Chapter 2Nature and extent of right wing extremism in Australia
2.1This chapter examines the nature and extent of right-wing extremism in Australia. It considers the motivations and objectives of individuals and groups that hold extreme views and the factors that contribute to right wing extremism in Australia.
2.2There is a long history of right wing extremist (RWE) movements in Australia and the views of those movements continue to evolve. During the early decades of the Cold War, RWE movements rallied against communism while in later decades they expressed 'hostility to Asian immigration'. Their changing views are informed by 'the ideas and approaches of international RWE movements while also drawing on domestic traditions of racism such as the White Australia Policy'.
2.3After 'the 9/11 [terror] attacks in 2001, RWE groups have focused heavily on the supposed threat of Islam'. Groups in Australia and overseas 'sought to exploit widespread Islamophobia after 9/11. The post-9/11 mainstreaming of Islamophobia paved the way for the resurgence of openly racist variants of RWE'.
2.4Academics from Victoria University argued that in the mid-2010s right wing extremism 'began to re-emerge in Australia on a scale not seen for decades'. The Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS) similarly reflected that while white nationalism has a long history in Australia, it has become more visible over the past decade. Those movements have been inspired and emboldened by international developments.
2.5A similar re-emergence in support for right wing extremism is visible in Victoria. According to Liberty Victoria:
Victoria Police observed in March 2021 that 40% of the extremists currently monitored in Victoria were deemed to be 'right-wing extremists'. Most concerningly, over recent times the Australian far-right movement has had an influx of young new members with social media expertise.
2.6Concern about the rising support for right wing extremism is not restricted to Australia. The Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism Network (AVERT Research Network) highlighted growing international concern about increasing support for right wing extremism. It referred to research from the United Nations Security Council that 'indicate[d] that there has been a 320 per cent rise in attacks conducted by individuals affiliated with such movements and ideologies' in the five years to 2020.
2.7According to the CRIS, with two exceptions, Australian RWE groups 'are characterised by constrained and volatile leadership capacity and mostly small and often informal cells and networks rather than many formal organisations'.
2.8The committee heard evidence that current RWE movements in Australia are fragmented but share some common ideological views. Those movements are opposed to the democratic ideal of equality and see themselves as under attack from a range of groups that are hostile to their views. They:
…view the current order as corrupt and on the brink of a conflict for which they must prepare. The predominant state is one of being under siege from a perceived enemy, whether it be the Marxist left, corrupt cultural and political elites, immigrants or inferior yet menacing races.
Motivations, objectives and capacity for violence
2.9A very small number of people who subscribe to extremist ideologies commit violent actions and there is no way of reliably identifying who those individuals will be. As Liberty Victoria submitted:
Experts agree that only an 'infinitesimally small' minority of people who hold extremist beliefs actually transition to violence. There is no empirically robust method to identify who these individuals will be, and it is wrong to assume that there is some kind of "conveyor belt" from exposure to extremist ideology to radicalisation and violence.
2.10There are a wide range of factors that can attract individuals to violent extremism. As more people are exposed to RWE ideas, including in online environments, 'it is important to understand the multiplicity of factors that drive and sustain engagement to right-wing extremism'.
2.11The committee received evidence that the threat posed by right wing extremism 'can also be overstated as a result of the large number of people arrested and charged with non-violent inchoate terrorism offences'. Liberty Victoria argued that examples of this overstatement can be seen in the United States and United Kingdom.
2.12Other submitters similarly argued that the threat posed by right wing extremism is overstated and that groups espousing RWE views do not pose immediate threats to national security. One submitter warned that any proposal 'to suppress' those movements would undermine democratic principles.
2.13Several inquiry participants outlined the broad social, economic, and political factors that have arguably contributed to an increase in right wing extremism. The AVERT Research Network, for example, listed a range of factors that have arisen over the past two decades:
The world has undergone profound stress and upheaval in the past two decades: environmental crises, a global financial crisis, growing inequality and a global pandemic. This has corresponded with the growth of far-right populism, disaffection with democracy, neoliberalism and global capitalism which has increased the lack of trust in government and institutions.
