Chapter 2The need for Australian support
2.1Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 precipitated a security, economic and humanitarian crisis which has left millions of people internally displaced and, more than two years on, continues to threaten global peace and stability.
2.2The invasion of a sovereign nation is a gross violation of international law and undermines the norms upon which security and prosperity are built. It is a direct contravention of articles 2.3 and 2.4 of the United Nations (UN) Charter:
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
2.3Mr Jon Richardson, a former Australian diplomat posted in Eastern Europe and current Visiting Fellow at the ANU Centre for European studies, submitted that turning a blind eye to an attack on the territorial integrity of a sovereign nation is virtually unprecedented since 1945:
There is no case since World War Two where the international community has broadly recognised the conquest or annexation of independent territory.The international community has rejected - sooner or later - such land grabs in Kuwait. India did annex Goa and other Portuguese enclaves in 1962, but under the subsequent UN framework of self-determination for non-self-governing territories, annexations of former colonies like Western Sahara and East Timor by their neighbours were rebuffed, sooner or later.
2.4Mr Chris Gardiner, Chief Executive Officer of the Institute for Regional Security, identified the Russian invasion of Ukraine as one of three conflicts which currently threaten the global rules-based order and peace:
[T]he Russian war against Ukraine; the Iranian military activities against Israel and its allies in the Middle East in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen and its movement towards nuclear weapons capability; and China’s territorial claims, assertion of which have thus far been limited to ‘grey zone’ warfare, in East Asia.
2.5This conflict has become so significant that its trajectory affects not only Ukraine and its neighbours, but also stability and security in the entire world, including the Indo-Pacific region. A perception of weakness on the part of Western democracies towards Russian aggression, analysts warn, will serve to embolden other authoritarian nations:
Russian success against Ukraine will not only beget more Russian aggression against other European nations (and more global economic instability) but also emboldens and informs those in our region who aspire to supress or extinguish their democratic neighbours. China is very open about this with Taiwan, as is North Korea with its southern neighbour. While protecting Ukraine now may not guarantee that Russia, China, Iran and North Korea eschew their offensive doctrines, not defending Ukraine will almost certainly see this authoritarian ‘Quad’ continue to push the bounds of global security norms.
2.6These facts prove that a fundamental principle underpins the strong moral argument for Australia and its partners in the international community to stand up to aggression: that revisionist powers must not be sent the message that might equals right.
A distant war?
2.7The committee is aware of arguments against Australian involvement. Assessing Australia’s response first requires, as put by academics from the United States Studies Centre:
…an analysis of whether support is merited and if so, the appropriate degree of support. As a middle power some 15,000km away, some argue that Australia has little to no interest in this war. The first European land war since World War II, some argue, is just that: a European war that should be left to Europeans to fight – particularly given the scope of the more immediate and proximate challenge that China poses to Australia’s interests.
2.8However, the geographic remoteness from Australia of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may not be the protective factor it may seem to be at first glance. A submission from the Embassy of Ukraine in Australia pointed out that Russia’s size means its eastern coastline is close to Australia’s major trading partners, potentially directly endangering Australia’s economic interests:
The fact is, Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine is a regional Indo-Pacific security priority for Australia. Russia’s Pacific Ocean coastline, including its Pacific Ocean naval base, is very much closer to Australia’s top three trading partners (China, Japan, and South Korea) than Australia is. This suggests a naval and air power risk to Australia’s maritime trade and two of its vital trading partners.
2.9An overwhelming majority of submitters who engaged with this inquiry supported Ukraine’s position and recognised the moral imperative to act in defence of a sovereign, democratic European nation under sustained attack. All but a handful of submitters agreed that Ukraine’s geographical distance from Australia does not mean it is a conflict without consequence closer to home. For example, Mr Adam Miljenovic, a former RAAF officer nominated by the Ukrainian Community of Queensland (UCQ) to liaise with Australian Government representatives, stated:
Defence of Australia, the Asia Pacific region and Australia's interests Preventing Russia's success in Ukraine would likely be a significant deterrent to China's expansionist aims, and hence would prove a sound investment to regional stability and Australia's defence. Australia is a regional power with a small defence force and moderate defence expenditure. In the context of the sending of aid to Ukraine, there must be consideration given to Australia's ability to defend itself, project force throughout the Asia Pacific region, support neighbouring countries and support operations of our partners to counter the soft and hard power efforts of our adversaries.
2.10This was echoed by Dr Jared Mondschein from the United States Studies Centre, who noted that brazen attempts to undermine sovereignty might unfold closer to Australia’s doorstep in future:
Then, Australia's Indo-Pacific challenges will also need European support, and Australia's support for Ukraine in Europe's greatest hour of need will not be forgotten by European allies.
