Chapter 4Military assistance
4.1Ukraine has had to rely heavily on military and financial support from its global partners, principally the United States (US) and members of NATO. The gravity of the conflict—described as ‘the most direct and serious threat to international order since World War II’—is reflected in the fact that it marks the first time that a European country has been the primary recipient of US aid since the Marshall Plan after World War II.
4.2The US leads the world in assistance to Ukraine. As of August 2024, the US Congress has appropriated US$174.2 billion from FY2022 through FY2024 in response to the war. The US also leads the world in military aid to Ukraine, having (as at the time of writing) contributed over US$55.5 billion in military assistance since the Russian invasion in 2022 and approximately US$58.3 billion since 2014.
4.3The European Union (EU) has also committed billions in lethal and non-lethal arms and training to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. Ukraine is not a NATO member and as such is not party to the North Atlantic Treaty mutual defence clause. Consequently, NATO forces have not been deployed on the ground, but NATO does coordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian Government. In July 2024 NATO agreed to play a bigger role in the coordination of military assistance, with members pledging a ‘minimum baseline funding of €40 billion [in military assistance to Ukraine] within the next year.’
Australia’s military contribution
4.4The Australian Government announced its intentions to work with NATO and other partners to provide military aid to Ukraine on 28 February 2022. As an immediate measure, this statement flagged an initial $4.2 million contribution to NATO’s Trust Fund for Ukraine for non-lethal military equipment and medical supplies.
4.5This was followed by a series of further announcements, set out below:
March 2022: $70 million in lethal military assistance to Ukraine, including missiles, weapons and a range of non-lethal military equipment.
20 March 2022: a $21 million military support package.
31 March 2022: a $25 million military package, including unmanned aerial and unmanned ground systems, rations and medical supplies.
8 April 2022: a $26.5 million package of anti-armour weapons and ammunition and a donation of 20 Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles.
27 April 2022: a contribution of six M777 155mm lightweight towed howitzers and howitzer ammunition.
19 May 2022: a gift of 14 M113AS4 armoured personnel carriers and 20 more Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles.
4 July 2022: an additional $100 million military package, including another 20 Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles, de-mining equipment, $20 million to NATO and $7 million towards purchasing technology and equipment from Australian suppliers.
27 October 2022: another 30 Bushmaster mobility vehicles and a contingent of 70 military personnel deployed to the UK to assist in training Ukrainian armed forces.
18 January 2023: the Australian Government confirmed that Australia had to date provided Ukraine with $475 million in military assistance.
24 February 2023: provision of uncrewed aerial systems and completion of training of the first rotation of 200 Ukrainian recruits as part of Operation Kudu.
26 June 2023: another 70 military vehicles, 28 M113 armoured vehicles, 14 Special Operations Vehicles, 28 Rheinmetall 40M medium trucks and 14 trailers and 105mm artillery ammunition.
12 July 2023: a further 30 Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles, bringing the total to 120. In the same week, the government committed to deploying a Royal Australian Air Force E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to Germany, to be used for protecting a gateway of international assistance to Ukraine.
25 October 2023: a further $20 million military package with support from the Australian defence industry, including demining equipment, portable x-ray machines, a 3D metal printer and counter drone systems.
14 December 2023: a commitment to extend and expand Australia’s contribution to the training of Ukrainian military recruits as part of Operation Kudu throughout 2024. Defence personnel participating would be increased from 70 to 90 per rotation and Australia’s role expanded to include a junior leadership program focusing on warfighting skills in urban and trench warfare, combat first aid, explosive hazard awareness and marksmanship.
15 February 2024: a $50 million grant to the International Fund for Ukraine, directly supporting procurement of military capabilities.
27 April 2024: a new $100 million package including $50 million of military assistance with support from the Australian defence industry, $50 million for short-range air defence systems and delivery of air-to-ground precision munitions.