2.14The committee received evidence that there is no universal motivating cause for people to become radicalised. There may often be several motivating factors that 'can co-exist with mental health issues, adverse childhood experiences, and other complexities'. Other motivating factors include 'perceptions of threat (often by out-groups), relative deprivation, and identity factors'. Suggestions that individuals could be motivated by 'economic uncertainty has been challenged…because it fails to compensate for perceptions of threat to identity and culture'.
2.15Mr Alexander Ritzmann, Senior Advisor, Counter Extremism Project (CEP), discussed the anthropological and psychological bases for extremism:
People who join extremist organisations, no matter the ideology, are unhappy with their life. They get promised they will be a hero, a warrior, a lion or a mother of the next generation of heroes, and this is why they commit to such an ideology and such a movement. Some of them leave voluntarily after some time because they realise that these ideologies, these groups, do not deliver on their promises.
2.16Mr Mike Burgess, Director-General, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), emphasised that intelligence agencies do not police the ideological views of individuals or groups. Those agencies will only become interested in a particular individual or group if they espouse violence.
2.17Mr Burgess observed that individuals or groups that hold particular ideological views can transition to violence for a wide variety of reasons:
It could be an individual, or it could be they form up with a couple of individuals and they feed off each other or it could be some organised group that's led by some charismatic, smart individual that attracts people and draws them in. It's every possibility you could imagine.
2.18Research by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) suggested that while there is considerable debate about the definition of radicalisation, the term:
…is generally understood to be a gradual process, involving multiple drivers, through which individuals accept moral or instrumental justifications for violence in pursuit of a social, economic, political or religious goal that often involves fundamental societal change.
2.19The end point of the radicalisation process is a key aspect of definitional debate:
Some definitions emphasise processes of developing violent extremist attitudes and beliefs (ie attitudinal/cognitive radicalisation), while others focus on the lead-up to involvement in acts of violent extremism (iebehavioural radicalisation). While behavioural radicalisation is a primary concern from a public policy standpoint, the development of violent extremist attitudes and beliefs, regardless of whether they manifest in violence, is also relevant.
The Overton window
2.20Some inquiry participants referred to the idea of the Overton window and the mainstreaming of RWE ideologies.
2.21The Overton window is a theoretical device:
…used to explain a limited range ("window") of policies and ideas that are politically and socially acceptable to openly discuss at any given time. Policies and ideas that are generally regarded as politically and socially unacceptable would be considered "outside" the parameters of the window.
2.22RWEs aim to broaden the range of policies and ideas that can be acceptably discussed in the public sphere. The CRIS submitted that they do that 'by normalising hate speech and thereby making it acceptable to voice extremist hate-filled ideas in order to influence the wider body politic and influence mainstream political discourse'.
2.23It likened the efforts of RWEs to shift the Overton window 'to the foreign interference efforts of hostile states, [which] seek the 'social diffusion of ideas and cultural values for the sake of provoking a profound, long-term, political transformation''.
2.24The committee heard evidence that extremists use free speech to strategically silence more moderate voices that may argue against their views and prevent the Overton window from shifting towards the fringes of the political spectrum. Dr John Byron, Principal Policy Advisor, Queensland University of Technology explained:
Free speech is deployed as a path-finding preliminary tool to clear the decks so that people can come in and make their extreme statements, trying to shift the Overton window so that they're normalising statements that are in fact quite extreme. Then there's a lack of counterargument, because the people that might be in a position to counterargue feel intimidated and withdraw themselves from the debate.
2.25For example, the AVERT Research Network suggested that Australian RWEs will conduct activities 'such as congregating in Jewish communities, pamphleting [sic] and protesting in public symbolic spaces on symbolic days in an attempt to capture headlines' to widen the Overton window.
2.26Dr John Coyne, Mr Henry Campbell, Ms Angela Suriyasenee, and Mr Justin Bassi, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), gave a similar example of extremists 'seeking to leverage discourse on emotive issues to mainstream their beliefs and to radicalise new members'. They referred to several neo‑Nazi protests in Sydney prior to Australia Day in 2024. Those protesters:
…sought to link their belief systems with public discussions on the future date of Australia Day. In doing so, they sought to attract those opposed to changing the Australia Day date to their ideologies.