2.11Assisting Ukraine is also a political investment and important for future generations in Australia and abroad, a submission from Svoboda Alliance stated:
Depending on our political will right now, we can either let large countries devour smaller countries or defend our national interest and the future of ourselves and our kids.
We believe that helping Ukraine to protect herself, as well as to help Belarusian and Russian people to overthrow tyrants and usurpers, is essential to protect our own national interest. We say it not only as just a community organisation uniting and representing people, but as an organisation uniting and representing people of Russian and Belarusian background in Australia. We know for a fact what Putin’s Russia is and why exactly it must be defeated.
2.12Many members of the Australian community wrote to the committee to raise similar matters of principle. A considerable number of ordinary Australians were of the view that Australia should support Ukraine simply because it is the right thing to do:
My grandfather was a Major General in the Australian Army, so I was raised to believe implicitly that we need to stand up for what is right and against those that are wrong, but perhaps most importantly – to stand with others to fight for justice.
2.13Some warned of lessons learned in earlier conflicts:
In February 2022, when Russia launched its unprovoked attack on Ukraine, my friends of Lithuanian heritage and I immediately stood in solidarity with our Ukrainian brothers and sisters. That I was born in Australia is a direct result of my Mother’s family fleeing Lithuania during World War II for fear of Soviet-Russian occupation of Lithuania and a repeat of historical oppression under Soviet-Russian occupation. I and my fellow Australians of Lithuanian heritage fervently condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Baltic states have warned of potential Russian aggression for decades. My relatives and friends in Lithuania know how real the threat their neighbour, Russia, poses. Russia will not stop at Ukraine. Today, I see history is repeating itself as I watch the horrors Russia is today inflicting on Ukraine.
2.14Others were concerned about the future implications of inaction:
I am deeply concerned that unless we help Ukraine to defeat Russia (not just to “hold the line” or not to lose the war), the threat posed by hostile totalitarian regimes in our region will increase. If Russia is allowed to succeed in Ukraine through a lack of support from allied countries – including Australia - we are at great risk that hostile regimes in our region will be emboldened to take their own military action. When this happens, it will be Australian fatalities not just Ukrainians.
2.15A small number of submissions presented a different view. The Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN), a national body comprised of around 50 organisations, for example submitted that there needs to be ‘far more discussion and debate around the decision by Australia to be involved’, particularly militarily. IPAN was of the view that Australia should focus on humanitarian aid and conflict resolution rather than military support.
2.16A submission from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggested that the government recognises what is at stake. The intentions behind Australia’s national response reflect the nation’s commitment to a rules-based world order and awareness that a resolution in Ukraine’s favour is of global importance:
It is in Australia’s national interests to work with our international partners to support Ukraine to end this war on its own terms and to impose costs on Russia for its illegal actions. Our national response reflects our commitment to the rules-based world order, and reiterates that there are severe consequences for those who seek to break these rules, including in the Indo-Pacific. Helping ensure Russia’s military aggression comprehensively fails is important to deterring future challenges to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2.17The committee noted that the Australian Government’s position reflects the views of the broader community, which, polling by the United States Studies Centre suggests, strongly supports Australian assistance to Ukraine:
[I]n our own polling data we found that Australian people see Ukraine's survival to be in Australia's national interest, and, unsurprisingly, two-thirds of Australians think that you should continue to send arms and diplomacy. But, perhaps more notably, we found that 11 per cent of Australians said that it would not be damaging to their country if Russia defeated Ukraine. I think we see both popular and political support for Ukraine; that needs to continue.
2.18Evidence provided to the committee suggests that the scale and coordination of Australia’s response, although well-intentioned, could nonetheless be improved. As put by Dr Oleksandra Molloy, a Ukrainian-Australian academic appearing before the committee in a private capacity, the position articulated by the Australian Government is encouraging and can be built on:
The question remains whether Australia can do more, and the answer is, unequivocally, yes. While Australia has provided substantial assistance to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, there is a compelling need to increase this aid and make it more consistent and systematic. On 27 April, in the joint press conference in Lviv, the Deputy Prime Minister of Australia stated that Australia 'will be contributing more in the future' and will 'stand side by side with Ukraine for as long as it takes'. This statement is promising and highlights Australia's commitment to further support for Ukraine.
