Chapter 3Diplomatic and political support
3.1Sovereignty and territorial integrity are the foundations of the international rules-based order. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an overt attempt at shifting this order and the global balance of power. Australia’s response to the invasion has been swift and, for the most part, in lockstep with its global partners.
Australia’s response
3.2The Australian Government has made a significant number of diplomatic announcements in response to the Russian invasion. These include:
20 February 2022: publicly attributing cyber attacks against the Ukrainian banking sector to the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), supporting Ukraine by establishing the bilateral Cyber Policy Dialogue and training Ukrainian officials in cyber security.
22 February 2022: temporarily closing the Australian embassy in Ukraine and withdrawing diplomatic staff, as well as condemning Russia’s declaration that the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine are independent states.
23 February 2022: first tranche of sanctions against Russian individuals, organisations and banks and amendment of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 to broaden the scope of people and entities which can be listed for sanctions.
24 February 2022: listing another 25 individuals and four entities responsible for the aggression against Ukraine for sanctions.
28 February 2022: implementation of sanctions against the Russian President and permanent members of Russia’s Security Council.
8 March 2022: a new round of sanctions on Russian purveyors of disinformation, including financial sanctions on the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation as well as sanctions and travel bans against an additional six senior military commanders.
14 March 2022: fresh sanctions on 33 Russian oligarchs, prominent businesspeople and their immediate family members.
18 March 2022: another 11 Russian banks and government entities added to the sanctions list.
20 March 2022: amendment of the Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme enabling donations to approved organisations supporting Ukraine to be tax deductable, as well as imposition of a ban on Australian exports of alumina and aluminium ores to Russia and donation of 70 000 tonnes of thermal coal to Ukraine.
25 March 2022: new sanctions on a further 22 Russian disinformation operatives, as well as the Belarusian President and members of his family.
31 March 2022: application of an additional tariff of 35 per cent for all imports from Russia and Belarus, as well as a prohibition on imports of oil and other energy products from Russia, to take effect from 25 April 2022.
5 April 2022: prohibition on the export of luxury goods to Russia, including wine, high value cosmetics and parts for luxury vehicles.
7 April 2022: financial sanctions on a further 67 individuals for their role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
14 April 2022: targeted sanctions on 14 Russian state-owned enterprises of strategic and economic importance to Russia.
22 April 2022: targeted financial sanctions on a further 147 individuals, including Russian senators and family members of the Russian President and Foreign Minister.
4 May 2022: another 110 individuals added to the sanctions list, including Ukrainian separatists and members of the Russian parliament.
10 May 2022: formally attributing malicious cyber activity against European networks to Russia.
18 May 2022: new sanctions on 11 individuals and 12 entities for promoting Russian propaganda.
3-4 July 2022: former Australian Prime Minister visited Ukraine and met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Announcements included duty-free access for Ukrainian imports to Australia, Australian intervention at the International Court of Justice in support of Ukraine, new sanctions on another 16 Russian individuals and the prohibition of imports of Russian gold into Australia.
4 July 2022: announcement on the removal of tariffs on imports to Australia from Ukraine.
15 August 2022: the intention to designate gold as an ‘import sanctioned good’ for Russia under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 announced, to commence 30 September 2022.
1 October 2022: sanctions on the import, purchase or transport of gold exported from Russia after 30 September 2022 announced.
2 October 2022: further sanctions and travel bans on 28 separatists, ministers and officials in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
20 October 2022: extension of the application of a punitive 35 per cent tariff on goods imported from Russia and Belarus for a further 12 months until October 2023, as well as instruction to Export Finance Australia to reject any requests for loans or other finance that support trade with, or investment in, Russia or Belarus.
10 December 2022: imposition of Magnitsky-style sanctions on seven Russian individuals involved in the attempted assassination of former opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
24 February 2023: financial sanctions on an additional 90 individuals and 40 entities, targeting Russian ministers with responsibilities spanning energy, natural resources, industry, education, labour, migration and health.
20 March 2023: targeted financial sanctions and travel bans on 13 Iranian individuals and one entity involved in the production and supply of drones to Russia.
19 May 2023: financial sanctions on 21 entities and three individuals, targeting sectors of economic and strategic importance to Russia.
20 July 2023: financial sanctions on 35 entities in Russia’s defence, technology and energy sectors, and 10 individuals including ministers and senior officials, as well as senior Russian and Belarussian military personnel.
25 September 2023: extending the 35 per cent tariff on Russian imports to Australia until October 2025.
3 November 2023: statement on Russia’s decision to revoke ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
10 January 2024: joint multinational statement condemning North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles and Russia’s use of these missiles.
24 February 2024: further targeted financial sanctions and travel bans on 55 individuals and 37 entities.
22 March 2024: joint statement on Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) reiterating support for Ukraine.
27 April 2024: Prime Minister and Minister for Defence visit Ukraine to meet with the Prime Minister of Ukraine and announce a new assistance package.
17 May 2024: targeted sanctions on a further six entities associated with North Korea’s supply of arms and related materiel to Russia.
31 May 2024: joint multinational statement on the North Korea-Russia transfer of arms for use in attacking Ukraine.
14 June 2024: Australian Minister for the National Disability Insurance Scheme and Government Services Minister Bill Shorten MP represented Australia at the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland.
