.
3.44
Industry representatives suggested that problems could be addressed by: establishing the importer-departmental relationship as a partnership or customer-service provider association; improving technology to reduce problems with inspection bookings and information sharing; simplifying and deregulating trade arrangements; fast-tracking trusted importers initiatives; ensuring that large importers have permanent inspection bookings; and adequately resourcing inspections.
3.45
The CPSU advised the committee of a range of problems, including declines in staffing levels and increases in insecure work, despite increasing cargo and mail volumes and changing workloads. It cited an over-reliance on documentation when clearing imports, and over-reliance on approved arrangements with insufficient assurance surveillance. By way of example, it admitted:
Members in various biosecurity work areas have reported that CCV [cargo compliance verification] inspections are often cancelled when officers are not available to conduct these inspections within 3 days of arrival as the import industry do not want cargo held and these inspections are not cost recovered.
3.46
The union highlighted the 'inability [of current arrangements] to manage current risks' and argued for a larger departmental inspection workforce, submitting that:
Having industry participants effectively self-regulate by managing these risks allows the import industry to reduce its costs while risking the integrity of our biosecurity system. There is a conflict of interest as importers inevitably consider the monetary impact when making decisions and assessments about biosecurity risk.
3.47
In September 2022, the Australian Government announced the establishment of the Cargo Service Rapid Response Team to help address increased workloads and delays in biosecurity clearance affecting commercial cargo imports. This team has provided additional capacity to manage and reduce delays and enhance industry collaboration and conducted a range of engagement activities. The department is continuing to develop an infringement notice scheme to address non-compliance in the cargo, maritime and mail pathways.
3.48
In relation to livestock transport, LiveCorp highlighted that additional measures put in place, including in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, have helped address biosecurity risks associated with the return of livestock transport vessels to Australia, including in relation to washing, disinfecting, fumigating, reduction of foot traffic, and the use of foot baths.
3.49
In terms of plant biosecurity measures, the committee received evidence that highlighted potential improvements to cargo screening measures. The Freight and Trade Alliance listed several longer-term biosecurity reforms, many of which were in their pilot phase, but would enhance border surveillance with new and emerging technologies. These reforms would see greater integration and use of x-ray technology, environmental DNA (eDNA) testing, handheld technologies, sensor and camera systems and artificial intelligence into border screening processes.
3.50
One diagnostic measure that has been progressed is Australia's eDNA biosecurity capability, with the establishment of a National eDNA Reference Centre and eDNA Collaboration Network. DAFF, in partnership with the University of Canberra and the Centre for Invasive Species Solutions (CISS), established the Centre to enhance the department's National eDNA Testing Program that assists with biosecurity decisions at the border and beyond. At present, eDNA testing is being used to detect khapra beetle and brown marmorated stink bugs arriving in sea containers, with additional capabilities being rolled out over between 2022 and 2026. The CISS and Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) reported that eDNA technology could be applied to detect a range of exotic bee pests and diseases, including varroa mite.
Committee view
3.51
Australia's border measures have been largely effective to date, however the committee has received evidence that the system is under pressure and fragile, because of increasing biosecurity threats, more mobile populations, and resourcing and capability constraints.
3.52
The committee received a range of evidence regarding the effectiveness of Australia's border assessment and screening measures. Both the previous and current governments put measures in place to address the risks posed by regional incursions of FMD and LSD through returning air travellers, which resulted in high levels of compliance and greater levels of biosecurity awareness by the public.
3.53
However, the committee also heard that implementation of some measures appears to have been patchy, and dependent upon the availability of biosecurity staff and resources on the ground. While there is future scope for screening to be further automated and improved through technology—potentially strengthening diagnostic capabilities, streamlining screening processes and bolstering human resource capabilities—the committee agrees with the government approach to maintain more traditional screening methods while the new capability is developed and becomes more reliable. The department may also wish to consider the need for an independent audit of border assessment and screening arrangements to determine their effectiveness and identify any areas for improvement.
3.54
The committee remains concerned that importers continue to be impacted by inspection delays and challenges resulting in higher container storage and detention costs. The committee heard that problems have been caused by ongoing effects of COVID-19 on officer availability, lack of resourcing, and the need to further develop industry partnerships and trusted importer arrangements.
3.55
The committee understands the department is aware of the key issues impacting arrivals and entry of mail and cargo to Australia and is undertaking ongoing work to address these issues and improve services, but emphasises that this work needs to be prioritised and fast-tracked.
3.56
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry prioritises the enhancement of screening and assessment systems to facilitate the timely processing of mail and cargo entering Australia.
3.57
The committee recommends that the Australian Government consults with freight, shipping, port and biosecurity stakeholders, including Australia Post, to develop priorities for the implementation and funding of new and emerging technologies into mail and cargo biosecurity screening systems.