Coalition Senators' additional comments

Introduction

1.1Coalition Senators are grateful to all witnesses and submitters who have contributed to this inquiry so far.

1.2Coalition Senators are largely comfortable, at this stage of the inquiry, with most of the content of the report.

1.3However, there are a number of issues (as identified below) that we believe should also be afforded additional consideration and commentary.

1.4Our guiding principle is straightforward: the paramount objective of higher education policy and institutional governance is to deliver the best outcomes for students, through excellent teaching and learning, support for students, appropriate workplace practices, and research that advances Australia's prosperity and security.

1.5In assessing recommendations, Coalition Senators will prioritise measures that improve accountability and performance without diverting resources away from the core mission of higher education providers.

Scope of the inquiry

1.6The committee's terms of reference concern the adequacy of TEQSA's powers and, with particular reference, the composition and transparency of governing bodies; the accuracy of financial reporting and controls; legislative compliance; executive remuneration; and any related matters.

1.7Coalition Senators consider that recommendations should be tethered to these objectives and framed to strengthen governance capability, proportionality and student outcomes.

Use of committee privilege and procedural fairness

1.8Coalition Senators support robust scrutiny and the protection of witnesses. Wealso note the Chair's opening remarks at both hearings of this inquiry reminding participants that evidence to the committee is protected by parliamentary privilege, that threats or disadvantage to witnesses may be treated as contempt, and crucially, that witnesses have a right to request to be heard in-camera and may give sensitive answers in private if the committee insists on an answer.[1]

1.9Notwithstanding those protections, Coalition Senators are concerned that highly distressing personal evidence was received in public that overlapped with ongoing processes related to employment disputes within a third-party organisation.

1.10As a consequence, it was unsurprising that multiple adverse media reports were published nationally within hours. By placing allegations already under formal investigation on the public record before that process concluded, parliamentary privilege compromised procedural fairness and may have caused significant reputational harm to a number of ANU officials.

1.11Receiving detailed personal allegations in public session—when the committee had expressly flagged the availability of private evidence—risked compromising internal complaint-handling, inhibiting proper testing of evidence, and shifting the inquiry's focus from systemic governance matters to unresolved individual disputes.

1.12Coalition Senators also observe that the evidence included graphic descriptions of self-harm and other highly personal experiences. While the Chair reminded witnesses of their entitlement to give evidence in-camera, no advance advisory was provided to those attending or viewing the hearing online that such testimony would be heard. In practice, this meant that committee members, staff, members of the public in the room, and those following the livestream were exposed to distressing material without an opportunity to withdraw. Inquiries of this nature should adopt procedures that protect vulnerable witnesses while also ensuring that audiences are not exposed to sensitive or confronting material without appropriate warning.

1.13Accordingly, Coalition Senators recommend that, where evidence is likely to include confronting personal material, the committee adopt a content advisory and prefer in-camera arrangements in the first instance. Such an approach would not only safeguard the welfare of participants but also uphold the principles of procedural fairness, ensuring that serious allegations are not placed on the public record before the conclusion of the appropriate investigative processes. This would enable the committee to examine systemic governance issues fairly and rigorously, without prejudicing ongoing proceedings.

Governance board composition

1.14Coalition Senators agree that diversity of experience is an important feature of effective governing bodies. However, the evidence to support prescribing a minimum proportion of members with public administration experience was largely led by university staff and unions reflecting on historical models of governance. Any prescription of Council composition risks narrowing the breadth of skills and overlooking more directly relevant expertise. Thecommittee could consider further evidence from outside of the university sector on best-practice governance models.

1.15The report itself notes that institutions such as the University of Western Australia and Monash University already use structured skills matrices to guide council appointments. Many universities maintain such matrices in line with the Voluntary Code of Best Practice, which emphasises the importance of identifying the capabilities required for effective governance and providing induction and development for all council members. Evidence to the inquiry, however, highlighted that while skills matrices are in use, their application is individualised across the sector, with varying levels of transparency:

In regard to the skill matrix and make-up of councils, that is a decision left to each university. My understanding is that each council has a matrix of skills where they proactively identify areas where they need additional skills or expertise to be represented on that council.[2]

1.16Coalition Senators therefore consider that Recommendation 5 should either be removed or refined to build on this existing practice by requiring councils to publish, periodically review, and make active use of their skills matrices against agreed national expectations. This approach would ensure capability breadth while avoiding the rigidity of prescribing minimum proportions from any one sector. Any such recommendation should also be framed to appropriately recognise that the legislative authority rests predominantly with state and territory governments.

