Chapter 5 - Other issues
Encouraging more efficient water use
5.1
The efficiency of water use in different areas, and the
profitability of use on different crops, varies greatly. The Committee
heard a number of examples of irrigation sectors that have improved their
efficiency of water use greatly in recent years or decades. However, overall
there is still much potential for improvement.
What should be done with saved water?
5.2
In the case of a textbook firm, efficiencies might
allow the firm either to produce more output with the same input, or to produce
the same output with less input (or any intermediate combination). The market
will show which course is most profitable. In the case of water reform, the
implicit aim, overall, is the second: to produce the desired output with less
water, so that saved water can be returned to the environment without hurting
farming economies.
5.3
The idea that a farmer might use saved water to
increase production intuitively seems to run counter to the aim of returning
water to the environment. Talk about how the savings from efficiencies should
be shared between farmers and the environment may raise concerns that a farmer
might be asked to invest in efficiencies, only to see government take the saved
water away. This sort of concern seemed to be behind comments by many witnesses
who stressed that if farmers are to invest in efficiencies they must be able to
reap the benefit:
If farmers are encouraged to invest on farm and water efficiency
projects then they should be able to recognise, use and retain any saving; and
similarly for government. Where there are jointly funded projects, you share
the benefits.[46]
5.4
The Committee agrees. To
encourage farmers to invest in efficiencies, they must obviously be able to use
the savings from their own investment as they see fit - whether to sell the
saved water or to increase their production. The duty of the community at
large, in conjunction with government, to ensure environmental health is a
separate matter, which it does by fixing the size of the consumptive pool and
by buying water for the environment as necessary:
The Wentworth Group strongly support water efficiency and we
strongly support water efficiency going to increased production, which creates
further wealth. However, it has to be underpinned by securing the environmental
health of the river first.[47]
Should government invest in efficiencies directly?
5.5
The question arises as to whether government should be directly
involved in subsidising or investing in efficiency infrastructure on private
land. The administrative costs will be considerable. It might be argued that
providing government has fixed the consumptive pool at a size that adequately
protects the environment and set water prices at full cost recovery (allowing
for environmental externalities), it is a matter for users to decide the most
profitable mix of capital (irrigation systems etc.) and consumables (water) in
their production. Whether a possible efficiency investment is attractive (for
example, piping channels to avoid seepage and evaporation losses) will depend
on the cost of water, the cost of the investment and the amount of water it
saves.
5.6
The IGA implies that government may be directly involved
in encouraging efficiencies - presumably by funding or subsiding efficiency
investments on private property in return for taking the saved water. The justification
for government involvement would be that society may take a longer term view
than the individual, and may wish to encourage investment whose payback period
would be too long to be attractive to the individual:
It costs money to save this water. the payback period on this
particular graph, which is about 15 years for the best-case scenario, is too
long for the farmer. We need to look into investments which can reduce this payback
period to less than five years so that farmers will start thinking about
conversion and providing this water for other users.[48]
5.7
On the other hand, if government wishes to intervene on
the basis that the individuals payback period is too short for societys
needs, it can force the pace simply by offering an above market price for
water. This would reduce the payback period for the individuals investment in
saving water.
5.8
Government will of course need to invest in public infrastructure
on its own account:
There is a big difference in the system between on farm, which
is essentially private property; near farm, which is the irrigation area which
tends to be a cooperative corporate structure; and then system wide, upstream
from the irrigation areas, which is effectively the commons and owned by the
government. Different principles need to be applied in each of those zones.[49]
5.9
It will be important that any direct government
investment in private efficiency infrastructure is economically disciplined,
and does not become a de facto form of structural adjustment assistance. There
is no reason for government to be involved in obtaining environmental water by
investment if the cost to government is higher than simply buying the water in
the market (subject to paragraphs 5.6-5.7).
5.10
Related comments are at paragraph 5.19 below.
Effect of reducing return flows
5.11
More efficient water use will reduce return flows to
the river or drainage past the root zone to recharge the aquifer. This will
reduce supply to downstream users. If this happens in a fully allocated system
which has significant return flows, the system will become overused. The
possible effects are important, since the possible savings in this way are
often high relative to savings from reduced evaporation or more productive
transpiration.