2.27Associate Professor Debra Smith, Dr Julian Droogan, Dr Muhammad Iqbal and Lise Waldek argued that RWEs pose two threats to Australia. The first threat relates to their long-term strategy to shift 'the parameters of acceptable political and social discourse to a point where it challenges political and social norms, most importantly our acceptance of a diverse and functioning multicultural democracy'. The second threat relates to the propensity for some RWE actors to 'celebrate and advocate the use of violence to promote their cause, undermine trust in social and governmental institutions, and achieve eventual revolution'. Those actors use online platforms to inspire and encourage individuals and groups to commit violent acts.
2.28Professor Smith et al observed that RWEs will opportunistically 'seek to appropriate conservative political narratives and beliefs to provide a façade of legitimacy for their radical political agenda'. In their view, conservative leaders should draw attention to the misappropriation of their values and call out those who seek 'to pervert conservative values for radical violence'.
2.29Dr Jordan McSwiney, Dr Imogen Richards, Dr Kurt Sengul, Callum Jones, and Cam Smith suggested that RWE ideology has seeped into more mainstream and politically acceptable discourse:
The borders between right-wing extremist movements, the far right, and the "mainstream" are more porous than these categories might suggest. Indeed, as Mondon and Winter note, many right-wing extremist actors today "espouse a racist ideology, but do so in an indirect, coded or even covert manner, by focusing notably on culture and/or occupying the space between illiberal and liberal racisms, between the extreme and the mainstream". Assuch, the far right has become increasingly mainstream. As a result of the far right's normalisation, ideas and rhetoric that were once considered taboo have permeated into the mainstream, resulting in an increase in hate speech, racism, queerphobia, conspiracy theories, and misogyny.
2.30In answer to questions from the committee, Mr Burgess indicated that Australian politicians espousing extreme views or conspiracy theories may risk giving those views greater legitimacy. He advised that any such conduct:
…has the potential to amplify in the wrong direction, even if that’s not their intent, whether members of this great house are deliberately doing that or not. Of course, yes, I would pay attention to that. That’s part of our job as a security service.
2.31The Australian Muslim Women's Centre for Human Rights (AMWCHR) considered that the media and politicians have a role in the mainstreaming of ideas that exist beyond the confines of regular political discourse. In its view, they are partly responsible:
…for shifting the Overton window on how Islam and Muslims are spoken about in public spaces, expanding levels of acceptance of dehumanising and Islamophobic rhetoric and policies. This has normalised the targeting and scapegoating of Muslim and migrant communities and provided cover for far‑right movements to flourish.
2.32The Real Republic Australia disagreed with part of the AMWCHR's assessment about the role of politicians in shifting the Overton window towards more extreme positions. In its view, extreme ideas 'should not be conflated with our mainstream political system that includes organised parties, interest groups, and other participants across the political spectrum'. Those mainstream organisations regularly condemn and reject the 'anti-democratic and often violent actions promoted by extremists'.
Ideological views
2.33As outlined in Chapter 1, it is difficult to present a coherent and uniform ideology that unites RWE individuals and movements. However, some inquiry participants presented broad themes or characteristics that are common to many RWEs.
2.34It has been suggested that individuals who hold extreme right wing views often refer 'to a mythical golden past age when society was less diverse, the nation was actively defended, and traditional gender roles were unquestioned'.
2.35It was submitted that anti-feminist ideals are attractive to RWEs as they 'often identify with 'traditionalist' ideas of society, culture, and gender in the private and public sphere'. The AMWCHR explained that opposition to feminism is a unifying cause for some RWEs:
…as it appeals to notions of 'tradition'. It can also unite those who believe the system is working against them, as it directs their focus towards those they view as benefitting at their expense – i.e., women and minorities.
2.36The Challenging Racism Project agreed that hostility towards 'feminism has become a 'uniting ideology' in far-right extremism, unifying key themes that animate extreme-right ideology, such as hierarchy, order, power, and a preference for 'tradition''.