Views on Australia’s response
3.3Submissions broadly acknowledged the strong diplomatic statements the Australian Government has issued in support of Ukraine. Most submissions received by the committee also recognised the contribution the Australian Government has made in the fight for Ukrainian territorial integrity. However, most were of the view that Australia—the 12th largest economy in the world but only 35th in terms of its contributions to Ukraine—should do more.
3.4Major General Mick Ryan, adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC and non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute, with experience assisting Australian soldiers preparing to train Ukrainian recruits in the United Kingdom (UK), succinctly identified four broad areas where support could be improved:
the quantity of aid provided;
the breadth of aid provided;
diplomatic assistance; and
coordination of aid.
3.5Ways in which Australia could strengthen its response by exerting diplomatic, political and economic pressure on Russia are set out below.
Bolstering diplomatic support
3.6Australia has been a vocal supporter of Ukraine in international forums since the beginning of the war. Stakeholders identified several areas where the government could build on the strong support already extended. The need to urgently re-establish Australia’s diplomatic presence on the ground in Ukraine by re-opening the Australian Embassy was raised often and had considerable stakeholder support.
Embassy in Ukraine
3.7Approximately 70 other nations have already re-opened their embassies. Failure to do so, the committee heard, is a missed opportunity to extend greater practical and symbolic diplomatic support and makes Australia’s position ‘inconsistent with its support of Ukraine and out of step with all its allies.’
3.8A number of witnesses identified compelling reasons for re-opening the embassy, including that doing so would send a powerful message of diplomatic support and confidence in the desired outcome of the war. It would also provide a practical channel for greater government-to-government dialogueand facilitate access to Ukraine by Australian businesses.
3.9Representatives from Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd, a company which develops and manufactures weapons and technologies used in warfare, highlighted how valuable a local diplomatic presence would be for the defence industry:
There's no doubt that there would be benefit if there was a presence in Ukraine. I've visited Ukraine three times since this conflict began and I've met with half-a-dozen embassies. The insight that they gain from being on the ground meeting the Ukrainians every day is invaluable for us. I have met with the Australian ambassador to Ukraine in Warsaw prior to one of the trips going in. We always debrief him, one way or another, on the way out as well. I've also had contact with the defence attaché who's based in Germany. I do think, though, that having a presence on the ground would be very, very beneficial, certainly for defence industry and companies like us. The feedback we get from the defence attaches and the ambassadors who are located in Ukraine is invaluable.
3.10The committee asked DFAT representatives at a public hearing whether work was underway to re-open the embassy. According to the department, the issue hinges in large part on the Secretary’s obligations towards staff under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. These obligations give the Secretary a personal responsibility for the safety of any employees deployed to the embassy:
It's the secretary's position—she said so publicly, I believe, in estimates—that we would prefer that the ambassador and his A-based staff could be in Kyiv. But there are some challenging thresholds to reach before she would be able to make that decision with full confidence that she was in compliance with relevant work health and safety legislation, which place very significant burdens and liabilities on her personally. Beyond that, as leader of the department she is deeply concerned about the safety of her staff. With regard to Kyiv the decision for our Australian staff to leave was made by the previous secretary in 2022. Following that, the status of the embassy in Kyiv has been more or less under constant review within the department across our security, IT and geographic areas. That's not an exclusive list. Many parts of the department have been monitoring this closely.
3.11DFAT representatives said that the risk posed by drone and missile strikes is a key consideration when considering the return of diplomatic staff to Kyiv:
There was a barrage of missiles and drones that hit Kyiv as recently as 8 July. You may have seen in the media that one of those hit a children's hospital, killing 20 people. It's incidents like these and the accompanying psychosocial impact on Australian staff who would be in Kyiv if that decision were taken which weigh heavily in our and ultimately the secretary's consideration of a return to Kyiv. If that threshold were met—if in the mind of the secretary, with the advice of the department, she decided that it was safe for those Australians to leave—there would be other steps to take in relation to the reinstallation of communications and other hardware.
3.12The committee explored whether a request had been made to the Ukrainian Government to move the Australian embassy into a building which meets the required safety thresholds. According to DFAT, however, the location of the chancellery building is not the only factor, with residential arrangements for diplomatic staff and safety in transit also being important considerations.
3.13Submitters acknowledged that operating a diplomatic post in a country currently at war carries risk:
While re-opening the embassy undeniably brings about some risk, the strategic imperatives for doing so outweigh the risk – particularly in comparison to the risk faced by Australian diplomats in capitals ranging from Baghdad to Port Moresby.
3.14The committee noted, however, that the risks involved may in fact be lower than those several other Australian diplomatic posts routinely operate under:
If Australian diplomats can remain in Port Moresby during riots, and in Tel Aviv during Hamas rocket attacks, why can’t they serve in Kyiv with its superb air, drone and missile defence system?
3.15DFAT argued that threat levels are difficult to compare when the range of risk mitigations available is never the same, however.
