Chapter 6Measures to counter violent extremism in Australia

6.1Many inquiry participants called for greater emphasis to be given to measures that prevent, rather than react, to violent extremism in Australia. They argued that punitive measures are often not the most effective or appropriate response to violent extremism.

6.2Dr John Coyne, Head, Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre, and Head, Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), reminded the committee that the priority should be on addressing violent extremism and not the ideologies that contribute to it. To that end, law enforcement and intelligence agencies should not be 'the thought police'. They should not be in the business of evaluating or preventing citizens from holding extreme ideas. Those agencies should be focused on preventing individuals from committing violent acts and not policing their ideological views.[1]

6.3Professor Melissa Castan, Director, Castan Centre for Human Rights Law (Castan Centre), drew attention to the broad weaknesses of existing legal responses to extremism:

The legal responses to incoherent and constantly changing forms of extremism have been reactive and tend to respond to specific incidences or crises. However, addressing extremism properly requires a comprehensive cultural and legal approach that addresses deeper and more systemic issues.[2]

6.4Liberty Victoria suggested that the response to violent extremism should focus 'on improving social cohesion and trust in institutions, including trust in government and the media, rather than focussing on expanding censorship and surveillance'.[3]

6.5Those measures should be taken to remedy 'the underlying social and structural issues that are fuelling systemic inequality, injustice, racism, as well as a declining trust in institutions, government authority and the media'.[4]

6.6It has been argued that young people are also less likely to respond positively to law enforcement intervention than they were in the past:

While a simple visit from the police once would have been enough to deter many youth from worrisome behaviours, this is no longer the case. Thispoints to the need for more nuanced thinking about prevention and intervention and a better understanding of how online platforms can function as gateways that draw youths into extremism.[5]

6.7The Castan Centre also drew attention to the balance that must be struck between implementing measures to address right wing extremism and protecting human rights. It warned against:

Broad or vague laws…[that] are particularly at risk of violating human rights in a way which is neither proportionate nor legitimate. The issue of right wing extremism cannot be used to suppress free speech that is neither violent, extremist, nor incitement.[6]

6.8It also indicated that while certain human rights are protected, they are not absolute. There are limitations on the right to freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and association. For those limitations to be lawful, they:

…must be adequately balanced and legitimate. Laws addressing hate speech and discrimination in Australia do not breach freedoms of the individual making right wing extremist statements or conduct, nor do they breach the implied freedom of political communication under the Commonwealth Constitution.[7]

6.9Inquiry participants recommended governments focus on the following measures:

community outreach and engagement programs;

deradicalisation programs;

education programs that foster critical thinking skills, improve knowledge of civics, and instil a greater sense of empathy; and

antiracism programs.

Community outreach programs

6.10Academics from Victoria University argued that civil society is integral to 'challenging the exclusivist agenda of [right wing extremist (RWE)] movements and minimising their appeal among local community members'. They indicated that the importance of civil society is recognised in other countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, but 'has been an underexplored and underutilised facet in Australia's approaches to tackling right wing extremism'.[8]

6.11Dr Mario Peucker, Project Lead and Executive Member, Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS), suggested that Australian community and civil society organisations have not responded to right wing extremism as strongly as their counterparts in other parts of the world. He argued that 'civil society is underutilised in the Australian context, and that's something we certainly need to work on, and look overseas for opportunities to learn how we can do that in the future'.[9]

6.12Dr Peucker argued that communities targeted by RWEs 'have not received enough airtime and platforms in the public debate about the threats of far-right extremism'. He indicated that those communities should not be responsible for 'fix[ing] far-right extremism. But at the same time, they should have a much bigger voice in shaping the responses'.[10]

6.13Civil society responses to right wing extremism can be powerful as they often have a 'high level of credibility within the local community'. However, the level of involvement of local communities in responding to right wing extremism:

…depend[s] on various locally specific factors, including the existence of vibrant civil society structures (e.g., many interconnected grassroots and community organisations) and the preparedness of well-connected and respected local community leaders to help organise a community response to RWE dynamics.[11]

6.14Government is able to assist communities to 'build vibrant civil society networks through, among others, funding and support programs'.[12]

6.15There are limits to the support government can provide to civil society as there are instances where its involvement can have deleterious or unintended outcomes. For example, individuals who mistrust government and government-‍led initiatives might not respond favourably to community programs that are perceived to have the backing of government. When working with those individuals:

Community actors become important, because programs run solely by government or indeed branded by government actually are not going to be effective, because we're trying to reach people who don't trust government in the first place. That's why, amongst many other things, it's important to work broadly across communities and have community groups leading many of these initiatives. The connection with government can actually devalue even quite good programs for those reasons.[13]

6.16Dr Peucker referred to exit programs that civil society organisations have contributed to overseas. In those programs:

…civil society organisations work with people to get them out of extremist movements in a nonjudgmental way that doesn't focus on changing their minds but catering for the social needs that got people into those movements in the first place, and helping people to find a way to meet those needs in a less socially and politically harmful way.[14]

6.17That approach recognises that people might join extremist movements 'because they were looking for belonging, for respect, for recognition, for meaning in life'. Dr Peucker suggested that a civil society organisation, such as one focused on specialised youth work for example, could:

…help people to find meaning, connectedness, respect and recognition in a different form, that's one way of getting people out. So, not focusing on necessarily deradicalising them, but disengaging them by offering them a positive outlook into the future.[15]

6.18The ANU Law Reform and Social Justice Research Hub (ANU LRSJRH) questioned the effectiveness of government funding for community organisations. It argued that the problem is not one of a lack of funding but a lack of demand for their services. To overcome this limitation, it suggested that governments use 'the school system to engage students in local community groups, so that when students leave school they continue to participate'.[16]

Youth engagement programs

6.19The New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties (NSWCCL) identified two community grant programs administered by the federal government that are designed to assist community groups in early intervention programs.[17]

6.20The Living Safe Together Grants Programme (LSTGP) distributed more than $1.6 million to 34 community-based organisations to assist them in developing skills to divert individuals away from violent ideologies.[18]

6.21The Safe and Together Community Grants Program (STCGP) provided communities and organisations with up to $2.5 million in funding to implement 'early intervention strategies for individuals susceptible to extremist conduct'. The program helped to increase community resilience against violent extremism, 'including by facilitating discussions with young people about violent extremism issues and educating them about protective strategies against the risks'.[19]

6.22In 2018, the NSW government established the Youth Justice New South Wales Countering Violent Extremism Unit. It provides assistance to youth who are exposed to radicalisation by providing counselling and the means to reintegrate into community life.[20]

6.23All Together Now, a not-for-profit organisation, also 'run[s] the 'Community Action for Preventing Extremism' project (CAPE project) to provide 'frontline education as an effective means of challenging the far-right in Australia''. The CAPE project 'involves the provision of interactive workshops with young people to equip them with a better understanding of far-right extremism in Australia and provide guidance on how to respond in early stages of engagement with right wing extremism'.[21]

6.24Dr Coyne, Mr Henry Campbell, Ms Angela Suriyasenee, and Mr Justin Bassi, ASPI suggested that the government give consideration to the establishment of a 'Community Engagement Resilience Grant'. That grant would be awarded to community groups to strengthen social cohesion through the funding of 'grassroots projects that amplify civic involvement throughout Australia'.[22]

6.25The Australian Federal Police (AFP) reported that it 'prioritises therapeutic pathways and other strategies to prevent and disrupt radicalisation of young people at an early stage'. Those approaches include:

Close collaboration with state, territory, commonwealth and international partners across government, industry, and private sector to identify opportunity to divert youth and expand available prevention tools, early intervention mechanisms, diversion processes and law enforcement response.

Facilitation of in-person engagement with communities, schools and social groups through the strong and long-established relationships.

Establishment of Community Liaison Teams located in each state and territory.

Active participation in forums and initiatives, including the 2022 Ministerial-led National Summit on Youth Radicalisation and 2024 Ministerial Summit on Youth Radicalisation.[23]

6.26If those 'diversionary approaches are insufficient, or an immediate threat is identified, law enforcement will respond through investigation, arrest and/or charge'.[24]

6.27The Victorian Department of Education:

…funds community service organisations to deliver the place-based Social Cohesion Through Education (SCTE) program. The program supports school communities and students by providing engagement opportunities and tailored activities to build resilience to all forms of violent extremism.[25]

6.28The activities offered by the SCTE program 'include mentoring workshops, peer support programs, resilience building modules, youth networking, sports, and parental engagement'.[26]

6.29Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, National Security and Resilience, Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), outlined the work that the department does in the youth engagement space:

We work through the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee [ANZCTC] and, through that, we have researchers that are able to assist us in the youth area, particularly around youth mental health issues, education and materials that are available online. We have a number of programs that we fund, like the Living Safe Together intervention program. We also fund other programs, like Fearlessly Australian, that seek to counter some of those extremist narratives and the like.[27]

6.30As the online environment rapidly evolves there is a:

…need to review our programs to determine whether or not people are able to access the right information at the right time and whether or not our programs are actually fit for purpose in the current circumstances. We're currently reviewing that as we're currently reviewing our counterterrorism strategy.[28]

Deradicalisation programs

6.31The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) drew a distinction between disengagement and deradicalisation. Disengagement involves 'halting an individual's involvement in extremist behaviour' whereas deradicalisation is 'a psychological and cognitive process by which the individual experiences a fundamental change in understanding and belief'. While the two processes are interrelated, deradicalisation 'does not necessarily go hand in hand with disengagement'.[29]

6.32The Australian government's Living Safe Together program understands the distinction between disengagement and deradicalisation:

When a person stops using violence but maintains a non-violent radical ideology, this is called disengagement. When they change or moderate their beliefs, and no longer subscribe to a radical ideology, this is called deradicalisation.[30]

6.33Deradicalisation programs are:

…purposefully planned interventions [that] aim to change the personal characteristics of individuals that are believed to underlie the motivations for engagement (i.e., attitudes, cognitive skills and processes, personality or mental health, and social, educational, or vocational skills) to ensure that individuals proceed to live a law-abiding, productive life.[31]

6.34Life After Hate argued that recognising the threat posed by violent extremism is the first stage in addressing it. That recognition requires understanding that the underlying ideologies of violent extremists:

…are largely driven by emotion and in the absence of fact or truth. Ideologically based hate is emotional. Hate crimes are emotional. Terrorism is emotional. There is no getting around it.[32]

6.35For that reason, Life After Hate argued that efforts to counteract violent extremism should also 'harness the power of compassion, of understanding, of redemption, and of community to combat such emotions'.[33]

6.36It was submitted to the committee that arguing with radicalised individuals that their beliefs are harmful is not the most effective way to deradicalise them and other ways of engaging with them are likely to be more effective. Ms Adeline Toohey, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, explained:

…the most recent research has found that the most effective way to deradicalise people is not by placing restrictions or legislating; it is through increasing community engagement and engaging with these people in an empathetic way.[34]

6.37The CEP also recognised that engaging with radicalised individuals offers an avenue to gather intelligence about the motivations of violent extremists (discussed in Chapter 2). Through the gathering of that knowledge, governments, service providers, and wider society can better learn what motivates violent extremists to develop more effective measures to address the underlying causes.[35]

6.38Life After Hate provides intervention services that focus on individuals rather than entire organisations. Those services must focus on 'the exiting individual, and not the organization itself'. In providing that care to individuals, their privacy must be protected, and they should not be forced or pressured into publicly telling their story.[36]

6.39When it was initially established, Life After Hate was:

…simply a group of former violent extremists looking to offer our own experiences to others. At the time, such support was all that was necessary. Over time, we came to realize that the people we were mentoring often had complex needs that required the skilled intervention and support of a variety of professionals, including social workers and mental health professionals. Today, we realize that addressing violent extremism requires far, far more than simply meaning well and trying hard. It demands tertiary services developed and led by an interdisciplinary team of licensed professionals, partnering with those with shared, lived experiences. Thoseservices are delivered by Life After Hate professionals virtually, allowing us to protect confidentiality, ensure the safety of our team, and serve individuals across the globe.[37]

6.40Its services are delivered by a range of trained and skilled professionals:

Our case managers are social workers, providing case management services, psychoeducation, and skills training to promote exit from violent extremism. Our team offers psychoeducational support groups that are developed for exiting individuals and led by these case managers and by our Exit specialists, all of whom have successfully left behind their past lives of violent extremism to now stand as exemplars of the second chances society can provide if one takes responsibility for their past actions. Today,these Exit specialists work with individuals to challenge and modify violent extremist beliefs, behaviours, and social networks to promote reintegration into society.[38]

6.41Life After Hate recognised that deradicalisation is a difficult process to achieve. It highlighted the importance of offering a multidisciplinary response to encourage violent extremists to disengage from harmful communities and reintegrate into society:

One key to Life After Hate's work is our commitment to a dynamic and diverse team of professionals focused on our mission and the difficult work at hand. By employing a multidisciplinary team with psychologists, social workers, and Formers, there is a higher likelihood of success in promoting disengagement and reintegration. By creating and maintaining a safe space to build awareness of the dangers of ideology-based violence, we address a range of issues within our communities of influence.[39]

6.42Life After Hate argued the role of former violent extremists 'is central to the success of this work'. They:

…play an essential role to exiting individuals, as no one else brings the experiences they do in understanding both living a life of violent hate and the struggles and benefits that come from ultimately leaving it. Our Exit specialists are some of the strongest individuals one will find, each day taking accountability for their past actions and each day making amends through their current work. CVE work would not be possible without the hard work, the proven achievements, and the dedication of this population of professionals.[40]

6.43The services provided by Life After Hate are designed in such a way that they provide valuable, prosocial outcomes:

One only needs to see the impact a multidisciplinary team can have on a struggling individual, providing the roadmap and supports necessary to travel the road of redemption and rebirth. These skilled team members make our communities stronger and safer each day, strengthening the roots a modern civil society demands. Equally important, they show individuals the kindness, empathy, and tough love necessary to reject violent extremism and leave behind lives of violent hate. They show that life after hate is indeed possible, both in their work and in the impact it has on the many individuals they help.[41]

6.44The CEP provided five lessons that could be drawn from deradicalisation programs that operate in the United States. Those lessons are:

develop a theory of change (ToC);

set clear goals;

advance a whole-of-society approach;

apply a trauma- and countering violent extremism (TCVE) lens; and

invest in evaluations.[42]

6.45A ToC is required to properly implement deradicalisation programs. Thattheory should clearly articulate:

…the multi-level mechanisms, obstacles, and facilitators for effectively and efficiently supporting the deradicalization and eventual rehabilitation of individuals affiliated with right-wing extremism in a way that reduces the risk of recidivism and enhances public safety.[43]

6.46The CEP argued that without a properly articulated ToC, deradicalisation programs could proceed ‘based on untested assumptions about what fosters change. Consequently, risking such interventions might in practice do more harm than good’.[44]

6.47By developing a ToC, deradicalisation programs can:

Elucidate the complexity that has hindered efforts to understand the study of radicalization to violence, and deradicalization in general.

Outline a multidisciplinary, evidence-backed framework that will facilitate better measuring and evaluation from the early stages of programming and as programming evolves in any jurisdiction or setting.

Advance context-specific programming and supervision, and provide tailored services for individuals seeking to leave right-wing extremist movements.

Detail how activities can promote a series of results in divergent spheres and life areas crucial to achieving the intended program goal.[45]

6.48The CEP argued that deradicalisation programs should not aim to dissuade individuals from particular ideologies. Deradicalisation programs should instead aim for:

Safety: Personal safety means people live in conditions that promote positive mental and physical health, connectedness, and resilience. Hence, deradicalization programs targeting individuals engaged in right-wing extremist movements should focus on individual well-being while protecting against any physical or psychological harm caused by disengagement.

Health: “Health” is usually equated to physical health and the understanding of “mental well-being” is mostly only correlated with obvious signs of mental distress (e.g., depression, anxiety, etc.). However,defining and measuring personal health and wellness also requires focusing on a person’s social involvement (i.e., community integration). EXIT initiatives targeting individuals engaged in right-wing extremist movements should thus integrate emotional well-being as an essential part of disengagement efforts.

Dignity: Radicalization into violence is preceded by perceptions of social alienation, which can emerge from a pattern of exclusion, humiliation, selective mistreatment, and prejudice towards groups or individuals by a community, the state and its institutions, or the wider society. To reduce the known pull factors linked to radicalization and reshape one’s worldview, perceptions of alienation are mitigated through strengthened community inclusion.[46]

6.49As radicalised individuals are often rebelling against government, it is often counterproductive if government is 'at the forefront of any deradicalization initiative'. Governments can contribute to deradicalisation efforts by engaging with a diverse range of stakeholders to:

identify and assess existing capacities;

develop a national understanding of the risk of extremism and the protective factors that are available;

build and share knowledge;

tailor specific deradicalisation responses that are appropriate for each individual case;

find innovative approaches from fields that are not specifically related to security or terrorism studies;

include a wide range organisations that are best placed to assist individuals at risk of radicalisation;

improve the assessment and evaluation of deradicalisation programs; and

assist in the further development of evidence-based practices.[47]

6.50A TCVE-informed approach to deradicalisation shifts the conversation with radicalised individuals 'away from “what’s wrong with you?” to “what’s happened to you?”'. In shifting the conversation in that manner, a TCVE-‍informed:

…approach seeks to understand why people are radicalized, looking at the trauma associated with radicalization drivers as well as the subsequent experiences in extremist movements, and incorporates an evolved understanding of the multitudinous effects of trauma and its links to health and behavior.