The size and scope of Australian support
2.19The committee noted the Ukrainian Government’s acknowledgement of assistance provided to date. This was expressed in a submission provided by Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia, which expressed his government’s appreciation for Australia’s bi-partisan support for his embattled nation:
The first and most important task before me is to register the sincere thanks of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the people of Ukraine, and most especially the frontline troops of Ukraine to the Australian Government and the people of Australia for the support provided to Ukraine thus far. Grateful thanks are also registered for the Government’s sincere statements of steadfast support for Ukraine, for as long as it takes Ukraine to resolve the war on Ukraine’s terms.
2.20Ukrainian diaspora organisations in Australia similarly welcomed all assistance Australia could provide. For example, the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations (AFUO)—the peak body for 22 Ukrainian community organisations across Australia—highlighted the bipartisan nature of Australia’s response with appreciation:
Ukrainians in Australia and Ukraine are grateful to the Morrison and Albanese governments, and will never forget how Australia has stepped up in Ukraine’s darkest hour.
2.21AFUO however pointed to the ‘enormous breadth of Ukraine’s needs…[which] make coordination consistency and strategy absolutely essential.’ As such, AFUO strongly advocated for Australia’s support to not only continue, but improve in scale, calling on the government to establish a dedicated office tasked with evaluating and prioritising Ukraine’s needs:
To enhance Australia’s support for Ukraine, a whole-of-government approach is necessary. This entails establishing a Ukraine Support Coordination Office within the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet. Such an office would ensure that Australia’s support is strategic, timely, coordinated, and comprehensive.
2.22This acknowledgement of the political will and intentions behind Australia’s response to the Russian invasion was broadly shared by many submitters. Most similarly called for the scale and ambition of Australia’s response to be increased to better reflect Australia’s position as the 12th largest economy in the world.
2.23In Mr Jon Richardson’s assessment, for example, Australian support had started out strongly but had lost momentum and was now lagging behind other nations:
Australia initially made strong contributions to helping Ukraine, but that effort has tapered off to the point where it is one of the weakest contributors among OECD countries.In April, the authoritative Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker showed that only South Korea, New Zealand and Turkey among OECD members had made smaller contributions as a percentage of GDP in total military, financial and humanitarian aid.
2.24As at May 2024, Australia was contributing 0.04 per cent of its GDP towards supporting Ukraine, a figure which, the committee heard, does not compare favourably to other nations’ contributions:
Australia’s 0.04 percent of GDP was less than a third of Japan’s 0.13 percent, and Japan was languished at 33rd out of 38 OECD countries, just two places higher than Australia. The lower ranked European states are spending five to seven times as much as Australia in percentage GDP term (including their share of EU contributions) while Canada is doing eight times more, as is the UK. The top-ranked countries - mostly Baltic and Scandinavian - are contributing thirty to fifty times more in relative terms.Australia’s most recent contribution of $100 million hasn’t changed our relative position - our percentage is now 0.045 percent of 2021 GDP.
2.25Mr Richardson held that, while Australia’s financial contribution should not be expected to match those of NATO or EU members, we should at least not lag non-European nations like Japan.
2.26The submission provided by DFAT sought to highlight that Australia’s international partners—including Ukraine—frequently commend Australia for its support. However, as put by Major General Mick Ryan (Retd.), diplomatic statements commending Australia’s response may not be representative of broader perceptions:
Firstly, many Ukrainians are amazed that a country on the other side of the world has taken an interest in them. They are terribly appreciative of that. Secondly, those who've received our military assistance are very grateful for it. They love the Bushmasters, and they should. But many others I talk to in Kyiv at the middle and senior levels, both military and non-military folks, are kind of confused by our approach. It's like we're hot and then we're cold for a long time. We give a little bit and then we don't, and we don't listen to them. I think we confuse them. I think our government's approach confuses the Ukrainians about whether we are interested or not. So I don't get those warm fuzzies when I talk to people and have honest conversations, although I'm sure those diplomatic conversations are very lovely to have.
2.27The committee notes that the bulk of Australia’s financial outlay in supporting Ukraine has gone towards military assistance, which may go some way towards explaining discrepancies in the perception of Australia’s support. Some witnesses and submitters were of the view that the focus on military assistance might come at the expense of other forms of aid:
At the moment, we're seeing this being a largely military assistance kind of support to Ukraine. That indicates to me that other government departments have kind of gone, 'Defence, over to you. This is a military thing.' It is not. Wars are not military things; they are national things. I think we're seeing the lack of coordination manifest in a lack of creativity in the kind of assistance packages we're seeing. We're not seeing assistance packages, for example, with sufficient aid for demining or the reconstruction fund that has been established for Ukraine. We've seen just in the last month a great South Australian group raising money to rebuild a school in Ukraine. Why isn't the Australian government helping with those kind of things? I think what we're seeing is the lack of coordination manifest as a lack of creativity in the breadth of the kind of support there is we can help Ukraine with. It doesn't just have to be all military.
