Chapter 3Accountability and transparency

3.1The committee received a significant volume of information addressing the accountability and transparency of university governance and decision‑making.

3.2Universities and sector peak bodies highlighted the various legislative obligations on universities, as well as policies and processes universities have in place to promote good governance.[1] For example, the University Chancellors Council (UCC) told the committee that university councils are 'structured to ensure that universities operate with integrity, accountability, and transparency' both in terms of their academic mission and their public responsibilities:

Each university's governing body is tasked with overseeing financial expenditure, risk management, and compliance with applicable laws. University governing bodies are supported by audit and risk management committees that are responsible for maintaining the highest standards of governance and oversight. These bodies are committed to promoting transparency, accountability, and effective decision-making processes.[2]

3.3The UCC also referred to the 'solemn responsibilities' of governing bodies to 'safeguard substantial investments in them by taxpayers, students and their families, and also to protect the livelihoods of many employees'.[3]

3.4Further, Ms Vicki Thomson, Chief Executive of the Group of Eight, stressed that the sector was taking continual and constructive action to address concerns about university governance:

We do understand the concerns that have been raised about representation, transparency and executive accountability. These are legitimate issues, and we are committed to working constructively with government, regulators, staff and students to address them—and our universities are actively and continually doing this.[4]

3.5Despite this, there was a general view among unions, student associations, academics, and other sector stakeholders that there is a lack of genuine accountability and transparency in the governance of Australian universities.

3.6Some of these contributors told the committee that the dual character of the Australian higher education sector—where universities are created under state and territory legislation, but the Commonwealth has primary funding and policy responsibility—has created gaps in accountability.[5]

3.7Dr John Quiggan described this as 'a major weakness in university governance', with the level of government that establishes universities having 'almost no role, and little interest in' their funding and performance. Dr Quiggan contrasted this with federal systems in the United States, Germany, and Canada, where state governments have both legal authority over universities and primary responsibility for their funding.[6]

3.8A similar argument was put forward by the University of Western Australia Academic Staff Association (UWAASA), which argued that the lack of state government interest in—or influence over—universities means that their governing councils are 'effectively not accountable to any entity'.[7]

3.9For many participants, the growing corporatisation of Australian universities has worsened the accountability and transparency of university governance.[8] This view was summed up by the Australia Institute, which observed that corporatisation had resulted in governance that reflected 'the worst of both worlds: not properly accountable to the Australian people, nor subject to the pressure of "market forces"':

Each year, billions of public dollars are spent on universities, but they do not receive nearly as much scrutiny as that faced by government agencies or for-profit corporations who are answerable to parliaments, the [Australian Competition and Consumer Commission] or [Australian Securities and Investments Commission]. While shareholders keep companies on their toes, university councils are poor at reigning in vice-chancellor remuneration or consultancy spending.[9]

3.10Similarly, Dr Quiggan observed that although a large proportion of university council appointments are drawn from the corporate world, university councils do not face the kind of scrutiny that applies to corporations:

… unlike corporate directors, members of university councils have no responsibility to shareholders or even (as in the case of government business enterprises) shareholding ministers.

As a result … the council is effectively dominated by the vice chancellor, who faces fewer constraints than either the [Chief Executive Officer] of a publicly-traded corporation or the Chair of a statutory authority.[10]

3.11Further, the Australia Institute noted that most universities are not 'accountable to Senate estimates, committee or other Commonwealth parliamentary oversight'.[11]

3.12In addition to gaps in accountability, the committee also received evidence from academics and students about the way governance structures and processes that appear comprehensive on paper can be severely undermined by cultural factors that affect how they operate in practice.

3.13Indeed, the gap between universities' perceptions of their governance processes and the experiences described by university staff and students was striking. The committee noted, for example, that despite the widely reported governance issues affecting universities, the UCC submission contained only one allusion to problems in the sector:

Over the last few years, there has been some breakdowns in management systems that has led to poor outcomes for staff at an institutional level. Robust systems of governance, while an antidote to failure in process, are not infallible and UCC is committed to continuous improvement in governance systems.[12]

3.14This gap in perceptions was also reflected in evidence from Professor MaryO'Kane AC, who described being struck (during University Accord consultations) by the difference between the views of staff and students and those with responsibility for university governance:

There were a lot of themes, but those were the big ones, and what struck us as odd was they were raised with us by students, staff and stakeholders. They were constant themes. And, of course, the Fair Work Commission was briefing us on the underpayments in a very significant way. But, when we met with those charged with governance, it didn't seem to be such a big issue. They didn't deny it, but it wasn't a strong focus …[13]

3.15Further, the committee is aware that the gap between university policy and practice was highlighted as a key issue in the recent 'Review of Gender and Culture Matters at ANU former College of Health and Medicine', by Professor Christine Nixon AO PSM. In her letter to the ANU Provost, Professor RebekahBrown, Professor Nixon stated that:

While ANU has developed comprehensive policies and procedures my review has identified significant and consistent failures in implementation and enforcement. This gap between institutional intent and operational reality requires urgent attention if trust is to be rebuilt.[14]

3.16During the committee's inquiry, a gap between policy and practice appeared evident in matters of transparency and the management of conflicts of interest across multiple universities. However, it was particularly stark when it came to the inclusion of staff and students in university governance processes. Experiences described to the committee suggest that staff and student members are not always treated on an equal footing with other council members.[15]

3.17In some cases, the attitude of senior university executives was even viewed as hostile. For example, the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) contended that the 'muting of staff and student voices' and 'devaluation of their skills, experience and expertise' underpinned 'the sometimes aggressive manoeuvres by senior leadership intended to isolate, ostracize and undermine elected staff and students, and even target the employment and financial security of elected staff representatives'.[16]

3.18In response, participants proposed a number of actions to improve the transparency and accountability of universities. These included enhanced transparency and reporting by universities, changes to the composition of university councils, better training for elected members of university councils, and cultural changes to embed and safeguard the participation of staff and students in university governance.

3.19The remainder of this chapter focuses on evidence received in relation to:

transparency in university decision-making;

management of conflicts of interest;

staff and student participation in university governance; and

participant suggestions to improve the transparency and accountability of governance at Australian universities.

3.20However, the committee acknowledges the evidence received on its wider terms of reference, including the corporatisation of Australian universities, the influence of private sector consultants in university governance, reduced academic autonomy, poorer student experiences, and the interoperability of regulation across jurisdictions. While touched on at various points in this chapter, these issues will be addressed more fully in the committee's final report.

There is a perceived lack of transparency in university decision-making

3.21A number of universities highlighted their existing obligations in relation to transparency and accountability. For example, the University of New South Wales (UNSW) stated that 'Australian universities are among the most regulated in the world with significant requirements for transparency and accountability'. More specifically, it noted that it reports regularly on 'governance matters, risk-management strategies and financial transparency'.[17]

3.22Similarly, the Australian National University (ANU) stated that it has 'robust governance frameworks in place that help guide decision-making, provide controls and transparency in processes, and ensure effective and clear accountability so that ANU continues to operate with the highest standards of decision-making and oversight'.[18]

3.23Despite these statements, numerous participants raised concerns about a lack of transparency in university decision-making.[19] This included one academic who noted 'several recent cases' where the university executive bypassed the council 'to make and announce decisions against the established governance mechanisms'.[20]

3.24Another submitter contended that 'funding decisions, restructures, and changes to course offerings are often made with minimal transparency, leaving staff and students in a state of uncertainty'.[21]

3.25Various submitters referred to the lack of trust engendered by poor transparency and accountability practices.[22] Some of the key concerns of participants were reflected in the University of Queensland NTEU Branch Committee's (NTEU UQ) description of the UQ Senate (see Box 3.1).

3.26While concerns about a lack of transparency and accountability were evident across a range of university activities, inquiry participants appeared to raise particular concerns about the transparency of council decision-making and university finances (including the use of consultants), as well as the handling of freedom of information (FoI) requests by universities.

Transparency of council decision-making

3.27For at least one inquiry participant, transparency was described as 'perhaps the most important issue' facing the university sector:

A management culture of secrecy allows unethical behaviour, favouritism or nepotism and conflicts of interest to occur, and to be quietly concealed when they are eventually revealed, with the whistleblowers often punished for their efforts. Even those who try to resist this culture are pushed out or reprimanded in some way. A lack of transparency is one of the pillars on which this dysfunctional corporate culture is built. It is evident in decision making, in finances, in rewards such as appointments and promotions.[24]

3.28Despite its importance, numerous participants reported a lack of transparency in relation to council decision-making, with UWAASA describing council and executive decision-making processes as 'extremely opaque'.[25]

3.29A 'distinct lack of transparency in council‑level decision-making' at Australian universities was also noted by the Australia Institute. It submitted that, unlike other public institutions, there are currently no requirements for universities to publish minutes of council meetings:

Under current rules neither university staff, students, nor the public have the right to know the decision-making processes of the councils that govern Australia's public universities. This is in contrast to most other government‑created bodies. For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia regularly publishes the minutes of the Board meeting. It is hard to believe that the deliberations of our public universities should be shrouded in greater secrecy than the deliberations of the RBA.[26]

3.30The lack of consistency in these requirements meant the committee received evidence of mixed practices across the sector. For example, Deakin University welcomed 'transparent scrutiny of its role and fulfilment of responsibilities' and described a range of actions it takes to ensure transparency, including:

publication of the council charter, as well as information about council functions and processes;

publication of the annual schedule of council meetings and business;

issuing of a report of outcomes following each meeting;

publication of an annual review of the fulfilment of the council business schedule and accountability for decisions made under delegation; and

rotation of council meetings between Deakin campuses.[27]

3.31Similarly, Professor Jennifer Westacott AC, Chancellor of Western Sydney University (WSU), told the committee that WSU publishes its minutes in full, with the exception of commercial-in-confidence matters, which are redacted.[28]