11 July 2024: the largest single military assistance package to Ukraine, with $250 million worth of air defence missiles, air-to-ground weapons, anti-tank weapons, artillery, mortar, cannon and small arms ammunition, as well as a shipment of boots for Ukrainian armed forces on the front line.
4.6The latest package announced brings Australia’s military assistance to Ukraine to $1.1 billion, as confirmed by Defence at a public hearing:
This latest package brings Australia's military assistance to Ukraine to more than $1.1 billion, including equipment, with around $102 million for Australian defence industry support and contribution to multinational funds. Overall Australian government assistance since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine now stands at more than $1.3 billion.
4.7At the time of this announcement, the Prime Minister also indicated that Australia would be contributing to NATO’s new security and training initiative for Ukraine. This is set to involve a number of staff currently posted in Europe under the Australian Defence Force (ADF) response and support team, the functions of which are being absorbed by the NATO initiative:
These personnel will shift to the NATO initiative. This will ensure our personnel remain embedded in the well-established international coordination architecture, which feeds the consolidated advice of Ukraine's military needs to its international supporters.
4.8Defence representatives indicated that Australia’s military contributions have reflected Ukraine’s capability needs:
Enduring priorities include air defence and integrated air and missile defence capabilities. In terms of land mobility, they include protected mobility vehicles, tanks and other armed capabilities. In terms of munitions, they include longer range missile capabilities and ammunition of every kind.
4.9The following section sets out evidence received on Ukraine’s military requirements and requests.
Requests from Ukraine
4.10Submissions such as that from Dr Michael J. Green, Professor Peter Dean and Jared Mondschein from the United States Studies Centre suggest that hardware specifically sought by the Ukrainian Government includes:
Protected mobility vehicles, including Bushmasters
M1 Abrams tanks
Armoured Personnel Carriers
M777 Howitzers
155 mm, 105 mm artillery ammunition
Anti-tank missile systems
Anti-aircraft missile systems for portable platforms
Sniper rifles and heavy machine guns
Drones and anti-drone guns
Deming equipment
Engineering equipment for building fortifications
Self-Deploying Communications Platforms and handheld radios
4.11This is reflected in other evidence the committee received, such as from the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations (AFUO). Further to this, AFUO described a number of ‘missed opportunities’ to provide much needed military equipment to Ukraine. Ms Kateryna Argyrou, the Co-Chair of AFUO, told the committee that she has contact with 50 different Ukrainian brigades on the frontline and reported a critical shortage of armoured vehicles such as Bushmasters and Hawkeis, Taipan helicopters (discussed later) and drones.
4.12AFUO also conveyed requests for F-18 aircraft, ASLAVS (Australian Light Armoured Vehicles), mortar systems and Tiger helicopters.
4.13Dr Oleksandra Molloy discussed the importance of consulting the Ukrainian Government on what help is needed and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry.
Tracking requests
4.14The committee sought clarity on the number or nature of specific requests received to date from the Ukrainian Government and how these are transmitted. Defence described the process as one of continuing dialogue:
Senator, we are in regular dialogue and discussion with the Ukrainian government through the Ukrainian ambassador in Canberra and through regular interactions with Ukrainian government representatives, including by our ambassador. The Deputy Prime Minister has had multiple discussions with his Ukrainian counterpart in recent weeks and months and had the opportunity to meet President Zelenskyy at the NATO summit alongside the leaders of Japan, Korea and New Zealand. So how I would characterise the situation in relation to Ukrainian requests is one of constant dialogue, where they will be putting proposals to us. We will consider each of them on a case-by-case basis.
4.15Defence representatives added that a single consolidated list of requests for military assistance from Ukraine may not exist:
To be honest, given the duration of the war and the intense level of dialogue over that period, I don't believe we would have a single consolidated list just by virtue of the sheer number of discussions that have happened over that period, including through the contact group. Within Defence, we will be working on options on a continuous basis.