5.12
The response could be either to cut allocations across
the board, or to define allocations as net of return flows - which requires
better knowledge of what the return flows are. Mr
Creighton of CSIRO stressed the need for
better water accounting to inform this matter:
We have come from a system in Australia
where you got an entitlement. You may not have used it allsleepers and dozers
and everything elseor, if you did, you allowed much of it to go via ground
water or surface run-off back to the system, then someone else picked it up and
used it. As we get more precision about our irrigation, our dry land or
whatever it is, that is not going to happen. But, unless we have a water
account and unless we understand the system, we are not going to be able to put
some numbers on the changes.[50]
5.13
Alternatively: When cost or technology limitations
prevent direct measurement of net use either an attempt should be made to deem
the extent of net use or entitlements should specifically make it clear that as
net use increases gross allocations will be cut on a one for one basis.[51]
5.14
A benefit of government buying environmental water in
preference to investing directly in efficiencies is that when government buys
environmental water the least efficiently used water is likely to be offered
first. When this water is returned to the environment the return flow problem
does not arise. If government invests in improving the efficiency of the least
efficient water, the return flow problem will be greatest.
5.15
The Committee draws
attention to the importance of this issue. The Committee
recognises the primary importance of better accounting for all water flows in a
catchment, and recommends that steps be taken in all catchment areas to
properly assess the amount of water necessary for maintenance of environmental
health and the amount available for trade.
Recommendation
5
5.16
Water management authorities should take steps to
properly assess in all catchments the amount of water necessary to maintain environmental
health and the amount available for
trade.
Recovering overallocated water
5.17
The Intergovernmental Agreement sets out principles for
recovering water for the environment. Options include:
-
investment
in more efficient water infrastructure;
-
purchase of
water on the market, by tender or other market based mechanisms;
-
investment
in more efficient water management practices, including measurement; or
-
investment
in behavioural change to reduce urban water consumption. (s79(ii)(a)).
5.18
The selection of measures should be primarily on the
basis of cost-effectiveness (s79(ii)(c)). The Intergovernmental Agreement on
addressing overallocation in the Murray-Darling
Basin has similar points (s23).
Buying back water versus investing in efficiencies
5.19
As to whether government should obtain environmental
water by simply buying it in the market, or by investing in efficiencies, the
same issues arise as at paragraph 5.5. It would be easier for government simply
to buy water as necessary, and leave it to the sellers to decide the best way
of finding it - whether by contracting their production, or by investing in
efficiencies so they can maintain production and have some water to sell:
If you go in with a voluntary [buyback] mechanism, you find all
of the water and you empower people with the money to upgrade, without having
to spend a lot of taxpayers dollars involved in designing complicated schemes.[52]
5.20
On the other hand, many submitters to this inquiry seemed
to prefer the prospect of direct government support. For example:
The way to tackle it in the community is not to say, Were
going to take away your water resource or your economy is going to go down the
tubes, but to say, We can actually show you a way where, if you start at the
marketing end of your product and look for overseas markets, if you look for
products which you can get paid more for, if you look at your quality
assurance, if you look at the way you grow your product and if you look at the
way you irrigate and do your business, there is actually a better outcome for
your regional community.[53]
5.21
In such comments there appears to be an underlying assumption
that government investment means water will be saved by efficiencies while
maintaining rural economies at the same level of output; but if government
simply buys water back for the environment it is more likely that rural economies will contract.
5.22
This is not necessarily so. If government buys water,
the sellers can use the money to invest in efficiencies to maintain their production,
and the end result will be the same as if the government invested in the
efficiencies directly and took the saved water. How much this happens will
depend on the return on investment at prevailing prices. The basic economic
calculus does not depend on who initiates the efficiency investment. It would
certainly be easier administratively for government simply to buy water, and
leave it to the market to prioritise efficiency investments.
5.23
If government wishes to support private efficiency
investment directly for policy reasons (which the IGA allows for), it will be
important that this investment is economically disciplined and directed with
priority to the best returns. It must also be kept in mind that the primary
motivation for the development of the IGA was severe degradation of a significant
river system. As such, providing money to support private efficiency investment
should be peripheral in light of larger issues to be tackled.
5.24
The comments above refer only to the economics of
obtaining environmental water. The quote at paragraph 5.20 also relates to
governments role in research, public education and consumer advice. These are
indeed vital roles of government. They cannot efficiently be turned over to
private enterprise because they have a large public good element.
How to treat sleepers and dozers
5.25
The question arises: should government should tackle
overallocation by confiscating sleepers and dozers (unused or little used
rights) with priority, on the grounds that this minimises economic dislocation?