A TCVE-informed approach is the most appropriate for understanding, unwinding, and reorienting the in-group/out-group bias that underlies extremist ideologies and how they create the scaffolding upon which extremist networks and movements fulfill social needs, offering not just an individual sense of purpose, meaning and significance but a sense of social connection, community, and camaraderie. This acknowledges the basic needs of individuals radicalized into right-wing extremism and permits an intervention that addresses them with a constructive approach that creates holistic individual and social supports and an environment conducive to the transition of identity in a manner promotive of social cohesion.[48]

6.51The CEP recommended the evaluation of deradicalisation programs. Evaluationis critical as no deradicalisation 'program will be 100% effective, and failures are to be examined'. Through the evaluation of deradicalisation programs, the findings of those investigations can be provided to practitioners and policymakers to better ensure that practices can be refined based on evidence.[49]

6.52Some inquiry participants argued that deradicalisation programs should be tailored to meet the specific needs of individuals depending on where they are in the radicalisation process:

It's about meeting those people were they're at and then tailoring interventions to suit the particular context in which they're operating. That needs to happen at multiple levels. It could be in a school. It could be creating sets of toolkits to support recognising disinformation. It could be understanding certain people at risk in a school environment or even in a university environment, and working with them to redirect them away from messaging that might be speaking to their grievances or perceived grievances, relative deprivations. So finding ways of meeting people who are at risk rather than people who are necessarily extreme is a much more effective strategy.[50]

6.53Providing radicalised individuals with tailored support, such as through mentoring programs, was suggested as another context-based strategy:

There are a number of different mentoring schemes that run that can be quite effective for those young people who have been drawn into extremism because they're seeking guidance, leadership and a sense of belonging. Oneway of pulling them back has been—and we have seen some success over the years with this approach—to provide that kind of mentoring and support.[51]

6.54Peer support networks are another option that could be deployed depending on the context of the individual's radicalisation:

If you go back and look at the dynamics of how young people become involved in extremist groups and networks, it is intensively peer based…Ifpeer groups are incredibly important in terms of how young people get involved in violent extremism or indeed other kinds of extremist networks, then you would have to say logically that peer networks are also very important for helping them disengage. What would peer led programs of young people working with and supporting other young people to disengage actually look like? That is a community response. That is something that can happen in schools or through schools. It is something that can happen in local community settings. But at the moment we haven't really explored, outside a couple of programs I can think of in the United States, what a peer-to-peer programmatic approach might look like.[52]

6.55A US program, the 'Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism initiative, housed by the Department of State' could be a model to emulate. Under that initiative:

Universities were tasked with coming up with initiatives and innovative ideas they could then share with their peers and share with younger individuals to help counter violent extremism. That was a system that worked for many years in the United States, and it had a lot of really interesting and unique perspectives on how to deal with the radicalisation problem.[53]

6.56The Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network (MYAN) submitted that 'the focus of violent extremism has overwhelmingly been on Islamist terrorism and radicalisation'. To more effectively combat all forms of extremism 'there is an urgent need to widen the scope of what counts as 'violent extremism' in an era of alt-right extremism across the world'.[54]

6.57Life After Hate submitted that focusing on terrorism and violent extremism, without considering other forms of violence, places 'exiting individuals, their families, and our communities at risk from other forms of violence'. Countering violent extremism (CVE) programs should be designed to include 'multidisciplinary teams with the training and experience working with other forms of violence, such as intimate partner violence and child abuse'. Those teams should also have the expertise to recognise, assess and manage risk for suicide.[55]

6.58For example, deradicalisation programs are increasingly exploring the connection between gender and violent extremism. Research published by Swinburne University of Technology explored the 'connection between anti-‍feminist sentiment and far-right extremist sentiment' by examining online groups based in Victoria. It 'found that far-right and anti-‍feminist sentiment is mutually reinforcing but differs depending on social media platform and wider context'.[56]

6.59The research published by Swinbourne University of Technology indicated that current deradicalisation programs appear to focus:

…on the role that women can play in (Islamic) deradicalisation efforts, placing much responsibility on women to prevent or counter violent extremism while less attention is paid to "how gender might function in the dynamics of violent extremism and radicalisation”.[57]

6.60To more holistically address violent extremism, researchers of Swinbourne University of Technology argued that deradicalisation programs should be designed to:

…cover both anti-‍gender and far-right ideology…[by] paying careful attention to trigger points, countering misinformation, providing alternative narratives and considering how far-right groups provide men with emotional support networks, with a view to providing better alternatives.[58]

6.61Associate Professor Josh Roose, CRIS, highlighted that responses to violent extremism should consider:

…some [of the] really important work being done on healthy masculinity construction. We know that the primary contributors to violent extremism are men. We know that's across the spectrum of actors. We know that anger is a core driver of violent extremism. There's a lot of work going on, in particular in this country, in the light of violent misogyny, questions around not only domestic violence, which is debatable in its links to extremism, but more broadly on the issue around why men are drawn into these groups.[59]

6.62He explained that in his own research he examines:

…the use of masculinity as a recruitment mechanism, how it's targeted by recruiters—talking about anger, shame, going from zero to hero by joining our group and belonging to something bigger than yourself.[60]

6.63Professor Roose submitted that effective deradicalisation strategies need to include gender-based programs that engage:

…young men around what it is to be a man, about contributing to society, about respect for women and other areas. That's a critical component that's got to be considered within the rubric of countering violent extremism; building healthy young men who want to contribute to society, and addressing potential grievances is critical.[61]

6.64Other commentators referred to research on international deradicalisation programs which indicated:

Understanding gender in violent extremism and how to counter it is about engaging with how gender maintains relationships of power and how it reproduces them. This is as important in thinking about how 'terrorist' or violent extremist groups function, as it is in thinking about relationships between institutions delivering CVE strategies and the people they are aimed at helping. It is clear that gender is no longer ignored in CVE and violent extremism. The use of gender in CVE programming has become more widespread. Funding calls often ask that gender is considered.[62]

6.65Life After Hate submitted that as exiting individuals may have mental health symptoms or disorders, deradicalisation programs should include 'licensed behavioural health providers who are trained to recognize, screen, and respond to mental health needs'. While 'mental health symptoms or disorders may not be the reason the individual became involved or remained in violent extremism, they may be barriers to disengagement and reintegration'.[63]

6.66Life After Hate submitted that other mental health factors, such as loneliness, social isolation or helplessness, may also be contributary factors that should be considered in deradicalisation programs. Programs could include:

Direct social support, such as peer mentoring, or through services that promote the development of healthy social support networks such as education or skills training to develop interpersonal skills…Likewise, programs should empower and support socially responsible self-‍determination in exiting individuals through future-oriented planning, goal setting, and services to address barriers to achieving personal goals.[64]

Countering violent extremism programs

6.67Academics from Victoria University suggested that efforts to address the violent aspect of right wing extremism could benefit from enhanced CVE measures. They argued that 'CVE programs form part of a broader counterterrorism strategy, with evidence that holistic CVE support can be an effective way of mitigating potential threats and enduring risk'.[65]

6.68It was submitted that CVE programs are perceived as 'the 'softer' side of counter-‍terrorism'. They aim to engage:

…communities in preventing terrorism through grassroots initiatives that promote social cohesion. Often, these communities are Muslim, given the CVE concept's links to the 'War on Terror'. Additionally, CVE differs from the more recently introduced concept of [preventing violent extremism (PVE)], in that PVE is understood to be more broadly focused on an earlier stage, 'pre'-radicalisation, or to take a longer-term approach, addressing structural factors. However, in reality, many countries use the two terms synonymously and interchangeably.[66]

6.69Each jurisdiction in Australia has CVE programs, including some that specifically target extremism. For example, Victoria Police operate the Network for Intervention and Tailored Engagement (NITE) program, which 'provide[s] a pathway towards disengagement for individuals who are either actively engage, or at risk of engaging' in ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE).[67]

6.70The Victorian Department of Justice and Community Safety (DJCS) coordinates the Victorian Government response to violent extremism. That response focuses on early intervention and prevention and includes:

…a suite of initiatives focused on supporting individuals at risk of violent extremism to address the drivers of radicalisation and reduce the threat of violence to the community. This includes:

Victoria Police-led CVE case management programs

Corrections Victoria's end-to-end framework for the management of individuals convicted of terrorism, or at risk of radicalisation in custody or while subject to a community-based disposition and

DJCS led services delivered through the Northern Community Support Group and the CVE Multi-Agency Panel and associated case management schemes.[68]

6.71The Victorian Government's early intervention and case management programs largely rely on funding from the Commonwealth.[69]

6.72To respond to the evolving threat posed by violent extremism, the Victorian Government submitted that its CVE policy needs to be 'informed by contemporaneous research to ensure responses are evidence-based and cognisant of the changing threat landscape'. It needs to be aware 'of current issues that impact extremist hate, propel mobilisation towards violence, and threaten social cohesion in the Victorian community'.[70]

6.73To better ensure that its policy approach is effective and responding to contemporary challenges, it established the CVE Unit within the DJCS. That unit has relationships with a range of government stakeholders, subject matter experts, and the Victorian community. It also engages with Home Affairs to support the ANZCTC and the Countering Violent Extremism Sub‍-‍Committee. That approach is designed to facilitate 'a coordinated approach by bringing together Victoria Police, and the health, education, and housing sectors to provide early intervention supports for at-risk individuals'.[71]

6.74While national government-led CVE programs are 'for the most part ideologically agnostic…some programs at State/Territory level have focused specifically on either far-right extremism, or youth, or both'. The NSW government's Community Partnership Action program (COMPACT) was created in response to the December 2014 Martin Place siege and is specifically focused on bringing the community together against extremism.[72]

6.75The COMPACT program 'engage[s] young people through arts, sports, volunteering, interfaith dialogue, critical thinking and other engagement methods'.[73]

6.76Dr Coyne et al, ASPI, submitted that while Australian CVE, counter-terrorism and rehabilitation strategies have proven to be successful, 'these are not "set and forget" areas of policy and practice'. The programs will need to adapt as the threat posed by extremists evolves.[74]

6.77The CRIS highlighted that Australian CVE programs 'focus on prevention, diversion and disengagement…of potential or committed violent extremist individuals'. The programs target the behaviours, rather than the beliefs of those individuals. In doing so, Australian CVE programs accord with the liberal democratic principles of freedom of thought and expression. Australian CVE programs also aim to build and sustain 'community resilience to violent extremism'.[75]

6.78For example, Home Affairs produced the ''Fearlessly Australian' website and podcast series, which focuses on promoting resilience in relations to tensions around masculinity and Australian identity'.[76]

6.79Effective CVE programs should provide a range of services to help address a range of issues that could increase an individual's risk of engaging in violent extremism. Those services could include 'mentoring to counter violent extremist ideology, mental health services to address mental health problems and assistance with housing and employment'.[77]

6.80The CRIS referred to CVE programs that are targeted towards individuals who have engaged with the justice system. Those programs include:

…the NSW Juvenile Justice package, which offers training to youth justice professionals around identifying young people who may be at risk of involvement in violent extremism, with a direct focus on far-right extremism; the CISP (Victoria) and PRISM (NSW) programs, both of which deal with post-conviction offenders; the NSW Engagement and Support Program (ESP), which focuses on reintegration into society for offenders who may be at risk of, or who have already engaged, in supporting or enacting violent extremism, and the NSW specialist CVE Unit within the youth criminal justice system, which has developed a youth-specific framework for dealing with at-risk and radicalised youth offenders.[78]

6.81It was submitted to the committee that CVE programs are not appropriate in all circumstances as they 'are only suitable for specific parts of the problem'. Toaddress other aspects of the threat of violence, including, for example, 'harassment, intimidation, hate crimes, or violent protests', different responses are required. Those responses 'include ensuring that racist abuses are taken seriously, improving the collection of information on hate crimes, and providing stronger support to victims'.[79]

6.82The Institute for Strategic Dialogue reflected on the current security landscape and concluded that the deradicalisation programs that were designed for the post-9/11 threat environment are no longer fit-for-purpose:

Over the last decade, the international extremist threat landscape has transformed dramatically, as a threat largely characterised by recognisably violent groups shifts towards more amorphous online extremist ecosystems. This nebulous landscape has facilitated the transnational spread of extremist ideas and strategies with highly local impacts, as the lines between diverse extremist communities, conspiracy movements and hate groups are increasingly blurred.

A suite of highly securitised responses developed in the aftermath of 9/11 – often narrowly targeted at Muslim communities – are not fit for purpose in responding to this transformed threat. In this increasingly hybridised threat environment, new proactive approaches are urgently needed which are rooted in a public health approach, which target the causes rather than symptoms of violence. Community-led designs are needed that respond to the evolving shape of extremism, and which bridge online and offline engagement in a context where these distinctions are increasingly arbitrary.[80]

6.83Dr Colin Rubenstein, Executive Director, Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), was critical of deradicalisation programs and suggested that other options to undermine extremism should be explored:

Regrettably, the initiatives for deradicalisation internationally don’t have too many runs on the board. That's why the need to review their effectiveness is important, because there's considerable investment in that area—it's well intentioned, of course. The exploration of alternative approaches to undermine extremism, especially violent extremism, needs to be addressed, I think, with even greater vigour.[81]

6.84The AIJAC gave examples of individuals who committed terrorist acts while in, or after going through, deradicalisation programs. It recommended that the government conduct 'a systematic and evidence-based review' of deradicalisation and CVE programs.[82]

6.85The AFP submitted that it works with domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies to strengthen CVE programs through:

Regular engagement via International Post, and the secondment of counter terrorism liaison officers.

Capacity building through workshops, seminars and training.

The establishment of working groups, improving the ability to share and utilise intelligence holdings and relevant information.

Leveraging Five Eyes (FVEYs) forums, including the FVEYs Counter Terrorism Heads' group, to deepen strategic cooperation and coordination to further our collaborative efforts against terrorism.

Implementing various counter terrorism-specific instruments of engagement supporting operational capacity, including Memorandums of Understanding for sharing and protecting information related to criminal and terrorist threats.[83]

6.86The AFP recognised that CVE programs require a wider range of experience and perspectives than those provided by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Those programs receive input from other Commonwealth, state and territory agencies as well as public and private partners. Effective CVE programs focus on 'addressing the underlying social causes and determinates [sic]' of radicalisation.[84]

6.87The AFP Community Liaison Teams regularly engage with communities across the country. Through that engagement, they aim to:

…act as a conduit between law enforcement and communities across all religious, cultural and ethnic backgrounds to help build productive relationships, establish police legitimacy and understand community sentiment and issues of concern.[85]

6.88Mr Smyth, Home Affairs, advised that the department conducts several initiatives:

…to reduce the risk of violent extremism, including IMVE, through: providing support and funding to states and territories for CVE intervention programs; developing state and territory capability through training and research; funding grassroots and community based groups in developing community resilience to violent extremism and support for vulnerable individuals; strategic communications programs to counter extremist narratives and strengthen young people's resilience to adversity; and identifying and referring terrorists and violent extremism content for removal from the online environment.[86]

6.89Home Affairs coordinates CVE programs nationally, with states and territories tailoring those programs to their specific circumstances. Each jurisdiction is also responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of those programs within the guidelines published in the National Evaluation Guide for Countering Violent Extremism developed by the Countering Violent Extremism Sub-Committee of the ANZCTC.[87] The department is considering a national evaluation of CVE programs to 'ensure we're assessing nationally, there's consistency in the application of the programs and also there's consistency in the consideration of what success looks like for the programs'.[88]

6.90Home Affairs advised that it has 'contracted the Australian Institute of Criminology [AIC] to conduct a national evaluation of Australia's Countering Violent Extremism framework and initiatives'. In 2018, the AIC evaluated the Living Safe Together Intervention Program (LSTIP).[89]

The National Counter-Terrorism Plan

6.91On 13 March 2024, the ANZCTC updated the National Counter-Terrorism Plan.[90]

6.92The National Counter-Terrorism Plan recognised:

Terrorism continues to pose a direct and ongoing threat to the safety and wellbeing of Australians both in Australia and abroad.

The threat associated with violent extremist ideologies remains of concern to governments around the world. The ideological justifications for attacks are not limited to religiously motivated extremist ideologies, but also include terrorism based on other ideological or political beliefs – such as nationalist and racist, and specific issue violent extremism.[91]

6.93Addressing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism 'requires a nationally consistent and coordinated response'. As the threat 'can manifest across jurisdictional boundaries', there needs to be co-operation between all Australian states, territories and the Commonwealth.[92]

6.94The National Counter-Terrorism Plan emphasised:

States and territories are the first responders to any incident that occurs within their jurisdiction and have primary responsibility for the protection of life, property and the environment within the bounds of their jurisdiction.[93]

6.95The national response to the terrorism and violent extremism threat also requires co-operation from '[t]he private sector, local government and the community'.[94]

6.96For those reasons, the National Counter-Terrorism Plan:

…recognises that counter-terrorism is a shared responsibility with all levels of government, the private sector and the community.

