Chapter 3Pathways to radicalisation
3.1This chapter explores the factors that contribute to individuals becoming radicalised.
Factors that contribute to radicalisation
3.2Radicalisation to violence is a social process which 'is different for every individual, comprised of highly complex and nuanced issues and motivations'.
3.3There are three broad factors that should be considered in cases where individuals are suspected of becoming radicalised:
Social relations – withdrawal from friends and/or family and engagement with a group.
Ideology – holding aggressive, hostile views that are ideologically founded.
Criminal activity – engagement in low-level crime justified by political, religious or ideological views.
3.4Academics from Victoria University proposed that individuals who are vulnerable to engaging in violent extremism have often experienced 'social isolation, undiagnosed and untreated mental health problems, unemployment, unstable housing, and other problems that can undermine effective coping with daily life'.
3.5Ms Lydia Khalil discussed some of the factors that have contributed to the increase in right wing extremism:
We've seen the world undergo a period of profound stress and upheaval over the past two decades, we've had environmental crises, a global financial crisis, growing inequality, and a global pandemic. We've also seen profound changes to our society through internet and communications technologies that have had a number of ill-effects, including the growth of disinformation, the fracturing of consensus reality, diminished agency and privacy among many disruptions and harms.
3.6The Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS) suggested that there are no straightforward paths to radicalisation as:
…social isolation, loss of status or privilege, and economic insecurities may, under certain conditions, increase one's susceptibility to far-right narratives, but these are complex processes that interplay with, among many other factors, individuals' sense of marginalization, perceived lack of control, and desire for recognition, status and social connectedness.
3.7However, other submitters cautioned against searching for particular markers of radicalisation or violent extremism. The Australian Muslim Advocacy Network (AMAN), for example, provided the finding of a report from the Brennan Center for Justice which found:
…despite the impetus to find a terrorist profile or hallmarks of radicalisation to hone in on incipient terrorists, empirical research has emphatically and repeatedly concluded that there is no such profile and no such easily identifiable hallmarks.
3.8Ms Rita Jabri Markwell, Legal Advisor, AMAN, suggested that perpetrators of terrorism often do not have a single ideological position and that they usually have an 'ideological salad'. She argued the focus on attempting to identify the ideological position of perpetrators of terrorism has not only been fruitless but has been counterproductive to community safety:
…the counterterrorism research sector has probably been barking up the wrong tree for the past 20 years in trying to discern how to work out ideology, because it's so different and it's always influenced by social processes, factors and personal circumstances. It can change; it can be fluid—and that's also the case when the accused is Muslim. It is probably useful from an academic point of view to be able to talk about political movements or, for example, to talk about things such as racist nationalism or white supremacy from an academic perspective and from a civil society and community discussion perspective. But in terms of law enforcement it is not helpful. It hasn't made anyone safer; it's actually making community less safe.
3.9Instead of attempting to discern the ideological views of a terrorist perpetrator, in Ms Jabri Markwell's view:
The focus should be on the transition to violence and all the other elements of the criminal offence of terrorism, which includes causing serious injury, the threat of causing serious injury and also the intention to coerce or compel the government or intimidate the population, which is an inherently political action and does give it a political flavour. We think that the focus should be on that intention and on the violence, rather than the constant speculation that happens every time about what the ideology was.
3.10Mr Alexander Ritzmann, Senior Adviser, Counter Extremism Project (CEP), disagreed with that view. He suggested:
The focus on violence is definitely helpful in narrowing down analysis, recommendations and possibly impact. But only to limit yourself, in terms of understanding how the process of mobilisation to violence works, to violent actors would be not helpful from our perspective.
3.11The CEP considered that understanding the ideological motivation behind violent extremism is important to countering the threat posed by it:
This is why we are looking into key actors, longstanding organisations and groups, that have been involved, for example, in propaganda that justifies violence, that legitimises violence—not necessarily to prosecute them, because this might be legal in the specific context, but to understand the transfer from mobilising, from calling for violence, from legitimising violence, for example, as an act of self-defence against alleged white genocide or great replacement. We need to understand the whole spear…not just focus on the tip of it.