4.16Defence however assured the committee that Australia was learning valuable lessons from the conflict and refining the support it provides to Ukraine:
I can say internally that our personnel deployed to Operation Kudu are improving and refining the training we are providing to Ukrainian armed forces. There is a process there. We do capture those lessons learnt. Each rotation that goes—we are up to rotation 7 now—conducts a 30-day report which provides immediate lessons learnt from the training of those individuals in the United Kingdom. We use that information to inform the next rotation and some of the mounting and mission preparation tasks for that.
4.17SYPAQ, an industry leading manufacturer of uncrewed autonomous systems (UAS), also stated that military assistance to Ukraine has benefitted Australia as well:
Australian military assistance to Ukraine has been valuable for both countries, supporting Ukraine on the battlefield, developing and proving sovereign capabilities for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and helping industry to scale up and refine its technology.
International mechanisms for identifying Ukraine’s needs
4.18The committee sought to understand the process through which Ukraine articulates its specific needs for military assistance. According to a submission from Defence, the process is jointly coordinated by the governments of the United States and Ukraine through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG):
The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), co-chaired by the United States and Ukraine, meets monthly and brings together representatives from around 50 countries to discuss Ukraine’s needs. These needs are also communicated in private briefings by Ukrainian and US officials, and are prioritised by Ukraine, in consultation with its partners.
4.19The UDCG explores military needs within eight ‘Capability Coalitions’:
Armour; Artillery; Air Force; Integrated Air and Missile Defence; Maritime; De-Mining; Information Technology; and Drones (of which Australia is a member). These coalitions provide a means by which Ukraine’s needs are further explored in a focussed way along each capability line of effort with a view to addressing them in concert with international partners, achieving efficiencies, and developing Ukraine’s armed forces.
4.20The Drone Capability Coalition of which Australia is a member is led by the UK and Latvia.
4.21Partner nations have announced initiatives such as the international demining coalition for Ukraine, a coalition of demining efforts assembled by Lithuania and open to other states, through the UDCG process as well.
4.22Defence said that, along with the UDCG process, other avenues for Ukraine to articulate its requirements include direct bilateral engagement ‘such as in capitals through Ukraine’s embassies and through high-level meetings.’
4.23According to Defence, Ukraine is also able to convey its requests for military assistance through architecture it has put in place together with its international partners, such as:
the UK-led International Donor Coordination Centre (ICSS); and
the US-led Security Assistance Group (SAG-U).
4.24Ukraine has its own logistics system for engaging with these entities, and Australia works within them, Defence added:
Ukraine’s primary engagement within those entities is through the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) Korovai logistics system, which aggregates requests from UAF units. Australia’s Support and Response Team – Europe works within these entities, which provide a further point of direct interaction for Defence with UAF counterparts.
4.25This system, named ‘Korovai’ after a traditional Ukrainian bread, monitors the movement of weapons and equipment in Ukraine. According to Defence, individual army formations transmit their needs to staff in Kyiv, who collate, prioritise and provide lists of requirements to donors.
4.26Defence stated that some of the components listed above would soon be wrapped into NATO processes instead. In July 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced the formation of a new command for planning, coordination and delivery of security assistance to Ukraine, the NATO Security Training and Assistance for Ukraine (NSATU). NSATU will operate in NATO-member states:
NSATU will not, under international law, make NATO a party to the conflict.It will support the transformation of Ukraine’s defence and security forces, enabling its further integration with NATO.
4.27Once Ukraine’s needs are identified through these avenues, individual states either proactively convey their ability to address them or are directly approached by Ukraine or other partner nations with specific requests. Each partner nation, according to evidence provided by Defence, uses its own specific national process to consider these requests.
4.28Defence representatives said that in Australia this process is coordinated by Defence, DFAT and PM&C. It was not clear to the committee from discussions with Defence who or which agency is leading, or whether Australia’s coordinated support is in response to a clearly set-out strategy.