Ministerial and military delegations
3.16The committee noted that Australia has in fact not sent a military delegation to Ukraine since the start of the conflict. As put by Major General Mick Ryan:
I personally find it concerning that we haven't. It's very safe to travel there. I just buy a train ticket. That's all you do. The Ukrainians are very hospitable. They look after you. They are very willing to share lessons from this war because they know this isn't just about them. There's a bigger security environment out there. I think having a delegation to learn particularly the lessons of air, missile and drone defence and Indigenous production, of civil military strategy, of long-range strike and of combat in the modern era would be invaluable. Frankly, you can't get all your lessons by reading Jane's Defence Weekly.
3.17While the Prime Minister and Defence Minister have both visited Ukraine, the committee noted suggestions that other ministers should also visit to better appreciate the situation on the ground and the needs of the Ukrainian Government. Re-opening an embassy in Kyiv would help facilitate such visits.
3.18As put by the Director of Minderoo Foundation, Mr Jay Weatherill:
[A]n on-the-ground presence would enhance understanding of the current situation, build deeper relationships, and, crucially, demonstrate Australia's support to the people of Ukraine.
States aiding Russia
3.19It is widely recognised that the conflict in Ukraine is of seismic geostrategic importance and that allowing Russia to use military force against a sovereign nation ‘…signals to other expansionist powers – including those closer to Australia – that sufficient military force can resolve disputes.’
3.20Seen in this light it is no surprise that Russia is receiving support from a number of other states, notably including the People’s Republic of China (China), the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (North Korea) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). Major General Mick Ryan described the advantage this has given Russia:
The Russians, who mobilised their defence industry in September 2022, now have a significant production advantage over Ukraine and the West. Combined with munitions provided by Iran and North Korea, this Arsenal of Authoritarians has an advantage in areas such as drones and artillery. The Russian Army has leveraged its overmatch in firepower to gain the initiative on the battlefield.
3.21These four authoritarian nations—China, Iran, North Korea and Russia—are not joined together through a formal alliance. Instead:
They are joined by a common belief that the West is in decline and their time has come. When one of them is successful somewhere, all four of them take heart from that. So we can't afford for Russia, Iran, North Korea or even China to be successful in its predations against its neighbours. What happens in Central Europe against Ukraine, if Russia is successful, sends a message to countries such as China in our region, North Korea in our region and Russia in our region that they might be able to get away with similar things in our region.
3.22The committee noted that the Australian Government has declared its intention to ensure that those who support Russia’s war efforts face consequences for doing so, placing sanctions on a number of Iranian and North Korean entities.
3.23This is not enough to send an unambiguous message to nations supporting Russia. The gravely concerning issue of China’s support for Russia in particular remains conspicuously unaddressed, set as it is against a backdrop of growing military cooperation between the two nations:
We've already seen the Russians and Chinese for the first time ever impinge on the US ADIZ [Air Defense Identification Zone] over in Alaska in the last month. We've seen the Russia-China maritime exercise that occurred just before this year's RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise]. So we're already seeing that cooperation manifest in the Pacific.
3.24China poses the most notable threat in our region and is likely watching this conflict closely:
The Chinese are very good at learning from other people's wars. They started watching during the Falklands War. They learned a lot during the 1991 Gulf War. In fact, their entire reform program that they are currently undergoing is based on a lot of the lessons from 1991. They watched the 2003 invasion of Iraq. They watched the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. They've watched this war very closely. It has been a testbed for weapons. It has been a testbed for ideas. It has been a testbed for policies. I think the Chinese have taken many things from this war. In particular, they've seen that this kind of aggression actually works. They think the Russians have been successful, particularly in rattling the nuclear deterrent, to prevent any further Western escalation. I think they have learned lessons about what to do with foreign leaders of countries that you invade. The Chinese will take from that they can't afford to have a Zelenskyy in Taiwan. They've learned how brutally you can deal with the citizens of a country you invade without the international community doing anything.
3.25Dr Benjamin Herscovitch, Research Fellow at the School of Regulation and Global Governance at the Australian National University, explained the nature of cooperation between China and Russia in Ukraine:
Ever since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow diplomatically by amplifying Kremlin friendly messages and undermining Kyiv's negotiating position. China has also offered an economic lifeline to Russia in the form of a surge in bilateral trade. Worse still, China has backed Russia on the battlefront. China might not be sending lethal military assistance, but its technology exports are critical to Russia's ability to wage war against Ukraine and its people.
3.26He added that China continues to supply Russia with dual-use products identified as high-priority goods used in Russia’s weapons production, with more than US$300 million-worth supplied each month:
Many of the Russian missiles, drones and tanks that are killing civilians and destroying cities in Ukraine depend on Chinese technological components. Australia can and should do more to directly support Ukraine on a range of different fronts.
3.27The committee is aware that the Australian Government has openly reminded China of its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council:
I would point to the foreign minister's comments, made publicly more than once, that as a P5 member and as a major global power China does have a special responsibility to ensure that the norms and rules that have permitted our region and the world, in fact, to prosper in a stable environment—are vital to sustain.
3.28Several of Australia’s closest allies have started taking steps by imposing sanctions on Chinese entities exporting these dual-use products to Russia, including the US, UK, EU and Japan. Dr Herscovitch was of the view that Australia has a moral obligation to take similar steps despite the risks involved:
China could impose retaliatory measures if Australia sanctions Chinese entities aiding Russia's war effort, yet the moral gravity of Russia's crimes in Ukraine demand more from Australia.