3.12Mr Mike Burgess, Director-General, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), gave the following rationale for using the terms 'religiously motivated violent extremism' and 'ideologically motivated violent extremism':
These terms better reflect the nature of the threats. ASIO does not investigate people solely because of their political views or their religion, and terms like 'left' and 'right' no longer capture the spectrum of beliefs we are seeing and therefore can obscure the main motivation behind the threat.
3.13ASIO advised that it only investigates people 'where there is a threat of violence'.
3.14According to the government's Living Safe Together program:
Many people join extremist groups for social reasons. In Australia, people are most vulnerable to involvement in violent extremism through the influence of close personal relationships. This is especially true for young people.
3.15As a person becomes more radicalised, 'they will often pull away from normal, mainstream activities and friendship groups. There may be conflict with family and friends over political or ideological views'.
3.16Instead of continuing to interact with the usual social groups, 'some people will start to interact more often with smaller, tight-knit networks of people who share their specific beliefs'. While radicalisation usually occurs in face-to-face settings, it is also possible for people to become radicalised in virtual environments.
3.17The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) identified the following risk factors that contribute to radicalisation:
various sociodemographic characteristics (being male, young, unemployed or underemployed);
psychological characteristics (low self-control, personal grievance, certain mental health conditions); and
contextual characteristics (criminal history or associations with other radicalised persons).
Social inequality
3.18Inquiry participants raised the issue of a widening perception of increased social inequality in Australia. It was submitted that this perception has contributed to increased anger and resentment towards the existing social and political order in some sections of the community.
3.19Ms Khalil suggested that rising economic inequality has contributed to an increase in right wing extremism. That increased inequality is perceived to be caused by globalisation and changes in the labour market that have been brought about by closer international economic integration. Further, Ms Khalil submitted that there is a perception in advanced economies that there is a growing:
…divide between winners (those who are professional, educated, cosmopolitan, skilled) and losers (the less educated, those working in industries that cannot globalise). This has inflamed anti-elite sentiment within democracies and triggered a turn towards authoritarianism and exclusionary nationalism by those who feel economically, socially or politically ostracised by globalisation.
3.20The committee received evidence that right wing extremists (RWEs) have used those divisions for their own political advantage 'by stoking anti-elite sentiment and inflaming cultural and identity divisions'. Ms Khalil suggested that this co-optation of widely held insecurities and anxieties:
…about loss of status are driving anti-establishment, anti-elite and anti-immigration attitudes. They are also driving the appeal of RWE narratives about the perceived causes of this loss of status, as well as right wing extremist solutions.
3.21The CRIS raised the issue of anger and resentment that contributes to some individuals seeking out other sources of meaning. Those emotions 'can be linked to feelings of disempowerment and associated emotions of shame, humiliation and grief resulting from perceived unfairness, sense of injury and frustration'. In some cases, those emotions can contribute to negative responses 'towards those people, groups, institutions or forces that are held responsible for such perceived negative feelings and experiences'.
3.22The Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism Network (AVERT Research Network) submitted that people who are disillusioned by their life's trajectory may seek out someone to blame. The AVERT Research Network submitted:
This phenomenon used to be limited to younger men. However, we are increasingly seeing a cohort of radicalized and angry men and more recently, women, in middle age. Consequently, we are seeing status frustration combined with a sense of nostalgia for a time and place in which men were successful and had a pathway toward a guaranteed upward economic and social trajectory.
3.23The committee received evidence that extremists can 'capture and exploit' these emotions. It was submitted by CRIS that extremists can harness people's disempowerment, anger and resentment and channel it 'toward social issues and social change in ways that are profoundly antisocial when they involve the reduction or denial of rights, dignity and wellbeing to others'.
3.24The AVERT Research Network submitted that anger and resentment based on '[a] sense of having been mistreated or slighted is a core mobilising element for the attraction to extremist narratives, as they can help make sense of these complex emotions'.