3.32The need for confidentiality around some aspects of council proceedings is reflected in the UCC Code of Governance Principles and Practice for Australia’s Public Universities, which states that council members should 'respect the confidentiality of proceedings save to the extent that they deal with matters in the public domain or reflected in the public minutes'.[29]

3.33However, participants such as the University of Technology Sydney NTEU Branch (NTEU UTS) argued that despite existing frameworks and codes of practice, there were still 'significant variation and gaps' in council reporting.[30] According to the NTEU UTS, in 2024 no UTS council reports were made public until November, 'with only summary reports made available and not more detailed minutes and attachments'.[31]

3.34Similarly, NTEU Monash University Branch (NTEU Monash) reported having significant difficulties accessing council meeting minutes. According to NTEU Monash, requests for access to minutes are 'regularly refused and no effort is made to make these public documents available to staff, students or the community'.[32]

3.35Dr Tim Moore described council meetings as 'closed affairs', with 'no agendas, minutes (or even just broad summaries of proceedings) … available to staff or the public'. Dr Moore also noted that confidentiality provisions also prevent staff representatives—'often limited to a single elected member' from reporting back to their colleagues.[33]

3.36In addition, Mr Christian Flynn, a former student member of the ANU Council, argued that the way council meetings are minuted reflects a focus on consensus, meaning they do not reflect the 'multitude of perspectives raised in discussions, with the more powerful voices dominating the final decisions and action items'.[34]

3.37Further, submitters such as UWAASA raised concerns about the use of 'closed' council meetings, which are not open to observers and are not publicly minuted.[35]

3.38In a similar vein, the NTEU stated that university governance has become 'increasingly opaque with much business conducted "in camera" on the basis that it is commercial in confidence'. It questioned how university communities and the public can trust that decisions are being made 'in their interest if they cannot see how those decisions are made and on what basis'.[36]

3.39Evidence provided to the committee suggests that a lack of transparency also applies to council activities more broadly. NTEU Monash provided the example of a review of governance arrangements undertaken by Monash University Council in 2023–2024, entitled Independent and External Review of Monash University Council. According to NTEU Monash, the existence of the review was never made known to students or staff, there was no opportunity for staff or students to contribute to the review, and 'no copy of the review's report has ever been tabled by Monash University Council'. NTEU Monash described the secrecy surrounding the review as 'consistent with a broader hostility to transparency that is not befitting to a large public institution'.[37]

3.40A similar experience with annual performance reviews was shared by the NTEU UTS, which stated that:

While annual performance review (of the institution and of Council itself) is already part of Council practice, there is no transparency over this process nor outcomes, and no indication of where Council itself sees opportunities for development.[38]

3.41Likewise, the University of Sydney Association of Professors (USAP) relayed concerns about a 'lack of transparency and perceived bias' in relation to a recent review of university policies. USAP noted that although the review report made 51 recommendations, little is known about who was consulted as part of the review. USAP observed that 'this has led some to question the legitimacy of the findings and whether the review was a genuine attempt to address systemic issues within the university'.[39]

3.42According to USAP, a level of secrecy also extends to the results of staff surveys:

Regarding the university's efforts to improve its culture, there are questions about the use of external consultants and surveys, such as the Sydney Listen survey. The university promised transparency and openness, but the results of these surveys were not shared with staff as promised. Despite repeated requests from employees and the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), the findings remain secret.[40]

3.43Similar experiences were shared by the Sexual Ethics on Campuses Project (SECS Project), which referred to a 2016 UNSW survey which asked students about their views on a proposed move to a trimester system. While the survey results were never publicly released, they were obtained by the UNSW student newspaper via a FoI request. This revealed that 'over 90percent of responses were critical of the transition to trimesters'. The SECS Project went on to point out that 'despite this near-unanimous feedback, UNSW management repeatedly dismissed student concerns and proceeded with the transition regardless'.[41]

Transparency of university finances and expenditure

3.44The committee received evidence from a range of participants about a lack of transparency around university finances and expenditure.

3.45For example, the NTEU UQ contended that there is 'too little transparency in university budgets', with staff needing to rely on the university's annual report for an institution-wide view of the university's finances. The NTEU UQ also pointed out that the annual report does not provide details of the internal distribution of funding:

Thus, it is difficult for staff to get a clear idea of the university's financial state, and external senators have little idea of the impact of changes in budgets on the level of operating units within the university. Budget cuts are made and felt at School level, such as reduction of casual tutoring hours for a course, but the rationale and effect of these changes within a larger budget picture is unclear.[42]

3.46A similar view was expressed by Dr Lachlan Clohesy, of the NTEU ACT Division, in relation to ongoing uncertainty around the ANU's financial situation, in particular, the calculations used to arrive at the university's underlying operating deficit, which are not subject to review by Commonwealth auditors:

In terms of finding out how those calculations are made, there's not a lot of transparency beyond what's in the annual report. The vice-chancellor has basically said publicly that their annual reports are audited by the ANAO, so they don't know how they could get more thorough than that. But I want to be very clear: the $89.9 million surplus is audited by the ANAO. The calculations that are then applied to it to get an underlying operating deficit are definitely not audited by the ANAO or by anyone else. That's why our members and others have called on ANU to open their books and justify their financial situation.[43]

3.47Submitters such as Professor Corinne Cortese also pointed to difficulties ascertaining the specifics of spending on consultancies—except for Victorian universities, which are required under the Financial Management Act 1994 (Vic) to report publicly on consultancy expenditure:

For other universities, to discern amounts paid to consultancies, an interested stakeholder would need to navigate the notes to the financial statements and find a line item in the 'Other expenses' note. The line item may have been listed as 'Professional and consulting fees', or 'Consulting and administrative services' and so it is difficult to discern precisely what the consultant-related spending was. Details of individual amounts paid to consultants and for what services is undisclosed.[44]

3.48In a similar vein, Professor James Guthrie and Dr Adam Lucas raised concerns about the lack of detail provided in relation to a number of multi-million dollar projects at the University of Wollongong (UoW), in particular:

… how much revenue has been directed toward the much‑vaunted Health and Wellbeing precinct. This is currently impossible to determine due to a lack of transparency in the public accounts about the partnership with Lendlease for this $250 million property development, which is currently stalled.[45]

Management of freedom of information requests

3.49In addition to broader concerns about a lack of transparency in university decision-making, a number of participants drew attention to universities' handling of FoI requests.[46] For example, NTEU Monash stated that FoI requests for council minutes 'are regularly blocked on spurious grounds'.[47]

3.50Mr Simon Walker expressed similar concerns and described his experience of lodging two FoI requests while a student at James Cook University (JCU). As neither request was actioned in over six months, Mr Walker felt that JCU had 'effectively "run out the clock" and even if these actions are ultimately upheld by the Information Commissioner, I have completed my course and thus no longer a student'.[48]

3.51Stop Woodside Monash (SWM) described its experience of submitting an FoI request following an unsuccessful attempt to obtain information from senior university staff. According to SWM, Monash University took 139 days to provide a decision on the FoI request. In the end, 22 relevant documents were identified by Monash University. However, its decision was to 'exempt each [and every one] of the 22 documents in full'. This included minutes of a council meeting, which SWM contended should have been publicly available on the university website.[49]

3.52Mr Walker argued that experiences like these are not isolated incidents but reflective of 'a broader cultural problem':

Universities have tended to be overly secretive and resistant to FoI disclosure, sometimes stonewalling requests or exploiting exemptions to withhold information (such as minutes of meetings, financial details, or internal correspondence that may reveal questionable decisions).[50]

Conflicts of interest are poorly managed

3.53The committee received a substantial volume of evidence in relation to the management of conflicts of interest at Australian universities.

3.54A number of universities and sector peak bodies highlighted the policies in place to manage conflicts of interest. For example, the University of Adelaide noted that the 'university is an institution of public trust' and deals with conflicts of interest in a 'sensible, equitable and accountable manner'. Further, its council and committee members are required to declare conflicts of interest 'as soon as they arise or might be seen to arise', with civil liabilities attaching to failures to comply with conflict of interest provisions.[51]

3.55At Charles Sturt University (CSU), council members are required to declare their material interests annually, with a 'consolidated register of interests available for all Council members to view at all times'. This register is updated throughout the year. In addition, declarations of interest is a standing agenda item at council and committee meetings and 'council members absent themselves from discussions or decisions when necessary'.[52]

3.56While the UCC's Code of Governance Principles and Practice for Australia’s Public Universities states that university councils should maintain a public conflict of interest register, it was not clear how many universities adhere to this guidance. Of the universities that submitted to this inquiry, it appeared that only the University of Sydney referred specifically to publishing its register for council members' interests.[53]

3.57The University of Sydney also described a differentiated approach to handling conflicts of interest (see Box 3.2). In doing so, it noted that its approach to managing external interests and outside earnings of executive leaders and staff members is different to many other universities, which only require disclosure of actual, potential or perceived conflicts.[54]

3.58Despite having conflict of interest policies in place, multiple inquiry participants raised significant concerns about the way universities manage conflicts of interest—whether actual or perceived. The focus for much of this concern was the close affiliation of university management with consultancy firms, as well as the ability of vice-chancellors to engage in outside employment.