5.26
Submitters to the inquiry, however much they regretted
the fact that licences may have been given too freely in the past, generally
did not favour this. They argued that sleeper licences have been treated as
property with value, property may have changed hands on that basis, and it
would not be fair to withdraw them now:
Even though they may be a sleeper or dozer, the finance industry
has valued that land at a higher value because of that piece of paper. That
higher value is not reflected only in the market rate upon selling the
property; even the valuer general recognises it when he values your property
for shire rates, whether or not you have used it.[54]
5.27
New South Wales
has particular problems with over-allocated groundwater systems, such as the Upper
Namoi. New water sharing plans for major groundwater systems have
been deferred to further consider this problem. It appears that the NSW
government is still considering all options:
The government is looking at the history of use as the focus of
how those licences should be amended. I think you will find that, in areas
where for whatever reason there has been a low history of usewhether because
of the nature of the aquifer or the level of development of the farmunder the
proposed structural adjustment regime the entitlements of those licences will
be reduced preferentially before the active licences[55]
5.28
A related matter is whether some groundwater sleepers
are in fact ghosts - licences held by farmers who do not in fact have access
to groundwater. The extent of the problem is unclear. The Committee
heard that there is a problem on the Gwydir.[56] The
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources suggested that it
is not so much a problem of no water as of low yield:
Senator HEFFERNANBut there are people
who have bore licences and do not have any bore water.
Mr AlvarezNo,
there are not any that do not have any bore water.. There are some areas of
cracked rock where the amount of water they were granted was greater than the
amount they could ever get out of it. There is no doubt about that. But, over
all aquifers, it is about the rate at which they can take it.[57]
5.29
NSW is now considering how to deal with these
situations:
In areas where for whatever reason there has been a low history
of usewhether because of the nature of the aquifer or the level of development
of the farmunder the proposed structural adjustment regime the entitlements of
those licences will be reduced preferentially before the active licences.[58]
5.30
In the Committees
view the question of how to treat sleepers and dozers will have to be worked
out by catchment communities and government on a case by case basis. The Committee
does not think that the owners of ghost licences should be allowed to profit
from them. There is no reason in fairness why a licence to take groundwater if there is any, when in fact there is
none (that point being at the licensees risk) should be upgraded into an
entitlement to a share of a known
water resource.
5.31
Related comment on sleepers is at paragraph 4.43ff.
Allowing for water interception by landuse changes
5.32
Interception of water before it reaches a watercourse
is a significant issue. The Intergovernmental Agreement provides that, in water
systems that are fully allocated or approaching full allocation, interception
activities above an agreed threshold size will require a water access
entitlement. Systems not yet near full allocation should be monitored, and
water access entitlements will be required when the threshold level of
interception is reached or the system approaches full allocation (s57).
5.33
Examples of such activities that are of concern, many
of which are currently undertaken without a water access entitlement, are:
-
large scale plantation forestry; and
-
intercepting and storing of overland flows (s55).
Effects of farm dams
5.34
The National Land
and Water Resources Audit estimated that in 1996-97 Australias
several million farm dams accounted for about 9% of total stored water.[59] Farm dams can obviously have a significant
impact on downstream water availability.
5.35
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
(DAFF) noted the concern about the growth in numbers of farm dams, particularly
in the upper catchments of major rivers. It described the different approaches
to farm dams taken by NSW and Victoria:
The NSW farm policy, for example, limits the right of
landholders to capture and use runoff for any purpose to 10% of the average yearly
rainfall runoff for their property. This is known as a Harvestable Right and is
tied to the land - it is intended to satisfy essential farm needs such as for
stock watering, house and gardens and may be for any purpose including
irrigation. This right will not be licensed and no fees will apply.
In Victoria,
the Water (Irrigation Farm Dams) Act 2002 came into operation on 4 April 2002. It amended the Water
Act 1989 and extends licensing arrangements to cover all irrigation and
commercial use in the catchment.[60]
5.36
Mr Weller
of the Victorian Farmers Federation gave the rationale for the new regulation
of farm dams in Victoria:
If you have a Murray-Darling Basin cap and farmers in the
catchment areas continue to catch water and create new developments on their
farmswhich they have been able to do, provided they do it off a waterwayyou
are undermining the reliability of the water supplied to the irrigators who
have made investments in laser grading and drip irrigation.[61]
5.37
The contrary view is that landholders should have a basic
right to take a share of the water which falls on their own property. Mr
Evans described the effect of the new rules
on upper Murray farmers:
Following passage of the [Victorian] Farm Dams legislation, a
landowner wishing to store any water resulting from rainfall on his/her land,
to use on that land for productive purposes, must first purchase a Water Right
from within the relevant catchment, and then build a storage dam for water
which has never left the farm![62]
5.38
Mr Evans
suggested that if 20 per cent of sales water was set aside for upper catchment
farmers, this would not be a significant risk to water supply to irrigation
farmers. He suggested further: The right to store water should be
proportionate to the average rainfall in the area of land it held, and not be
transferable.[63]
Comment
5.39
The Committee is
sympathetic to these concerns, especially in light of the fact that the farm
dam controls differ between Victoria
and New South Wales. However
there is no denying that, in principle, upstream water interception should be
integrated into the total water sharing plan for the catchment. That implies
controlling it if necessary, along the lines suggested in the Intergovernmental
Agreement.