3.25For that reason, extremists often calibrate their messaging, propaganda, and recruitment to exploit those who are angry or resentful. According to the AVERT Research Network:
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Analysis reveals that anger and hatred is critical and central to the messaging of violent extremist groups, terrorists and their narratives. Such groups are also adept at framing violence through a defensive, rather than offensive lens, asserting that any attack, no matter how violent, is righteous and just.
3.26The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) reflected on the characteristics of those who have engaged in its countering violent extremism programs. According to MrNathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, National Security and Resilience, Home Affairs:
…just over a quarter of participants possess [ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE)] ideologies, almost half of the participants are under the age of 18, IMVE participants are significantly more likely to have a mental health condition than other ideological affiliations and a quarter of IMVE participants have engaged in interpersonal violence. More broadly, we're seeing that Australian IMVE actors are a diverse cohort who can differ in their grievances and ideological views. IMVE individuals increasingly have mixed, unstable or unclear ideologies and adopt aspects of different ideologies rather than immersing themselves within a singular coherent ideology.
Social isolation
3.27Throughout the inquiry, several participants raised loneliness, social isolation and disconnection from community as a contributory factor in the radicalisation of individuals.
3.28The ANU Law Reform and Social Justice Research Hub (ANU LRSJRH) reported that there has been a marked decline in civic engagement in Australia and other Western countries. While that decline is not necessarily reflective of increased social isolation, it 'is a common-sense risk factor' that contributes to social isolation.
3.29The Strengthening Democracy Taskforce indicated that an increase in social isolation and loneliness is evident in Australia:
The proportion of Australians participating in social, community and political groups has also fallen over time, and we are less likely to volunteer, attend religious services, join political parties, become trade union members, or play team sports than we were decades ago.
3.30The ANU LRSJRH highlighted that peers can act as a moderating force on those who are beginning to engage with radical or extremist ideas and assist in deterring them from progressing further into radicalisation:
When individuals become detached from those around them, they lose the check on radical beliefs that friends and family would ordinarily provide, and they can channel their underlying hunger for social connection into less desirable social groups.
3.31Social isolation, in the view of the ANU LRSJRH, can lead to individuals turning to the online environment where they are more likely to be exposed to radical and extreme ideas.
3.32The AVERT Research Network suggested that some individuals without adequate psychological or social support and suffering from isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic were vulnerable to targeting by extremists.
3.33The AVERT Research Network provided the example of the Christchurch terrorist who spent a lot of time alone on the internet. The royal commission that investigated that attack stated:
He was…an avid internet user and online gamer…his relationships with others have been limited and superficial…his limited personal engagement with others left considerable scope for influence from extreme right-wing material, which he found on the internet…As a child he had unsupervised access to the internet from a computer in his bedroom. He spent much of his free time at school accessing the internet on school computers. In 2017, he told his mother that he had started using the 4chan internet message board when he was 14 years old…[As he got older] [w]e have no doubt that he visited right-wing internet forums, subscribed to right-wing channels on YouTube and read a great deal about immigration, far-right political theories and historical struggles between Christianity and Islam…he also posted some right-wing and threatening comments.
3.34Mr Mike Burgess, Director-General of Security, in his 2021 Annual Threat Assessment argued that the increased level of social isolation brought about by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to an increase in exposure to radical ideas:
…it's fair to say that threats to our safety and security didn't go away with the onset of COVID. In many areas, they evolved; in some they intensified…For those intent on violence, more time at home online meant more time in the echo chamber of the internet on the pathway to radicalisation. They were able to access hate-filled manifestos and attack instructions, without some of the usual circuit breakers that contact with community provides.