Coordination of Australian support
2.28Australian assistance to Ukraine is coordinated between government departments and private entities. Stakeholders suggested that this approach could be streamlined. As put by Business NSW:
There is scarce perception of a coordinated Australian approach to support for Ukraine. Other organisations and groups, such as Business NSW, have sought to fill some of the vacuum of a missing coordination mechanism which could bring non-governmental support, equipment, skills and investment to Ukraine through a clear and well signposted central point of contact.
2.29Submissions received from government agencies suggest that coordination of Australia’s response might be hampered by an inconsistent understanding of the objectives guiding support for Ukraine. Defence, DFAT and PM&C each described the objective behind Australia’s actions slightly differently:
Defence’s submission described the objective as ‘two-fold: to support Ukraine and to impose costs on Russia for its aggression’.
According to PM&C, Australia is pursuing ‘two key objectives: helping Ukraine to end the war on its own terms and hold Russia accountable for its actions’.
DFAT stated that ‘It is in Australia’s national interests to work with our international partners to support Ukraine to end this war on its own terms and to impose costs on Russia for its illegal actions’.
2.30AFUO representatives added that, although Ukrainians are immensely grateful for the support Australia has extended, the aid provided has been disjointed:
But the aid that's been provided so far has been piecemeal; it hasn't been highly coordinated, it has been in response to community pressure, it's been in response to ministerial visits and it's been in response to announcements that had to be made at a certain point in time.
2.31The Association of Ukrainians in Victoria (AUV) cited the example of an Australian citizen and volunteer firefighter who approached AUV with respiratory protection masks he had developed which could support Ukrainian troops and firefighters. He had noticed in the media that Ukrainian soldiers often seemed to wear bandanas and wanted to help with the protective gear he had developed, but struggled to identify a point of contact at the federal government level. He instead encountered a long and convoluted process:
Considering the process has taken two years for Defence to raise an order, this example particularly raises questions around timely support for Ukraine and coordination and communication between bureaucrats and diplomats, and Ukrainian Communities and individuals. Meanwhile firefighters in Ukraine battle with minimal equipment and firefighters, soldiers, volunteers and civilians continue to be exposed to complex mixtures of toxins from such things as phosphorous bombs, resulting in health and unbelievable environmental impacts.
2.32Ms Chrestyna Kmetj, a member of the Executive Committee of AFUO, astutely commented that ‘coordination is an indicator of strategy—you cannot have one without the other.’
2.33The committee heard that it would be better if support was guided by an overarching strategy which clearly explains the purpose of supporting Ukraine and sets out the kind of assistance the Australian Government can provide. Major General Mick Ryan stated:
The Australian government should consider the development of a Ukraine Support Strategy. This strategy would bring together the various elements of support recommended in this submission. Further, it should provide the compelling strategic purpose, and national interest, in supporting the defence of Ukraine.
2.34Like other submitters, Major General Ryan argued that identifying and appointing a single person to be responsible for this overarching strategy mechanism would be key to ‘ensuring Ukrainian needs are compiled, prioritised and met where Australia can do so’:
The government should appoint such a coordinator and ensure they have [the] appropriate authorities and resources to effectively coordinate support among federal agencies, collaborate with Ukrainian support groups across Australia and coordinate Australian aid with that of other international government and multinational agency partners.
2.35His submission similarly highlighted the importance of improving government communication and presenting a consistent narrative on the conflict to the broader Australian public. The reasons for Australia’s response must be clearly articulated to dispel the persistent yet incorrect assumption that Australia’s interests in the war in Ukraine are minimal. He identified several ways of informing and influencing public opinion on the war, such as the establishment of a government-initiated program of visiting Ukrainian speakers who would provide firsthand accounts of the war, as well as instructing government departments to use their public-facing media campaigns to provide statements of support for Ukraine:
This could include the Department of Defence regularly highlighting the training of Ukrainian soldiers or use of Bushmasters, or other government departments expressing moral support the education of Ukrainian children despite Russian threats or support for Ukrainian power workers. More creativity is required on the part of our Canberra-based media staff across government.
2.36AFUO, which also called for the establishment of a specific Ukraine-support coordination office, was asked how this would improve coordination. AFUO Co-Chair Ms Kateryna Argyrou was of the view that it would help simply by offering the community a single interface point:
We have many different issues; every time we come here to Canberra to advocate, it's never just one thing that we're talking about. We're going between ministers' offices, we're going between senators and members of parliament, advocating for different issues on behalf of our community members. If we could just have one point that we can go to and say: 'Look, these are the issues that we have.' And we are not a community where we just come with problems; we would like to come with solutions as well.
