Chapter 1Introduction and context
1.1Violent extremism is a growing global concern. The acceleration in violent extremism is, in part, 'enabled by digitally based social, operational and financial connectivity' and Australia is not immune from that trend.
1.2Organisations that focus on the deradicalisation of individual extremists have warned that more needs to be done to address this threat. For example, Life After Hate, a violence intervention organisation based in the United States, warned:
Violent extremism is a clear and present danger. Research study after research study demonstrates that ideology-based violence continues to rise, year after year. Despite the data and despite the public understanding, we as a civil society, still do very little to address this scourge.
1.3The objective of this inquiry is to examine the:
nature and extent of right wing extremist (RWE) movements in Australia and the links they have with similar movements overseas;
role of the online environment in radicalisation and the promotion of extremist ideas; and
measures that could be adopted to counter the threat posed by extremist movements.
Referral of the inquiry
1.4On 7 December 2023, the Senate referred an inquiry into right wing extremist movements in Australia to the Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee (the committee) for inquiry and report by 6 December 2024.
1.5The committee was required to inquire into RWE movements in Australia, with particular reference to:
(a)the nature and extent of movements and persons holding extremist right wing views in Australia, with a particular focus on:
(i)the threat posed by extremist movements, including right wing extremism;
(ii)the motivations, objectives and capacity for violence of extremist groups and individuals holding such views;
(iii)links between individuals and groups with international movements;
(iv)how individuals progress to committing acts of violence; and
(v)the role of the online environment in promoting extremism;
(b)the terms and operation of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023;
(c)measures to counter violent extremism in Australia, with particular focus on young people; and
(d)any other related matters.
Conduct of the inquiry
1.6The committee advertised the inquiry on its website and wrote to organisations and individuals inviting submissions by 5 April 2024. The committee received and published 45 submissions, which are listed at Appendix 1.
1.7The committee held two public hearings in:
Melbourne, Victoria, on 17 June 2024; and
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, on 24 July 2024.
1.8A list of witnesses who appeared at the hearings is at Appendix 2.
Structure of the report
1.9This report comprises seven chapters, as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the inquiry, outlines its conduct, and provides background on the topic of right wing extremism;
Chapter 2 examines the nature and extent of RWE movements in Australia;
Chapter 3 assesses the threat posed by extremist movements in Australia;
Chapter 4 explores the international connections that RWE groups have developed;
Chapter 5 discusses how right wing extremism is promoted in the online environment;
Chapter 6 considers measures to counter violent extremism in Australia; and
Chapter 7 outlines the committee's views and recommendations.
Background
1.10Inquiry participants reflected on the definition of right wing extremism and suggested that it represents a range of ideological positions. Those positions are not necessarily logically coherent or based on rational, objective reality. It was made clear that extremists generally hold inconsistent, and often seemingly incompatible, ideological views. For that reason, it is difficult, if not impossible, to place extremist individuals or groups on the binary left-right political spectrum.
1.11For example, Dr John Coyne, Mr Henry Campbell, Ms Angela Suriyasenee, and Mr Justin Bassi, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), suggested that the terms right- and left-wing extremism have 'in recent decades often been an understandable, if not perfect, descriptor for a range of extremist views'. However, due to the 'excessively broad and simplistic' meaning of those terms, they are 'often unhelpful'. It is often more helpful to avoid any suggestion that extremists have 'a coherent foundation of political beliefs' by giving them a more precise label.
1.12Dr Coyne explained that labelling someone a right-wing extremist is an overly broad categorisation that risks obfuscating that individual's true ideological position. Applying a more specific ideological label would enable a more targeted intervention strategy to address the specific security challenge or threat posed by such an individual.
1.13Despite that difficulty in accurately categorising the ideological positions of extremists, some inquiry participants outlined characteristics that broadly define RWE movements.
1.14The Castan Centre for Human Rights Law (Castan Centre) indicated that it is difficult to form a comprehensive definition of right wing extremism:
…a shifting, complex and overlapping milieu of individuals, groups and movements (online and offline) espousing different but related ideologies, often linked by hatred and racism towards minority groups, xenophobia, Islamophobia, or anti-Semitism.