4.29A 2023 audit of Australia’s military assistance to Ukraine by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) concluded that Australia’s approach for providing military assistance is ‘largely effective’, and suggested two areas for improvement:
(a)resolve, in consultation with the Department of Finance and DFAT, issues identified in its administration of financial assistance grants provided by the Australian Government to assist the Government of Ukraine; and
(b)review or evaluate its arrangements for the delivery of military assistance to the Government of Ukraine, to inform its approach to and implementation of any further assistance initiatives.
4.30The Defence submission states that the department implemented the following changes in response to the ANAO suggestions:
(a)seeking and receiving a delegation from the Minister for Finance to the Secretary of Defence to enable the gifting of Defence property in support of Ukraine;
(b)establishing an internal consultation process, chaired at the senior executive level, to coordinate current and future Defence support for Ukraine; and
(c)establishing a dedicated coordination unit within International Policy Division to provide a focal point for Defence on Ukraine, and to work with stakeholders on supporting the provision of credible, practical military assistance to Ukraine.
4.31Defence further submitted that it had refined its decision-making processes and is now better placed to review specific requests from the Ukrainian Government ‘in a timely and constructive manner’.
Missed opportunities
4.32Many submissions nonetheless suggested that Australia could do more to support Ukraine militarily. Mr William Thiel, for example, attributed this to poor direction and lacking political will:
I think we have some significant problems at Defence, problems in language and demonstration of our commitment for Ukraine to win from DFAT and a lack of demonstration of political will to direct the government bureaucracy from our elected officials that are in a position to do so.
4.33Noting that Australia’s assistance to Ukraine has been in excess of $1 billion already, the Ukrainian Council of NSW argued that more could be done and lamented wasted opportunities to send unused military equipment to Ukraine.
4.34The issue of how retired or otherwise unused Australian military capabilities could be used was raised by others. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) suggested these could be part of a broader review of available capabilities:
Defence should conduct a review of capabilities that are close to retirement or retired, as well as capabilities being produced by Australian defence industry, which may be particularly suited to assisting Ukraine. This review should be conducted with a particular eye on low-cost capabilities that might have an asymmetric effect, like ‘cardboard drones’. This review could have positive carryover to the changes we need to make to Australia’s own national defence, deploying technology for asymmetric advantage.
4.35Australia’s decision to not send unused Taipan helicopters to Ukraine as requested, but to instead dispose of them, is perhaps the most well-known example of missed opportunity.
4.36Mr Oleg Pristupa, a Ukrainian military helicopter pilot now residing in Australia, explained that Ukraine has a very small fleet of helicopters and could have benefited immensely from the Taipans Australia had at its disposal:
Sending 45 Taipans would have made a lot of difference and could have saved thousands of lives. We currently fly old and outdated Soviet helicopters, which lack modern electronics. Because of this, the range of tasks that we can perform and the types of conditions that we can fly in are much more limited than those of a Taipan pilot.
4.37He illustrated the need with a personal story, relating his experience of evacuating a seriously injured young Ukrainian girl flying a helicopter with older technology:
After another round of Russian shelling, a residential building on the outskirts of Mariupol was set on fire. As a result of this shelling, a ten-year-old girl ended up in hospital in a very difficult condition with 70% of her skin suffering severe burns. After receiving first aid in a local military hospital, she needed to be urgently transferred to Ukraine’s capital Kyiv for proper treatment. I received an order to fly out around 11pm, and had reached the hospital at about 12:30am. However, it took three or four attempts to land. The reason why it was so difficult for us to land is that unlike Taipans, our helicopter wasn’t fitted with any night vision equipment, nor did it have a modern autopilot capable of automatically landing or hovering in one spot…Had this helicopter been a Taipan, not Mi-8, many of the risks could have been avoided.
4.38According to Defence, reviews of available capabilities, including retired equipment occur on an ongoing basis:
We will regularly provide the government with updates on the requests that have been received and how we propose to respond to them. In some cases, too, we will go through and look at capabilities that haven't been requested but that we know might be nearing the end of their life within the Australian Defence Force and provide initial advice to government on those organisations. In some cases, that will generate a follow-on discussion with the Ukrainian government. We might say to them, 'Look, we know you requested these particular systems, but we have this system that might be available. What do you think?' It's in that sense that it can be a bit more fluid.