3.59In addition, the NTEU also reported that 'conflicts of interest trickle down from the senior executive to run rife inside institutions'.[56] This appeared to be reflected in evidence from other participants, who provided the committee with examples of perceived conflicts of interest in various aspects of universities' operations.[57]

University affiliation with consultancy firms

3.60Numerous submitters highlighted the growing involvement of consultancy firms in Australia's universities.[58] For example, the NTEU reported that in 2023, universities spent up to $734 million on '"consulting" and professional advice or services'.[59]

3.61According to the Australia Institute, the use of consultants has led to 'major, controversial decisions being taken at Australian universities without the integrity and transparency needed to ensure public confidence'.[60] In addition, the NTEU noted that 'several universities have brought management consultants onto their councils via their power to appoint members'.[61]

3.62Similar concerns were raised by Professor Cortese, who observed that many council members have 'substantive affiliations with some of Australia's largest corporations, all of which have close ties to the Big 4, adding to the intricacy of the networks of interest that can permeate university councils'. Professor Cortese argued that this orients university councils toward 'big business' and raises 'questions about the underlying presence of conflicts of interest':

Many of these questions have been raised in the public domain in recent months, with University of Wollongong's Interim Vice Chancellor, John Dewar, questioned over his secondment from his position at consulting firm KordaMentha, ANU Chancellor Julie Bishop questioned over inappropriate procurement practices with respect to consulting engagements, and University of Canberra's Interim Vice Chancellor Stephen Parker resigning from his role in December 2024, citing a loss of faith in the university council.[62]

3.63The potential for conflicts of interest to arise via the movement of senior executives between universities and consultants was underscored by ProfessorGuthrie and Dr Lucas, who highlighted the involvement of KordaMentha in the UoW Transformation Strategy (TS):

KordaMentha appears to have played a role in promoting the narrative that [the University of Wollongong's] financial status is unsustainable, and that as a consequence, dozens of subjects, courses, and disciplines should be targeted for 'downsizing' or 'disestablishment'.

KordaMentha has further leveraged its ability to implement and enforce its [University of Wollongong] TS following the installation of one of its partners, Professor John Dewar, as Interim Vice-Chancellor in June 2024.[63]

3.64The UoW case (see Box 3.3) was cited by multiple participants as an example of universities failing to appropriately manage conflicts of interest, despite having dedicated policies in place.[64] Professor Fiona Probyn-Rapsey of the NTEU told the committee:

The conflict of interest issue is, according to the chancellor, managed according to policy. The problem is that the conflict of interest should never have happened in the first place. Once that conflict of interest emerged, it would have made more sense to actually admit that it shouldn't have happened in the first place, and that hasn't occurred.[65]

3.65When questioned at a public hearing about this potential conflict of interest, MrMichael Still, Chancellor of UoW, stressed that it 'was not gone about in the way that has been reported to the press'. However, he also noted that 'at face value, of course, there's a likely perception of conflict'.[67]

3.66A further example of a perceived conflict arising from the relationship between universities and consultancy firms was provided by the Australia Institute, this time in relation to the merger between the University of South Australia and the University of Adelaide.

3.67According to the Australia Institute, 'the Chief Executive of Deloitte Asia‑Pacific, David Hill, was a member of the University of Adelaide's council when it voted in favour of the merger. Deloitte was later selected as 'the "integration and transformation partner" contracted to manage the prospective merger'. While both Deloitte and the University of Adelaide rejected the suggestion of a conflict of interest, questions were raised about how much information Deloitte had about the merger ahead of the tender process.[68]

Vice-chancellors and outside employment

3.68Participants were also concerned about potential conflicts of interest arising from the ability of senior university executives—particularly vice-chancellors—to engage in employment outside their university roles.According to the NTEU, there is currently a lack of 'university specific regulation regarding conflicts of interest and paid external appointments of senior executives'.[69]

3.69Concerns about paid external appointments were raised by various contributors, including the Australia Institute and the Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS).[70]

3.70The NTEU argued that the corporatisation of Australia's universities has 'normalised the … practice of highly paid university vice-chancellors taking on large portfolios of external paid appointments'. The NTEU also claimed this is 'often to a degree that would not be allowed for ordinary staff'.[71]

3.71In addition to the example of Professor John Dewar at UoW, the NTEU highlighted the appointment of Southern Cross University Vice Chancellor, Professor Tyrone Carlin (see Box 3.4), which it said, 'exemplifies' its 'concerns over transparency and potential conflicts of interest'.[72]

3.72The NTEU also raised concerns in relation to the external employment of a number of other university executives, including previous University of Melbourne Vice-Chancellor, Professor Duncan Maskell, who held directorships with:

CSL Limited (paid position, USD$187 334 in 2023);

Grattan Institute (not disclosed);

Group of Eight Ltd (unpaid);

Melbourne Business School (unpaid);

Melbourne Theatre Company (not disclosed); and

Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research (WEHI, not disclosed).[74]

3.73In particular, the NTEU queried the appropriateness of Professor Maskell's directorships with CSL and WEHI given the 'multi-million dollar commercial arrangements' between those two organisations and Melbourne University. Itnoted that despite Professor Maskell's directorships, none of the organisations' annual reports identified contracts between them as related party transactions.[75]

3.74Further, the NTEU pointed out that, as a director of CSL, the Corporations Act2001 requires Professor Maskell to 'act "in good faith in the best interests"' of CSL (with similar fiduciary duties applying to his role with WEHI). At the same time, under the University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic), Professor Maskell is '"the chief executive officer … responsible for the conduct of the university's affairs in all matters"'. The NTEU reflected on the inherent conflict in these dual roles:

Serious questions arise as to how Professor Maskell can simultaneously discharge these duties in relation to the multi-million commercial arrangements between the University of Melbourne, CSL and WEHI especially given their scale and significance. These questions are more acute given the substantial public funding being provided to this project (through Breakthrough Victoria).[76]

3.75The engagement of Swinburne University of Technology Vice-Chancellor, Professor Pascale Quester, by the Victorian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) was provided as another example of potentially problematic outside employment. While the NTEU did not know whether Professor Quester was paid for her consultancy activities, it noted that she engaged in lobbying by making a video promoting the VCCI's 2022 state election platform. Professor Quester also spoke in the VCCI's Chamber Change program as one of its champions.[77]

3.76In addition, in 2023, the Therapeutic Goods Authority (TGA) paid $22 000 to Hexagon, a marketing firm which lists Professor Quester as the sole director and shareholder. According to the NTEU, the TGA engaged Professor Quester as an expert witness in an Administrative Appeals Tribunal proceeding. However, neither the TGA payment or Hexagon were referred to in Swinburne University's relevant annual reports.[78]

3.77Questions were also asked about the appropriateness of former ANU Vice‑Chancellor Genevieve Bell retaining a paid position with Intel, which evidence suggests she failed to disclose to the university council.[79]

3.78In addition to raising questions about potential conflicts of interest, the NTEU questioned whether the time commitment required by multiple external appointments is compatible with the fulltime role of a university vice‑chancellor.[80]

Staff and student participation in university governance has declined

3.79Evidence about staff and student participation in university decision-making centred primarily on the decline in the number of elected council representatives, as well as their experiences on university councils.

Decline in staff and student representation on university councils

3.80The composition of university councils is set out in each university's establishing legislation. For example, according to the University of Melbourne, its establishing act 'specifies the membership of the Council, which includes':

The official members of the Council are—

(a)the Chancellor; and

(b)the Vice-Chancellor; and

(c)the president of the Academic Board.

The government appointed members are—

(a)at least 3 persons appointed by the Governor in Council; and

(b)one person appointed by the Minister.

The Council appointed members are the persons appointed by the Council.

The number of government appointed members must be equal to or greater than the number of Council appointed members.

At least 2 must be persons with financial expertise with relevant qualifications or experience in financial management; and one must be a person with commercial expertise at a senior level.[81]

3.81While omitted from the University of Melbourne submission, the University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic) also specifies that the university council includes elected members—these being one or more members elected by and from the university's staff and one or more members elected by and from the university's students.[82]

3.82Various submitters described an overall decline in the number of elected representatives on university councils.[83] For example, the Australia Institute noted that the past two decades have seen a decrease in the number of elected members on university councils—from more than one‑third of council positions in 2000 to one in four by 2020. At the same time, the number of corporate appointments to councils has increased.[84]

3.83Some participants, including the NTEU UQ, pointed to the role of the National Governance Protocols (NGP) in reducing the numbers of elected council members. The NGP mandated smaller councils with a majority of external council members and were a condition of Commonwealth Grant Scheme funding between 2004 and 2008. According to the NTEU UQ, vice-chancellors were 'empowered and emboldened' by the NPG 'to reduce elected staff and student representation to a minimum'.[85]

3.84The NTEU reported that in April 2024, elected members made up only 137 of the 545 council positions across Australia's public universities, with 366 being appointed members and 40 being ex-officio members (not including chancellors and vice-chancellors).[86] The proportion of elected and appointed council members varied across universities, with the University of Adelaide and CurtinUniversity having the highest proportion of elected representatives (38percent). The universities with the lowest proportion of elected representatives (13per cent) were Victoria University, Deakin University, Federation University, and La Trobe University (see Figure 3.1).

Source: NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 3 (The corporatisation of university governance in Australia), p. 3.