Speaking last month at the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, Australia's Minister for the National Disability Insurance Scheme, Bill Shorten, called for a world where no country dominates and no country is dominated. I think we can all agree this is a noble goal, but Australia cannot hope to build that kind of world if it isn't willing to take concrete actions against China's support for Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine.
3.29Representatives from the United States Studies Centre observed, however, that the West has not done enough to either call countries out for their support of Russia’s military campaign or to deter Iran, China and North Korea from supporting Russia.
3.30The committee identified an incongruity between Australia’s strong support for Ukraine on one hand, and its reticence to bolster the diplomatic messaging about countries supporting Russia’s war effort directly working against the international rules-based order. Dr Herscovitch agreed, describing it as a ‘massive inconsistency’ which reflects how Australia appears to be trying to ‘thread a number of different needles’:
On the one hand, Canberra wants to stabilise the relationship with Beijing and improve ties with China, and it doesn't want to say or do things that would risk that process of ongoing bilateral stabilisation with China. But, at the same time, of course it's sincere in its support for Ukraine and does not want Russia to win in Ukraine.
3.31This, Dr Herscovitch explained, applies more broadly in the region, because Russian trade with Indo-Pacific countries which Australia wants to deepen its ties with, such as India and Vietnam, is ‘absolutely booming’. Ultimately, it means Australia is currently treading a narrow line in attempting to respond to Russia’s invasion without jeopardising relationships with regional partners and, notably, without endangering stabilisation in the Australia-China bilateral relationship.
3.32Professor Peter Dean, from the United States Studies Centre, discussed China’s motivation in supporting Russia. He looked at the geopolitical consequences of the conflict continuing for some time, framing these in the context of China’s leadership pursuing its own strategic interests. Professor Dean said that the earlier days of the war saw significant commentary in the United States about the war in one way offering ‘an ability to degrade Russian military capabilities in Europe by providing support to Ukraine.’ As the war has continued, however, China’s ongoing support for Russia is: ‘
…having a major impact upon the West's defence industrial base, which we have seen has really struggled in keeping up with the demands not just of Ukraine but also the ability of a number of states, including Australia, to increase our own defence preparedness and our own defence capabilities in what is a deteriorating global situation.
3.33In China’s assessment, Professor Dean posited, supporting Russia in the continuation of the war is having strategically desirable effects for China without resulting in increased diplomatic or political pressure on the Chinese Government. This, Professor Dean added, is ‘one of the reasons we need a much more coordinated response to the support that Rusia is receiving from the states you mentioned [Iran, North Korea and China].’
3.34Dr Herscovitch concurred, stating that he saw ‘scant chance of China convincing Russia to pull back from Ukraine’:
That's simply because, from China's point of view, there is a benefit in a strong, powerful Russia, the embarrassment to US leadership provided by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the move towards a different international system that is not so dominated by a small group of advanced liberal democracies. My assessment would be that the chance of China actually willingly pulling back its support for Russia is vanishingly small.
3.35This being the case, he outlined ways of exerting pressure on China to curb its assistance to Russia. One way to do so, Dr Herscovitch stated, would be the direct route of imposing sanctions on Chinese entities providing Rusia with assistance. This would send a clear signal to Beijing, but would not be the only way to exert pressure on China:
I think there's probably a broader diplomatic and regional component to it as well. Part of it would be more fulsomely, publicly and forcefully objecting to China's support for Russia militarily, economically and technologically and doing so in public as well.
3.36The committee also explored the potential impact of the West failing to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia. Professor Peter Dean stated that, in his view, it would send countries such as Iran, China and North Korea a powerful message regarding their own expansionist aims:
[I]f Russia is successful, the message will clearly be that might equals right, that military force and military power can be used to change the international order and that those states are able to achieve their strategic outcomes through the use of coercion and force without undue impact upon their stance and situation in the world.
Tracking Russian oil
3.37The flow of petroleum-based products made from Russian-derived petroleum into Australia is of specific concern. As put by one submitter, Australia has in fact added $3 billion in taxes to the Russian treasury since the start of the war in Ukraine:
This has occurred through Australian purchases of fuels and products refined from Russian oil in third countries. It is legal to do this, and a loophole we have allowed. This tax figure is more than triple our Ukraine aid, and is derived from fuels of a value of AUD $14.95 Billion refined from Russian oil in countries such as China, India, South Korea, Turkeye etc. This $3 Billion tax figure is an underestimate.
3.38Australia prohibited the direct import of Russian oil not long after the invasion of Ukraine, in lockstep with its international partners. This has not prevented Russian oil from making its way into Australia:
[A]n opinion piece I wrote for the Canberra Times in September last year highlighted several routes by which Russian oil is making its way to the fuel tanks of unwitting Australian motorists, including routes that involve laundering by third-party refiners in countries such as China and India. The flow of Russian derived petroleum products to Australia has since continued unabated.
3.39The committee noted research undertaken by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, which has published damning reports on how Russia is circumventing global efforts to stymie its earnings from oil exports. China and India, in particular, take over 40 per cent of Russian crude oil, which is then refined and makes its way to Australia.