3.35The Victorian Government submitted that the COVID-19 restrictions may have been conducive to creating the conditions for radicalisation and limiting factors that protect against it. For example, lockdowns and other restrictions on movement and socialising:
…resulted in risk factors for radicalisation, including increased isolation, unemployment, financial strain, mental health instability, as well as minimised prosocial contact, including with family. A 2021 study by VicHealth found that the first Victorian lockdown led to issues including high psychological distress, lower levels of life satisfaction, less social connection, and increased financial hardship and uncertainty. These factors can exacerbate an individual's susceptibility to radicalisation; however, they are insufficient in and of themselves to cause individuals to use violence to achieve certain political or social outcomes.
3.36The AIC argued that groups opposed to the government, many of which were 'interlinked with far-right or conspiratorial ideologies', exploited the COVID-19 response measures to promote their ideas and increase social divisions.
3.37The AIC indicated that social isolation is likely to contribute to 'increased time spent online, which increases exposure opportunities, and an increased vulnerability to radicalisation when violent extremist materials are encountered'.
3.38Having a sense of belonging to, or being part of, an online community can have the same social outcomes as being associated with an offline group. The AIC stated 'that belonging to a group impacts perceptions of other groups and one's self-image'. Extremist communities, both on- and offline:
…often promote social categorisation by defining clear in-group and out-group identities, which can result in polarisation (ie a sharp division between two groups or ideologies). These communities tend to hold disparaging views of the out-group and exaggerate differences between the in-group and out-group, creating conflict. Perceptions of being marginalised or poorly treated, and ascribing blame to the out-group, can drive endorsement of hostile or violent actions against the out-group.
…
Certain processes like socialisation, bonding and peer pressure within online groups and communities of violent extremists can gradually shift inhibitions and create a proclivity for violence. Socialisation can also make individuals feel attached to the group or community, and adopt its norms and values in order to conform and connect with other members. Memberscan be encouraged to break ties with friends and family who do not conform, further entrenching them in the group and distancing them from prosocial relationships, consequently driving radicalisation.
Mental health
3.39Mental health conditions may elevate an individual's risk of adopting extremist views. Based on data collected by Life After Hate:
88% of exiting individuals endorsed experiencing at least one mental health symptom or risk factor such as suicidal ideation, violence ideation, depressed mood, anxiety, panic, major shifts in mood, angry outbursts, or low self-esteem.
Nearly 50% of exiting individual reported some form of risk at intake, with 42% reporting suicidal ideation and 28% reporting violence ideation or intent within the past 30 days.
When asked, 42% of exiting individuals reported feeling alone and 35% reported feeling helpless. Individuals who were actively involved in violent far right extremist groups and those who had recently disengaged were most likely to report feeling alone and helpless, while those who had been disengaged for multiple years were less likely to endorse those feelings.
3.40Dr Jamie Hyams, Senior Policy Analyst, Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council, highlighted the link between people with autism or other mental health issues and extremist activity. In his view, further investigation of this link is required to ensure that problematic behaviour can 'be addressed by social and mental health services'.
3.41Academics from Victoria University indicated that there has been an increase in the number of neurodiverse individuals referred to extremist violence prevention programs in Australia. That trend is particularly noticeable among young people and in relation to online offending. They reported that the literature on the relationship between neurodivergence and violent extremism 'encourages caution against over-simplification of how facets of neurodiversity can contextualise risk and resilience to violent extremism'.
3.42The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) conducted research on neurodiversity and found that it 'may contextualise vulnerability to extremism engagement, as well as resilience and disengagement'. The CREST reported:
Existing research does not indicate that there is a direct causal link between neurodivergence and engagement in criminality or violent extremism in the general population. However, while estimates vary, a proportion of individuals within violent extremist populations are also neurodivergent. Within these individuals, specific symptoms of neurodivergent conditions such as autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) may contextualise vulnerability to such engagement, as well as resilience and disengagement, that may differ from their neurotypical counterparts.
3.43Academics from Victoria University listed similar facets of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) that:
…can contribute to push and pull factors that shape an individual's pathway to engagement. Specifically, these facets have been identified as:circumscribed interests; rich vivid fantasy amidst a backdrop of impaired social imagination; need for order, rules, rituals, routine, and predictability; obsessionality, repetition and collecting; social interaction and communication difficulties; cognitive styles; and sensory processing.