2.37The Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network (MYAN) indicated that RWEs subscribe to racist ideologies that threaten to undermine Australian values. It stated that RWEs:
…believe that 'white identity' is under attack and prescribe to a set of ideologies that include promoting the notion of exclusionary 'white nationalism' which at its core is a profoundly racist concept.
2.38MYAN identified several 'characteristics' shared by contemporary RWE movements in Australia:
False ideas of biologically or culturally separate races and false narratives of threat to the imagined "white nation".
A nostalgic, ultra-nationalism view of Australia, where 'true Australians' shared values and cultural characteristics that are threatened by 'outsiders' who are the risk to Australia's social fabric, including non‑white immigrants, Muslims, and those who support Aboriginal land rights, multiculturalism, environmentalism, human rights and animal rights.
Anti-Semitism.
A stereotyping and deep opposition toward Islam, Muslims and Muslim cultures.
A belief that immigrants must assimilate into a 'unitary' Australian culture.
A general disdain for progressive people and ideas.
A strong sense of heterosexual gender distinction whereby men are 'heroic' protectors of 'capable but vulnerable' women and thus have a general disdain for feminists and their supporters and the LGBTIQ+ community.
General distrust in government and government systems.
A willingness to defend the state against what they consider to be poor government policies [that] threaten the integrity of the nation (including democratically elected governments).
A strong support of national defence including a willingness to support violence and militant activities in defence of nation and their perceptions of national culture.
2.39The AMWCHR discussed the example of the Christchurch terror attack and the ideological views that motivated the perpetrator to carry out the attack. It referred to his manifesto:
…which outlined his 'justifications' for the murders. These 'justifications' largely centred around the far-right 'Great Replacement' or 'White Replacement' conspiracy theory, which posits that Anglo-European (white) people in western countries are being socio-culturally as well as demographically 'replaced' by people of non-Anglo-European descent. Proponents of the Great Replacement theory attribute these perceived demographic and cultural changes to high birthrates among non-white communities, in addition to immigration from non-western/non-European countries. These demographic projections are not based in reality. The Great Replacement is, by definition, inherently ethno-nationalist and centred on the belief that 'the west', and whiteness specifically, is a superior culture and race.
2.40The Christchurch terrorist was motivated by the Great Replacement conspiracy theory. His manifesto opened with the statement, repeated three times, 'It's the birthrates'. Throughout the document he:
…makes clear that he not only regarded women and girls as legitimate targets, but that he saw their extermination as the central element of his mission…[T]he manifesto goes on to elaborate that all Muslims, including children, are to be regarded as enemies on the basis of their reproductive capacity...Their 'crime' was to be Muslim – and to be 'breeders'. Long‑accused of potentially concealing weapons beneath their modest clothing, Muslim women are now accused of harbouring a still more sinister weapon within their bodies – their wombs.
2.41The CRIS referred to Australian RWE groups that are primarily motivated by a desire 'to build a white ethnostate in Australia, expelling migrants, Jews, non‑whites and those deemed ethnoculturally 'other''.
2.42The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) submitted that '[e]xtremist movements threaten an inclusive society through their violent denial of diversity, a foundation of racism, and harm diverse individuals and communities—particularly those that are negatively racialised'.
Links with international movements
2.43This section explores the international connections that RWE groups have developed and considers the reasons and motivations for building those links.
2.44The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) observed that extremist actors have historically organised into 'formalised groups'. More recently they have become increasingly decentralised:
…the increasingly 'post organisational' threat landscape is comprised of highly-networked but loosely-affiliated digital ecosystems. This is typified by the far-right mobilisation around 'leaderless resistance', which emphasises the ability of grassroots activists to take coordinated action.
2.45The ISD provided the example of the perpetrator of the 15 March 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack as an example of an individual 'radicalis[ing] and plan[ning] an attack in an online space without group backing'. That individual influenced and inspired others to conduct similar attacks in the United States, Germany, Norway, and Slovakia.
2.46The committee received evidence that Australian RWEs develop links with international movements for several reasons. For example, Dr McSwiney et al observed that building connections with international movements provided 'ideological, discursive, financial, and organisational inspiration and support'.