3.85In its submission, Victoria University indicated its 'intention to increase student representation on Council to include an undergraduate and post graduate category'.[87]

3.86While the value of corporate expertise in relation to financial and commercial matters was recognised, the Australia Institute argued that 'the influence of these interests in such an important governing body serves to undermine democratic accountability, as well as the participation of staff and students in university management'.[88]

3.87According to Professor Corinne Cortese, low rates of staff representation on universities councils leads to the exclusion of 'the expert voice within universities' and misses an opportunity for universities to build internal capacity and promote collegiality:

… those who work within the universities and who often have for decades‍‍—‍are absent from this highest echelon of university governance. Harnessing participative engagement from staff who have devoted years of service to the sector offers an opportunity for universities to invest in their own capacity and to work through and with academic cultures rather than around or even against them.[89]

3.88Similarly, the National Union of Students (NUS) noted that the lack of a universal requirement for student representation has resulted in 'inconsistent policies and a lack of student voices in key decision-making processes':

Without mandated student representation, governance decisions risk being made without consideration of student perspectives, potentially leading to policies that do not adequately reflect student interests.[90]

3.89Further, CAPA and NATSIPA contended that the increasing the involvement of internal university stakeholders in governance committees 'improves research and financial performance', which supports 'the argument that participation of different stakeholders in strategic decision-making provides critical expert knowledge'.[91]

3.90Similar views were shared by a range of contributors who also raised concerns about the proportion of council members who lack experience in, or a deep understanding of, the institutions they govern.[92] Dr Terri MacDonald of the NTEU explained:

… one of the things our report found which was quite concerning is that the view is that university boards are quite removed from the actual business of the institutions themselves. Many of those who are on the boards actually have very little, if any, experience. They wouldn't know what it's like to stand in a lecture theatre; they wouldn't know what it's like to be in student admin during the enrolment period—things like that. It's really important that these boards understand the business of what they're doing as well as their responsibility to act in the public interest.[93]

3.91This sentiment was also reflected in the testimony of Dr Liz Allen, a former staff‑elected member of the ANU Council, who observed that:

People who have so-called skin in the game, those that work or study at the ANU, are outnumbered by people that rarely set foot on campus. When the appointed members do come to campus, it's for official ceremonies and duties only; it's not ever to operate or interact at the coalface, so to speak. So they're very out of touch with the reality of higher education.[94]

3.92Professor Peter Tregear OAM noted that 'barely a third' of university council members in Australia have a background in tertiary education—a situation he described as 'an anomaly internationally'. Professor Tregear compared this with Oxford University in the United Kingdom, where 77 per cent of members 'have experience in the university sector, and 73 per cent have an explicit academic background and expertise'.[95]

3.93The University of Wollongong NTEU Branch Committee (NTEU UoW) argued that this lack of higher education expertise limits the ability of councils to 'fulfil their fundamental duties of probing management and decision-making'. According to the NTEU UoW, this can result in 'capture of governance and decision-making by management, who may present the equivalent of "dog and pony shows" to councils'.[96]

3.94Dr Robert Czernkowski also referred to the potential for council 'capture' by the executive. Dr Czernkowski's evidence appeared to suggest this risk was heightened—at least at UTS—by the unwillingness of external council members to engage with university staff outside formal board meetings. Dr Czernkowski noted that 'this type of interaction assists with a mutual understanding and helps develop more nuanced comprehension of the business of the entity'.[97]

3.95Dr Mary Russell, Chief Executive Officer of TEQSA, also spoke to the need for university councils to have public sector governance expertise:

I would add that, as public institutions, there is a need for the experience and expertise of people who have a background in public sector governance and accountability. That is one of the areas that is, at the moment, not sufficiently addressed in governance requirements or skills and capability matrices for university councils. That is one of the issues that I am raising with the expert committee.[98]

Staff and student experiences on university councils

3.96Evidence received by the committee revealed a disconnect between the structures and processes universities may have in place to facilitate staff and student participation in the governance of universities, and the way those structures and processes operate in practice.

3.97For example, the UCC stated that university governing bodies are 'very aware and supportive' of requirements in relation to competent academic governance and leadership, and the participation of students in academic governance:

This point needs emphasising because it highlights the academic collegial approach that is deeply entrenched in our system. They are aware of their obligation under the Standards to take steps "to develop and maintain an institutional environment in which freedom of speech and academic freedom are upheld and protected, students and staff are treated equitably, the wellbeing of students and staff is fostered, informed decision making by students is supported and students have opportunities to participate in the deliberative and decision-making processes of the higher education provider".[99]

3.98However, the UCC also pointed out that 'tensions may be perceived when a governing body makes a decision that some in the academic community or student body disagree with, but sometimes there is no alternative'.[100]

3.99Some universities provided the committee with details of the steps they take to facilitate staff and student participation in university governance. For example, Deakin University stated that in addition to elected staff and student members of council, it also holds regular student forums.[101]

3.100Similarly, Distinguished Professor George Williams AO, Vice-Chancellor and President of WSU told the committee of the various avenues used to engage with students:

I spend a lot of my time listening to students, somewhat uncomfortably, sometimes on TikTok and Instagram—all sorts of places—to be where our students are. My most impactful times have been spent with students as I'm teaching this year. I've spent time in our student services hub and I attend community dinners. What I've heard from our students is reflected in our recently released 2030 strategy that the board has recently endorsed.[102]

3.101In addition, Professor Williams told the committee that WSU's change process is being 'driven from the ground up by our staff' and that the university is listening to, and working in partnership with, the NTEU on issues such as casualisation.[103]

3.102However, other contributors, such as Professor Gerd Schröder-Turk, argued that university governance structures are '"window dressing" for university management that, on paper, appears to have a robust system of independent governance but that in practice is disempowered and not effective in providing oversight'.[104]

3.103A similar view was expressed by Mr William Burfoot, an elected student member on the ANU Council, who described both structural and cultural barriers to staff and student participation in university governance:

I think there are two parts to this. There is the structural and there is the cultural. With the cultural aspect, rather than just focusing on the presence of students on councils we need to … focus on the ability of students and staff to actually participate fully and to fulfil their obligations to provide oversight and accountability. … students and staff need to be trusted members of council and council needs to take their perspectives and their opinions seriously. During my time on ANU Council I saw the exact opposite of that. I've seen a real distrust between external and internal members.[105]

3.104This view was supported by other participants, who suggested that approaches to staff and student representation on council can be tokenistic. For example, the NTEU observed that staff and student representatives are excluded from some governance committees. In addition, there is a sense that their contributions are undervalued in comparison to those members with corporate expertise:

… the contribution of the university community—that is, the staff, students and alumni, is minimised and their knowledge and skills not valued at the same level.This is a particular issue on institutional audit and risk bodies, and on remuneration committees which set Vice Chancellor salaries. The exclusion of staff from these bodies also impacts on issues around transparency, trust and accountability.[106]

3.105To this end, Mr Burfoot spoke about what he felt was ANU Council's dismissive attitude toward student representatives:

I appreciate that I am 22 years old and that I am an undergraduate student. … I know that I can't always give as well informed an opinion as other council members, but I do expect that, regardless of what I say, I'm treated with respect and in good faith. I can't say that that has always been the case. There have been times where I have made a point … The response to that, I felt, was demeaning. It was dismissive, and it ignored my core concerns and almost made a joke out of them. I can't imagine any kind of corporate board or any other decision-making body like council where that kind of behaviour would be acceptable.[107]

3.106Dr Allen also spoke of the divide between the appointed and elected members of ANU Council:

The council situation at the ANU is very far removed from the very egalitarian system that exists across the university generally. There is a very clear delineation between the appointed members, who are appointed via a nominations committee which is headed by the chancellor, and the elected members, who come through the staff, via an election process, or the students, through a similar, democratic process.[108]

3.107The NTEU also claimed it was aware of 'many instances' of staff representatives 'being excluded from parts of meetings, being prevented from adding to agendas, not receiving papers, not being able to speak out during meetings, excluded from positions on subcommittees, etc'.[109]

3.108Dr Francis Markham, a staff-elected representative who resigned from the ANU Council due to governance concerns, spoke to this point:

Recent council meetings have revealed a fundamental disagreement regarding our interpretations of our roles. Efforts by other council members to seek information have been unsuccessful … and attempts to move motions have not been permitted by the chair at times … My experience has been that meeting procedures have, at times, both made it difficult to know what decisions have been made and limited full discussions.[110]

3.109In a similar vein, Mr Burfoot described actions that felt to him 'like deliberate attempts to limit council members' access to information and to frustrate any real attempts at oversight or active council involvement'. He explained:

… following the 3 July out-of-session council meeting, which was called by me and other elected members, a motion was brought that sought to pause Renew ANU and its related activities until TEQSA has concluded their investigation. This motion was not brought to a vote and in my opinion no satisfactory reason was given why. Following this and the leaking of matters discussed in the meeting, council access to documents, information, briefings, senior executives and further out-of-session council meetings was cancelled. While I appreciate the need for confidentiality, it is my opinion that this step was taken not to ensure the safety or security of future council meetings but to punish members for raising concerns and to limit our oversight during a period where many change proposals were being released.[111]

3.110Participants also highlighted the burden on the (sometimes) sole staff or student representative on council, which can be made worse by the confidentiality around council deliberations. Professor Schröder-Turk elaborated:

A single council member elected by and from the academic staff is not sufficient to ensure that the views and the 'on the ground' experience of the academic staff are appropriately considered in council decision making. It is too easy for the university management to portray any view expressed by that single member as the view of an individual, and it is difficult for other council members to judge whether a view expressed by that member is that of an individual or a more widely held view. This is particularly relevant in cases where the views expressed are contrary to the narrative that the university management conveys to the council.[112]

3.111Similarly, Mr Burfoot described his experiences engaging with 'very inaccessible' ANU Council meetings:

My time in council has indicated that how council meetings are structured and run is very inaccessible. The council packs are regularly over 400 pages—600 pages in some cases. On a good week, they'll be delivered to us the week before the meeting. … it's incredibly difficult to decipher the information in the packs and then accurately relay that and home in on it. So I think, in that sense, it's very difficult for a student—and other elected members on council—to properly engage and provide the oversight that we would expect of council.[113]

3.112A similar sentiment was expressed by Mr Weihong Liang, the International Office with CAPA, who told the committee of the difficulties faced by students:

Student representatives have a lack of support from the professional staff and a lack of training. A common situation is when I sit on the university committee. What I face is hundreds of pages of agendas prepared by professional consultants, presented by the senior and professional staff and leaders. We are like soldiers being sent into battle, armed only with our courage. How can student representatives respond efficiently in this environment? It's really hard.[114]

3.113For CAPA and NATSIPA, this reflects the lack of a 'unified model for how universities should engage constructively with members of their community, such as students', which can result in students feeling overwhelmed due to a lack of training, or feeling as if engagement is tokenistic.[115]

3.114The Department of Education noted that clarifying the way the role of governing body members is described was one of the priority areas for action guiding the work of the Expert Council on University Governance.[116]