The Plan adopts the following approaches:

the Australian Government and agencies are committed to an intelligence-led approach to assessing the terrorist threat;

jurisdictions adopt a cooperative national approach to counter-terrorism, with a focus on interoperability; and

in the interest of public safety, early disruption of planned attacks will often be prioritised over waiting to gather further evidence for a successful prosecution.[95]

6.97The National Counter-Terrorism Plan is regularly reviewed:

…by the ANZCTC to ensure it reflects current governance and operational responsibilities in: preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist acts in Australia and its territories.[96]

Prevent, prepare, response and recovery model

6.98The National Counter-Terrorism Plan adopted the prevent, prepare, response and recovery model.

Prevent

6.99The plan aims to prevent terrorism and violent extremism 'by preventing:

people or diverting people from becoming terrorists; and

terrorist attacks through intelligence-led disruption'.[97]

6.100To prevent or divert people from engaging in terrorism or violent extremism, the National Counter-Terrorism Plan focusses prevention strategies on:

countering violent extremism activities, including disengaging people from violent extremism, rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremist offenders, preventing the exploitation of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists, and providing positive, alternative narratives to build the resilience of individuals vulnerable to extremist messaging;

the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence;

investigating the planning of, support for and facilitation of terrorist activity;

employing measures to protect the community and assets; and

influencing the international environment.[98]

6.101The National Counter-Terrorism Plan explained:

CVE aims to reduce the risk of individuals becoming or remaining violent extremists and to address the social impacts of violent extremism. CVEactivities are distinct from, but complement, counter-terrorism activities such as investigations and operational responses.[99]

6.102To further that aim:

The Australian Government and state and territory governments are all engaged in practical efforts to strengthen social cohesion, challenge violent extremist ideologies and prevent people from becoming terrorists. Australia's CVE efforts aim to:

support the diversion of individuals at risk of becoming violent extremists;

build the awareness and resilience of communities to violent extremism;

rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremists, including those who have returned to Australia from overseas conflict zones;

prevent the exploitation of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists;

provide positive, alternative narratives to build the resilience of individuals vulnerable to extremist messaging; and

support and invest in measures to strengthen social cohesion to mitigate the social impacts of violent extremism.[100]

6.103Australian governments engage with a range of stakeholders to further those strategies:

In support of these efforts, governments engage with communities, civilsociety organisations, digital industry, and international partners and with academia to ensure best practice approaches are identified and, where appropriate, implemented.[101]

6.104Australian governments also collaborate:

…to develop training and awareness-raising materials to educate and empower communities, families, youth, organisations and frontline professionals to more effectively recognise and respond to those vulnerable to violent extremism. These materials are developed in consultation with young people, and are therefore appropriately applied and effective.[102]

6.105The LSTIP is an example of that collaboration:

The LSTIP is a national program framework designed to address all forms of violent extremism, including religiously and ideologically motivated violent extremism.

Under the LSTIP framework, states and territories are responsible for the delivery of CVE interventions and work to refer, assess and support people who are vulnerable to violent extremism.

The LSTIP relies on a network of government and community partners to implement individualised, early intervention strategies, so that people can disengage from violence before they harm themselves or others.

The Australian Government provides national coordination, support and funding for the LSTIP program.[103]

6.106In addition to the LSTIP program, the Australian government provides support to communities through the STCGP:

The Program works with community organisations to implement projects that:

increase community awareness of extremism;

empowers communities and families to engage with vulnerable young people; and

supports vulnerable individuals and their families who are successfully disengaging from extremist views and behaviours.[104]

6.107Australian governments also 'deliver high risk rehabilitation and reintegration services for high risk violent extremists in custody and in the community'. Forexample, the High Risk Rehabilitation and Reintegration program (HRRRprogram) provides:

…interventions for high risk violent extremists across a range of settings including:

convicted terrorist offenders who do not meet the requirements for the [High-Risk Terrorist Offenders] regime;

offenders in prison or subject to community-based orders identified as violent extremists;

offenders remanded for terrorism offences;

foreign terrorist fighters returning from overseas; and

family members of foreign fighters, where appropriate.[105]

6.108Therapeutic interventions are offered through the HRRR program on a voluntary basis. Those interventions 'support disengagement from violent extremism, rehabilitation and reintegration into the community'. In some cases, mandatory participation may be enforced if it is considered appropriate and there is a legal basis for it.[106]

6.109Frontline corrections officers are also offered formal training 'to recognise and respond to radicalisation' through the Radicalisation and Extremism Awareness Program.[107]

6.110Each jurisdiction also maintains Fixated Threat Assessment Centres. Thosecentres:

…assess, manage and review fixated persons with a mental health illness who may pose a serious threat to dignitaries, have the potential for grievance-‍fuelled violence or are vulnerable to lone actor radicalisation.[108]

Prepare

6.111The National Counter-Terrorism Plan aims to prepare for terrorist and violent extremist threats through:

…the process of understanding the terrorist threat and communicating, planning, resourcing and exercising to ensure governments, agencies, the private sector and the community are best able to prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorist act. Preparedness measures include the development, testing and review of counter-terrorism arrangements.[109]

6.112To prepare for terrorist and violent extremists threats, agencies and personnel undergo professional development to acquire 'specialist skills through training, exercising and the acquisition of equipment'. Agencies and personnel operating within each jurisdiction maintain interoperability with each other through 'the development of complementary and coordinated plans and consistent capability development'.[110]

Response

6.113The National Counter-Terrorism Plan indicated that Australian agencies aim to respond to terrorist and violent extremist attacks through:

…immediate actions taken to prevent or minimise loss of life, injury, damage to property and damage or disruption to infrastructure; facilitate investigations into the terrorist act, including the prosecution of offenders; and ensure that people affected by the threat or act are given immediate relief and support.[111]

6.114In response to a terrorist act within its jurisdiction, a state or territory government may activate:

…a State Crisis Centre (SCC) or Territory Crisis Centre (TCC). The SCC/TCC provides support to its relevant Executive Government members and will be the primary communications link between the police command, the Australian Government and state and territory governments.[112]

6.115While the police and emergency response agencies in each state and territory have primary responsibility for responding to attacks, the Commonwealth government 'supports the affected state or territory as appropriate'. In some circumstances, the Commonwealth may deploy defence resources 'to respond to domestic and international terrorist threats and attacks in support of Australian Government, and state and territory agencies'.[113]

Recovery

6.116To recover from terrorist acts, all Australian governments will coordinate a:

…process of supporting affected communities in reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of psychological, social, economic, environmental and physical wellbeing in the aftermath of a terrorist act.[114]

Education

6.117Several inquiry participants emphasised the importance of education in addressing the motivating factors that contribute to the increase in right wing extremism.

Critical thinking skills

6.118The ANU LRSJRH remarked that social media is often the first place that young people engage with political content. Young people can often lack the critical thinking skills and experience that adults have in contextualising and critically assessing the content that they are exposed to. For those reasons, 'young people are especially susceptible to being led astray by the sensationalist far-right content on social media'.[115]

6.119Professor Michele Grossman AM, Director, CRIS, suggested that 'stronger educational tools that help create a more critically literate and empathetic national discourse in the digital age' are required.[116]

6.120The CRIS argued that critical literacy skills should be developed at every level of the education system. There should also be resources available to those associated with school communities to assist them 'if they are concerned about a young person's potential involvement in violent extremist activities or networks'.[117]

6.121The Living Safe Together program recognised that education is vital to addressing the presence of extremism online:

Developing and promoting online critical thinking skills, especially among young users, can play a vital role in combating problematic online behaviour. This is important not only to safeguard against violent extremist messages but also things such as online child exploitation and online scams. Individuals are likely to be better equipped to make an informed decision about the information they are viewing and downloading if they are encouraged to investigate and question the source of messages they encounter online.[118]

Civics education

6.122In addition to civics education, Professor Castan advocated for more human rights education in the national school curriculum. That education would:

…bolster people's understanding of our democratic institutions, of right from wrong, of the inherent dignity of all people, of the importance of equality. Some of these key foundational human rights perspectives help young people understand their place in the world, their place in their society and their role as advocates for progress, social cohesion and tolerance, their own individual obligations which we all have.[119]

6.123Professor Castan recognised that there are limitations to that approach as not everyone would be exposed to it and some people would not be receptive to it. She explained that it:

…won't answer the people who are not in that school context and who are extremely socially isolated…[or] extremely disbelieving of anything being genuine and grabbing onto conspiracy theories or what we'd call 'fake news' or 'fake discourse'. That person is probably already past what my generalist recommendation would be.[120]

6.124Designing the education curriculum so that it is 'community led and community codesigned' would help to address those limitations. Mr Scott Walker, Research Fellow, Castan Centre, explained:

Such an approach would be a model which is not top-down but which is community grown and with consultation from community. Otherwise, you're going to have the same issues of disengagement and not wanting to be involved or to trust an institutional-led approach.[121]

6.125Ms Rana Ebrahimi, National Manager, MYAN, agreed that education is a suitable preventative measure against extremism. In her view, that education should not be limited to young people:

It also needs to cover the families, especially mothers, because they are in a constant relationship with the child as well, and they can see the signs of change in behaviour. The fathers are role models, especially for misogynistic behaviours. So, it takes the whole of the family, and the schools need to be educated and informed to be prepared to do preventive measures.[122]

6.126The Real Republic Australia focussed on the need for 'more and better civics and citizenship education for all Australians'. That education would 'inoculate Australian society against extremism of any kind'.[123] There is a need to focus on:

…the type and quality of civics and citizenship education provided to young Australians while at school [which] can help them navigate the challenges, debates, and arguments they will encounter throughout their lives and to do so with a firm commitment to maintaining a healthy and functioning democratic system as a guard against extremism.[124]

6.127The Real Republic Australia referred to the 2019 National Assessment Program: Civics and Citizenship report prepared by the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority. That report showed:

…53% of Year 6 students (down from 55% in 2016) and only 38% of Year 10 students (same level as 2016) achieved the standard of knowledge of civics and citizenship issues expected of their year level.[125]

6.128The Real Republic Australia recommended improving civics and citizenship education at Australian schools as that 'is likely to be the last opportunity most Australians will have to be exposed to the essential elements of forming and underpinning our democratic system of government'.[126]

6.129It suggested that without adequate exposure to civics and citizenship education at school people:

…may be more likely to be alienated from the mainstream democratic political system, and may therefore not recognise or understand legitimate ways in which they can participate in public debate and advocacy, and may end up favourably disposed towards extremist views in their post-school lives.[127]

6.130Ms Jae Brieffies, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, advocated for more opportunities for young people to engage with civic institutions not just within formal education settings but also outside of them. She reflected on her own involvement with the Rotary Club:

I know that, for me, being part of the Rotary Club was a factor that shaped how I viewed myself as a member of society before I was part of a voting cohort.[128]

6.131Those spaces can provide a non-judgemental forum for young people to begin to form their own views and understand how they fit within the wider community.[129]

Tertiary education

6.132The Group of Eight (Go8) told the committee that university is often where young people are first exposed 'to people with different views, perspectives, backgrounds and cultural beliefs'.[130] University is often also 'the first time they are presented with intentionally challenging material through their coursework'.[131]

6.133Universities Australia (UA) argued that tertiary education institutions:

…are beacons of free speech, debate, expression and discourse. They are places where ideas are freely and openly discussed and debated, no matter how popular or unpopular they are, and should remain so if it is done safely, respectfully and in accordance with the law.[132]

6.134The Go8 similarly outlined the purpose of universities. They are designed to provide learning experiences that are:

…intended to extend and develop, challenge ingrained perceptions and attitudes and teach a discipline of critical thinking. The intended outcome is the ability to not only tolerate and consider divergent views but incorporate these into one's own thinking where appropriate without this process creating tensions or divisions.[133]

6.135The Go8 admitted that '[t]his is not easily accomplished'. It appreciated that for some individuals:

Discovering that questions you believed to have absolute answers are flecked with shades of grey can be extremely confronting, especially at first. This can lead to frustrations, culminating in unwanted social behaviours both on and off campus and increases vulnerability to simplistic narratives that offer simple—if incorrect or dangerous—solutions.[134]

6.136Universities are aware of the tension between providing intellectually challenging learning experiences and their obligation to ensure that their students maintain socially acceptable ways of interacting with others:

Universities therefore have an important responsibility in the intellectual and social development of young people, in helping them to navigate the difficult path from knee-jerk reaction to learning to "disagree well". This is becoming increasingly difficult in today's polarised and confrontational environment, noting that access to radicalisation pathways and extremist narratives are readily accessible.[135]

6.137The Go8 reported that its universities are actively engaged with their students to guide their:

…social and intellectual development, through structured course content and separate initiatives designed to instil tolerance and behavioural strategies. Induction programmes are designed to promote rapid adjustment to an Australian setting, to promote inclusion and integration and avoid the risks of loneliness and isolation that can lead to vulnerability to extremist group messaging.[136]

6.138UA similarly recognised the importance of maintaining a balance between the open interrogation of ideas and respect for other people:

Universities do not condone any form of racism, threats to safety, hate speech, intimidation, threatening speech, bullying or harassment. Codes of conduct or student charters exist at all universities to educate students and staff on their responsibilities. Individual institutions have also implemented a range of measures that support diversity, wellbeing, inclusion, equity, and access that underpin the various strategic action plans across the sector to promote good and respectful behaviour.[137]

6.139UA recognised 'that there are certain responsibilities that come with upholding' the principles of academic freedom and freedom of speech:

Exercising freedom of speech needs to be balanced with preventing racial hatred, discrimination and vilification, including incitement of these behaviours and violence against individuals and groups based on their race, nationality or ethnicity.[138]

6.140It submitted that universities are committed to responsibly defending those principles:

…in Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech Policies. These policies are interlinked with codes of conduct in place which explicitly state racism, racial vilification, discrimination, harassment and intimidation are not tolerated, and outlines potential consequences for individuals or groups engaging in problem behaviours.[139]

6.141Emeritus Professor Konrad Kwiet, Resident Historian, Sydney Jewish Museum reflected on the limitations of education in addressing extremism:

…education and the rule of law continue to be our most effective weapons in combating hate ideologies and hate induced behaviour, but there are no silver bullets. What we have seen in recent times is that, despite the enormous amount of energy and money invested into Holocaust and antisemitism education, it has not done anything to prevent the upsurge—and this is a worldwide rise—in hate crimes and antisemitism.[140]

6.142His colleague, Mrs Sandy Hollis, Community and Professional Education Officer, SJM, clarified that while Holocaust education is effective:

…the way that you give Holocaust education is important, and that is to make the issues relevant to the students' lives today. In other words, you can't educate about the Holocaust in isolation; you have to bring it into the students' world.[141]

6.143Mr Peter Wertheim, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Executive Council of Australian Jewry, agreed about the value of education, and about the Holocaust in particular, 'but it needs to be much more broadly based'. He argued that students need to be educated about racism, even from a young age:

That includes antisemitism, anti-First Nations racism, anti-Asian racism, Islamophobia and so on. Unless the education process addresses those things specifically—not dealing with racism in a generic way and as a general subject but directing the student's mind and teacher's mind to specific forms of racism that are prevalent in Australia—it won't be effective.[142]

6.144The AIC highlighted that education can play a key role in addressing violent extremism by 'build[ing] awareness of democracy, pluralism and peaceful ideas to promote mainstream views and mitigate the rejection of these ideals and the normalisation of violent extremist beliefs'. CVE education programs in Australia, which have mainly focussed on countering religiously motivated violent extremism:

…have shown some success but have been criticised for not addressing the underlying causes of radicalisation, for not addressing other forms of violent extremism, and for equating to state interference in religion through sponsorship of an 'acceptable' version of Islam.[143]

Empathy

6.145Empathy was a major theme that emerged over the course of the inquiry. Severalparticipants considered that education played an important role in equipping people to live harmoniously with others but recognised that there are limitations to what education can achieve.