1.15In its working definition of RWE, the Castan Centre proposed:
…right wing extremist movements may be identified by the following indicia:
(a)the construction of exclusivist in-groups;
(b)the use of anti-democratic and anti-pluralist ideologies; and
(c)the advocating of the use of force or violence.
Ethnic exclusionism in particular appears to be a key feature of right wing extremism.
1.16The Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism Research Network (AVERT Research Network) listed a range of ideologies that exist on 'a spectrum of socio-political movements' that could be understood as being RWE. That spectrum 'is increasingly complex, fragmented and eclectic' and includes:
…most obviously white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups but also include[s] movements and ideologies that promote exclusivist nationalism, fascism, racism, chauvinism and certain anti‑government and conspiracist movements. Broadly speaking, RWE movements and ideologies share an 'anti-democratic opposition to equality'. They reject democratic governance and use, or justify the use of violence, to effect societal and political change.
1.17Dr Jordan McSwiney, Dr Imogen Richards, Dr Kurt Sengul, Callum Jones, and Cam Smith identified right wing extremism as:
…part of a broader political family, which we refer to as the far right. We use far right as an umbrella term that covers a variety of parties, movements, and activists that are broadly united in their authoritarianism, exclusionary radical nationalism, and racism. We also recognise that political misogyny or male supremacism forms a distinct element within many contemporary far-right movements. Within this, we understand right-wing extremism, or the "extreme right" as those who outright reject democracy in principle.
1.18They further explained that extremist movements more broadly:
…believe the success or survival of an in-group (defined by religion, nationality, ethnicity, gender, race, or sexuality), cannot be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group (e.g. ethnic minorities, queer people, women). These hostile actions can be violent or non-physically violent in nature, ranging from terror incidents, violence and intimidation, to verbal attacks, hate speech, and other forms of discriminatory behaviour.
1.19Importantly, right wing extremism is not linked to mainstream political positions. The ideological positions and narratives espoused by RWE groups go 'beyond what would be considered normative for mainstream conservative or political right views'.
1.20Far-right extremists are usually removed from mainstream society. They are fundamentally opposed to, and even openly hostile towards, prevailing institutions, norms, and groups within mainstream society. As the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS) argued:
Far-right extremist movements create, and operate within, parallel ideologically driven communities in radical and antagonistic opposition to the political mainstream. These communities generally reject basic principles of deliberative democracy. Yet those who identify with these far‑right networks create alternative communities that promote a sense of belonging and connectedness with likeminded others, forming sustained in‑group identities and bonds and enacting their ideological sentiments through verbal, physical, online and offline exchanges and activities.
1.21According to an academic analysis highlighted by the CRIS, RWEs promote 'strong state or authoritarianism, nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and populism or anti-establishment rhetoric'.
1.22Liberty Victoria referred to a definition of right wing extremism developed by the political scientist Dr Cas Mudde in the early 2000s. Dr Mudde's definition comprised five components: 'nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, anti‑democratic views and populism'.
1.23Ms Lydia Khalil focussed on exclusionism as a central factor among RWE movements:
RWE also centres on exclusion—a conceptualisation or creation of 'the other' or the 'out group'…that is dehumanised and made a threat, thereby becoming a legitimate target of violence. RWE groups also conceptualise their 'in group' as superior and their success as inseparable from the exclusion or destruction of others.
1.24The CRIS explained that holding particular views does not necessarily make someone a RWE. In its view, holding or expressing:
…certain ideological views or attitudes such as racism, homo/transphobia, conspiracy thinking or authoritarianism and anti‑government sentiments increases someone's vulnerability to far-right radicalisation, but they are not in themselves evidence of the risk or the rise of far-right extremism.
1.25The CRIS went on to suggest that there are certain factors or conditions that could make someone more susceptible to radicalisation:
…social isolation, loss of status or privilege, and economic insecurities may, under certain conditions, increase one's susceptibility to far-right narratives, but these are complex processes that interplay with, among many other factors, individuals' sense of marginalization, perceived lack of control, and desire for recognition, status and social connectedness.