4.39Asked about specific retiring capabilities including helicopters, Defence replied that its advice to government ‘tends to be iterative in that it might be provided at a moment in time when our judgement is that donating the capability at this point in time would have a negative effect on ADF preparedness.’
4.40Defence representatives stated that Defence’s advice on whether to donate specific equipment is also influenced by input from international partners:
A significant proportion of the equipment we have donated will have been provided to us by a foreign partner such as the United States. It can be an iterative process to get advice from that partner about their willingness for us to donate their capability, about the level of remediation or refurbishment that might be required, and about ITARs and technology restrictions that might be imposed upon us if we seek to donate to an end user.
4.41The committee explored whether such equipment could be passed back to source countries for adjustment before being provided to Ukraine, given the possibility that Defence might be hesitant to donate equipment with systems created by the United States in particular. Major General Ryan was of the view that this would be a sensible approach, particularly where tanks were concerned.
4.42Other submitters also raised the issue of tanks, specifically M1A1 Abrams tanks which Australia is in the process of decommissioning even though Ukraine already operates this model of tank and they are sorely needed.
4.43Speaking to the committee at a public hearing in Canberra, Defence representatives were unable to respond to specific questions concerning plans for retired M1A1 battle tanks as assessments were currently underway.
4.44This hesitation, or failure, to donate unused equipment trickled down to cold weather military clothing, which, despite a cold European winter approaching, continues to be sold off by Defence at auctions in Australia rather than donated to Ukraine.
4.45The committee was interested in whether Australia’s military is equipped to decide what Ukraine needs, particularly where the Ukrainian army has indicated that a particular capability is needed. Major General Mick Ryan, who has extensive experience on the ground in Ukraine, was of the view that the answer to this question is ‘no’:
I don't believe we are. We haven't sufficiently studied that war in depth. We don't have anyone on the ground to make those kind of judgements. We need to work with the Ukrainians more closely. Frankly, they just need lots and lots of simple things—munitions, Bushmasters, M113s for casualty evacuation. It is lots and lots of those things.
Defence industry
4.46The war in Ukraine is reflective of the volatile global security landscape and a reminder that a robust domestic defence industry is a crucial asset which plays a critical role in the ADF’s preparedness.
4.47The committee noted that government decision-making processes on military assistance to Ukraine might be unclear from the perspective of Australia’s defence industry. DroneShield, a company focussed on counter-drone systems which supplies many of Australia’s allies and which has a contract issued by the NATO procurement agency, NSPA, submitted that Australia’s decision process for what to send to Ukraine and when to send it has been opaque from the defence industry’s perspective. DroneShield referred to the specific example of ‘Counter-Uncrewed Aerial System (C-UAS), more commonly known as counter-drone systems:
It appeared that the support didn’t always align with the enunciated needs from Ukrainian Government representatives. Specifically, C-UAS was in the top-10 requests from Ukraine from the start of the war, but no C-UAS aid was provided until 18 months after the invasion despite Australia having arguably the best supplier of C-UAS equipment in the world.
4.48Once the government had made the decision to send the hardware, however, the speed of deployment from Australia was satisfactory:
From DroneShield’s perspective, once the government decision was made to send hardware (approximately $10m worth of DroneShield C-UAS equipment was provided as part of the Government’s $20m package late 2023), the ADF coordinated logistics consolidation and delivery of equipment to Ukraine. This coordination was well handled. From when the equipment was passed to the ADF, we received support enquiries related to that specific hardware, directly from the Ukrainian front-lines, in under 8 weeks.
4.49DroneShield highlighted the ‘speed of relevance’, observing that Russian military forces and industry are iterating their drone capabilities at a speed requiring a commensurate response for Ukraine’s counter-drone systems:
This echoes the technological leaps that have occurred in every major human conflict in history, so is not surprising. Over the first two years of the war, DroneShield found that software updates were sufficient to address new Russian UAS technologies. Recently, we have observed that exotic frequencies are now being used; meaning that, previously effective hardware is now sub-optimal, with reduced ranges or much more limited tactical effects. Next generation C-UAS hardware is urgently required. This needs to be distributed rapidly and can’t wait for a drawn-out processes.