Student membership on governing boards

1.17Coalition Senators believe a paramount objective of higher education policy and institutional governance is to deliver the best outcomes for students and we note there has been limited engagement in the inquiry directly from students. Coalition Senators do not believe there was sufficient evidence to support prescribing minimum representation of undergraduate and postgraduate students on governing bodies. While student perspectives are critical, evidence highlighted that the effectiveness of governing bodies depends not simply on who is present, but on whether members are equipped to participate fully and discharge their duties:

With the cultural aspect, rather than just focusing on the presence of students on councils we need to, like you said, focus on the ability of students and staff to actually participate fully and to fulfil their obligations to provide oversight and accountability.[3]

1.18Professor Jennifer Westacott AO, Chancellor of Western Sydney University, cautioned against rigid prescriptive requirements:

No, I wouldn't agree with a majority being elected … I think that changes the whole nature of governance, and I certainly think there should be very strong student and staff voices on these governing bodies … I think you would change the nature of governance dramatically if more than 50 per cent of people were elected.[4]

1.19Dr Mary Russell, Chief Executive Officer of TEQSA, described a 'persistent tension' faced by elected staff and student members, creating conflicts that are difficult to resolve:

If I may raise an issue that I think is central to the considerations of this committee, it is the manifestation of conflicts of interest that can arise when elected or nominated members of council are perceived or perceive themselves to have accountabilities to entities outside the council that give rise to a conflict with their obligations and their fiduciary obligations within the council. Many of the issues that have been raised and talked about today about elected staff or elected student members have been framed in terms of perceived conflicts or absence of trust in the maintenance of confidentiality, and there is a fundamental tension that is unresolved in many councils that makes the roles of those elected members difficult.[5]

1.20The University Chancellors Council also cautioned against overregulation, noting that universities already operate under complex legislative schemes and that flexible leadership structures remain the best model to effectively fulfil their education missions.[6]

1.21Coalition Senators acknowledge that most universities provide induction to all council members, including students. However, evidence to the committee indicates that the quality and consistency of this support varies across institutions:

Something that we hear a lot from student members on university councils is that they feel that they've kind of been set up to fail because they haven't received that training and then, in their council meetings, they are faced with feeling very much like an outsider.[7]

1.22Coalition Senators would therefore recommend that, should the Albanese Government consider reform which mandates student membership on councils, institutions must ensure structured induction practices so that these members can discharge their fiduciary duties appropriately.

1.23Coalition Senators further note the historical evolution of governance arrangements. The National Governance Protocols introduced by the Howard Government in 2004 required university councils to have a majority of external, independent members, a reform intended to strengthen accountability, independence and public confidence.

1.24In 2008, the Rudd Government removed these requirements, arguing at the time that universities already had sufficient governance safeguards, that the protocols represented unnecessary federal intrusion into state-regulated institutions, and that prescriptive rules on council composition limited flexibility. In doing so, the Rudd Government explicitly recognised that rigid composition requirements were not the most effective way to achieve robust governance.

1.25Coalition Senators therefore suggest that Recommendation 6 be removed, and that emphasis instead be placed on structured induction of student members, rather than prescribing fixed membership requirements for governing bodies.

Recognition of sector-wide challenges

1.26Coalition Senators do not entirely agree with a number of the reflections made about Australia's universities in the committee view section of the report. These include the assertion, at 5.85, that universities believe that there are 'no areas' requiring sector-wide improvement.

1.27Coalition Senators also do not accept the characterisation, particularly at 5.83, that universities 'refused to acknowledge systemic issues' across the sector.

1.28On the contrary, evidence before the committee has shown that sector representatives acknowledge system-wide challenges but emphasise that cases are often best analysed and understood at an individual institutional level and that effective solutions must be proportionate, coordinated and risk-based.

1.29Universities Australia told the committee that they welcome scrutiny and checks and balances, but cautioned that the key was 'ensuring proportionate, non-duplicative regulation that does not overreach'. It also drew attention to the scale of compliance already required, observing that universities operate under 'over 300 pieces of legislation and regulation'.[8] The University of Technology Sydney described universities as already sitting within a 'complex web of oversight mechanisms' and urged that any new structures should 'complement rather than duplicate existing ones'.[9]

1.30These statements make clear that witnesses have not denied systemic issues but identified over-complex and overlapping frameworks as a primary driver of concern.

Regulatory burden and reporting duplication

1.31Coalition Senators share the concerns expressed by many witnesses that regulatory and reporting demands have grown substantially and are increasingly duplicative. These include the points reflected in 3.21 of the report that Australian universities are heavily regulated. Indeed, this was a strong component of the evidence provided, in particular, by the University of Wollongong and the University of Western Sydney.