1.26Submitters from ASPI made a clear distinction between extremism and violent extremism. In their view, 'all terrorists subscribe to some form of extremist belief or beliefs, not all those with extremist beliefs use, have an intent to use or support the use of violence'.
1.27Citizens of a liberal democratic society, such as Australia's:
…need to avoid automatically linking what some, or even many people, view as extreme viewpoints with terrorism, violence or criminality. Indeed, a person who holds a view that is considered extreme by some should not be accused of being an extremist—in some cases the attempt to restrict different views is itself an extreme perspective that we, as a society, should also actively seek to avoid.
1.28Individuals and groups can only be violent extremists if they believe that their ideological views are best advanced through the 'use of unlawful fear, terror and violence'.
1.29While extreme right wing or nationalist groups operating in Australia hold views that 'are offensive to many, their words and actions are not necessarily unlawful. Using or advocating violence to promote these or other beliefs, however, is always unlawful'.
1.30The Living Safe Together program draws a distinction between radicalisation and violent extremism:
When a person's beliefs move from being relatively conventional to being radical, and they want a drastic change in society, this is known as radicalisation. This is not necessarily a bad thing and does not mean these people will become violent.
However, if a person or group decides that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and then acts accordingly, this is violent extremism.
1.31Right wing or nationalist extremists have a unique goal that distinguishes them from other forms of violent extremism. Those forms of extremism seek to preserve:
…the perceived majority culture (usually white/Anglo-Saxon culture/race) at the expense of other cultures. These ideologies justify violence based on patriotism or a belief of superiority to other cultures and races.
1.32Life After Hate reflected on the politicisation of extremism, which frustrates efforts to counter it:
We fear that calling out the violent far right is somehow a political statement, rather than one targeting hate-based ideology. We fear that calling out violent antisemitism is somehow an endorsement of Islamophobia. We fear that calling out violent misogyny or attacks against the LGBTQ+ community is an affront to the male ego. And we fear that calling violent extremism what it is—domestic terrorism—is somehow an idea that can be misunderstood, misapplied, or misperceived as an overreaction.
1.33It argued that to address the increase in violent extremism, 'we need to adopt approaches that require individuals, groups, and the government to take specific action'. One of the first steps in convincingly acting against violent extremism involves 'defining the scourge of violent extremism in the correct terms'.
1.34The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) no longer uses the terms 'right-wing extremism' or 'left-wing extremism'. Since 2021, ASIO has used two categories of politically motivated violence (PMV):
religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE); and
ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE).
1.35ASIO adopted those terms:
…to reflect emerging and evolving threats. The new language reinforces the fact that our counter-terrorism investigations focus on individuals or groups based on their use or advocacy of violence. ASIO does not investigate people solely because of their political views, so labels like 'left' and 'right' often distract from the real nature of the threat. They also no longer adequately describe the phenomena we are seeing.
A growing number of individuals and groups no longer fit on the left-right spectrum, rather they are motivated by fear of societal collapse or a specific social or economic grievance or conspiracy.
1.36ASIO reiterated that extremists who operate in the contemporary threat environment are 'motivated by a hybrid of conspiracies, grievances and anti‑authority beliefs. It is neither helpful nor accurate to assign these individuals a place on the political spectrum'.
1.37International security organisations have also commented on the hybridisation of the threat environment. For example, the Director of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr Christopher Wray, has likened this mixture of seemingly incongruous views to a 'salad bar of ideologies'. Director Wray stated it is challenging to neatly categorise the ideological position of extremists:
…because one of the things that we see more and more in the counterterrorism space is people who assemble together in some kind of mish-mash, a bunch of different ideologies. We sometimes refer to it as almost like a "salad bar of ideologies," a little bit of this, a little bit of that, and what they are really about is the violence. And we are not going to stand for the violence.
1.38The terminology used by ASIO has also been adopted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), which similarly avoids placing extremist actors on the political spectrum.