2.47Some RWE groups believe that they face shared challenges that extend beyond national boundaries. For that reason, they 'are increasingly convinced that they must organise globally to meet global challenges'.
2.48The CEP observed that the online environment facilitates easy communication between extremist actors operating globally. That ease of communication has allowed for the sharing of ideas and the creation of a transnational RWE movement:
The creation of borderless online spaces has led to a digital world with few impediments to communication for (violent) extremists between different continents. As a result, while right-wing extremist movements have maintained strong local and national characteristics, some narratives, ideologies, trends, and strategies have become transnational. This is especially true among right-wing extremists in English-speaking countries. The rise of unregulated social media and communications platforms also gave extremists and terrorists new possibilities to connect and learn from each other, recruit new members, raise funds, and spread their propaganda to large audiences.
2.49Some inquiry participants indicated that RWEs also engage in offline activities that bring them together. The AVERT Research Network, for example, highlighted 'transnational cultural, music and sporting events and international speaking tours and conventions that bind RWE actors and movements'. These events provide RWEs with an 'important means of networking, building solidarity as well as contributing to ideological convergence'.
2.50The AFP reported that ideologically motivated violent extremist (IMVE) groups that operate over large geographical areas can be difficult to investigate. It submitted:
…IMVE groups can have fluid leadership and membership, and allegiances may shift rapidly. In some instances, membership is also more geographically dispersed and isolated. This can make it difficult for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify individuals at risk or who are already radicalised.
2.51There are three listed terrorist organisations that are 'categorised as IMVE in Australia'. While those organisations are based overseas, their encouragement, promotion and glorification of terrorism online has resulted in the radicalisation and influence of individuals in Australia'.
Shared cultural identity and community building
2.52Inquiry participants highlighted examples of cultural references that RWEs use to develop their ideological worldview and build community.
2.53Dr McSwiney et al submitted that the sharing of ideology is the most obvious reason for creating international linkages between RWEs. They suggested that Australian RWEs rely 'on ideological support, encouragement, and legitimation from the global neo-Nazi movement, even if they may adapt these ideologies to the Australian context'.
2.54Several submitters referred to foundational texts of right wing extremism. Forexample, DrMcSwiney et al referred to:
Key texts of right-wing extremism, such as William Luther Pierce's TheTurner Diaries and James Mason's Siege—both American texts regarded as manuals for global neo-Nazi terrorism and influential to the so-called manifestos of terrorists such as Brenton Tarrant (2019 Christchurch mosque shootings) and Anders Brevik (2011 Norway attacks)—have become widely popular among the Australian far right.
2.55Dr McSwiney et al also highlighted the shared discourse related to 'political and cultural issues that are prominent within the international far right, particularly the United States'. Shared narratives have emerged in relation to Islamophobia, western civilisation, and perceived online censorship.
2.56Other cultural touchstones and movements can be co-opted by RWE movements to give their ideological views greater credibility. The AVERT Research Network, for example, submitted that some RWEs 'look to other national and ethnic contexts for inspiration and validation of their ideologies'.
2.57The AVERT Research Network suggested that a global narrative has developed among RWE groups. According to that narrative, an imagined 'white civilisation and white race [is] in decline'. Those groups see themselves as having a duty to defend that civilisation and race from further decline.
2.58The committee received evidence that some extremist groups draw upon antisemitic, anti-immigrant, anti-elite and a range of conspiracy theories to create a shared cultural identity that crosses national boundaries. Thoseconspiracy theories are often adapted 'to local conditions and preoccupations'.
2.59The Victorian Government indicated that:
Global events have influenced the re-emergence of [nationalist and racist violent extremism (NRVE)] in Victoria. It coincides with recent and notable NRVE terrorist attacks in New Zealand, Europe, and the United States of America.
2.60The committee received evidence that some RWEs with an interest in the medieval period of history have created a shared and ahistorical understanding of the Middle Ages. It was submitted to the committee that shared cultural understanding of the time period 'functions as a common reference point for geographically disparate RWEs, and can be a point of connection between groups and individuals with different ideologies'.