1.32Professor Max Lu, Vice Chancellor and President of the University of Wollongong, highlighted the sheer scale of the compliance burden facing universities, which distracts leadership from core responsibilities:

My understanding is that we have several hundred—over 300—pieces of legislation at the state and federal levels that we have to comply with.[10]

1.33Universities are currently accountable to multiple oversight bodies, including the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, the Department of Education under the Higher Education Support Act 2003, the National Student Ombudsman, the Interim Australian Tertiary Education Commission, the Fair Work Ombudsman, and state auditors-general, in addition to obligations under privacy, human rights and workplace law. Evidence before the committee highlighted that each of these bodies may require overlapping or repetitive reporting:

I think the best analysis on the regulatory burden and the increase on regulation is from the University of Sydney, which has highlighted the fact that there's around a 20 per cent increase in regulation over a number of years. There are 300 pieces of legislation, according to that analysis, that we have to adhere to, and it's increasing. I think Vicki has highlighted some of the federal legislation that we deal with, but it's important to remember that individual universities—38 of my 39—are constituted under state and territory legislation, and so governance arrangements are dictated by those jurisdictions, and they're all outlined in their various enabling acts. We are dealing, as a sector, with an enormous amount of additional regulation. Seemingly, with each piece of additional funding or intervention from the government—particularly this government—there is an additional regulatory sting.[11]

1.34In practical terms, this density of oversight risks diverting governing bodies and senior executives from strategic stewardship, risk management, student experience and research quality. Coalition Senators would like the committee to consider how there can be stronger coordination between Commonwealth and state oversight, data-sharing between regulators to avoid repeat requests, and consolidated reporting mechanisms that re-use information already subjected to audit or assurance.

1.35Coalition Senators emphasise that reducing duplication does not mean reducing accountability. Rather, it means ensuring that every reporting requirement is necessary, proportionate, and demonstrably contributes to improved educational and research outcomes, while adding value for students.

1.36Reforms that streamline and coordinate existing obligations would improve governance effectiveness and allow universities to devote greater energy to their primary mission of teaching, research and student support.

Other issues

1.37Coalition Senators also have reservations with some of the content in the section of the report on the transparency of university finances and expenditure. In our view, this area of the report does not give adequate voice to university perspectives on financial accountability or any relevant parallels to non-university organisations such as schools or community services.

1.38There is also an overemphasis in the report on the University Accord Interim Report—which was used to test more controversial positions—as opposed to the Accord's Final Report.

1.39As one example, in point 1.28 of the report for this inquiry, there is a reference to the 'Accord's Vision'. However, the words being cited have been drawn from the Accord's Interim Report—not the final version (from which such words were, in fact, removed).

1.40We also observe that, at this stage, the inquiry has not featured significantly strong participation from current students and student groups—who, all things being equal, are among the people who will always be most directly affected by any improvement or deterioration in university governance practices.

Conclusion

1.41Coalition Senators support reforms that strengthen public confidence in the governance of Australian universities, provided they are evidence-based, proportionate, and directed towards improving student outcomes.

1.42Coalition Senators also emphasise the importance of accurately characterising the evidence given to the committee. Universities have not denied systemic issues; rather, they have highlighted the burden of overlapping regulation and the need for proportionate, coordinated oversight. Reforms that multiply reporting requirements without addressing duplication risk diverting councils and executives from their core responsibilities of teaching, research and student support.

1.43Coalition Senators are committed to practical reforms that enhance capability and outcomes for students, rather than prescriptive measures that risk entrenching bureaucracy and diverting focus and resources from the core mission of our universities.

Footnotes

[1]Senator Marielle Smith, Chair, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 1 and Senator Marielle Smith, Chair, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 1.

[2]Mr Alec Webb, Chief Executive Officer, Regional Universities Network, Proof Committee Hansard, 8September 2025.

[3]Mr William Burfoot, President, Australian National University Students' Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 23.

[4]Professor Jennifer Westacott AO, Chancellor, Western Sydney University, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, pp. 8–9.

[5]Dr Mary Russell, Chief Executive Officer, Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 50.

[6]University Chancellors Council, Submission 23 (47th Parliament), p. 3.

[7]Ms Ashlyn Horton, National President, National Union of Students, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 22.

[8]Mr Luke Sheehy, Chief Executive Officer, Universities Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 12August 2025, p. 13.

[9]Professor Andrew Parfitt, Vice Chancellor and President, University of Technology Sydney, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 20.

[10]Professor Max Lu, Vice-Chancellor and President, University of Wollongong, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 39.

[11]Mr Luke Sheehy, Chief Executive Officer, Universities Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 13.