Chapter 1 - Introduction

Chapter 1Introduction

1.1On 24 February 2022, Russia embarked on an unprovoked and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, building on its seizure and annexation of territory in Crimea in 2014.

1.2Australia, like its other Western partners, understands that the conflict which has been raging in Ukraine ever since represents a line in the sand. While the outcome of the war affects the Ukrainian people first and foremost, the threat Russia’s invasion poses to international stability means that the effects of the outcome will be felt globally. The conflict also has implications for the Indo-Pacific region where Russia remains a major military power in deepening partnerships with totalitarian governments. Supporting Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity and freedom is therefore nothing less than standing up for the rules-based order the world has benefitted from since the end of WorldWarII and contributing to stability in the Indo-Pacific. Recognising this, Australia has extended Ukraine bipartisan support since the onset of hostilities and is committed to continuing to do so.

1.3The objective of this inquiry is fundamentally to identify ways in which Australia can refine its support and ways in which we can support Ukraine to defeat the Russian invasion by working together with allies and international partners.

1.4As the war is ongoing with no end in sight this inquiry has unfolded against the backdrop of daily volatility and uncertainty. The committee is therefore cognisant that the situation may change rapidly from one day to the next. That being the case, this report sets out the Australian Government’s response in key areas and the views on this response presented by organisations and individuals at a given point in time and without the benefit of knowing what tomorrow will bring. Nonetheless, the evidence gathered is sourced largely from people and organisations who want to see an end to this horrific conflict on Ukraine’s terms, and it is on this basis that the committee has identified areas where Australia could build on its support.

Referral of the inquiry

1.5On 27 March 2024, the Senate referred this inquiry into Australian support for Ukraine to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (the committee), with particular reference to:

(a)whether the support is timely, coordinated and comprehensive;

(b)whether support is appropriately coordinated on a whole-of-governmentand whole-of-country basis;

(c)efforts to hold Russia to account, including by addressing mis- and dis-information in Australian public debate and the region; and

(d)any related matters.[1]

1.6The committee was required to report by 4 August 2024. On 2 July 2024, the Senate agreed to extend the reporting date to 16 September 2024.[2]

1.7Details of the inquiry were made available on the committee’s webpage and in a media release. The committee also invited a number of organisations and individuals to provide submissions.

1.8The committee published 230 submissions, listed in Appendix 1 of this report, and held three public hearings, two in Canberra and one in Melbourne. The organisations and individuals who gave evidence at these hearings are listed in Appendix 2.

Notes on references

1.9References to Committee Hansard are to proof transcripts. Page numbers may at times vary between proof and official transcripts.

Australia’s response

1.10Australian condemnation of the Russian invasion was prompt. To date, the Australian Government has contributed defence, economic, energy and humanitarian assistance totalling more than $1.3 billion,[3] with the latest and single most substantial package announced after submissions to this inquiry had already been lodged.

Military assistance

1.11More than $1.1 billion of Australia’s total contribution has been in military assistance. Defence submitted that the military support takes two principal forms:

(a)an ADF operation, known as Operation KUDU, comprising two elements: training Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in the United Kingdom (UK), and the deployment of a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail early warning and control aircraft to Europe from October 2023 to March 2024; and

(b)materiel and financial contributions, including equipment from ADF stocks, equipment purchased from Australian defence industry and contributing funds through international partners.[4]

1.12The latter includes:

a substantial package, announced in July 2024, of around AUD 250 million in materiel comprising air defence missiles, air-to-ground and anti-tank weapons, and artillery, mortar, cannon, and small arms ammunition, together with boots;

vehicles, including 120 Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles, 56 M113 armoured vehicles, and 28 M40 medium trucks;

M777 Howitzers and artillery ammunition, including under a partnership arrangement with France;

AUD 102 million sourced from Australian Defence Industry, including for drones, counter-drone systems, deployable 3D Printers and accessories, portable X-Ray machines, and soldier personal combat equipment; and

financial contributions, including AUD 50 million to the International Fund for Ukraine, directly supporting the procurement of priority military capabilities and AUD 24 million to NATO's Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Trust Fund.[5]

1.13Defence’s submission indicated that the government continues to weigh options for future military support.[6]

Humanitarian support

1.14The Australian Government’s broader response packages include $85 million in humanitarian aid provided since February 2022 to meet urgent needs.[7]

1.15This support is aligned with announcements by like-minded countries—such as the US, UK and Canada—and has enabled the government’s humanitarian partners, including the United Nations (UN) and non-government organisations (NGOs), to provide food, water, health services and shelter to vulnerable Ukrainians.[8]

1.16As outlined by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia has also committed:

AUD 20 million to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and roughly 80,000 tonnes of thermal coal to support Ukraine's energy security.