2.61The AVERT Research Network also referred to the misappropriation of medieval history by RWEs. Through the construction of a mythologised past, RWEs 'create shared white identity, heritage and culture…[these] medievalist historical narratives have been used to lend credence to violent white masculinity and white nationalism'.
2.62It was submitted that RWEs with an interest in medievalism have a particular shared understanding of the Middle Ages. In their understanding:
…the medieval period was the last time that European-derived societies were white bastions; for some these were pagan, for others, Christian. It was also the last time that society was uncontestedly male-dominated and based in a warrior ethic, and that extreme violence against racial and religious enemies was seen as virtuous. In the RWE imaginary, this becomes a "paradise lost" of racial homogeneity and religious uniformity, masculine domination and legitimate violence. RWE medievalism is a travesty of the Middle Ages that does not survive exposure to the historical facts.
2.63The scholars explained that RWEs around the world can connect with each other:
…through shared investments in racism, and so-called white heritage and culture. This supposed shared identity, heritage and culture is frequently expressed through appropriations of medieval European history, including in popular forms; this is termed 'medievalism'.
2.64The committee received evidence that RWEs misrepresent medieval European history to imagine an ongoing conflict between Western civilisation and other outsider groups. For example, RWEs construct stories from:
…numerous examples of hero narratives in medieval Europe, from Norse mythology and Viking warriors, to Christian Crusaders, and the Frankish leader Charles Martel, who defeated Muslim forces on French soil in 732. Misrepresented through RWE medievalisms, these narratives help RWEs position present-day antisemitism and Islamophobia, and related violence, as part of an ongoing historical conflict and to suggest connections between hero narratives and extremist violence.
2.65It was submitted that through the construction and telling of these historical misrepresentations, RWEs are able to encourage others to commit 'real violence, as actors are encouraged by online materials and social relationships (online and offline) to see themselves as warriors for a white future, inspired by a white past'.
2.66The committee received evidence that extremist groups also build international communities using the internet and other communications channels. Membersof these groups use encrypted online chat rooms to engage with others and access 'documents on practical and operational issues'.
2.67Joining online communities serves a psychological purpose and can be a motivating factor for some individuals to become involved with extremist groups. Ms Khalil suggested that this is often an overlooked aspect of extremism:
The importance of communities is often underestimated when examining extremist movements. Finding a sense of community and belonging is a strong motivating factor for involvement in violent extremism. Especially since many traditional community forums and spaces are decreasing IRL or 'in real life'.
2.68It was submitted that calling individuals who commit violent acts lone actors often hides 'their interconnectedness to a broader movement facilitated by the internet, making it more difficult to distinguish between individual action and networked provocation'.
The transnational active club network
2.69The CRIS reported that international RWE groups are inspired by 'the traditions of the Völkisch and Hitler Youth movements in Nazi Germany, which emphasised physical fitness, outdoor activity, and paramilitary training'. Contemporary RWE groups 'link their ideological coordinates and activities' to those pursuits. They have also established 'gym-based networks and 'fight club' style arrangements…which often emphasise training with weights, hiking and mixed martial arts training'. In some cases, these pursuits are used 'to create isolationist bulwarks that are separate from incursions into or scrutiny by mainstream society or authorities'.
2.70The CRIS argued that these 'ideologically-based networks…are emerging as key elements for far-right extremist recruitment and mobilisation'. In its view, these real-world networks, based on 'kinetic violent extremism', have been largely overshadowed by online networks. They are attractive to some extremists, particularly young people, 'who may be seeking not only a sense of belonging but also a sense of efficacy expressed through physical accomplishment, momentum or enhancement as they transition into adulthood'.
2.71The AVERT Research Network indicated that while sport can serve as a tool to prevent individuals from engaging in extremist behaviour, depending on who is leading the activity it 'can also serve as a recruiting mechanism for violent extremism groups and exposure to RWE ideas'.
2.72Mr Ritzmann informed the committee that 'white supremacist active clubs are arguably the largest and fastest-growing violent extreme-right network worldwide, with more than 100 groups in at least 25 countries'. He alerted the committee that the CEP is aware of one group that appears to be following the active club strategy in South Australia.
