Appendix 5 - Submission No. 157
1. I
would like to take this opportunity to make a submission to the committee
concerning the retention of personnel in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). I am
a Chief petty Officer Writer (CPOWTR) and I have served in the RAN for just
over 21 years. the Writer branch is mainly responsible for pay, all accounts
(personal and trader), finance and personnel administration.
2. I
believe the problems commenced when the Defence Reform program (DRP) was
implemented which included centralisation of services, civilianisation of naval
billets and contracting services to civilian companies. I served in the Sydney
area when services were centralised and civilianised and am now serving in
Victoria where services are also centralised and civilianised. The problems I
continually see are mismanagement, a lack of accountability, ignorance and
written contract problems. Civilian contractors are not held accountable for
breeches of contract, which is extremely dis-heartening as sailors would be
held accountable, including being charged under the Defence Force Discipline
Act (DFDA). Contracts are not written properly and a number of tasks are not
included, hence the sailor has to pick up the slack as well as perform their
own duties. From my own experience, civilian personnel who are employed in
pay, registry, removals and accounts are not professionally qualified to
perform these functions. There have been problems with non-payment of Qantas
accounts to the point where they have threatened that no more travel bookings
will be accepted until the account is paid. Non-payment of credit card
accounts, one case in particular, a Visa account had not been paid for
approximately four months. Defence is the ultimate loser as the organisation
gains a bad reputation when it comes to paying bills.
3. As a
result of centralisation and civilianisation the Supply Branch has been
decimated and mismanaged to the point, where the numbers are at critical
levels. The downsizing of the Writer’s branch was not monitored correctly to
ensure that the correct level of numbers were maintained. In 1998 there were
almost 500 Writers and we had to reach a target of about 227 by 2003. The
Writer’s Branch is well under the target set for 2003 and the year is 2001. I
have been offered promotion and a posting goes with the job, there are problems
trying to replace me, as there are not enough CPOWTRs. The career managers are
searching through the Reserve List to try and find a replacement. I also get
about five weeks notice to move from Victoria to Sydney; it is fortuitous that
I am not married.
4. My
current position in a Command billet and the staff are CSIG. The ridiculous
situation is that I have no input into the management of the staff, not able to
provide professional guidance to staff and not able to provide divisional
management. To add further insult I have been advised that the staff, who are
also Writers, will be supervised by a Chief Petty Officer of a completely
different specialisation. With all due respect to the Chief, this individual
is not professionally qualified to supervise and provide professional guidance
and train junior Writers. I ask where is the logic in this decision. Instead
I now have personnel who are extremely irate and morale has dropped significantly
to the point where one staff member, has submitted his discharge from the RAN.
The introduction of Corporate Support, now known as CSIG, has driven a wedge
not only between members of the Supply Branch but also the uniformed members of
the Navy.
5. To
add further fuel to the fire, one position in the office was identified to be
civilianised. This was advised in February 2001, to date the billet is still
not filled. Meanwhile the office is manned by two people, instead of three,
one of which is a trainee Writer. So in reality, one person is doing the work
of two plus training and supervising the trainee. The mismanagement and
bungling processes that have occurred in order to get the position advertised
was totally unprofessional. The Public Service also need to get their act
together regarding a number of processing procedures and lack lustre way of
doing business.
6. Also
as a result of the DRP, the tri-service approach is being introduced and there
is also bungling and mismanagement in this process. Navy has always lead the
way with how they manage welfare and personnel related matters of its members.
With the tri-service approach, Navy has had to step back fifty steps to keep
pace with the RAAF and Army. Navy’s Personal Services Organisation (PSO) which
is now the Defence Community Organisation (DCO) was second to none. Although
the Social Workers and Family Liaison Officers are still available through the DCO,
the professional expertise of the uniformed members has been lost, due to
centralisation of housing, removals and the ability to provide that something
extra. Army and RAAF had no such organisation.
7. The
introduction of PMKeys, what a joke this system is. Again Navy has the best
personnel management system called NPEMS. The current RAAF and Army systems
are deficient and again Navy has to step back because the other two services
are not up to speed with their personnel management. PMKeys is civilian
oriented, has no military relation and is extremely non-user friendly. I did
the course in March 2001 and still have not received a login to the system,
even after considerable effort to obtain one. If I don’t get a login to access
PMKeys, I am not able to do my job. By the time PMKeys is actually installed,
I will have forgotten how to use the system. Also during the course, a number
of anomalies were identified and questions asked; answers could not be supplied
because the instructor did not know enough about the system. Why listen to our
concerns or objections we are just the ‘bunnies’ at the coalface who have to
use the system!
8. The
bottom line is I joined the Navy for a career not a job and I am a fourth
generation service member. I agree changes have to be made, but the changes
haven’t stopped and people are now so confused as to who does what, it is
affecting the way we do business. Defence is not a corporation, we do not make
a profit, therefore, stop trying to engineer our structure as if we were a
profit making corporation. The good people of Navy are discharging because
enough is enough, our conditions of service are declining, there is no fun any
more and we are being worked into the ground because of the ‘can do’ attitude.
My standard working day is about 12–13 hours a day and I am certainly not
remunerated for the work I do. To ensure there is no misunderstanding, I love
the Navy and have a great deal of pride in the uniform. However, I do not know
how much longer I can continue to perform the level of work I am currently
undertaking when there is no light at the end of the tunnel.
9. I
also have concerns at the lack of backbone the Navy has when it comes to tri-service
issues and decision making. The Army trounces over the RAAF and Navy and if it
is not done the ‘green’ way then it is no way. The day I have to wear a green
uniform, will be the day I discharge. I have had enough of this! I
continually have up-hill battles with Army personnel who have a belligerent and
inflexible attitude and who are not willing to go that extra mile for their
people.
10. The management of defects is a
joke. There is a large amount of funding and resources being wasted. For
example, I reported three defects at the same time all regarding blown light
bulbs or fluorescent lights and all in the same building. Three contractors
came out on three separate days and each had a contract to fix the blown
lights. This is a regular occurrence. When the contractors were asked why the
other lights in the building were not fixed at the same time, the reply was “I
only have a contract to fix the external lights that have blown.” What a gross
waste of money and resources. How cost effective is this?
11. Navy had better start actively
seeking answers to the retention problem and start listening to their people,
otherwise there will not be enough people to man the shore bases, let alone
ships. I blame the DRP and CSP for much of Navy’s problems. Decisions are
made that affect people at the coalface, yet they are not consulted or trials
are not conducted to ascertain the effectiveness of the decision. A prime
example of this is the Defence Plaza in Pitt Stree, Sydney with respect to the
pay being centralised and not enough people performing the function. But it
was implemented anyway and the resultant effect was a number of personnel had
problems with their pay, including debts. The Sydney area alone had a debt
owing to the commonwealth of approximately $475,000 (this figure was quoted
late 1999). CSP and civilianisation was introduced to save money, as sailors
are an expensive commodity. However, how cost effective has it been and the
cost to the Navy has been retention of its people, which is now a critical
problem. The hierarchy continually say ‘people are its number one asset’ yet
they do nothing but deliver ‘lip service’ to try and cope with the situation. I
have seen a number of teams implemented and surveys despatched and I am yet to
see anything concrete. Money is an issue, accommodation, welfare, family
support are all issues as well, yet little is being done. Finally the outcome
is:
DRP, Civilianisation and CSP =
Senate Committee Inquiry into Retention.
12. I request this submission be made
public with name and address deleted.
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