2.37The problem with the absence of centralised coordination mechanisms was aptly captured by Ms Kmetj:
At the current moment, there is no single official advocate for Ukraine assistance in Canberra. There is no one office or branch or agency which works to promote delivery of a robust and nuanced government strategy. With so many different needs, both for Ukraine’s fight and for displaced Ukrainians who have arrived in Australia, it is imperative that opportunities for support are compiled and prioritised so that responses across government and the community can be adequately coordinated.
2.38The committee noted that calls for the government to establish a single Australia-Ukraine coordinator were echoed in relation to humanitarian assistance as well, with the Minderoo Foundation urging the government to appoint an Australia-Ukraine coordinator with responsibility for facilitating a whole-of-government approach to assisting Ukraine.
2.39A submission from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, conversely, described Australia’s whole-of-government coordination as ‘effective’, pointing to an internal restructure in the second quarter of 2022 which the department, allowed ‘PM&C to give Ukraine matters the focus they required.’
2.40While the committee noted that government agencies were of the view that existing coordination processes work well, the number of submissions calling for better coordination suggests that improvements are necessary.
2.41Witnesses from PM&C after extensive questioning from the committee stated that there was no documented plan or strategic approach to Australia’s support for Ukraine, acknowledging that departments and agencies reacted when the government chose to make an announcement about further support to Ukraine stating:
Senator FAWCETT: Were those decisions to update a strategy, or were they a series of decisions that were each taken at a point in time that authorised a particular package of aid to Ukraine?
Mr Fletcher: There is not one single document that gets updated. It's an iterative process of government decision-making.
…
Senator FAWCETT: I'm interested to understand, coming back to this concept of strategy, do we have a position based either on quantum of support or humanitarian or military outcomes that Ukraine can achieve that guide our decisions, or is it just, as you articulated before, a series of essentially individual and unique decisions that are taken from time to time?
Mr Fletcher: Senator, it is more the latter than the former.
2.42Mr William Thiel, who analyses the war and has experience in the region, was scathing in his assessment and drew an unfavourable comparison with the support Russia receives from its allies:
Coordinated supply of needed material looks like what happened when Putin met Kim Jong Un in Vladivostok on 13 September 2023. Within ten days of that meeting the first of more than 6500 shipping containers began arriving in Russian ports, amounting to what is estimated at 3 million rounds of artillery ammunition. The forces of evil provide their support to Russia in a timely and systematic approach, while Ukraine is left to beg in each instance of any aid found for them from the liberal democracies and delivery takes months and months to commence. It’s honestly like a perverse scientific experiment when we are all trying to see how little aid can be provided to Ukraine and still allow them to survive.
Committee view
2.43The committee notes that government agencies repeatedly stated that Australia’s support for Ukraine was coordinated. Submissions from the three government departments coordinating Australia’s response indicate that there is not currently a consistent whole-of-government objective or mission statement outlining Australia’s aims in supporting Ukraine. It is therefore unsurprising that non-government stakeholders express a less favourable assessment of the coordination of Australia’s response. This being the case, coordination should be streamlined to better target the support Australia is providing. The committee believes the government should articulate a consistent strategic objective in its support for Ukraine, centralise coordination of its support in a single office and appoint an appropriately experienced official to lead the coordination of Australia’s response.
2.44The committee recommends that the Australian Government should:
develop and commit to a consistent objective and mission statement in our support for Ukraine across all departments, ensure all government agencies are working to those same objectives, and ensure that all of Australia’s assistance, support and diplomacy is designed to achieve these objectives;
commit to a comprehensive package which reflects Australia’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine’s defence, humanitarian needs and support, including multi-year sustainable Australian support;
develop an integrated National Security Strategy spanning foreign affairs, defence, and national resilience, noting that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of a number of threats to global security and stability, and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region; and
take steps to increase public awareness of the threat to Australia by the increasingly coordinated, aggressive actions of totalitarian regimes, and the need for collective defence cooperation by democratic nations.
2.45The committee recommends the Australian Government appoint a Coordinator-General to lead coordination of Australia’s assistance and support to Ukraine across all agencies. The person tasked with this lead coordination role should report directly to the National Security Committee of Cabinet, and should be provided with adequate resources and staff to ensure they can act as the central coordination point for government and other stakeholders in relation to Australia’s support for Ukraine.