1.39ASIO and the AFP suggested that there are occasions when it may be necessary to categorise an individual or group in a sub-category of these two broad categories:
Some sub-categories for ideologically motived violent extremism include nationalist and racist violent extremists [NRVE], anarchist and revolutionary violent extremists, and specific issue violent extremists. Religiously motivated violent extremism sub-categories include but are not limited to Sunni and Shia violent extremists.
1.40In the AFP's assessment:
…the use of NRVE indicates support for violence to achieve political outcomes or in response to specific political or social grievance/s that is derived from nationalist beliefs or bias against others, related to race or ethnicity, including a given population group. NRVE aligned ideologies encompasses neo-Nazism, white supremacism, fascism and opposition to left-wing philosophies and institutions because of their promotion of multiculturalism, liberalism and diversity within society.
1.41The AFP identified three ideologies that are NRVE in nature. They include, but are not limited to:
National socialism/Nazism/Neo-Nazism: These individuals/groups adopt the symbolism, terminology and beliefs of Nazi Germany. They believe in the superiority and exceptionalism of the white 'Aryan' race and view fascism as the 'natural order' of the world where the strong dominate the weak. They are explicitly anti-Semitic and claim malign Jewish forces are actively working to destroy the white race through mass migration, undermining traditional values, capitalism, globalism and mass media.
Ethno-nationalism/white nationalism/white separatism: These individuals/groups believe membership of the nation should be predicated on ethnicity, rather than shared civic values and liberal democracy, and believe Australia should be a white ethno-state. They are opposed to globalism, multiculturalism and non-white immigration.
White supremacy: These individuals/groups believe white people are culturally and intellectually superior to non-white people. They justify violence and subjugation of non-white people in furtherance of white aspirations.
1.42The Victorian Government similarly identified three broad groups on the NRVE ideological spectrum: moderate, far right, and extreme right. In its conceptualisation, 'there is a broad range of groups that adhere to ideas associated with civic nationalism, ethno-nationalism and/or national socialism'. Those associated with the extreme right are most likely to use 'violence to influence change'.
The ASIO threat assessment
1.43In his 2021 National Threat Assessment, Mr Mike Burgess, Director-General of Security, ASIO, referred to the threat posed by ideological extremism. In relation to RWEs, he suggested:
People often think we're talking about skinheads with swastika tattoos and jackboots roaming the backstreets like extras from Romper Stomper, but it's no longer that obvious.
Today's ideological extremist is more likely to be motivated by a social or economic grievance than national socialism. More often than not, they are young, well-educated, and middle class—and not easily identified.
The average age of these investigative subjects is 25, and I'm particularly concerned by the number of 15 and 16 year olds who are being radicalised. They are overwhelmingly male.
1.44In November 2022, the national terrorism threat level was lowered to POSSIBLE. ASIO stated:
…that while Australia remains a potential terrorist target, there are fewer extremists with the intention and capability to conduct an attack in Australia than there were when the threat level was raised in 2014. In particular, there's been a moderation in the threat from religiously motivated violent extremists. International networks, capabilities and allure of groups such as [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and al-Qa'ida have been degraded, with their support in Australia declining accordingly. But terrorism remains a significant threat in some parts of the world and a growing menace in others, and developments overseas could resonate in Australia, with little warning.
1.45ASIO submitted that IMVE accounted for 25 per cent of its caseload and that the largest IMVE concern related to 'the threat from lone actors who could move to violence without warning'. In its assessment, most 'established nationalist and racist groups are more likely to focus on recruitment and radicalisation rather than attack planning in the foreseeable future'.
1.46ASIO submitted that it has observed 'an uptick in the number of NRVEs advocating sabotage in private conversations both here and overseas'. The calls for sabotage are most common 'among NRVE 'accelerationists'—meaning extremists who want to trigger a so called 'race war''.
1.47Those extremists have discussed 'attacks on power networks, electrical substations and railway networks'. Mr Burgess indicated that while these discussions are 'largely big talk, ASIO remains concerned about a lone actor moving from talk to action without warning'.