3.44The CREST concluded that neurodivergent traits alone do not make individuals more susceptible to violent extremism:
…rather, they can combine with or exacerbate other vulnerabilities, such as those associated with social isolation and rejection; comorbidities and complex needs; difficulties in transitional periods; a lack of support from support systems; and socio-environmental factors such as the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the time spent online.
3.45It was submitted to the committee that those same facets of ASD can also be helpful in leading individuals with ASD away from violent extremism, or protect them from engaging in it at all.
3.46The Victorian Government suggested that lone actors who commit violent acts 'have more in common with fixated people (i.e., those with an intense or obsessive preoccupation that they pursue to an excessive degree) than with terrorist organisations'. Many of those people have 'unmet health needs' and some of them 'may be prone to developing a grievance or [are] susceptible to ideological influences due to isolation, disenfranchisement, and high stress'.
3.47This is a sensitive area requiring considered discussion informed by expert evidence. It is important to emphasise that mental illness does not directly cause extremist violence. However, the committee received evidence that it could be a contributory factor in the radicalisation of some individuals as 'it may make an individual vulnerable to ideological influences, and to being manipulated and proselytised by charismatic leaders'.
Declining trust in civic institutions
3.48Inquiry participants indicated that the perception of increased social inequality and social isolation has contributed to a decline in the level of trust in civic institutions.
3.49CRIS drew attention to the declining level of trust in political institutions and an erosion of civil society in Australia since the 1980s. The 2023 Edelman Australia Trust Barometer (Edelman Trust Barometer) found that 'Australia is on a path to polarisation, driven by a series of macro forces that are weakening the country's social fabric and creating increasing division in society'. Almost half of Australians agree that the country 'is more divided today than it was in the past'. These forces are partly driven by 'the decline of trust in public information'.
3.50The decline in trust is not limited to public institutions. Mainstream media has also become less trusted 'as a reliable fact-checker' and people have turned to social media for their news. Liberty Victoria referred to one study which found a correlation between the increased use of social media as the main source of news and a rise in the mistrust of media. That study argued that as social media platforms limit the variety of information presented to consumers of news through algorithms that present information that confirm pre-existing views, those algorithms potentially amplify and intensify those pre-existing views.
3.51The Victorian Government argued that an increase in mis- and disinformation has contributed to a decline in public trust in government and the media. It warned that as a large portion of the Australian population relies 'on social media as a source of truth, there is an increased risk of misinformation and disinformation proliferating'. People who are exposed to misinformation and disinformation may be at increased risk of radicalisation. The Victorian Government argued that an increase in the amount of mis- and disinformation may 'erode trust in government and public institutions, undermine democratic processes, and negatively impact social cohesion'.
3.52Liberty Victoria submitted that individuals who have lost trust in government and the media may 'gravitate to 'doing their own research' on the internet'. In doing so, Liberty Victoria argued that those individuals may be attempting to regain:
…a sense of control over what has been perceived to have been lost through social or economic dislocation. Some people then believe they are discovering the truth and are standing in opposition to the brainwashed mainstream.
3.53Liberty Victoria further argued that individuals who mistrust civic institutions and are seeking alternative sources of information are particularly 'vulnerable to right-wing extremism'. Liberty Victoria argued that '[t]he internet allows the disaffected and alienated a space for acceptance, particularly on social media'.
3.54The Edelman Trust Barometer indicated that decline in trust is not observed uniformly throughout Australian society. The Edelman Trust Barometer identified 'two different trust realities' that are determined by an individual's level of economic security and education. More highly educated and economically secure individuals are more likely to trust public information while those who are economically and educationally disadvantaged are more distrustful of public information.