3.40The effect of this is that Russia’s oil and gas revenue continues to soar despite the war. India’s Reliance Industries refinery in Jamnagar is a prime example of how Russian oil is slipping through Australia’s sanctions structure:
It forms arguably the largest refining complex in the world, in a country that is now the largest importer of seaborne Russian oil. The Jamnagar refinery is reported to include 26 per cent of Russian crude in their feed. This is likely to grow further beyond, given recent reports of a deal of three million barrels per month with Russian supplier Rosneft. Reliance have exported 1.3 million tonnes of petroleum products to Australia in just the first six months of 2024, suggesting that Australia has indirectly provided a market for almost 0.3 million tonnes of Russian oil, mostly as diesel, from just one Indian refinery. A tanker from Jamnagar is actually docked in Melbourne while this hearing is in session. This tanker carries 62,000 tonnes of 91-octane petrol—including 16,000 tonnes derived from Russian crude—to be sold to Victorian motorists, who are totally unaware of the shady provenance.
3.41The committee discussed this with DFAT. Noting that Russia has been able to put $13.6 billion towards its war efforts on the back of oil exports, the committee sought clarity on whether Australia was reconsidering its approach to sanctions. DFAT responded by indicating that of 2182 autonomous sanctions currently in place, more than half relate to the Russia-Ukraine war.
3.42Asked specifically about oil, Ms Julie Heckscher, First Assistant Secretary in the Regulatory and Legal Division of DFAT, stated that Australia’s ban on the importation of Russian oil is consistent with similar bans put in place by other countries. The ban was also not intended to address products made with substantially transformed oil, she added:
There was also something called an oil price cap, which is not quite the way it sounds. It's quite a complex kind of mechanism. Australia participated in all of that. Our ban on imports of oil was very similar to that imposed by other partners around the world. It was not intended to hit substantially transformed oil and gas, which I think is getting to the point that you wanted. We've got the ban. We've got the oil price cap. It was intended to hit Russian oil and gas, not to necessarily stop global supply of energy, because that would be a major impact on countries beyond Russia. What it means is that oil that's been substantially transformed is not picked up in what is banned by sanctions, and that's consistent with every country that's imposed that kind of ban.
3.43In an answer to a question the committee put on notice to DFAT, the department did not specifically address the issue of refined Russian oil but stated that Australian’s sanctions framework is ‘under regular review’.
3.44The committee notes that the Centre for Research of Energy and Clean Air has a team of data analysts who track shipping movements through existing commercially available services such as Kpler, Eurostat, Comtrade and Equisis. Their work has shown that tracking Russian crude oil entering refineries in other countries is possible.
Assisting with Ukraine’s energy needs
3.45Ukraine has an urgent and pronounced need for energy assistance. Researchers from the United States Studies Centre stated that Australia is well-positioned to help Ukraine meet its needs.
3.46Early on in the conflict, Australia sent Ukraine a 79 000-tonne shipment of thermal coal, at an estimated cost of $33.5 million. Dr Michael J. Green, Professor Peter Dean and Jared Mondschein estimated that 80 000 tonnes of thermal coal are only enough to fire a medium-sized generator for about three to five days.
3.47The Ukrainian Government requested more coal in December 2023, pointing to its escalating need as the northern autumn approaches and continued airstrikes undermine Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Despite this growing need and Ukraine’s request, the Australian Government has indicated that further shipments are not under consideration.
3.48The committee noted that an 80 000-tonne shipment of thermal coal would represent a fraction of the 203 million tonnes Australia is forecast to export in 2024-25:
A shipment of 80,000 tonnes of thermal coal could be delivered on a single Panamax vessel. Additionally, falls in thermal coal prices indicate that the nominal cost of such a shipment would be approximately A$15 million — half the cost of an equivalent shipment in 2022 when coal prices spiked due to Russia’s invasion.
3.49Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants and infrastructure means that energy shortages continue to be a critical area of concern for Ukrainian government and civilians. It is likely that Ukraine’s energy requirements will continue to evolve as the war continues.
Demining
3.50Environmental damage in Ukraine as a result of the war exceeds $56.4 billion and chemical contamination of the soil, water and air is widespread. In addition to this, almost a third of the country is ‘contaminated with landmines unexploded ordnance, heavy metals, radionuclides, petroleum hydrocarbons, PFAS, and other carcinogenic chemicals.’
3.51Demining operations face significant challenges in Ukraine. With nearly 25 per cent of the country contaminated with unexploded ordnance and landmines, the scale of operations required is enormous. The committee received evidence from International Action Alliance (IAA), a not-for-profit company which has signed a memorandum of partnership with the Ukrainian Association of Humanitarian Demining and Recovery (UAHDR) and is in the process of signing a similar memorandum with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence.
3.52These initiatives require funding from the international community, as well as assistance with capacity building and raising public awareness.
3.53IAA urged the Australian Government to help with these initiatives, noting that Australia has almost unrivalled capability in the field:
Australia is a world leader in the landmine clearance equipment manufacturing industry, and one of the foremost companies in this field is Minelab. Their metal detectors are recognised for their multi-frequency operation and fine-tuning capabilities, making them suitable for different search conditions.