5.40
The Committee could
not question the Victorian government on this matter, as the Victorian
government declined the Committees invitation
to appear. In relation to the policy, the Committee
cannot comment on whether the recent tightened regulation of farm dams is warranted,
or an over-reaction, in context of the water balance the whole catchment. The Committee
notes the different policies of the New South Wales
and Victorian governments, and suggests that the two governments should
negotiate a harmonised position.
5.41
On the question of fairness: the situation is similar
to any situation where government limits a long held right for policy reasons -
for example, new controls on land clearing, or withdrawing a sleeper water licence
on use it or lose it policy. Government must be able to make such changes for
the longer term common good. Fairness means making reasonable transitional
arrangements for the people most affected.
5.42
The Committee notes
that the Victorian farm dams legislation provided a subsidy to those who
decided to put in dams following the passage of the legislation, although
according to Mr Evans
this has had a very slow take-up.[64] The suggestion
to give the affected farmers a water entitlement raises concerns about how
widely eligible landowners should be defined and what the effect would be on
demand:
ACTING CHAIRIf we are going to buy back
water for the environmentand there is not a lot of water, just a few thousand
megalitrescouldnt we buy their water back for them?
Prof. CullenIt might only be a few
thousand megalitres at the moment, but I think once you set that precedent
there will be quite a big queue.[65]
5.43
The Committee suggests
that where a tightening up policy is necessary, in fairness it would at least
be reasonable to announce it as a use it or lose it policy, and give farmers
a reasonable time to use it.
Effects of plantation forestry
5.44
The issue of water-intercepting landuse changes arises
particularly in relation to plantation forestry in higher rainfall areas. A
pine forest at the 800mm rainfall isohyet intercepts up to 2 megalitres per
hectare per year; at the 1000mm isohyet, up to 3 megalitres - which is about
equivalent to the effect of a small farm dam on every hectare.[66] Plantation
forestry in the Murray-Darling Basin
is growing strongly, with government incentives. On one estimate, the goals for
forestry development in the 2020 Vision
for plantation forestry would reduce flow in the Murray-Darling by 600
gigalitres per year.[67]
5.45
The plantation forestry industry disputes exactly how
serious the problem is;[68] however there
can be no disputing the principle that this interception of water should be
considered a consumptive use, and should be factored into water planning for a catchment.
5.46
This issue has been slow in being recognised. For
example, the Committee was concerned to note
that the recent Murrumbidgee water sharing plan made no
reference to it.[69]
It appears that it is now being addressed. Mr
Sutherland of NSW
DIPNR advised:
In high-yielding aquifers with good quality water, there is
clearly a threat to the water production potential of those aquifers. So New
South Wales, together with other states and the Commonwealth, is certainly
exploring this: firstly, getting the scientific knowledge right in terms of how
we model that and, secondly, using the best range of policy instruments to
provide incentives or disincentives to industry so as not to see plantations
established in those high-yield catchments.[70]
5.47
The plantation forestry industry is concerned that
forests should not be discriminated against because they are the most visible
target. It argues that a national
approach to water rights and allocations should take into account water use by
all irrigated and dryland rural industries in a non-discriminatory manner.
There is no scientific basis to suggest that plantation forestry should be
regulated in a different manner to any other dryland landuse.[71]
General comment on water intercepting activities
5.48
The Committee
appreciates the difficulty of this issue and the good intentions of this
section of the IGA. However it has a concern that the IGA provisions on this
depend very much on the interpretation of when a water system is approaching
full allocation, and what the threshold level of water intercepting activity
should be. Progress on this matter will depend on continuing political
commitment. The prospect of introducing a wide ranging new suite of rural
landuse controls to account for dryland water use is daunting. Alternatively, Prof.