1.48At a Budget Estimates hearing on 29 May 2024, Mr Burgess advised '[n]ationalists, racists, violent extremists…are still a significant threat in the terrorism landscape'. He explained that those ideologies currently represent a lower volume of ASIO's caseload than in the past:
At its peak it was 50 per cent of ASIO's counterterrorism caseload. It's less than that today, but it is still a significant issue. They're active. They're active in trying to recruit new members to the fold. They're out there doing things around protest for recruitment purposes. We have a handle on the people we know about, and we're interested in discovering those other people who might have such an ideology and think violence is the answer.
1.49Mr Burgess emphasised that while RMVE currently accounts for most of ASIO's caseload, a security threat could come from any of the cases that it is investigating:
Right now, I would say it is about 60-40, to give a rough estimate, of religious motivated violent extremists versus nationalist and racist violent extremists. Then I would put in a broad category of other people with conspiracy theories. That is about the mix, but it moves around. It doesn't necessarily mean it translates that 60 per cent will generate all the attacks. It could well be one on the margins or in the 40 per cent.
1.50On 5 August 2024, Mr Burgess suggested PMV poses an equal threat to Australian security as espionage and foreign interference:
Politically motivated violence encompasses terrorism but is broader than that. It covers any violent act or violent threat intended or likely to achieve a political objective. This includes violent protest, riot or an attack on a politician or our democratic institutions.
Political differences, political debates and political protests are essential parts of a healthy democracy.
Unfortunately, we are seeing spikes in political polarisation and intolerance, uncivil debate and unpeaceful protest.
Anti-authority beliefs are growing; trust in institutions is eroding; provocative and inflammatory behaviours are being normalised.
1.51Based on intelligence gathered by ASIO, 'threats to our way of life remain elevated, we are seeing an increase in extremism'. The Director-General stated '[m]ore Australians are being radicalised, and radicalised more quickly'. Not only that, but they 'are embracing a more diverse range of extreme ideologies, and more Australians are willing to use violence to advance their cause'.
1.52On 5 August 2024, ASIO raised the national terrorism threat level to PROBABLE, due to a security environment that is becoming increasingly permissive of the use of violence. In ASIO's assessment, 'there is a greater than fifty per cent chance of an onshore attack or attack planning in the next twelve months'.
1.53The Director-General reported that over 'the last four months, there have been eight attacks or disruptions that either involved alleged terrorism or are being investigated as potential acts of terrorism'. Without commenting on the specifics of those incidents, he indicated that they shared four characteristics:
First, the threat from lone actors. The most likely terrorist attack involves an individual or small group, using rudimentary weapons such as knives, improvised explosives or a gun.
Second, the acceleration of radicalisation. Individuals are moving to violence with little or no warning, and little or no planning. Acts of violence can be almost spontaneous or purely reactive.
Third, a resurgence in the number of minors embracing violent extremism. In the recent cases, the oldest alleged perpetrator was 21, the youngest was 14. Extremist ideologies, conspiracies and mis-information are flourishing in the online ecosystem, and young Australians are particularly vulnerable.
Finally, the diverse drivers of extremism. When we last raised the threat level, individuals were often being radicalised by sustained exposure to a particular extremist ideology, or by an authority figure. Now, individuals are being motivated by a diversity of grievances and personalised narratives. In some of the cases I referred to, the alleged perpetrators appear to have been motivated by extreme religious beliefs; in others by nationalist and racist beliefs.
1.54On 4 November 2024, the Director-General provided an update on the terrorism threat in Australia:
So far this year there have been nine attacks, disruptions or suspected terrorist incidents in Australia. In our assessment, one-third of the incidents involved religiously motivated violent extremism. The majority of incidents were allegedly motived by nationalist and racist ideologies or mixed ideologies. Importantly—because this is often misunderstood—none of the attacks or plots were directly inspired by the conflict in the Middle East. The recent cases highlight other features of the new counterterrorism environment. All involved young people. All involved lone actors or small groups. All involved low-capability weapons. Few of the alleged perpetrators were previously known to ASIO or police, and of those who moved to violence the majority gave little or no warning.
1.55ASIO attributed a range of domestic and international factors to the rise in PMV:
…there were spikes in political polarisation and intolerance, uncivil debate and unpeaceful protest. Anti-authority beliefs grew; trust in institutions eroded; provocative and inflammatory behaviours were normalised.