3.54IAA explained that the benefits of assisting Ukraine with this endeavour, which is of enormous humanitarian importance, are multifold:
By providing assistance to Ukraine with demining, the Australian Government would not only contribute to a vital humanitarian cause but also enhance its standing on the world stage. Supporting demining efforts will demonstrate Australia's commitment to global security and humanitarian aid, while showcasing its leadership in landmine clearance technology. This initiative would strengthen diplomatic relations and open avenues for future collaborations, solidifying Australia's reputation as a global leader in this critical industry.
Indirect and no-cost aid
3.55The committee noted that Australia could consider aid to Ukraine which is at no net cost to Australian taxpayers.
3.56Dr Graham Marning canvassed several options, including sending a portion of Australia’s commodities profits to Ukraine:
The Russian-Ukraine War has resulted in a massive commodities prices boon for sectors of the Australian economy and consequently, company taxes for Treasury. We should aid Ukraine at 5% of these taxes boon and establish a regular funding model to enable Ukraine to resource plan.
3.57Dr Graham also suggested transferring existing Russian assets in Australia’s jurisdiction to Ukraine:
We should legislate and transfer these funds to Ukraine for the current reconstruction and repair of their power grid, health facilities and transport systems. Are we really concerned if Russia doesn’t want to invest in Australia in the future?
3.58Mr Jon Richardson, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University Centre for European Studies, said that an estimated $9 billion in Russian assets are reportedly frozen in Australia and advocated seizing these for Ukraine’s benefit:
An estimated $A9 billion in frozen Russian assets are reportedly held in Australia. It would be consistent with the principles of international law, particularly the obligations of aggressor states to make reparations, to ensure that such assets can be used to help Ukraine. Countermeasures of this kind are codified in the UN International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States.
3.59Business NSW, a peak business organisation involved in many aspects of the international trade and diplomacy field, agreed and emphasised that these funds should go towards areas of the most immediate need:
Australia should be amongst the first to hold Russia to account by redistributing Russian financial assets held under sanction to the most immediate humanitarian, economic and military areas, as advised by the Ukraine government. This would enable Australia, at no direct cost to itself, to show global leadership and encourage our businesses and investment leaders to engage positively with the opportunities in Ukraine.
3.60Priority areas of need are presently being collated through the Register of Damage for Ukraine established by the Council of Europe and announced at the 4th Council of Europe Summit of Heads of State and Government in Reykjavik on 16-17 May 2023. The Register is a first step towards a future international compensation mechanism for Ukraine and membership is open to Council of Europe member and non-member states.
3.61Ukrainian diaspora organisations posited that transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine would not compromise any important trade relationships:
There are no great trade relationships at risk. Australia is exactly the right country to take a global leadership role in this area…The Australian Government should put in place the legislative framework allowing Russian assets in Australia to be used to support Ukraine. Australia is the ideal stalking horse to demonstrate the efficacy of such a strategy globally.
3.62Bolstering trade as a means of assisting Ukraine was also suggested. Business NSW submitted that Australia could seize an opportunity to be the first country in the world to negotiate a ‘Special Emergency Trade Agreement’ with Ukraine. Such an agreement could lower or entirely waive otherwise applicable levies, duties and taxes for the duration of the conflict, which would encourage trade with Ukraine:
It could also hold a legal arbitration framework to rapidly facilitate the Australian trade and investment that is so badly needed, and we should provide support in the energy generation space as an immediate priority.
3.63This could benefit Australia as well. The committee explored the flow-on effects to the Australian community of funding energy-related assistance to Ukraine specifically, for example through the provision of generators. Procuring generators from Australian industry, as an example, would not only build the relationship with Ukraine and highlight Australia’s capabilities, but also help the local community in challenging economic times through contracts for local companies.
3.64The government taking steps to facilitate greater trade would therefore have positive consequences beyond the very worthwhile aspiration of helping Ukraine, Business NSW concluded:
Supporting basic commerce, having people on the ground and keeping supply chains going will have real consequences. The sooner we can bring this conflict to an end, the sooner Australian businesses and households will indirectly benefit, along with other great trading nations under the rules based order. Conversely, the opposite is true. We have every reason to support Ukraine at the moment, and not just for ethical or principle reasons.
3.65Stakeholders such as Business NSW and Minderoo Foundation expressed broad support for such an initiative, but at the same time recognised the need for this to be one of a number of considerations the government could assess.
3.66The need to increase humanitarian assistance during the conflict and re-focus support for Ukraine on its eventual reconstruction featured prominently in evidence received. Key points are set out in Chapter 4.
Foreign interference and disinformation
3.67Multiple submitters and witnesses discussed the issue of Russian propaganda, its effect on public opinion concerning the need to even support Ukraine in this war and how the risks this poses can be mitigated.
3.68Assessing the form Russia’s propaganda takes is not straightforward, but the internet is a well-known channel for influencing public opinion. The Ukrainian Council of NSW Inc submitted:
Russia controls a large percentage of the global information space and invests a lot of money in media and social networks around the globe to legitimise false narratives, circumvent sanctions and even influence the outcomes of elections. We all know this, ASIO knows this.