Concerns about the treatment of staff and student representatives

3.115In addition to concerns about the ability of staff and student representatives to participate fully in council deliberations, the committee also heard troubling evidence in relation to their treatment by senior executives. The NTEU stated it was aware of occasions where staff representatives had been targeted for speaking publicly about their concerns, as well as instances 'where university management has attempted to remove them from boards and/or threatened their employment'.[117]

3.116The NTEU highlighted the case of Professor Schröder-Turk, of Murdoch University, who had spoken to the media about the exploitation of international students, including concerns for the students' health and welfare and for the academic integrity of the university's degree programs. According to the NTEU, Murdoch University attempted to remove Professor Schröder-Turk from its council and later tried to sue him:

… alleging that he was responsible for a 15 per cent drop in their international student enrolments and thus owed what may amount to millions of dollars in damages. The University later dropped the case.[118]

3.117In his submission to the inquiry, Professor Schröder-Turk warned that staff representatives on councils were fearful that 'actions or expressions in their governance roles may have adverse consequences for their employment or career progression'. He also considered that the fuelling of those fears—or at least the failure to dispel them—by university management 'could be seen as intimidatory or inappropriate'.[119]

3.118Dr Mathew Abbott, NTEU Branch President at Federation University, reported on his treatment as a staff elected member of Federation University's council:

My own experiences as a staff elected councillor reflect these problems and, from a governance perspective, reflect what I regard as hostility towards staff members who ask questions or raise concerns about the decisions and behaviour of management. I have been subject to intimidation, vilification, attempts at silencing and what appeared to me to be threatening behaviour from the chair of the council.[120]

3.119Fears about retribution were also expressed by witnesses at the committee's public hearings, including MrMillan Pintos-Lopez, president of the ANU NTEU branch and a former professional staff representative on the ANU Council. After his departure from ANU Council, Mr Pintos-Lopez said he received an unsigned letter from the ANU's legal office titled 'Reminder of obligations of confidentiality'. Two weeks later, he was instructed to begin submitting timesheets for all time spent on union activities—despite the enterprise agreement providing him with a 40 per cent time release for these activities. Afew days after this, he was told the ANU's Chief Operating Officer had requested a copy of his performance development review:

In over eight years at the ANU, including during my time on the council and as a union president, my performance development reviews and timesheets have never been requested at the executive level nor have I ever received formal letters from university lawyers. I believe these actions were a direct response to my public criticism of the ANU's leadership decision to launch Renew ANU and, unfortunately, the message was received. I felt intimidated, I began second-guessing my public statements and I hesitated to speak to the media in my role as union president. I started removing my signature from union emails and relying on the division's secretary for my communications. I genuinely feared for my job and had serious conversations with my partner about the possibility of being dismissed.[121]

3.120When questioned about the request for Mr Pintos-Lopez' performance development review, the ANU's Chief Operating Officer, Mr Jonathan Churchill, denied it was linked to Mr Pintos-Lopez' public criticisms of the university. Instead, Mr Churchill stated that he 'just wanted to make sure that the obligations between employer and employee were appropriately satisfied'.[122]

3.121However, participants such as Professor Tregear contended that the ANU has a culture of active suppression of 'whistleblowing of all kinds'. During his appearance, Professor Tregear pointed out that a recent review by Professor Christine Nixon AO had concluded that the 'most significant element' leading to the ANU's '"remarkable tolerance for poor behaviour and bullying" across the university' is the fact that 'at ANU, poor behaviour doesn't lead to negative consequences'. Professor Tregear argued that he knew 'only too well why':

As I've outlined, whistleblowing of all kinds is not just discouraged at the ANU; it is actively suppressed by, for instance, the habitual mishandling of public interest disclosures or the misuse of non-disclosure agreements. Deflection and denial are the standard responses when managerial problems attract outside attention.[123]

3.122While less common, the committee also received evidence about positive experiences on university councils. For example, Dr Robert Czernkowski, an elected member of the UTS Council, stated that there are many things that the UTS Council does well:

Compared to other universities, at Council there is no bullying, conflicts of interest are managed appropriately, and meetings are professionally run with respectful engagement.[124]

Training for staff and student representatives

3.123The committee received mixed evidence on the issue of training for elected council members. For example, the UCC's Code of Governance Principles and Practice for Australia’s Public Universities promotes the provision of information and training for council members as good practice. It further states that:

Each governing body should make available a program of induction and professional development for members and require that they undertake training on the specific responsibilities and expectations of their role as governing body members.[125]

3.124To this end, the UCC stated that council members and staff with governance responsibilities complete a course that it offers in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD).[126]

3.125UoW told the committee that all council members receive 'a series of inductions on commencement … including a governance induction', as well as an annual briefing by the university's general counsel on council member duties and obligations.[127]

3.126Similarly, Dr Czernkowski stated that the university 'generously enrolled me in governance and finance courses through the … AICD'.[128]

3.127In his evidence to the committee, Mr Burfoot stated that the ANU offers AICD training to all council members, which goes 'part of the way to ensuring that council members do understand the broad expectations and obligations of the role'.[129]

3.128Ms Ashlyn Horton, National President of the NUS, contended that the provision of governance training was not standard practice. According to Ms Horton, this results in student representatives feeling as though they are outsiders on councils and are 'set up to fail':

Something that we hear a lot from student members on university councils is that they feel that they've kind of been set up to fail because they haven't received that training and then, in their council meetings, they are faced with feeling very much like an outsider. There's very little engagement with them from the other members on the council, and they're treated like a child. I think that setting students up to fail in these spaces gives universities an excuse to not engage with their student representatives.[130]

3.129Similarly, CAPA and NATSIPA contended that a 'lack of investment into student participation undermines the participation and threatens to tokenise engagement'.[131]

3.130The Department of Education noted that the requirement for council members to undertake governance training was one of the priority areas for action guiding the work of the Expert Council on University Governance.[132]

Suggested actions to improve transparency and accountability

3.131In response to the issues outlined above, inquiry participants proposed a range of actions to make university decision-making processes more transparent, and leadership more accountable and responsive to the university community and the public. These included:

enhanced transparency and reporting by universities;

changes to the composition of university councils;

better training for elected members of university councils; and

cultural changes to embed and safeguard the participation of staff and students in university governance.

Enhance transparency and reporting

3.132Multiple participants reflected on the need for universities to enhance transparency and reporting, particularly in relation to council deliberations and decisions, as well as conflicts of interest—including outside employment of vice‑chancellors—and expenditure on consultants.

Publish university council meeting minutes and other key documents

3.133There was significant support for the proposition that all universities should be required to publish minutes of council meetings. For some, this extended to support for the publication of other documents such as meeting agendas and papers, consultation outcomes, and council evaluations.[133]

3.134For example, the Australia Institute recommended that all university councils publish their minutes in full, 'with any exceptions or redactions publicly explained'.[134]

3.135NTEU Monash proposed the 'timely and irrevocable publication' of council minutes, as well as minutes of other decision-making committees and the outcomes of consultations with the university community.[135]

3.136NTEU UTS suggested there should be 'standard frameworks for public release of Council reports for both regular meetings and annual reports, including those regarding Council self-performance evaluations'.[136]

3.137Other participants, such as Mr Christian Flynn, also called for minutes to 'accurately record the contributions and action items according to who is suggesting feedback'. Further, he urged that 'open, recorded votes on governance matters should be taken, allowing for more democratic debate and discussion'.[137]

3.138Some participants, such as Public Universities Australia, suggested that council meetings could be held in public—either in full or in part.[138] The Australia Institute provided the example of the University of Turin in Italy, which holds all meetings of its collegial bodies in public.[139]

3.139Others, such as Professor Brian Yates proposed introducing 'town hall' style council meetings 'to allow for direct feedback from the university community'.[140] A similar suggestion was received from Dr Tim Moore, who recommended that council members 'present to their university community on at least a yearly basis—to speak to the contents of their annual report and to field inquiries about their activities from the university community'.[141]

Report consultancy expenditure, conflicts of interest, and external employment

3.140A range of participants suggested that greater transparency would be achieved by improved reporting in relation to consultancy expenditure, conflicts of interest, and external employment of senior executives.[142]

3.141Some, like the Australia Institute and Professor Cortese, suggested that the Victorian model of consultancy spending disclosures be adopted nationally.[143]

3.142Disclosure of consultancy spending was also supported by Professor Williams, who noted that while the amount WSU spends on consultants is in its audited reports, he was also happy to answer questions about consultancy expenditure:

This is public money spent by a public organisation. It's in our audit accounts, but we don't mind answering questions and, indeed, being asked why we did use a consultant in a particular case.[144]

3.143Similarly, Professor Andrew Parfitt, the Vice-Chancellor and President of UTS, told the committee that while UTS already discloses consultancies over $50 000 in its annual report, 'all consultants could well be listed as an appendix'.[145]

3.144In addition to reporting on expenditure, Professor Cortese proposed 'full and transparent disclosure of the process for tendering consulting engagements by universities, and particularly by university councils'.[146]

3.145Likewise, as well as supporting 'more robust reporting of all consultancy activities' Dr Tim Moore advocated for a limit to be imposed on 'the percentage of university revenues that can be expended on external consultancies'.[147]

3.146Mr Simon Walker proposed amendments to the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011 or other legislation to require public reporting of—among other things—external consultants, as well as conflicts of interest.[148]

3.147Similarly, the Australia Institute argued that 'a national requirement to report on itemised spending on consultants should also be accompanied by stricter requirements for the disclosure of conflicts of interest'. To this end, it proposed that council members' real (or perceived) conflicts of interest be made publicly available and reported to TEQSA.[149]

3.148A similar proposal was put forward by the NTEU UoW, which recommended that universities adopt conflict of interest policies dealing with university council members and senior university executives. In addition, it suggested that:

policies applying to the management of conflicts at the executive and management level align with provisions applying to the public sector; and

an external agency be empowered to investigate concerns over conflicts of interest.[150]

3.149There was also a suggestion that universities improve transparency around donations, particularly where a donor assumes a role in the governance of a university.[151]

3.150There were mixed views on vice-chancellors undertaking external work. While some participants advocated for a complete ban, others argued for stricter controls and public reporting. For example, the NTEU recommended that there be public reporting of, and strict limits on, vice-chancellor external engagements 'to ensure the proper performance of their responsibilities'.[152]

3.151However, the Australia Institute went further and recommended that vice‑chancellors and other key executives be prohibited from taking on 'other paid work during their tenure'. It also argued that:

Any executive who is paid more than $250 000 should be required to disclose any ongoing partnership or non-remunerated corporate role to the national regulator, not to a university council. The national regulator should be empowered to make the final determination about whether such external positions are appropriate.[153]

Change the composition of university councils

3.152Various contributors reflected on possible changes to the composition of university councils, particularly in relation to the need for increased public and higher education sector expertise, as well as an increase in the number of elected council members.