Young suggested that better accounting for
impacts, both positive and negative, would allow more market-based solutions:
You set up robust ways so that people account for water fully
and properly; similarly, you set up robust ways of accurately defining salinity
impacts and accountability for salinity and giving people credits for when they
produce real solutions and giving them debits when they do notand similarly
with issues like greenhouse. If you put the whole suite together and design your
pricing, quota and allocation systems, whether for water or salinity or
whatever, then you can have optimal allocation through market processes without
having to have tighter planning controls. Alternatively, you can use zoning
type models where you just prohibit people from doing things at specific
locations.[72]
5.49
This raises the question of whether we have enough
scientific knowledge to do the necessary accounting. Dr
Williams suggested:
Have we got enough technical and scientific knowledge of our
landscapes to be able to do comprehensive water balance and water accounting
everywhere? Probably the answer is: we have enough to start, but we will need
to refine it as we go along.[73]
5.50
Prof. Young
suggested that there is a tradeoff between the cost and complexity of a water
accounting system and the accuracy required:
The systems the work best are those that are quite clunky and
have four or five classes and a deeming arrangement, in which it is assumed
that, for now, all lucerne, for example, has a recharge of such and such, or a
run-off of such and such, or that a certain class of plantation has a factor of
so muchyou do it on a class-by-class basis. You build your accounting
framework on that sort of fairly crude system, which will get it 80 or 90 per
cent right.[74]
5.51
The Committee
recommends these matters be progressed quickly, so that water authorities can
adequately manage the total water balance of the catchment.
Recommendation
6
5.52
Water management authorities should give priority to
establishing the systems necessary to account for the total water balance of
catchments to allow better management of water-intercepting activities.
5.53
The Committee is
sympathetic to the concern of the plantation forestry industry that plantations
should not be discriminated against because they are the most visible target.
The IGA refers to all water-intercepting activities in the same way, which is
appropriate. However it may be a matter of practical necessity to control large
scale plantation forestry with priority, if the science shows that that is the
most important single issue.
5.54
The Committee notes
the importance of better scientific knowledge to account for total water
movement in catchments. The Committee
recommends that this should be a priority for Commonwealth funded programs such
as the National Land
and Water Resources Audit, the Cooperative Centre for Catchment Hydrology, and
the Water for a Healthy Country Flagship.
Recommendation
7
5.55
Relevant Commonwealth funded research programs should
give priority to researching the total water balance of catchments to allow
better management of water-intercepting activities, with particular reference
to the effects of large scale plantation forestry on runoff.
Example of overallocation: the Lower Balonne
5.56
The lower Balonne
River in southwest Queensland
stands as an example of some problems of water planning which are not solved in
the Intergovernmental Agreement. Solving them will require continuing political
motivation.
5.57
The lower Balonne is a flood pulse river, whose flows
vary enormously from year to year. The downstream floodplain environment
(including the important RAMSAR listed Narran
Lake Nature Reserve[75]),
as well as the productivity of floodplain graziers, depends critically on the
regime of flooding.
5.58
During the 1990s water harvesting developments on the
lower Balonne (downstream of St George)
increased greatly. Total offstream storage is now about 1,500,000 megalitres -
five times greater than in 1993/94.[76] Cubbie
Station, the biggest cotton farm in the district, has storage capacity of 460,000
megalitres.