3.69Mr Adam Miljenovic described Russia’s propaganda techniques as ‘firehose of falsehood’ or ‘firehose of disinformation’, techniques which are designed to erode the public’s trust in authorities:
This technique requires the creation of a multitude of conflicting narratives that make it difficult for media consumers to filter out the noise, and begin to select narratives that begin to align with their biases, rather than those founded in objective reality.
3.70It can be postulated that the disinformation circulating online originates from and is amplified by Russian authorities, Mr Miljenovic added. These methods of deliberately sowing doubt and eroding social cohesion are part of what is known as ‘hybrid warfare’.
3.71Professor Peter Dean, Director of Foreign Policy and Defence at the United States Studies Centre, also described propaganda efforts as an attempt to undermine community support for aid to Ukraine with false narratives about the causes of the war:
There seems to be a concerted effort by Russia, supported by China and other such states, to undermine locally based support. So that is the mis- and disinformation that this is all the responsibility of the West, that NATO caused this and it was all the responsibility of NATO expansionism, which is utter rubbish. But this is a narrative that's being pushed more and more. You can see this tracking in particular peace networks and peace groups that they're trying to influence and also in individuals in the Australian community and in other states and communities in the West, where it starts to erode that position on the legitimacy of Ukraine and the responsibility for Russia starting the war, which is an overall attempt to undermine what we're basically discussing here—the levels of aid and support from individual states to Ukraine.
3.72Mr Andrew Mencinsky, an Australian of Ukrainian heritage, was of the view that the Australian media add to the problem by unintentionally amplifying propaganda in an attempt to portray a balance of views:
Our major media coverage has a large role to play here. I am a subscriber to the Sydney Morning Herald, and I find it an endless source of frustration—and I've written to the Herald about this on numerous occasions—that the comments section, even though it is moderated, constantly publishes Russian misinformation. It will say, 'This is NATO's war', 'Zelenskyy is a traitor', 'Zelenskyy is corrupt'. There is no basis in fact for any of these comments; they are blatant, outright lies, and they are published, I'm guessing, in some sense of journalistic balance and readers' viewpoints.
3.73Mr Mencinsky also pointed to the role of the Australian Government in countering disinformation, calling for a stronger and more consistent narrative on the importance of defending Ukraine:
I think the Australian government also has a very strong role to play. We mentioned having a strong narrative. I think the government can assist by being much stronger in articulating why Ukraine has to be supported, to explain why it's so important that we defend democracy and the rules-based order…We would request the Australian government be extremely strong by just stating again and again why Ukraine has to be supported. All government departments should ideally keep talking about Ukraine, how they're supporting it and the benefits of doing so. I think having that strong narrative from the government would do a large amount of good in countering Russian disinformation.
3.74Ms Kateryna Argyrou, Co-Chair of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations, said that the Russian propaganda machine is in ‘overdrive’ and described the Ukrainian diaspora’s attempts to counter its effects:
As a community, we have engaged with government to identify different things that were misinformation or completely false information, such as on Telegram channels that are either supported or curated by the Russian embassy, the Russian consulate or supporters of the Russian Federation. We have highlighted items in previous Senate inquiries here—one of them was the inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media—and we continue to work with the authorities, whether it's local police, federal police or other agencies, to highlight any time we see disinformation being spread widely in Australia.
3.75Ms Argyrou also raised the role of the Australian media, citing the example of a documentary that was broadcast on Australian television, ‘Ukraine’s War: The Other Side’, in which a journalist reported from the Russian side of the military front having been facilitated in this placement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The documentary was mentioned by others, such as Dr James Hester, who said that ‘Russian disinformation is able to penetrate Australian broadcast media by relying on appearance of balance.’
3.76Dr Hester pointed to an official statement made by the ABC Ombudsman in response to complaints:
Hundreds of complaints to the ABC resulted in an official statement from the ABC ombudsman on March 25th, exonerating the ABC. The ombudsman’s defence was that, taken together with other broadcasts about Ukraine, there was sufficient balance to meet the ABC’s editorial standards, that nowhere were any opinions advanced that could be interpreted as belonging to the ABC, and that the journalist balanced pro-Russian statements with pro-Ukrainian ones. The program remains available on ABC iView.
3.77This, Dr Hester submitted, misses the point about the ‘propagandistic’ aspect of the broadcast.
3.78Asked by committee members whether Australia could do more to respond to well-founded concerns regarding propaganda, Ms Argyrou expressed surprise at the fact that the Australian Government had not responded to calls in relation to practical steps which could be taken, such as expelling Russia’s ambassador among other measures:
I am surprised that the Australian government hasn't addressed the fact that the mouthpiece of a war criminal is currently being represented on Australian territory, considering that Mr Albanese was calling for the expulsion of the Russian ambassador when he was in opposition during the Morrison government. I'm surprised that the Australian government has not responded to our call to declare Russia a terrorist state, which is what it is.
3.79Mr Miljenovic reported a similar experience:
In the experience of Ukrainian community members, and others who monitor them, reporting of Russian propaganda channels in Australia largely seems to fall on deaf ears.