Increase public and higher education sector experience on university councils

3.153There were multiple calls for reforms to ensure greater public and higher education sector experience on university councils.[154]

3.154For example, the NTEU observed that the Universities Accord had called for more sector experience on university councils and proposed 'consideration of public and higher education sector experience in board appointments, rather than the current preference for consultants and corporate'.[155]

3.155Similarly, the Curtin Student Guild provided a suite of recommendations aimed at increasing the number of members who 'possess the depth of knowledge of academia, academic governance and the real-world implications of decisions'. These included:

that universities be required to increase the number of academics seated as co‑opted and appointed governing body members;

that academic governance experience should be a skill sought after in recruitment for co-opted and appointed governing body positions; and

a requirement that the majority of non-university governing body members have public sector experience.[156]

3.156The NTEU UoW proposed that UoW's establishing legislation be amended to require that 'half of the independent appointed members … have expertise, experience and skills in the tertiary education sector, and at least two members … have expertise in teaching and research'. In addition, it suggested that state ministers report publicly on the appointment of members to university councils.[157]

Increase the number of elected members on university councils

3.157While there were numerous calls to increase the number of elected members on university councils,[158] there were conflicting views on what would constitute an appropriate number or proportion of elected members.

3.158For example, the Australia Institute recommended amending universities' establishing legislation to require a majority of council members to be democratically elected by staff and students.[159]

3.159Similarly, submitters such as Professor Lionel Page argued that professors should make up more than 50 per cent of university councils.[160]

3.160A majority of elected members on council was also supported by other participants, including CAPA, Professor Tregear, Dr Bede Harris, and Professor Nicholas Biddle, among others.[161]

3.161Others recommended a lower proportion of elected members. For example, Professor Schröder-Turk recommended that at least one third of council members be 'elected by and from the academics of the university'.[162]

3.162While the NTEU proposed that the university community should comprise the majority of university council members, it recommended the 'proportion of democratically elected staff representatives should constitute no less than 20percent' of council members.[163]

3.163Similarly, the NTEU UTS proposed that staff representation be set at 33 per cent of all voting members of council, plus one member who is a union representative. However, on sub-committees of council, it proposed a majority of staff members.[164]

3.164Others, such as Professor Cortese, did not specify a proportion or number but stressed the need for councils to 'include a greater proportion of elected staff positions'.[165]

3.165In terms of student representation, the NUS proposed that university councils should have at least two democratically elected student representatives with full voting rights.[166]

3.166In addition, the SECS Project proposed that all university governing bodies 'be composed of at least 30 per cent students',[167] while further, CAPA advocated for 'greater inclusion of postgraduate students in the governance framework'.[168]

3.167The NTEU argued that the 'simplest option' for achieving greater staff and student representation would be via nationally agreed minimum standards for the number of elected staff and student positions on university councils'.[169]

3.168However, the proposal for a majority of elected council members was rejected by other participants. For example, while Professor Westacott stressed the importance and impact of student engagement and supported 'very strong student and staff voices on these governing bodies', she contended that having more than 50 per cent elected members would not resolve universities' governance issues:

I don't know that that is going to be a solution to many of the issues that people are raising. … There are things like publishing minutes and allowing parts of the meeting to be observed. It's also very important to have stability in governance, and I'm not sure that having 50 per cent or more than 50 per cent of people elected is actually going to do a lot for stability.

The final point is that these are complex organisations. Our act is very clear: the job of the board is to govern for the university and to act in the university's interests. … And it's very important that boards have the right expertise to act in the university's interests.

… Is there an opportunity for greater staff and student representation? Sure, and hopefully that's something Melinda Cilento's review will pick up on.[170]

3.169Professor Westacott also pointed out that council membership is not the only forum for student engagement and noted the heavy consultation she and the vice-chancellor engage in at WSU:

For example, prior to selecting the vice-chancellor, I actually held forums with the students about what they were looking for in their vice-chancellor, rather than just having a student on the selection committee.[171]

3.170In a similar vein, the Department of Education also observed that while the Expert Council on University Governance was considering staff and student council membership, it was also considering the need for 'separate, transparent processes' to capture staff and student input on 'university strategy, policies and performance'.[172]

Improve training for elected members of university councils

3.171Alongside an increased proportion of elected council members, various participants highlighted a need for better training to ensure members are able to contribute effectively.[173] For example, the SECS Project proposed that student council members receive training about:

the role and purpose of the governing body;

the roles of other representatives in the body;

how to read and engage with formal meeting packs and procedures;

how to raise issues on the governing body; and

the scope of the governing body.[174]

3.172For many participants, members' training needs went beyond a single course. For example, the NUS called for 'induction programs, governance training, and ongoing support to student representatives'.[175]

3.173The NTEU recommended that council members undertake formal professional development programs. These would go 'beyond ensuring that members are aware of their duties and responsibilities' and extend to 'training on interpret[ing] institutional data, financial information, and around working constructively with diversity'.[176]

3.174CAPA and NATSIPA argued that universities needed to provide 'adequate training, inductions and investment into the students, so that they can effectively contribute as partners to the academic and corporate governance'. They also advocated for ongoing supervision to ensure students were engaging appropriately.[177]

3.175Mr Liang also recommended a national program to support students in their roles with university councils, but suggested that it should go beyond training:

We need briefings from staff. We need access to data and policy research capacity. We need proper training. We need a living allowance that can cover our time to work in that space. In particular, international students engaged in a formal representative role should be allowed to undertake part-time study in order to carry out these responsibilities. This support is needed at both a national level and a campus level. I suggest the federal level establish a program especially to support student representation.[178]

3.176The Department of Education noted that the Expert Council on University Governance was looking at requirement for 'all governing body members to have, or undertake, training on the specific responsibilities and expectations of their role as governing body members'.[179]

Cultural change to embed and safeguard staff and student participation

3.177The committee received evidence that pointed to the need for cultural change within universities to embed and safeguard staff and student participation in university governance. For example, the NTEU stated that university councils should 'not unreasonably discriminate between governing body members, and all members have a right to serve on relevant committees and sub-committees'. In addition, it called for greater protections to ensure elected members can 'exercise their rights and responsibilities in relation to the sound management and stewardship of the institution and act in the best interests of the university as a whole':

This includes holding the institution's management to account for its decisions, actions and direction; understanding the mission of the institution and helping to define its strategic direction; contributing to the monitoring and review of the governing body, including the performance of the Vice‑Chancellor, and ensuring that governance structures and processes are fit for purpose.[180]

3.178Similarly, the NUS advocated for student representatives to be included in 'all major governance discussions, particularly those related to financial management, risk assessment, and institutional restructuring'.[181]

3.179Mr Richard Lee, National Vice-President of CAPA, spoke about the limits on student participation in governance structures and argued for more authentic involvement:

Our members who are student members on governing bodies have repeatedly talked to us about being treated as second-class members on their respective university councils. We have reduced access to papers, or we're not able to nominate for council committees. Some universities don't even have postgraduate student members on their governing body, and the majority of universities don't differentiate between coursework and research postgraduate members on their council or university senate. In some universities, the student members are the only ones who are not remunerated for their time. This is indicative of the levels of respect afforded to student members in the university senates.

What we want to see is a more authentic embedment of student members in the university governance framework. This means actively listening to what students have to say in council and senate meetings and providing students with the appropriate resources so that they are able to maximise their expertise in these council and senate meetings.[182]

3.180To this end, CAPA and NATSIPA recommended the Higher Education Standards Framework be amended to 'include a framework for how universities should work with students as partners in corporate and academic governance'.[183]

3.181Recommendations addressing some of the issues raised in this chapter are set out in the committee view at the end of Chapter 5.

Footnotes

[1]See, for example, Monash University, Submission 40 (47th Parliament), pp. 1–7; Macquarie University, Submission 61 (47th Parliament), [pp. 3–5]; University of Wollongong (UoW), Submission 42 (47thParliament), pp. 1–5; University of Adelaide, Submission 54 (47th Parliament), pp. 5–13; Deakin University, Submission 33 (47th Parliament), [pp. 1–8]; Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia, Submission 9, pp.2–3; Swinburne University of Technology, Submission 35 (47th Parliament), [pp. 1–4]; Innovative Research Universities, Submission 64 (47thParliament), [pp. 1–3].

[2]UCC, Submission 23 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[3]UCC, Submission 23 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[4]Ms Vicki Thomson, Chief Executive, Group of Eight, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p.11.

[5]See, for example, University of Western Australia Academic Staff Association (UWAASA), Submission 38 (47th Parliament), pp. 1–2; Dr John Quiggan, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), [p. 11]; Mr Simon Walker, Submission 112 (47th Parliament), [pp. 2–3]. All universities are established under state or territory legislation except for the Australian National University (ANU), which is established under Commonwealth legislation.