5.59
It is now clear that the government of the day was at
best shortsighted, at worst reckless and overpowered by self-interest, in
allowing this level of development. The enormously increased water harvesting
has greatly reduced the reliability of supply to the pre-existing St
George irrigation area. Reduction in
beneficial flooding has seriously affected the productivity of the downstream
floodplain graziers in southwest Queensland
and northwest New South Wales.[77] It will
probably have serious long term effects on the ecology of the floodplain,
mainly by eliminating the more frequent small floods. This is important because
the health of ecological assets such as the Narran
Lakes depends on the frequency of
floods. A 2003 scientific review found:
The Panel supports the
contention of the CRC for Freshwater Ecology that there will be significant
long term degradation of the Lower Balonne
floodplain and of the Narran lakes in particular once the system experiences
the water extraction that is possible with the present infrastructure. We see a
long period of decline, with the full impacts not necessarily being fully
obvious within the 40 year time scale of this assessment, due to the background
high flow variability. [78]
5.60
For example, the medium flood in January 2004 delivered
far less water to the floodplain than the similar event in 1994. Cubbie
harvested about 150,000 megalitres.[79] The NSW
government reported later:
The flow events of February-March 1981, March 1988 and March
1994 all followed long periods of no flow (the 1981 being the longest) and are
similar to the January 2004 event. The
volume of water entering NSW, as a proportion of the total flow at St
George, was 44% for 1981, 45% for 1988 and
48% for 1994. In contrast, the
cross-border flow from the Jan 2004 was only 20% of the total at St
George. Preliminary Landsat 5 image
analyses, comparing the 1988 and 2004 events, indicate that this 50% reduction
in total flow and greater attenuation of flow peaks, resulted in a reduction to
floodplain inundation of 73% in Queensland and 88% in NSW.[80]
5.61
Against this background the Queensland
government has been conducting a contentious and long-drawn-out water planning
exercise for the Condamine-Balonne. The draft Condamine-Balonne Water Resource
Plan issued in December 2003 proposes that Lower Balonne
water users would reduce their daily extractions by up to 10% during specified
flow events (the water will be paid back by allowing higher extraction during
bigger floods).[81]
However it also formalises existing practices for taking overland flows, by
building levees to redirect flow, or by bunding - excluding water from an
area in order to harvest the water that would have soaked into the ground over
that area. These developments have taken place apparently without adequate
regulation or assessment of environmental impacts. In fact some evidence points
to environmental evasion.
5.62
The floodplain graziers regard the 10% provision as inadequate.
Mr Betts, using the example of the January 2004 flood, showed that a 10 per
cent reduction in water harvesting over 5 days would only have added 3.5 per
cent to the total downstream flow over the whole event: It may put a couple of
inches in the river but would be insufficient to produce any beneficial
flooding:[82]
Our big problem is that the extractions were already very
highover 100 per cent in some flow rates down to about 70 per cent. When you
reduce it by 10 per cent, it makes a minuscule difference. This reduction
period is only for up to five days. In this last flow event it would have only
made 3,500 megalitres extra per day to be spread over five rivers, which would
make no difference to the flood plain.[83]
5.63
They also stress that there is no change proposed to
harvesting large flows, which means there will be very little chance of
getting a large flood until the 1,200 gigalitres of storage is filled:
At a peak of 200,000 Ml/day the extraction rate is 99,917 Ml/day
(49.9%). The 10% reduction for up to 5 days is only for low and medium flows,
so there would be no reduction for these large flows. As it is the height and
duration of the peak that is essential for beneficial flooding these large
extraction levels will mean there will be very little chance of getting a large
flood until the 1,200 gigalitres of storage is filled.[84]
5.64
The floodplain graziers oppose the proposals to
legitimise existing harvesting of overland flows:
We are largely prepared to accept what has been given in the
original river licences. Our main problem is all the overland flow extraction,
bunding and rediverting; it has been the law of the jungle out on the flood
plain.
The water-harvesting licences are basically capped at a flow
rate out of St George of
60,000 megalitres a day. So, once you reach 60,000, there is no increase in the
amount of water that can be taken under the water-harvesting licences. If you
have a big flood of in excess of 100,000 or up to 150,000 megalitres a day,
there is sufficient water then to service the flood plain down below. But, if
the extractions from the flood plains are allowed to continue, they go on right
up to flows of 200,000 megalitres per day and basically permit up to at least
50 per cent of that water to be diverted. The problem is that some of that
water is not actually extracted by pumps but by gravity diversion, which means
that it can be done at an enormous rate.[85]
5.65
The practice of bunding also raises serious concerns
about the environmental consequences for land which is no longer wetted. Prof.
Cullen commented:
The logic was that if people put up bunds to create a farm dam
they should be given an extra licence for the water that would have flooded
their land. This was the type A licence. You can see the logic for that, but
the logical extension of it was that people started to put up bunds just to
create type A licences and that seems to be a scandalous way to manage water on
a flood plain.
I think they have quite a good water planning framework in
place, but in that situation they are dealing with the mistakes of past
governments, when water planning was almost nonexistent as far as I can see.
ACTING CHAIRAnyhow,
you would like to knock A and B on the head?
Prof. CullenCertainly.
ACTING CHAIRI am
amazed that there has been no environmental work done on what happens to a
piece of flood country when you peg it off from water for all time.