3.80Current government information campaigns on proposed disinformation laws, submitters stated, also fail to adequately address the issue as it relates to foreign interference. The Ukrainian diaspora community, Mr Miljenovic stated, is of the view that individuals do not have to have links with foreign authorities to engage in foreign interference:
Even if the individual is not a paid or directly authorised agent of the Russian government, if their work or activities promote or further Russia's soft power aims, policies, narratives, propaganda or cultural chauvinism, or otherwise seek to create influence networks that can be leveraged to promote the former, then this is foreign interference.
3.81The committee explored the issue with the Department of Home Affairs, whose representatives referenced the work of the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce chair by the department:
We're aware of major misinformation campaigns globally targeting particular news outlets and a range of different misinformation campaigns domestically in Australia as well. From a Home Affairs perspective we provide advice to government from a policy perspective and coordinate across our national intelligence agencies in support of those activities and to counter those activities, including referrals to the ASIO taskforce in particular.
3.82It is clear that Russia is not being held to account for its dissemination of propaganda, and the committee is of the view that the Australian Government must take concrete steps to curtail the effects of disinformation on public debate on the conflict.
Committee view
3.83The committee strongly concurs that Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts are deliberate actions designed to influence public debate on the war in the Australian community. The committee is of the view that more can be done to counter Russian propaganda with improved resourcing of relevant agencies and consistent messaging from the Australian Government.
3.84The committee is persuaded of the urgent need to re-establish Australia’s diplomatic presence in Ukraine. Doing so would offer innumerable benefits in deepening the bilateral relationship between the two nations. The committee recognises that a range of Defence personnel visits to Ukraine have taken place, including by the Defence attaché based at Australia’s embassy in Berlin. These visits have been used to absorb lessons from this conflict which can then feed into Australia’s own military capability development. In the committee’s view, the success of such visits only further underscores the need to re-establish a permanent diplomatic presence in Ukraine. Reactivating the embassy would strengthen existing points of bilateral liaison, improve deployment of Australia’s support and send a strong signal to all parties to the conflict.
3.85The committee considers that Australia’s response to the war in Ukraine recognises the risk Russia’s invasion poses to the international rules-based order. As nations increasingly declare their allegiances while the principles of democracy, sovereignty and territorial integrity come under sustained attack from authoritarian regimes, Australia must keep pace with its global partners in applying pressure to countries which choose to aid Russia’s war efforts.
3.86The committee notes that economic pressure is a key lever. To this end, the committee notes the considerable amount of money which is currently frozen in Russian-owned assets within Australia’s jurisdiction and is persuaded by calls for these assets to be directed towards assisting Ukraine. For this to be accomplished it is necessary to identify the assets in question and have the political will required to seize them.
3.87The committee considers the continued importation of products made with refined Russian oil to be untenable if Australia wishes to increase pressure on Russia. While issues such as maintaining supply in Australia and limiting the adverse effect of import disruptions on trading partners need to be weighed carefully, the committee nonetheless encourages the Australian Government to work towards closing loopholes which allow vast amounts of revenue to continue to flow to Russia.
3.88The committee is strongly of the view that the Australian Government should respond with urgency to any future requests from Ukraine to support their energy needs. Doing so would help Ukraine address a significant civil infrastructure need, which the Ukrainian Government has in the past directly appealed for from Australia.
3.89The committee is cognisant of the fact that the situation in Ukraine has become increasingly complex as this inquiry draws to a close, with a significant number of military and diplomatic developments occurring at the time of writing. Perhaps most significantly on the diplomatic front, the committee believes that the Australian Government should lend its weight to calls in the international arena for the lifting of restrictions on the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike military targets within Russia.
3.90The committee recommends the Australian Government re-open the Australian Embassy in Ukraine, and ensure Australia is represented at the highest levels at future global meetings that discuss Ukraine’s defence, peace, and reconstruction.
3.91The committee recommends that the Australian Government support the lifting of restrictions on the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia as part of the defence of Ukraine from the Russian invasion.
3.92The committee recommends that any future requests from the Ukrainian Government for Australian coal shipments be responded to with high priority, acknowledging the serious threat to the Ukrainian population of energy shortages and Australia’s ability to assist with this challenge.
3.93The committee recommends that the Australian Government become a Participant or Associate Member of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine (Register of Damage for Ukraine) as a matter of priority.
3.94The committee recommends that the Australian Government identify as a matter of priority all Russian assets in Australia that are subject to sanctions, and assess what legislative changes are required to enable the transfer of these assets or associated income to Ukraine.
3.95The committee recommends that the Australian Government improve tracking of petroleum-based products made with refined Russian oil, and apply autonomous sanctions as required in order to prevent the sale of Russian oil and petroleum products in Australia.
3.96The committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure relevant agencies are appropriately resourced to identify and address foreign interference and disinformation activities in Australia, including from Russian actors, and to respond to community and diaspora concerns regarding these activities.
3.97The committee recommends the Australian Government publicly attribute the role that the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) are playing in supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine, and ensure Australia’s foreign policy settings reflect the reality of the cooperation of these four authoritarian states in sustaining the war and risking further conflicts in other parts of the world.
3.98The committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure that Australia keeps pace with international partners in sanctioning entities and individuals providing support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including provision of weapons and componentry used to manufacture weapons.