1.56PMV is a ‘principal security concern’ for ASIO. It includes terrorism and covers a broad range of violent acts or threats that seek ‘to achieve a political objective’. Those acts include 'violent protest, riot or an attack on a politician or our democratic institutions’.
1.57The COVID-19 pandemic and government responses to it as well as the more recent conflict in the Middle East have contributed to an increase in PMV. These factors have ‘raised the temperature of the security environment and created a climate more permissive of violence, making acts of terrorism more likely’.
2019 Christchurch terror attack
1.58Several submissions discussed the March 2019 Christchurch terror attack as a major event in the evolution of right wing extremism in Australia and internationally.
1.59On 15 March 2019, an Australian citizen residing in New Zealand murdered 51 people and attempted to murder another 40 people. On that day, the individual drove from his home in Dunedin to Christchurch with six firearms and several rounds of ammunition. Prior to arriving at Christchurch, he had:
…written words and phrases on the firearms and magazines reflecting his extreme right-wing, ethno-nationalist and Islamophobic ideology. There were more than 200 references to events in history, individuals or ideas, using short-hand terms that were intended to be recognisable and meaningful to those whose thinking aligned with that of the individual.
1.60On 8 April 2019, the New Zealand Government established the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15March 2019 (Royal Commission) to investigate what was known about the perpetrator prior to the attack, what could have been done to prevent the attack from occurring and what public agencies could do to prevent similar attacks from occurring in the future.
1.61The Royal Commission found that the individual:
…displayed racist behaviour from a young age. His life experiences appear to have fuelled resentment and he became radicalised, forming extreme right-wing views about people he considered a threat. Eventually, he mobilised to violence.
1.62He moved to New Zealand on 17 August 2017 'and from this time, his life was largely devoted to planning and preparing for a terrorist attack'. In preparation for the attack, he 'develop[ed] firearms expertise and work[ed] out at a gym [while] taking steroids to bulk up'.
1.63The Royal Commission was satisfied that the individual had been radicalised prior to arriving in New Zealand. It reported that he had come:
…with a fully-developed terrorist ideology based on his adoption of the Great Replacement theory and his associated beliefs that immigration, particularly by Muslim migrants, into Western countries is an existential threat to Western society and that the appropriate response (at least for him) was violence.
1.64While he was living in New Zealand, the Royal Commission described him as:
…socially isolated. He was financially independent and widely travelled. In his preparation and planning for his terrorist attack, he was methodical and single-minded. The individual could present well and conduct himself in a way that did not attract suspicion. He was not identified as someone who posed a threat.
1.65The Royal Commission presented his social isolation as a factor in his radicalisation and an element of his choice to commit a violent terror attack as it provided:
…limited opportunity for the hard edges of his political thinking to be softened by regular and lasting connections with people with different views. In fact, his limited personal engagement with others left considerable scope for influence from extreme right-wing material, which he found on the internet and in books.
1.66The Royal Commission outlined the events that contributed to 'the individual's decision to engage in terrorism', including the:
Dā'ish-inspired terrorist attacks in Europe;
electoral loss of Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election; and
number of migrants he saw in France during his visit in April and May2017.
1.67In its assessment of the individual's manifesto, the Royal Commission summarised the motivation for the terrorist attack as being driven by a:
desire to retaliate against 'Islamist extremist terrorist attacks in Europe';
response to the lack of a democratic mandate for a reduction in immigration; and
'nostalgia for a pre-immigration past'.
1.68On 15 May 2019, in response to the Christchurch terror attack, New Zealand and France launched The Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online (Christchurch Call). Supporters of the Christchurch Call:
…made a firm commitment to each other and to affected victims and communities that we would take strong, decisive action to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. We would not allow terrorists and violent extremists to undermine human rights online nor our ability to realise the benefits of a free, open, and secure global internet.
Note on references
1.69In this report, references to the Committee Hansard are to the proof (that is, uncorrected) transcript. Page numbers may vary between the proof and the official transcript.
Acknowledgements
1.70The committee thanks those individuals and organisations who made submissions and gave evidence at the public hearings.