Prof. CullenIt
certainly does not stay as flood country, does it?[86]
5.66
The NSW Government has criticised the draft
Condamine-Balonne Water Resource Plan strongly. The New
South Wales submission is mostly focussed on
ecological rather than economic effects, but it corroborates the concerns of
the floodplain graziers. The main criticisms are:
-
The plan fails to address the cautionary
statements about possible future environmental damage in Cullen et als 2003
scientific review;
-
It is doubtful that the environmental flows
rules will be enough to prevent degradation of Narran Lakes;
-
The proposed 10% cuts to harvesting during
specified flood events will do little to reduce the impact on beneficial
flooding;
-
There will be a total loss of minor to small
floods;
-
Paying back reduced harvesting in small floods
with increased harvesting in bigger floods will decrease the ecological value
of large floods in NSW;
-
It is unacceptable that the plan defers any
significant clawback of current extractions for 5 years.
5.67
In summary, the draft WRP is completely unacceptable
to New South Wales.
5.68
NSW considers that significant clawback is essential to
avert ecological collapse. NSW believes that Queensland
must set a volumetric cap for the Condamine-Balonne, and specify an acceptable
timeframe to bring diversions back to this level.[87] The Committees
recommendation at paragraph 2.7 above also deals with the issue of
overallocation in Queensland
systems.
Comment
5.69
The Lower Balonne problem shows
the difficulty of trying to repair matters following the shortsighted decisions
of the past. The Committee agrees with NSW
that the draft Water Resource Plan is a weak response to the problem. The Committee
also agrees with New South Wales that
Queensland must set a volumetric
cap for the Condamine-Balonne, and specify an acceptable timeframe to bring
diversions back to this level.
5.70
In the Committees
view the principle of bunded water licences should be banned. If proper science
shows that this practice has more damaging environmental consequences than harvesting
from the river (which seems likely), it logically suggests that water harvested
in this way should be clawed back with priority.
5.71
The Committee suggests
that if necessary the Commonwealth should take a stronger role in progressing
this issue. For example, the Commonwealth could attach conditions to future
financial assistance for water reform, comparable to the conditions attached to
national competition payments.
5.72
Another possibility is that, because the Narran Lake
Nature Reserve is listed under an international treaty (the RAMSAR Convention),
the Commonwealth could legislate to control its management using the external
affairs power (section 51(xxix) of the Constitution).
5.73
The Committee notes
with concern that large proposals to divert overland flows with levees are now under
consideration in New South Wales
(for example, at Carbucky near Goondiwindi).[88] The Committee
urges New South Wales to treat
such proposals with extreme caution and not to repeat the past mistakes of Queensland.
Example of groundwater management problems: the Latrobe
aquifer
5.74
Many witnesses stressed the need for better knowledge
and more consistent management of the whole water system, integrating surface
water and ground water.
We have put the emphasis on the surface water flow and
regulating the surface extraction. If you look at the ground water extraction,
you will find that we have put a cap on one and increased the other. We really
need to treat the whole hydrological system as one and to understand the
interactions within it.[89]
There are very important links between ground water and surface
water ecosystems and that, if you are trying to manage a ground water resource,
you have to take into account environmental ground water flows, which are
basically discharges of ground water. Trying to find a rational way of doing
that has been exercising most state agencies.[90]
5.75
This issue is particularly important in relation to
groundwater because the effects of extraction may be longer appearing and harder
to reverse:
Ground water is very different in its nature from surface water
in that there are long timelags associated with changing recharge and the
response we see in stream systems. If we focused upon end-of-valley targets and
the control of stream salinity as part of those targets then timelags typically
range between 10 years and 200 years. So in some of our ground water systems we
are still seeing a response to the initial European clearing.[91]
5.76
In some cases in the past governments have knowingly
overallocated groundwater - an effective policy of mining the aquifer. This is
of course unacceptable. The long term damage could be severe, both for the
environment and for rural communities who find the resource they depend on
gradually disappearing.
5.77
Better accounting for the total water balance is
important in relation to the problems of return flows and water-intercepting
landuse changes, mentioned above.