2.73The CEP suggested that Australian law enforcement agencies should closely collaborate with their international counterparts to monitor extremist groups that might be adopting the active club strategy.
2.74The committee received evidence that the active club strategy aims 'to build up a network of dedicated and trained extremist individuals while evading law enforcement scrutiny and counter‑measures'. Active clubs are often founded by members of neo-Nazi groups, however, to avoid attention from law enforcement agencies the clubs will 'pretend to have deradicalized and to only focus on sports and brotherhood'. To that end they attempt:
…to present a friendly face to the public with the aim to avoid, delay, mitigate, and withstand law enforcement interventions. Consequently, Active Club members are asked to avoid threatening behavior or displaying obvious Nazi symbols in public to appear less relevant and less dangerous than other groups. This less aggressive and more mainstream strategy, also called the 3.0 model, is also meant to help grow the network, in particular by recruiting from the general public.
2.75It was submitted that active clubs operate according to several principles, which include:
"Make fascism fun," "A group of strong white men is a fascist statement in itself," "The best strategy is to be as unpolitical as possible to be as appealing as possible," and "White unity at every opportunity".
2.76Members of active clubs are encouraged not to 'talk about politics, Jews, or history. Instead, the focus in public should be on brotherhood, fitness, and self‑defense'. Active clubs are loosely connected to each other with 'no central command structure'. Members of active clubs:
…are asked to carry out combat sports training and potentially illegal political activism like banner drops, stickering, and graffiti tagging to promote a risk-taker mentality and to train operational and logistical capacities like scouting target locations and avoiding law enforcement. Creating local and national leadership figures in this process is another main objective. The Active Club strategy also promotes membership in other extreme-right organizations to overcome the infighting between different extreme-right groups.
2.77ASIO is aware of the active club strategy and defines it as:
…a trend in the global white nationalist scene which focuses on male-only real-world fitness and martial arts training. Active clubs promote physical toughness as a holistic form of self-improvement, deemed by white nationalists as necessary to protect the white race in the future. The clubs also provide a space to espouse nationalist and racist ideologies.
2.78Mr Burgess informed the committee that ASIO and law enforcement agencies have close relationships with their international counterparts. As part of their cooperation with foreign agencies, they discuss strategies to monitor and investigate security risks.
2.79In ASIO's assessment, while active clubs 'are likely to continue to attract Australian white nationalists, the clubs are unlikely to engage in, permit, or direct acts of politically motivated violence'.
Links between Australians and international extremists
2.80The CEP provided an example of the Iron March Forum, which was an online RWE forum active from 2011 to 2017. The forum promoted a violent ideology based mainly on neo-Nazi accelerationism, antisemitism and homophobia. Adata leak revealed that the forum had about 1200 regular users, of whom 1185were identifiable through their internet protocol address. The leak showed that 59 Australians were active participants on the site. The Iron March Forum helped to create and promote the Australian-based Antipodean Resistance RWE group. Antipodean Resistance later merged with the Lads Society to create the National Socialist Network, which is currently the largest Australian neo-Nazi group.
2.81The CEP observed that Australian RWEs have operated in online spaces and have become 'international movement leaders'.
2.82Dr McSwiney et al suggested that international RWE movements have established 'local franchises' in Australia.
2.83Dr McSwiney et al stated that Australian RWE groups are part of a global movement that is hostile towards liberal democratic values. In addition to providing an ideological basis for Australian extremists:
These links provide material support such as fundraising—in Australia and around the world—to support the activities of right-wing extremists. Theseconnections support the exchange of ideas on matters of strategy, tactics, and discourses, providing encouragement and advice on how to refine the activities of right-wing extremists to forward their supremacist and anti‑democratic agenda. In this sense, international links help to shape not only the kinds of activities Australian right-wing extremists engage in, but also the potential targets of such activities.
2.84Dr McSwiney et al concluded that Australian extremists are actively engaged in the international RWE space:
Crucially, Australian right-wing extremist movements are not passive actors in international right-wing extremism. As the Christchurch massacre tragically demonstrates, Australian extremists are actively involved in shaping what global right-wing extremism looks like today.