6.146Mr Benjamin Archibald, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, discussed the importance of fostering empathy and a higher level of civic engagement. Empathy and feeling part of the wider community can help to overcome the sense of isolation and disconnection that some people can feel. He explained:

A key part of this civic engagement and why it's so important is the reason these individuals are feeling disenchanted with institutions or other minorities—a lack of empathy. It's empathy that we need to start fostering between young people and society in general. Civic engagement, whether that be social interaction or part of a more structured community sport or that kind of stuff—it's necessary through that engagement…[E]mpathy can be built through interaction. That's why civic engagement and a lack thereof is so concerning and distressing, because you don't have the same opportunity to foster this empathy.[144]

6.147It is difficult to foster that kind of social connection and develop empathy by engaging with peers in online environments. The anonymity of online environments does not assist in the development of empathy and could even contribute to the development of a dismissive attitude towards perspectives that do not align with your own. As Mr Archibald argued:

In an online space, where youth are migrating towards these online platforms rather than things in person, I don't think that same empathy can be built—at least from my experience speaking to other young people. Youmay be commenting on videos distributed to you via your feed or participating in discussion forums, but, given there's not the same level of interaction—it's just an anonymous username you're interacting with—there's not the same empathy that can be built up. Out of that comes this willingness to dismiss others' ideas or perspectives on the world and a willingness to generate quite a hateful sentiment towards different minorities without that empathy towards those minorities.[145]

6.148Professor Kwiet maintained that encouraging young people to display empathy is an important component of education:

Empathy is one of the cornerstones of our education program, to teach students to not only respect but to honour and even to love other people. That will help to bring about a just society in which there is no need for legal or hostile hate ideologies. Because they are all based on hate, and hate is the root of what we're seeing currently.[146]

6.149How the education system fosters that empathy is also important. Ms Esther Bornstein, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, argued that 'just having things talked at students' is not an effective method of instilling empathy. In addition to understanding the context of historical events, such as the Holocaust, students should be exposed to the lived experience of individuals who lived through those events. She suggested that students:

…find that things such as movies and books are very relevant when discussing that sort of topic, because it allows students to be able to take their own route of understanding certain events and certain topics…[W]eshould be pushing for that sort of education—including visiting museums that we've got available across the country—and really ensuring that that sort of education does remain and gets pushed forward.[147]

6.150Some students are also less receptive to learning in a traditional classroom setting, as Ms Lolade Ogunbambi, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH outlined:

…a lot of people aren't paying as much attention in the classroom as we'd like to think that they would be. That's why movies and other devices that do build those sorts of emotional connections can be helpful, as can either interacting with real people they can relate to, who are, again, peers who can say, 'This isn't the way we do things here,' or interacting with real people who are part of those groups that may have been stigmatised on social media but, they realise, are actually normal, kind people.[148]

6.151Those interactions do not have to occur in formal educational settings. MsOgunbambi suggested that interacting with other people who have different perspectives at sporting events or through artistic activities, for example, is also personally enriching and an appropriate way to develop empathy for others.[149]

6.152In reflecting upon the lessons he has learned over 50 years of teaching about the Holocaust and antisemitism, Professor Kwiet acknowledged that 'nothing is more difficult than to eradicate deep seated prejudices'. In his view, these deep seated prejudices are:

…now flourishing, in our society and worldwide, because there is now a need to find the scapegoats of society which you can blame, defame and dehumanise for the ills of that society. So it's not only a question of education; it's a question of the fabric of your society in which you then have these kinds of problems.[150]

6.153Submitters from ASPI suggested that Australian governments provide students with a deeper understanding of the political system and their civic responsibilities. Efforts should also be made to equip students with the digital literacy and critical thinking tools necessary to identify and counteract online mis- and disinformation.[151]

6.154Dr Jordan McSwiney has worked on media literacy programs for the New South Wales government. In his view, those programs 'are not really fit for this purpose'. The programs that he has contributed to are designed to protect:

…children from online predators, which is obviously an extremely important role, but that's not the same thing as critical media literacy to deal with mis- and disinformation, extremist or terroristic content and things like that.[152]

6.155Most of those programs are also exclusively designed and provided to schoolchildren. In Dr McSwiney's view, 'it is not just schoolchildren who are vulnerable to these kinds of materials online'.[153]

6.156The Strengthening Democracy Taskforce recognised the importance of 'active, informed and engaged citizens' to a well-functioning democracy. The federal government helps to foster citizen engagement with the democratic process through the provision of electoral education programs, a civics curriculum, and other school-based programs. The government also provides the Parliament and Civics Education Rebate program to give financial assistance to students to visit national cultural institutions and Australian Parliament House in Canberra.[154]

6.157The Strengthening Democracy Taskforce indicated that there is widespread agreement that media and digital literacy training is an effective tool, at the individual-level, to address the spread of misinformation.[155] It identified the Australian Media Literacy Alliance, 'a collective of national public institutions including museums, archives, libraries, public broadcasters, schools and universities that supports media literacy for all ages', as one provider of media and digital literacy training.[156]

6.158The Office of the eSafety Commissioner (eSafety) has developed resources for young people that are 'designed to help young people cultivate respect, responsibility, empathy, resilience, and critical thinking in relation to online content and conduct'. There are also a range of resources that provide strategies to deal 'with distressing and violent content'.[157]

Antiracism programs

6.159Dr Rachel Sharples indicated that extremists can 'tap into…localised tensions and issues' to further their cause. For example, in Australia far-right extremists have used existing racist sentiments to draw people to into their movement.[158]

6.160The Australian Jewish Democratic Society (AJDS) advocated for antiracism programs in schools that educate students about 'Nazism, genocide and other related crimes'.[159] Those programs should not solely focus on the crimes committed by the Nazi regime during the Holocaust. They should also highlight a broader range of hate crimes committed against other persecuted communities, including those groups that are targeted by extremist movements in contemporary Australia.[160]

6.161UA advised that universities are working 'with students and staff from culturally and linguistically diverse communities to develop anti-racism plans and strategies'.[161] In addition to that work, UA assured the committee that universities regularly reinforce antiracism messages through '[t]argeted communications reinforcing that universities celebrate diversity and do not condone harassment, discrimination, vilification, or violence of any kind'.[162]

6.162Those messages to students are reinforced through antiracism training that clarifies expectations around behaviour:

Several universities have adopted the 'Racism. It Stops with Me' campaign and provide training to all students to clarify behavioural expectations in a multicultural society which includes respecting fellow students and staff regardless of their backgrounds. These strategies explicitly reference antisemitism, Islamophobia and urge students and staff who experience or witness these problem behaviours to report to their university.[163]

6.163UA referred to some of the services that universities provide to their students to report racism and other problem behaviours. For example:

The Safer Community service provides a single point of reporting for all issues of racism and other problem behaviours. Investigation of matters of racism that involve the display of posters and materials on campus or online are prioritised, while targeted prevention to address specific concerns are undertaken in collaboration with Respectful Relationships/Communities.[164]

6.164Some universities also employ 'Harassment and Discrimination Contact Officers, who are trained to provide confidential information and support to students with concerns relating to discrimination, harassment, bullying, vilification, and victimisation'.[165]

6.165Ms Shannon White, National Policy and Advocacy Lead, MYAN, gave an example of programs run by MYAN's partners to counteract the dehumanisation of particular groups of people in Australian society:

…we do have a number of programs run by our partners across the country, where young people go out and speak to community groups and schools about their experiences and their journey to Australia. We'd really love to see that expanded a little bit more with purpose, in a sense, to maybe speak to some of these more specific issues and experiences in Australia. Broadly, at the moment, it is to give a human face to the refugee experience, to talk specifically about what it's like to be a young person and to connect with the community in those ways.[166]

6.166Ms White reported that those programs with schoolchildren have generated discussions and education within families:

We've had some really interesting anecdotal feedback from some different programs, where parents have gone back to schools and said, 'My kids came home to tell me these things last night,' and I was like, 'No, that's not true; that doesn't happen here.' We jumped on the computer together and I found out that I was actually wrong on migration or asylum policy, and that generated some really interesting conversation[s] at home.[167]

6.167Professor Grossman highlighted the importance of antiracism training, particularly in a multicultural society. While she recognised the value of antiracism education and human rights frameworks generally, she posited that they can create a 'backlash' or a counterargument that seeks to reduce or eradicate the idea that certain groups are oppressed in society.[168]

6.168A backlash usually attempts to popularise:

…the view that women and/or other minority groups (such as Indigenous people or migrants) exaggerate their oppression or have increased or disproportionate power, and are subordinating white, straight men (as seen as 'reverse discrimination' or 'relative deprivation').[169]

6.169A number of witnesses submitted that there are several motivating factors that could contribute to the development of a backlash against antiracism training and social change more broadly. For some men, decades of significant social change has been uncomfortable and threatening. As Pam Nilan, Josh Roose, Dr Peucker and Bryan S Turner explained:

The first thing to note is that much has altered in the economy, in the workplace, the home, and in politics. The second significant trend lies in more and more compelling calls for equality and the recognition of diversity. Some claim a resulting 'crisis' of masculinity, one characterised by uncertainties over livelihood, social identity, sexuality, work, and relationships.[170]

6.170They went on to state that the 'backlash' against social change is not uniformly shared as:

…not all men currently experience a sense of crisis. Some may feel relieved by recent change and keen to adapt. For example, a recent study of men and identity found a variety of Australian masculinities that did not match up with the idea of a single, unified gender crisis among men. Men who do feel in crisis are more likely to be disadvantageously positioned in the labour market due to the decline in heavy industries, reduced demand for physical labour, development of the service economy, and widespread upskilling.[171]

6.171The AIC discussed the provision of counternarratives, alternative narratives and strategic communications in response to violent extremist content:

These approaches counteract the effects of engaging with violent extremist content, such as scepticism of mainstream views and the subsequent development of problematic ideologies, and neutralise provocations by making violent extremist messages less appealing. Similarly, echo chamber effects and the adoption of polarising views can be decreased by making alternative ideas more widely and readily available, impeding the entrenchment and validation of biased perspectives.[172]

6.172It warned, however, that it is difficult to ascertain whether those approaches 'are reaching or resonating with their intended audience'. Evaluations of these strategies usually do not examine their 'actual impacts on the audience's attitudes or behaviour'. The measures are likely to:

…be more effective with people in the early stages of radicalisation than with those who already hold ingrained violent extremist views. Further, the persuasiveness of these campaigns is maximised when they are delivered by those who are seen as 'one of them'. Conversely, counternarrative campaigns, if undertaken too aggressively and with individuals who already hold entrenched extremist view, can backfire and drive radicalisation instead of reversing or preventing it.[173]

6.173The Victorian Government reported:

The Multicultural Affairs portfolio within [the Department of Premier and Cabinet] is developing a statewide Anti-Racism Strategy, informed by strategic advice from the Anti-Racism Taskforce, as part of its broader commitment to addressing racism, faith-based discrimination, and vilification. The Strategy will provide a five-year plan for preventing and addressing race and faith-based discrimination in Victoria.[174]

6.174In the 2023–24 Victorian State budget, $77.5 million was allocated to the Multicultural Affairs portfolio over four years to deliver a range of initiatives including:

$6 million over three years to deliver campaigns to address vilification, with $3 million allocated to programs to counter antisemitism and $3 million allocated to address Islamophobia;

$900,000 over three years to the Community Security Group to investigate and track antisemitic incidents and racist sentiments;

$40 million to the Multicultural Infrastructure fund; and

$12 million to multicultural and multifaith festivals and events.[175]

6.175The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) recommended that the government address racism by 'building broad-based racial literacy and developing deeper understanding about race and racism in Australia as part of any counter-extremism response'.[176]

6.176In 2022, the government announced that it would provide the AHRC with $7.5million over four years to develop a National Anti-Racism Strategy.[177] That strategy 'aims to provide a shared vision, as well as a focus for specific actions, to tackle racism in its interpersonal, institutional, and systemic forms'.[178]

6.177In December 2022, the AHRC published the National Anti-Racism Framework Scoping Report. That report is being used 'as an evidence base for the development and implementation of the National Anti-Racism Framework'. The AHRC:

…stresse[d] the importance of national, holistic, and coordinated anti racism action to effectively tackle far right extremism in Australia, and call[ed] on the Commonwealth Government to endorse and implement a National Anti-Racism Framework as a crucial component of its counter extremism response.[179]

6.178In July 2024, the AHRC released the findings of its review into 'existing anti racism work conducted or funded by the three tiers of government in Australia'.[180]

6.179Among the 12 key findings of the review, two are particularly pertinent to the present inquiry:

governments are reluctant to use the term 'racism' and prefer to use the term 'social cohesion'. That preference 'has weakened approaches to anti-racism work'; and

there is limited monitoring or evaluation of anti-racism programs in Australia.[181]

6.180The AHRC put forward six recommendations that it developed following its review of Australian anti-racism programs.

6.181The Race Discrimination Commissioner, Mr Giridharan Sivaraman, explained the need for a national antiracism plan and outlined mechanisms to measure its impact:

Australia needs a national plan to address racism, and this plan needs to be a whole-of-society approach, which coordinates efforts at all levels of government and across all sectors. It needs to set benchmarks and measure outcomes, and, importantly, it needs to centre those impacted by racism.[183]

6.182Beyond the implementation of a National Anti-Racism Framework, the AHRC recommended that the government improve racial literacy by taking steps to develop 'deeper understanding about race and racism in Australia as part of any counter-extremism response'. To that end, it promoted several possible initiatives such as:

…introducing anti-racism curricula within education institutions that include truth-telling about Australia's settler colonial history, migration history, and the ongoing impacts of discriminatory policies; incorporating diverse histories, knowledge, and culture in curricula; and introducing anti racism training and support networks for students, teachers, and employees.[184]

Regulation of the online environment

6.183The algorithms that social media platforms use to deliver highly personalised content to their users can contribute to the development of 'echo chambers' where individuals are increasingly served content that aligns with their pre-‍existing perspective. Ms Toohey, ANU LRSJRH, suggested that in the context of right wing extremism this becomes problematic when people:

…create an echo chamber for themselves where they might think that everyone shares those [RWE] views and that those views are okay, because they're simply not getting any other content. So, regardless of education, the algorithm is still a problem.[185]

6.184Social media platforms deliver 'filtered content' to their users which limits the range of perspectives that they are exposed to. Mr Archibald suggested that a better understanding of the mechanisms social media platforms use to deliver content to their users would assist in addressing the promotion of certain material online:

Filtered content uses the algorithms that promote certain types of videos or photos to your feed, and everyone—particularly young people—is spending hours and hours each day scrolling though this filtered content. We thought it particularly necessary to address the way in which this content is filtered towards us in such a way that we get this one-sided or insulated view of the world. And to do this—it's a complex issue—we first of all hoped to institute a greater understanding of the mechanisms by which these algorithms work.[186]

6.185Mr Archibald recognised that there are legal issues that would frustrate efforts to better understand how the algorithms used by social media platforms filter content. He clarified that the ANU LRSJRH was not arguing for an end to content filtering and was instead suggesting that perhaps an independent body could be established to 'investigate the algorithms and then identify what's going on'. Once it is clearer how extremist material is promoted online, those issues can be better addressed.[187]

6.186The AIC identified five methods for preventing radicalisation online. Those methods are outlined in Figure 6.1.

Source: Heather Wolbers, Christopher Dowling, Timothy Cubitt and Chante Kuhn, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15 June 2023, p. 6, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

6.187The AIC recommended a holistic approach to countering violent extremism that focuses on both the online and offline environment:

Given the overlap and interaction between online and real-world influences, online measures must work in tandem with broader approaches. This is consistent with current countering violent extremism strategies, which tend to include initiatives that span primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, to target the societal, community, interpersonal and individual elements of radicalisation, and to address multiple forms of violent extremism. Measures aimed at addressing online drivers of radicalisation are best situated within this broad regime to maximise their effectiveness.[188]

Social media monitoring and reporting

6.188Several inquiry participants advocated for greater monitoring of social media platforms to identify and address inappropriate content.

6.189MYAN recommended that steps be taken to regulate and monitor the online environment to limit the appeal of, and access to, extremist material online. Itsuggested that the government collaborate with technology companies to 'enhance efforts to identify and remove extremist content online'.[189]

6.190Mr Stephen Blanks, Executive Committee Member, NSWCCL, proposed that a classification system could be imposed on social media platforms. Such a system would 'restrict content to users according to the proper classification of content'. He admitted, however, that establishing a content classification system 'is going to need a lot of engagement'.[190]

6.191Ms Rita Jabri Markwell, Legal Adviser, AMAN, did not support technology companies self-regulating their platforms as that would not result in 'a system which is resilient, fair and even handed and provide protection to every community based on protected characteristics'. She also advised against placing the burden on communities to police social media platforms. In her view, a clear definition of dehumanising material is required. That would:

…give very clear practical guidance to regulators such as eSafety and [the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)] to hold platforms to account and to focus in particular on those bad actors which are running a business out of dehumanising a group based on a protected characteristic and doing it in a serial or systematic manner.[191]

6.192Clear guidelines for social media companies would assist them in enforcing their compliance policies. Ms Jabri Markwell stated that while social media companies should 'have an obligation to fund their own compliance units', there should also be 'clear guidelines about what they're looking for'. Those guidelines should be developed by eSafety and should be accessible to those administering them.[192]

6.193Providing those guidelines would also assist in the development and operation of technological solutions that could assist in monitoring social media platforms. Ms Jabri Markwell commented:

…there's a lot of good technology that now exists for doing sentiment analysis and identifying those actors that are serially or systematically engaging in dehumanising information operations or dehumanising hatred. That will help surface the actors that they rally need to focus on, that are the most dangerous. From there, there needs to be a notice-of-action takedown model where, like they do with other unlawful content, they go to the platforms and they say, 'Take this down.' If the platform doesn't, penalties apply to the platform, and they need to be proportionate enough to make the platform take it into account with their business model.[193]

6.194In AMAN's model, civil penalties would be applied to the social media platform and the user of that platform if take down orders are not complied with. Toensure the transparency of the model, they would be notified of the order and the criteria that is being used in it.[194]

6.195Professor Castan argued that there are no human rights barriers to increasing the regulation of online platforms in Australia:

It seems entirely plausible to be able to regulate the very large online platforms. We're not subject to the kind of ideological total free speech agenda that the US environment is subject to. We should be able to regulate what's on those platforms.[195]

6.196She also argued that there does not appear to be any technological barrier to increased regulation of those platforms:

Given the micro-targeting that those platforms have in their algorithms and their extreme precision to be able to tell, in my case, whether I'm looking at dog food or cat food this week—they can be extremely precise and targeting. Given the algorithms can pick up almost within half an hour what you were looking at, they must be able to identify when children, as viewers and users of the platform, are being targeted by certain source material or certain language material that is dangerous.[196]

6.197The CEP argued that extremists 'often violate the terms of service of the platforms, which generally claim that they do not allow the presence of white supremacists/right-wing extremists on their platform'. Itsuggested that the regulation of online platforms could be strengthened 'to ensure and enhance comparable content monitoring standards between platforms'.[197]

6.198Mr Joshua Fisher-Birch, Content Review Specialist and Researcher, CEP, argued that addressing extremism requires a combination of interventions in the real world, and the monitoring and regulation of the online environment. The latter will only be successful with the support of the operators of social media platforms and other communication apps.[198]

6.199Other inquiry participants urged caution in the regulation of social media platforms.