5.78
As an example of the problems that can arise, the Committee
notes the plight of groundwater users of South Gippsland,
where there is a strong correlation between offshore oil drilling and dropping
groundwater levels. This causes expense to farmers who must deepen or replace
bores, and creates a risk of land subsidence. The Victorian Farmers Federation
(VFF) explained the situation:
Approximately 100,000 megalitres of fluid is extracted annually
with water being brought to the surface, separately from the oil and gas
component and then dumped back into the sea... As a result of these activities,
groundwater levels in the La Trobe aquifer have been declining by around 1
meter per year across the whole Gippsland
Basin.[92]
5.79
Mr Greenaway
of the VFF argued that that water really should be reinjected into the
aquifer, which happens in most oilfields around the world.[93]
5.80
According to the VFF the Commonwealth, which licences
the oil wells, has refused to acknowledge the cause of the problem:
To date, the Commonwealth Government has rejected our request
for financial assistance to be made available to farmers whose groundwater
irrigation bores have been impact upon by the extraction of oil and gas off
shore. This action of the Commonwealth in relation to this matter is unfair
particularly when it is assessed against the one billion dollars in resource
rent tax that it receives annually from the oil and gas fields in Bass
Strait.
The VFF feels frustrated with the way the Commonwealth is
unwilling to fully engage on this matter, especially since all the published
research in this area clearly indicates that the problems arises from the off
shore fluid extraction.[94]
5.81
The Committee shares
the VFFs concerns. Quite apart from the need to do justice to the affected
farmers, the long term effect on the aquifer, and the risk of land subsidence,
is severe. The Committee recommends that the
Commonwealth should acknowledge this problem and propose solutions as a matter
of urgency. The Committee notes the Federal
Government has commissioned an investigation by Dr
Tom Hatton of
CSIRO into all aspects of the Latrobe aquifer.[95]
Recommendation 8
5.82
The Commonwealth should, as a matter of urgency,
address the impact of Commonwealth-licensed oil drilling on the Latrobe
aquifer and propose solutions which respect the rights of groundwater users.
Coordination of research on water
5.83
Many of the policies in the National Water Initiative
imply a need for better scientific knowledge.
5.84
The Commonwealth supports water research through the
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) (including
the recently established Water for a Healthy Country Flagship), the Bureau of
Meteorology, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, the
Bureau of Rural Sciences, Land and Water Australia
and the National Land
and Water Resources Audit (part of the Natural Heritage Trust program).
5.85
For example, the recently established CSIRO Water for a
Healthy Country Flagship aims to achieve the following outcomes:
-
information at regional and Australia-wide
scales to support improved water and natural resources policy ;
-
rational water allocation decisions, based on
water use benefits and opportunities, and providing input to water trading and
market arrangements;
-
best practice farming and urban water uses that
increase productivity, improve water quality, re-use resources and reduce input
costs;
-
investment strategies that build on a systems
understanding of our catchments, rivers and estuaries; and
-
inclusion of climate variability and climate
change as a component of all water resource use management decisions.[96]
5.86
A number of Cooperative Research Centres deal with
water, including the CRC for Catchment Hydrology, the CRC for Freshwater
Ecology, the CRC for Water Quality and Treatment, the CRC for Irrigation
Futures, and crop-specific CRCs such as the CRCs for cotton and rice. The CRC
program involves a combination of public and private sector funding, and is administered
by the Department of Education, Science and Training. The Committee,
noting recent cuts to government funding to some CRCs, urges that the
government should be mindful of the importance of the CRCs work on water
issues when allocating funding for their operation.
5.87
The Committee has a
concern that the number of research bodies involved could lead to a lack of
coordination of the water research effort. The Committee
is pleased to note that the Intergovernmental Agreement commits to the research
needed to implement the agreement, and to more effectively coordinate the
national water knowledge effort (s101(ii)).
5.88
Mr Creighton
of CSIRO described arrangements in the USA
and the Netherlands
for integrating research and policy-making:
They have a strong link between the science, the management and
the policy. The science does scenarios, the science collects informationyes,
we need more information about water and so on but the science does not play
the policy game. It gives the information. The scenarios then go forward to the
managers, the bureaucrats, the people in government and so on, and they look
through which lever is to be pulled and which opportunities we have got. That
comes forward every five years as a report to their parliaments and they
actually get in there and debate the future of the natural resources or their
public health.
That rigour in the way we pick up science knowledge, we
understand the progress we are making and then we finetune, move forward,
implement changes in management policy is not quite there yet in Australia,
but we are a long, long way towards that. I think it is just putting the final
touches on it that is important.
I am looking for a closer link between science and policy, and I
am saying to you that the [CSIRO Water for a Healthy Country] Flagship is an
opportunity to move forward on that right now. [97]
5.89
The Committee suggests
that coordinating research to best inform implementation of the Intergovernmental
Agreement could be a responsibility of the National Water Commission. It would
have to consult the interested bodies as to how to delegate effective
management of the coordination role in the scientific community.
Aden Ridgeway, Senator
for New South Wales
Chair