[6]Dr John Quiggan, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), [p. 11].

[7]UWAASA, Submission 38 (47th Parliament), pp.1and 2.

[8]See, for example, Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5, [p. 1]; Dr Marija Taflaga, Dr Francis Markham, and Professor Keith Dowding, Submission 6, [pp. 3, 10, 11]; Name Withheld, Submission 145 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[9]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 31.

[10]Dr John Quiggan, Submission 11 (47th Parliament), [p. 12].

[11]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 1.

[12]University Chancellors Council (UCC), Submission 23 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[13]Professor Mary O'Kane AC, Interim Chief Commissioner, Interim Australian Tertiary Education Commission, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 12.

[14]Professor Christine Nixon AO PSM, Report of a Review into matters of gender and culture in the ANU College of Health and Medicine and its constituent Schools, the John Curtin School of Medical Research, the School of Medicine and Psychology, and the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, 27May2025, p. 6.

[15]See, for example, Mr William Burfoot, President, Australian National University Students' Association (ANUSA), Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 25; NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), pp. 15 and 16; Mr Christian Flynn, Submission 12, [pp. 3 and 4].

[16]National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 5.

[17]University of New South Wales (UNSW), Submission 34 (47th Parliament), pp. 2 and 4. See, also, TheUniversity of Queensland, Submission 43 (47th Parliament), pp. 1–4; Charles Sturt University, Submission 52 (47thParliament), pp. 6–12; The University of Notre Dame Australia, Submission 63 (47th Parliament), [pp. 1–2]; The University of Western Australia, Submission 19 (47th Parliament), pp. 1–6.

[18]Australian National University (ANU), Submission 107 (47th Parliament), p. 7.

[19]See, for example, Name Withheld, Submission 298 (47th Parliament), p. 4; Mr Ian Gray, Submission 2 (47th Parliament), [p. 1]; Name Withheld, Submission 289 (47th Parliament), p. 4; Dr Shumi Akhtar, Submission 288 (47th Parliament), p. 2; The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p.22; UWAASA, Submission 38 (47th Parliament), p. 2; Professor Nicholas Biddle, Submission 14, [p. 2]; Dr Matthew Allen, Submission 85 (47th Parliament), p. 1; Dr John Fitzsimmons, Submission 79 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[20]Name Withheld, Submission 153, [p. 1].

[21]Name Withheld, Submission 173, p. 1.

[22]See, for example, NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 15; Professor Nicholas Biddle, Submission 14, [p. 5]; Professor Peter Tregear, Submission 191 (47th Parliament), p. 4; Name Withheld, Submission 143 (47th Parliament), p. 1; Name Withheld, Submission 289 (47th Parliament), p. 8; DrMarija Taflaga, Dr Francis Markham, and Professor Keith Dowding, Submission6, [p.15]; Name Withheld, Submission 173 (47th Parliament), p. 1.

[23]University of Queensland NTEU Branch Committee (NTEU UQ), Submission 102 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[24]Name Withheld, Submission 275 (47th Parliament), [p. 1].

[25]UWAASA, Submission 38 (47th Parliament), p. 2. See also, NTEU University of Wollongong Branch Committee (NTEU UoW), Submission 78 (47th Parliament), p. 2; Professor Nicholas Biddle, Submission 14, [pp. 3 and 5].

[26]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 22.

[27]Deakin University, Submission 33 (47th Parliament), [p. 2]. See also, University of Technology Sydney (UTS), Submission 14 (47th Parliament), p. 7; ANU, Submission 107 (47thParliament), pp. 2, 7, and 11.

[28]Professor Jennifer Westacott AC, Chancellor, WSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 8September 2025, p.8.

[29]UCC, Submission 23 (47th Parliament), [p. 7].

[30]UTS NTEU Branch (NTEU UTS), Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p.3]. See also, Dr Matthew Allen, Submission 85 (47th Parliament), p. 1; Mr Simon Walker, Submission 112 (47th Parliament), [p. 4]; Dr John Fitzsimmons, Submission 79 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[31]NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p.3].

[32]NTEU Monash University Branch (NTEU Monash), Submission 117 (47th Parliament), [p. 8].

[33]Dr Tim Moore, Submission 104 (47th Parliament), p. 3.

[34]Mr Christian Flynn, Submission 12, [p. 4].

[35]UWAASA, Submission 38 (47th Parliament), p. 2.

[36]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 15.

[37]NTEU Monash, Submission 117 (47th Parliament), [p. 8].

[38]NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[39]University of Sydney Association of Professors (USAP), Submission 113 (47th Parliament), p. 16.

[40]USAP, Submission 113 (47th Parliament), p. 16.

[41]Sexual Ethics on Campuses Project (SECS Project), Submission 28 (47th Parliament), [p. 4].

[42]NTEU UQ, Submission 102 (47th Parliament), [p. 4].

[43]Dr Lachlan Clohesy, Secretary, ACT Division, NTEU, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p.8.

[44]Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 75, [p. 7]. See also, The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 24; Dr Tim Moore, Submission 104 (47th Parliament), p. 4.

[45]Professor James Guthrie and Dr Adam Lucas, Submission 188 (47th Parliament), pp. 9–10.

[46]See, for example, NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p. 5]; Dr Alex Burns, Submission 99 (47th Parliament), p. 9; The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), pp. 7–8; Name Withheld, Submission 282 (47th Parliament), p. 1; Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5, [p. 4].

[47]NTEU Monash, Submission 117 (47th Parliament), [p. 8].

[48]Mr Simon Walker, Submission 112 (47th Parliament), [p. 5].

[49]Stop Woodside Monash, Submission 118 (47th Parliament), pp. 3, 4, and 5.

[50]Mr Simon Walker, Submission 112 (47th Parliament), [p. 5].

[51]University of Adelaide, Submission 54 (47th Parliament), p. 8. See also, UNSW, Submission 34 (47thParliament), p. 3; UTS, Submission 14 (47th Parliament), pp. 5–6; Innovative Research Universities, Submission 64 (47th Parliament), [p. 2]; University of Western Australia, Submission 19 (47th Parliament), p. 4; University of Queensland, Submission 43 (47th Parliament), p. 2.

[52]Charles Sturt University, Submission 52 (47th Parliament), p. 8.

[53]University of Sydney, Submission 39 (47th Parliament), p. 6.

[54]University of Sydney, Submission 39 (47th Parliament), p. 6.

[55]University of Sydney, Submission 39 (47th Parliament), pp. 6–7.

[56]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1, p. 13.

[57]See, for example, Name Withheld, Submission 144 (47th Parliament), [pp. 2–3]; USAP, Submission 113 (47th Parliament), pp. 16–17; Name Withheld, Submission 275 (47th Parliament), [pp. 3–4]; Mr Simon Walker, Submission 112 (47th Parliament), [pp. 13 and 14]; NTEU Monash, Submission 117 (47th Parliament), [pp. 10–11].

[58]See, for example, NTEU UQ, Submission 102 (47th Parliament), [p. 7]; Name Withheld, Submission 271 (47th Parliament), [p. 1]; Name Withheld, Submission 238 (47th Parliament), [p. 1] Public Universities Australia, Submission 71 (47th Parliament), p. 16; Professor Peter Tregear, Submission 191 (47th Parliament), p. 12; NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [pp. 8 and 9]; Name Withheld, Submission 251 (47th Parliament), [p. 1]; USAP, Submission 113.1 (47th Parliament), p.3; DrRobert Czernkowski, Submission 5, [p. 4]; Name Withheld, Submission 278 (47th Parliament), [p.2].

[59]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 14.

[60]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), pp. 24–25.

[61]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 14.

[62]Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 75, [p. 8].

[63]Professor James Guthrie and Dr Adam Lucas, Submission 188 (47th Parliament), p. 4.

[64]See, for example, NTEU UoW, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), pp. 3–4; NTEU, Submission 15 (47thParliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 11; The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament) Appendix A (Elective spending at Australian universities: Millions splashed on consultancies, travel and advertising), pp. 20–21; Name Withheld, Submission 268 (47th Parliament), [p. 1]; Name Withheld, Submission 278 (47th Parliament), [p.2].

[65]Professor Fiona Probyn-Rapsey, Member, NTEU, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 March 2025, p. 4.

[66]NTEU UoW, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), pp. 3–4.

[67]Mr Michael Still, Chancellor, UoW, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p.40.

[68]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 25. See also, Thomas Kelsall, 'Conflict concerns after Deloitte awarded uni merger contract', InDaily, 4 October 2023, updated 14 January 2025.

[69]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 11.

[70]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 30 and CHASS, Submission 48 (47thParliament), pp. 1–2.

[71]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 11.

[72]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 12.

[73]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 12. See also, Julie Hare, 'University boss got a $240k pay rise over three years', Australian Financial Review, 4 September 2025.

[74]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 2 (University governance concerns in relation to Victorian vice-chancellors and chancellors), p. 9.

[75]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 2 (University governance concerns in relation to Victorian vice-chancellors and chancellors), pp. 9 and 10.

[76]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 2 (University governance concerns in relation to Victorian vice-chancellors and chancellors), p. 12.

[77]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 2 (University governance concerns in relation to Victorian vice-chancellors and chancellors), pp. 5 and 6.

[78]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 2 (University governance concerns in relation to Victorian vice-chancellors and chancellors), p. 6.

[79]Dr Liz Allen, Private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 32 and Mr Millan Pintos‑Lopez, Private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 30. See also, Julie Hare, 'ANU council members say Bell's second job was never mentioned', Australian Financial Review, 20December 2024 and Julie Hare, 'No mention of Bell's Intel job in key ANU council meeting minutes', Australian Financial Review, 15 January 2025.

[80]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 2 (University governance concerns in relation to Victorian vice-chancellors and chancellors), pp. 9 and 10. See also, The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 30.