6.200For example, Dr Imogen Richards suggested that there could be 'unintended outcomes of things like restricting who can access these platforms, what they access and the ways they can use it'. If people are unable to access one platform they could move to a different one.[199]

6.201Mr Michael Stanton, Immediate Past President, Liberty Victoria, argued that efforts need to be made:

…to improve information literacy and address the danger of social media echo chambers and combat those who would want us to believe in conspiracy theories in a post-truth world of fake news.[200]

6.202Mr Stanton explained that improving information literacy is vital as all people need to be equipped with 'the ability to discern reliable information'.[201] Hewarned:

This idea of complete relativity in a post-truth world, and that there are no truths, is something that Hannah Arendt warned about in The Origins of Totalitarianism and the emergence of fascism in Germany. If people don't trust sources of information, and anything can become true or anything can be disbelieved, then that is deeply concerning.[202]

6.203Freedom of expression must be protected in information literacy programs. Anyresponse must avoid 'increased, disproportionate censorship and surveillance'. Mr Stanton voiced Liberty Victoria's support for the Christchurch Call which stated:

The events of Christchurch highlighted once again the urgent need for action and enhanced cooperation among the wide range of actors with influence over this issue, including governments, civil society and online service providers such as social media companies, to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.

…

All action on this issue must be consistent with the principles of a free, open and secure internet without compromising human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression. It must also recognise the internet's ability to act as a force for good, including by promoting innovation and economic development and fostering inclusive societies.[203]

6.204Mr Stanton recognised that there appears to have been a deterioration of the quality of public debate, particularly online:

…people are willing to say things online that they never would have said in the town square 20 years ago. There's just been this change in the tone of our discourse and sometimes that comes from demagogues, and that really runs a risk of infecting the quality of our democracy.[204]

6.205Survey results submitted to the committee indicated that Australian adults are not confident in their ability to identify misinformation. Ina 2021 national survey, only 39 per cent of them believed that they would be able to do so. That survey also found that 'media literacy decreases with age, poverty, disability, and remoteness'.[205]

6.206Professor Castan suggested that an absence of legislation to regulate disinformation 'leaves space for extremist, racist and inflammatory commentary'. During election periods in particular, that absence 'undermines the important civil and democratic debates that are necessary in any election contest'. Imposing '[p]roportionate limitations on any hate speech, disinformation and harassment…[would assist] in creating a political and social culture of cohesion, tolerance and accountability'.[206]

6.207Professor Castan argued that legislation should not be the sole response to extremism, hate speech, disinformation and harassment:

Our law does not and should not regulate civility. The right to free speech involves the right to say things that people may strongly disagree with or even by upset by. But it is appropriate still to have laws that are proportionate and can be human rights compliant, and the law cannot be the only or sole driver of social change…[T]here are significant complexities in addressing extremism which require a strong focus on public education and prevention in addition to the appropriate legal protections.[207]

6.208In an environment of increased distrust, Professor Castan argued that it is possible that government-led efforts to improve civics education and information literacy could deepen the public's distrust. Professor Castan illustrated this point by stating:

People don't really know anymore what to trust, and so they just stop trusting everything. That creates this problem with civics education and information literacy, because we are creating a culture where people don't know what's trustworthy and what's not.[208]

6.209The Victorian Government pointed to measures taken by:

Other Western countries, including Sweden and the United Kingdom…to combat misinformation and disinformation. In 2022, Sweden established its Psychological Defence Agency, within its Department of Defence. TheAgency is designed to safeguard Sweden's open and democratic society and the formation of opinion through identifying, analysing and countering foreign malign information influence, and other misleading information directed at Sweden or its interests. The agency also has several educational campaigns to enhance its population's media literacy. In 2023, the United Kingdom passed the Online Safety Act 2023 (UK). The Act aims to increase user safety and improve users' ability to keep themselves safe online. Allregulated services must protect users from illegal content that reaches the criminal threshold. The Act requires social media applications to remove misinformation and disinformation content that meets the threshold set out in their own policies.[209]

6.210In 2022, the European Union introduced the Terrorist Content Regulation, which 'enables governments within the European Union to require online platforms to remove within an hour specific posts, music, livestreams, photos, and videos inciting violence and glorifying terrorist attacks'.[210]

6.211ACMA oversees the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation. That Code of Practice 'is a voluntary industry code with signatories committing to protect Australians against harm from online disinformation and misinformation'. It:

…includes signatories such as Apple, Google, Meta and TikTok. According to Meta's 2023 Misinformation Transparency Report, between January and December 2023, Meta removed 91,000 pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram in Australia for violating its Harmful Health Misinformation policies'.[211]

6.212The AHRC recognised that, when they operate online, bad actors 'often adapt their methods or wordings of harassment to circumvent moderation, and/or amplify their messages through algorithms. This may turn individual incidents into a public harm'.[212]

6.213The Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism Network (AVERT Research Network) explained that removing those who share extremist content online is likely to be ineffective as RWEs who 'have been de-platformed have migrated to alternative social media sites with little to no content moderation such as Gab and Telegram'. They also use 'unmoderated forums and chan sites'.[213]

6.214The AIC observed:

Detection and removal of violent extremist content makes this content less accessible, increasing the effort required by at-risk individuals to find and engage with it, and reducing the risk of inadvertently viewing it. Reducingthe accessibility of content also obstructs the processes of normalisation and reinforcement of violent extremist ideas.[214]

6.215There are practical challenges to detecting and removing content:

Due to the nature of the internet, violent extremist content can rapidly proliferate beyond the capacity of reasonable control measures. Forexample, following the Christchurch attack, which was live streamed by the perpetrator, platforms like Facebook and YouTube were unable to stop the rapid spread of the video as millions of reproductions were uploaded while users circumvented systems in place to prevent this.[215]

6.216While there are automated processes available to detect and remove content, human oversight and intervention is still necessary:

…making online content detection and removal a time- and labour-intensive process. Because of these challenges, many platforms lack a robust moderation regime, creating vulnerabilities that can allow the spread of violent extremist content on these platforms, and potentially onto others.[216]

6.217The AIC indicated that there is evidence of successful content removal schemes, including the removal of 9.4 million pieces of Islamist extremism related content from Facebook between April and June 2018. However, it is unknown how much violent extremism content went undetected, 'meaning it is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of moderation'.[217]

Suspending accounts

6.218The AIC argued there are benefits to suspending the user accounts of violent extremists. For example, there is evidence that the suspension of accounts that were 'supportive of Islamic State greatly affected the terrorist organisation's ability to develop and maintain communities online'. Similarly, the closure of hate-based Reddit subforums reduced the level of hate, misogyny and racism that users expressed on other subforums.[218]

6.219The AIC recognised that 'banned users may move to other platforms where their potential audience is smaller but they are able to operate with fewer restrictions and a lower risk of having their account suspended'. It argued that 'without broader coordination and consistency, problematic individuals can move from site to site, establishing a presence on platforms where moderation standards are lower'.[219]

Policing and law enforcement

6.220Democracy in Colour suggested that addressing the threat posed by RWEs 'requires intervention from all aspects of our society. That is, from our political leaders, to law enforcement and the broader community'. It advocated against adopting a response that focussed solely on policing and law enforcement as 'interactions with police or the justice system are often used as propaganda tools to increase notoriety among leaders of these movements'.[220]

6.221MYAN recommended that 'domestic right wing and white supremacist extremist groups and individuals' in Australia should be monitored and investigated. It argued that as demonstrated by the Christchurch terror attack, 'it only takes one individual to listen to, embrace and act on a violent extremist ideology to have a tragic and devastating impact'.[221]

6.222MYAN suggested that as the recruitment and radicalisation techniques employed by RWE groups are 'similar to those seen among jihadists', the lessons learned in efforts to counter those techniques could be applied.[222]

6.223Dr Larry Stillman, Committee Member, AJDS, drew the committee's attention to the limitations of the legal system in addressing extremism:

Law is a brute club. It's a hammer. What you're dealing with are social cohesion and social tension issues, which need a community development approach. That's one point. That's not handled well through law.[223]

6.224Dr Stillman's second point was 'that even if you have laws, there are people who will try and skirt the law and play games'. In his view:

…it's easy to make a mockery of the law. As well as that, a law case or proceeding takes a long, long time. The sorts of things we talk about are things for which you need evidence. It's very, very hard to charge someone and directly associate them with a hate crime. It's a very, very rare thing. It'smuch more important to put more money into leadership at all levels and community education of all sorts and types.[224]

6.225The NSWCCL agreed that a law enforcement approach alone would not 'address the root underlying socialisation causes of violent extremism'. Lawenforcement measures should be approached cautiously as they risk 'giv[ing] law enforcement and other authorities' powers which are capable of being misused and have a chilling effect on democracy and legitimate freedoms'.[225]

6.226Ms Isabelle Skaburskis, Committee member, Liberty Victoria, cautioned that criminal justice response to violent extremism 'can be counterproductive'. Shesuggested that 'ample consideration and funding and research opportunities be given to independent organisations, community organisations and academics for more preventive measures and deradicalisation measures'.[226]

6.227Dr Richards raised a similar point as 'taking a criminalising sort of approach, or exclusively trying to address a structural issue through this lens, is that we're treating the symptom rather than the root cause, so it's less effectual'. Exclusively addressing extremism through the criminal justice system could 'harden anti-establishment sentiments and really cement certain types of in-‍group out-group beliefs and ideas about persecution'.[227]

6.228Submitters from ASPI raised a further concern about the criminalisation of extremist beliefs. Banning those beliefs is likely to drive those who hold them underground 'below the level of detection'. Such a result would be counterproductive to efforts to address extremism in Australia.[228]

6.229The AFP reminded the committee that state and territory police are usually the 'first responders to emergency situations and protests'. Those police forces interact with the AFP, the intelligence community and international law enforcement through Counter-Terrorism investigations conducted by Joint Counter Terrorism Teams (JCTTs). JCTTs have a range of tools to disrupt terrorist plots including 'prosecution for criminal offences, disruption using state laws such as firearms and drug offences, countering violent extremism programs and the application of Supervisory Orders'.[229]

Commonwealth counter-terrorism legislation

6.230The terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code) provide the basis for legislative counter-terrorism action. Those provisions 'are targeted at individuals and organisations who engage in, train for, prepare, plan, finance or otherwise support terrorist activities'.[230]

6.231For example, Division 119 of the Criminal Code:

…makes it an offence to enter a foreign country with the intention of engaging in hostile activities, unless certain exceptions apply. This Division is important given the rise to the Australian community posed by individuals who have fought for or otherwise supported terrorist organisations offshore and seek to return to Australia.[231]

6.232The Castan Centre referred to the 'significant body of law which seeks to specifically address or otherwise incidentally addresses right wing extremist movements at both a State and Territory and Commonwealth level'. It submitted that body of law either addresses right wing extremism directly or address the 'behaviour deployed by right wing extremists'.[232]

6.233Academics from Victoria University discussed a case heard by the Supreme Court of Victoria that addressed the behaviour, rather than the ideology, of an extremist. In that case, Commonwealth counter terrorism legislation was used against Mr Phillip Galea, a Victorian 'far-right extremist…[who] was charged with plotting a terrorist attack against 'leftists''.[233]

6.234The Supreme Court of Victoria found Mr Galea:

…guilty of two offences:

(a)Doing acts in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act, contrary to s101.6 of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code"); and

(b)Attempting to make a document likely to facilitate a terrorist act, contrary to ss 11.1(1) and 101.5(1) of the Code.[234]

6.235In its judgement, the court drew a distinction between holding certain political views and using violence to promote those beliefs. It explained to Mr Galea that he was:

…not being punished for holding radical, right-wing views, or for saying things that many people would find deeply offensive. Rather, you are being punished for the violent means by which you contemplated promoting your beliefs.[235]

6.236Mr Galea was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a non-parole period of nine years.[236]

6.237Ms Jabri Markwell argued that counter-terrorism legislation 'is the single most instrumental change that will reduce anti-Muslim far-right extremism'. She suggested that the motive element which references ideologically and religiously motivated terrorism has the risk of glamorising certain extremist movements. For example, the term religiously motivated terrorism not only:

…glamorises [the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)] and al-Qaeda, which want to be known as religiously motivated, but greatly fuels the far-right extremist movement by providing a steady supply of official speech and media stories and an information system which conflates Islam and terrorism and dehumanises the entire religious community of Muslims.[237]

6.238The Attorney-General's Department (AGD) explained that Commonwealth counter terrorism legislation does not differentiate 'between different ideologies, or between ideologically motivated and religiously motivated terrorism'.[238]

The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023

6.239On 14 June 2023, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023 (Prohibited Hate Symbols Bill) was introduced into the Parliament.[239]

6.240The Prohibited Hate Symbols Bill sought to amend the Criminal Code to:

create offences for publicly displaying prohibited Nazi or Islamic State symbols, and trading in items bearing these symbols;

create offences for using a carriage service to deal with violent extremist material;

strengthen the offence of advocating terrorism in section 80.2C; and

remove the three-year sunsetting of terrorist organisation listings, so that listings would operate until a decision is made to proactively de-list an organisation.[240]

6.241On 21 June 2023, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) commenced an inquiry into the Prohibited Hate Symbols Bill.[241]

6.242On 15 November 2023, the PJCIS tabled its report in the House of Representatives.[242]

6.243On 28 November 2023, amendments to the Prohibited Hate Symbols Bill were introduced. Those amendments implemented most of the recommendations made in the PJCIS report. They:

removed the Islamic State flag from the definition of prohibited symbol in section 80.2E of the bill;

created new offences for the public display and trade of symbols that a terrorist organisation, or members of a terrorist organisation, use to identify the organisation;

extended the journalistic purpose exemption in subsection 80.2J(5) to ensure that news reports containing prohibited symbols made by not only professional journalists, but also other professionals involved in the news and current affairs process, can be lawfully traded;

expanded the journalistic purpose exemptions in paragraph 80.2H(9)(b), paragraph 80.2M(3)(b) and paragraph 474.45D(1)(e) to include editors, producers and others involved in the news and current affairs reporting process;

clarified that any report made by the PJCIS in respect of terrorist organisation listings under the Criminal Code must be solely presented to the Parliament; and

expanded the public display offences to criminalise the public performance of the Nazi salute.[243]

6.244The AFP advised that IMVE:

…groups use symbols and insignia to identify and recruit like-minded individuals, instil fear, vilify targeted communities, and assist in accelerating the normalisation of radical beliefs and their presence in society. The display and use of Nazi symbology (including, but not limited to, the Nazi Hakenkreuz and the Double Sig Rune) may signal an individual is on the journey to radicalisation, encouraging or praising a specific ideology or terrorist individual/group, and potentially mobilising towards violence. The AFP is aware of recent protests and physical demonstrations (including performing Nazi gestures), used to amplify the messaging of extremist groups, including through the use of gestures.[244]

6.245On 6 December 2023, the Prohibited Hate Symbols Bill passed both Houses of Parliament. On 11 December 2023, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Act 2023 (Prohibited Hate Symbols Act) received Royal Assent.[245]

6.246The AVERT Research Network highlighted some of the critiques of the Prohibited Hate Symbols bill that were raised during the PJCIS inquiry. Themain point raised during that inquiry related to the likelihood of the provisions of the bill failing to 'effectively tackle the root causes of violent extremism'. The AVERT Research Network argued that the bill could have the undesirable effect of 'provid[ing] opportunities for extremist provocation in response to the laws'. In its view, while the provisions of the bill:

…would assist law enforcement in early intervention efforts, it may also have the effect of intensifying the anti-establishment sentiments of a prosecuted person, as well as solidifying their identity against perceived 'oppression' through a perceived infringement of democratic freedom.[246]

6.247The CRIS cautioned that banning particular symbols such as the Hakenkreuz, the double-sig rune, and the Nazi salute:

…may perversely make them more attractive to extremists and potentially help recruit new adherents if the ban is used as a lever to accelerate perceptions of government overreach or intrusion into the lives of citizens. Official censure may create something that further strengthens the bonding that is characteristic of in-group formations.[247]

6.248The AJDS suggested that extremists 'have mocked the saluting laws'. They deliberately engage in offensive behaviour, contrary to the law, to get publicity.[248]

6.249Extremists could use banned symbols in an effort 'to portray themselves as 'martyrs' committed to free expression'. In that situation, the criminalisation of those symbols could 'have the perverse outcome of generating more attention towards such persons (and indeed the icons themselves) through lengthy litigation'. In Liberty Victoria's view, this outcome is already evident in Victoria after the prohibition of the Nazi salute in that state.[249]

6.250However, the CRIS argued that outcome is outweighed by the social benefit that is likely to arise from the banning of Nazi symbols. Those symbols are 'being increasingly used by extremists in ways calculated to cause harm and distress in the broader community'. The ban on Nazi symbols is appropriate as they have 'been weaponised by extremists bent on intimidating others, and creating division, conflict, and fear'.[250]

6.251The AVERT Research Network argued that provisions of the legislation could also 'have unintended negative impacts on freedom of expression, journalism and activism'. The AVERT Research Network suggested that by imposing criminal penalties on the distribution of violent extremist material, the legislation could limit 'activities that are crucial for public debate and understanding'.[251]

6.252Democracy in Colour reported that while most of its supporters welcomed the ban on the public display of hate symbols, they recognised 'that a more substantive approach is required to ensure that our communities are safe'.[252]

6.253Liberty Victoria held similar concerns about the effectiveness of using criminal law to effectively condemn racism and racial vilification. In its view, 'prohibition is a blunt instrument that will not prevent signals and 'dog-whistling' being given to extremist groups'. Nazi symbols, including the swastika, have been banned in Germany for a long period of time and have not 'prevent[ed] the re-‍emergence of far-right extremism'.[253]

6.254The Australian Muslim Women’s Centre for Human Rights (AMWCHR) raised concern about 'the expansion of the offence to include 'praising' the doing of a terrorist act'. It suggested that this could 'be misappropriated to target Muslim communities. For example, speaking supportively of legitimate social and political resistance in Muslim societies may be misconstrued as supporting "terrorism"'.[254]

6.255The AMWCHR also expressed concern about the ban on 'anything which is likely to be confused with or mistaken for the flag' of ISIS. There is little else contained on the ISIS flag:

…other than the shahada, written in Arabic text, on a black background. Theshahada, or testimony of faith, is an important piece of text in Islam, and is commonly displayed in books, artwork, mosques, and in people's homes.[255]

6.256The AMWCHR warned that the legislation could create 'the incorrect impression that the shahada is a symbol of violence'.[256]

6.257The CRIS maintained that there are drawbacks to banning symbols or gestures associated with Nazism. Banning certain symbols could simply lead to the 'creation or appropriation of new gestures and symbols'. Efforts to ban those new gestures or symbols 'would constantly lag behind' their adoption.[257]

6.258The AVERT Research Network shared that view and gave the example of certain extremists adapting the 'OK' hand gesture to symbolise 'white power'.[258]

6.259The Threats to Australian Domestic Security Research Group, Charles Sturt University, recommended a:

…broader definition of both "Nazi symbols" and "Nazi gestures/salutes" to capture symbol and gesture innovation over time that is sensitive to the evolution over time of ethnocentric and other extremist group ideology.[259]

6.260Jurisdictional differences in the regulation and criminalisation of hate symbols and gestures across Australia was raised as a concern for some submitters.[260]

6.261The AFP submitted that RWEs 'use symbols and insignia to identify and recruit like-minded individuals, instil fear, vilify targeted communities, and assist in accelerating the normalisation of radical beliefs and their presence in society'. The public display of a Nazi symbol 'may signal an individual is on the journey to radicalisation, encouraging or praising a specific ideology or terrorist individual/group, and potentially mobilising towards violence'.[261]

6.262During the PJCIS review of the Prohibited Hate Symbols Bill, the AHRC:

…expressed the critical need to make the critical distinction between extremist organisations such as Islamic State, and the broader Islamic faith, and to ensure that elements of the offences in the bill did not contribute to Islamophobia through the conflation of Islam and terrorism.[262]

6.263The AGD submitted that the Prohibited Hate Symbols Act:

…amended the Criminal Code Act 1995 to:

Establish new criminal offences for the public display of prohibited Nazi and terrorist organisation symbols; the public performance of the Nazi salute; and trading in goods depicting or containing prohibited symbols (Schedule 1).

Establish new criminal offences for using a carriage service for violent extremist material; and possessing or controlling violent extremist material obtained or accessed using a carriage service (Schedule 2).

Expand the offence of advocating terrorism in section 80.2C to include instructing on the doing of a terrorist act or commission of a terrorism offence, or praising the doing of a terrorist act or commission of a terrorism offence in specified circumstances; and increasing the maximum penalty for advocating terrorism from 5 to 7 years' imprisonment (Schedule 3).

Remove the sunsetting requirement for instruments which list terrorist organisations and bolster safeguards (Schedule 4).[263]

6.264The AGD explained that terrorism and violent extremism remains a threat within Australia. That threat is continuing to evolve and those who wish to cause harm 'are finding new ways to promote hatred, instil fear and vilify people within the community'. Symbols are being used by extremists 'to signal their ideology to a wide-reaching audience, and to recruit and radicalise others'.[264]

6.265The Prohibited Hate Symbols Act made it a criminal offence to:

publicly display a prohibited Nazi or terrorist organisation symbol;[265]

publicly perform a Nazi salute;[266] or

trade goods depicting or containing a prohibited Nazi or terrorist organisation symbol.[267]

6.266The Victorian Government reminded the committee:

It is not an offence under Victorian law for a person to trade Nazi memorabilia (unless a person causes an item that contains a Nazi symbol to be displayed in public pursuant to s41K of the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic)).[268]

6.267The Victorian Government welcomed the Commonwealth legislation as it extends to areas that states and territories do not have jurisdiction over:

This includes the online environment where it is an offence to display prohibited hate symbols online. The Act also creates new offences for using a carriage service to possess or disseminate violent extremist material, noting the harmful nature of the material itself. These are welcome provisions given that they are more wide-reaching than the Victorian offences and given that the promotion and idealisation of extremist views online used to incite violence and instil fear in the community is of growing concern.[269]

6.268The AFP reported that there have been instances of groups using Nazi symbols or salutes during public protests or demonstrations. The groups used those symbols and salutes 'to attract attention and rally around'. In the AFP's view, the Prohibited Hate Symbols Act will assist law enforcement 'in disrupting the use of Nazi symbology to garner support or promotion of extreme right wing ideology'.[270]

6.269The AVERT Research Network recognised that the Prohibited Hate Symbols Act allows religious entities to display 'symbols with a similar appearance to the Swastika'. That exemption poses a potential problem as some extremists maintain that they hold legitimate religious views and that the symbols they display are 'part of their religious practice'.[271]

6.270The AFP understood:

The Act intends to ensure no one is able to glorify or profit from acts (including gestures) or symbols that celebrates the Nazis or their ideology by establishing offences for public display and trading of prohibited Nazi and terrorist organisation symbols, and performance of the Nazi salute in a public place.[272]

6.271It recognised that extremists could 'adapt their behaviour and usage of these symbols or these gestures to avoid legislative sanction'. Even if they do so, the intention of the legislation will have been achieved as the public display of overtly Nazi symbols and gestures will have declined.[273]

6.272The AFP contended that the Prohibited Hate Symbols Act will assist law enforcement 'in disrupting the use of Nazi symbology to garner support or promotion of extreme right wing ideology'. It also submitted that the intended purpose of the Act is 'to ensure no one is able to glorify or profit from acts (including gestures) or symbols that celebrate the Nazis or their ideology'. TheAFP recognised that while extremist groups could adopt:

…other less recognisable or widely used symbols and gestures, the intention of the legislation to reduce the use and display in the community of highly offensive symbols will have been effectively achieved'.[274]

6.273Home Affairs was also of the view that the new criminal offences for using a carriage service to deal with violent extremist material introduced by the Act will support the department to 'prevent terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of the internet, and will assist with early intervention to allow for greater opportunities for disruption, diversion and rehabilitation'.[275]

6.274Commander Thomas Hester, Counter Terrorism North, AFP, reflected on the outcomes of the Prohibited Hate Symbols Act, particularly in relation to the spread of extremist material online:

The proliferation of extremist material online and the damage that does to young people is of great concern to us. The ability to look at having a criminal charge for not only receiving the information but actively using it, cataloguing it and making value of that extremist material—for us, that has been very good and very helpful legislation for some of the matters we have been investigating since the legislation came into place.[276]

New South Wales Police Force Operation Shelter

6.275On 11 October 2023, New South Wales Police launched Operation Shelter following a series of protests in Sydney following the Hamas attack on Israel.[277]

6.276On 29 September 2024, several individuals displayed flags and images associated with Hezbollah at protests in Sydney and Melbourne.

6.277On 2 October 2024, a 19-year-old woman was arrested and charged with publicly displaying a prohibited terrorist organisation symbol at the protest in Sydney. She was granted strict conditional bail to appear before the Downing Centre Local Court on 23October 2024.[278]

6.278On 6 October 2024, an authorised protest occurred in Sydney. At that protest, a 56-year-old man was arrested for allegedly displaying a swastika symbol. Onthe same day he was charged with knowingly displaying a Nazi symbol in public without reasonable excuse. He was granted conditional bail to appear before the Downing Centre Local Court on 24 October 2024.[279]

6.279On the same day, police issued a move on notice to a man who put up a poster of a Nazi swastika in Hyde Park, Sydney. On 7 October 2024, he was charged with knowingly displaying a Nazi symbol in public without reasonable excuse. He was issued a future court attendance notice to appear before Downing Centre Local Court on 21 November 2024.[280]

Australian Federal Police Operation Ardvarna

6.280The AFP advised that between the period of the Prohibited Hate Symbols Act coming into force on 8 January 2024 and the end of October 2024, it had ‘received a total of 113 reports of crime…relating to prohibited hate symbols’. As a result of those complaints, ‘49 have been subject to further investigations by the joint counterterrorism teams, and at the moment we’ve got 28 that remain active’.[281]

6.281A series of rallies took place in major cities on 29 September 2024. Hezbollah flags were displayed at rallies in New South Wales and Melbourne.[282]

6.282State and territory police forces are primarily responsible for policing public order in protest activity. The AFP does ‘provide support to them and some specialist capability where it’s required, but they are primarily the ones on the front line at the protest activity’.[283]

6.283Victoria Police referred allegations of individuals publicly displaying prohibited symbols to the AFP. In response to those referrals, the AFP Counter Terrorism and Special Investigations Command (in Victoria) established Operation Ardvarna.[284] Mr Ian McCartney APM, Acting Commissioner, AFP, informed the committee that the primary purpose of Operation Ardvarna is to:

…investigate reports of crime against 14 individuals for allegedly displaying prohibited terrorist organisation symbols at a Melbourne protest in September this year. About 1,100 hours have been spent investigating this matter, including reviewing 90 hours of CCTV evidence and Police Body Worn Camera footage and progressing the analysis of information collected during a recent week of action.[285]

6.284The AFP is continuing to investigate these matters. As of 5 November 2024:

Fourteen individuals are under investigation for display of a prohibited terrorist organisation symbol in a public place; three search warrants have been executed against three individuals, while a further three people have been spoken to by investigators; and a number of mobile telephones have been seized as well as an item of clothing depicting a prohibited terrorist organisation symbol. If relevant thresholds are met, the AFP will provide briefs of evidence to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to determine if charges will be laid.[286]

6.285Operation Ardvarna was established largely due to the volume of footage from the rally and the number of referrals that Victoria Police and the AFP received in relation to it. Ms Krissy Barrett APM, Deputy Commissioner, National Security, AFP, stated ‘there have been many other investigations, and some that are still on foot outside of that particular protest, that we continue to progress’.[287]

6.286In addition to the matters that are currently under investigation by federal and state or territory police, there are at least two matters that have proceeded to charge and trial.[288]

Hate crime legislation

6.287Some submitters raised the issue of hate crime legislation and the establishment of a national hate crimes database.

6.288Mr Alastair Lawrie argued that LGBTIQA+ people are not adequately protected by Commonwealth legislation. He was concerned by an 'anti-trans neo-Nazi display on the steps of Victorian Parliament' and discussed the shortcomings of the Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures Act 'which focused on the public display of Nazi symbols, including people engaging in Nazi salutes, while not addressing hate speech against LGBTIQ people more generally'.[289]

6.289In his understating of the Act, the focus on Nazi symbols and salutes is a weakness of the legislation. He commented:

…it would not capture a situation of a group of thugs dressed in black assembling on the steps of Victorian Parliament, shouting at trans people and waving a banner which says 'destroy paedo freaks', provided they did not also wear Nazi symbols or perform a Nazi salute.[290]

6.290The AHRC indicated that through its development of a National Anti-Racism Framework, it has heard from stakeholders that there is a:

…need to enhance understanding of how extremist violence and hate crime both lie on the same continuum of violent denial of diversity, and that extremist violence should be recognised as an extension of hate crimes.[291]

6.291MYAN stated that 'Australia lacks a clear and consistent definition of hate crime'. That inconsistency between states and territories means that 'people can be reluctant to report hate crimes as they are either unaware of protections under these laws and/or fear retribution from perpetrators as a result of reporting'. MYAN suggested that this reluctance to report hate crimes has resulted in 'a lack of comprehensive data about the incidence of hate crime in Australia'.[292]

6.292It was argued that there is a similar lack of data relating to hate crimes committed by RWEs. That is caused by uncertainty about 'exactly what constitutes violence motivated by far-right ideology. This is compounded by the lack of any systematic way to track acts of far-right violence in Australia'.[293]

6.293MYAN recommended that Australia adopt 'a national definition of, and take steps to criminalise hate crimes and hate speech in federal law'.[294]

6.294Professor Grossman spoke about 'the challenges of data collection across states and territories, which do not have necessarily similar methodologies'. She highlighted the work of Associate Professor Matteo Vergani at Deakin University.[295]

6.295Dr Stillman argued that existing data surveys 'tend to take a partisan view of hate crime'. In his view these kinds of surveys should be conducted by an impartial and 'independent academic source which can deal with these conflicting world views'.[296]

6.296Mr Wertheim referred to the Report on antisemitism in Australia which is produced annually by his organisation. He stated that the antisemitic incidents that inform the report are drawn:

…from a variety of sources that have been built up over many years. They come from the roof bodies of the various states; individual Jewish organisations that receive reports of antisemitic incidents; and reports that are made directly to us, as well as to the various volunteer security groups that exist in the Jewish community around Australia.[297]

6.297The Report on antisemitism in Australia 'is relied on and accepted, and has been for many years, by governments, by human rights agencies and by the media'.[298]

6.298Ms Esheshka (Shae) Flanagan, Acting National Director, Democracy in Colour, agreed that some thought would need to be given to how people report these matters and how the data that is collected influences policy making. Shereported that young people in particular 'are reluctant to report on these kinds of crimes, for a variety of reasons'.[299]

6.299Ms White stated that there is anecdotal evidence that suggests young people are reluctant to report due to concerns about the security of the information that they provide. They are worried that information they provide with the protection of anonymity could be leaked or linked to them and that there could be retaliation against them as a result.[300]

6.300On the same point, Ms Ebrahimi stated that people are reporting consultation fatigue to MYAN. That 'fatigue is coming from the lack of response'. Sheindicated:

Usually a lack of reaction from the receiver of the data is an issue. Like with workplaces young people constantly are sharing that even if they share the issue at a workplace there will be no process for responding to that issue. Inthe end, they will be victimised or they will be identified as troublemakers and they will be at risk of losing their jobs.[301]

6.301Ms Flanagan argued that the data should not be limited to reports from individuals. She suggested that reports from social media platforms would also provide important data.[302]

6.302Ms Ebrahimi suggested that there are community reporting tools in Victoria and that there should be a national repository of data on hate crimes, racism and discrimination. Providing a process where deidentified information could be entered would be an integral part of that process.[303]

6.303Mr Wertheim expressed ECAJ's support for the establishment of a national system to report and record hate crimes:

…we would very much support having a uniform national system for defining and keeping records of hate motivated crime. At the moment, this is done state by state, the criteria vary, there is no uniformity, and Australia is unique among English-speaking countries in not having such a national system.[304]

6.304He informed the committee that ECAJ has worked with academics to develop a plan 'in support of a national system for defining and recording hate motivated crime and for putting such a system in place'. That plan has been shared 'with the [AHRC] and with successive governments, but no action has been taken'.[305]

6.305Professor Castan agreed 'there is a need for some form of national based intervention'. While the organisations that gather data on hate crimes do 'very, very good work, they no longer have the capacity to adequately compile that information. The information gathered in a national database could then be used to better develop interventions that address hate crimes.[306]

6.306Representatives of the Castan Centre discussed the limitations of racial discrimination and vilification laws. Professor Castan stated that one of the difficulties relates to the requirement for:

…an individual to stand up and pursue a particular case through to the end—which is very onerous emotionally in their own social life—with the necessity for a broad base of provable evidence and the ability to see processes through.[307]

6.307In relation to that limitation, her colleague Associate Professor Ronli Sifris, Deputy Director, Castan Centre, stated:

The law can play a very powerful role, as we have seen when there's a clear precedent established which establishes that certain forms of behaviour are unacceptable in society. So, the law has a role to play, but it also has its limits. One of those limits, as was just articulated, is the fact that where you have a case, it involves one person often. So it's no substitute for broader systemic institutional cultural change. They have to go hand in hand.[308]

6.308In his submission to the inquiry, Dr McSwiney submitted that a national hate crimes database could provide the quantitative evidence for the efficacy of legislative measures that address extremism. Dr McSwiney stated 'it would be good to have a clear picture of the incidence of racist violence, for example, to see if these kinds of measures are having any impact' on countering extremism.[309]

6.309The AHRC called for the:

…adopt[ion of] an atrocity-prevention approach in addressing hate crimes and violent extremism, both online and offline, by building an anti-racist public information environment that does not tolerate the dehumanisation of any groups based on protected characteristics.[310]

6.310In the online space, the AHRC suggested:

…sustainably resourcing and bolstering community-controlled media organisations, as well as strengthening media regulation and standards, including in digital media and in relation to online hate, by:

(a)exploring law reforms that ensure anti-racism media standards are community-informed, enforced, and independently monitored;

(b)establishing adequate moderation and regulation mechanisms across platforms to better protect individuals and communities from online race hate;

(c)strengthening industry codes and standards in relation to online hate;

(d)exploring the establishment of an independent body to monitor and enforce anti-racism standards across the media industry; and

(e)exploring options to expand information and education about cyber abuse takedown options and explore further enforcement mechanisms, including civil penalties, to alleviate the burden on negatively racialised communities.[311]

National hate crimes database

6.311Numerous stakeholders 'have called for the creation of a centralised repository of hate data'. Those stakeholders include 'law enforcement, human rights commissions and civil society'.[312]

6.312One of the reasons for the lack of an Australian hate crimes database is the 'different legislative frameworks across different states'. There is also 'no common definition of hate crime throughout the country'.[313]

6.313In international jurisdictions there are a variety of data sources 'to map and track trends regarding hate'. For example:

Registers of hate incidents, which can be reported to, or collected by, two types of organizations:

Governmental (for example, law enforcement agencies such as the [Federal Bureau of Investigation], human rights agencies and intergovernmental organizations, such as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and local governments);

Non-governmental (for example, community and watchdog groups that collect complaints from community members, such as the Anti-‍Defamation League and TellMAMA).

Survey data, where a sample of the population is asked whether they have been victims of hate crime (for example, victimisation surveys in the USA and in the UK).

Media, which include mainstream media reports and other data collected from social media (for example, ProPublica's Documenting Hate or hate maps created using social media data).[314]

6.314In Australia, some organisations compile data on hate crimes using media or from surveys. The Online Hate Prevention Institute and the Islamophobia Register are two examples. The data collected by these organisations 'cover some forms of hate for specific time frames, but their data do not cover all forms of hate systematically and consistently because of the lack of resources'. Some Australian law enforcement agencies and human rights commissions 'collect information about the motivation of crimes and incidents of discrimination'. Victoria Police and the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission are two examples. There is no consistent data collected on hate crimes across different states and territories. Any data that is collected by state and territory agencies is 'limited by barriers to sharing such data with other agencies and gaps in current legislative frameworks'.[315]

6.315The consistent and uniform collection of data on hate crimes would benefit law enforcement agencies, human rights commissions and governments.

6.316For law enforcement agencies, the collection of hate crime data could help to:

inform and evaluate policing;

inform education for police forces; and

identify new early warning systems (eg. when are episodes of hatred early warnings of more serious crime like violent extremism?).[316]

6.317Human rights commissions could be assisted by the collection of hate crime data as it could assist them to develop advocacy programs and better tailor victim support programs.[317]

6.318Governments could be assisted through the collection of hate crimes data as it could help to:

inform and evaluate policy and programming aimed at tackling hate (eg. anti-racism programs, focus areas);

inform community awareness and education;

inform victims support services and responses to serious incidents; and

adapt legislation and sentencing to a changing environment.[318]

The Christchurch Call

6.319Liberty Victoria referred to the Christchurch Call, which it saw as '[a] useful model for balancing rights'. The Christchurch Call:

…was formulated in response to the Christchurch mosque shootings on 15 March 2019, perpetrated by an Australian. Australia is a founding supporter of that document. It should be noted that in New Zealand human rights are protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), so it is instructive to see how the Christchurch Call seeks to balance individual rights and public safety.[319]

6.320The Christchurch Call sought to achieve a balance between restrictions on:

…the dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content, including by governments and online service providers, it emphasises that a free, open and secure internet is a powerful tool to promote connectivity, enhance social inclusiveness and foster economic growth. Further, it states that "[a]ll action on this issue must be consistent with principles of a free, open and secure internet, without compromising human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression".[320]

6.321Education and media literacy was also highlighted in the Christchurch Call. Liberty Victoria endorsed that approach to addressing violent extremism:

This is a powerful approach because it recognises the important role of civil society and is primarily concerned with addressing the drivers of why some people are drawn to extremism in the first place, as opposed to being a reactive model that will always be a step behind the problem.[321]

6.322Mr Stanton reiterated that, in its response to extremism, Australia must 'protect freedom of expression and ensure that we do not engage in a response that leads to increased, disproportionate censorship and surveillance'. Liberty Victoria:

…support[ed] the Christchurch Call, which states in part: "The events of Christchurch highlighted once again the urgent need for action and enhanced cooperation among the wide range of actors with influence over this issue, including governments, civil society and online service providers such as social media companies, to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.' However, the Christchurch Call goes on to say: 'All action on this issue must be consistent with the principles of a free, open and secure internet without compromising human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression. It must also recognise the internet's ability to act as a force for good, including by promoting innovation and economic development and fostering inclusive societies'.[322]

6.323Dr McSwiney supported the development of guidelines for how the media reports on right wing extremism. The Christchurch Call recommended the development of 'best media practice to avoid sensationalist reporting and reporting that inadvertently amplifies violent extremist content'.[323]

6.324In a related point, Dr Richards called for greater public and institutional awareness of how social media companies operate and the tools that they may use to shape public opinion. She recommended a public information campaign that explains 'what these social media platforms do, the ways in which they raise revenue and some of the political implications of the ways in which they operate'.[324]

Footnotes

[1]Dr John Coyne, Head, Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre, and Head, Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p.37.

[2]Professor Melissa Castan, Director, Castan Centre for Human Rights Law (Castan Centre), Faculty of Law, Monash University, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 42.

[3]Liberty Victoria, Submission 25, p. 3.

[4]Liberty Victoria, Submission 25, p. 10.

[5]Garth Davies and Mackanzie Hart, 'Online Extremist Threats: A View From The Trenches', Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 12 September 2024, www.crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/online-extremist-threats-a-view-from-the-trenches/ (accessed 26 September 2024).

[6]Castan Centre, Submission 26, p. [1].

[7]Castan Centre, Submission 26, pp. [2]–[3].

[8]Professor Ramón Spaaij, Associate Professor Mario Peucker, Professor Debra Smith, Professor Natalie Pyszora and Professor Zainab Al-Attar, Victoria University, Submission 5, p. 16.

[9]Dr Mario Peucker, Project Lead and Executive Member, Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS), Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 4.

[10]Dr Peucker, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 4.

[11]Professor Spaaij et al, Submission 5, pp. 16–17.

[12]Professor Spaaij et al, Submission 5, p. 17.

[13]Mr Mark Duckworth PSM, Associate Director, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 9.

[14]Dr Peucker, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 9.

[15]Dr Peucker, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 9.

[16]ANU Law Reform and Social Justice Research Hub (ANU LRSJRH), Submission 20, p. 4.

[17]New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties (NSWCCL), Submission 21, p. 11.

[18]NSWCCL, Submission 21, p. 12. Also see: Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, Attorney-General and Minister for the Arts, 'Living Safe Together Grants Programme – Successful Grant Recipients', Media Release, 2 May 2015.

[19]NSWCCL, Submission 21, p. 11.

[20]NSWCCL, Submission 21, p. 13.

[21]NSWCCL, Submission 21, p. 12.

[22]Dr Coyne, Mr Henry Campbell, Ms Angela Suriyasenee, and Mr Justin Bassi, ASPI, Submission 22, p. 9.

[23]Australian Federal Police (AFP), Submission 27, p. 8.

[24]AFP, Submission 27, p. 8.

[25]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 16.

[26]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 16.

[27]Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, National Security and Resilience, Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 69.

[28]Mr Smyth, Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 69.

[29]Counter Extremism Project (CEP), Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [2].

[30]Living Safe Together, Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia, 2015, p. 19.

[31]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [2].

[32]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 2.

[33]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 2.

[34]Ms Adeline Toohey, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 32.

[35]Counter Extremism Project (CEP), Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [1].

[36]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 3.

[37]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 5.

[38]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 5.

[39]Life After Hate, Submission 45, pp. 4–5.

[40]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 5.

[41]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 6.

[42]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, pp. [3]–[8].

[43]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [3].

[44]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [3].

[45]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [3].

[46]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, pp. [3]–[4].

[47]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, pp. [4]–[6].

[48]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [6].

[49]CEP, Supplementary Submission 3.1, p. [8].

[50]Dr Vivian Gerrand, Research Fellow, AVERT Research Network, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 8.

[51]Professor Michele Grossman AM, Director, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 8.

[52]Professor Grossman, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 9.

[53]Dr Jared Dmello, Contributor, AVERT Research Network, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, pp. 9–10.

[54]Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network (MYAN), Submission 13, p. 4. Note: the term 'alt-right' is broadly synonymous with right wing extremism. Individuals who subscribe to alt-right ideas 'largely hark back to ideas of national chauvinism and returning society to traditional ideas of 'order', both publicly and privately', see: Dr Christine Agius, Associate Professor Kay Cook, Associate Professor Lucy Nicholas, Dr Ashir Ahmed, Dr Hamza bin Jehangir, Noorie Safa, Taylor Hardwick & Dr Sally Clark, 'Mapping Right-wing Extremism in Victoria: Applying a Gender Lens to Develop Prevention and Deradicalisation Approaches', Swinburne University of Technology, 2020, p. 2.

[55]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 3.

[56]Dr Agius et al, 'Mapping Right-wing Extremism in Victoria: Applying a Gender Lens to Develop Prevention and Deradicalisation Approaches', Swinburne University of Technology, 2020, p. 2.

[57]Dr Agius et al, 'Mapping Right-wing Extremism in Victoria: Applying a Gender Lens to Develop Prevention and Deradicalisation Approaches', Swinburne University of Technology, 2020, p. 6; Elizabeth Pearson, 'How Gender Matters in Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter it', in Farangiz Atamuradova, Stuart Macdonald & Richard Burchill (eds.), Lessons from P/CVE Research: Innovative Methods, Challenges, and Good Practices, Hedayah, 2019, pp. 95–116, p. 96.

[58]Dr Agius et al, 'Mapping Right-wing Extremism in Victoria: Applying a Gender Lens to Develop Prevention and Deradicalisation Approaches', Swinburne University of Technology, 2020, p. 2.

[59]Associate Professor Josh Roose, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 9.

[60]Professor Roose, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 9.

[61]Professor Roose, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 9.

[62]Elizabeth Pearson, 'How Gender Matters in Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter it', in Farangiz Atamuradova, Stuart Macdonald & Richard Burchill (eds.), Lessons from P/CVE Research: Innovative Methods, Challenges, and Good Practices, Hedayah, 2019, pp. 95–116, p. 109.

[63]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 4.

[64]Life After Hate, Submission 45, p. 4.

[65]Professor Spaaij et al, Submission 5, p. 17.

[66]Elizabeth Pearson, 'How Gender Matters in Violent Extremism and Efforts to Counter it', in Farangiz Atamuradova, Stuart Macdonald & Richard Burchill (eds.), Lessons from P/CVE Research: Innovative Methods, Challenges, and Good Practices, Hedayah, 2019, pp. 95–116, p. 96.

[67]Professor Spaaij et al, Submission 5, p. 17. Also see:Victoria Police, Victoria Police Counter Terrorism Strategy 2022–2025, 31 January 2023, p. 7.

[68]Victorian Government, Submission 40, pp. 14–15.

[69]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 15.

[70]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 17.

[71]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 17.

[72]CRIS, Submission 19, pp. 26–27. Also see: Multicultural NSW, 'The COMPACT Story', 13January2023, www.multicultural.nsw.gov.au/community-resilience/compact/ (accessed 16July2024).

[73]Multicultural NSW, 'The COMPACT Story', 13January2023, www.multicultural.nsw.gov.au/ community-resilience/compact/ (accessed 16July2024).

[74]Dr Coyne et al, ASPI, Submission 22, p. 2.

[75]CRIS, Submission 19, p. 25.

[76]CRIS, Submission 19, p. 27. Also see: Fearlessly Australian, 'Fearlessly Australian', no date, www.fearlesslyaustralian.com.au/ (accessed 16 July 2024).

[77]Professor Spaaij et al, Submission 5, p. 18.

[78]CRIS, Submission 19, p. 27.

[79]Professor Spaaij et al, Submission 5, p. 18.

[80]Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Positive Online Interventions Playbook: Innovating Responses to a Shifting Online Extremist Landscape in New Zealand, 24 July 2024, p. 3.

[81]Dr Colin Rubenstein, Executive Director, Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 32.

[82]AIJAC, Submission 42, pp. 9–10.

[83]AFP, Submission 27, p. 6.

[84]AFP, Submission 27, p. 8.

[85]AFP, Submission 27, p. 8.

[86]Mr Smyth, Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 62.

[87]Home Affairs, answers to questions taken on notice, Canberra, 24 July 2024 (received 10October2024).

[88]Ms Smyth, Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p.70.

[89]Home Affairs, answers to questions taken on notice, Canberra, 24 July 2024 (received 10October2024).

[90]Australian National Security, 'National Counter Terrorism Plan updated', 13 March 2024, www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/news-media/archive/article?itemId=1183 (accessed 16 July 2024).

[91]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 7.

[92]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 7.

[93]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 8.

[94]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 7.

[95]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, pp. 8–9.

[96]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 50.

[97]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 19.

[98]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 19.

[99]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 19.

[100]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 19.

[101]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, pp 19–20.

[102]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 20.

[103]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 20.

[104]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 20.

[105]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 21.

[106]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 21.

[107]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 21.

[108]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 22.

[109]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 31.

[110]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 31.

[111]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 38.

[112]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 39.

[113]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 38.

[114]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 5th edition, 2024, p. 46.

[115]ANU LRSJRH, Submission 20, p. 7.

[116]Professor Grossman, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 2.

[117]CRIS, Submission 19, p. 29.

[118]Living Safe Together, Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia, 2015, p. 14.

[119]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 45.

[120]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 45.

[121]Mr Scott Walker, Research Fellow, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 45.

[122]Ms Rana Ebrahimi, National Manager, MYAN, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 17.

[123]The Real Republic Australia, Submission 11, p. 5.

[124]The Real Republic Australia, Submission 11, p. 1.

[125]The Real Republic Australia, Submission 11, p. 5. Also see: Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority, National Assessment Program: Civics and Citizenship, 2020, p. 53.

[126]The Real Republic Australia, Submission 11, p. 6.

[127]The Real Republic Australia, Submission 11, p. 6.

[128]Ms Jae Brieffies, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 30.

[129]Ms Brieffies, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 30.

[130]Group of Eight (Go8), Submission 10, p. 2. Note: Universities Australia highlighted the cultural diversity of Australian universities: 'People from over 140 countries study and work at our institutions, which reflects the vibrant, multicultural nation that Australia is. Diversity is what makes our campuses and our country stronger and more successful through the unification of different cultures, experiences, beliefs and traditions', Submission 12, p. 1.

[131]Go8, Submission 10, p. 2.

[132]Universities Australia, Submission 12, p. 1.

[133]Go8, Submission 10, p. 2.

[134]Go8, Submission 10, p. 2.

[135]Go8, Submission 10, p. 2.

[136]Go8, Submission 10, pp. 2–3.

[137]UA, Submission 12, p. 1.

[138]UA, Submission 12, p. 5.

[139]UA, Submission 12, p. 5.

[140]Emeritus Professor Konrad Kwiet, Resident Historian, Sydney Jewish Museum (SJM), Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 31.

[141]Mrs Sandy Hollis, Community and Professional Education Officer, SJM, Committee Hansard, 17June2024, p. 32.

[142]Mr Peter Wertheim, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 32.

[143]Heather Wolbers, Christopher Dowling, Timothy Cubitt and Chante Kuhn, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 9, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[144]Mr Benjamin Archibald, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 28.

[145]Mr Archibald, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 28.

[146]Professor Kwiet, SJM, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 33.

[147]Ms Esther Bornstein, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 29.

[148]Ms Lolade Ogunbambi, Student Researcher, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p.30.

[149]Ms Ogunbambi, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 30.

[150]Professor Kwiet, SJM, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 32.