4.50To optimise Australian military support for Ukraine, DroneShield recommended against sending ‘worn-out ADF equipment’ or sending money through international funds. Instead, the submission stated, capabilities should be provided directly through the Australian defence industry, as the US government is increasingly doing by procuring directly from industry instead of accessing its own stocks.
4.51Such an approach would benefit Ukraine, as well as Australia’s defence industry:
The direct approach: provides Ukraine with a lot of its requested capability (C-UAS, drones, etc), and supports the Australian defence industry in increasingly uncertain geopolitical times (not only providing financial support via orders, but continuing to drive the capability edge in Australia). Donating capabilities from domestic manufacturers will position Australia and its defence industry at the front of mind for our allies, in particular Ukraine: they will receive, operate and in some cases, have their lives saved by Australian designed and manufactured solutions.
4.52ASPI also encouraged the government to prioritise domestic production of military materiel, submitting that this would be of benefit both in terms of Australia’s own national defence and for export to Ukraine:
This should include nurturing sovereign capability, developing research and industrial collaborations with the AUKUS coalition and a wider range of partners, and encouraging further investment from trusted partners in manufacturing facilities in Australia.
4.53The committee noted that Major General Ryan highlighted the need to engage with Australian companies manufacturing drones in particular:
There are multiple Australian companies that make lethal drones that we should be buying not by the hundreds but in the thousands. We just don't understand the proliferation and density of these systems now. Whilst, yes, the Pacific is different, there're also big bits of land in the Pacific where these things are going to be useful, notwithstanding some geographical and weather differences. Drone and counterdrone is an area where I'd really like to see us coming forward across all the domains. That's not just land but air, land and sea.
4.54The committee considered the question of giving money to the Ukrainian defence industry as well, as suggested by Major General Mick Ryan and as some of Australia’s international partners are doing:
The Ukrainian defence industry has expanded significantly over the past two years. In my recent discussion with the Minister for Strategic Industries in Ukraine, Minister Kamyshyn indicated that Ukrainian defence capacity currently outstrips funding. To that end, Australia should consider providing funding for specific Ukrainian defence manufacturing efforts in a similar way to that of Canada, which has recently announced that it will fund drone construction in Ukraine.
4.55This was explored with Major General Ryan, noting that government funding could instead be directed towards assisting the Australian defence industry in producing required capabilities at scale, whether for use in Ukraine directly or to replace what is being donated. Major General Ryan was of the view that one did not preclude the other, but that the return on investment would be different:
We absolutely should be supporting Australian defence industry. I'm a big supporter of our defence industry. I think they are a very underappreciated part of our nation. For a very small investment, you can get a very big return out of Ukrainian defence industry. The purchasing power of $1 million there is far more than what you'd get here. We need to spend a lot of money here. But a bit of investment in their defence industry not only will help them now but will put their defence industry on a sustainable level so they can sustain it over the long term for what is probably going to be if not a long-term war, a long-term security requirement to deter Russian aggression in the future after the war.
4.56Dr Oleksandra Molloy called for funding and direct cooperation between Australian and Ukrainian industry:
There is a lot of pull for Australia to also step up. One way I can see that is, again, direct cooperation with our industry, between Ukraine and Australia. Australia can provide their resources, but also innovation to continue to outsmart the adversary. And also the potential financial support like funding initiatives. For example, we know that in Ukraine there is a developing program like Brave1 and so on and so forth, where the technologies and the innovations are continuously improving. I believe that if Australia can step up and also join some of these initiatives via joint collaborative funds or direct financial support or commit to manufacturing so that there are those benefits to support Ukraine, but also to strengthen its defence capabilities.