AUD 2 million to the United Nations Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNPRPD) for emergency response and disability inclusion programs in Ukraine.

Duty-free access for Ukrainian imports to Australia (since 4 July 2022) this measure has been extended until 3 July 2026.

AUD 9.4 million to assist Ukraine's State Border Guard Service to upgrade border management equipment, improve cyber security and enhance border operations.

AUD 1 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the Agency's response to the situation in Ukraine.

AUD 800,000 worth of vital detection and protection equipment to Ukraine's State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate (through the IAEA), to help ensure the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities.

AUD 200,000 to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to help protect against chemical attacks.

AUD 200,000 to the NSW Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors to offer professional development to 7 Ukrainian mental health professionals.

AUD 150,000 to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's Rapid Response Plan to support agricultural production in Ukraine.

Technical assistance through the Australian Taxation Office to help Ukraine protect its revenue base, in partnership with the World Bank and OECD.[9]

Pressure on Russia through political and trade measures

1.17The Australian Government has taken steps to put economic and political pressure on Russia through sanctions and trade measures. According to the most recent DFAT information, Australia has now:

imposed more than 1200 targeted sanctions against individuals and entities supporting Russia's invasion;

applied trade sanctions banning the import and export of certain goods;

denied Russia access to most-favoured-nation tariff treatment and imposed an additional tariff on goods manufactured by Russia; and

intervening at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to support Ukraine’s case against Russia.[10]

attributing a series of malicious cyber activities to the Russian Government.[11]

1.18A chronological list of government announcements relating to diplomatic and political, military and humanitarian assistance is included in each chapter of this report, which consists of four chapters:

Chapter 1 broadly outlines Australia’s support for Ukraine.

Chapter 2 explores the principles underpinning Australia’s response.

Chapter 3 sets out diplomatic and political aspects of Australia’s response.

Chapter 4 examines Australia’s military assistance to Ukraine.

Chapter 5 looks at the humanitarian aid Australia is providing.

1.19The committee’s report confirms the reasons for unreservedly seeking to help Ukraine and makes a series of recommendations aimed at refining Australian support in each sphere.

Acknowledgement

1.20The committee thanks those who contributed to this inquiry by making submissions or appearing at public hearings.

1.21In particular, the committee acknowledges the impact of this war on the Ukrainian diaspora in Australia and the courage of those who shared insights into their experience.

Footnotes

[1]Journals of the Senate, No. 108, 27 March 2024, p. 3238.

[2]Journals of the Senate, No. 117, 2 July 2024, p. 3593.

[3]See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s response to Russia’s invasion, available at: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au) (accessed 9 September 2024).

[4]Department of Defence, Submission 53, p. 2. The training operation falls under a UK-led, multinational operation—named INTERFLEX—which Defence reports has trained more than 30 000 Ukrainian soldiers since June 2022. According to Defence, Australia deployed the RAAF E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to Germany for six months in response to a request from the United States, for the purpose of providing ‘early warning of threats against a gateway that is a vital supply line for humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine.’Neither the aircraft nor ADF personnel deployed with it entered Ukraine during the deployment.

[5]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s response to Russia’s invasion, available at: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au) (accessed 9 September 2024).

[6]Department of Defence, Submission 53, p. 4.

[7]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s response to Russia’s invasion, available at: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au) (accessed 9 September 2024).

[8]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission 75, p. 6.

[9]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s response to Russia’s invasion, available at: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au) (accessed 9 September 2024).

[10]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s response to Russia’s invasion, available at: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au) (accessed 9 September 2024).

[11]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission 75, p. 12.