[151]Dr Coyne et al, ASPI, Submission 22, p. 9.

[152]Dr Jordan McSwiney, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 14.

[153]Dr McSwiney, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 14.

[154]Home Affairs, Strengthening Australian democracy: A practical agenda for democratic resilience, report of the Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 15 July 2024, p. 18.

[155]Note: other tools targeted at the system-level, such as platform design changes that are targeted at the system-level, could also be an effective means to combat misinformation, see: Home Affairs, Strengthening Australian democracy: A practical agenda for democratic resilience, report of the Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 15 July 2024, p. 40.

[156]Home Affairs, Strengthening Australian democracy: A practical agenda for democratic resilience, report of the Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 15 July 2024, p. 40.

[157]Office of the eSafety Commissioner (eSafety), Submission 28, p. 2. Also see: eSafety, 'Young and eSafe', no date, www.esafety.gov.au/educators/classroom-resources/young-and-esafe (accessed 13August 2024); eSafety, 'Distressing content', 30 May 2024, www. esafety.gov.au/key-topics/illegal-restricted-content/distressing-content (accessed 13August2024).

[158]Dr Rachel Sharples, Lecturer, Social Sciences, and Member, Challenging Racism Project, Western Sydney University, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 19.

[159]Australian Jewish Democratic Society (AJDS), Submission 41, p. 2.

[160]AJDS, Submission 41, pp. 2‍–3.

[161]UA, Submission 12, p. 4.

[162]UA, Submission 12, p. 5.

[163]UA, Submission 12, p. 5.

[164]UA, Submission 12, p. 5.

[165]UA, Submission 12, p. 5.

[166]Ms Shannon White, National Policy and Advocacy Lead, MYAN, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 19.

[167]Ms White, MYAN, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 19.

[168]Professor Grossman, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 5.

[169]Dr Agius et al, 'Mapping Right-wing Extremism in Victoria: Applying a Gender Lens to Develop Prevention and Deradicalisation Approaches', Swinburne University of Technology, 2020, p. 6.

[170]Pam Nilan, Josh Roose, Mario Peucker and Bryan S Turner, 'Young Masculinities and Right-Wing Populism in Australia', Youth, 3, 2023, pp. 285­–299, p. 287, https://doi.org/10.3390/youth3010019.

[171]Nilan et al, 'Young Masculinities and Right-Wing Populism in Australia', Youth, 3, 2023, pp. 285­–299, p. 287, https://doi.org/10.3390/youth3010019.

[172]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 9, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[173]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 9, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[174]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 16.

[175]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 16.

[176]AHRC, Submission 14, p. 4.

[177]AHRC, Mapping government anti-racism programs and policies, July2024, p. 1. Note: a further $1.4million per year ongoing was budgeted for the strategy and to extend the Racism. It Stops With Me campaign, see: The Treasury, Budget October 2022–23: Budget Paper No. 2, p. 53.

[178]AHRC, Submission 14, p. 3.

[179]AHRC, Submission 14, p. 4.

[180]AHRC, Mapping government anti-racism programs and policies, July2024, p. 1.

[181]AHRC, Mapping government anti-racism programs and policies, July2024, p. 2.

[182]AHRC, Mapping government anti-racism programs and policies, July2024, pp. 4–5.

[183]AHRC, 'New report finds governments at all levels across Australia failing on racism', Media Release, 10 July 2024.

[184]AHRC, Submission 14, p. 4.

[185]Ms Toohey, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 29.

[186]Mr Archibald, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 29.

[187]Mr Archibald, ANU LRSJRH, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 31.

[188]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 10, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[189]MYAN, Submission 13, pp. 11–12.

[190]Mr Stephen Blanks, Executive Committee Member, NSWCCL, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p.49.

[191]Ms Rita Jabri Markwell, Legal Adviser, Australian Muslim Advocacy Network (AMAN), Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 40. Note: AMAN provided a working definition of dehumanising material, see: Submission 44, pp. 38–41.

[192]Ms Jabri Markwell, AMAN, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 46.

[193]Ms Jabri Markwell, AMAN, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 46.

[194]Ms Jabri Markwell, AMAN, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 46.

[195]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 47.

[196]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 47.

[197]CEP, Submission 3, p. 5.

[198]Mr Joshua Fisher-Birch, Content Review Specialist and Research, CEP, Committee Hansard, 24July2024, p. 54.

[199]Dr Imogen Richards, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 13.

[200]Mr Michael Stanton, Immediate Past President, Liberty Victoria, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 35.

[201]Mr Stanton, Liberty Victoria, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 35. Note: the Victorian Government defined media literacy as 'the ability to identify false information', see: Submission 40, p.12.

[202]Mr Stanton, Liberty Victoria, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 35.

[203]Mr Stanton, Liberty Victoria, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 35.

[204]Mr Stanton, Liberty Victoria, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 37.

[205]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 12. Also see: Tanya Notley, Simon Chambers, Sora Park and Michael Dezuanni, Adult Media Literacy in Australia: Attitudes, Experiences and Needs, 2021, p. 12.

[206]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 43.

[207]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 43.

[208]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 44.

[209]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 13.

[210]OECD, Transparency Reporting on Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online: Fourth Edition, OECD Digital Economy Papers No.367, June 2024, pp. 8–9.

[211]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 13.

[212]AHRC, Submission 14, p. 7.

[213]Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism Network (AVERT Research Network), Submission 23, p. 39. Note: the AVERT Research Network explained that chan (short for channel) sites are 'foundational to the modern internet'. A lot of 'internet culture' has its origins in content shared on these sites, p. 40. Also see: Caitlin Dewey, 'Absolutely everything you need to know to understand 4chan, the Internet's own bogeyman', The Washington Post, 25 September 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/09/25/absolutely-everything-you-need-to-know-to-understand-4chan-the-internets-own-bogeyman/ (accessed 22July 2024).

[214]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 7, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[215]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 7, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[216]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 7, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[217]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 7, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[218]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 7, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[219]Wolbers et al, 'Understanding and preventing internet-facilitated radicalisation', Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, no. 673, 15June 2023, p. 7, https://doi.org/10.52922/ti77024.

[220]Democracy in Colour, Submission 15, p. 4.

[221]MYAN, Submission 13, p. 4.

[222]MYAN, Submission 13, p. 7.

[223]Dr Larry Stillman, Committee Member, AJDS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 25.

[224]Dr Stillman, AJDS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 25.

[225]NSWCCL, Submission 21, p. 9.

[226]Ms Isabelle Skaburskis, Committee member, Liberty Victoria, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p.36.

[227]Dr Imogen Richards, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 16

[228]Dr Coyne et al, ASPI, Submission 22, pp. 2–3.

[229]AFP, Submission 27, pp. 3–4.

[230]Home Affairs, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, March2024, p. 17.

[231]AFP, Submission 27, pp. 5–6.

[232]Castan Centre, Submission 26, p. 3.

[233]Professor Spaaij et al, Submission 5, p. 6.

[234]CDPP v Galea [2020] VSC 750 [1].

[235]CDPP v Galea [2020] VSC 750 [4].

[236]CDPP v Galea [2020] VSC 750 [62].

[237]Ms Jabri Markwell, AMAN, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 40.

[238]Attorney-General's Department (AGD), Submission 16, p. 4.

[239]AGD, Submission 16, p. 5.

[240]Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Advisory Report on the Counter-‍Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023, November2023, p. 1.

[241]PJCIS, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023, November2023, p. 1.

[242]Votes and Proceedings, No. 91, 15 November 2023, p. 1121. Also see: AGD, Submission 16, p. 5.

[243]AGD, Submission 16, p. 5

[244]AFP, Submission 27, p. 4.

[245]AGD, Submission 16, p. 3.

[246]AVERT Research Network, Submission 23, p. 48.

[247]CRIS, Submission 19, p. 20.

[248]AJDS, Submission 41, p. 1.

[249]Liberty Victoria, Submission 25, p. 8.

[250]CRIS, Submission 19, p. 20.

[251]AVERT Research Network, Submission 23, p. 48.

[252]Democracy in Colour, Submission 15, p. 4.

[253]Liberty Victoria, Submission 25, p. 8.

[254]Australian Muslim Women’s Centre for Human Rights (AMWCHR), Submission 9, p. 10.

[255]AMWCHR, Submission 9, p. 10.

[256]AMWCHR, Submission 9, p. 10.

[257]CRIS, Submission 19, p. 21.

[258]AVERT Research Network, Submission 23, pp. 48­–49.

[259]Threats to Australian Domestic Security Research Group (ADS Research Group), Charles Sturt University, Submission 24, p. 22.

[260]ADS Research Group, Submission 24, pp. 22–24.

[261]AFP, Submission 27, p. 4.

[262]AHRC, Answers to written questions on notice, 25 July 2024 (received 28 August 2024).

[263]AGD, Submission 16, p. 3.

[264]AGD, Submission 16, p. 4.

[265]'The Act defines a prohibited Nazi symbol as the Nazi hakenkreuz (or hooked cross), the Nazi double-sig rune (the Schutzstaffel insignia or SS bolts) or something that so nearly resembles the Nazi Hakenkreuz or the Nazi double-sig rune that it is likely to be confused with, or mistaken for, one of those symbols (section 80.2E). The Nazi hakenkreuz and Nazi double-sig rune instil fear in the community including those with family who endured the Holocaust, and have recently been used to target other groups such as the LGBTIQA+ community'. AGD, Submission 16, p. 6.

[266]The Act does not define 'Nazi salute'. The AGD submitted that Nazi salute 'is intended to refer to gestures which were used by the National Socialist German Workers' Party from 1920 to its dissolution in 1945…The gesture is abhorrent and has no place in Australian society. It is intended that the court would have discretion to determine whether a gesture made was the Nazi salute, taking into account all of the circumstances of the case, including both the appearance of the gesture and the context in which it has been made'. AGD, Submission 16, p. 6.

[267]AGD, Submission 16, p. 6.

[268]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 13.

[269]Victorian Government, Submission 40, p. 14.

[270]AFP, Submission 27, pp. 4–5.

[271]AVERT Research Network, Submission 23, p. 49.

[272]AFP, Submission 27, pp. 9–10.

[273]AFP, Submission 27, p. 10.

[274]AFP, Submission 27, p. 5; pp. 9–10

[275]Home Affairs, Submission 8, p. 5.

[276]Commander Thomas Hester, Commander, Counter Terrorism North, AFP, Committee Hansard, 24July 2024, p. 72.

[277]Patrick Staveley, Operation Shelter launched by NSW Police following criticism over how pro-Palestinian protests were handled, 11 October 2023, www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/operation-shelter-launched-by-nsw-police-following-criticism-over-how-propalestinian-protests-were-handled/news-story/4cdcfef5ddb8ed19e34d1512cb6e77af (accessed 8 October 2024).

[278]New South Wales Police Force, Woman charged following Sydney CBD protest – Operation Shelter, 2October 2024, www.police.nsw.gov.au/news/news_article?sq_content_src=%2BdXJsPWh0dHBz JTNBJTJGJTJGZWJpenByZC5wb2xpY2UubnN3Lmdvdi5hdSUyRm1lZGlhJTJGMTE0NDAwLmh0bWwmYWxsPTE%3D(accessed 8 October 2024).

[279]New South Wales Police Force, Police operation for protest concludes; one man charged – Sydney CBD, 6October 2024, https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/news/news_article?sq_content_src=%2BdXJsPWh 0dHBzJTNBJTJGJTJGZWJpenByZC5wb2xpY2UubnN3Lmdvdi5hdSUyRm1lZGlhJTJGMTE0NDcwLmh0bWwmYWxsPTE%3D (accessed 8 October 2024).

[280]New South Wales Police Force, Police charge second man for allegedly displaying Nazi poster in Hyde Park, 8 October 2024, www.police.nsw.gov.au/news/news?sq_content_src=%2BdXJsPWh0dHB zJTNBJTJGJTJGZWJpenByZC5wb2xpY2UubnN3Lmdvdi5hdSUyRm1lZGlhJTJGMTE0NDk1Lmh0bWwmYWxsPTE%3D (accessed 8 October 2024).

[281]Ms Krissy Barrett APM, Deputy Commissioner, National Security, AFP, Committee Hansard, 5November 2024, pp. 114–15.

[282]ABC, ‘Police investigate potential crimes after Hezbollah flag appears at Gaza and Lebanon ceasefire rally in Melbourne’, ABC News, 30 September 2024, www.abc.net.au/news/2024-09-30/hezbollah-flag-melbourne-gaza-lebanon-rally-afp-police/104412306 (accessed 12November2024).

[283]Ms Barrett, AFP, Committee Hansard, 5November 2024, p. 121.

[284]Mr Ian McCartney APM, Acting Commissioner, AFP, Committee Hansard, 5 November 2024, p. 105. Also see: AFP, ‘AFP statement on display of prohibited symbols’, Media Release, 3 October 2024.

[285]Mr McCartney, AFP, Committee Hansard, 5 November 2024, p. 105.

[286]Mr McCartney, AFP, Committee Hansard, 5 November 2024, p. 105.

[287]Ms Barrett, AFP, Committee Hansard, 5November 2024, p. 116.

[288]See, for example: Catie McLeod, Mostafa Rachwani and Rafqa Touma, ‘Woman, 19, charged after allegedly displaying Hezbollah flag at Sydney rally’, The Guardian, 2 October 2024 (accessed 4December 2024); Kristian Silva, ‘Far-right extremist Jacob Hersant found guilty of performing Nazi salute outside Victorian court’, ABC News, 8 October 2024 (accessed 4 December 2024).

[289]Mr Alastair Lawrie, Submission 31, p. 2.

[290]Mr Lawrie, Submission 31, p. 2.

[291]AHRC, Submission 14, p. 7.

[292]MYAN, Submission 13, p. 9.

[293]MYAN, Submission 13, p. 9.

[294]MYAN, Submission 13, p. 11. Note: the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee is currently inquiring into the provisions of the Criminal Code Amendment (Hate Crimes) Bill 2024.

[295]Professor Grossman, CRIS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 10.

[296]Dr Stillman, AJDS, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 25. Note: Dr Stillman suggested that the Online Hate Prevention Institute is an example of an organisation that could fulfil this role.

[297]Mr Wertheim, ECAJ, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 28.

[298]Mr Wertheim, ECAJ, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 28. Note: Mr Wertheim stated that the Report on antisemitism in Australia has been produced annually since 1989.

[299]Ms Esheshka (Shae) Flanagan, Acting National Director, Democracy in Colour, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 16.

[300]Ms White, MYAN, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 16.

[301]Ms Ebrahimi, MYAN, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 16.

[302]Ms Flanagan, Democracy in Colour, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 16.

[303]Ms Ebrahimi, MYAN, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 16.

[304]Mr Wertheim, ECAJ, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 28.

[305]Mr Wertheim, ECAJ, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 28.

[306]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 45.

[307]Professor Castan, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 45.

[308]Associate Professor Ronli Sifris, Deputy Director, Castan Centre, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 46.

[309]Dr McSwiney, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 14

[310]AHRC, Submission 14, p. 8.

[311]AHRC, Submission 14, pp. 9–10.

[312]Tackling Hate, 'Understanding and addressing the gap in hate data collection in Australia', no date, www.tacklinghate.org/trainingmodule/understanding-and-addressing-the-lack-of-hate-data-in-australia/ (accessed 13 November 2024).

[313]Tackling Hate, 'Understanding and addressing the gap in hate data collection in Australia', no date, www.tacklinghate.org/trainingmodule/understanding-and-addressing-the-lack-of-hate-data-in-australia/ (accessed 13 November 2024).

[314]Tackling Hate, 'Understanding and addressing the gap in hate data collection in Australia', no date, www.tacklinghate.org/trainingmodule/understanding-and-addressing-the-lack-of-hate-data-in-australia/ (accessed 13 November 2024).

[315]Tackling Hate, 'Understanding and addressing the gap in hate data collection in Australia', no date, www.tacklinghate.org/trainingmodule/understanding-and-addressing-the-lack-of-hate-data-in-australia/ (accessed 13 November 2024).

[316]Tackling Hate, 'Understanding and addressing the gap in hate data collection in Australia', no date, www.tacklinghate.org/trainingmodule/understanding-and-addressing-the-lack-of-hate-data-in-australia/ (accessed 13 November 2024).

[317]Tackling Hate, 'Understanding and addressing the gap in hate data collection in Australia', no date, www.tacklinghate.org/trainingmodule/understanding-and-addressing-the-lack-of-hate-data-in-australia/ (accessed 13 November 2024).

[318]Tackling Hate, 'Understanding and addressing the gap in hate data collection in Australia', no date, www.tacklinghate.org/trainingmodule/understanding-and-addressing-the-lack-of-hate-data-in-australia/ (accessed 13 November 2024).

[319]Liberty Victoria, Submission 25, p. 11.

[320]Liberty Victoria, Submission 25, p. 11.

[321]Liberty Victoria, Submission 25, p. 11.

[322]Mr Stanton, Liberty Victoria, Committee Hansard, 17 June 2024, p. 35.

[323]Dr McSwiney, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, p. 12.

[324]Dr Richards, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 24 July 2024, pp. 13–14.