4.57The committee notes that representatives from Defence highlighted the latest Australian Government package (see Chapter 1), with approximately $102 million going towards Australian defence industry support and multinational funds.
4.58Industry stakeholders suggested that a greater proportion of Australian military equipment to be included in Australia’s future contributions, and that the government should establish mechanisms for improving communication between the government departments and Australia’s defence industry. Representatives from Electro Optic Systems suggested that a quarterly working group would be ‘mutually beneficial’ for government and industry.
4.59The committee heard evidence relating to a highly successful collaboration with Australian industry, specifically SPEE3D, an Australian company which manufactures ‘cutting-edge Australian design and build technology to Ukraine.’
4.60Another submission from an Australian company, Micro-X, similarly reflected the positive contribution Australia’s defence industry can make:
Since the war in Ukraine began, we have provided our Rover mobile x-ray devices to be used in Ukraine’s hospitals and on the front line for treatment of injured military personnel. Our first units were deployed into Ukraine in 2022 with the proceeds of fundraising by US-based charities. In October 2023, the Australian Government announced it would provide additional Rover mobile x-ray units to the Ukrainian Government as part of a $20 million Australian Capability package. We have now delivered 30 Rover mobile x-ray devices to Ukraine to support medical care throughout the country.
4.61Micro-X reported that the opportunity to participate in Australia’s response to the Ukraine crisis was coordinated well by Defence.
Committee view
4.62While announcements of continued support for Ukraine from the Australian Government are welcome, evidence from defence industry stakeholders indicates that government processes around the provision of military assistance remain opaque and that clearer communication from the government is needed. There is also a pronounced need for greater urgency and more responsiveness in processing Ukraine’s direct requests for aid. Nowhere was this more evident than with the decommissioning of Taipan helicopters. The shortcomings identified echo problems with coordination processes noted in previous chapters looking at non-military support.
4.63The committee sees value in prioritising bilateral communication with the Ukrainian Government to ensure that known priority needs are met. Deepening bilateral communication should extend to our nations’ respective armed forces, as there are valuable lessons to be learned from Ukraine’s experience in responding to Russia’s invasion.
4.64Furthermore, the committee urges the government to do more to support the Australian defence industry’s involvement in supporting Ukraine. The industry is a valuable asset with greater potential than is currently being utilised.
4.65The committee recommends that the Australian Government expediently responds to requests from the Ukrainian Government for specific military and defence equipment and materiel, acknowledging that the Ukrainian authorities with direct knowledge of the battlefield situation are best placed to decide whether the equipment sought from Australia can be used effectively in the defence of Ukraine.
4.66The committee recommends that the Australia Government adopts a default position that Defence materiel being retired or otherwise disposed of will be gifted to Ukraine unless there is a compelling case against this for an individual asset.
4.67The committee recommends that the Australian Government urgently directs the Department of Defence to develop plans to provide Ukraine with:
additional Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles;
Hawkei reconnaissance vehicles;
the retiring M1A1 Abrams tanks;
the retiring Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters;
other retired or unused military equipment; and
innovative defence capabilities, some of which have been provided previously, including drone, counter-drone, x-ray, de-mining, 3-D printing, communications, and other equipment.
4.68The committee recommends the Australian Government commits to replenish, via new orders from manufacturers or through enhanced acquisition plans, all new Australian Defence Force commitments to Ukraine with the exception of assets being retired where replacement capabilities are already acquired.
Recommendation 16
4.69The committee recommends that the Australian Government urgently join Australia to the Demining Coalition for Ukraine.
4.70The committee recommends Australia deepen cooperation and liaison between Australia and NATO partners, as well as the Australian Defence Force and the Armed Forces of Ukraine to ensure Australia learn from Ukraine’s defence and response to Russia’s invasion.
4.71The committee recommends the Australian Government strengthens support for Australia’s defence industry to provide equipment to Ukraine, and to develop innovative technologies relevant to modern warfare as highlighted by Ukraine’s defence against the Russian invasion.