3.55Dr Rachel Sharples, Lecturer, Social Sciences, and Member, Challenging Racism Project, Western Sydney University, argued that citizens of a healthy democracy should have a level of mistrust and scepticism of official institutions. It is only when that healthy level of mistrust is leveraged by malign actors that it begins to pose a threat. Dr Sharples argued that RWEs are able to manipulate that mistrust to turn public opinion against civic institutions:
They amplify it, they magnify it and they really get into what is wrong or the feelings that people have around those institutions. It's the amplification of it that turns it into the very meaty thing that the far right can use.
3.56Dr Sharples suggested that there are steps civic institutions can take to reduce public distrust. Taking those steps would assist in 'remov[ing] the thing that the far right can grab hold of and turn into a much bigger issue'. Dr Sharples submitted that civic institutions should admit when they get things wrong or approach a public policy problem in an insensitive way:
Institutions could go: ‘Yes, actually, we got that wrong. We didn’t do the messaging right. If we had have messaged migrant communities in language’—there could bea whole range of reasons—‘then we might have alleviated some of the concerns those groups had at that point.’ There are very tangible things that can be done to address some of those distrust issues, and I think institutions absolutely should be doing that.
3.57The Strengthening Democracy Taskforce found that while trust is a difficult concept to measure, Australians have historically had a high level of trust in their political leaders and civic institutions. It indicated that 'many observers of Australian society are becoming increasingly alarmed by levels of concentrated distrust'.
3.58The Strengthening Democracy Taskforce indicated that most Australians are sceptical about their political leaders but hold civic institutions in high regard:
…four out of five Australians believed government leaders abuse their powers at least some of the time. Nevertheless, there are many examples of highly trusted democratic institutions providing public services, such as the Australian Electoral Commission (trusted by nine in ten Australians).
3.59According to the report of the Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, younger and/or financially insecure people are more likely to distrust government and democracy. It also found that there are low levels of anti-democratic sentiment in Australia as evidenced by limited and declining 'support for anti-democratic notions – like rule by a strong leader, one political party, the military or experts'. However, the report cautioned that 'there are worrying signs emerging and aggregate measures of trust and distrust may miss outliers that reveal more alarming threats to democracy'.
Radicalisation of people online
3.60The AVERT Research Network argued that people can express extremist opinions or thoughts online without voicing those thoughts publicly or engaging in physical violence. It suggested:
…online extremist activity, networking and extremist content consumption can, though does not necessarily, lead to offline action. In most cases, being extremist online does not lead to violent action offline.
3.61The AMWCHR contended that '[y]oung people are particularly at risk of developing links with right-wing extremist movements, and especially young men'. In its view, '[y]oung men who feel disconnected are prone to seeking out 'identity-building narratives' centred around the development of a community of individuals holding similarly extreme beliefs'. Those communities 'create a sense of unity within the right-wing ecosystem, and directly respond to young men's misplaced feelings of ostracization and victimhood'.
3.62The ANU LRSJRH argued that individuals could begin their journey towards radical or extremist content on innocuous 'mainstream sites like Tik Tok, Reddit, Instagram, and YouTube'. The algorithms used by those sites could, over time, direct those individuals towards more radical or extreme content as the algorithms favour 'emotive, shocking, and salient' content.
3.63The Strengthening Democracy Taskforce argued that over time, as social media users are presented with a larger volume of similar material, they become trapped in 'filter bubbles'. The algorithms increasingly present them with information that reinforces their beliefs and separates them 'from information that contradicts their viewpoint'. If those users are continuously presented with 'far-right content by algorithms…[that] user is then ensnared by a swirling web of far-right extremism'.
3.64The CRIS suggested that extremist actors can use mainstream sites to reach a wider audience. It gave the example of white nationalists using anti-COVID lockdown and anti-vaccination Telegram groups for recruitment purposes.
3.65Dr Imogen Richards stated that extremists use mainstream social media platforms 'as a funnel to go to more closed sites where, for example, planning for acts of political violence are more likely to take place'.