[81]University of Melbourne, Submission 53 (47th Parliament), p. 3.

[82]University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic), s. 11(4A).

[83]See, for example, Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 75 (47th Parliament), p. 5; Dr James Kite, Submission 252 (47th Parliament), p. 1; CAPA and NATSIPA, Submission 60 (47th Parliament), [p. 9].

[84]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), Appendix A (At the Crossroads: What is the post-COVID future of Australia's Public Universities?), p. 54.

[85]NTEU UQ Branch Committee, Submission 102 (47th Parliament), [p. 1]. See also, Dr Adam Lucas, Submission 182 (47th Parliament), p. 7; CAPA and NATSIPA, Submission 60 (47th Parliament), [p. 12].

[86]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 3 (The corporatisation of university governance in Australia), p. 2.

[87]Victoria University, Submission 26 (47th Parliament), p. 5.

[88]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), Appendix A (At the Crossroads: What is the post-COVID future of Australia's Public Universities?), p. 54.

[89]Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 75 (47th Parliament), p. 9 (citations omitted).

[90]National Union of Students (NUS), Submission 69 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[91]CAPA and NATSIPA, Submission 60 (47th Parliament), [p. 12].

[92]See, for example, NTEU UQ, Submission 102 (47th Parliament), [pp. 1–2]; Dr Shumi Akhtar, Submission 288 (47th Parliament), p. 9; Professor Hans Zoellner, Submission 296 (47th Parliament), p.29; Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5, [p. 2]; Dr Marija Taflaga, Dr Francis Markham, and Professor Keith Dowding, Submission 6, [p.1]; Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission75 (47th Parliament), p. 9; Mr Christian Flynn, Submission 12, [p. 3].

[93]Dr Terri MacDonald, Director, Public Policy and Strategic Research, NTEU, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 4.

[94]Dr Liz Allen, Private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 30.

[95]Professor Peter Tregear OAM, Submission 191 (47th Parliament), p. 3.

[96]NTEU UoW, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), p. 2.

[97]Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5, [pp. 2 and 3].

[98]Dr Mary Russell, Chief Executive Officer, TEQSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 March 2025, p.24.

[99]UCC, Submission 23 (47th Parliament), Appendix 2 (UCC Response to Australian Higher Education Accord Panel further questions), pp. 2–3.

[100]Mr William Burfoot, President, ANUSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 23.

[101]Deakin University, Submission 33 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[102]Distinguished Professor George Williams AO, Vice-Chancellor and President, WSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 2.

[103]Distinguished Professor George Williams AO, Vice-Chancellor and President, WSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, pp. 2 and 4.

[104]Professor Gerd Schröder-Turk, Submission 110 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[105]Mr William Burfoot, President, ANUSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 23.

[106]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 15.

[107]Mr William Burfoot, President, ANUSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 25.

[108]Dr Liz Allen, Private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 30.

[109]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 16.

[110]Dr Francis Markham, Private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 28.

[111]Mr William Burfoot, President, ANUSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 20.

[112]Professor Gerd Schröder-Turk, Submission 110 (47th Parliament), [p. 5]. See also, NTEU UoW, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), p. 2; NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p. 3]; NTEU UQ, Submission 102 (47th Parliament), [p. 2–3].

[113]Mr William Burfoot, President, ANUSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 21.

[114]Mr Weihong Liang, International Officer, CAPA, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 30.

[115]CAPA and NATSIPA, Submission 60 (47th Parliament), [p. 16].

[116]Department of Education, Submission 37 (47th Parliament), pp. 8 and 9.

[117]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 16.

[118]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 16.

[119]Professor Gerd Schröder-Turk, Submission 110 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[120]Dr Mathew Abbott, Union Member and Federation University Branch President, NTEU, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 March 2025, pp. 2–3.

[121]Mr Millan Pintos-Lopez, Private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 27.

[122]Mr Jonathan Churchill, Chief Operating Officer, ANU, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p.41.

[123]Professor Peter Tregear, Private capacity, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p.28. The review referred to is the Review about gender and culture matters at ANU former College of Health and Medicine by Professor Christine Nixon AO.

[124]Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5, [p. 1].

[125]UCC, Submission 23 (47th Parliament), Appendix 1 (A Code of Governance Principles and Practice for Australia’s Public Universities), [p. 1].

[126]UCC, Submission 23 (47th Parliament), [p. 2].

[127]UoW, Submission 42 (47th Parliament), p. 4.

[128]Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5, [p. 2].

[129]Mr William Burfoot, President, ANUSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p. 21.

[130]Ms Ashlyn Horton, National President, NUS, Proof Committee Hansard, 12August 2025, p. 22.

[131]CAPA and NATSIPA, Submission 60 (47th Parliament), [p. 19].

[132]Department of Education, Submission 37 (47th Parliament), pp. 8 and 9.

[133]See, for example, UoW NTEU, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), p. 4; Professor Brian Yates, Submission 20 (47th Parliament), p. 1; Public Universities Australia, Submission 71 (47th Parliament), p. 74; Professor Hans Zoellner, Submission 296 (47th Parliament), p. 40; Dr Shumi Akhtar, Submission 288 (47th Parliament), p. 2; Name Withheld, Submission 153 (47th Parliament), [p. 1]; Dr Tim Moore, Submission 104 (47th Parliament), p.5.

[134]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 23.

[135]NTEU Monash, Submission 117 (47th Parliament), p. 9.

[136]NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[137]Mr Christian Flynn, Submission 12, [p. 4].

[138]Public Universities Australia, Submission 71 (47th Parliament), p. 74. See also, Professor Hans Zoellner, Submission 296 (47th Parliament), p. 40.

[139]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 23.

[140]Professor Brian Yates, Submission 20 (47th Parliament), p. 1.

[141]Dr Tim Moore, Submission 104 (47th Parliament), p.5.

[142]See, for example, NTEU UoW, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), p. 6; NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p. 2]; Name Withheld, Submission 278 (47th Parliament), [p. 3]; The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), Appendix A (Australian public universities are now spending millions on consultants), p. 3.

[143]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 27 and Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 9 (47th Parliament), p. 9.

[144]Distinguished Professor George Williams, AO, Vice-Chancellor and President, WSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 8.

[145]Professor Andrew Parfitt, Vice-Chancellor and President, UTS, Proof Committee Hansard, 8September 2025, p. 26.

[146]Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 9 (47th Parliament), p. 9.

[147]Dr Tim Moore, Submission 104 (47th Parliament), p.5.

[148]Mr Simon Walker, Submission 112 (47th Parliament), [p. 17].

[149]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), pp. 27 and 28.

[150]UoW NTEU, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), pp. 4 and 5.

[151]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 9 and Name Withheld, Submission 298 (47th Parliament), p.7.

[152]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 9.

[153]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 30.

[154]See, for example, Professor Brian Yates, Submission 20 (47th Parliament), p. 1; Professor Hans Zoellner, Submission 296 (47th Parliament), p. 39; Stretton Health Equity, Submission 30 (47th Parliament), [p. 3]; Australian Council of Deans of Science, Submission 46 (47thParliament) p. 1; Public Universities Australia, Submission 71 (47th Parliament), pp. 15–16.

[155]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 3 (The corporatisation of university governance in Australia), p. 2.

[156]Curtin Student Guild, Submission 80 (47th Parliament), p. 4.

[157]UoW NTEU, Submission 78 (47th Parliament), p. 4.

[158]See, for example, Mr William Burfoot, President, ANUSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, p.23; The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), pp. 21–22; Dr James Kite, Submission 252 (47th Parliament), [p. 1]; Dr Bede Harris, Submission 10 (47th Parliament), p. 4; NTEU, Submission 15, (47th Parliament), p. 9; Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 75, p. 9.

[159]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), p. 2.

[160]Professor Lionel Page, Submission 103 (47th Parliament), p. 14. See also, Name Withheld, Submission 298 (47th Parliament), p. 10.

[161]Mr Jesse Gardner-Russell, National President, CAPA, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p.35; Professor Peter Tregear, Submission 191 (47th Parliament), p. 5; Dr Bede Harris, Submission 10 (47th Parliament), p. 4; Professor Nicholas Biddle, Submission 14, [p. 6]

[162]Professor Gerd Schröder-Turk, Submission 110 (47th Parliament), [p. 6].

[163]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 9.

[164]NTEU UTS, Submission 92 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[165]Professor Corinne Cortese, Submission 75 (47th Parliament), p. 9.

[166]NUS, Submission 69 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[167]SECS Project, Submission 28 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[168]Mr Richard Lee, National Vice-President, CAPA, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p.29.

[169]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 3 (The corporatisation of university governance in Australia), p. 2.

[170]Professor Jennifer Westacott AC, Chancellor, WSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p.9.

[171]Professor Jennifer Westacott AC, Chancellor, WSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p.8.

[172]Department of Education, Submission 37 (47th Parliament), p. 8.

[173]See, for example, Australian Multicultural Action Network, Submission 1, [p. 3]; Ms Ashlyn Horton, National President, NUS, Proof Committee Hansard, 12August 2025, p. 22; NTEU, Submission 15, (47th Parliament), p. 5; SECS Project, Submission 28 (47thParliament) [pp. 2–4].

[174]SECS Project, Submission 28 (47th Parliament), [pp. 3–4].

[175]NUS, Submission 69 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[176]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 10.

[177]CAPA and NATSIPA, Submission 60 (47th Parliament), [p. 18].

[178]Mr Weihong Liang, International Officer, CAPA, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p.30.

[179]Department of Education, Submission 37 (47th Parliament), p. 9.

[180]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), p. 10.

[181]NUS, Submission 69 (47th Parliament), [p. 3].

[182]Mr Richard Lee, National Vice-President, CAPA, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, p. 31.

[183]CAPA and NATSIPA, Submission 60 (47th Parliament), [p. 19].