3.66The Victorian Government similarly recognised the connection between mainstream and online media, which it saw as being 'intricately connected'. Mainstream media has covered and 'largely denounced the actions and behaviour of [nationalist and racist violent extremists (NRVEs)]'. However, that attention 'has created greater awareness of related ideas and motivations, introducing these more generally into the public domain'. As these groups are currently focused on recruitment, it is likely that any attention from mainstream media will 'be harnessed by these groups to attempt to gain greater support and grow their membership base'.
3.67The AFP suggested that young people who access violent extremist content online 'may be more susceptible to certain extremist content, such as memes, in‑group language and jargon'. The AFP submitted that many of those people do not limit themselves to online extremist platforms, they also:
…spend significant periods of time online, immersed in various internet and gaming subcultures. Accordingly, there is often a substantial overlap between participants in dedicated NRVE online forums and in mainstream spaces, leading to a cross-pollination of terminology, symbolism and ideas. Through this process, extremists co-opt benign internet subculture and repackage it to introduce their ideas to new audiences.
3.68In the AFP's view:
It is anticipated that the new carriage services offences relating to violent extremist material, contained in the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Act 2023, will assist in disrupting the dissemination of such content.
3.69The AFP noted there has been an increase in the number of 'young people being investigated by the [Joint Counter Terrorism Teams] across several Australian state and territory jurisdictions'. The AFP discussed its operational experience of investigating these matters:
Since July 2021, the AFP has commenced investigations and conducted operational activity against a number of individuals 16 years old or younger, with the youngest being 11 years old. This caseload includes a number of youths on a path to radicalisation or demonstrating concerning behaviours, including planning for possible attacks at schools on students and teachers, and the production of explosives or possession or use of weapons.
3.70The committee heard evidence that the increase in the radicalisation of young people is a global trend. Mr Reece Kershaw APM, Commissioner, AFP, gave the example from the United Kingdom where:
…the latest data released by the UK's Home Office shows that 2023 recorded the highest number of terrorism arrests of young people since records began on 11 September 2001. Of the 219 arrests for terrorism-related offences in the UK last year, 19 per cent or 42 per cent of those were young people aged 17 and under.
3.71Commissioner Kershaw reported that while the AFP is concerned about the threat of young people committing violent acts:
Where possible, and where there is no immediate threat to the community, the AFP prioritises early intervention and disruption strategies ahead of prosecuting young people. Once there is a prosecution and conviction, many lives are severely disrupted.
3.72Commissioner Kershaw discussed the particular challenge of online radicalisation of young people and the role parents have to play. He stated that the AFP is:
…working with agencies, therapeutic services, communities, and leaders of faith, but we also need parents to be invested in their children's online nutrition. There is a lot of junk and rubbish on the internet and on social media platforms. What young people digest online can have a significant impact on their health, including their mental health.
3.73The AFP recognised:
Extremists engage with young people at a critical time when they are developing their identity and learning different forms of socialisation. Ayoung person's risk of radicalisation is influenced by a number of factors, including: social dislocation, peer influence, mental health challenges, neurodiversity factors, active online engagement with extremists, and triggering or traumatic events.
3.74The Living Safe Together program explained that there is no specific process of online radicalisation. However, there are behavioural signs that could indicate that someone is at risk of being radicalised online:
These signs may include:
using online social networking platforms such as Facebook or Twitter to promote violence or other criminal behaviour to advance a cause, or
looking at or downloading large amounts of violent extremist content including:
online instruction and training manuals about making explosives or other methods to undertake violence
violent extremist literature, images and/or video clips that advocate the use of violence or other illegal behaviour to promote a cause.
3.75These signs are not conclusive evidence of someone being radicalised online. For example, someone could 'have legitimate reasons for downloading concerning material, including for a research project'. If that person's online behaviour is accompanied by changes in the way they behave offline, it may indicate that they are radicalising.
3.76The AIC stated that the internet does not provide unique radicalisation pathways, instead it 'accelerates and exacerbates certain elements of the radicalisation process by increasing the accessibility and reach of violent extremists and their messages'.